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T H I S DOCUMENT I S T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY-S GOVERNMENT Printed
for the War Cabinet.
May 1940. Copy N o .
SECRET.
^ *j
W . M . (40)
148th Conclusions.
TO B E K E P T
UNDER
LOCK
AND KEY.
I t is requested t h a t special c a r e m a y be t a k e n to
e n s u r e the secrecy of t h i s document.
WAR
CONCLUSIONS
CABINET
148 (40).
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing
S.W. 1, on Thursday,
May 30, 1940, at 5-30 P . M .
Street,
Present : T h e R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the Chair). T h e R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E C H A M B E R L A I N , T h e R i g h t H o n . C. R . A T T L E E , M . P . ,
L o r d P r i v y Seal.
M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The R i g h t H o n . VISCOUNT HALIFAX,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
The R i g h t Hon. A . GREENWOOD, M.P.,
Minister without Portfolio.
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t :
The R i g h t H o n . A . V . A L E X A N D E R ,
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.,
Secretary of S t a t e for W a r .
The
ARCHIBALD
S e c r e t a r y of
The R i g h t H o n . S i r J O H N ANDERSON,
M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r t h e
H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of
Home Security
T h e R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T CALDECOTE,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r D o m i n i o n
Affairs.
The R i g h t H o n . A . D U F F COOPER, M . P . ,
The Right H o n . MALCOLM MACDONALD,
M . P . , M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h (Item 11).
Mr.
The
A i r Chief M a r s h a l Sir C Y R I L L. N . N E W A L L , C h i e f of t h e A i r Staff. Right
SINCLAIR,
Hon.
Bt.,
Sir
M.P.,
S t a t e for A i r .
Hon.
Sir
ALEXANDER
CADOGAN,
P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for F o r e i g n Affairs. A d m i r a l of t h e F l e e t S i r D U D L E Y
P O U N D , F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d Chief of
N a v a l Staff. M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n .
R.
H.
CROSS, M.P.,
Minister
of
S h i p p i n g (Item 9).
General Sir J O H N D I L L , Chief
I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff. Secretariat.
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Major-General H . L. ISMAY.
Lieutenant-Colonel V . DYKES,
Group Captain W . ELLIOT.
Mr. E . P . DONALDSON.
M r . G. N . F L E M M I N G .
RE.
of
the
WAR
CABINET
148 ( 4 0 ) .
CONTENTS.
Minute
No.
1
Subject.
Page
311
The W e s t e r n F r o n t
Withdrawal of the B.E.F. from France.
Situation at Dunkirk.
2
The A i r S i t u a t i o n
3
France
...
,
311
312
Communications with the French Government.
4
U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a
...
...
...
...
...
312
Message from President Roosevelt to His Majesty The King.
5
Italy
312
Suggested direct approach to Signor Mussolini.
6
Italy
313
Probable intentions.
7
Italy
313
Action against Italians in the United Kingdom.
8
Seizure of C r e t e in the event of I t a l i a n hostilities ...
9
Norway
...
313
314
10
I n v a s i o n of G r e a t B r i t a i n
...
11
E v a c u a t i o n of school c h i l d r e n
...
...
...
...
314
...
...
...
...
316
9
The Western
Front.
Withdrawal of
the B.E.F. from
France.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 147th
Conclusions,
Minute 1.)
1. The Prime Minister
said t h a t h e h a d received conflicting
accounts of t h e n u m b e r s of the B r i t i s h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force who h a d
been evacuated. T h e W a r Office figure of the numbers evacuated to
Dover, R a m s g a t e , M a r g a t e a n d H a r w i c h since the 2 0 t h M a y w e r e
as follows :—
92,642
B r i t i s h fit
British wounded
8,152
Allies
4,447
T o t a l ...
105,241
T h e A d m i r a l t y h a d given a figure of 86,000.
L a t e r in the M e e t i n g the First Lord of the Admiralty
said t h a t
the A d m i r a l t y figure for the n u m b e r l a n d e d a t all t h e p o r t s u p to
12 noon t h a t d a y w a s 101,154.
The Prime
Minister
asked t h a t t h e W a r Office a n d t h e
A d m i r a l t y should, in f u t u r e , collaborate in c o m p u t i n g the n u m b e r s
of B r i t i s h a n d other troops e v a c u a t e d from F r a n c e , w i t h a view to
s u b m i t t i n g a n a g r e e d r e p o r t to the W a r C a b i n e t .
