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<TAP? ns /go CONFIDENTIAL Copy No A , o f 2 Copies
MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD TO CC(84) 1st Conclusions Thursday 12 January 1984 HANDLING OF
DOCUMENTS
A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f Cabinet on 12 January 1984 t h e Prime M i n i s t e r reminded h e r c o l l e a g u e s t h a t , where o f f i c i a l s from t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e C e n t r a l O f f i c e were a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d e p a r t m e n t a l d i s c u s s i o n s o f p o l i c y , M i n i s t e r s should be s c r u p u l o u s l y c a r e f u l t o ensure t h a t they were n o t g i v e n access t o c l a s s i f i e d m a t e r i a l . T h i s c o u l d r e q u i r e c a r e f u l h a n d l i n g i n r e l a t i o n n o t o n l y t o documents b u t a l s o t o detailed oral discussions. THE MINISTER OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, MR GUMMER, s a i d t h a t i n one r e c e n t case an o f f i c i a l o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e C e n t r a l O f f i c e who had been i n v o l v e d i n d e p a r t m e n t a l d i s c u s s i o n s o f p o l i c y had r e s i g n e d h i s appointment a t C e n t r a l O f f i c e t o take up an o u t s i d e appointment i n which h i s foreknowledge o f Government i n t e n t i o n s c o u l d be o f p r i v i l e g e d v a l u e t o him. He had a c t e d v e r y p r o p e r l y i n a g r e e i n g t h a t t h e r e should be an i n t e r v a l between h i s g i v i n g up h i s appointment w i t h t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e C e n t r a l O f f i c e and t a k i n g up h i s new appointment. Arrangements were b e i n g made t o change t h e c o n t r a c t s o f employment f o r people employed i n t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e C e n t r a l O f f i c e t o make i t e a s i e r t o ensure t h a t i n such circumstances a reasonable i n t e r v a l elapsed between two appointments. The Cabinet -
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Employment. Thursday 9 February 1984 THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT reminded c o l l e a g u e s t h a t t h e
C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y 1983 General E l e c t i o n M a n i f e s t o had drawn a t t e n t i o n t o
concern about t h e way i n which the r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l t r a d e u n i o n members
not t o pay t h e p o l i t i c a l l e v y o p e r a t e d i n p r a c t i c e . I t had set out t h e
Government's i n t e n t i o n t o i n v i t e t h e Trades Union Congress (TUC) t o
d i s c u s s t h e steps which t r a d e u n i o n s themselves c o u l d t a k e t o ensure t h a t
i n d i v i d u a l members were f r e e l y and e f f e c t i v e l y a b l e t o decide whether o r
not t o pay t h e p o l i t i c a l l e v y ; and i n d i c a t e d t h a t , i f t r a d e u n i o n s were
not w i l l i n g t o t a k e such s t e p s , the Government would be p r e p a r e d t o
i n t r o d u c e measures t o guarantee freedom of c h o i c e . The Trade Union B i l l
c u r r e n t l y b e f o r e P a r l i a m e n t r e q u i r e d t r a d e unions t o h o l d b a l l o t s b e f o r e
e s t a b l i s h i n g p o l i t i c a l funds and s u b s e q u e n t l y membership every 10 years i f
t h e y wished t o c o n t i n u e o p e r a t i n g them. Pending t h e outcome o f d i s c u s s i o n s
w i t h t h e TUC, however, i t made no p r o v i s i o n f o r c o n t r a c t i n g - o u t t o be
r e p l a c e d by c o n t r a c t i n g - i n . He had been d i s c u s s i n g t h i s m a t t e r w i t h t h e
General S e c r e t a r y o f the TUC and t h e Chairman of t h e TUC's Employment
P o l i c y Committee (EPOC). The General S e c r e t a r y was c l e a r l y anxious t o
improve t h e t r a d e u n i o n s ' g e n e r a l w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Government
and had been making c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t s t o ensure a s a t i s f a c t o r y v o l u n t a r y
u n d e r t a k i n g on t h e p o l i t i c a l l e v y . As a r e s u l t a d r a f t agreement had been
p r e p a r e d which t h e General S e c r e t a r y wished t o put t o EPOC f o r i t s
a p p r o v a l on 15 February. I f i t were approved, he would t h e n f o r m a l l y
c o n s u l t t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r Employment about i t s c o n t e n t s , so t h a t
the Government's immediate r e a c t i o n c o u l d be made known when the document
was p u t b e f o r e the TUC General C o u n c i l t h e f o l l o w i n g week. He f e l t t h a t
the terms o f the d r a f t agreement were t h e b e s t which t h e Government might
have been expected t o secure under a v o l u n t a r y agreement.
I t r e q u i r e d the
unions t o r e v i e w e x i s t i n g procedures t o ensure t h a t adequate i n f o r m a t i o n
and guidance was g i v e n t o members about t h e i r r i g h t t o c o n t r a c t out and
t h a t e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n was t a k e n t o remove any o b s t a c l e s t o c o n t r a c t i n g
out.
I f t h e General C o u n c i l approved i t , a l l t r a d e unions would be
expected t o comply w i t h i t s terms. He c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e agreement c o u l d
be a c c e p t e d by t h e Government as a b a s i s f o r a g r e e i n g n o t t o l e g i s l a t e u
on c o n t r a c t i n g - i n . I n v i e w of t h e d e l i c a t e t i m i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i t
would be h e l p f u l t o have c o l l e a g u e s ' agreement now, so t h a t he c o u l d
i n d i c a t e the Government's p o s i t i o n i f t h e General S e c r e t a r y was a b l e t o
secure t h e a p p r o v a l o f EPOC on 15 February.
THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n , s a i d t h a t t h e Cabinet agreed t h a t a v o l u n t a r y agreement would be p r e f e r a b l e t o l e g i s l a t i o n , p r o v i d e d t h a t i t s terms were s a t i s f a c t o r y and t h a t i t was honoured by the t r a d e u n i o n s . They were c o n t e n t t o accept t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r Employment's judgment t h a t an agreement on the l i n e s i n d i c a t e d was a c c e p t a b l e . I t was c l e a r , however, t h a t i t was not s u f f i c i e n t t o o b t a i n o n l y the f o r m a l endorsement o f t h e TUC General C o u n c i l f o r i t . I f , f o r example, t h e l e a d e r s o f two o r t h r e e major t r a d e unions i n d i c a t e d t h a t 1
SECRET
SECRET they would n o t comply w i t h the agreement i n p r a c t i c e , o r remained s i l e n t i n i t i a l l y b u t d i d n o t a c t u a l l y comply l a t e r on, the agreement would be o f l i t t l e v a l u e . I t would t h e r e f o r e be unwise f o r the Government f i n a l l y t o abandon a t t h i s stage the o p t i o n o f l e g i s l a t i n g , even though l e g i s l a t i o n on t h i s s u b j e c t , which would a f f e c t the f u n d i n g o f the Labour P a r t y , would c r e a t e g r e a t unease and should n o t be e n t e r e d i n t o l i g h t l y . The a t t i t u d e of the TUC so f a r j u s t i f i e d proceeding as the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r Employment proposed, p r o v i d e d t h a t i t was made c l e a r t h a t the Government expected i t s own pledge o f good f a i t h t o be met w i t h equal good f a i t h by the t r a d e u n i o n s , and t h a t the Government would c o n t i n u e t o r e s e r v e t h e r i g h t t o l e g i s l a t e i f t h e v o l u n t a r y agreement broke down i n p r a c t i c e . The Cabinet ­
1.
Took n o t e , w i t h a p p r o v a l , o f the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s summing up o f t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n . 2.
I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r Employment t o be guided a c c o r d i n g l y i n h i s f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the Trades Union Congress. 2
SECRET SECRET Copy No I o f 4 Copies
MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD TO CC(84) 5 t h
Conclusions Thursday 9 February 1984 The Cabinet c o n s i d e r e d a memorandum by the C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer (C(84) 5) on economic s t r a t e g y . THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t the 1984 Budget would set t h e
tone f o r the remainder o f the p r e s e n t P a r l i a m e n t . The background was one of f a l l i n g i n f l a t i o n and r i s i n g o u t p u t . I n b o t h r e s p e c t s , performance i n 1983 had been b e t t e r than f o r e c a s t . The p r o s p e c t s f o r the year ahead were encouraging.
Output was expected t o r i s e by 3 p e r c e n t , and i n f l a t i o n , a | t e r r i s i n g t o about 54 p e r cent i n t h e e a r l y summer, t o f a l l t o about
4 ^ p e r cent by the end o f 1984.
A l t h o u g h the r e c o v e r y had i n i t i a l l y been based on h i g h e r consumption, i t was now broadening t o i n c l u d e e x p o r t s and i n v e s t e m e n t , b o t h o f which were expected t o i n c r e a s e t w i c e as f a s t as consumers' spending i n 1984.
There were, however, r i s k s f r o m e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s . F i r s t , the s i z e o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s budget d e f i c i t c o n t i n u e d t o e x e r t upward p r e s s u r e on i n t e r e s t r a t e s . Secondly, a sharp f a l l i n o i l p r i c e s would be u n h e l p f u l t o our balance o f payments and t a x revenues i n
the coming year. D o m e s t i c a l l y , the main r i s k l a y i n e x c e s s i v e wage settlements. The P u b l i c Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) i n 1983-84 was s t i l l expected t o show an overshoot o f some £1.8 b i l l i o n compared t o the 1983 Budget f o r e c a s t o f £8.2 b i l l i o n .
I t would be i m p o r t a n t f o r market c o n f i d e n c e and t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f the Government's economic p o l i c y t h a t the overshoot should not be c a r r i e d f o r w a r d . As a minimum, the Government must be seen t o be r e t u r n i n g t o t h e p a t h set i n the 1983 Medium Term F i n a n c i a l S t r a t e g y (MTFS), which envisaged a PSBR o f £8 b i l l i o n f o r 1984-85. There were indeed arguments f o r aiming a t a lower f i g u r e . 1984-85 was t h e peak year f o r N o r t h Sea o i l revenue, and c o u l d t h e r e f o r e be expected t o f e a t u r e a low PSBR. Asset s a l e s , which had s m a l l e r e f f e c t s on i n t e r e s t r a t e s than a r e d u c t i o n i n p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e , would p l a y an u n u s u a l l y l a r g e p a r t i n r e d u c i n g the PSBR. I t would c e r t a i n l y be wrong t o p r o v i d e f o r a PSBR h i g h e r t h a n £8 b i l l i o n , and p r o b a b l y r i g h t t o aim f o r a s l i g h t l y lower f i g u r e . F o r t u n a t e l y , the f i s c a l p r o s p e c t s f o r 1984-85 had improved since h i s Autumn Statement; and t h e r i s k o f t a x i n c r e a s e s b e i n g r e q u i r e d i n March was s l i g h t . He t h e r e f o r e expected the 1984 Budget t o be b r o a d l y n e u t r a l ; he would welcome t h e views o f h i s c o l l e a g u e s on the a p p r o p r i a t e balance between d i f f e r e n t taxes i n t h a t c o n t e x t . Looking f u r t h e r ahead, t h e r e was a p r o s p e c t o f w o r t h w h i l e t a x r e d u c t i o n s i n 1985-86 i f t h e Government adhered t o i t s p u b l i s h e d e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n s . The c o n t i n u i n g success o f the Government's economic p o l i c i e s had confounded i t s c r i t i c s and should have a good e f f e c t on e x p e c t a t i o n s . E x p e c t a t i o n s would a l s o be c o n d i t i o n e d by t h e MTFS. The p r e s e n t MTFS e x p i r e d i n 1985-86. F i g u r e s should now be p u b l i s h e d , e x t e n d i n g t o 1988-89 and so c o v e r i n g the remainder o f the p r e s e n t P a r l i a m e n t . The Government's u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e should be p r i c e s t a b i l i t y . T h i s r e q u i r e d monetary growth t o be b r o u g h t down, p r e f e r a b l y w i t h o u t recourse t o h i g h e r i n t e r e s t 1
SECRET SECRET r a t e s . I t was t h e r e f o r e necessary t o aim f o r lower Government b o r r o w i n g .
