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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 5th Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 3 F e b r u a r y 1972 at 11, 30 am
THE S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R D E F E N C E said that the A r m y
welcomed the inquiry which the Lord Chief Justice of England,
Lord Widgery, had agreed to undertake under the Tribunals of
Inquiry (Evidence) A c t 1921 into the events in Londonderry on
Sunday 30 January.
It was to be feared that serious d i s o r d e r s ,
with a risk of a further loss of life, might result f r o m the marches
planned to take place in and around Newry on Sunday 6 F e b r u a r y .
Contingents f r o m Dundalk, which lay close across the B o r d e r , were
intending to take part.
The dispositions made by the security forces
involved in this case the Royal Ulster Constabulary ( R U C ) , whom it
had been impracticable to deploy in this way in Londonderry; the
A r m y would be kept in r e s e r v e to cover points which the R U C might
not be able to hold,
THE P R I M E MINISTER, summing up a brief discussion, said that
there might be advantage in ensuring that it was more widely known
that, as the Lord Chancellor had already informed the House of
L o r d s , it had been Lord Widgery s own proposal that he should
conduct the Inquiry alone.
This might help to forestall any
suggestion that the Government had appointed a single individual
in order to avoid the possibility of a divergence of view such as
had arisen between Lord P a r k e r and Mr John Boyd-.Carpenter M P
on the one hand and L o r d Gardiner on the other hand during their
recent Inquiry into the procedures governing interrogation.
L o r d Widgery judged that his own Inquiry was simply into questions
of fact; that he would be able to f o r m an opinion by questioning e y e ­
witnesses without the need for expert or other assistance; and that
he could conclude the Inquiry more quickly if he conducted it alone
The Roman Catholic residents of Londonderry might not be prepared
to co-operate with him.
But he would have power to summon
witnesses sub poena; and it could not be convincingly argued
that the Lord Chief Justice of England lacked impartiality.
As
to the marches planned in and around N e w r y , it was desirable that
every influence should be brought to bear to prevent their taking
place.
He had himself written to the Roman Catholic Archbishop
5
e
1
of Westminster and to the Roman Catholic P r i m a t e of A l l Ireland;
and H M Ambassador in Dublin was delivering a personal message
to the P r i m e Minister of the Irish Republic, Mr Lynch, asking him
in particular to dissuade citizens of the Republic from taking part.
The Cabinet ­
1.
Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s
summing up of this part of their discussion.
T H E P R I M E MINISTER said that the Northern Ireland P r i m e Minister,
M r Faulkner, had been invited to London to discuss the political
situation on the following day.
There w e r e reports that Mr Lynch
and the leaders of the Fine Gael and Labour Parties in the Republic
might also wish to come to London to meet British Ministers.
If
such a request was made and could be deemed to be for the purpose
of serious discussion rather than mere propaganda, it would be unwise
to refuse.
It was desirable to lower the political tension in the
Republic, if possible, particularly in view of Mr l y n c h ' s precarious
position and the absence of any successor who could exert a
moderating influence.
The situation was being kept under constant
r e v i e w by the Ministers principally concerned; in particular possible
forms of political initiative w e r e being carefully appraised.
In discussion there was general agreement on the importance of ­
maintaining a broad base of support in Great Britain for the
G o v e r n m e n t s policy.
A growing section of public opinion wished
to see British troops withdrawn f r o m Northern Ireland.
It was
sometimes forgotten, however, that the A r m y was the A r m y of
the United Kingdom and was not operating in a foreign or colonial
territory.
Moreover, to threaten withdrawal might create an
expectation that the G o v e r n m e n t s resolution was weakening, while
to c a r r y it out could only result in extensive bloodshed in Northern
Ireland, in which the Roman Catholic element of the population might
well be the main sufferers.
Before the A r m y garrison could be
reduced to a significantly lower level an acceptable state of law and
order would have to be r e s t o r e d and a satisfactory political settle ­
ment would need to be achieved.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , in order to retain
a broad measure of public support for the maintenance of l a r g e
military forces in Northern Ireland, it was desirable that movement
towards some political solution of the conflict should be seen to be in
prospect.
It was also probable that there would be increasing
international p r e s s u r e in favour of a political initiative.
But, although any political initiative, in order to have any prospect
of success, must command a broad measure of support f r o m all
political Parties in the United Kingdom Parliament, it mast also
be acceptable to substantial numbers of both Protestants and Roman
Catholics in Ireland.
Otherwise the bulk of the Protestant
population would be antagonised and possibly provoked to violent
reaction, while the Roman Catholics would remain no less
alienated than at present.
The acceptance by Roman Catholics
of any political settlement, however, depended in large measure
on its endorsement by the Government of the Republic.
The l o n g ­
term solution might therefore have to involve some kind of
constitutional association between the two parts of Ireland,
while permitting the Six Counties of Northern Ireland to continue
to f o r m part of the United Kingdom.
Similarly, the Government
of the Republic would not be able to mobilise public support against
the Irish Republican A r m y (IRA) unless they could convincingly
endorse whatever solution was found in Northern Ireland.
The
uncertainty of Mr l y n c h ' s political position might be relevant to
this pointj but the importance of action by the Government of the
Republic against the IRA was underlined by the military impossibility
of completely sealing the Border,
In order to promote a political settlement it might be necessary to
take major political r i s k s , which might involve a substantial
modification of earlier policies and even the possibility of
considerable bloodshed.
Nevertheless, it might be possible
to reach an acceptable solution on the basis of ensuring the minority
community an active, permanent and guaranteed r o l e in government,
while simultaneously giving assurances about the position of
Northern Ireland in relation to the r e s t of the United Kingdom.
If it was made clear that this latter question would be made the
subject of a plebiscite, albeit not for a number of y e a r s , this might
remove the emotive subject of the Border f r o m the centre of
Northern Ireland politics.
Nor was it necessarily impossible
to secure the continuance of the Parliamentary system of government
established by the Government of Ireland Act 1920 within a generally
acceptable political solution.
It had been found possible elsewhere,
for example in the Lebanon, to devise an acceptable method of
allocating governmental responsibilities between representatives
of different religious groupings.
Whatever the form of any political initiative, however, it would have
to take account of the problems created by internment.
Within the
limits imposed by the requirements of security it might be necessary
to devise a phased p r o g r a m m e for the r e l e a s e of internees; and it
might be desirable to give further consideration to the possibility of
establishing special courts empowered to try accused persons under
rules of evidence, which would go some way to meet the difficulties
which the IRA's campaign of intimidation placed in the way of the
direct confrontation of witnesses.
THE P R I M E MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that a
major obstacle to any rational solution was likely to be the absence
of any incentive to the IRA to desist f r o m violence at any point short
of the establishment of a revolutionary all-Ireland Republic.
The
Cabinet s discussion, however, had indicated several lines of thought
which might profitably be explored further.
The immediate question
was whether the tragic events of the previous weekend in Londonderry
had provided an opportunity for a political initiative or whether, on
the contrary, they had made such an initiative impracticable for the
time being.
When he had met Mr Lynch in B r u s s e l s at the signing
of the Treaties of A c c e s s i o n to the European Economic Community
Mr Lynch had suggested, even though in rather indefinite t e r m s , that
the moment for a political initiative might a r r i v e when the influence
of the IRA in Belfast had been perceptibly weakened but the Protestant
community were still sufficiently apprehensive of violence to be
prepared to offer a measure of compromise.
But, even if this
had been Mr Lynch's view a few weeks e a r l i e r , it must probably
be assumed that it would no longer be so; and, even if this analysis
had been correct at the time, it could hardly be regarded as valid in
present circumstances.
The Ministers directly concerned with
Northern Ireland affairs would continue to keep the situation under
close review and would report further to the Cabinet as necessary.
1
The Cabinet ­
2,
Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s
summing up of their discussion.
Cabinet Office
4 F e b r u a r y 1972
O C U M E N T IS THE P R O P E R T Y O F HER B R I T A N N I C MAJESTY'S
G O V E R N M E N T C O P Y NO
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0
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 7th Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 17 F e b r u a r y 1972 at 10. 30 a. m.
ITHERN
LAND
Parker
sort
cial
vers A c t s
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that the Ministers directly concerned
had considered the Report of the Committee on Interrogation
Procedures under the Chairmanship of L o r d P a r k e r .
The 3 P r i v y
Counsellors who had constituted the Committee had been unable to
agree upon their conclusions.
L o r d P a r k e r and M r . Boyd Carpenter
had formed the view that the use of hooding and certain other methods
in connection with the interrogation of detainees in Northern Ireland
had been morally justified and would be morally justified in similar
circumstances elsewhere but that in Great Britain at least they had
no legal justification.
They had refrained from expressing an opinion
about their legality in Northern Ireland since a case which might
r a i s e this issue was currently before the Courts there.
The effect
of the majority recommendation, therefore, was that the Government,
before authorising these techniques on a future occasion, should
ensure that there was adequate legal authority for them.
L o r d Gardiner, on the other hand, had taken the view not only that the
techniques w e r e plainly unlawful but also that they could not in any
circumstances be morally justified.
The Ministers concerned had
reached the conclusion that the majority recommendation should be
accepted to the extent that it held the techniques to be morally
justified but that it was unrealistic to suppose that legislation giving
them legal authority could be passed through Parliament.
The
Report would be published in the course of the following week; and he
would make an appropriate statement about the Government's position
at the same time.
Meanwhile, it was important that the Report
should be regarded as highly confidential.
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R also informed the Cabinet that judgment was
shortly to be given in the Northern Ireland Supreme Court in a case
which raised the issue whether the A r m y could properly be authorised
to c a r r y out functions under the Civil Authorities (Special P o w e r s )
Acts of the Northern Ireland Parliament.
The Ministers concerned
1
w e r e urgently considering the situation which would a r i s e if the
judgment w e r e adverse to the Crown and the A r m y w e r e limited,
as a result, to such functions as they could normally discharge in
support of the civil power under common law.
The Cabinet Took note of the statements by the P r i m e Minister.
Cabinet Office
17 F e b r u a r y ,
1972
2
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
C M ( 7 2 ) 9th Conclusions
Tuesday 22 F e b r u a r y 1972 at 11. 00 am
RTHERN
LAND
evious
ference:
(72) 7th
seclusions,
ute 3
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that the Attorney General had had
further discussions with the legal authorities in Northern
Ireland regarding the appeal by the Member of the Northern
Ireland Parliament, M r John Hume, of which the Cabinet had been
informed at their meeting on 17 F e b r u a r y .
Judgment in the case
was expected to be delivered at 10 o'clock am on Wednesday
23 February; it was likely to be adverse to the Crown.
In
particular the judgment might declare that the Northern Ireland
Parliament was precluded by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920,
from conferring any powers upon members of Her Majesty's
For;es.
Since 1969, the A r m y had relied heavily upon powers
conferred upon them by the Civil Authorities (Special P o w e r s )
Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922-43 ("The Special P o w e r s A c t s " ) .
The effect of the pending judgment might therefore be to invalidate
a l l actions taken by the A r m y by virtue of those powers.
It was
not certain how widely the judgment would be drawn; but it seemed
that it could not affect the A r m y ' s powers in so far as they were
derived from sources other than the Northern Ireland Parliament,
for example the common law.
In the event of an adverse judgment, tvro courses of action would be*
open to the Government.
The first would be to appeal to the House
of L o r d s .
But this would inevitably take time; the House of
Lords might, in the event, confirm the judgment upholding
M r Hume's appeal; and, meanwhile, the A r m y w o u l d b e inhibited
from exercising powers conferred upon them by the Special P o w e r s
Acts and would be exposed to litigation in respect of their past
actions based on those powers.
The second course was to introduce '
declaratory legislation, interpreting the Government of Ireland A c t ,
1920, in such a way as to make it clear that it did not exclude from
the competence of the Northern Ireland Parliament all legislative
provision relating to m e m b e r s of Her Majesty's forces and that,
in particular, it did not preclude the conferment of powers in
relation to the maintenance of public order in Northern Ireland.
In
consultation with those Ministers most directly concerned, he had
concluded that this w a s the better course; and a short draft Hill,
(the text of which was circulated to the Cabinet during their
discussion) had accordingly been prepared.
But, although the
B i l l was in form no m o r e than a technical restatement of the
legal position as it had always been thought to be, its introduction
would be liable to expose the whole complex of Northern Ireland
issues to further debate in Parliament.
The Leader of the
Opposition, whom he had consulted in confidence, had indicated
a willingness to co-operate in revalidating actions authorised in
good faith under both the previous and the present Administrations;
but he had pointed out that the introduction of the Bill would offer
scope for debating the disputed policies which the A r m y ' s
operations in Northern Ireland could be held to be supporting.
There were precedents for passing legislation through all stages
in a single day in circumstances of emergency.
It might
therefore be possible either to enact the proposed Bill on
Wednesday, 23 F e b r u a r y , or to publish it on that day and to pass it
through all stages on Thursday 24 F e b r u a r y . Ifc wao for co&*ii&ere.taosa
whether the draft B i l l should be amended to place a limitation of time
upon the grant of special powers to the F o r c e s .
This, however,
might alter the character of the B i l l by importing an issue of policy
into legislation which was confined essentially to a question of
interpretation; and a substantive amendment of the Government of
Ireland Act, 1920, could not be easily reconciled with a short Bill
which was designed m e r e l y to clarify the construction which
Parliament intended should be put upon that statute.
It would be
desirable that, in addition to his further consultations with the
L e a d e r of the Opposition, he should send a message to the P r i m e
Minister of the Irish Republic, M r Lynch, informing him that the
action which the Government proposed to take was essentially
technical and should certainly not be construed as in any sense an
adverse response to the helpful tone of M r Lynch's recent address
to the annual conference of the Fianna F a i l Party.
The Northern
Ireland P r i m e Minister, M r Faulkner, should also be kept informed
of the G o v e r n m e n f s intentions.
THE A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L informed the Cabinet that M r Hume
had appealed against a conviction for failing to disperse when
ordered to do so by a member of the F o r c e s in accordance with
Regulation 38 made under the Special P o w e r s A c t s .
Although a
judgment in the English courts in September, 1971, had not
questioned the validity of the exercise by the F o r c e s of powers
conferred by tl ese A c t s , M r Hume's appeal contended that such
powers had not been validly conferred.
If his appeal was upheld,
the A r m y would therefore be exposed to writs of habeas corpus
and to accusations of wrongful a r r e s t , unlawful entering of
p r e m i s e s and, probably, assault.
Moreover, individuals would be
entirely within their legal rights in refusing to obey o r d e r s given
by members of the F o r c e s under powers conferred by the Special
P o w e r s Acts.
The draft B i l l before the Cabinet was designed,
both in its form and in its long title, merely to declare that
Parliament intended the relevant provisions of the Government of
Ireland Act, 1920, to be interpreted in the sense which had always
been assumed hitherto.
It did not propose any amendment of the
1920 A c t .
Any such amendment, for example, in the form of a
limitation in time of the powers declared to have been conferred by
the Act, would be a matter of policy and would require a B i l l of a
different kind.
Other judgments which had been given, or were
pending, in cases concerning the alleged abuse by m e m b e r s of the
F o r c e s of powers conferred by the Special P o w e r s Acts w e r e
separate from the present case, which was concerned solely
-with the legal poegepesion of those powers bv the F o r c e s .
In discussion it was pointed out that most of the Regulations
conferring special powers upon the F o r c e s were of many y e a r s
standing and that the previous Administration had stated in public
that the F o r c e s relied heavily upon these powers for operational
purposes in Northern Ireland.
Nevertheless, a judgment that the
powers had not been validly conferred by the Northern Ireland
Parliament might reinforce the widely held feeling that the present
division of powers between Westminster and Stormont was
unsatisfactory and that the United Kingdom Government and
Parliament should assume the whole of the responsibility for
matters of law and order in No rthern Ireland.
It might be thought
desirable to r e a s s e r t the principle of close control by the United
Kingdom Government over the actions of the A r m y and the powers
entrusted to them; but a positive reassertion of this principle
might necessitate specific enactments at Westminster in terms
identical with considerable portions of the Northern Ireland Special
P o w e r s legislation. M o r e o v e r , if legislation was introduced at
Westminster with a wider scope than a simple interpretation of the
1920 Act, it might be taken as constituting the whole of the
political measures which much recent speculation had suggested
that the Government w e r e contemplating.
Even a simple i n t e r ­
pretative Bill, however, would inevitably give rise to a demand to
be informed whether, and if so when, a major political initiative
was contemplated.
This question could not be answered until
Ministers had given further consideration to the decisions which
they might wish to take and the substantive legislation which these
might entail.
Nevertheless, it could be stated that the possibility
of more widely ranging legislation was not excluded but that it
would have to be considered in a wider political context.
1
Meanwhile, the A r m y would be placed in a very difficult position if
the powers previously thought to have been conferred on them by the
Special P o w e r s Acts w e r e not speedily revalidated.
It was true
that legislation in the form proposed would give retrospective
validity to their actions p r i o r to the enactment of the B i l l .
But in
the interval between publication of the legal judgment and Royal
Assent to the legislation individuals would be fully justified in law
in resisting any action taken by a member of the F o r c e s under powers
conferred by the Special P o w e r s A c t s .
It was therefore important
to complete the legislative process as rapidly as possible; and,
meanwhile, the security forces would have to r e l y upon powers
deriving from common law and upon the powers conferred by the
Special Powers Acts upon the civil authority.
A brief interim
period might be acceptable; but any significantly longer period
would be very undesirable, not least in the opportunity which it
would provide to the Irish Republican A r m y to rebuild its strength
and its resources.
A s regards the timing of the legislation, introduction of the Bill on
Wednesday, 23 February, might be criticised as not allowing
Parliament sufficient time for proper consideration of the issues.
On the other hand postponement until Thursday, 24 February, would
provide more scope for controversy about the measure to develop.
It would in any event be necessary to study the terms of the
judgment with care in order to confirm that the proposed Bill was
c o r r e c t l y drawn.
The best course might be to make statements in
both Houses at 3. 30 pm on Wednesday, 23 F e b r u a r y , informing
Parliament of the legal judgment and indicating the Government's
intention to introduce legislation at the earliest possible moment.
A procedural Resolution might then permit the interruption of
business later the same day for the B i l l to be introduced and passed
through all its stages in the House of Commons, with a view to
passing the House of Lords and receiving the Royal Assent as e a r l y
as possible on Thursday, 24 F e b r u a r y .
T H E P R I M E MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the
Cabinet agreed that, if the court in Northern Ireland deHvered a
judgment adverse to the Crown, corrective action should be taken
in the form of legislation rather than an appeal to the House of L o r d s .
The L o r d President of the Council, the L o r d P r i v y Seal, and the
Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury, should consider, in consulta­
tion with officers of both Houses of Parliament, the feasibility of
arrangements whereby statements would be made at 3. 30 pm or
Wednesday, 23 F e b r u a r y , the B i l l would be presented on the same
day and passed through all its stages in the House of Commons
f r o m 7. 00 pm onwards, all stages being thereafter taken in the
House of Lords and the Royal Assent being given on Thursday,
24 F e b r u a r y .
Should this not be feasible, the aim should be to pass
the legislation through all stages in both Houses, and to obtain the
Royal Assent, on Thursday, 24 F e b r u a r y ; this latter course might
in any event have to be accepted if there was a strong feeling in the
House of Commons that a debate on Wednesday, 23 February,
would afford insufficient time for p r i o r consideration of the issues.
He would himself consult further with the Leader of the Opposition
as appropriate.
He would also arrange for M r Faulkner to be
informed of the Governments intentions and for a message to be sent
4
to M r Lynch indicating that the proposed legislation was no m o r e
than a technical restatement of the law as it had always been
considered to be and was in no sense intended to discount the helpful
tone of M r Lynch's recent public statements.
Although the draft
B i l l was purely technical, however, the Parliamentary debate was
likely to r a i s e wider political questions which would require to b e
dealt with discreetly.