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r r e a d a r e p o r t from D u n k i r k s t a t i n g t h a t
a s h i p h a d been s u n k there t h a t a f t e r n o o n u n d e r conditions w h i c h
suggested t h a t i t m i g h t be difficult to c o n t i n u e to use the h a r b o u r ;
t h a t fog w a s seriously i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h the e v a c u a t i o n ; a n d t h a t
p r o g r e s s w a s being delayed by the w i t h d r a w a l of the more m o d e r n
destroyers.
The Chief of Naval Staff said t h a t he h a d no knowledge of t h i s
r e p o r t a n d t h a t every available destroyer w a s being used.
L a t e r in t h e M e e t i n g the Minister
of Information
r e a d to t h e
W a r C a b i n e t a d r a f t c o m m u n i q u e as to t h e o p e r a t i o n of w i t h d r a w a l
from F r a n c e a n d as to the very successful a i r fighting on the p r e v i o u s
d a y (see M i n u t e 2).
Situation at
Dunkirk.
The Secretary of State for War said t h a t L o r d G o r t h a d been
placed i n a difficult p o s i t i o n o w i n g to the fact t h a t t h e senior
F r e n c h officers at D u n k i r k h a d received no o r d e r s a t all about
evacuation. I f t h e F r e n c h received clear o r d e r s to evacuate as m a n y
of t h e t r o o p s as possible, t h e B r i t i s h could t h i n out the t r o o p s
h o l d i n g the p e r i m e t e r , b u t i n p r e s e n t circumstances L o r d G o r t felt
compelled to r e t a i n local reserves for c o u n t e r - a t t a c k in order n o t
to let the F r e n c h down. T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e suggested t h a t a
t e l e g r a m should be sent by the P r i m e M i n i s t e r to M. R e y n a u d a s k i n g
for the F r e n c h a c t i o n to be c o - o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h a t of the B r i t i s h .
H e read t h e t e r m s of the proposed t e l e g r a m to the W a r C a b i n e t .
A f t e r discussion, the W a r C a b i n e t —
(1) A u t h o r i s e d the Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff to
d e s p a t c h to G e n e r a l W e y g a n d a t e l e g r a m in t h e above
sense.*
(2) A p p r o v e d the t e r m s of a n official s t a t e m e n t to be m a d e to
the P r e s s by t h e M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n a n n o u n c i n g
t h a t e v a c u a t i o n was in p r o g r e s s , a n d g i v i n g some
d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h were t a k i n g place.
The Air
Situation.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 146th
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
2. The Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t d u r i n g the o p e r a t i o n s
on the previous d a y t h e R o y a l A i r F o r c e h a d definitely accounted
for 76 enemy a i r c r a f t in F r a n c e a n d N o r w a y . T h e t r u e figure
probably a m o u n t e d to more. T h r e e of these h a d been shot down in
N o r w a y a n d t h e r e m a i n d e r over D u n k i r k . A g a i n s t this, o u r t o t a l
losses h a d a m o u n t e d to 30. T h i s figure included 16 F i g h t e r s a n d
3 o u t of 15 heavy Bombers w h i c h h a d been c a u g h t by fog on
* Copy attached to these Conclusions.
o
n
i? ^
r e t u r n i n g from o p e r a t i o n s on t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t . T h e crews of these
h a d been saved by j u m p i n g w i t h p a r a c h u t e s . T h e r e m a i n i n g losses
h a d been a m o n g a i r c r a f t belonging to t h e Fleet A i r A r m a n d A i r
Component. B o m b i n g o p e r a t i o n s on t h e previous d a y h a d been
directed m a i n l y on enemy r o a d movements south of t h e B r i t i s h
E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force.
T h e a i r o p e r a t i o n s in p r o g r e s s t h a t d a y were b e i n g h a m p e r e d
by fog a n d low cloud; nevertheless, 47 bombers were a t t h a t moment
o u t on v a r i o u s missions. T h e b a d flying w e a t h e r over F r a n c e w a s in
our favour in t y i n g the enemy to the g r o u n d a n d p r e v e n t i n g h i m
from bombing the beaches from w h i c h t h e B r i t i s h E x p e d i t i o n a r y
Force w a s e v a c u a t i n g . So far, only one enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been
r e p o r t e d t h a t day over D u n k i r k .