The Government had a l r e a d y decided on e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n s f o r 1986-87. The
same r e a l l e v e l o f p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e should be used as t h e b a s i s o f t h e
MTFS f o r 1987-88 and 1988-89. I t would be made c l e a r t h a t t h i s was o n l y an assumption and d i d n o t pre-empt p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s , which would be taken
i n t h e u s u a l way i n f u t u r e P u b l i c E x p e n d i t u r e Surveys. In
d i s c u s s i o n t h e f o l l o w i n g main p o i n t s were made ­
a.
There was g e n e r a l agreement t h a t t h e r e was no case f o r a r e l a x a t i o n i n f i s c a l and monetary s t r a t e g y . Some members o f t h e Cabinet argued t h a t t h e Government's f i s c a l stance had i n p r a c t i c e been more r e l a x e d i n >the l a s t two years than i t s r h e t o r i c suggested, and so had c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e speed o f economic r e c o v e r y ; and t h a t i t was unnecessary t o t r e a t t h e l e v e l o f t h e PSBR, so l o n g as i t
remained below t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l o f £10 b i l l i o n , as c r u c i a l . O t h e r s , however, d i s p u t e d t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f e v e n t s , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t i t c o u l d now be seen t o have begun t o i n c r e a s e as e a r l y as 1981.
T h i s u n d e r l i n e d t h e need t o c o n t i n u e t o pursue t h e prudent p o l i c i e s which had secured t h e Government c o n s i d e r a b l e c r e d i t at home and abroad. The Government's p o l i c i e s were succeeding, b u t were i n e v i t a b l y a t r i s k f r o m e x t e r n a l e v e n t s . Both f a c t o r s c o u n s e l l e d s t a b i l i t y and c a u t i o n i n f i s c a l and monetary p o l i c y , on t h e l i n e s suggested i n C(84) 5. b.
Some members o f t h e Cabinet c o n s i d e r e d t h a t such resources as c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e f o r r e d u c t i o n s i n t a x a t i o n i n 1984 should be devoted p r i m a r i l y t o r e d u c i n g burdens on i n d u s t r y , such as t h e N a t i o n a l Insurance Surcharge. A l t h o u g h company p r o f i t a b i l i t y had improved d r a m a t i c a l l y , i t was s t i l l e x t r e m e l y low and needed g r e a t l y to be i n c r e a s e d . The U n i t e d Kingdom depended on i n d u s t r i a l and commercial e n t e r p r i s e s f o r i t s economic f u t u r e . Many o f them were s t i l l i n a p a r l o u s f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n . Most members o f t h e C a b i n e t , however, took t h e v i e w t h a t p r i o r i t y should be g i v e n t o i n c r e a s e s i n the income t a x t h r e s h o l d s , which were s t i l l t o o c l o s e t o s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t l e v e l s . Poor wage-earners p a i d t o o much income t a x . They should be h e l p e d , f o r b o t h s o c i a l and economic reasons. Moreover, i n c r e a s e s i n t h e income t a x t h r e s h o l d s might have a u s e f u l e f f e c t i n moderating pay s e t t l e m e n t s . c.
While i t was i n g e n e r a l u n d e s i r a b l e t o i n t r o d u c e more c o m p l e x i t i e s i n t o t h e t a x system and indeed p r e f e r a b l e t o reduce them, t h e r e was a case f o r c o n t i n u i n g t o g i v e encouragement t o t h e development o f s m a l l businesses and t o t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f employees i n t h e f u t u r e success o f t h e i r companies, f o r example t h r o u g h share o p t i o n schemes. d.
There was g e n e r a l agreement t h a t t h e MTFS should be r o l l e d f o r w a r d as proposed i n C(84) 5. I t a l s o seemed i n e v i t a b l e t h a t t h i s should be done on t h e b a s i s o f an assumption t h a t p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e i n r e a l terms would be h e l d a t t h e same l e v e l i n 1987-88 and 1988-89 as i n 1986-87: i t might be p o s s i b l e t o g i v e a range o f assumptions, b u t t h i s would reduce t h e e f f e c t on e x p e c t a t i o n s , which i t was one o f the main aims'of t h e MTFS t o secure. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t would be i m p o r t a n t t o make i t c l e a r i n p u b l i c t h a t t h e assumption r e g a r d i n g p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e was o n l y an assumption and d i d n o t pre-empt p o l i c y decisions. 2
SECRET SECRET e.
C a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be g i v e n i n t h e MTFS t o f o r e c a s t s of the " f i s c a l adjustment".
Experience suggested t h a t such f o r e c a s t s tended t o exaggerate t h e room f o r t a x r e d u c t i o n s and so b u i l t up e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t c o u l d n o t i n t h e event be f u l f i l l e d . THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up t h e d i s c u s s i o n , s a i d t h a t t h e Cabinet overwhelmingly supported t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer's judgment, as set o u t i n C(84) 5: i n p a r t i c u l a r , they endorsed h i s judgment o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e PSBR i n 1984-85. He would no doubt take account o f t h e views t h a t had been p u t f o r w a r d i n d i s c u s s i o n i n r e a c h i n g f i n a l d e c i s i o n s on t h e o v e r a l l balance o f h i s Budget and i n c o n s i d e r i n g p a r t i c u l a r t a x changes. The Cabinet agreed t h a t t h e MTFS should be extended t o 1988-89. I t should be based on t h e assumption t h a t t h e r e a l l e v e l o f p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e would be t h e same i n 1987-88 and 1988-89 as i n 1986-87; b u t , as t h e C h a n c e l l o r of t h e Exchequer had made c l e a r , t h i s was n o t i n t e n d e d t o pre-empt t h e d e c i s i o n s t h a t M i n i s t e r s would take i n due course on p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n s i n t h e annual P u b l i c E x p e n d i t u r e Surveys. E n q u i r e r s f r o m t h e media about t h e Cabinet's d i s c u s s i o n would be t o l d t h a t t h e Cabinet had c o n s i d e r e d t h e economic s i t u a t i o n and t h e approach t o t h e Budget, n o t i n g the f i r m p r o s p e c t o f c o n t i n u i n g steady growth and l o w i n f l a t i o n and t h e importance o f keeping e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l o f Government b o r r o w i n g . The Cabinet ­
1.