Meanwhile, during the period between an
adverse judgment and the grant of Royal Assent to the proposed
B i l l the F o r c e s should refrain from exercising the powers confessed
upon them by the Special P o w e r s Acts; it would be necessary to
rely on the powers which they possessed under common law and on
those conferred by the Special Powers Acts upon the civil authority.
Finally, the proposed publication of the P a r k e r Report on
Wednesday, 23 February, should b postponed.
The issues raised
by that report, in so far as they related not to the possession of
certain powers by the F o r c e s but to the manner in which the F o r c e s
had used those powers, w e r e wholly distinct from the question which
the Cabinet had been discussing; and it would be important to avoid
any possibility of confusion.
D
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e Minister^
summing up of their discussion.
Cabinet Office
22 F e b r u a r y 1972
5
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It is issued for the persona
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.A*w/
.r^.^..Jl^A.
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27
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 11th Conclusions, Minute 4
T h u r s d a y 2 March 1972 at 11. 00 am
HERN
,ND
me
once:
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that the situation in Northern Ireland had been kept under close examination by the Ministers principally concerned.
The time had now come when the Cabinet must begin to consider decisions of the utmost importance on the future administration of the Province,
2) 9th
usions
T H E H O M E S E C R E T A R Y said that he believed that the point
had been reached when a decisive political initiative by the United
Kingdom Government was required.
The Roman Catholic minority
had now become totally alienated; and it was clear that, despite the
successes of the A r m y , military action alone could not bring peace
and stability to the Province.
The dangers involved in a political
initiative were great; but the dangers of allowing the present
situation to continue unresolved were even greater.
The Protestant
majority needed a renewed assurance that Northern Ireland would
remain part of the United Kingdom, while the Roman Catholic
minority were entitled to claim the just share in government which
the present political system denied them.
Political reform must
accordingly be directed to satisfying both these aspirations; and it
might need to be supplemented by a progressive relaxation of
internment.
It seemed clear that, in addition, the United Kingdom
Government would have to assume constitutional responsibility for
the maintenance of law and o r d e r .
But if a political reform of this
kind was to succeed, it would be n e c e s s a r y to make a break with the
past and to arrange for the United Kingdom Government to exercise
direct responsibility for the administration of Northern Ireland for
an interim period.
He would circulate a memorandum to the
Cabinet, setting out in greater detail proposals on the lines which
he had indicated, as the basis for an e a r l y discussion of the whole
problem.
T H E LORD C H A N C E L L O R said that studies of possible arrangements
for bringing to trial some of the individuals who were at present
interned under the Special P o w e r s Acts had been put in hand.
If
the main problem was the perversity or intimidation of j u r i e s , it
would be possible by legislation at Westminster to create special
courts without j u r i e s .
If, however, the principal objective was to
provide an acceptable substitute for internment, it would be
n e c e s s a r y to enact legislation which would enable prosecutions
to be conducted under an inquisitorial, rather than our traditional
adversarial, procedure.
Even so, it would not seem possible
wholly to protect the identity of witnesses c r to be confident that
judicial proceedings of this kind would necessarily result in the
conviction and subsequent imprisonment of all those whose activities
constituted a menace to stability.
The Cabinet A g r e e d to resume consideration of a political
initiative in Northern Ireland at a meeting early
in the following week.
Cabinet Office
2 March 1972
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 13th Conclusions
Tuesday 7 March 1972 at 11. 00 am
ERN
D
e
ce:
11th
nions,
4
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of
State for the Home Department ( C P ( 7 2 ) 26), together with copies
of letters addressed to the P r i m e Minister by the Prime Minister
of Northern Ireland, M r Faulkner, on 16 February and 1 M a r c h ,
T H E H O M E S E C R E T A R Y said that the dangers involved in launching
a political initiative were undoubtedly great but that he believed the
dangers of not taking action nc r to be even greater.
Over 50 y e a r s ,
under an artificially constructed constitution, the Unionist Parly­
had enjoyed political domination at Stormont to the exclusion of the
minority community.
A s an inevitable result the estrangement of
the two communities was greater than ever; and the social and
economic structure of the Province was rapidly deteriorating.
It
was becoming increasingly evident that,, however successful the
A r m y might be in disrupting the Irish Republican A r m y ( I R A ) , it
would never be possible by military means alone to prevent
individual atrocities or completely to root out urban guerilla warfare
so long as a substantial element of the population remained alienated
from the forces of law and order.
The only hope for the future of
Northern Ireland lay in the creation of a united community in the
Province, which could be tolerated, if not supported, by the
majority of the people of the Republic.
But any initiative which
contained features attractive to both parties to the dispute was
liable, for that very reason, to be heavily criticised from both sides.
In particular, no solution could expect to command general
agreement unless it reduced the dominance of the Unionist faction;
and this could easily be represented as penalising the Protestant
community, which professed a strong loyalty to the Crown and
had behaved with commendable restraint in recent months.
So long
as it remained the wish of the majority community/in Northern
Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, this wish must be
respected; but only on the understanding that the standards of
political tolerance observed elsewhere in the United Kingdom were
accepted by Northern Ireland as well and that the overriding
authority of the United Kingdom Government and Parliament were
1
accepted in Ulster as in all other parts of the United Kingdom.
For
this purpose he proposed that responsibility for law and order
should be transferred from Stormont to Westminster; that a
plebiscite should be held on the question of the Border at an early
date but should not thereafter be repeated for some 15 or 20 y e a r s ;
and that consultations should be initiated in order to seek ways of
making provision for the proper participation of the minority
community as of right not only in the Parliament but also in the
Government of the Six Counties,
If M r Faulkner held to his recent
public statements, these proposals would probably be unacceptable
to him and he would be unlikely to keep his Administration in being
until a reformed constitution took effect.
In any event it must be
doubtful whether it would be possible to move to a new structure of
government in Northern Ireland without a clean break with the past
or to establish constructive consultations with all political elements
in Northern Ireland so long as M r Faulkner remained P r i m e Minister.
He had therefore concluded that the least dangerous course would
be to proceed initially to a temporary period of direct United Kingdom
rule, which might be of something approaching two y e a r s ' duration.
The Unionist Party attached great importance to the Northern
Ireland Parliament as a guarantee of the integrity of the B o r d e r
under the Ireland Act, 1949.
He therefore proposed that during
the interregnum of direct rule it should not be dissolved but should
be temporarily suspended by prorogation, which would permit its
being reconvened should the result of the plebiscite make it
necessary to seek its consent to the detachment of Northern Ireland
from the United Kingdom.
Its legislative functions would be
discharged by O r d e r in Council at Westminster; and the executive
powers of the Northern Ireland Government would be transferred
to a Secretary of State, who would be advised by a Northern Ireland
Commission.
In addition, we should seek to modify the present
system of internment by releasing some of the least dangerous
internees and by making it clear that we looked forward to the total,
end of internment when security considerations and the state of
public order made this possible.
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R D E F E N C E agreed that
t e r r o r i s m could not be extirpated by military m e a s u r e s alone.
In
Belfast the A r m y had almost completely disrupted the battle ord^r
of the " P r o v i s i o n a l " wing of the IRA; and the numbers of shooting
incidents and explosions would probably soon reach as low a level
as it was possible to achieve.
But it was not possible to prevent
a continuation of spasmodic outrages, some of which w e r e liable
to be major in scale and highly destructive of life and property.
Moreover, the A r m y ' s success in Belfast had led to an
intensification of IRA activity in B o r d e r a r e a s , where terrorists
could find a ready refuge within the Republic; while in Londonderry,
by deliberate policy, no military operations of any size had been
undertaken, with the result that the Bogside and Creggan districts
2
had become areas where the authority of the Government had
virtually ceased to be enforceable.
There could thus be no purely
military solution.
But a political initiative might have some effect
upon the intensity of the t e r r o r i s t campaign; and, if it could
contain elements capable of winning a measure cf support among
moderate Catholics, the IRA might forfeit much of the benevolent
neutrality which they enjoyed at the hands of individuals who
sympathised with their political aims even while abhorring their
methods.
In discussion it was suggested that a comprehensive initiative of
the kind proposed by the Home Secretary would entail serious risks
both in Northern Ireland and at Westminster.
In Northern Ireland
it might merely alienate the Protestant community without gaining
any support from the Catholics; while at Westminster it might
erode support for the Government both among the U l s t e r Unionist
M e m b e r s and more widely among tne Conservative Party as a whole.
It had long been the avowed strategy of the IRA, first, to render
Northern Ireland ungovernable, then to compel the British
Government to r e s o r t to direct rule of Northern Ireland and,
finally, to achieve the severance of Northern Ireland from the
United Kingdom and its absorption within a single United Ireland.
The majority of Protestants in Northern Ireland would be liable to
see the proposed initiative as marking an advance from the first to
the second of these stages and as bringing the final stage even
nearer.
Moreover, a sense of direct confrontation with the British
Government might inspire the I R A to intensify their campaign of
t e r r o r i s m and possibly to extend it to Great Britain on a wider scale
than the recent bomb outrage at Aldershot.
There must also be
some doubt whether the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Northern
Ireland Civil Service and even, perhaps, the Judiciary would be
prepared to co-operate with an imposed system of United Kingdom
rule.
N o r would a plebiscite on the Border necessarily count for
much as a counter weight.
Its result was so easily predictable that
it could not be significant as a concession to Protestant feeling.
On the other hand the declaration of a single plebiscite for the
whole of the Province might well provoke demands for local
plebiscites in specific a r e a s ; but the Border communities were so
intermingled that the problem of adjustment was insoluble, as hvA
been shown in 1925.
Other elements of the proposed initiative were equally open to
criticism,
"Community Government", with statutory allocation of
Cabinet portfolios according to the representation of P a r t i e s in the
Northern Ireland House of Commons, could not be reconciled with
the democratic concept of responsibility to a Parliamentary
majority.
In those countries where Ministerial offices had been
distributed by statute or by convention among opposing political
Parties there had at least been general agreement upon the broad
3
objective of preserving the integrity of the State,
In Northern
Ireland this basic prerequisite was lacking.
Bvt if for this reason
"Community Government" proved unworkable in practice, we might
find ourselves committed in perpetuity to the system of direct
United Kingdom rule which we had envisaged as only a temporary
expedient; and in e a r l i e r discussions Ministers had frequently
agreed that direct rule represented a policy of last r e s o r t .
Moreover, a modification of the internment policy would not
necessarily lead to any significant reduction in the level of violence;
it was the excessive level of violence prior to 9 August, 1971, which
had compelled the Government to acquiesce in the introduction of
internment.
These objections would not only be liable to be strongly urged by the
Government's supporters in the Parliament at Westminster; they
would also be voiced by a considerable body of anti-Irish opinion in
the country as a whole, which woulu find it very difficult to
understand why the Government appeared to be conceding some of
the objectives of the IRA when it might seem more appropriate to
declare the IRA illegal in Great Britain and to deprive citizens of
the Republic of some of the privileges which they enjoyed in the
United Kingdom.
Reactions of this kind could seriously jeopardise
the Government's political position as a whole, not least as regards
their prospect of retaining adequate Parliamentary support for the
legislation necessary to confirm our accession to the European
Communitie s.
It was also questionable whether the proposed initiative would in fact
secure the support from the Republic which was a necessary element
in any ultimate solution.
Most citizens of Lhe Republic looked to the
objective of a United Ireland; and it must be doubtful whether they
could be brought to support any system of Government of a separate
Province of Northern Ireland.
N o r was it clear how the imposition
of United Kingdom rule could assist the P r i m e Minister of the Irish
Republic, M r Lynch, in taking stronger action against the I R A within
the Republic.
On the other hand, while Government supporters in the House of
Commons might see difficulty in endorsing the suggested initiative,
public opinion in Great Britain generally was demanding that some
move should be made.
Recent examples of t e r r o r i s m had created
a sense of revulsion in the Catholic community, which made the
present a particularly propitious time at which to act.
The object
must be to satisfy some at least of the legitimate aspirations of
each community.
The majority of Roman Catholics probably had
no real desire for Northern Ireland to be absorbed immediately into
the Republic.
They w e r e content to remain in the United Kingdom;
many of them, indeed, had served in the A r m e d F o r c e s of the Crown.
4
But they regarded, the A r m y in Northern Ireland as being merely the
tool of the Northern Ireland Government and saw no future for the
peace and prosperity of the Province if Stormont w e r e perpetuated
in its present form.
The only hope of loosening the grip of the IRA
on the minority community was to adopt an initiative on the lines
proposed by the Home Secretary.
Any other course would simply
enable the IRA to gain even firmer control.
In further discussion it was suggested that it might not be necessary
to give immediate effect to all the proposals in order to achieve the
stability required for political discussions leading to reforms in
the constitution.
It might be w i s e r to appoint a Secretary of State
with specific responsibility for Northern Ireland and to invite him
initially to concentrate on the main points of disaffection.
Thus,
there were strong arguments in favour of a referendum on the
B o r d e r , which would r e a s s u r e the Unionists about the constitutional
integrity of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.
There
was also a good case for transferring responsibility for law and
order to Westminster and combining this change with a substantial
modification of the internment policy,
These m e a s u r e s were
regarded by M r Lynch as a fundamental necessity and were felt by
a considerable body of opinion
Great Britain to be highly d e s i r a b l e .
It was inherently unsatisfactory that, although the A r m y was
constitutionally under the control of the United Kingdom
Government. Ministers at Westminster had no responsibility for
law and order in the Province which the A r m y played the principal
part in maintaining.
M o r e o v e r , they had publicly to defend the
policy of internment while having neither the power to influence the
detention orders which were made in particular instances nor
proper access to the information upon whic^i these decisions were
made.
There must be room for some doubt whether all the internees
w e r e active and dangerous t e r r o r i s t s ; and a policy of gradually
releasing the less dangerous on suitable conditions should be
pur sued.
On the other hand M r Faulkner had said both publicly and privately
that he could not continue to lead a Government which surrendered
the responsibility for law and o r d e r .
When he was confronted with
the alternative he might not adhere to this position.
If he did,
however, it would probably be unrealistic to hope that an acceptable
alternative Government could be formed at Stormont.
No Unionist
politician could hope to lead an Administration from a more moderate
position than that held by M r Faulkner; and, although D r Paisley
had in recent months seemed to adopt a more reasonable posture
(and had, indeed, stated that he would support government by
commission), he did not command the majority in Parliament which
was necessary to enable the Governor to invite him to form an
Administration.
The most probable consequence of M r Faulkner s
resignation on the issue of l a w and order, therefore, would be a
disintegration of the political structure in the Province, which would
make it necessary for us to i m p o j e United Kingdom rule, whether
we wished to or not.
1
5
Other points made in discussion were as follows ­
a.
Although public opinion in Great Britain might be
increasingly disturbed by the high price which we were
paying in order to try to maintain order in Northern Ireland,
it would be liable to be even more offended by any suggestion
that we should disclaim all further responsibility for the
Province, withdraw the troops and let the Six Counties
collapse in the violence and bloodshed of a civil w a r .
b.
Although there might be advantage in a plebiscite
on the vexed issue of the Northern Ireland Border, it might
be invoked as a precedent by nationalist groups in other parts
of the United Kingdom.
c.
Although there w e r e some analogies between the
situation in Northern Irelanu and the communal disputes in
Cyprus following independence, it would not be politic to
invite the United Nations to maintain order in the Province,
If M r Lynch chose to call upon the United Nations to patrol
the Republican side of the B o r d e r , that was another matter;
and it might be a helpful step.
But it was in fact unlikely
that M r Lynch would r e s o r t to action of this kind.
THE P R I M E MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the
Cabinet were not yet ready to reach a decision about the course to
be adopted in the current situation.
Misgivings had been expressed
about the Home Secretary's proposals taken as a whole, particularly
as regards the institution of direct United Kingdom rule and the
ultimate possibility of "Community Govern..aent" as the basis of a
constitution for Northern Ireland.
On the other hand there was
support for the view that we should assume responsibility for law
and order; that we should then embark on a policy of gradual
release of internees; and that we should institute a plebiscite on
the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as an integral part of
the United Kingdom.
The Cabinet must resume their discussion at
an early date, since timing was of the essence of any initiative and
time was not on our side.
Meanwhile, it was essential that strict
secrecy should be maintained about the Home Secretary's proposals
and the Cabinet's deliberations.
The Cabinet A g r e e d to resume their discussion at an early date.
Cabinet Office
7 March 1972
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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 14th Conclusions, Minute 5
Thursday 9 M a r c h 1972 at 11. 00 a m
THERN
LAND
vious
erence:
(72) 13th
elusions
T H E P R I M E MINISTER said that the Cabinet s discussion on
7 M a r c h had produced a considerable measure ox agreement that the
Government should take a political initiative consisting at least of a
referendum on the B o r d e r , the transfer of responsibility for l a w
and order to Westminster, some modification of the current
internment policy and the appointment of a C ^ r e t a r y of State for
Northern Ireland.
Opinions had varied, however, on whether we
should go further.
T w o main problems a r o s e .
F i r s t , would an
initiative limited to the measures which he had indicated be
sufficient to persuade a l l sections of political opinion in Northern
Ireland to co-operate in discussions directed towards a future
political structure which would guarantee to the minority, as of
right, an active and permanent role in the government of the
P r o v i n c e ; or to persuade the P r i m e Minister of the I r i s h Republic,
M r Lynch, to take the m o r e effective measures against the Irish
Republican A r m y (IRA) without which it was questionable how far
any political initiative in Northern Ireland could succeed in bringing
t e r r o r i s m to an end?
Second, what would be the consequences of a
refusal on the part of the Northern Ireland P r i m e Minister,
M r Faulkner, to c a r r y on his Administration if responsibility for l a w
and order was transferred to Westminster?
It was difficult to
envisage either that an alternative P r i m e Minister could emerge
capable of commanding a majority in the Northern Ireland
Parliament or that a G e n e r a l Election could be held in Northern
Ireland in present circumstances.
The consequence of a decision
to transfer law and order might therefore, whether we wished it or
not, be the imposition, at least for a time, of direct Uctffted Kingdom
rule.
Against this background it w a s now necessary to consider both
the manner in which the Government s thinking should be presented to
M r Faulkner and the means by which M r Lynch might be brought to
take stronger action against the IRA within the Republic.
1
1
1
In discussion it was suggested that the transfer of responsibility for
law and order to Westminster might do little in itself to ensure their
more effective enforcement within the Province.
M o r e o v e r , if a
decision to transfer this responsibility led to the imposition of direct
United Kingdom rule, this would be liable to be regarded as a
concession of one of the major policy aims of the IRA.
This in turn
might encourage the terrorists to intensify their campaign and,
perhaps, to extend it to Great Britain; and it might, in addition,
deprive the Government not only of such confidence as they enjoyed
among the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, but also of the
support of a number of those upon whose votes they relied in the
United Kingdom Parliament for the implementation of their European
policy.
It could be argued that the successful enactment of the
legislation confirming our accession to the European Communities
was a matter of even more fundamental importance than the solution
of the problems of Northern Ireland.
It might be w i s e r , therefore,
to think in terms of an initial step going no further than the transfer
to Westminster of responsibility for all aspects of the internment
policy, leaving other questions on law and order with the Stormont
Government.
On the other hand, it would be intolerable to permit the situation in
Northern Ireland to deteriorate further without some new and radical
action on the part of the Government.
The Government s policy for
Northern Ireland required both that the IRA should be deprived of the
considerable measure of benevolent neutrality, if not support, which
its members enjoyed among l a r g e sections of the minority community
and that political discussions should be set in train directed towards
a more just and balanced political structure for the Province.
It
was doubtful whether either of these aims could be achieved without
the suspension, at any rate for a time, of the Parliamentary system
established by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920.
In terms of
public relations there would be considerable advantage in presenting
any suspension of the Stormont Parliament as a temporary
measure; and the more quickly discussions could be pressed
forward and the necessary period of suspension could be brought to
an end, the less would be the danger that direct rule might become
permanent for want of any realistic alternative.
The suspension of
Stormont might be less unacceptable to the Governments supporters,
however, if it appeared as a necessary consequence of a refusal by
M r Faulkner to maintain his Administration following a decision by
the United Kingdom Government to transfer responsibility for law and
order to Westminster.