The W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above s t a t e m e n t .
France.
3 . T h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d before them the following infor­
m a t i o n :—
Communica­
tions with the
(a) A t e l e g r a m from the S w a y n e M i s s i o n to t h e W a r Office in
French
r e g a r d to the p o s i t i o n on t h e Oise C a n a l .
Government.
(b) R e p o r t s to t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r from G e n e r a l S p e a r s as to
(Previous
t h e position of the F r e n c h A r m y a n d F r e n c h r e q u e s t s for
Reference:
assistance.
W.M. (40) 147th
Discussion ensued as to t h e e x t e n t of the help w h i c h w e could
Conclusions,
afford to the F r e n c h a t the p r e s e n t j u n c t u r e . D e t a i l s of t h i s
Minute 2.)
discussion a r e recorded in the S e c r e t a r y ' s S t a n d a r d F i l e of W a r
C a b i n e t Conclusions.
The W a r C a b i n e t ­
(1) A g r e e d t h a t the P r i m e M i n i s t e r a n d the L o r d P r i v y Seal,
a c c o m p a n i e d by the Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff,
should proceed to F r a n c e on t h e following day.
(2) Gave g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l to t h e l i n e w h i c h the P r i m e M i n i s t e r
proposed to t a k e i n h i s discussions w i t h t h e F r e n c h
Government.
United States of
America.
Message from
President
Roosevelt to His
Majesty The
4. The Permanent
Under-Secretary
of State for
Foreign
Affairs i n f o r m e d t h e W a r C a b i n e t t h a t he h a d j u s t h e a r d t h a t the
U n i t e d S t a t e s A m b a s s a d o r h a d asked for a n a u d i e n c e w i t h H i s
M a j e s t y T h e K i n g m o r d e r t o p r e s e n t a message from P r e s i d e n t
Roosevelt. H e knew n o t h i n g as to the n a t u r e of the message.
C a b i n e t took note of t h i s s t a t e m e n t .
T
h
e
W
a
r
King.
Italy.
Suggested direct
approach to
Signor
Mussolini.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 146th
Conclusions,
Minute 12.)
5, The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
s a i d t h a t he
h a d j u s t received a telephone message from Flis M a j e s t y ' s
A m b a s s a d o r in P a r i s to t h e effect t h a t M . D a l a d i e r h a d a g a i n r a i s e d
the question of m a k i n g a d i r e c t c o m m u n i c a t i o n to S i g n o r Mussolini,
a n d h a d h a n d e d h i m a document s e t t i n g out the lines on w h i c h he
proposed to m a k e such a n a p p r o a c h . S i r R o n a l d C a m p b e l l h a d done
his best to d i s s u a d e M . D a l a d i e r , b u t t h e l a t t e r h a d only r e t u r n e d to
the c h a r g e .
T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y suggested t h a t i t w a s useless to a t t e m p t
to r e s t r a i n t h e F r e n c h any longer from m a k i n g the proposed
a p p r o a c h , b u t t h a t w e m u s t m a k e it q u i t e clear t h a t they should not
commit us by a n y t h i n g w h i c h they s a i d to Signor M u s s o l i n i .
T h e W a r C a b i n e t a p p r o v e d t h e line of action proposed by
t h e F o r e i g n Secretary.
Italy.
Probable
intentions.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 146th
Conclusions,
Minute 10.)
6. The Secretary
of State for Foreign
Affairs
d r e w the
a t t e n t i o n of t h e W a r C a b i n e t to t e l e g r a m No. 15 (Saving), d a t e d the
2 8 t h May, from H i s M a j e s t y ' s A m b a s s a d o r a t Lisbon r e p o r t i n g t h a t
D r . S a l a z a r w a s s a i d to h a v e expressed the belief t h a t I t a l y would
n o t e n t e r the w a r .
Italy.
Action against
Italians in the
United
Kingdom.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 146th
Conclusions,
Minute 11.)
7. The Home Secretary
s a i d t h a t the n u m b e r of d e s p e r a t e
c h a r a c t e r s whom he would wish to i n t e r n w a s 1,500 I t a l i a n s , p l u s
300 B r i t i s h subjects connected w i t h I t a l i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h i s
country.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of this statement.
