(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:CAB/24/264
Image Reference:0002
THIS DOCUMENT IS T H E PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
Printed
for the Cabinet.
August
GOVERNMENT
1936.
SECRET.
Copy No.
C P . 234 (36).
CABINET.
WESTERN
MEDITERRANEAN: SITUATION ARISING
SPANISH CIVIL WAR.
FROM
THE
N O T E BY THE ACTING SECRETARY.
T H E accompanying Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, which has
not yet been considered by the Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence, is circulated to
the Cabinet a t the request of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
(Signed)
2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1,
August 31, 1936.
[13728]
R. B. H O W O R T H ,
Acting Secretary to the Cabinet.
^
Printed
for the Committee
of Imperial
Defence.
August
1936.
SECRET.
125&-B.
(Also Paper No. CCS.
509.)
COMMITTEE OF I M P E R I A L
WESTERN
DEFENCE.
MEDITERRANEAN: SITUATION ARISING
SPANISH CIVIL WAR.
FROM
THE
Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee.
I N accordance w i t h the request contained in the letter from the Foreign
Office which is attached as Annex I to this Report, we have h a d u n d e r eonsidera­
tion the extent to which B r i t i s h interests would be affected and w h a t action H i s
Majesty's Government might take in the event of I t a l y t a k i n g some action which
might upset the existing balance in the W e s t e r n Mediterranean.
British interests in the Western
Mediterranean.
2. The chief B r i t i s h interest in the Western M e d i t e r r a n e a n is the safety
of our t r a d e and of our sea and a i r communications which pass t h r o u g h t h e
S t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r a n d close along the southern shore of Spain.
F o r the
purpose of m a i n t a i n i n g the required degree of security in this area, as well as
for the protection of our sea communications with South America a n d the Cape,
it is essential t h a t G i b r a l t a r should continue to be available to us as a secure naval
base. I n addition, it is hoped to establish in the comparatively near future
an a i r base a t G i b r a l t a r which will be a key station in the " all red " air routes
from U n i t e d Kingdom both to the F a r E a s t and to the Cape. Even if t h e air
route t h r o u g h the M e d i t e r r a n e a n were to be closed to us through the loss or
destruction of air facilities at Malta, the Gibraltar air base would still be
essential for the use of the alternative air route via the west coast of Africa.
3. For 150 miles east of G i b r a l t a r both shores of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n are
Spanish, and are no more t h a n one h u n d r e d miles a p a r t at any point. I n a w a r
w i t h a E u r o p e a n Power it would, therefore, be essential to our interests t h a t
S p a i n should be friendly, or at worst, strictly neutral. A hostile S p a i n or the
occupation of Spanish territory by a hostile Power would make our control of the
S t r a i t s and use of Gibraltar as a naval and air base extremely difficult, if not
impossible, and would thus imperil I m p e r i a l communications by way of the
Mediterranean.
Similarly, a p a r t from the situation in the Western Mediterranean itself,
the possession by a hostile Power of harbours on the A t l a n t i c seaboard in S p a n i s h
territory would imperil our communications by way of the A t l a n t i c .
4. Our position at G i b r a l t a r has for many years been based on a continuation
of friendly relations with Spain. A p a r t from the risk of any foreign interven­
tion, should a Government inimical to Britain, whether Fascist or Communist,
emerge from the present struggle, the question of the security of our base a t
Gibraltar will require serious examination.
[13696]
B
5.
as—
Our interests in the present Spanish crisis may therefore be summarised
'
' '-\.
fV/
'
.
'
' '
.
-'- ^.
r
'/V^
'--''
(a) the maintenance of the Territorial integrity of Spain and her possessions
(Balearics, Morocco, Canaries and Rio de Oro);
(5) the maintenance of such felations with any Spanish Government t h a t
may emerge from this conflict as will ensure benevolent neutrality in
the event of our being engaged in any European war.
Italy
and the Morocco Treaty
position:
6. The Treaty position as regards fortifications and cession of territory
in Morocco, so far as we have been able to assess it is explained in A n n e x I I .
The effect of existing conventions seems to be briefly as follows :
(1) France, Spain and ourselves are all bound to prevent the erection of
fortifications, & o , on the Spanish-Moroccan coast bordering on t h e
Mediterranean w i t h the exception of certain ports and islands which
are under full Spanish sovereignty.