Took n o t e , w i t h a p p r o v a l , o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r ' s summing up o f t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n . I n v i t e d t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer t o take 2.
account o f t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n i n p r e p a r i n g h i s f o r t h c o m i n g Budget. 3
SECRET SECRET Copy No 1 o f 3 Copies
MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD TO CC(84) 6 t h
Conclusions Thursday 16 February 1984 NORTHERN
IRELAND
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, a t the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s r e q u e s t , r e p o r t e d on the d i s c u s s i o n s which she had had w i t h the F o r e i g n and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y and h i m s e l f about N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The c o n c l u s i o n o f these d i s c u s s i o n s was t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be g i v e n t o the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a new approach t o the I r i s h q u e s t i o n . Not l e a s t among the reasons f o r t h i s were the growing p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h o f P r o v i s i o n a l Sinn F e i n and the c o n t i n u i n g l a c k o f c o n f i d e n c e on the p a r t of the m i n o r i t y community i n the f o r c e s o f law and o r d e r i n the P r o v i n c e . A f u r t h e r f a c t o r was t h e impending r e p o r t o f the "Forum f o r a New I r e l a n d " which was now expected t o be made p u b l i c e a r l y i n March. A l t h o u g h the c o n t e n t s o f the r e p o r t were n o t known, i t was c l e a r t h a t i t would c o n t a i n p r o p o s a l s about N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d t o which the Government would have t o respond. What t h a t response should be had t o be c o n s i d e r e d b o t h from the p o i n t o f view o f the s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n i n the P r o v i n c e and a l s o f r o m the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e , i n c l u d i n g the U n i t e d Kingdom's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . The d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r had a c c o r d i n g l y c o n c e n t r a t e d on p o s s i b l e ways o f i m p r o v i n g s e c u r i t y i n c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h the I r i s h R e p u b l i c , and o f going some way to meeting the concerns o f the m i n o r i t y community i n the N o r t h . Measures c o n s i d e r e d i n c l u d e d the p o s s i b l i t y o f j o i n t p o l i c i n g i n a d e f i n e d area a l o n g b o t h s i d e s o f the I r i s h b o r d e r , and h a r m o n i s a t i o n o f l a w enforcement procedures as between N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d and the R e p u b l i c . I t was, however c l e a r t h a t measures o f t h i s k i n d c o u l d be contemplated o n l y i f t h e r e was a f i r m i n d i c a t i o n f r o m D u b l i n t h a t the R e p u b l i c would be prepared i n r e t u r n f o r m a l l y t o r e c o g n i s e the c o n t i n u i n g e x i s t e n c e of the u n i o n ( a t l e a s t f o r the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e ) and t o waive t h e t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m on t h e N o r t h embodied i n A r t i c l e s 2 and 3 o f the I r i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n . A l t h o u g h t h e r e was no hard i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e I r i s h Government's a t t i t u d e , t h e r e were i n d i c a t i o n s t o suggest t h a t , whatever s o l u t i o n s the Forum might advocate, the Taoiseach (Dr F i t z g e r a l d ) h i m s e l f wanted p r i o r i t y g i v e n t o i m p r o v i n g the s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n i n the N o r t h by s t r e n g t h e n i n g the c o n f i d e n c e o f the m i n o r i t y i n the f o r c e s o f l a w and o r d e r t h e r e ; and t h a t he would l i k e t o e x p l o r e w i t h t h e B r i t i s h Government ways o f r e a s s u r i n g u n i o n i s t o p i n i o n about N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ' s p l a c e i n the U n i t e d Kingdom i n r e t u r n f o r arrangements which would a s s o c i a t e the Republic i n some v i s i b l e way w i t h law enforcement i n the Province. W i t h o u t c l e a r e r i n f o r m a t i o n about the t h i n k i n g o f the D u b l i n Government i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o judge whether t h e r e was any r e a l i s t i c p r o s p e c t o f making p r o g r e s s a l o n g these l i n e s o r t o t r y t o work out the d e t a i l s o f a p o s s i b l e package. S u b j e c t t o the views o f the C a b i n e t , t h e r e f o r e , the Prime M i n i s t e r proposed t o ask the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Cabinet t o make an i n f o r m a l , c o n f i d e n t i a l and s t r i c t l y e x p l o r a t o r y approach t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f the I r i s h Government, Mr Dermot N a l l y . The o b j e c t o f t h i s approach would be s i m p l y t o sound out t h e I r i s h p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t any commitment on e i t h e r s i d e and t o s i g n a l t o the Taoiseach i n advance o f t h e 1
SECRET SECRET Forum's r e p o r t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h Government was t h i n k i n g c o n s t r u c t i v e l y about t h e problem. The f a c t t h a t t h i s approach was b e i n g made, which c o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a major development i n t h e Government's p o s i t i o n on the I r i s h q u e s t i o n , would c l e a r l y be o f t h e g r e a t e s t s e n s i t i v i t y . I t was t h o u g h t t h a t t h e Taoiseach and Mr N a l l y would do t h e i r b e s t t o keep i t s e c r e t , a t l e a s t as l o n g as t h e d i s c u s s i o n s were p u r e l y e x p l o r a t o r y i n c h a r a c t e r . But i t would be made c l e a r t o t h e I r i s h f r o m t h e o u t s e t t h a t e v e r y t h i n g was dependent on t h e i r b e i n g w i l l i n g and a b l e t o d e l i v e r an a c c e p t a b l y b i n d i n g commitment t o waive t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m and acknowledge t h e c o n t i n u i n g e x i s t e n c e o f t h e u n i o n , a t l e a s t f o r t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . So l o n g as i t c o u l d t r u t h f u l l y be s a i d t h a t any e x p l o r a t o r y d i s c u s s i o n s