In this connection it was doubtful whether it
was realistic to think in terms of transferring only the responsibility
for internment policy; in practice internment could not be isolated
from other aspects of law and order.
The United Kingdom Government
Representative in Belfast had expressed the view that M r Faulkner
would probably refuse to remain in office if law and order w e r e
transferred to Westminster, although opinions varied as to the extent
to which, after resigning, he might try t o mount a campaign of
1
2
outright opposition to the United Kingdom Government.
The outcome
might depend to a considerable extent on the attitude adopted by the
Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Royal Ulster Constabulary
( R U C ) ; and there w e r e grounds for believing that they would maintain
their loyalty to the Crown, although the position of the Special Branch
of the RUC might require special consideration.
Nevertheless, it
would remain true that an initiative on the lines under discussion
would be liable to appear more attractive to the minority than to the
majority.
It was for consideration, therefore, whether the assurance
of continued union with the rest of the United Kingdom which was
implicit in the proposal for a B o r d e r referendum should be
supplemented by the proscription of the IRA as an illegal organisation
in Great Britain and by a substantial further programme of economic
assistance to Northern Ireland.
THE P R I M E MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the
next step should be a discussion with M r Faulkner, designed to
establish his intentions and to test, so far as possible, his probable
reaction to an initiative of the kind which thp Cabinet had been
considering.
It would be necessary to accept the risk that the
substance of this discussion might become known and that
M r Faulkner might seek to mount a campaign of opposition to the
United Kingdom Government with the aid of his Northern Ireland
Cabinet colleagues. He would consider further the form and timing of
such a meeting, taking into account the various considerations which
Meanwhile the Home
had emerged during the Cabinet s discussioru
Secretary was examining the possibility of proscribing the IRA as an
illegal organisation in Great Britain; and the possibility of a further
substantial programme of economic aid for Northern Ireland should
also be borne in mind.
It might be necessary to ask the Cabinet to
resume their consideration of all these matters at short notice in the
light of the discussion with M r Faulkner.
1
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e Minister s
summing up of their discussion.
1
Cabinet Office
9 M a r c h 1972
3
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 15th Conclusions, Minute 1
Tuesday 14 March 1972 at 10. 00 am
ERN
ID
U8
ce:
) 14th
fcions,
5
T H E P R I M E MINISTER said that, when it became clear that the
refusal of the Social Democratic and Labour Party in Northern
Ireland to participate in any conference eliminated the hope that
an acceptable settlement would emerge from current discussions,
it had been necessary for us to take the initiative in constructing
proposals to meet the needs of the situation in Northern Ireland,
The purpose of the initiative which we now had in mind was to
secure a situation in which the majority and the minority had equal
opportunities in the political and social life of the P r o v i n c e .
The
Home Secretary's proposals were in no sense a surrender to the
Irish Republican A r m y (IRA), whose objective was the immediate
reunification of Ireland by force.
The Cabinet had first to consider
whether to take some political initiative or not.
Failure to act now
would mean acquiescence in a situation in which t e r r o r i s m could
never be completely eradicated from Northern Ireland, despite the
disruption by the A r m y of the IRA organisation in Belfast; in which
large areas of Londonderry would be outside the effective control
of the forces of law and order; and in which terrorists could
operate in the country areas from across the B o r d e r in relative
safety.
In addition, the p r e s s u r e of Parliamentary and public
opinion would increase to a degree which might become intolerable
before long.
If an initiative was to be taken, it had to be one
which would be effective in securing our ultimate objective.
A
relaxation of internment was perhaps its most important element.
It should be possible gradually to release the less dangerous
elements among the internees.
But at present internment was
controlled by the Northern Ireland Government; and, in order to
be certain of achieving our purpose, we should have to assume
responsibility not only for internment but probably also for the
maintenance of law and order, in so far as it affected public
security.
In addition it would be right to seek to allay the
dominant anxiety among the majority community by instituting
periodic referenda on the question of U l s t e r ' s continued membership
of the United Kingdom.
It would also be desirable to construct a
new economic programme in which the United Kingdom Government
would have a more dominant role than had been the case in the past,
in order to prevent the mismanagement by the Northern Ireland
Government of financial subventions and to anticipate allegations
that they were used exclusively for the benefit of the majority
community.
The question for the Cabinet was whether so limited
an initiative would secure a willingness by all Parties to participate
in political discussions with a view to a settlement and influence
the Government of the Irish Republic towards taking more effective
measures against the I R A operating from their territory.
If the
P r i m e Minister of Northern Ireland, M r Faulkner, were to refuse
to agree to these m e a s u r e s and were to decide that he could not
continue his Administration if they were imposed, the question
would arise whether the Cabinet were prepared to accept a
temporary period of United Kingdom r u l e .
How M r Faulkner would
react could not be ascertained without discussion with him; there
was some hope that he would respond to appeals to his loyalty to the
Crown and carry on his Administration.
Moreover, it should be
borne in mind that there was a substantial element in the majority
community which would welcome radical m e a s u r e s of reform.
Likewise, it would be necessary to try to ascertain the probable
response of the Government of the Irish Republic.
The current
situation had put the Republic in a position of serious economic
weakness; and their Government might well find it in their interest
to respond favourably to the kind of limited initiative which we
had in mind.
In discussion it was agreed that some political initiative was now
clearly necessary.
It was argued that m o r e radical changes would
be preferable to the limited m e a s u r e s which the P r i m e Minister
had outlined.
But account had to be taken of the possibility that an
immediate move to United Kingdom rule, which might well become
a permanency in default of any agreement about the future
Constitution of Northern Ireland,, would not receive the unanimous
endorsement of the Government's supporters in the House of
Commons; and in that event the G o v e r n m e n t s other policies might
be endangered.
It seemed necessary, therefore, to be content
with a more limited objective for the time being.
While it might
assist the P r i m e Minister in his discussions with M r Faulkner to
know whether he had the support of his colleagues in proceeding to
United Kingdom rule as a temporary measure should M r Faulkner
refuse to co-operate in a more limited initiative, it seemed
preferable, on balance, that the initial discussion with
M r Faulkner should be conducted on the b a s i s of ascertaining his
reaction to the more limited proposal.
When that was known, the
Cabinet could consider the further m e a s u r e s which might then be
necessary.
So far as the approach to M r Faulkner was concerned, the possibility
that a refusal on his part to co-operate in a partial transfer of
functions to Westminster might lead to the imposition of United
Kingdom rule was not the only consideration which might influence
him.
Public opinion in Great Britain was becoming increasingly
impatient about the commitment of such l a r g e military forces to
2
Northern Ireland,.
There w e r e , indeed, arguments for a
progressive withdrawal - at least from the Roman Catholic areas ­
of troops who were now finding themselves engagsd in an apparently
permanent police role,,
Although there were also powerful
arguments against this course, M r Faulkner should be left in no
doubt of the extent to which the safety of the Province depended on
our maintaining a military presence which we should wish to
terminate as soon as possible.
The prospect of additional
economic assistance was also a factor which might influence
M r Faulkner.
The Northern Ireland Government had shown
themselves incapable of managing the economy of the Province
satisfactorily; and if, as was agreed to be desirable, they were
to receive further large subventions, the United Kingdom
Government must not only retain a measure of control over their
application but w e r e also entitled to require some reciprocal
willingness on M r Faulkner's part to co-operate in measures which
we judged to be n e c e s s a r y to meet the needs of the political
situation.
In short, if the majority community in Northern Ireland
attached importance to U l s t e r s continuing membership of the
United Kingdom, they must be prepared to accept United Kingdom
standards in the administration of the Province.
1
In further discussion it was argued that, although the proposal for
"Community Government", under which certain Cabinet portfolios
would be statutorily assigned to representatives of the minority
community, might have some attraction in theory as ensuring a
guaranteed role for the minority in the government of the Six
Counties, it was hard to envisage its working satisfactorily in
practice; and it was unlikely to be acceptable to all the political
elements involved.
Although direct United Kingdom rule might be
criticised as undemocratic by the Protestant faction in Northern
Ireland, this criticism could hardly stand if the position of the
Province were assimilated to that of Scotland and W a l e s .
Indeed,
the local, rather than the central, government concept was best
suited in the long term to the circumstances of Northern Ireland.
It was also agreed that the enlargement of the functions of the
United Kingdom Government by the addition of responsibility for
law and order in the Province would make it desirable that
Northern Ireland affairs should henceforward be the concern of a
separate Secretary of State.
While legislation to make membership
of the I R A unlawful in G r e a t Britain might prove in practice to be
incapable of effective enforcement, it should be a valuable element
in our political initiative and should attract support from those who
might be concerned that we w e r e yielding to the p r e s s u r e of violence.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up the discussion, said that the
Cabinet agreed that the United Kingdom Government should assume
responsibility for law and o r d e r in Northern Ireland in so far as it
affected public security.
This would include responsibility for
internment; and it was agreed that we should pursue a policy of
3
TOP
SPrRFT
gradually reducing the number of internees.
We should also
institute a system of periodic referenda on U l s t e r ' s continued
membership of the United Kingdom; and we should be prepared to
inject substantial additional finance into the Northern Ireland
economy in order to rehabilitate industry and commerce; but the
United Kingdom Government should retain a measure of control
over the manner in which these economic subventions were applied
in the Provinces not least because it was in our interests that the
economy of the Republic should also be healthy and this considera­
tion would need to be borne in mind in considering the m e a s u r e s to
be adopted.
In addition, the legislation necessary for these
purposes should provide for membership of the IRA to be unlawful
in Great Britain; and a separate Secretary of State should be
appointed to deal with our enlarged concern in Northern Ireland
affairs.
The Cabinet further agreed that he should hold an early meeting
with M r Faulkner, in order to ascertain his reaction to the
measures which had now been approved and to seek to persuade
him to co-operate in their implementation.
He would not at that
stage give M r Faulkner any indication of the consequences of a
refusal of co-operation on his part; but he would report
M r Faulkner's reactions to the Cabinet, who would then have to
reach final decisions upon the m e a s u r e s to be adopted, which would
have to be communicated to M r Faulkner.
At an appropriate point
in this process soundings would also be taken in Dublin.
The initial meeting with M r Faulkner might precipitate a situation
in which the Government would be obliged to act with great speed.
There was therefore advantage in postponing it until the visit of the
President of the French Republic during the forthcoming weekend
had been completed and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had
opened his Budget on 21 M a r c h .
It was desirable, however, that
the meeting should be announced during the current week; and
thereafter he would inform the Leader of the Opposition about the
G o v e r n m e n t s intentions.
Meanwhile, the Home Secretary, in
consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry, should consider the further
m e a s u r e s of economic assistance to Northern Ireland which might
be put in train and the manner in which the United Kingdom
Government might retain the necessary measure of control over
the use to which further subventions w e r e put.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e Minister's
summing up of their discussion and invited the
Home Secretary to be guided accordingly.
Cabinet Office
14 March 1972
4
The circulation of this paper has been^?trictly limited^.
YDM
- \
It is issued for the personal use o f , ^ ^ .
iS.iuA(.../.t^^
(rnirtTcft)
T O P SECRET
Copy No..
10
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 18th Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 23 M a r c h 1972 at 10. 30 am
THSRN ND lous
rence:
72) 15th
lusions,
te 1
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that, together with the Home Secretary
the L o r d President of the Council, and the Secretary of State for
Defence, he had held discussions on the previous day with the
P r i m e Minister of Northern Ireland, M r Faulkner, and the
Deputy P r i m e Minister, Senator A n d r e w s .
He had opened the
discussion with M r Faulkner on the lines which the Cabinet had
agreed at their previous Meeting.
He had explained that an
assessment of the military situation in Northern Ireland led to
the conclusion that the successes achieved by the security forces
against the t e r r o r i s t campaign could be effectively consolidated
only if an improvement in the political situation could be secured
by political means.
F o r this reason, and in order to rectify the
present unsatisfactory position in which the United Kingdom
Government had to c a r r y both the domestic and the international
responsibility for a security policy in Northern Ireland over which
they had only limited control, the Government had decided that
certain fresh measures w e r e necessary.
F i r s t , a plebiscite should
be conducted as aoon as possible on the continued status of Northern
Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and should thereafter be
repeated at intervals of 15 y e a r s .
Second, we should begin to
release the least dangerous of the individuals interned under the
Special P o w e r s Acts, with the intention that this process should
continue a a public order and security improved.
Third, the
responsibility for security policy, the administration of the criminal
law and matters connected therewith should be transferred to the
United Kingdom Government.
Fourth, a separate Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland should be appointed.
The purpose of
these measures would be to seek to deprive the Irish Republican
A r m y ( I R A ) of the support which it enjoyed among a substantial
portion of the minority community in Northern Ireland; to persuade
representatives of all political elements in Northern Ireland to join
in discussions on the future poHtical structure of the Province; and
to remove the inhibitions which at present appeared to make it
impossible for the P r i m e Minister of the Irish Republic, M r Lynch,
to take firm action against the IRA south of the B o r d e r .
M r Faulkner had not felt able to accept this initiative.
He seemed
to feel that the needs of the situation would be adequately met by
a simple continuation of the policy of seeking the defeat of the
terrorists by military means, coupled with political measures
not going beyond those outlined in the Northern Ireland Government's
Green Paper and in his own letters of 16 F e b r u a r y and 1 March to
the P r i m e Minister.
He had agreed that a plebiscite on the Border
might help to conciliate minority opinion; but he had said that the
majority would r e g a r d it as adding nothing to the safeguards already
inherent in the Ireland Act, 1949.
M o r e fundamentally, however,
he had indicated that he and his political supporters could not agree
to the transfer to the United Kingdom Government of the Northern
Ireland G o v e r n m e n t s present responsibilities for law and order,
on the grounds that a change cf this kind would imply that the
United Kingdom Government no longer had confidence in the
Administration at Stormont, that the responsibilities which would
remain with the Government of Northern Ireland would not be
sufficient to maintain its political credibility and that the reduction
in its status would be claimed by the IRA as a victory for the forces
which they represented.
He had made it clear that he would r e g a r d
the transfer of responsibility for law and order to Westminster as
even less realistic and acceptable politically than the assumption by
the United Kingdom Government of complete responsibility for all
functions of government in Northern Ireland.
He had offered, as a
possible compromise, only the beginning of a phased elimination
of internment by agreement between the 2 Governments; the
appointment of a United Kingdom Minister as Joint Chairman with
the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs of the Northern
Ireland Joint Security Committee, on the basic that each Joint
Chairman would have a right of veto; aad the replacement of the
Special P o w e r s Acts in Northern Ireland by fresh legislation which
would be enacted at Stormont and would be designed ultimately to
assimilate the emergency powers available to the Northern Ireland
Government to those available in the rest of the United Kingdom.
It had been agreed that each P r i m e Minister should consult further
with his Cabinet colleagues.
So far, he had not told M r Faulkner
specifically that, if the United Kingdom Cabinet found his counter
proposals unacceptable, they would be prepared to go to the full
length of legislating to prorogue the Stormont Parliament and to
transfer all the powers of the Northern Ireland Government to a
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
But, in answer to a
hypothetical question on this point, M r Faulkner had said that he and
his colleagues would have to decide whether they should oppose the
imposition of United Kingdom rule of the Province or should perhaps
offer themselves as candidates for membership of the United
Kingdom Parliament.
He had also said, however, that he would
do all he could to moderate the political temperature in Northern
Ireland if the United Kingdom Government decided that they had no
choice but to assume the responsibility for direct government of
the Province which was implicit in Section 75 of the Government of
Ireland Act, 1920.
He had made it clear that in that event the
Government at Westminster must be prepared to deal with industrial
action by the majority community in Northern Ireland and, perhaps,
with acts of violence against the minority.
A s r e g a r d s the
longer term, M r Faulkner had not seemed fully to realise the
nature of the problem either of persuading the representatives of
the minority to resume active participation in the political life of
the Province or of re-establishing law and order in areas such as
the Bogside and Creggan districts of Londonderry.
This attitude
on his part, coupled with the fact that his counter-proposals for
immediate action would merely increase the responsibility of the
United Kingdom Government without giving them any significantly
greater control over public order and security in the Province,
confronted the Cabinet with the need to take the final decision.
They should first consider whether the counter-proposals w e r e
acceptable; but, if not, they must then decide what should be said
to M r Faulkner when the two P r i m e Ministers resumed contact
following their respective Cabinet meetings.
THE F O R E I G N A N D C O M M O N W E A L T H S E C R E T A R Y said that
it was important to take account of the probable reactions of the
P r i m e Minister of the Irish Republic, M r Lynch, to the various
courses under consideration.
M r Lynch would almost certainly
r e g a r d as unacceptable changes which did no more than give the
United Kingdom Government some degree of joint control over
security in the Six Counties.
He would welcome the transfer of
responsibility for law and order
to the United Kingdom
Government.
But he would endorse above all the imposition of a
period of United Kingdom rule.
In discussion it was suggested that the reaction of extreme elements
of both communities in Northern Ireland to such radical measures
as the transfer to Westminster of responsibility for law and order
or the imposition of United Kingdom rule had perhaps been under­
estimated.
The Unionist reactions, in particular, might be so
violent as to provoke a state of virtually civil war, while the IRA
might be provoked into extending their campaign of t e r r o r i s m to
Great Britain.
There could be no certainty that measures of the
kind envisaged would succeed in persuading either community in
Northern Ireland to take part in fresh discussions directed towards
creating a new political structure in the Province.
It was true
that Unionist opinion might be prepared to participate in such
discussions, particularly if certain Unionist leaders w e r e prepared
to accept the need, at least temporarily, for a fuller integration
of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom as an essential first
step.
But, if this hope was disappointed or the minority community
3
w a s not equally co-operative, the temporary imposition of United
Kingdom rule might inevitably become permanent.
This was
perhaps the more to be feared since the United Kingdom G o v e r n m e n t s
proposals could not be regarded as satisfying any of the 3 "conditions"
stated by the IRA in the context of their recent " t r u c e " - i. e. the
withdrawal of the A r m y from Northern Ireland, the abolition
(presumably in perpetuity) of the system of regional Parliamentary
government in Northern Ireland and a general amaeety for persons
convicted of acts of t e r r o r i s m or interned or detained on suspicion
of association with such acts.
On the other hand there seemed to be no prospect of bringing
violence to an end and re-establishing public order in Northern
Ireland unless the IRA could be deprived of its base in the minority
community and M r Lynch coula be induced to institute sterner action
against its supporters within the Republic.
It was therefore
necessary to adopt whatever measures seemed best calculated to
achieve these purposes and to create a fresh climate in which
constructive discussions about the long term political structure of
the Province might be initiated.
The transfer of responsibility for
law and order to Westminster was probably the minimum change
required to this end; the temporary suspension of Stormont might
do even more to enlist the support of responsible Roman Catholic
opinion in both parts of Ireland.
Moreover, the limited scope of M r Faulkner's counter-proposals
suggested that he now had little freedom of political manoeuvre
in relation to his own supporters, who were still reluctant both
to recognise the importance to British public opinion of a fresh
start in Northern Ireland or to accept that, even after the withdrawal
of responsibility for law and order, Northern Ireland would enjoy a
substantially l a r g e r measure of regional self government than either
Scotland or W a l e s .
The joint control of security policy, on the
b a s i s that the Northern Ireland Government would retain the right
of veto, would place the United Kingdom Government in an impossible
position, while an arrangement which would give them little more
than a say in decisions on the release of individuals from internment
could not be expected to have sufficient impact to precipitate the
radical change in political attitudes which was now essential.
There
w e r e indications that opinion among the G o v e r n m e n t s supporters in
Parliament, including some of the Ulster Unionist M e m b e r s
themselves, was moving towards the view that the present situation
could not continue indefinitely; and it would be politically intolerable
for the Government to retreat so far from the requirements which
the Prime Minister had indicated to M r Faulkner that it would be
clear that they had no greater freedom of political initiative than
the Northern Ireland Government w e r e prepared to allow them.
In
the presentation of an eventual decision to suspend Stormont,
however, it would be important that M r Faulkner should be clearly
seen to have been offered the more limited proposal of the transfer
of law and order to Westminster and to have rejected it before the
more drastic course was adopted.