(2) W i t h the same exceptions, Spain is under an obligation not to cede any
of her r i g h t s in her sphere of influence in Morocco to another Power.
P O S S I B L E COURSES OF A C T I O N BY ITALY.
7. I t is clear t h a t I t a l y is the Power t h a t has most to gain by upsetting
t h e existing balance in the Western Mediterranean since her present strategic
position in the Mediterranean is obviously unfavourable.
Both exits are in
foreign hands, and her seaborne t r a d e with countries outside the M e d i t e r r a n e a n
is therefore at the mercy of any Power t h a t can control the S t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r
a n d the Suez Canal. Consequently, it is not impossible t h a t I t a l y may t r y to take
advantage of the present crisis in Spain to improve her position in the
Mediterranean.
8. The steps which Italy might take with the above object in view may be
summarised as follows :—
(i) She might openly intervene in support of the insurgents;
(ii) She might create some pretext, such as the protection of her nationals
or the infringement of her maritime rights, to occupy Spanish territory
in a less conspicuous way;
(iii) Signor Mussolini might obtain from General Franco the promise of the
lease, or cession, of some Spanish territory in exchange for his effective
intervention in the present struggle. Territories which might be so
bartered are—
p a r t of Spain itself, one or more of the Balearic Islands, p a r t of
Spanish Morocco, the Canary Islands, and Rio de Oro;
(iv) I n addition, or alternatively to (iii) above, Signor Mussolini might come
to an understanding with General Franco that, in exchange for
effective I t a l i a n intervention, the latter would conclude an offensive­
defensive I t a l o - S p a n i s h alliance when he came into power.
T h e above measures, and particularly the effect which they would have on British
interests, are discussed seriatim in the p a r a g r a p h s t h a t follow.
9. With regard to Paragraph
8 (i) above, open Italian intervention
in
support of the insurgents would precipitate a major international crisis. I t
would be beyond the scope of this P a p e r to attempt to consider in detail the
situation t h a t would arise.
10. The possibilities summarised in p a r a g r a p h 8 (ii) and (iii) will be
considered together, since the material effect of an I t a l i a n occupation of any of
the territories in question, however t h a t occupation is brought about, is much the
same.
11. The Occupation by Italy of any land in the Spanish Peninsula would
obviously prejudice the security of our position a t Gibraltar and of our
communications. B u t the S p a n i a r d s are a people intensely proud of their own
race and country, and we, therefore, consider it reasonable to rule out the
possibility of any permanent I t a l i a n occupation of Spain itself. I t is t r u e t h a t
Catalonia m i g h t split away, but we do hot think even this province could be
dominated by foreigners for long.
12. The Italian occupation of any part of Spanish Morocco, and p a r t i c u l a r l y
of Ceuta, which is fifteen miles from G i b r a l t a r , would bring" G i b r a l t a r
within range of heavy I t a l i a n air attack, and thus deny to us its full use as a Naval
Base. I n addition, the possession and possible development by I t a l y of any of
the Spanish Moroccan ports, small and undeveloped though they are a t the present
time, would contribute to our difficulties in controlling the S t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r .
Accordingly, we regard the maintenance of t h e territorial integrity of S p a n i s h
Morocco as of vital importance to B r i t i s h interests. France also has a n interest
in this possibility, since an I t a l i a n occupation of the t e r r i t o r y in question would
menace the communications between her M e d i t e r r a n e a n and A t l a n t i c seaboards.
13. An Italian occupation of any of the Balearic Islands would probably
not be acceptable to the islanders themselves, b u t the possibilities' of their h a v i n g
to submit to force majeure cannot be ruled out.
The naval facilities in these islands are at present as follows : - Majorca, 450 miles from Gibraltar, has no harbour entirely suitable for a
naval base, since P a l m a and Pollenza Bay, although good in some ways, are too
exposed. Minorca, which is still further from Gibraltar, has in P o r t Mahon a
small, but heavily defended, naval base.
A s regards a i r facilities, there are, so far as is known, no m i l i t a r y a i r stations
in the Balearic I s l a n d s at the present t i m e ; but there is no doubt t h a t they could
be established w i t h o u t great difficulty. I t is understood t h a t there is a satis­
factory aerodrome site a t Pollenza, and t h a t civil seaplane services were operated
at P o r t Mahon a n d P a l m a in 1932.