The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
said t h a t C o u n t
C i a n o h a d r a i s e d w i t h S i r P e r c y L o r a i n e the question of e v a c u a t i n g
B r i t i s h subjects from I t a l y . T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y suggested t h a t ,
as soon as t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t h a d replied to the communication
w h i c h we h a d m a d e to t h e m on t h e previous day, S i r P e r c y L o r a i n e
should say to C o u n t C i a n o t h a t we a p p r e c i a t e d the fact t h a t he
w a s p l a c i n g no obstacle in the w a y of B r i t i s h subjects leaving I t a l y ;
t h a t w e should like to act reciprocally a n d f a c i l i t a t e t h e d e p a r t u r e
of I t a l i a n s i n t h i s c o u n t r y ; t h a t t h e first shipload would be leaving
shortly, a n d t h a t we should be g l a d to know to which p o r t i t should
be directed. H e (the F o r e i g n Secretary) would be glad if the
A d m i r a l t y would a t once have a ship p r e p a r e d for t h i s purpose,
so t h a t as soon as we h a d h e a r d from t h e F r e n c h Government t h e
scheme could be p u t in motion, if so decided.
T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y a d d e d t h a t we m i g h t continue in the
p r e s e n t position vis-a-vis
I t a l y for some f u r t h e r t i m e ; w a s it
necessary t h a t these 1,800 men should be seized at once ?
The Home Secretary
said t h a t he h a d no objection to some
f u r t h e r delay, p r o v i d e d t h a t there was no leakage of our intentions.
H e assumed t h a t t h e communication m a d e to t h e F r e n c h h a d dealt
w i t h the m a t t e r on the basis of a r e t u r n of t h e I t a l i a n s to t h e i r
c o u n t r y on h u m a n i t a r i a n g r o u n d s .
The Foreign Secretary
m a d e on these lines.
confirmed t h a t o u r a p p r o a c h h a d been
T h e W a r C a b i n e t a g r e e d —
(i) T h a t no f u r t h e r action should be t a k e n in r e g a r d to the
i n t e r n m e n t of I t a l i a n s u n t i l a reply h a d been received
from t h e F r e n c h Government, but t h a t the l a t t e r should
be asked to e x p e d i t e t h e i r reply,
(ii) T h a t in t h e m e a n t i m e the F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y
should a r r a n g e for a suitable ship to be m a d e available,
in w h i c h these 1,500 I t a l i a n s could be deported as soon
as p r a c t i c a b l e a f t e r they h a d been seized,
(iii) T h a t the F o r e i g n Secretary a n d t h e H o m e Secretary, in
consultation, should review from d a y to day the question
w h e t h e r these 1,500 I t a l i a n s plus t h e 300 B r i t i s h subjects
connected w i t h I t a l i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s in this c o u n t r y
should be seized.
Seizure of Crete
in the Event of
Italian
Hostilities.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 126th
Conclusions,
Minute 7.)
8. T h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d before them a R e p o r t by the Chiefs
of Staff ( W . P . (40) 175) s e t t i n g out t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h h a d
been concerted w i t h the F r e n c h for t h e seizure of Crete in the
event of a n I t a l i a n a t t a c k on Greek t e r r i t o r y .
The Chief of the Air Staff said t h a t the Allied forces would
t a k e about 48 h o u r s on t h e voyage. T h e s h i p s would sail on t h e
o r d e r s of local Commanders, w i t h o u t f u r t h e r reference to t h e i r home
Governments, a n d a r r a n g e m e n t s h a d been m a d e to give t h e
C o m m a n d e r s a s early i n f o r m a t i o n as possible of a n I t a l i a n a t t a c k .
T h e p l a n would not be set i n motion unless t h e I t a l i a n s a t t e m p t e d
a n a t t a c k on Greek soil. T h e Greeks w o u l d not be i n f o r m e d of our
i n t e n t i o n to occupy C r e t e u n t i l t h e o r d e r for the d e s p a t c h of the
e x p e d i t i o n h a d been issued. I t m i g h t be difficult to hold Crete
indefinitely, w i t h the forces proposed, u n d e r heavy a i r a t t a c k from
t h e Dodecanese, but by d i s p e r s i n g the t r o o p s to give t h e m protection
a g a i n s t such a t t a c k i t would probably be possible to deny t h e use
of the aerodrome to t h e I t a l i a n s . I n t h e last resort t h e aerodrome
could be m i n e d w i t h delay a c t i o n mines, before t h e forces were
evacuated.