were b e i n g conducted on t h i s premise, and w i t h the a i m o f i m p r o v i n g t h e s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n , t h e f a c t o f such d i s c u s s i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e - i f i t d i d become known - would be p u b l i c l y d e f e n s i b l e . I f t h e Cabinet agreed t o proceed as proposed i t would be necessary t o c o n s i d e r t h e m a t t e r a g a i n i n the l i g h t o f t h e I r i s h Government's response; and t h e Cabinet would be f u l l y c o n s u l t e d b e f o r e any f i r m o r d e t a i l e d p r o p o s a l s were p u t t o t h e I r i s h Government. I n d i s c u s s i o n i t was p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e abandonment by t h e I r i s h R e p u b l i c o f i t s t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m t o t h e N o r t h would i n v o l v e amending the t e r r i t o r i a l p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e I r i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h a t t h i s would r e q u i r e a referendum i n t h e R e p u b l i c . I t was u n l i k e l y t h a t any I r i s h Government would be ready t o h o l d such a referendum, t h e r e s u l t o f which appeared almost c e r t a i n l y t o be n e g a t i v e . I t might be p o s s i b l e t o devise a means whereby t h e I r i s h R e p u b l i c c o u l d waive i t s t e r r i t o r i a l
c l a i m w i t h o u t f o r m a l amendment o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , b u t a d e c l a r a t i o n by t h e p r e s e n t I r i s h Government t o t h i s e f f e c t , unaccompanied by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment, would c a r r y no c o n v i c t i o n w i t h u n i o n i s t o p i n i o n and would be l i a b l e t o be revoked by a f u t u r e Fianna F a i l Government. For t h e B r i t i s h Government t o e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e I r i s h on the b a s i s o f a pledge by t h e I r i s h Government about t h e u n i o n which i t
was subsequently unable t o d e l i v e r c o u l d be h i g h l y damaging. I t was, however, i m p o s s i b l e t o judge what m i g h t o r m i g h t n o t be n e g o t i a b l e w i t h o u t f i r s t e x p l o r i n g t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e I r i s h Government. A l t h o u g h e x p e r i e n c e suggested t h a t any B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d was l i k e l y t o r a i s e u n j u s t i f i e d e x p e c t a t i o n s and f e a r s i n t h e P r o v i n c e and t h e r e b y make m a t t e r s worse, t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n t h e r e was so bad t h a t i t would be wrong n o t t o e x p l o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r change. The consequences of d o i n g n o t h i n g c o u l d be as damaging i n terms o f c o n t i n u e d l o s s o f l i f e as t h e consequences o f seeking a new approach. Contacts w i t h t h e I r i s h Government on t h e q u e s t i o n were i n t r i n s i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e . The growing p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h o f P r o v i s i o n a l Sinn F e i n and t h e impending r e p o r t o f the "Forum f o r a New I r e l a n d " would have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e U n i t e d Kingdom's f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s , n o t a b l y w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and t h e approach o u t l i n e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d appeared to r e p r e s e n t t h e l e a s t u n p r o m i s i n g way f o r w a r d . Any new approach t o t h e problem by t h e B r i t i s h Government would arouse f i e r c e u n i o n i s t h o s t i l i t y , but i t would be wrong t o be d e t e r r e d f r o m u n d e r t a k i n g a p r e l i m i n a r y , low-key e x p l o r a t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h t h e I r i s h . THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the d i s c u s s i o n , s a i d t h a t t h e Cabinet was i n agreement t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Cabinet s h o u l d make an i n f o r m a l , s e c r e t and s t r i c t l y e x p l o r a t o r y approach t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e I r i s h Government on t h e l i n e s o u t l i n e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r N o r t h e r n Ireland. 2
SECRET SECRET The Cabinet -
I n s t r u c t e d the S e c r e t a r y o f the Cabinet t o proceed on t h e l i n e s proposed, and t o r e p o r t . 3 SECRET SECRET Copy No J o f 3 Copies MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD TO CC(84) 9 t h Conclusions Thursday 8 March 1984 NORTHERN
IRELAND
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Cabinet had now had an i n f o r m a l , s e c r e t and e x p l o r a t o r y d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e I r i s h Government i n t h e terms a u t h o r i s e d by t h e Cabinet on 16 February. I t had been apparent t h a t t h e Taoiseach, Dr F i t z g e r a l d , was h e a v i l y
p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h b r i n g i n g t h e "Forum f o r a New I r e l a n d " t o a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n ; and t h a t , p a r t l y i n consequence o f t h a t p r e o c c u p a t i o n , t h e I r i s h s i d e had been taken somewhat by s u r p r i s e by t h e B r i t i s h approach. They welcomed a number o f elements i n i t , b u t had s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the idea o f a border s t r i p which would i n c o r p o r a t e t e r r i t o r y on t h e R e p u b l i c ' s s i d e o f t h e b o r d e r . I t appeared t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e Taoiseach stood by t h e "basic e q u a t i o n " which t h e I r i s h s i d e had adumbrated e a r l i e r - namely, t h a t he was l o o k i n g f o r arrangements which would a s s o c i a t e the Republic w i t h law enforcement i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d i n r e t u r n f o r r e c o g n i t i o n by t h e Republic t h a t N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d would remain p a r t o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom f o r t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e - he s t i l l had no c l e a r ideas of h i s own on how t o g i v e i t p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t . I t seemed t o be t h e I r i s h w i s h t o keep t h e B r i t i s h s i d e i n p l a y w h i l e they d i d t h e i r own homework; and i t would p r o b a b l y be necessary t o a w a i t p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e Forum's r e p o r t b e f o r e i t would be p o s s i b l e t o g e t a c l e a r e r p i c t u r e o f t h e I r i s h Government's t h i n k i n g . The Cabinet -