It would also be essential to
ensure the continued loyalty of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and
of the public servants in the Northern Ireland Departments which
were to come under the control of the new Secretary of State.
It
might therefore be necessary for senior officials to visit Northern
Ireland immediately after the announcement of the new measures
in order to explain the context of the G o v e r n m e n t s decisions and
to remind all concerned of their allegiance to the Crown.
In further discussion it was suggested that the suspension of
Stormont might be made m o r e acceptable to Conservative and
Unionist opinion if it w e r e accompanied by the proscription nf the
IRA as an illegal organisation in Great Britain as well as in
Northern Ireland.
But, although this might be desirable on merits,
the introduction of such a provision into the legislation for the
suspension of Stormont would be liable to complicate and to delay
its enactment, especially since it would probably be necessary, but
would certainly be controversial to empower the Secretary of State
to proscribe by O r d e r any organisation which was concerned to
promote the use of violence for political ends in relation to
Northern Ireland.
It was important, for several reasons, to
secure the passage of the main legislation as rapidly as possible.
Even if M r Faulkner agreed to remain in office until the Bill was
passed, it would be desirable to effect the transition to United
Kingdom rule with the minimum of delay; and, if he did not agree
to maintain an Administration during this interval or was prevented
from doing so, it would be even more important to reduce to the
minimum the period during which there would be no Northern
Ireland Minister of Home Affairs capable of exercising the statutory
powers in relation to internment and security. Moreover, it could
be v e r y dangerous if, during the period of the Easter marches,
there were any uncertainty about the attribution of responsibility for
maintaining law and order in Northern Ireland.
It might therefore
be best at this stage to omit any reference to the proscription of the
IRA from the prospective legislation but at the same time to let it
be known that the Government were examining means by which more
positive action could be taken against the organisation in Great
Britain.
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up the discussion, said that the
Cabinet agreed unanimously that, if M r Faulkner, after reference
to the Northern Ireland Cabinet, could not advance beyond the
counter-proposals which he had put forward on the previous day,
he should be informed that these w e r e not regarded as adequate
by the United Kingdom Government, who would accordingly feel
obliged to proceed to implement their own intentions, including, in
particular, the transfer to Westminster of the responsibility for law
5
and order.
If M r Faulkner indicated that in that event he could
not remain in office, he should be told that the United Kingdom
Government would then have no alternative but to legislate for the
introduction of direct United Kingdom rule in Northern Ireland
and that this would entail the prorogation of the Northern Ireland
Parliament and the assumption by a Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland of the powers of the Northern Ireland Government.
At
the same time it would be made clear that the temporary suspension
of Stormont was designed to permit the widest possible consultations
with the various bodies of political opinion in the Province in an
effort to seek agreement on the form of longer term arrangements
which would guarantee for all elements of the community an active,
permanent and guaranteed role in the public affairs of the Province.
The suspension of the Northern Ireland Parliament and the
assumption by the Government of the United Kingdom of the powers
of the Northern Ireland Government would also be accompanied by
a declaration of our intention to hold at the earliest practicable
moment a plebiscite on the status of Northern Ireland as part of the
United Kingdom and by measures constituting a first step towards
the termination of internment on the lines which had been broadly
agreed between the two Governments.
Meanwhile, he would arrange
for the practical implications of these decisions, including
particularly the timing of the legislation, the related public
announcements and the necessary appointments, to be considered
further by the Ministers directly concerned.
If M r Faulkner,
following his deliberations with his colleagues, put forward a
fresh set of counter-proposals, it might be necessary for the
Cabinet to meet again at short notice.
Otherwise, the action which
the Cabinet had now approved would take its course.
There was
no doubt that it entailed great r i s k s ; but even greater dangers
would attend any alternative policy.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e Minister's
summing up of their discussion.
Cabinet Office
24 March 1972
6
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It is issued for the personal use of 5*
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I o
Copy No
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) I9th Conclusions, Minute 3
Tuesday 28 March 1972 at 11. 00 am
tHERN
l/UND
us
nee:
) 18th
eions,
3
T H E LORD P R E S I D E N T OF THE C O U N C I L said that on his visit to
Northern Ireland on 25 M a r c h , in his capacity as Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland designate, he had found a confused situation
which nevertheless gave grounds for cautious optimism.
The
senior officers of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Royal
U l s t e r Constabulary ( R U C ) had assured him of the loyalty of their
respective Services in the difficult task of adjustment to the situation
created by the Government's decision to take over the powers of
the Northern Ireland Government.
In particular, there was no
evidence that any m e m b e r s of the R U C had supported the appeal
of the Ulster Vanguard movement for a two day strike.
The strike
had seriously affected the economic life of the P r o v i n c e
particularly as a result of the need to impose reductions of power
supplies.
He believed, however, that it derived to a significant
extent from the need to maintain the credibility of the threatened
"Protestant backlash" and that, once the protest had been made, the
mood of the majority of Unionist supporters might be m o r e
reasonable.
He had assured the R U C that the policy of beginning
a phased release of internees implied no criticism of their previous
actions; but this would continue to be a sensitive subject.
In the
predominantly Roman Catholic areas of the cities there was
evident relaxation of tension and a m o r e friendly mood towards
the A r m y .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the number of bombing and shooting
incidents had so far shown little decrease; and there had been a
serious outbreak of violence in the predominantly Protestant town
of Portadown,
A number of misconceptions had been fostered
among the Protestant community.
He would be concerned to
correct these and, in particular, to make it clear that the proposed
Advisory Commission would have no executive p o w e r s ,
A number
of matters would require early decision, especially the question
whether the Government should r e l a x the total ban on marches
before the Easter weekend.
It was difficult in practice to do m o r e
than contain marches and to try to prevent them from erupting into
inter-sectarian violence; and, if the ban were maintained for the
traditional Nationalist m a r c h e s at E a s t e r , we should have no choice
e
but to attempt to enforce it during the Orange marching season in
the sixmmer.
It was also desirable to consider at an early stage
whether the policy of cratering Border roads should be modified.
Some degree of relaxation might lead to closer local co-operation
between the R U C and the Gardai, which might in turn assist in
preventing the smuggling of a r m s and explosives from the
Republic into Northern Ireland.
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R D E F E N C E said that the
military units which had been brought to short notice as possible
reinforcements for the Northern Ireland garrison were still
standing by; but it was to be hoped that the situation would soon
be sufficiently clarified to permit a relaxation of the readiness of
at least some of these units.
The A r m y was currently taking care
to avoid any actions which might be regarded as provocative in
predominantly Roman Catholic areas; but it would be necessary
to take early decisions about the intensity of future search
operations to discover terrorists of the Irish Republic A r m y ( I R A ) .
In discussion it was pointed out that, although the initial reactions
of the P r i m e Minister of the Irish Republic, M r Lynch, to the
G o v e r n m e n t s decisions had been helpful, it might still be difficult
for him overtly to adopt more severe measures against the IRA in
the Republic.
But any action which could be taken unobtrusively
in Northern Ireland - for example a gradual relaxation of the
cratering of B o r d e r roads - might prompt M r Lynch to give
correspondingly d i s c r e e t directions to his own security forces to
intensify their operations against the IRA.
M r Lynch's attitude
might also be affected by the scope and timing of the first steps in
the phased r e l e a s e of internees; and this was an additional reason
for seeking to reach early decisions on this subject.
In further discussion of the arrangements for the passage of the
Northern Ireland ( T e m p o r a r y Provisions) Bill through Parliament,
it was reported that the Opposition were likely to move an
amendment providing that O r d e r s in Council on matters which had
previously been the legislative responsibility of the Northern
Ireland Parliament should be subject to Affirmative, rather than
Negative, Resolution procedure in the United Kingdom Parliament.
It might be considered reasonable to accept this amendment; but
it would be n e c e s s a r y to ensure that the early appointment of a
D i r e c t o r of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, which would
need to be validated by O r d e r in Council, would not be prejudiced
as a result.
The attitude of the G o v e m m e n f s supporters to the
B i l l was probably not as adverse as some P r e s s comment had
suggested; nevertheless, some Conservative as well as Ulster
Unionist M e m b e r s might well vote against the Bill on Second
Reading,
The U l s t e r Unionist M e m b e r s hoped that, so long as
the Northern Ireland Parliament stood prorogued, it would be
possible to limit to the essential minimum the Northern Ireland
2
legislation laid before the United Kingdom Parliament by O r d e r s in
Council.
Nevertheless, a substantial volume of important
Northern Ireland legislation, flowing from the reorganisation of
local government in the Province, was in fact outstanding
This
legislation had reached various stages in the Northern Ireland
legislative p r o c e s s ; and it would be important to consider how
urgently the United Kingdom Parliament might need to deal with
its different elements.
0
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up the discussion, said that he
would arrange with the Ministers immediately concerned for early
decisions on the questions of the A r m y ' s operational policy in
predominantly Roman Catholic areas and the maintenance or
relaxation of the ban on m a r c h e s .
Early consideration should also
be given to policy as r e g a r d s the cratering of Border roads and to
the scope and timing of the first releases of internees.
On
political reforms in the longer term he would consider the best
means of devising proposals for constitutional discussions and
preparing a strategy for the associated negotiations.
The L o r d
President of the Council, after his next visit to Northern Ireland,
should report whether he could put forward proposals for the
establishment and composition of the Advisory Commission.
He
should also consider further, in consultation with the Attorney
General, whether, if the Affirmative Resolution procedure were
adopted for O r d e r s in Council concerning Northern Ireland, it
would nevertheless be possible to make the necessary arrangements
for the immediate appointment of a Director of Public Prosecutions
for Northern Ireland.
Thereafter he should complete his
examination of the state of the Northern Ireland legislative
programme and should take steps to secure such action as might
be urgently required in this respect from the outgoing Northern
Ireland Ministers.
He should also give further consideration to
the financial situation of the Northern Ireland Government and
should consider how far the need for increasing subventions from
the United Kingdom could provide a means of p r e s s u r e upon
political leaders in Northern Ireland to adopt a more reasonable
and co-operative attitude.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s
summing up of their discussion and invited the
L o r d President of the Council to be guided
accordingly.
Cabinet Office
28 March 1972
3
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It is issued for the personal use o:
T O P SECRET
.
*
10
Copy No£.r..
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 20th Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 13 A p r i l 1972 at 10, 30 am
HERN
ND
ous
cnce:
2) 19th
ueions,
o 3
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D said that
the political situation in the Province was still confused and was
likely to remain so for some time.
There w e r e , however, a number
of signs of a growing d e s i r e for peace within the Roman Catholic
community.
There had been numerous informal approaches to
his own Office; and two particularly encouraging developments
had been the widespread advocacy by Roman Catholic priests of
a cessation of violence (although the influence of the Church was
probably less than it had been in the past) and the meetings held
by a group of women in the Andersonstown area of Belfast who
were working to the same end.
In addition, the Social Democratic
and Labour P a r t y w e r e trying to encourage a move a w a f from
violence, although it was again questionable how strong their
influence was in relation to that of the I r i s h Republican A r m y
(IRA)
Nevertheless, these favourable trends would take some
time to develop; and it would remain n e c e s s a r y to maintain a
careful balance, not going so far in conciliating the Roman Catholic
community as to alienate the Protestants.
0
The Protestants themselves had reacted l e s s sharply to the
introduction of direct United Kingdom rule than might have
been expected,
A number of Unionists had made informal
approaches to his Office; but he was for the moment confining
his personal contacts with the Unionists to their leader, M r Faulkner
Unionist politicians would probably be prepared to take part in the
work of the A d v i s o r y Commission if it was confined to m e m b e r s of
the prorogued Northern Ireland Parliament; but this was out of the
question.
The level of violence in the Province and the extent to
which the security forces could resume control of certain a r e a s of
Belfast and Londonderry would strongly influence Unionist attitudes.
The Unionists in Northern Ireland tended both to ignore the fact that
there had, for many y e a r s , been little effective control of a number
of predominantly Roman Catholic a r e a s and to underrate the
magnitude of the military operation necessary to restore the rule of
l a w completely in those a r e a s .
M r Faulkner, however, had been
brought to admit publicly that it would be impossible to mount
military operations in those a r e a s without incurring heavy civilian
casualties.
Londonderry, where hooliganism was spreading, would
present the most difficult problems and would eventually call for a
concerted major effort employing all available military, political,
and public relations r e s o u r c e s .
The Royal Ulster Constabulary ( R U C ) and the senior echelons of the
Northern Irish Civil Service had remained loyal, although the Special
Branch of the R U C had not concealed some anxieties about the
accelerated r e l e B B e of ctprteSn internees.
A number of difficult
decisions regarding internment were in prospect; and, although
there was little doubt that a substantial number of those still interned
could safely be released, it was important both for political reasons
and in relation to the m o r a l e of the RUC that it should not be suggested
that internment had not been justified in the conditions of 1971. Ke
had authorised the r e l e a s e of further small ncmbers of interi-ees;
and he intended to continue with this process as fast as security and
political considerations permitted.
But there would inevitably
remain a number of v e r y dangerous individuals whose reloase
would present great difficulty.
He had been v e r y favourably impressed by the standard of the
military personnel whom he had met in the Province; and he had
found that the morale of the U l s t e r Defence Regiment, apart from
one temporary local instance, had been maintained at a high level
throughout the recent constitutional changes.
The report submitted
by the Lord Chief Justice, L o r d Widgery, upon the shootings in
Londonderry on 30 January might present problems of presentation.
With v e r y few exceptions it provided a vindication of the A r m y ' s
conduct in Londonderry on that day; but for that reason it might
be represented in some quarters as a biased document.
He would
discuss further with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State
for Defence the timing and method of its publication.
In the course of a brief discussion there was general agreement on
the importance of taking advantage of the opportunity provided by
the recent constitutional changes to move towards political
discussions designed to promote agreement on the future form
of government of the P r o v i n c e .
It might perhaps be advisable
to concentrate first upon discussions in Northern Ireland with
individuals representing all the main bodies of opinion.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up the discussion, said that
the introduction of direct United Kingdom rule had, in some respects,
proceeded m o r e smoothly than might have been feared; and this
reflected great credit on the Secretaries of State for Northern
Ireland and for Defence.
He would give further consideration to
the best means of devising a comprehensive framework of
proposals for the l o n g - t e r m constitutional settlemento
It
would be necessary to take into account not only the relationship
between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom but also the
relationship between the United Kingdom and the IVIGL Rep^olic,
bearing in mind particularly the prospective accession of both
countries to the European Communities,
It was to be hoped that
the leaders of various groups of opinion, both in Ireland and in Great
Britain, would not prejudice the prospects of an agreed solution by
taking up intransigent positions.
Future decisions on the release
of internees would present a particular problem in reconciling the
hopes of the Roman Catholic community with the f e a r s of the
Protestants.
It would be wise to present further r e l e a s e s as
justified on security grounds rather than as political gestures,
but without suggesting that the initial internments had not been
justified.
It was also important to maintain an effective public
presentation of the G o v e r n m e n t s policy, particularly in response
to any suggestions that the Government were n.o longer concerned
about the maintenance of security within the Province.
The
imposition of direct United Kingdom rule had improved the
G o v e r n m e n t s public standing abroad.
Within the I r i s h Republic,
however, there was still scope for m o r e vigorous action against
the I R A .
In particular, and despite the political difficulty for the
Government of the Republic of giving overt instructions to this end,
a more rigorous control of the Southern side of the B o r d e r would
make it easier for us to modify the policy of cratering roads on the
Northern side.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s
summing up of their discussion.
Cabinet Office
13 A p r i l 1972
C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S
G O V E R N M E N T
C O P Y NO
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 22nd Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 20 A p r i l 1972 at 11. 00 am
ERN
ND
us
nee:
) 20th
titans,
3
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D informed
the Cabinet that, although the shooting by the A r m y of Joseph McCann,
a prominent member of the "official" wing of the I r i s h Republican
A r m y , together with the publication of the Report of the inquiry by
the Lord Chief Justice, L o r d Widgery, into the events in Londonderry
on 30 January 1972 had tended to exacerbate the political atmosphere
in Northern Ireland, there had nevertheless been some moderately
encouraging developments within the Reman Catholic community.
In particular, a women's meeting held in the Andersonstown district
of Belfast in favour of a cessation of violence had been well attended;
and there were signs of a less hostile attitude towards the A r m y even
in the Bogside and Creggan districts of Londonderry.
There
remained no lack of opportunities for those who wished the
Governments poHcies ill to say that those policies had failed;
but it was important that the Government should not be deflected
from their course by day-to-day political p r e s s u r e s .
He had
therefore authorised, with the minimum of publicity, the r e l e a s e
of a further 26 internees.
Despite statements to the contrary by the Unionist Leader,
M r Faulkner, there w e r e no areas in Belfast through which
the security forces could not pass freely.
A s soon as any
barricades were put up they were removed; and in some cases
the local residents had dismantled them in anticipation of action
by the A r m y .
In Londonderry the situation differed little from
that of past months, although hooliganism was showing signs of
extending beyond the Bogside and Creggan a r e a s .
Within those
a r e a s , however, there was no deterioration.
The continuing
protection by the A r m y of the Royal U l s t e r Constabulary post
in Bligh's Lane was an unpalatable military commitment; but
for political reasons it could not be abandoned.
He hoped to
be able to announce within the next week that satisfactory a r r a n g e ­
ments had been worked out to enable him to lift the comprehensive
ban on marches, particularly since this would enable the Northern
Ireland Labour P a r t y to hold a march on 1 May, which he was
confident would be reasonably conducted and would serve as an
example to others.
It would be necessary, however, to give
further consideration to the question whether, following the removal
of the ban, he should authorise remission of the sentences of six
months' imprisonment recently passed on the Westminster M e m b e r s
of Parliament, M i s s Bernadette Devlin and M r Frank McM. nus who
were at present on bail pending appeal.
Given that a number of
infringements of the ban on marches by " L o y a l i s t " organisations
had gone unpunished, it would be difficult, if he now lifted the ban,
not to remit the sentences on the two M e m b e r s of Parliament.
s
The Cabinet Took note of the statement by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Cabinet Office
20 A p r i l 1972
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 23rd Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 27 A p r i l 1972 at 11. 00 am
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D informed
the Cabinet that, although the situation in the Province was still
confused, the movement of opinion in favour of a search for a
peaceful solution was stronger than might appear from P r e s s
reports.
This movement must be encouraged; and he was convinced
that it would now be v e r y unwise to deviate from the course which the
Government had adopted.
There had admittedly been a recent
increase in military casualties, which might be due in part to the
reaction of the "official" wing of the I r i s h Republican A r m y (IRA)
to the shooting of Joseph McCann and in part to the desire of the
"provisional" wing of the IRA to frustrate policies of reconciliation.
Nevertheless, a more repressive operational policy would be liable
to provoke a major outburst of renewed violence, which would have
serious effects upon opinion throughout the world.
Although the
level of patrolling by the A r m y had been reduced in recent weeks,
there had been no modification in the instructions to the troops to
act with the utmost vigour against gunmen, considerable numbers
of whom had been hit in recent exchanges.
In addition., nine
prominent members of the IRA had been arrested in Belfast
within the last ten days.
He proposed to discuss shortly with the Ministers most directly
concerned a number of aspects of Government policy relating to
Northern Ireland.
Meanwhile, however, he sought the agreement
of the Cabinet to a relaxation of the present total ban on m a r c h e s .
The ban could not be enforced in its entirety; and its application
was therefore exposed to charges of selectivity and bias.
It would
remain possible to require individual marches to be rerouted o r even
prohibited altogether if agreement could not be reached with their
organisers; but the removal of the total ban would be seen as a
realistic decision and would be widely welcomed, particularly if
the decision were announced that evening in good time to permit
a march planned for 1 M a y by the Northern Ireland Labour Party.
1
A number of consequential points would a r i s e for deci$ion.
He
proposed that no further prosecutions should be brought in respect
of alleged breaches of the ban, with retrospective effect to
25 December 1971 and that sentences of imprisonment already­
passed should be remitted.