The War C a b i n e t A p p r o v e d t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s m a d e for t h e d e s p a t c h of a n
A l l i e d force to seize C r e t e in t h e event of a n I t a l i a n a t t a c k
on Greek t e r r i t o r y , as set out in P a p e r No. W . P . (40) 175.
Norway.
(Previous
Eef erence:
W.M. (40) 146th
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
Invasion of
Great Britain.
9. T h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n a M e m o r a n d u m
by the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs in r e g a r d to o p e r a t i o n s
in Norway.
A record of the discussion, a n d of t h e conclusions reached,
is recorded in t h e S e c r e t a r y ' s S t a n d a r d F i l e of W a r
Cabinet Conclusions.
T
10. T h e W ar C a b i n e t h a d before t h e m a R e p o r t by the Chiefs
of Staff ( W . P . (40) 178).
(Previous
The Chief of the A ir Staff said t h a t , in view of recent r e p o r t s
Reference:
of t h e possibility of a sea-borne r a i d on a l a r g e scale by a fleet of
W.M. (40) 147th
f a s t motor boats, combined w i t h air-borne r a i d s , t h e Chiefs of Staff
Conclusions,
felt t h a t the Avhole c o u n t r y should be w a r n e d a n d roused to the
Minute 3.)
i m m i n e n t d a n g e r w h i c h confronted u s . H e d r e w a t t e n t i o n to t h e
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of the C h i e f s of Staff c o n t a i n e d i n p a r a g r a p h 12
of t h e P a p e r , (b) a n d (c) h a d a l r e a d y been p u t to t h e C o m m a n d e r ­
in-Chief, a n d he w a s a c t i n g accordingly. A s r e g a r d s (d), a d d i t i o n a l
labour for beach defences w o u l d be r e q u i r e d on a l a r g e scale. T h e
l e n g t h of coast to be covered w a s very considerable.
The Lord President
of the Council said t h a t he w a s h o l d i n g a
m e e t i n g of the M i n i s t e r s concerned on t h e following m o r n i n g to deal
w i t h t h e question of r o u s i n g t h e country. A s for t h e provision of
a d d i t i o n a l labour, t h e M i n i s t e r of L a b o u r h a d i n f o r m e d h i m t h a t
D i v i s i o n a l Controllers h a d a l r e a d y been i n s t r u c t e d to p r e p a r e t h e
labour exchanges to s u p p l y w h a t e v e r w a s r e q u i r e d , b u t the d e t a i l s
of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e W a r Office h a d not yet been received.
T h e M i n i s t e r w a s p r e p a r e d to use compulsory powers to obtain
t h e labour necessary. T h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t said t h a t he h a d l a t e r
consulted t h e Commander-in-Chief,
H o m e Forces, who fully
c o n c u r r e d in the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of the Chiefs of Staff. H e h a d
o r d e r e d C o m m a n d s to proceed immediately w i t h defence w o r k s on
t h e beaches, a n d to p u t local C o m m a n d e r s in touch w i t h t h e labour
e x c h a n g e s to o b t a i n the men they r e q u i r e d .
Discussion ensued as to t h e possibility of different methods of
a t t e m p t e d invasion.
The Chief of Naval Staff s a i d t h a t t h e r e h a d been definite signs
of G e r m a n activity on the N o r w e g i a n coast. T h e r e w e r e also
i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t motor-boats h a d been collected a t B r e m e n a n d
Hamburg.
M e a n w h i l e , the G e r m a n s were k n o w n to have a n
o r g a n i s e d force of ships a t V i g o . T h e dispositions to deal w i t h t h i s
l a t t e r t h r e a t were described. I t m i g h t also be significant t h a t t h e
G e r m a n s h a d left one p a r t i c u l a r s t r e t c h opposite o u r coast clear
of mines. T h e p o s i t i o n in t h i s m a t t e r h a d been b r o u g h t to t h e
notice of t h e Commander-in-Chief, H o m e Forces. I t w a s hoped
t h a t t h e p r o d u c t i o n of a n t i - t a n k mines for l a y i n g on beaches would
s t a r t in a w e e k ' s t i m e .
The Prime Minister
d o u b t e d w h e t h e r a r a i d on a l a r g e scale
could be c a r r i e d o u t by f a s t motor-boats. These c r a f t w o u l d have
to come over in flotillas, if t h e y w e r e to p u t ashore a n y useful
n u m b e r of men a t a n y one p o i n t . T h e Navy would have to m a k e
every e n d e a v o u r to i n t e r c e p t such r a i d s on the h i g h seas.