I n view of t h e foregoing an I t a l i a n occupation of any of the Balearic I s l a n d s
would not vitally affect B r i t i s h strategical interests. A t the same time it would
give I t a l y a base for naval and a i r operations, 250 miles nearer G i b r a l t a r t h a n
anything which she possesses at the present time. T h e menace to our control of
the S t r a i t s and to Gibraltar itself would thus be increased.
14. I t is to be noted in addition t h a t an I t a l i a n occupation of any of the
Balearic Islands would constitute a direct t h r e a t to French communications
between France and her possessions in Northern A f r i c a ; it is. therefore,
reasonable to assume t h a t an enterprise of this kind would be most energetically
opposed by France.
15. An Italian occupation of the Canary Islands and/or Rio de Oro would
present her with a base flanking our communications to the Cape of Good H o p e
and South America. Since, in a w a r w i t h Italy, the bulk of our eastern t r a d e
might have to use the Cape route, it is clear t h a t an I t a l i a n occupation of either
the C a n a r y Islands or Rio de Oro would be prejudicial to our interests.
An Ttalo-Spanish
Alliance.
16. I t remains to consider the possibility indicated in p a r a g r a p h 8 (iv),
namely, the conclusion of an Italo-Spanish alliance. The effect of this would be
t h a t Spanish ports and aerodromes would be available for the use of I t a l i a n forces
in time of war. This would constitute a most serious menace not only to our
use of Gibraltar as a naval and air base, and to our control of the Straits, but
also to our I m p e r i a l communications.
From the French point of view a n Italo-Spanish alliance is equally undesir­
able, though obviously for different reasons.
17. I t will be seen from the foregoing t h a t the adoption by I t a l y of any of
the courses of action which have been discussed in the preceding p a r a g r a p h s
would in effect be a threat, to a greater or lesser degree, to B r i t i s h and French
interests.
..... W e now t u r n to the question of w h a t action H i s Majesty's Government might
take to safeguard the situation.
A C T I O N O P E N TO H I S M A J E S T Y ' S
GOVERNMENT.
18. The successful issue of the Abyssinian campaign in the. face of League
opposition, suggests t h a t Mussolini, if determined to exploit t h e Spanish crisis
to. his own advantage, will not be deterred by threats, and only, by the certainty
[13696]
B 2
*..that force, and adequate force, will be employed against him. We are, therefore,
driven to the conclusion t h a t any action, other t h a n action; in the diplomatic
sphere, which H i s Majesty's Government might t a k e which would: effectively
t h w a r t his designs, must inevitably; involve a serious risk of war between Great
B r i t a i n and Italy.
:il
- .
.
19. The relative preparedness for war of these/ two countries. has been
examined so exhaustively d u r i n g the past twelve months t h a t i t is unnecessary
in this paper to reconsider the question in any detail.. Suffice it to say
that I t a l y is the only Power whose forces are fully mobilised arid available for
immediate operations.
20. W e now t u r n to the consideration of w h a t action, other than the t h r e a t
of direct military action, might be taken by H i s Majesty's Government to prevent
I t a l y from embarking upon any of the enterprises visualised a t the beginning of
this Report. Before setting out our views on this point we venture to suggest,
with the memories of last year's events still fresh in our minds, t h a t we should
avoid at all costs the possibility of becoming involved in action which, on the
one hand, fails to achieve our object, and, on the other hand, tends further to
alienate Italy, i.e., we should take no action which we are not prepared to back
up by all the force a t our command. This statement is made on the under­
standing t h a t I t a l y is the only enemy in contemplation.
21. W i t h t h a t general proviso, the courses of action t h a t appear advisable
are summarised as follows :—
I n the first place, we should press for the conclusion and rigid enforcement
of a universal agreement of non-interference in S p a i n by all European Powers.
If such an agreement can be reached and enforced, there would be no reason for
the winning side in Spain to g r a n t territorial concessions to, or negotiate closer
military relations with, her neighbours than now exist.
22. If no general agreement of non-intervention can be reached, we should
not cease to impress on Prance, whose strategic interests are largely identical
with our own, the desirability of giving no cause for intervention by Italy.