These would include the sentences
passed upon the Westminster M e m b e r s of Parliament,
M i s s Bernadette Devlin, M r Frank McManus and M r G e r a r d Fitt,
It would also be for decision whether, if fines imposed but not yet
paid were remitted, fines already paid should be r e i m b u r s e d ,
T H E A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L said that he supported the proposal
that no further prosecutions should be brought in respect of alleged
breaches of the ban on m a r c h e s , the m o r e so since it was important
that the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern
Ireland should be freed to give their attention to their proper
function of dealing with criminal cases.
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up a brief discussion, said
that the Cabinet agreed that the comprehensive ban on m a r c h e s
in Northern Ireland should be lifted; that no further prosecutions
should be brought in respect of alleged breaches of the ban; that
sentences of imprisonment and fines already imposed should be
remitted; that fines already paid should be reimbursed; and that
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should issue a statement
that evening announcing the lifting of the ban and the amnesty in
respect of breaches of the ban with effect from 25 December 1971.
It did not appear practicable, however, to consider any form of
compensation for persons who might already have served all o r
part of prison sentences.
He would discuss further with the
Ministers most directly concerned the development of the
Governments policy in relation to Northern Ireland, including
its implications for the level of military activity to be pursued
against a background of military casualties which had recently
been heavy.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s
summing up of their discussion and invited the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to be guided
accordingly.
Cabinet Office
27 A p r i l 1972
The circulation of this paper has been strictlv Umited.
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 26th Conclusions, Minute 5
Thursday 18 May 1972 at 11. 00 am
HERN
ID
us
once:
) 24th
3ions
2
s
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D informed
the Cabinet that there had been a renewed outbreak of violence in
the Province during the previous weekend, culminating in a bomb
explosion in Belfast on 13 May, which had been followed by a
prolonged confrontation between the security forces and the local
inhabitants.
There was little doubt that responsibility for the
explosion should be attributed to the Irish Republican A r m y ( I R A ) .
But initial suspicion had fastened on Protestant extremists; and this
had aggravated the violence of the reaction.
The continuing
intransigence of the Ulster Vanguard, the extreme Protestant
force led by M r C r a i g , was providing the I R A with fresh grounds
for provoking the Protestant faction to acts of violence which
provided them with an excuse for no l e s s violent retaliation; and
inter-communal tension was liable to remain high at least until the
Vanguard parade scheduled for 3 June.
The risk that the
Protestants would take to a r m s in any organised and comprehensive
fashion might be exaggerated; and the picture of Protestant "no g o "
areas had perhaps been overdrawn.
Nevertheless, it would be
n e c e s s a r y to keep a close watch on the rising tide of Protestant
feeling and to continue to make it clear to all concerned, including
the U l s t e r Unionist M e m b e r s of the Parliament at Westminster,
that the British Government would not tolerate a revival of violence
and lawlessness in Northern Ireland,
The Cabinet Took note of the statement by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Cabinet Office
18 May 1972
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 30th Conclusions, Minute 4
Thursday 15 June 1972 at 10. 30 am
pTHERN
BLAND
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D said that
the fear of imminent civil war might now at last be impelling the
Protestant and Roman Catholic extremists in Northern Ireland to
consider more realistically the possible consequences of their
actions.
The Protestant comiriunity had been sorely tried by
the campaign of t e r r o r i s m on the part of the Irish Republican
A r m y ( I R A ) ; but the l e a d e r s of the Protestant extremist body,
the Ulster Defence Association ( U D A ) , had now postponed their
potentially provocative plan to erect permanent b a r r i c a d e s on a
widespread scale during the following weekend.
Equally, the most
recent approach by the " P r o v i s i o n a l " wing of the I R A , although
couched in an unacceptable form, perhaps reflected a consciousness
of declining support within the Roman Catholic community; and the
invitation, which he had accepted, to discuss the situation with
M r John Hume and M r Paddy Devlin of the Social Democratic and
Labour Party ( S D L P ) could only be welcomed as an indication that
the elected representatives of a substantial body of Roman Catholic
opinion might be coming to realise that the only hope of a peaceful
future for the Province lay in the policies of reconciliation which the
Government were now trying to pursue.
In his discussions with the leaders of the UDA he had pointed out that
Protestant violence could only be to the advantage of the I R A , since
it enabled them to represent themselves as the protectors of the
Roman Catholic population.
He had also emphasised that Northern
Ireland would not cease to be part of the United Kingdom unless and
until the majority of its people so wished; that the vigorous pursuit
of t e r r o r i s t s remained an essential part of the G o v e r n m e n t s policy;
and that the problem of the Bogside and Creggan a r e a s of
Londonderry would be dealt with, although not by a military
operation of a kind which would inevitably result in heavy civilian
casualties.
They appeared to accept that a direct military assault
upon these a r e a s would not be appropriate; and they had given him
an undertaking that the UDA would erect no barricades over the
following weekend.
It was to be hoped that their control over their
followers would be adequate to ensure this.
So far, however, there
was no evidence that either the former Northern Ireland P r i m e
Minister, M r Faulkner, or the leader of the Ulster Vanguard,
M r C r a i g , had exercised any effective moderating influence upon
the activities of the U D A ; and there were indications that
M r Faulkner w a s not prepared to do so on the pretext that
the violence of Protestant extremists had been provoked by
the policies which the United Kingdom Government had pursued
after the introduction of direct r u l e .
His discussions with leaders of the UDA had been immediately
followed by an invitation, cast in the form of an ultimatum, from
the " P r o v i s i o n a l " wing of the IRA to enter into discussion of their
"terms".
If he had given any indication of readiness to "negotiate"
with the IRA, or even if he had deferred rejecting their ultimatum,
there would have been a violent Protestant reaction,
A number of
responsible individuals in Northern Ireland, including the Governor,
had regretted that he had rebuffed this approach, on the ground that
the Government should not appear to be adopting a rigid and negative
attitude towards any developments which might offer a prospect,
however remote, of p r o g r e s s towards peace.
On the other hand
all the Roman Catholic m e m b e r s of the A d v i s o r y Commission had
supported his view that to respond to the invitation from the IRA
would have undermined the position of the more moderate Roman
Catholic representatives who were seeking a cessation of violence.
He therefore particularly appreciated the proposal for discussions
with M r Hume and M r Devlin, whom he would be meeting that
afternoon.
He proposed to take this opportunity to make it clear
that he had no intention of going behind the backs of the elected
representatives of the minority community in order to enter into
direct negotiations with the I R A .
At the same time, however, he
would ask them whether they could exercise their influence in such
a way that the maximum advantage could be taken of the evident
desire of large sections of the Roman Catholic community for an
end to violence.
In sum, these recent developments offered an opportunity for political advance which the Government could not afford to m i s s ; the question was how to seize it.
If the opportunity was not taken, there might be no alternative to a military operation designed, if not to occupy, at least to seal off the Bog side and Creggan areas by force.
In discussion it was suggested that, while it had been inevitable that a virtual ultimatum from the IRA should be rejected, it might be difficult to achieve any political solution of the problems of Londonderry without some dealings with the leaders of the P r o v i s i o n a l wing.
In many countries (including Ireland in 1921)
it had proved n e c e s s a r y to negotiate with terrorist l e a d e r s ; and
suitable channels might be found - whether through the S D L P , the
Roman Catholic Church o r released internees - through which the
IRA could be persuaded that an end to violence could be followed by
a relaxation of military activity, an end to internment and the
restoration of normal life throughout the Province, including
the Roman Catholic enclaves.
To this end it might be important
to avoid any public statement which could be interpreted as a threat
o r a commitment to the a r r e s t of IRA leaders when the Bogside and
Creggan a r e a s w e r e opened up.
t,
n
In further discussion it was pointed out that, although a principal
object of the G o v e r n m e n t s policies had been to detach moderate
Roman Catholics from supporting the IRA, no effective p r e s s u r e
to secure an end to violence had in fact been exerted as yet by the
m o r e moderate elements.
In renewing his appeal to the moderate
leaders, therefore, the Secretary of State might point out that, if
they could not exercise any influence to this end, the Government
might have no choice but to adopt measures such as the sealing off
of the Bogside and Creggan a r e a s , which could only revive the
alienation of the Roman Catholic community.
Although any direct
discussions with the IRA would probably remain out of the question,
the Secretary of State might be able to convey his m e s s a g e to them
not only through selected intermediaries but also by means of public
statements directed specifically tov/ards them as well as to a wider
audience,
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up this part of the discussion,
said that it was essential that nothing should be done which might
undermine the position of the elected representatives of the
predominantly Roman Catholic a r e a s of Northern Ireland,
The Secretary of State should do everything possible to persuade
responsible Roman Catholic leaders to initiate a p r o c e s s of
discussion by which the growing influences for moderation might
be effectively brought to bear upon the more extreme factions.
His discussions with M r John Hume and M r Paddy Devlin would
provide an opportunity for this; for example, they might be asked
if they could promote a gradual withdrawal of the b a r r i e r s
surrounding the Bogside and Creggan areas of Londonderry
in order that the much needed work of reconstruction within
those areas might begin.
The Secretary of State should also
seek to convey to the I R A l e a d e r s , by indirect means, that a
cessation of bombing and shooting would do more than anything
else to bring about a situation in which a settlement acceptable
to all might be achieved.
At this stage we should be particularly
careful not to lay down conditions upon which we might subsequently
find it impolitic to insist; and we should seek to avoid any
declarations of policy which might hamper our freedom of manoeuvre
in the very complex negotiations which would be n e c e s s a r y if we were
to arrive at a solution ensuring the Roman Catholic community the
social and economic opportunities to which they were entitled,
together with a fair share in the political life of the Province,
while reassuring the Protestant faction that there would be no
question of any change, without their consent, in the status of
Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.
The Cabinet ­
1,
Took note, with approval, of the Prime Minister*s summing up of this part of their discussion and invited the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to be guided accordingly. In the light of the preceding discussion the Cabinet considered
two memoranda by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
proposing the immediate announcement of decisions to enter upon
preparatory discussions with a view to a Round Table Conference
on the future form of government in Northern Ireland (CP(7Z) 59)
and the introduction of Proportional Representation ( P R ) for the
local government elections in Northern Ireland which were at present
envisaged for 18 October 1972 (CP(72) 60).
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D said that,
despite the more hopeful tendencies to which he had r e f e r r e d
e a r l i e r , further action was urgently needed to maintain the
momentum of the G o v e r n m e n t s political initiative.
The two
m e a s u r e s which he now proposed could help to promote a climate
of opinion in which poHtical activity rather than violence was accepted
as the only means of achieving lasting p r o g r e s s .
It would be
necessary, however, to maintain a careful balance between these
two proposals.
The reintroduction of the system of P R , which had
operated in Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1929, would be
regarded by the Unionist Party as designed to reduce their dominance
in Northern Ireland politics.
It was particularly important,
therefore, that the suggestion of a Round Table Conference should
be put forward in a manner which would r e a s s u r e the Unionists that
there was no intention of altering the status of Northern Ireland
within the United Kingdom unless a majority of its inhabitants so
wished.
F o r this reason he proposed to emphasise that the type
of conference which he had in mind was a meeting at which
representatives of the people of Northern Ireland themselves
could search for common ground and could report their conclusions
to the United Kingdom Government; and he would be equally
concerned to make it clear that at this stage the Government
were not imposing a Round Table Conference but were m e r e l y
proposing that discussions should be opened in order to ascertain
whether a conference could be brought into being.
He would
indicate at the same time that, if there should emerge clear
evidence of a widespread desire for an e a r l y plebiscite on the
status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, the
Government would arrange such a plebiscite without delay.
The precise terms of reference, composition, and method
of operation of the conference would be matters to be explored
in the preliminary discussions with the parties concerned.
It
might not be easy to secure agreement upon the choice of a
Chairman.
The former Northern Ireland P r i m e Minister,
M r Faulkner, had suggested that the Secretary of State himself
might represent the only generally acceptable
appointment to this post.
His own view was that, since
the conference should be p r i m a r i l y a meeting of representatives
of the people of Northern Ireland, the Governor might be an
appropriate Chairman; but the G o v e r n o r s participation might,
however wrongly, be regarded as entailing an undue involvement
of the Crown in political discussions.
A s regards the local government elections, it was necessary, if
the planned date of 1 A p r i l 1973 for the introduction of the reformed
structure of local government was to be kept, to take an early
decision on the question whether the present system of simple
majority voting was to be retained or whether the single transferable
vote system of PR w a s to be reintroduced.
There were cogent
arguments for reintroducing P R for the forthcoming elections,
without prejudice to any l o n g e r - t e r m constitutional arrangements
for the Province.
If the simple majority vote was retained, v e r y
few councillors would be returned who w e r e not supporters of one
of the two extremist P a r t i e s , Ulster Vanguard or Sinn Fein.
The
reintroduction of P R might not wholly prevent such a polarisation;
but if PR was still withheld, the blame for the polarisation would
be placed upon the Government by those moderate elements in
Northern Ireland whom it was most desirable to encourage.
M o r e o v e r , the Opposition at Westminster strongly favoured
the reintroduction of PR in Northern Ireland; and, if the Government
rejected this course, the Opposition would probably seek to obstruct
the substantial programme of legislation n e c e s s a r y to c a r r y through
the reforms of the local government structure to which the
Government were committed.
M r Faulkner had indicated
that there would be strong objection to P R within the Unionist
Party.
But there were signs that Unionist opinion would in fact
be divided; and it w a s doubtful whether P R would be an emotive
issue for the extremists of the U D A ,
Some of the G o v e r n m e n t s
supporters at Westminster might have misgivings about PR; and
it would be desirable to emphasise that the proposal involved no
more than the reintroduction, on an experimental b a s i s , of the
system which had prevailed in Northern Ireland between 1921 and
1929 and that it constituted no precedent for elections in Great
Britain,
A s a result of the introduction of PP. the elections in question would
have to be postponed until November or December 1972; but the new
arrangements for local government could still be introduced on
1 A p r i l 1973.
The need to define the multi-member constituencies
which were inherent in a P R system would require v e r y prompt
Parliamentary action.
In discussion it was suggested that, while the proposed Parliamentary
statement should be confined to suggesting preparatory discussions
for a Round Table Conference, the desirability of such a conference
should be clearly indicated.
If the preliminary exchanges failed to
result in agreement on arrangements for a conference, this would be
due solely to the intransigence of the participants and would not
reflect upon the G o v e r n m e n t s policies.
It was also important
that the statement should be so worded as to r e a s s u r e Unionist
opinion in Northern Ireland that the status of the Province within
the United Kingdom would remain unchanged unless and until a
majority of its citizens chose otherwise.
The question whether
the conference could discuss this aspect of the status of Northern
Ireland, however, must inevitably depend to some extent on the
outcome of the preliminary exchanges.
In discussion of the reintroduction of P R for the local government
elections there was general agreement on the importance of
satisfying all sections of the electorate that the system was
fair in its operation.
The single transferable vote system
had been adopted successfully in a number of countries and
had, indeed, operated in Northern Ireland between 1921 and
1929. Although it might in general be regarded as inferior
to the system of a simple majority vote and l e s s conducive
to the maintenance of stable government, the political arguments
for its adoption in the special case of Northern Ireland w e r e v e r y
strong; and the circumstances were so exceptional that it should
not be difficult to resist p r e s s u r e to extend P R to local government
elections in Great Britain,
In terms of Parliamentary time,
however, it was v e r y desirable that the necessary O r d e r s in
Council should, if possible, not be brought forward for debate
before the middle of July at the earliest.
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up this part of the discussion,
said that the Cabinet agreed that the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland should make a statement in Parliament that afternoon about
the G o v e r n m e n t s decisions to initiate preparatory discussions with
a view to a Round Table Conference on the future form of
government in Northern Ireland and to reintroduce the single
transferable vote system of P R for the forthcoming local government
elections in Northern Ireland.
The statement on the conference
should clearly indicate the G o v e r n m e n t s desire that representatives
of the people of Northern Ireland should meet to seek a common
approach to a solution of their problems.
The timing, terms of
reference, membership, chairmanship and method of operation of
the conference would be matters to be explored in greater detail in
the preliminary discussions.
It should be made clear that the
Government would arrange for an early plebiscite on the status
of Northern Ireland in relation to the rest of the United Kingdom
if there was a clear consensus of opinion in the Province that this
would be desirable; but It would be necessary to give renewed
assurances that there would be no change in the status of the Six
Counties unless the majority of the inhabitants so chose.
It would
also be desirable to emphasise that the adoption of P R represented
a reintroduction, on an experimental basis and for the forthcoming
local elections in Northern Ireland only, of the system which had
operated there between 1921 and 1929.
While the elections could
not be postponed beyond November or December and the work of
defining new multi-member constituencies should therefore be put
in hand without delay, the Secretary of State should consider how
far he could defer the introduction of the necessary legislation by
Order in Council under the procedures laid down in the Northern
Ireland ( T e m p o r a r y Provisions) Act, 1972.
The Secretary of State
should also ensure that the Opposition and the Government of the
Irish Republic were given appropriate prior notification of the
decisions to be announced that afternoon.
The Cabinet ­
2.
Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e
Minister s summing up of their discussion and
invited the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland to be guided accordingly in preparing
a statement to be made in Parliament that afternoon.
1
Cabinet Office
16 June 1972
The circulation of this paper has been strictly Hmited.
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' j- \
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ri
T O P SECRET
Copy No
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 31st Conclusions, Minute 4
Thursday 22 June 1972 at 10.30 am
M
h
s,
T H E S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D said that
he had reason to believe that a statement would be issued that
afternoon by the "Irish Republican Publicity B u r e a u " on behalf of
the "Irish Republican l e a d e r s h i p " .
This statement would be to the
effect that the Irish Republican A r m y (IRA) were prepared to
suspend offensive operations with effect from midnight on Monday,
26 June; and it would probably indicate that, while the "Irish
Republican l e a d e r s h i p " would welcome this cessation of violence,
they would expect a r e c i p r o c a l response from the A r m e d F o r c e s of
the Crown, that they believed that the cessation of violence would
provide scope for the development of political discussions and that
they had developed a "peace p l a n " which they would be prepared to
put f o r w a r d .
He believed that, if the statement took this form, the distinction
between the "Irish Republican leadership" and the IRA might be
significant as indicating the possible emergence of political
personalities closely linked with the IRA but sufficiently separate
from them to have a possible role in future political discussions.
It would also be significant if the statement included no stipulations
about the release of individuals interned under the Special P o w e r s
Acts.
A cessation of violence on this b a s i s would clearly
represent a very favourable development.
But a number of
problems would a r i s e about the practical observance of a " c e a s e f i r e "
e . g , the policy to be adopted thereafter as r e g a r d s the a r r e s t of
individuals who had long been wanted by the security forces.
M o r e o v e r , there might be a violent reaction by the Protestant
extremists of the U l s t e r Defence Association ( U D A ) ; or internal
fighting might break out within the I R A between its "Official" and
" P r o v i s i o n a l " wings.
if the " P r o v i s i o n a l " wing was now genuinely
disposed towards a'fceasefire", this was no doubt due in part to the
success of the G o v e r n m e n t s policy of isolating the I R A from much
of their previous support within the Roman Catholic community.
But a genuine fear of the growing strength of the U D A had probably
1
been a significant contributory factor.
If the statement was issued,
as he expected, at 2, 00 pm, he would make a statement in the
House of Commons at 3. 30 pm to the effect that, if violence indeed
ceased, the A r m e d F o r c e s of the Crown would obviously reciprocate.
If he was asked whether he was now prepared to enter into direct
discussions with the " I r i s h Republican leadership" he would confine
himself to emphasising that the immediate issue was whether
violence was to cease within the next few days and that it was
important that nothing should be said or done which might prejudice
this hope.
He would give the Opposition brief advance notice of
his statement; but it was important that there should be no
suggestion that the Government had had prior knowledge of the
intentions of the "Irish Republican leadership".