The First Sea Lord said t h a t s u b m a r i n e a n d t r a w l e r p a t r o l s
were being m a i n t a i n e d to get i n f o r m a t i o n of such r a i d s , b u t o w i n g
to t h e speed of t h e boats a n d the f a c t t h a t they m i g h t effect t h e
crossing in d a r k n e s s , t h e N a v y could n o t g u a r a n t e e t h a t destroyer
p a t r o l s w o u l d be able to i n t e r c e p t t h e m before they reached the
shores of t h i s country. A single cruiser finding them m i g h t sink
some of t h e boats, b u t some w o u l d probably get t h r o u g h .
I n the discussion w h i c h followed the p r i n c i p a l p o i n t s m a d e
were : —
(i) T h e r e w a s some doubt as to t h e precise n u m b e r s of motor
b o a t s w h i c h t h e G e r m a n s possessed, b u t they could be
f a i r l y quickly constructed. They would be fitted w i t h
t h e a e r o p l a n e t y p e of engine,
(ii) T h e w a k e w h i c h l a r g e fast c r a f t would leave should be
visible to a i r reconnaissance, b u t experience h a d shown
t h a t it w a s by n o m e a n s easy to keep t r a c k of t h e G e r m a n
m o t o r t o r p e d o boats w h i c h h a d been o p e r a t i n g recently
off the C h a n n e l p o r t s .
(iii) These c r a f t could be r e a d i l y disguised a g a i n s t a i r
reconnaissance as b a r g e s . Even if suspicious concen­
t r a t i o n s were observed in t h e G e r m a n or D u t c h h a r b o u r s ,
it w o u l d be difficult to t a k e effective action a g a i n s t t h e m
by n i g h t bombing.
(iv) T h e coast w a t c h i n g service h a d been g r e a t l y s t r e n g t h e n e d
recently, a n d c o n s t a n t w a t c h w a s being m a i n t a i n e d .
Small b o a t p a t r o l s along the coasts h a d been i n s t i t u t e d .
The Prime Minister
t h o u g h t t h a t we should not h e s i t a t e to
c o n t a m i n a t e o u r beaches w i t h g a s if t h i s course would be to our
a d v a n t a g e . W e h a d the r i g h t to do w h a t we liked w i t h our own
territory.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t : ­
(i) A p p r o v e d the R e p o r t by the Chiefs of Staff ( W . P . (40)
178).
(ii) Took note :—
(a) t h a t t h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the Council h a d a l r e a d y
t a k e n i n h a n d the necessary measures to w a r n
a n d rouse t h e c o u n t r y to the i m m i n e n t d a n g e r of
invasion;
(b) t h a t the C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , H o m e Forces, w a s
o r d e r i n g t h e A r m y a t home to a h i g h degree of
alertness, p a r t i c u l a r l y
at night,
and
was
r e v i e w i n g h i s dispositions i n the l i g h t of the n e w
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p u t f o r w a r d in the Chiefs of Staff
Report;
(c) t h a t the M i n i s t r y of L a b o u r h a d m a d e all a r r a n g e ­
ments to s u p p l y t h e necessary labour for beach
defences, a n d t h a t t h e local m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s
h a d been i n s t r u c t e d to get in touch w i t h the
employment exchanges in order to obtain t h e i r
requirements.
(iii) I n v i t e d the F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y t o r e p o r t to t h e
W a r C a b i n e t t h e n a v a l m e a s u r e s i n h a n d (including the
l a y i n g of minefields) to p r e v e n t a possible l a n d i n g on
t h e E a s t Coast.
Evacuation of
School
Children.
(Previous
Eef erences:
W.M. (40) 138th
Conclusions,
Minute 10, and
W.M. (39) 121st
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
11. The Home Secretary recalled t h a t i t h a d been decided to
s t a r t the evacuation of school c h i l d r e n a n d p r i o r i t y classes from
nineteen p o r t s on the E a s t Coast a n d S o u t h Coast of E n g l a n d on
S u n d a y . C o n s i d e r a t i o n w a s now b e i n g given to t h e e v a c u a t i o n of
school c h i l d r e n from L o n d o n a n d o t h e r e v a c u a t i o n a r e a s .