Support by France and Russia to the forces of the Spanish Left may well lead
I t a l y to afford open support to General Franco.
23. W e should endeavour to ensure t h a t any action taken by Foreign
Powers, either to protect their nationals in Spanish territory or exact reparations,
is international and concerted.
Failing such agreement, every endeavour should be made locally for concerted
action to be taken when occasion arises.
This applies with particular force to action by I t a l i a n ships; and we should,
therefore, arrange t h a t wherever an I t a l i a n man-of-war is berthed in Spanish
waters there is also a B r i t i s h ship, and t h a t at important ports the British Senior
Naval Officer is, if possible, senior to the Italian.
24. Since this report was p u t in hand, we have seen a copy of the Foreign
Office memorandum t h a t has recently been circulated to the Cabinet Committee
on Foreign Policy (Paper No. F . P . (36) 10). I t is suggested in this P a p e r t h a t it
should be made publicly plain t h a t " any alteration of the status quo in the
Western Mediterranean must be a matter of the closest concern to H i s Majesty's
Government."
W e agree t h a t Signor Mussolini should be under no mis­
apprehension as to the possible consequences of any action t h a t he may take to
disturb the existing balance in the Western M e d i t e r r a n e a n ; and we, therefore,
desire to endorse the Foreign Office suggestion.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.
25.—(i) Our interests in the present Spanish crisis are t h e maintenance—
. (a) of the territorial integrity of Spain and her possessions, and
(6) of such relations with any Spanish Government which may emerge from
this conflict as will ensure benevolent neutrality in the event of our
being engaged in a European w a r ;
(ii) Open intervention by I t a l y in support of the insurgents in Spain would
precipitate a major international crisis;
--" (in) The occupation by I t a l y of any t e r r i t o r y in S p a i n itself would be
d e t r i m e n t a l td B r i t i s h d n t e r e s t s ;
; ; ;i
. ^
.
(iv) -The I t a l i a n occupation of any p a r t of Spanish Morocco, and p a r t i c u l a r l y
of Ceuta, would be a t h r e a t to vital B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s ;
- '
...,i
(v) The I t a l i a n occupation of any of the Balearic Islands, Canary Islands,
a n d / o r R i o de Oro, is highly undesirable from the point of view of British,
interests,,but cannot be regarded as a vital menace; ..
.......
.:. (vi) A n y of the contingencies specified in (ii) to (v) above would be injurious
i n greater or lesser degreei to French interests;
*
(vii) The conclusion of any Italo-Spanish alliance would constitute a t h r e a t
t o vital B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s ;
(viii) The t h r e a t of effective action, other t h a n action in a diplomatic sphere,
to t h w a r t I t a l i a n designs would involve a grave risk of w a r ;
(ix) I t a l y is the only Power whose forces are mobilised and ready for
immediate action. H e r preparedness for the initial phase of hostilities, -ms-d-vis
G r e a t B r i t a i n , is g r e a t e r t h a n it was nine months ago.
!
RECOMMENDATIONS.
26.
"
Our recommendations may be summarised as follows : ­
(i) The principle t h a t should govern any action on the p a r t of H i s
Majesty's Government should be t h a t it is most i m p o r t a n t to avoid
any measures which, while failing to achieve our object, merely tend
further to alienate I t a l y ;
(ii) W e should press for the earliest possible conclusion of a non-inter­
ference p a c t in Spain, embracing France, Russia, P o r t u g a l , Germany,
I t a l y a n d the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ;
(iii) I f no general agreement can be reached, we should impress on the
French the desirability of giving no cause for intervention by I t a l y ;
(iv) W e should m a i n t a i n sufficient naval forces on the W e s t e r n
M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d Spanish A t l a n t i c coasts to ensure t h a t we have
at least one ship at every port where the I t a l i a n s have one, and t h a t
at i m p o r t a n t ports the B r i t i s h S.N.O. is, if possible, senior to the
Italian;
(v) W e should, if possible, get an agreement w i t h the other Powers t h a t any
landing or other action by armed forces to preserve order should be
not only i n t e r n a t i o n a l in character, but also, wherever this is possible,
preconcerted between the Powers affected;
(vi) F a i l i n g such agreement, every endeavour should be made locally for
concerted action to be taken when occasion arises;
(vii) W e should make it known to Signor Mussolini that, in the words of
F . P . .(36) 10, " any alteration of the status' quo in the Western
M e d i t e r r a n e a n must be a m a t t e r of the closest concern to H i s Majesty's
Government " in order t h a t he may be under no misapprehension as
to the consequences. of any action t h a t he may take to disturb the
existing balance.