Took n o t e . SECRET SECRET Copy No I o f 3 Copies
MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD TO CC(84) 24th Conclusions Thursday 28 June 1984 PARLIAMENTARY
AFFAIRS
Northern
Ireland
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t t h e Cabinet would r e c a l l a u t h o r i s i n g t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Cabinet t o e x p l o r e , i n i n f o r m a l and s e c r e t d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e I r i s h Government, Mr Dermot N a l l y , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i d e n t i f y i n g a b a s i s f o r agreement under which t h e Republic would reassure o p i n i o n i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d by t a k i n g f o r m a l a c t i o n which would have t h e e f f e c t o f w a i v i n g o r suspending t h e t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d embodied i n t h e I r i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n , and would r e a f f i r m the acceptance o f t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s o f N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d c o u l d be changed o n l y w i t h t h e consent o f t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e people o f N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , i n r e t u r n f o r arrangements p r o v i d i n g f o r j o i n t a c t i v i t y i n t h e f i e l d o f s e c u r i t y and f o r p o l i t i c a l arrangements which c o u l d s t r e n g t h e n t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e S o c i a l Democratic and Labour P a r t y (SDLP) a g a i n s t Sinn F e i n . A p r e l i m i n a r y round o f d i s c u s s i o n s had t a k e n p l a c e , and t h e I r i s h Government had welcomed t h e U n i t e d Kingdom's c o n s t r u c t i v e approach t o t h e exchanges. Since t h e n , t h e New I r e l a n d Forum's r e p o r t had been p u b l i s h e d . I t would now be a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e Cabinet t o a u t h o r i s e f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t o r y d i s c u s s i o n s which would be designed t o e s t a b l i s h a c l e a r e r p i c t u r e o f t h e e x t e n t o f I r i s h w i l l i n g n e s s t o develop t h e d u a l approach which had been o u t l i n e d , and t o e x p l o r e f u r t h e r what p o s s i b i l i t y t h e r e was o f a g r e e i n g upon arrangements which would be a c c e p t a b l e b o t h t o u n i o n i s t and t o n a t i o n a l i s t o p i n i o n i n
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . There were obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s . The New I r e l a n d Forum's r e p o r t had i d e n t i f i e d t h e t h r e e o p t i o n s o f a u n i t a r y s t a t e , a c o n f e d e r a l s t a t e , o r j o i n t a u t h o r i t y . The I r i s h argued t h a t they had d e l i b e r a t e l y avoided t h e term " j o i n t s o v e r e i g n t y " ; t h e r e were d i f f e r e n c e s of view on t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e concept o f " j o i n t a u t h o r i t y " f o r t h e c o n t i n u i n g e x e r c i s e o f B r i t i s h s o v e r e i g n t y . I t was n e v e r t h e l e s s c l e a r t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d c o u l d n o t be l e f t as i t was w i t h o u t some f u r t h e r a t t e m p t t o e x p l o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e a s s u r i n g t h e U n i o n i s t s on t h e b o r d e r i s s u e w h i l e o f f e r i n g t o t h e Republic some p o l i t i c a l movement a f f e c t i n g s e c u r i t y and t h e Assembly. The I r i s h argued t h a t they c o u l d n o t , f o r t h e i r p a r t , undertake s i g n i f i c a n t concessions on the t e r r i t o r i a l and border issues unless they were o f f e r e d a reasonable package i n r e t u r n . Both s i d e s r e c o g n i s e d t h e i r j o i n t i n t e r e s t i n weakening support i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d f o r Sinn F e i n . A f u r t h e r round o f e x p l o r a t o r y d i s c u s s i o n s would be s e c r e t : knowledge o f t h e exchanges t o date had n o t leaked o u t , and i t was v i t a l t h a t secrecy should c o n t i n u e t o be p r e s e r v e d .
I f t h e r e were t o be a l e a k , t h e I r i s h Government would be unable t o c o n t i n u e t h e process. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND summarised, a t t h e Prime M i n i s t e r ' s i n v i t a t i o n , h i s approach t o t h e f o r t h c o m i n g P a r l i a m e n t a r y debate, on 2 J u l y , on t h e r e p o r t o f t h e New I r e l a n d Forum and o t h e r documents. He noted t h a t , w i t h t h e "marching season" due t o b e g i n on 12 J u l y , i t would be i m p o r t a n t t o a v o i d pushing t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d i n t o h a r d p o s i t i o n s . He would t h e r e f o r e adopt a q u i e t I
SECRET SECRET approach, i d e n t i f y i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s which t h e New I r e l a n d Forum's r e p o r t posed: i t was c l e a r t h a t changes c o u l d n o t take p l a c e i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d w i t h o u t consent and t h a t none o f t h e t h r e e courses sketched o u t i n t h e r e p o r t c o u l d command consent.
He c o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s welcome some p o s i t i v e elements i n t h e r e p o r t and make i t c l e a r t h a t i t was t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d themselves which c o u l d make t h e greatest c o n t r i b u t i o n t o progress.
I t was n o t a b l e t h a t t h e r e had been a s i g n i f i c a n t change i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e l e a d e r o f t h e Democratic U n i o n i s t P a r t y , Mr I a n P a i s l e y . A f t e r w i n n i n g a p e r s o n a l v o t e o f over o n e - t h i r d o f t h e t o t a l i n t h e e l e c t i o n s t o t h e European P a r l i a m e n t , Mr P a i s l e y was e v i d e n t l y i n a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n and f e l t a b l e t o c a r r y h i s
p a r t y w i t h him. He had i n d i c a t e d t h a t he would be prepared t o engage i n
p r i v a t e t a l k s w i t h t h e l e a d e r o f t h e SDLP, Mr John Hume, who, f o r h i s p a r t , d i d n o t r u l e t h i s o u t i n h i s search f o r a package w i t h an I r i s h dimension.