Thereafter, he
would need to discuss further with the Ministers most directly
concerned the wider implications of a " c e a s e f i r e " for our policy as
r e g a r d s search and a r r e s t ,
T H E P R I M E MINISTER, summing up a brief discussion, said that,
if a statement was made by the "Irish Republican leadership" on
the lines forecast by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
and if a cessation of violence did in fact take effect from midnight
on Monday, 26 June, this could be welcomed as an important first
step towards the attainment of a political settlement.
The Cabinet
would wish to congratulate the Secretary of State upon the advance
which, he had made towards the restoration of peace in Northern
Ireland and the achievement of a political solution of its p r o b l e m s .
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e Minister's
summing up of their discussion.
Cabinet Office
22 June 1972
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 33rd Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 29 June 1972 at 10. 30 am
ItTHERN
LAND
Pvious
erence:
(72) 31st
Inclusions.
iUte 4
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D informed
the Cabinet that, despite the brutal cynicism displayed by the Irish
Republican A r m y (IRA) in maintaining their campaign of t e r r o r i s m
till midnight on 26 June, the " c e a s e f i r e " had subsequently been
well enforced.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , there were still extremists in both
the Protestant and the Roman Catholic factions who w e r e anxious
to maintain the campaign of violence.
On the previous day he had
received representative l e a d e r s of the Ulster Defence Association
( U D A ) , who had said that they could no longer accept the exclusion
of the Roman Catholic enclaves in Londonderry from the normal
enforcement of law and o r d e r .
He had gone some way towards
meeting their point of view by assuring them that a plebiscite on the
status of Northern Ireland in relation to the United Kingdom would
be held before the local government elections planned for the
autumn and by informing them that wherever possible, and
particularly as r e g a r d s individuals who received salaries or other
payments from public funds, he proposed to demand repayment of
a r r e a r s of rent oi rates which had been withheld as part of the
campaign of civil disobedience.
He had also promised to take all
practicable steps to deal with the problem of the Roman Catholic
enclaves; but he had been necessarily inhibited by considerations
of security from revealing that officials of his Department would
shortly enter the Bogside and Creggan districts of Londonderry in
order to discuss with the l e a d e r s of those communities the first
steps towards a removal of the b a r r i c a d e s and a restoration of
normal conditions of life.
At the end of the interview the U D A leaders had undertaken to reach
no decision that evening; but within an hour they had announced that
they intended to erect b a r r i c a d e s of their own, all over Northern
Ireland, during the coming weekend.
We must still hope, despite
this announcement, that the leaders of the Bogside and Creggan
communities would agree to dismantle some of their b a r r i c a d e s ,
since much of the incentive for the U D A ' s proposed action should
then be removed.
But if the inhabitants of the Bog side and
Creggan were no longer willing to consider any reduction in their
b a r r i c a d e s , the U D A would certainly erect barricades on a l a r g e
scale.
On the other hand their threats to cut off essential services
to the Bogside and Creggan areas were unrealistic.
In conjunction with the military authorities he would continue to
watch the situation closely and to plan the deployment and operations
of the security forces in the light of developments.
The Protestant
marches, which w e r e about to begin and would culminate in the
Orange parades on 12 July, were serious potential sources of
inter communal violence; and, if the Protestants behaved
provocatively, the leaders of the I R A might not be able to restrain
their m o r e extreme followers from breaking the " c e a s e f i r e " .
F o r the present the security forces w e r e not carrying out operations
of search and a r r e s t within Roman Catholic a r e a s .
But they w e r e
deployed in considerable strength along inter sectarian, boundaries;
and the Royal U l s t e r Constabulary ( R U C ) were now patrolling in
greater strength.
It would be preferable not to release any further
individuals from internment until it was clear whether the
" c e a s e f i r e " had endured at least beyond 12 July.
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R D E F E N C E said that he agreed
with this estimate of the potential dangers in the period up to
12 July.
But, if that period passed relatively peacefully, it might
be wise to consider some reduction in the strength of the A r m y in
Northern Ireland.
It would also be necessary to examine the
possibility of deploying Royal Military Police personnel within the
Bogside and Creggan a r e a s as an interim measure until patrolling
by the R U C became acceptable.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up a brief discussion, said that
the Cabinet agreed that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
should continue to maintain a close watch upon the situation and
should act in accordance with the general policy which he had
indicated.
The implications of that policy would be considered
further by the Ministers directly concerned.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e Minister s
summing up of their discussion.
1
Cabinet Office
29 June 1972
2
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 34th Conclusions, Minute 5
Thursday 6 July 1972 at 10. 30 am
KRTHERN
PLAND
ovious
ftference:
if(72) 33rd
inclusions,
Bnute 3
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D informed
the Cabinet that the " c e a s e f i r e " proclaimed by the " P r o v i s i o n a l " wing
of the Irish Republican A r m y (IRA) was in general being observed,
although there had been a number of isolated incidents of shooting.
A more serious development w a s the expansion of the Ulster Defence
Association ( U D A ) , whose strength and influence were extending
steadily throughout the Protestant community.
The Association
undoubtedly commanded a substantial amount of tacit support from
Protestants who would not themselves wish to indulge in violence but
still resented the G o v e r n m e n t s policy towards the minority, whose
conduct over the last three years they regarded as calling for
punishment rather than reconciliation.
The security forces
had been tolerant of the erection of b a r r i c a d e s by the U D A so
long as these were confined to predominantly Protestant a r e a s .
On 3 July, however, the Association had threatened to extend the
barricaded areas to include streets containing substantial numbers
of Roman Catholics as well as Protestants.
There was good reason
to believe that, if this had been permitted, the leaders of the
" P r o v i s i o n a l " wing of the IRA would not have been able to enforce
the continued maintenance of their " c e a s e f i r e " .
The A r m y had therefore been deployed to prevent the extension of
the areas in question.
M o r e than 1,000 m e m b e r s of the U D A in
marching order had confronted the troops.
He had thereupon
authorised the commanders of the security forces to make clear
to the leaders that no extension of the barricaded a r e a s would be
permitted; and, in view of the likely consequences of any attempt
of this kind by the U D A , he had agreed that in the last resort the
security forces might be ordered to open f i r e .
This had been a
v e r y grave decision; but, if the Cabinet w e r e to rule out entirely
the possible use of f i r e a r m s against l a r g e formations of unarmed
but disciplined persons in similar circumstances, the U D A would
extend their b a r r i c a d e s in the a r e a s inhabited by Roman Catholics,
with incalculable consequences in terms of intersectarian violence.
On the day in question, however, the UDA had finally withdrawn in
the face of the f i r m stand taken by the security forces, on the basis
of an agreement that they might c a r r y out patrols within the a r e a s
which they had at present barricaded.
It must be hoped that the
incident would have inculcated a greater sense of responsibility
among their l e a d e r s .
But, although the security forces would
do their utmost to prevent a repetition of this confrontation, no
moderate Unionist leader was prepared to attempt to control the
Association or to mobilise moderate opinion against them.
The
present leaders of the U D A might therefore be tempted to establish
a political organisation, in which event the local government of the
Province might eventually fall under the control of a type of mob rule
which, though professedly " l o y a l i s t " in sentiment, would paradoxi­
cally resemble in many respects an extreme left wing r e g i m e .
The
prospect might be m o r e hopeful if an individual with an established
political position, such as the leader of the Democratic Unionist
Party, Dr Paisley, could acquire a m e a s u r e of control over the
political aspirations of the U D A ,
T H E PRIME M I N I S T E R , summing up a brief discussion, said that
sensitive legal issues could a r i s e when the actions of large gatherings
appeared liable to lead to serious breaches of the peace but were not
in themselves unlawful.
There was no dispute that the civil power
could call upon military personnel to assist in securing objectives
deemed n e c e s s a r y for the maintenance of law and order and that,
in rendering such assistance, military personnel were entitled to
use such force, including the use of f i r e a r m s in the last r e s o r t , as
might be n e c e s s a r y for the purpose.
But the degree of force which
might justifiably be used must be commensurate with the gravity of
the threat which it was intended to avert.
On this basis the use of
f i r e a r m s would be p e r m i s s i b l e only if a careful assessment of the
likely consequences of the actions of a crowd indicated a substantial
risk of widespread disorder or loss of life and if all alternative
means of holding them in check, such as the use of baton rounds
o r CS riot control agent, had been exhausted.
The Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland and the military authorities should continue
to be guided by these principles, which inevitably involved a nice
judgment of the probability that actions not unlawful in themselves
might precipitate other actions, perhaps by other individuals, likely
to cause bloodshed.
Nevertheless the legal issues, important as
they w e r e , could well be overshadowed by the political repercussions
of, on the one hand, the use of f i r e a r m s by British troops against an
unarmed Protestant gathering and, on the other hand, a renewal of
t e r r o r i s m and intersectarian violence such as might well have
followed the extension of Protestant b a r r i c a d e s to include a r e a s
of mixed population.
It w a s a matter for satisfaction that the f i r m
action of the Secretary of State and the military authorities on
3 July had persuaded the leaders of the UDA to recoil from an
ultimate confrontation with British troops; and it was to be hoped
that the incident had caused them to reflect carefully upon the
possible consequences of psrovocative actions.
The Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland should continue to do everything
possible to encourage a proper sense of responsibility in all
sections of the community during the critical period up to, and
including, the major Orange marches on 12 July.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s
summing up of their discussion and invited the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the
Secretary of State for Defence to be guided
accordingly.
Cabinet Office
6 July 1972
! L \
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 36th Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 13 July 1972 at 10. 30 am
T H E S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D informed
the Cabinet that the Orange m a r c h e s on 12 July had passed quietly,
mainly as the result of a very l a r g e deployment of military and
police personnel.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , individual shooting incidents and
explosions continued.
In general the situation, following the
announcement on 9 July by the " P r o v i s i o n a l " wing of the Irish
Republican A r m y ( I R A ) that they w e r e terminating their " c e a s e f i r e " ,
remained uncertain.
Certain of the " P r o v i s i o n a l " leaders w e r e
attempting to fix upon the British Government and A r m y the principal
responsibility for the breakdown of the " c e a s e f i r e " ; but he w a s not
without hope that the more moderate leaders might prevail and that
the " t r u c e " might be resumed.
While violence continued, however,
it would not be right to take any step which might be publicly
construed as a negotiation with t e r r o r i s t s .
It was also desirable to
refrain from any action which might alienate Roman Catholic
opinion or jeopardise the prospects of a renewed cessation of
violence.
Nevertheless, the security forces could not remain
completely passive in the face of t e r r o r i s m ; and he was prepared,
in consultation with the Secretary of State for Defence, to authorise
a firm miHtary response, on a selective b a s i s , to flagrant
provocation such as the continued bombardment of observation posts.
It remained to be seen whether this would suffice to convince
Protestant opinion, and in particular the Ulster Defence Association
( U D A ) , of the G o v e r n m e n t s determination to put an end to
t e r r o r i s m by the I R A .
A considerable body of Protestant opinion,
which favoured m o r e drastic military measures designed to root out
the I R A completely, had little enthusiasm for a " c e a s e f i r e " ; and the
U D A might seek to destroy any further " t r u c e " which might be
secured.
But it must be doubtful whether sterner military m e a s u r e s
would succeed in completely eradicating the IRA, even if the cost in
terms of civilian casualties and alienation of the two communities
w e r e thought acceptable; and the reaction of moderate Roman
Catholic opinion would be the sharper to the extent that the U D A
embarked upon violent action in ostensible support of the security
forces.
1
In discussion it was suggested that the two communities in Northern
Ireland might prove to be permanently and irretrievably
irreconcilable.
If the breakdown of the " c e a s e f i r e " proved
irrevocable, we might therefore have to face a state of armed
rebellion in U l s t e r , backed by at least the acquiescence of a
considerable section of the population.
We might then have to
choose between launching military operations on a v e r y formidable
scale indeed and embarking on a fundamental reconsideration of our
responsibilities towards Northern Ireland.
One hypothetical
solution, which might on examination prove to be within the scope
of the pledges which successive British Governments had given to
the majority of the people of Northern Ireland, might be the
establishment of an independent State within the Commonwealth.
On the other hand the implications of a change in the nature of our
responsibilities towards the Six Counties or of a decision to launch
more intensive military operations were so serious as to underline
the desirability of continuing to seek a reduction of tension as a
prelude to a political solution which would permit the two
communities to live together within the United Kingdom,
A wide
range of possible solutions, including such extreme m e a s u r e s as
a redistribution of populations, might require to be examined for
this purpose.
T H E P R I M E MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the
Cabinet agreed that we should continue to pursue a policy of political
and military restraint, tempered by a firm military response to
flagrant provocation, in the hope of securing a renewed cessation
of violence and an opportunity for the resumption of political
discussions.
If the breakdown of the " c e a s e f i r e " should prove to
be irrevocable, however, the Cabinet might need to consider the
possible courses of action open to us on the basis of an alternative
concept of policy.
In consultation with the Ministers most directly
concerned, he had set in train an examination of the practical
implications of a number of contingencies in this context.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should
continue to keep the Cabinet informed of the course of developments.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s
summing up of their discussion and invited the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the
Secretary of State for Defence to be guided accordingly.
Cabinet Office
14 July 1972
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7
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 37th Conclusions, Minute 5
Thursday 20 July 1972 at 10. 30 am
NORTHERN
IRELAND
Previous
Reference:
CM(72) 36th
Conclusions,
Minute 3
THE S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D
informed the Cabinet that he had continued to work for a js
reconciliation of the two communities with a view to the restoration
of a stable society in Northern Ireland; but that, as the Cabinet
had agreed at their previous meeting, the continuing campaign of
t e r r o r i s m mounted by the " P r o v i s i o n a l " wing of the Irish
Republican A r m y ( I R A ) made it necessary to temper the policy of
reconciliation with f i r m yet selective military responses to
provocation.
Such responses w e r e bound to c a r r y the risk of
damaging relations with the Roman Catholic community resulting
for example in the unnecessary departure of s e v e r a l hundred
persons from the Lenadoon estate in Belfast; on the other hand
some major exchanges of shooting elsewhere in the city, in which
the IRA w e r e believed to have sustained some 50 casualties, of
which about half w e r e probably fatal, had aroused no similar
reaction.
He proposed to include details of casualties suffered by
the IRA in his statement in the House of Commons that afternoon,
with the aim of refuting criticism alleging too passive an attitude
on the part of the security forces.
To the extent that the IRA
chose or w e r e compelled to restrict their activities, however, the
opportunities for selective response by the security forces w e r e
correspondingly limited.
The incidence of explosions in Belfast
had been reduced by the severe restrictions placed upon vehicular
traffic in the city centre; and new measures w e r e being s i m i l a r l y
introduced in Londonderry.
He continued to attach importance to the maintenance of
bipartisan support in Parliament for the G o v e r n m e n t s policy.
He
would be receiving later that day a report from the L e a d e r of the
Opposition, M r . Harold Wilson, upon his conversations the
previous day with l e a d e r s of the " P r o v i s i o n a l " wing.
M r . Wilson
had already told him that he had expressed support for the
Government s policy and made c l e a r to the IRA his view that their
political demands w e r e unrealistic: and it was to be hoped that
1
1
the IRA leaders had got this impression firmly.
Nevertheless,
if the IRA were to proclaim a conditional " c e a s e f i r e " on terms
which, though in fact unacceptable to any British government,
could be represented as warranting serious consideration if not
acceptance, the Government could be e m b a r r a s s e d by a consequent
polarisation of opinion, as between not only the two communities
in Northern Ireland but also possibly between the two main parties
at Westminster.
It might become increasingly difficult to
maintain a consensus of moderate opinion in support of the
Governments policy, but he saw no alternative policy as offering
any prospect of securing the Governments long-term objective
of a stable political future for Northern Ireland.
In the meantime
he hoped that some representatives of moderate and non-political
opinion in the Province would put forward constructive suggestions
in response to his invitation.
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up a brief discussion, said that
the Cabinet had taken note of the statement by the Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland and fully endorsed the policy that he
was pursuing.
It would remain important to maintain the
confidence of the Governments supporters in Parliament, while
taking account of their anxieties.
Subject to consultation with the
Secretary of State on the security situation, other Ministers who
might have occasion to pay official visits to Northern Ireland on
matters unconnected with the emergency should be encouraged to
do so.
The Secretary of State should r a i s e , for discussion by the
Ministers most directly concerned, a number of questions relating
to the proposed plebiscite on the future relationship of Northern
Ireland with the United Kingdom.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e Minister's
summing up of their discussion.
Cabinet Office
20 July 1972
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 38th Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 27 July 1972 at 11. 00 am
jRTHERN
pLAND
wA
ovious
(erence:
i(72) 37th
Bclusions,
Bute 5
T H E S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E F O R N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D informed
the Cabinet that on Friday 21 July the " P r o v i s i o n a l " wing of the
Irish Republican A r m y ( I R A ) had exploded 26 bombs in Belfast in
circumstances calculated to inflict widespread damage and
casualties.
Nine persons had been killed and over 100 injured,
some very severely.
This had aroused feelings of extreme
revulsion throughout the world; and within Northern Ireland not
only among the Protestant community, but in the Roman Catholic
community a l s o .
The anger of the Protestant community had been
such that, if he and the Secretary of State for Defence had not
immediately authorised sterner measures by the security forces
against the IRA, there would have been a very serious risk of direct
action on the streets on a widespread scale.
The operations that
had been undertaken had done much to calm Protestant opinion;
nevertheless they had made no more than modest inroads upon the
operational capability of the IRA, and had predictably caused some
alienation of Roman Catholic opinion.
However, a substantial body
of Roman Catholic opinion still appeared prepared to accept a need
for stern action against the t e r r o r i s t s .
He thought it unrealistic
to hope to be able to rely on any lasting renewal of the " c e a s e f i r e "
by the I R A ; and he believed that a continuation of military operations
at no m o r e than the present level would m e r e l y stimulate further
feelings of frustration within the Protestant community and
irritation among the Roman Catholics.
He therefore believed that the present climate of public opinion,
while the events of F r i d a y 21 July were still fresh, w a s opportune
for the Government to take action, as was its duty, to show that it
could no longer tolerate the existence of barricaded a r e a s to which
the security forces had only limited access.
The Bogside and
Creggan areas of Londonderry w e r e of particular symbolic
importance in this connection; but, if militarily feasible,
simultaneous action should also be directed against a r e a s in Belfast
similarly dominated by extremists, whether of the I R A or the U l s t e r
Defence Association ( U D A ) .
He thought it right to point out,
1
however, that the success of the operation in promoting the
G o v e r n m e n t s ultimate objectives would depend greatly upon the
manner of its conduct, and the reaction of the residents of the areas
concerned.
If the population accepted that the operation was
directed solely against t e r r o r i s t s , its successful execution could
produce substantial political advantage a and help to open the way for
political discussions.
If, on the other hand, as was possible, there
was widespread resistance to the operation, and heavy casualties
w e r e inflicted, the prospects for an eventual political solution would
probably have received a severe setback.
The Government would
be liable in those circumstances to lose the support of the
Opposition in Parliament, of the Roman Catholic community in
Northern Ireland, and of a l a r g e body of opinion in the Republic of
Ireland and throughout the world.
On balance, however, and in view
of the deterioration which he believed would follow a decision not to
take stronger m e a s u r e s , he recommended that a military operation
should be launched to reoccupy the barricaded areas, with a clear
political presentation designed to retain the goodwill of the Roman
Catholic community in Northern Ireland and to restate the
G o v e r n m e n t s objective of a political solution offering a just and
secure future for that community.
T H E S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E F O R D E F E N C E said that he supported
the recommendation of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
To carry out an operation on the lines envisaged would involve the
reinforcement of the garrison in Northern Ireland by a further seven
major units, four of which would be drawn from the United Kingdom
and three from the British A r m y of the Rhine.
The operation could
be mounted in the early hours of Monday 31 July.
The only tracked
vehicles employed would be four armoured bulldozers equipped to
deal with mined b a r r i c a d e s on the outskirts of the Bogside and
Creggan a r e a s .
The movement of units to Northern Ireland could
not be concealed, but could be explained in general terms as part of
the policy of stronger m e a s u r e s against the IRA which the Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland had declared e a r l i e r in the week.