(Signed)
E. L. E L L I N G T O N .
C. J . D E V E R E L L
C. E. K E N N E D Y - P U R V I S .
(A.C.N.S. for
C.N.S.)­
2 Whitehall Gardens. S.W. 1,
August 24, 1936.
A N N E X I.
W. 8332/G.
Foreign Office,
Dear Colonel Ism ay,
August 12, 1936.
L O R D H A L I F A X has asked me to write to you to ask t h a t the Chiefs
of Staff should begin considering to what extent British interests would be
affected, and w h a t action they advise t h a t H i s Majesty's Government should
take in w h a t is, of course, still regarded as the unlikely event of I t a l y t a k i n g
some action which might upset the existing balance in the W e s t e r n Mediterranean.
We do not wish to give the impression t h a t the Foreign Office have any real
fears on this point at the present time, but it seems i m p o r t a n t t h a t we should
be prepared to consider what should be the reaction and the reply of H i s
Majesty's Government to any such step as the landing of I t a l i a n troops in Spanish
territory, or the creation by I t a l y of some pretext to occupy territory in a less
conspicuous way, or the g r a n t by General Franco of the lease of some island to
Italy. W e should be grateful if you would kindly take the a p p r o p r i a t e steps
to have these possibilities examined.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed)
A L E X A N D E R CADOGAN.
Colonel H . L. Ismay, C.B., D.S.O.,
Committee of Imperial Defence.
ANNEX I I .
ITALY AND MOROCCO TREATY P O S I T I O N .
So far as can be gathered from a cursory examination of the treaties, t h e
position as regards fortifications in Morocco is as follows : —
By Article 7 of the Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, between the U n i t e d
Kingdom and France, both Governments are bound not to permit the erection
of any fortifications or strategic works on t h a t portion of the coast of Morocco
comprised between, but not including Melilla and the heights which command
the r i g h t bank of the River Sebor. This condition does not apply to the places
which were in the occupation of S p a i n on the Moorish Coast of the Mediterranean,
i.e., Ceuta, Melilla and probably also the following islands : —
Penon de Velez;
Alhucemas; and
Zafrin.
Under Article 3 of the secret portion of the Declaration of the 8th A p r i l ,
1904, the two Governments also agreed t h a t on Spain acquiring a sphere of
influence in Morocco she would have to undertake not to alienate any p a r t of
that sphere.
Both of these stipulations were reproduced in the Franco-Spanish Convention
respecting Morocco, signed on the 3rd October, 1904, under Article 1 of which
Spain adhered to the Anglo-French Declaration of the preceding A p r i l . U n d e r
Article 7 of this Convention, Spain undertook not to alienate or to cede in any
form, even temporarily, the whole or any p a r t of her sphere of influence in
Morocco.
The relations between Spain and France in Morocco were again regulated
in 1912 by the Convention dated the 27th November of t h a t year (it does not
appear, however, t h a t the Convention of the 3rd October, 1904, was abrogated).
Under Article 5 of this new Convention, Spain again engaged herself not to
alienate, even temporarily, her rights in any p a r t of the territory composing her
zone of influence; and under Article 6 both Governments undertook not to p e r m i t
fortifications or strategic works on the coast of Morocco above mentioned.
So far as can be traced, Italy is under no obligation not to fortify any p a r t
of the coast of Morocco except at Tangier, the s t a t u t e of which she acceded to
in 1928.
The position in brief, therefore, seems to be as follows :—
(1) France, Spain, and ourselves are all bound to prevent the erection of
fortifications, & c , on t h e Spanish-Moroccan coast bordering on the
Mediterranean, w i t h the exception of certain ports and islands above
mentioned which are under full Spanish sovereignty. .
(2) W i t h the same exceptions, Spain is under an obligation'not to cede any
of her r i g h t s in her sphere of influence in Morocco to another Power.