The
M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h w a s due to b r o a d c a s t t h a t evening i n v i t i n g
p a r e n t s to r e g i s t e r t h e i r children before M o n d a y , the 3 r d J u n e .
T h e i n d u c e m e n t to be held out to p a r e n t s to r e g i s t e r t h e i r c h i l d r e n
w a s t h a t i t m i g h t be necessary to s t a r t e v a c u a t i o n i n t h e following
week, a n d t h a t those registered by t h e 3 r d J u n e would go first.
T h e question arose w h e t h e r t h i s d r i v e should proceed or
whether, if invasion w a s r e g a r d e d as a possibility in the n e a r
f u t u r e , it would be better to o r d e r t h e e v a c u a t i o n of a p r o p o r t i o n
of the i n h a b i t a n t s of the E a s t Coast towns. T h e a r g u m e n t for the
l a t t e r course w a s t h a t , if the i n h a b i t a n t s of these towns r e m a i n e d
w h e r e they were, or d i d not move u n t i l t h e c o u n t r y w a s invaded,
they m i g h t well i n t e r f e r e w i t h m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . I t would not
be possible to proceed w i t h both schemes simultaneously.
The Minister
of Health pointed out t h a t h i t h e r t o the policy
h a d been not to s t a r t e v a c u a t i o n from L o n d o n u n t i l bombing h a d
actually been experienced, b u t i n view of t h e more recent develop­
m e n t s i t m i g h t be necessary to reconsider t h i s . H e himself w a s in
favour of a movement from London, & c , to W e s t C o u n t r y a r e a s on
account of the length of t i m e r e q u i r e d to move t h e l a r g e n u m b e r s
involved.
The Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t t h e Chiefs of Staff were
definitely of opinion t h a t the E a s t Coast e v a c u a t i o n should be given
p r i o r i t y over L o n d o n evacuation.
The Lord President of the Council t h o u g h t t h a t , as L o n d o n was
well defended, a n d experience of G e r m a n m e t h o d s on t h e C o n t i n e n t
showed t h a t t h e enemy p r e f e r r e d to a t t a c k small towns a n d villages
r a t h e r t h a n l a r g e cities, it w a s p r e f e r a b l e to avoid by evacuation
the serious m i l i t a r y difficulties t h a t m i g h t be e n t a i l e d if t h e E a s t
Coast w e r e invaded. On the Other h a n d , the r e g i s t r a t i o n of children
i n L o n d o n a n d other evacuation a r e a s i n no w a y committed the
G o v e r n m e n t to proceed w i t h t h e evacuation of children so registered
on a n y given d a t e .
The W a r C a b i n e t : —
A u t h o r i s e d the H o m e S e c r e t a r y a n d the M i n i s t e r of
H e a l t h to proceed w i t h the e x i s t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s ,
i n c l u d i n g the b r o a d c a s t a p p e a l for the r e g i s t r a t i o n of
school children in L o n d o n a n d other e v a c u a t i o n areas, on
the u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t these a r r a n g e m e n t s in no way
p r e j u d i c e d the decision as to t h e d a t e on w h i c h the
children now registered should be evacuated, or as to the
p r i o r i t y between e v a c u a t i o n of c h i l d r e n from L o n d o n , & c ,
a n d evacuation of the " u s e l e s s m o u t h s " from c e r t a i n
E a s t Coast towns.
Richmond
Terrace, S.W.
May 30, 1940. 1, ANNEX.
Telegram,
from
the Chief
of the Imperial
General
(see Minute 1).
Staff
to General
Weygand
O R D E R S h a v e been sent to L o r d G o r t t h a t he is to continue to hold h i s
p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n as long as possible i n o r d e r to cover t h e m a x i m u m e v a c u a t i o n
of A l l i e d troops. I t is clear t h a t t h e position a t D u n k i r k c a n n o t be held
indefinitely o w i n g , p r i n c i p a l l y , to t h e difficulty of k e e p i n g the forces t h e r e
s u p p l i e d w i t h food, w a t e r a n d m u n i t i o n s . P o l i c y m u s t therefore be to e v a c u a t e
a n d o r d e r s t o t h i s effect have been given to L o r d G o r t . I should be g l a d if
you would give s i m i l a r o r d e r s to t h e Senior F r e n c h C o m m a n d e r i n the D u n k i r k
region so t h a t h e a n d L o r d G o r t m a y be able to act in complete concord. I a m
sending a copy of t h i s message to L o r d G o r t .