He
believed, however, that the justification for the operation now
contemplated would be clearer if it were preceded by an appeal for
the removal of all b a r r i c a d e s , and an offer of military assistance
in removing them, coupled with an indication that if they were not
removed the security forces would have to take appropriate action.
In discussion it was accepted that the success of the operation would
depend greatly upon keeping casualties among the population to a
minimum, and that there could be no assurance that the IRA would
not persuade or compel large crowds to take to the streets, thus
greatly increasing the risk of casualties.
It was suggested, however,
that this, while underlining the desirability of rapid and simultaneous
action, did not detract from the need to take resolute action against
the IRA in the very near future to prevent further deterioration of the
2
security situation.
The question of a p r i o r appeal or warning must
be considered in the light of its possible effect upon casualties.
It
might lead to widespread demonstrations involving women and
children.
On the other hand it might encourage the more
responsible elements to keep the streets clear.
If it was followed
by evacuations, these would, while politically embarrassing, reduce
the risk of casualties to persons other than t e r r o r i s t s .
It would
also be desirable to ensure that the forces involved were fully­
instructed regarding the importance of maintaining the A r m y ' s
traditional standards of discipline and employing only the minimum
force necessary to achieve the objectives of the operation.
These
principles must apply to the interrogation of suspects, of whom
considerable numbers might be arrested and detained for periods
of up to 48 hours; intelligence gained from these interrogations,
and from the reoccupation of the barricaded a r e a s , should make
practicable a selective approach to searches for a r m s and to the
a r r e s t of individuals for the preferment of criminal charges or for
m o r e protracted detention.
There were strong political arguments
against the renewal of internment in the form in which it had been
introduced in August 1971, It would be necessary to give further
consideration to means of ensuring that the m o r e dangerous
terrorists were kept off the streets.
It might be necessary to
introduce legislation after the Summer Recess to create courts of
a special character appropriate to the hearing of criminal charges
in the situation existing in Northern Ireland; meanwhile it might be
necessary to make a number of detention o r d e r s under the Special
P o w e r s Acts, and to justify them by a stated intention to introduce
this legislation.
T H E P R I M E MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the
Cabinet agreed that, in the situation created by the bombing incidents
of Friday 21 July, a military operation should be mounted to reoccupy
those areas from which either the IRA or the U D A sought to exclude
the normal operation of the security forces.
The a r e a 6 of greatest
difficulty would probably be the Bogside and Creggan districts of
Londonderry, and the enclaves dominated by the I R A in Belfast;
nevertheless it was important that the operation should be clearly
seen to be directed against extremists of either community.
The
operation should be launched in the early hours of Monday 31 July;
and the reinforcement of the garrison with seven major units and
n e c e s s a r y supporting elements (including armoured bulldozers)
should proceed.
The operation should consist of rapid and
simultaneous penetration into the several areas concerned, in order
to inflict maximum damage upon the capability of the I R A to wage its
campaign of t e r r o r i s m while keeping to a minimum the risk of
casualties to persons other than t e r r o r i s t s .
The paramount
importance of avoiding innocent casualties underlined the importance
of maintaining the A r m y ' s traditional standards of discipline and
restraint in the exercise of force against the civil community.
The
3
operation should be preceded by an appeal to the inhabitants of the
areas concerned to remove their b a r r i c a d e s , and an offer of military­
assistance in doing so, failing which the A r m y would have to take
appropriate action.
He would discuss further with the Ministers
most directly concerned the content and timing of such an appeal,
together with other more detailed aspects of the operation itself,
and of its presentation in the context of the G o v e r n m e n t s overall
policy for Northern Ireland.
He would also give consideration to
the extent of advance notice that might be given to the L e a d e r of the
Opposition and to the P r i m e Minister of the Irish Republic.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e Minister's
summing up of their discussion.
Cabinet Office
27 July 1972
4
IS D O C U M E N T IS THE P R O P E R T Y O F HER B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S
G O V E R N M E N T
COPY N O
10
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(72) 46th Conclusions, Minute 4
Wednesday 25 October 1972 at 11. 30 am
plTHERN
LAND
)vious
erence:
(72) 45th
elusions,
ute 6
[
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E FOR N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D said that
the recent deterioration in the security situation in Northern Ireland
compelled him to advise the Cabinet to r e v e r s e their e a r l i e r
decision and to announce that the local government elections would
not take place on 6 D e c e m b e r , as had been e a r l i e r envisaged.
Intimidation of Roman Catholics by Protestant extremists had
recently increased to an alarming extent; and many Roman
Catholic candidates would be too frightened to stand at the elections.
Indeed, virtually none of the political P a r t i e s now wished the
elections to take place on 6 December,
In these circumstances
it would be prudent to announce, preferably on the following day,
that the elections would be postponed for 6 months, until May 1973,
with the result that the new local authorities would be constituted
in the following October.
The announcement of this change should
lay emphasis on the widespread desire among the political Parties
in Northern Ireland for a postponement of the elections and on the
fact that it would enable the proposed plebiscite on the B o r d e r to be
held first.
On this b a s i s the plebiscite might best be held in
January.
Our troops would need to be reinforced for both the
elections and the plebiscite.
There were grounds for considerable concern about the effect on
Protestant extremist opinion of recent public statements by
M r C r a i g , the leader of the Vanguard Movement including his
recent inflammatory speech in London to the Monday Club.
Urgent
consideration was being given to further steps to counter the
activity of the Tartan gangs and other extremist groups whose
violent behaviour received additional encouragement from such
utterances.
The intimidation of magistrates and the prejudice
of j u r i e s were also assuming serious proportions.
Bail was
being granted against police advice; and verdicts were being
returned against the balance of the evidence.
1
T H E P R I M E MINISTER, summing up a brief discussion, said that, although there w e r e obvious dangers in allowing ourselves to be deterred by threats of violence from giving effect to our decisions of policy, it seemed clear that the elections would have to be postponed.
Since he had privately informed the P r i m e Minister of the Irish Republic of our e a r l i e r intentions during the recent Summit Meeting in P a r i s , he would now arrange for him to be warned of this change in our plans. It was obviously objectionable that individuals who were clearly guilty of public incitement to violence should escape the legal consequences of their speeches; and although we must have r e g a r d to the political implications in Northern Ireland of bringing criminal charges against political leaders who could command significant popular support, especially if there was a risk that such prosecutions might fail, we must nevertheless show continuing determination to maintain law and order.^ In this context the Cabinet were glad to be informed by the Attorney General that he ' was already examining M r C r a i g ' s recent speech to the Monday Club.
A s regards the intimidation of magistrates, the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland should consider the possibility of statutorily debarring
bail in certain types of cases.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e Minister's
summing up of their discussion^
Cabinet Office
26 October 1972
2
THIS
DOCUMENT
IS T H E PROPERTY
O F H E R BRITANNIC
MAJESTY'S
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of*
GOVERNMENT
4
^
, .
'
TOP SECRET
Copy No
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
C M ( 7 1 ) 13th C o n c l u s i o n s , Minute 5
T u e s d a y 9 M a r c h 1971 a t 11, 00 a m
\NORTHERN
^EIAND
devious
Reference:
£M71) 9th
oncl sion6,
&iute 1
c
lV
U
T H E H O M E S E C R E T A R Y i n f o r m e d the C a b i n e t that, a s the r e s u l t of
h i s r e c e n t v i s i t to U l s t e r , he w a s s a t i s f i e d that, although the
i n c r e a s i n g a c t i v i t y of e l e m e n t s of the I r i s h R e p u b l i c a n A r m y
w a s c r e a t i n g a s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n i n the R o m a n C a t h o l i c a r e a s
of the P r o v i n c e , the A r m y w e r e c o n t i n u i n g to k e e p the s i t u a t i o n
under c o n t r o l .
B u t p o l i t i c a l c o h e s i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h i n the
U n i o n i s t P a r t y , a p p e a r e d to be s l o w l y d i s i n t e g r a t i n g ; a n d i f ,
a s a r e s u l t , the G o v e r n m e p t of M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k w a s
o v e r t h r o w n , we s h o u l d be l i a b l e to f a c e a v e r y s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n
for w h i c h we should n e e d to r e v i e w our c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n s .
C a b i n e t Office SW1
9 M a r c h 1971
TOP SECRET
THIS
DOCUMENT
IS T H E PROPERTY
O F H E R BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has beer^ strictly limited. ^ It is issued for the personal use of .... TOP SECRET
Copy No.
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
C M ( 7 1 ) 15th C o n c l u s i o n s , Minute 4
T h u r s d a y 18 M a r c h 1971 a t 11. 00 a m
NORTHERN
R E L A N D
Previous
f-eferencet
Conclusions,
I
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R s a i d t h a t , together w i t h the H o m e S e c r e t a r y
and the D e f e n c e S e c r e t a r y , he h a d d i s c u s s e d the s i t u a t i o n i n U l s t e r
w i t h the P r i m e M i n i s t e r of N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ,
M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k , at the l a t t e r * s u r g e n t r e q u e s t , on T u e s d a y
16 M a r c h .
M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k h a d b e e n c o n c e r n e d to
e m p h a s i s e that he c o u l d m a i n t a i n h i s p o s i t i o n only if t h e r e w e r e a n
e f f e c t i v e p u b l i c d e m o n s t r a t i o n that the A r m y w e r e i n t e n s i f y i n g t h e i r
m e a s u r e s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m ; and h e h a d a s k e d i n p a r t i c u l a r that a
f u r t h e r 5 m a j o r u n i t s should be sent to the P r o v i n c e .
The Ministerial
C o m m i t t e e on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d h a d c o n s i d e r e d these r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
a n d - i n a d d i t i o n to c o m m i s s i o n i n g a n i m m e d i a t e study of the a d d i t i o n a l
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n w h i c h might be t a k e n , h a d a u t h o r i s e d the d e s p a t c h of
2 m a j o r u n i t s , together w i t h a n a r m o u r e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n ­
not s o m u c h b e c a u s e t h e s e r e i n f o r c e m e n t s w e r e e s s e n t i a L f r o m a
s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y point of v i e w a s b e c a u s e t h e y m i g h t h e l p t o e n s u r e
the p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l of the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w n i c h
it w a s i n o u r i n t e r e s t to s u s t a i n .
T h e n e c e s s a r y public announce­
m e n t w o u l d be m a d e that a f t e r n o o n , i n i t i a l l y I n L o n d o n and s h o r t l y
It s e e m e d c l e a r
t h e r e a f t e r i n the H o u s e of C o m m o n s at S t o r m o n t .
f r o m the guidance w h i c h the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d G o v e r n m e n t h a d
e v i d e n t l y g i v e n to the P r e s s and f r o m s u c h e p i s o d e s a s the p u b l i c
c r i t i c i s m of the A r m y by the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d M i n i s t e r of S t a t e ,
H o m e A f f a i r s , that the a u t h o r i t i e s i n U l s t e r h a d d e l i b e r a t e l y sought
m e a n s of b r i n g i n g p r e s s u r e to b e a r on u s to m e e t t h e i r r e q u e s t ; and
we should need to h a v e thi3 i n m i n d i n our future d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e m .
E a r l i e r i n the w e e k t h e r e h a d b e e n s p e c u l a t i o n w h e t h e r
M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n could s u r v i v e f o r m o r e
than a f e w d a y s .
If the U n i o n i s t C e n t r a l C o u n c i l , w h i c h w a s to m e e t
on 29 M a r c h , o r M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k ^ own c o n s t i t u e n c y
A s s o c i a t i o n d e m o n s t r a t e d that they h a d l o s t confidence i n h i m , he
w o u l d p r o b a b l y r e s i g n wichout putting h i s support i n the N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d H o u s e of C o m m o n s to the t e s t .
It w a s p o s s i b l e , i n
M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k s v i e w , that the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d M i n i s t e r
of D e v e l o p m e n t , M r F a u l k n e r , m i g h t be a b l e to f o r m a s u c c e s s o r
T
T
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; but, if he i n v i t e d m e m b e r s of the e x t r e m e r i g h t
wing to j o i n i t , he would not be a b l e to count on the s u p p o r t of a l l the
m e m b e r s of the p r e s e n t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n If M r F a u l k n e r f a i l e d ,
the outcome m i g h t be a G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n ^ w h i c h would a l m o s t
c e r t a i n l y p l a c e p o w e r u n m i s t a k a b l y i n the h a n d s of the e x t r e m e
T h e C a b i n e t might t h e r e f o r e be f a c e d w i t h the need to
right wing.
take v e r y s e r i o u s d e c i s i o n s I n the n e a r f u t u r e ; and c o n t i n g e n c y
If the s i t u a t i o n b e c a m e
p l a n s w e r e being p r e p a r e d a c c o r d i n g l y .
c r i t i c a l d u r i n g h i s f o r t h c o m i n g v i s i t to B o n n , h e would be p r e p a r e d
to r e t u r n to .London f o r t h w i t h .
The Cabinet T o o k note of the P r i m e M i n I s t e r s
T
C a b i n e t Office SW1
18 M a r c h 1S71
TOP SECRET statement.
SECRET
r
HXS D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y
OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
COPY
GOVERNMENT
NO
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
C M ( 7 1 ) 16th
Conclusions
M o n d a y 22 M a r c h 1971 a t 11„ 30 a m
i?<*THERN
f^LAND
^ c l
15th
U
s
Kxutc
i
o
4
n
s
T H E P R I M E MINISTER reviewed developments i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
s i n c e t h e C a b i n e t ' s d i s c u s s i o n o n 18 M a r c h .
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r of
N o r t h e r n Ireland? M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k , had telephoned on the
f o l l o w i n g d a y t c s a y t h a t he i n t e n d e d t o r e s i g n f o r t h w i t h , i n d i c a t i n g
t h a t i n a p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t he w o u l d f e e l o b l i g e d t o r e l a t e h i s
r e s i g n a t i o n t o t h e u n w i l l i n g n e s s o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t
to r e s p o n d to h i s r e q u e s t s f o r a d d i t i o n a l m e a s u r e s to d e a l w i t h the
security p r o b l e m i n Ulster^
He had t o l d M a j o r Chichester - C l a r k
i n r e p l y t h a t t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d be b o u n d p u b l i c l y
t o r e f u t e a n y s t a t e m e n t o f t h i s k i n d , s i n c e i t w o u l d n o t o n l y be
f a c t u a l l y u n t r u e but w o u l d a l s o j e o p a r d i s e the s u c c e s s f u l f o r m a t i o n
of a new A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , ,
M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k had subsequently
agreed to defer h i s r e s i g n a t i o n f o r a s h o r t t i m e ; and the M i n i s t e r i a l
C o m m i t t e e on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d had a r r a n g e d f o r the S e c r e t a r y of
State f o r D e f e n c e and the C h i e f of the G e n e r a l Staff to v i s i t S t o r r n o n t
o n 20 M a r c h i n o r d e r n o t t o u n d e r t a k e a n y n e w i n i t i a t i v e b u t t o m a k e
s u r e that t h e r e was no m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g on the p a r t c f the N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d G o v e r n m e n t a b o u t the m e a n s b y w h i c h t h e A r m y w a s
implementing Her Majesty's Government's policy i n relation
to the maintenance of l a w and o r d e r and the s u p p r e s s i o n of
terrorism,
A f t e t the S e c r e t a r y of State had r e t u r n e d
M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k had i n d i c a t e d i n a f u r t h e r telephone
m e s s a g e t h a t he w a s s t i l l r e s o l v e d t o a n n o u n c e h i s r e s i g n a t i o n
o n t h e e v e n i n g o f 20 M a r c h ; b u t t h e p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t w h i c h he
c o n t e m p l a t e d b o r e l i t t l e r e l a t i o n to the e a r l i e r v e r s i o n and avoided
any r e c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t the U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t .
We
ourselves had issued a short statement simultaneously, r e g r e t t i n g
Major C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k ' s decision and r e a f f i r m i n g our d e t e r m i n a t i o n
t o c o n t i n u e t o p u r s u e t h e p o l i c i e s w h i c h , a? h e h i m s e l f a d m i t t e d i n h i s
o w n s t a t e m e n t , o f f e r e d the b e s t hope of r e s c u i n g N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
f r o m its present difficulties.
SECRET
SECRET I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t w o u l d be a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t h e s h o u l d m a k e
a s t a t e m e n t i n the House of C o m m o n s that a f t e r n o o n , acknowledging
M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k ' s s e r v i c e s and i n d i c a t i n g the G o v e r n m e n t ' s
f i r m r e s o l v e that the A r m y should c o n t i n u e t o c a r r y out i t s t w o f o l d
task of m a i n t a i n i n g o r d e r and p r e v e n t i n g c o m m u n a l s t r i f e and of
e r a d i c a t i n g t e r r o r i s m w i t h the l e a s t possible damage to the p r o g r e s s
t h a t had been a c h i e v e d and the w e l f a r e of i n n o c e n t people*
He w o u l d
a l s o m a k e i t c l e a r t h a t the U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t had b o t h the
u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y and the u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d a n d t h a t w e w o u l d s u p p o r t a n y G o v e r n m e n t a t Stormo?*t
w h i c h c o n t i n u e d to i m p l e m e n t the s o c i a l and e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s
of w h i c h we a p p r o v e d ,
T H E SECRETARY OF S T A T E FOR D E F E N C E said that i t appeared
f r o m h i s d i s c u s s i o n s o n 20 M a r c h w i t h M a j o r C h i c h e s t e r - C l a r k a n d
the other m e m b e r s of the Cabinet at S t o r m o n t t h a t they s t i l l hoped
f o r our a g r e e m e n t that the A r m y should e s t a b l i s h m i l i t a r y posts
w i t h i n the a r e a s subject to the i n f l u e n c e of the I r i s h R e p u b l i c a n
A r m y ( I R A ) , as t h e y h a d s u g g e s t e d a t a n e a r l i e r stage,,
In reply
he h a d m a d e i t v e r y c l e a r t o t h e m t h a t s u c h t a c t i c s w e r e , f r o m a
m i l i t a r y p o i n t of v i e w , w h o l l y unsound and unacceptable.
Northern
I r e l a n d M i n i s t e r s , h o w e v e r , w e r e s t i l l r e p r e s e n t i n g that the A r m y
was not taking sufficiently vigorous action to combat t e r r o r i s m ,
although they had been c o m p e l l e d to accept the f o r c e of his arguments
a n d h a d h a d no c o n s t r u c t i v e s u g g e s t i o n s o f t h e i r o w n t o o f f e r
0
T H E F O R E I G N A N D C O M M O N W E A L T H S E C R E T A R Y s a i d that the
P r i m e M i n i s t e r of the I r i s h Republic had made a h e l p f u l statement,
condemning acts of violence.
We h a d m a d e s e v e r a l s u g g e s t i o n s t o
h i m a b o u t t h e a c t i o n w h i c h m i g h t be t a k e n i n t h e R e p u b l i c i n o r d e r t o
a s s i s t i n the s u p p r e s s i o n of I R A t e r r o r i s m i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d .
I n d i s c u s s i o n the Cabinet t e n d e r e d t h e i r c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s to the
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r D e f e n c e o n t h e s k i l l w i t h w h i c h he h a d d e a l t
w i t h a v e r y d i f f i c u l t situaticn„
They agreed that t h e r e would need
t o be a n e a r l y d e b a t e i n t h e H o u s e o f C o m m o n s o n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
a n d t h a t i t w o u l d be p r e f e r a b l e t h a t i t s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e b e f o r e ,
r a t h e r than a f t e r , any new N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had
been long established i n office.
The e a r l i e s t suitable day appeared
t o be T h u r s d a y 25 M a r c h .
The Cabinet
­
1.
T o o k note of the s t a t e m e n t s by the P r i m e
M i n i s t e r and the S e c r e t a r y o f State f o r D e f e n c e .
2.
I n v i t e d the L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the C o u n c i l
to d i s c u s s t h r o u g h the u s u a l c h a n n e l s the p o s s i b i l i t y
of a r r a n g i n g a debate on N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d i n the
H o u s e o f C o m m o n s o n 25 M a r c h .