Quiet d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h i s k i n d c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y produce a h e l p f u l outcome, and i t was t h e r e f o r e i m p o r t a n t , i n t h e f o r t h c o m i n g P a r l i a m e n t a r y debate, t h a t n o t h i n g should be s a i d which might p r e j u d i c e them. I n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s i n t h e O f f i c i a l U n i o n i s t P a r t y made i t h a r d e r t o d e a l w i t h ; b u t "The Way Forward" was a good document and t h e e x t e n t o f i t s r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s o f t h e m i n o r i t y was encouraging.
The I r i s h Government were u n l i k e l y t o be d i s t u r b e d by t h e debate i f they knew t h a t the s e c r e t exchanges which t h e Prime M i n i s t e r had d e s c r i b e d were t o go ahead: he c o u l d t h e r e f o r e a f f o r d , i n t h e debate, t o a v o i d u p s e t t i n g t h e U n i o n i s t s , t h e r e b y p r e s e r v i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t a l k s between them and t h e SDLP. THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up t h e d i s c u s s i o n , a g a i n emphasised t h e importance o f c o n t i n u i n g t h e s e c r e t d i s c u s s i o n s between t h e S e c r e t a r y o f the Cabinet and t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e I r i s h Government. I t was one t h i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e framework f o r p o s s i b l e progress b u t another t o move i n t o the n e x t phase o f i d e n t i f y i n g s p e c i f i c means o f a c h i e v i n g i t .
I f complete secrecy were n o t p r e s e r v e d progress would be i m p o s s i b l e . I t was necessary a t t h i s j u n c t u r e t o l o o k f u r t h e r ahead i n I r e l a n d than t h e B r i t i s h Government had done b e f o r e . Ten thousand B r i t i s h s o l d i e r s c o u l d n o t be l e f t i n Northern I r e l a n d f o r e v e r , nor could the very considerable cost o f s u b s i d i s i n g t h e P r o v i n c e be s u s t a i n e d , w i t h o u t c o n t i n u i n g t h e search f o r p o s s i b l e f o r w a r d movement. The Cabinet -
I n s t r u c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Cabinet
l i n e s proposed, and t o r e p o r t . 2
SECRET t o proceed on t h e CONFIDENTIAL Copy No X of 4 Copies
MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD TO CC(84) 3 6 t h Conclusions Thursday 8 November 1984 THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t t h e annual Autumn Statement ECONOMIC SITUATION AND would be p u b l i s h e d on Monday 12 November. I t would t a k e f u l l account of t h e d e c i s i o n s which the Cabinet had j u s t taken on the 1984 P u b l i c PROSPECTS E x p e n d i t u r e Survey. On t h e g e n e r a l economic s i t u a t i o n , i t would show t h a t o u t p u t was expected t o grow by about 2£ per cent i n 1984 and 3£ per cent i n 1985 as the economy recovered f r o m t h e e f f e c t s of the c o a l m i n e r s ' s t r i k e . I n f l a t i o n would d e c l i n e from 43/4 per cent i n t h e f o u r t h q u a r t e r o f 1984 t o about 4£ p e r cent i n the f o u r t h q u a r t e r o f 1985.
The balance o f payments on c u r r e n t account, which had been s e r i o u s l y i m p a i r e d by a d d i t i o n a l o i l i m p o r t s and o t h e r consequences o f the c o a l m i n e r s ' s t r i k e , was expected t o improve f r o m bare balance i n 1984 t o a s u r p l u s o f between £2 b i l l i o n and £3 b i l l i o n i n 1985.
The u n d e r l y i n g r a t e o f i n c r e a s e o f e a r n i n g s was l i k e l y t o remain u n d e s i r a b l y h i g h , a t about 7 i per cent i n 1984 and 7 p e r cent i n 1985.
He had agreed w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r S o c i a l S e r v i c e s t h a t the r a t e s o f N a t i o n a l Insurance c o n t r i b u t i o n s should remain unchanged, s u b j e c t t o r e v a l o r i s a t i o n o f the upper and lower e a r n i n g s l i m i t . Employers would, however, enjoy the b e n e f i t of a f u l l year's freedom from the N a t i o n a l Insurance Surcharge, which The P u b l i c had been a b o l i s h e d w i t h e f f e c t from 1 October 1984.
Sector Borrowing Requirement i n 1984-85 was expected t o be £8£ b i l l i o n : t h i s had a l r e a d y been p u b l i c l y i n d i c a t e d . On the b a s i s o f the Government's spending p l a n s and the u s u a l assumptions r e g a r d i n g revenue and b o r r o w i n g , c u r r e n t p r o j e c t i o n s suggested t h a t t h e r e might be room f o r a f i s c a l adjustment i n 1985-86 i n the range o f £1-1 £ b i l l i o n . The Autumn Statement would make i t c l e a r t h a t i t was assumed ( b u t n o t p r e d i c t e d ) t h a t t h e s t r i k e would n o t l a s t i n t o 1985; and t h a t t h e unemployment assumption g i v e n t o the Government A c t u a r y f o r the purposes of h i s v a l u a t i o n o f the N a t i o n a l Insurance Fund and a d v i c e on a p p r o p r i a t e N a t i o n a l I n s u r a n c e f i g u r e s r e l a t e d t o Great B r i t a i n , excluded school l e a v e r s and, as i n p r e v i o u s y e a r s , was c o n v e n t i o n a l . A minor p o i n t , o f which h i s c o l l e a g u e s should be aware, was t h a t i t would be announced t h a t p r i n t i n g o f the £1 n o t e would cease a t the end o f 1984, s a v i n g £3i m i l l i o n i n p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e i n a f u l l y e a r . T h i s d e c i s i o n would need c a r e f u l p r e s e n t a t i o n . The Cabinet -
Took n o t e . Cabinet
Office 15 November 1984 CONFIDENTIAL SECRET Copy No 1 o f
Copies
MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD TO CC(84) 38th
Conclusions
Thursday 22 November 1984 ANGLO-IRISH
SUMMIT
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t she had h e l d t a l k s w i t h the Taoiseach, Dr F i t z G e r a l d , a t Chequers on 18 and 19 November. T h i s was t h e second meeting o f the A n g l o - I r i s h I n t e r - g o v e r n m e n t a l C o u n c i l t o be h e l d a t the Summit l e v e l . On N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , the Taoiseach had expected t o o much from t h e d i s c u s s i o n s and had r e j e c t e d the o f f e r o f a more modest outcome. Dr F i t z G e r a l d had s e t h i s h e a r t on s e c u r i n g a package which would be seen as amounting t o the e x e r c i s e i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d o f j o i n t a u t h o r i t y by the B r i t i s h and I r i s h Governments, i n r e t u r n f o r t h e abandonment o f the I r i s h t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m t o N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d by means o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment. There had been t h r e e main areas of d i s c u s s i o n . F i r s t l y , on s e c u r i t y , the I r i s h had been o f f e r e d a J o i n t S e c u r i t y Commission, c o m p r i s i n g the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , the I r i s h M i n i s t e r o f J u s t i c e and the Chief P o l i c e O f f i c e r s f r o m b o t h s i d e s o f the b o r d e r , which would p r o v i d e a forum i n which the n a t i o n a l i s t s c o u l d r a i s e any m a t t e r s o f concern t o them i n the s e c u r i t y f i e l d . The n a t i o n a l i s t s i n the N o r t h would have an advocate on the Commission, i n the person o f the I r i s h M i n i s t e r . The Commission would have o n l y an a d v i s o r y r o l e , b u t i t s c r e a t i o n would n e v e r t h e l e s s r e p r e s e n t a major step f o r w a r d i n A n g l o - I r i s h c o - o p e r a t i o n . The Taoiseach had been unable t o accept t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n s i n c e i n h i s view a J o i n t S e c u r i t y Commission would be seen i n the South as s i m p l y a d e v i c e by which the U n i t e d Kingdom was e n l i s t i n g I r i s h h e l p i n m a i n t a i n i n g s e c u r i t y i n the N o r t h . The second main area covered by t h e d i s c u s s ions had been t h a t o f the p o l i t i c a l framework i n
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . On t h i s , the Taoiseach had r e p e a t e d l y r e v e r t e d t o
t h e s u b j e c t o f power-sharing, which was anathema t o t h e U n i o n i s t s . The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t she had p o i n t e d out t h a t e x c l u s i o n from the e x e r c i s e o f power was a f a t e shared by a l l m i n o r i t i e s when p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were based on r e l i g i o n o r r a c e . The B r i t i s h Government c o u l d n o t impose a p o l i t i c a l framework on the p a r t i e s i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d : progress was l i k e l y t o r e s u l t o n l y from t a l k s , f r e e l y e n t e r e d i n t o , between those p a r t i e s . I t would be up t o the I r i s h Government t o
press the n a t i o n a l i s t s t o engage i n such d i s c u s s i o n s , w h i l e t h e B r i t i s h Government c o u l d e x e r t s i m i l a r p r e s s u r e on the U n i o n i s t p a r t i e s . Talks o f t h i s n a t u r e c o u l d take p l a c e under t h e aegis o f t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , and e a r l y d i s c u s s i o n s t o t h i s end were envisaged.
The t h i r d area o f d i s c u s s i o n concerned the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o - o p e r a t i o n i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f c r i m i n a l law i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d and t h e Republic and t h e q u e s t i o n whether f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be g i v e n t o the c r e a t i o n o f mixed c o u r t s over which judges from b o t h sides of the b o r d e r might p r e s i d e . The Taoiseach's u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o s e t t l e , f o r the time b e i n g , f o r progress towards the c r e a t i o n o f a J o i n t S e c u r i t y Commission had prevented the meeting as a whole from p r o d u c i n g a p o s i t i v e outcome. I
SECRET SECRET
The Taoiseach had spoken f a i r l y and c o n s t r u c t i v e l y a t h i s press conference f o l l o w i n g t h e Summit m e e t i n g . F o l l o w i n g h i s r e t u r n t o D u b l i n , however, he had faced h o s t i l e press comment and, a t a meeting w i t h h i s backbenchers, had a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o make u n h e l p f u l remarks which had, f o r t h e time b e i n g , soured t h e atmosphere o f A n g l o - I r i s h relations. I n a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n , i t was noted t h a t , i n t h e immediate a f t e r m a t h of t h e Chequers m e e t i n g , i t had seemed p o s s i b l e t h a t f u r t h e r movement towards agreement on the c r e a t i o n o f a J o i n t S e c u r i t y Commission would be f e a s i b l e and t h a t i t might even s t i l l be p o s s i b l e , over a l o n g e r p e r i o d , t o move towards a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e I r i s h s i d e would be able t o c o n s i d e r a referendum on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment. F o l l o w i n g Dr F i t z G e r a l d ' s o u t b u r s t i n D u b l i n , however, t h e o u t l o o k was c l e a r l y l e s s p r o m i s i n g . The Taoiseach's i n t e m p e r a t e r e a c t i o n t o h i s p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s had been echoed by l e a d i n g members o f t h e S o c i a l Democrat and Labour P a r t y (SDLP) i n B e l f a s t . A p e r i o d o f calm was now r e q u i r e d . I t would be i m p o r t a n t t o impress on t h e U n i o n i s t s t h a t they h e l d a p o s i t i o n o f c o n s i d e r a b l e t a c t i c a l s t r e n g t h and should t h e r e f o r e a l l o w themselves t o demonstrate, i n p r i v a t e d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e SDLP, t h a t they r e c o g n i s e d t h e need t o a l l e v i a t e t h e concerns o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t minority. The Cabinet -
Took
note.
Cabinet O f f i c e 26 November 1984 2
SECRET 
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