C a b i n e t O f f i c e SW1
22 M a r c h 1971
SECRET
THIS
DOCUMENT
IS
T H E PROPERTY
O F H E R BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has bee^2trictjy lirnijed.
It is issued for the personal use of.
TOP SECRET
Copy No..
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
C M ( 7 1 ) 40th C o n c l u s i o n s , Minute 2
T h u r s d a y 22 J u l y ,
NORTHERN
IRELAND
evious
Reference:
CM(71) 38th
Conclusions,
Minute 3
1971 a t 10. 30 a m
T H E H O M E S E C R E T A R Y s a i d that the c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n i n
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d g a v e s e r i o u s c a u s e for c o n c e r n .
The f i r m
c o n t r o l w h i c h the P r i m e M i n i s t e r of N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ,
M r . F a u l k n e r , h a d s e e m e d h i t h e r t o to be a b l e to e x e r t w a s now
b e i n g w e a k e n e d by the effect on the r i g h t w i n g of the U n i o n i s t
P a r t y of the r i o t s i n L o n d o n d e r r y a n d the r e c e n t a c t s of
t e r r o r i s m by the I r i s h R e p u b l i c a n A r m y ( I R A ) .
The increasing
b o l d n e s s and a p p a r e n t e f f i c i e n c y of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s w e r e c r e a t i n g
f r e s h a l a r m ; a n d M r . F a u l k n e r w a s now m a k i n g r e n e w e d r e q u e s t s
that the U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d r e - a f f i r m the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d and s h o u l d i n s t i t u t e
more drastic military measures.
R e a s s u r a n c e o n the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n c o u l d r e a d i l y be g i v e n ; a n d , a s r e g a r d s
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , the G e n e r a l O f f i c e r C o m m a n d i n g , N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d , i n t e n d e d s h o r t l y to i n t r o d u c e m e a s u r e s w h i c h w e r e l i k e l y
to d e m o n s t r a t e the G o v e r n m e n t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n to s u p p r e s s
terrorism.
T h e s i t u a t i o n w a s s u c h , h o w e v e r , that w e now h a d
s e r i o u s l y to c o n t e m p l a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y that we m i g h t be
c o m p e l l e d to i n s t i t u t e d i r e c t r u l e i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d i f
M r . F a u l k n e r ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s unable to r e t a i n i t s a u t h o r i t y
and w a s r e p l a c e d by a r e g i m e w h o s e p o l i c i e s we c o u l d not a c c e p t .
I n d i s c u s s i o n i t w a s pointed out that the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t M e m b e r s
of the P a r l i a m e n t at W e s t m i n s t e r w e r e b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y
c r i t i c a l of the l a c k of f i r m n e s s , a s they s a w i t , on the p a r t of the
U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t i n d e a l i n g w i t h the s i t u a t i o n ; and
t h e r e w a s i n c r e a s i n g d a n g e r of t h e i r p e r s u a d i n g m o r e of the
G o v e r n m e n t ' s s u p p o r t e r s to adopt t h i s attitude.
They regarded
the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a f u l l - t i m e unit of the U l s t e r D e f e n c e
R e g i m e n t a s a p a r t i c u l a r t e s t of the G o v e r n m e n t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
I n f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n i t w a s s u g g e s t e d that the i n s t i t u t i o n of d i r e c t
r u l e s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d a s a p o l i c y of l a s t r e s o r t a n d that b e f o r e
i t w a s adopted i t m i g h t w e l l be r i g h t to a g r e e that the N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d i n v o k e t h e i r p o w e r s of i n t e r n m e n t .
W h i l e i t w a s c l e a r that i n t e r n m e n t i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d w o u l d be
1
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET m o r e e f f e c t i v e i f the G o v e r n m e n t of the I r i s h R e p u b l i c c o u l d be
p e r s u a d e d to adopt a s i m i l a r p o l i c y i n the South, the d e c i s i o n
should not depend s o l e l y on the r e s p o n s e of the G o v e r n m e n t of
the R e p u b l i c , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e the u s e of i n t e r n m e n t i n the
N o r t h w o u l d s u b j e c t the P r i m e M i n i s t e r of the R e p u b l i c , M r . L y n c h ,
to i n c r e a s i n g p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e w h i c h w o u l d not c o i n c i d e w i t h o u r
own i n t e r e s t s .
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , s u m m i n g up the d i s c u s s i o n , s a i d that the
M i n i s t e r i a l C o m m i t t e e o n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d w o u l d s h o r t l y m e e t to
c o n s i d e r the s t e p s needed to d e a l w i t h the p r e s e n t d a n g e r o u s
situation i n Northern I r e l a n d .
W h i l e i t w a s not p o s s i b l e to g i v e
any p r i o r i n d i c a t i o n to the G o v e r n m e n t ' s s u p p o r t e r s i n P a r l i a m e n t
of the n a t u r e of the i m m e d i a t e m i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s to be t a k e n , the
H o m e S e c r e t a r y w o u l d take the opportunity of a m e e t i n g of the
C o n s e r v a t i v e M e m b e r s ' D e f e n c e C o m m i t t e e i n the following w e e k
to e x p l a i n the G o v e r n m e n t ' s p o s i t i o n .
The Cabinet T o o k note, w i t h a p p r o v a l , of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s
s u m m i n g up of t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n .
Cabinet Office,
23 J u l y ,
SW1
1971
TOP SECRET SECRET
^ D O C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T
COPY
NO
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(71) 4 4 t h C o n c l u s i o n s ,
Minute 2
M o n d a y 16 A u g u s t 1971 a t 6. 00 p m
NORTHERN
IRELAND
^cevious
Reference*.
kuljX) 43rd
Conclusions,
Wute 3
The Cabinet discussed c u r r e n t developments i n N o r t h e r n Ireland.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R r e c a l l e d t h a t , w h e n the C a b i n e t l a s t
discussed the s i t u a t i o n on 3 A u g u s t , i t had been agreed that
he and the H o m e S e c r e t a r y , the F o r e i g n and C o m m o n w e a l t h
S e c r e t a r y a n d t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r D e f e n c e s h o u l d be
a u t h o r i s e d t o t a k e w h a t e v e r a c t i o n m i g h t be r e q u i r e d a t s h o r t
n o t i c e to d e a l w i t h d e v e l o p m e n t s d u r i n g the R e c e s s .
On the
a f t e r n o o n o f 5 A u g u s t t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r of N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ,
M r F a u l k n e r , had v i s i t e d London and had discussed developments
w i t h h i m , the H o m e S e c r e t a r y , the F o r e i g n and C o m m o n w e a l t h
S e c r e t a r y and the S e c r e t a r y of State f o r D e f e n c e , and had
r e p r e s e n t e d that the s i t u a t i o n d e m a n d e d i m m e d i a t e use of
the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d G o v e r n m e n t ' s p o w e r s of i n t e r n m e n t .
A f t e r f u l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the i m p l i c a t i o n s , they had a g r e e d
t o t h i s c o u r s e , o n t h e f o o t i n g t h a t t h e a r r e s t s s h o u l d be a c c o m p a n i e d
by an announcement of a p r o h i b i t i o n of a l l m a r c h e s for a p e r i o d .
E f f e c t had been g i v e n to these d e c i s i o n s on M o n d a y 9 A u g u s t , and
the m a r c h of the A p p r e n t i c e B o y s h a d n o t t a k e n p l a c e i n L o n d o n d e r r y
o n 12 A u g u s t .
The a r r e s t s had a c h i e v e d a l a r g e m e a s u r e of s u c c e s s ,
and about h a l f the l e a d e r s of the I r i s h R e p u b l i c a n A r m y had been
apprehended.
He and the M i n i s t e r s i m m e d i a t e l y c o n c e r n e d b e l i e v e d
that i t was now n e c e s s a r y to take some p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e , and that
t h e u s e o f t h e p o w e r o f i n t e r n m e n t s h o u l d p r o p e r l y be r e g a r d e d as a
m e a n s b y w h i c h v i o l e n c e c o u l d be s p e e d i l y e n d e d t o e n a b l e f u r t h e r
p o l i t i c a l a d v a n c e t o be a c h i e v e d .
I t had a c c o r d i n g l y been proposed
t o M r F a u l k n e r t h a t o n c e o r d e r h a d b e e n r e s t o r e d , he a n d
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of b o t h sides of the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d P a r l i a m e n t
s h o u l d m e e t u n d e r t h e c h a i r m a n s h i p o f t h e H o m e S e c r e t a r y t o see
whether i t was p o s s i b l e , w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of the d e m o c r a t i c
s y s t e m i n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , to devise f u r t h e r means of giving
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e m i n o r i t y , as w e l l a s t h e m a j o r i t y , a n a c t i v e
and p r o m i n e n t r o l e i n the p r o c e s s e s of g o v e r n m e n t and
administration.
I t w a s t o be m a d e c l e a r t h a t t h e B o r d e r
1
SECRET
SECRET
and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d as p a r t of the
United Kingdom were not i n issue,
Mr Faulkner's immediate
r e a c t i o n w a s t h a t , i n t h e c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , he c o u l d
n o t a c c e p t t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t he h a d i n d i c a t e d a d e s i r e t o
f i n d s o m e m e a n s by w h i c h the O p p o s i t i o n a t S t o r m o n t c o u l d
t a k e u p t h e a c t i v e r o l e o f o p p o s i t i o n w h i c h t h e y h a d so d r a m a t i c a l l y
abandoned s o m e w e e k s ago.
He had a c c o r d i n g l y i n v i t e d M r F a u l k n e r
to have d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h h i m and the Home S e c r e t a r y at Chequers on
T h u r s d a y 19 A u g u s t .
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r of the I r i s h R e p u b l i c ,
M r L y n c h , h a d o n T h u r s d a y 12 A u g u s t m a d e a s t a t e m e n t i n D u b l i n
a t t a c k i n g the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d G o v e r n m e n t and a d v o c a t i n g i t s
r e p l a c e m e n t by a body on w h i c h the m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t y w o u l d
have equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h the m a j o r i t y ,
Mr Faulkner's
p u b l i c r e a c t i o n to t h i s s t a t e m e n t h a d b e e n s h a r p j he and h i s
c o l l e a g u e s , h o w e v e r , had thought i t b e t t e r that the United K i n g d o m
G o v e r n m e n t should n o t engage i n a p u b l i c debate w i t h the G o v e r n m e n t
of the I r i s h R e p u b l i c , w h i c h c o u l d only e x a c e r b a t e the s i t u a t i o n .
M e a n w h i l e , the L e a d e r of the O p p o s i t i o n a t W e s t m i n s t e r ,
M r H a r o l d W i l s o n , had approached h i m that m o r n i n g over
the r e c a l l of P a r l i a m e n t .
He h a d s u g g e s t e d w i t h o u t , a s he
p u t i t , m a k i n g a f o r m a l r e q u e s t , t h a t P a r l i a m e n t s h o u l d be
recalled i n a fortnight's time.
He thought t h a t , r a t h e r t h a n
i m m e d i a t e l y r e j e c t i n g any r e q u e s t f o r the r e c a l l of P a r l i a m e n t ,
t h e w i s e r c o u r s e w o u l d be t o l e a v e o p e n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r e c a l l
after his discussions with M r Faulkner.
He a c c o r d i n g l y p r o p o s e d
to r e p l y to M r W i l s o n t h a t , i n the p r e s e n t state of f e e l i n g , i m m e d i a t e
r e c a l l was n o t d e s i r a b l e , and that i t was n o t p o s s i b l e to f o r e s e e
d e v e l o p m e n t s o v e r t h e n e x t f o r t n i g h t ; b u t t h a t he w o u l d k e e p t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y of r e c a l l closely i n m i n d .
The Cabinet
-
T o o k n o t e , w i t h a p p r o v a l , of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s
statement.
Cabinet Office
SW1
17 A u g u s t 1971
SECRET
SECRET
S I S ^ D C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y
O F H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T
C O P Y NO
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(71) 45th Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 2 September 1971 at 11.45
*?*THERN
ISLAND
T
vious
erenceJ; (7l)44th
r°nclu
to
&ut 2
e
R e f
M
8 i o n S t
l
e
am
The Cabinet d i s c u s s e d the situation i n Northern I r e l a n d .
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that the P r i m e Minister of the I r i s h
Republic, M r . L y n c h , had accepted his invitation to d i s c u s s i o n s
at Chequers on 6 and 7 September.
A meeting with M r . L y n c h
had originally been envisaged i n late October; but the deterioration
in the situation and the recent public statements by M r . L y n c h
suggested that it should be brought forward.
At the meeting with
M r . L y n c h he intended to emphasise both the reforms which had
taken place i n Northern Ireland in the past few y e a r s and the
United Kingdom Government's determination that minority rights
should be safeguarded.
He would then a s k M r . L y n c h to use his
influence to persuade the Northern I r e l a n d P a r l i a m e n t a r y
Opposition to desist from tactics of c i v i l disobedience i n favour of
the more constructive part that could be played by a constitutional
Opposition.
He would a l s o seek to i m p r e s s on M r . L y n c h that the
I r i s h Republican A r m y were as dangerous to the Republic as to
Northern I r e l a n d and would urge h i m to curb its activities in the
Republic.
More generally, it would be n e c e s s a r y to make
M r . L y n c h aware of the growing public feeling in G r e a t B r i t a i n that
the Republic could not be permitted to connive in the subversion of
Northern I r e l a n d while continuing to enjoy a l l the advantages of its
s p e c i a l relationship with the United Kingdom.
So far as the political
situation in Northern I r e l a n d itself was concerned, there was a c l e a r
need at this juncture for the United Kingdom Government to promote
constructive d i s c u s s i o n between the two communities with a view to
finding means of giving the minority an active and prominent role in
the life of the P r o v i n c e ; and the Home S e c r e t a r y had been considering
how that object might best be achieved.
Meanwhile an inquiry had
been set up under the c h a i r m a n s h i p of S i r Edmund Compton to
investigate allegations of brutality against persons in the custody of
the s e c u r i t y forces p r i o r to their subsequent r e l e a s e , the preferring
of a c r i m i n a l charge against them or their being lodged i n a place
specified i n a detention o r d e r .
1
SECRET
SECRET
In d i s c u s s i o n the following points were made ­
a .
The continuance of M r . L y n c h i n power i n the Republic But his political position was not served our i n t e r e s t s .
strong; and he would find difficulty i n taking effective action as a result of the forthcoming meeting unless he could represent that the Republic had derived some advantage from i t . Little could be offered i n this connection, save possibly an understanding that there would be regular contact with h i m i n the future. b.
The feeling of alienation among the minority community i n
Northern I r e l a n d was likely to grow.
But it was not
r e a l i s t i c to suppose that active participation i n the life of
the Province could, i n the foreseeable future, r e a c h the
point of participation i n a coalition Government.
The
divergence of b a s i c political beliefs deprived a coalition
between Unionist and Nationalist interests of any effective
meaning.
c .
It was important that s e c u r i t y m e a s u r e s , including any
further a r r e s t s with a view to detention or internment,
should be seen to be i m p a r t i a l l y directed against a l l who
constituted a danger to law and o r d e r , r e g a r d l e s s of the
community to which they belonged.
T h e r e had been c r i t i c i s m
that the inquiry into allegations of brutality was not to allow
legal representation to complainants or the confrontation of
witnesses.
While the protection of the l i v e s of members of
the security forces i n the face of possible r e p r i s a l was the
paramount need, the possibility of allowing legal r e p r e s e n t a ­
tion i n exceptional c a s e s , where it would serve the interests
of a thorough and j u s t investigation, deserved reconsideration.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up the d i s c u s s i o n , said that the
Government's fundamental purpose must continue to be to secure a
situation i n which the objective of participation by the roir.or.ily i n the
life of the Community could be pursued by reasonable and
constructive d i s c u s s i o n , both i n Northern Ireland and between the
Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic, rather than
by violence. Meanwhile, the Home S e c r e t a r y should consider the
point made i n d i s c u s s i o n relating to the legal representation of
complainants to S i r Edmund Compton's inquiry.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s
summing up of their d i s c u s s i o n .
Cabinet Office, SW1
3 September 1971 2
SECRET
SECRET
i
? D O C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T C O P Y NO
8
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(71) 46th Conclusions, Minute 3
Thursday 9 September 1971 at 11. 45 a m
NORTHERN
IRELAND
Previous
Reference:
CM(7V) 45th
Conclusions,
Minute 3
3.
The Cabinet d i s c u s s e d developments in the situation in
Northern I r e l a n d .
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that, in the light of the recent decision
of the Opposition in Northern Ireland to withdraw f r o m the
P a r l i a m e n t at Stormont, he had thought it n e c e s s a r y to d i s c u s s the
problem of Northern Ireland with the P r i m e Minister of the
I r i s h Republic, Mr L y n c h .
T h i s meeting had taken place at
Chequers on 6 and 7 September; and, in deference to a request
by Mr L y n c h , no other Ministers had taken part on either side.
A s r e g a r d s the s e c u r i t y situation in Northern Ireland Mr L y n c h had
claimed that he was doing a l l that he could to r e s t r i c t the activities
of the I r i s h Republican A r m y (IRA) but that he w a s not prepared to
intern members of the I R A in the South unless they became an overt
threat to the Republic itself and that he could not deploy any
additional units of the Regular A r m y of the Republic for m i l i t a r y
He had told Mr L y n c h that, so f a r a s
patrolling of the B o r d e r .
we w e r e concerned, the B r i t i s h A r m y were taking s p e c i a l m e a s u r e s
to avoid the accidental crossing of the Border by m i l i t a r y patrols,
such a s had recently o c c u r r e d near C r o s s m a g l e n .
A s regards political action M r L y n c h had had no solution to propose,
apart f r o m h i s e a r l i e r suggestion that the P a r l i a m e n t at Stormont
should be replaced by a C o m m i s s i o n in which the minority groups
He had therefore
would share authority equally with the majority.
outlined to Mr L y n c h our own proposal, which had a l r e a d y been
agreed with the P r i m e Minister of Northern I r e l a n d , Mr F a u l k n e r ,
that the Home S e c r e t a r y should preside over a meeting of the
Northern Ireland Government, representatives of both sides of the
Northern Ireland P a r l i a m e n t and other representatives of the
majority and minority communities in the hope of devising means
by which the minority, a s w e l l a s the m a j o r i t y , could enjoy an active,
SECRET
SECRET permanent and guaranteed role In the life and public affairs of the
Province.
He had a s s u r e d Mr L y n c h that no suggestions consistent
with the existing constitutional status of Northern Ireland would be
excluded f r o m these d i s c u s s i o n s ; and he had invited h i m to use h i s
influence to persuade members of the minority groups to attend the
conference.
Mr L y n c h , however, had declined to lend any support
to this proposal, except on the footing that he would himself be
present or be represented at the conference or that it would be
preceded by quadripartite d i s c u s s i o n s , to be attended on the one hand
by the P r i m e Minister of the United Kingdom and by Mr F a u l k n e r
(whom he could not recognise as more than the leader of one
political P a r t y ) , and, on the other hand, by himself, a s P r i m e
Minister of the Republic, and the minority leader in Northern Ireland.
Mr L y n c h had sought to justify this attitude by maintaining that,
since both the settlement of 1920 and the B o r d e r were invalid, he
was the legitimate spokesman of the I r i s h people a s a whole and
could not accept that he should be excluded f r o m d i s c u s s i o n of the
affairs of any part of Ireland.
In reply he had told Mr L y n c h that
any cuch proposal was not constitutionally acceptable; but he had
offered, Instead, a meeting between h i m s e l f , Mr L y n c h and
Mr F a u l k n e r .
T h i s , too, Mr L y n c h had declined to accept on the
ground that he could not recognise Mr F a u l k n e r a s being, like the
United Kingdom P r i m e Minister and h i m s e l f , the head of a sovereign,
independent State or a s possessing any authority to speak for the
people of Northern Ireland.
It had, therefore, been left that the
United Kingdom Government would announce their initiative for the
convening of the proposed conference under the Home S e c r e t a r y ^
chairmanship and that he himself would keep Mr L y n c h informed of
developments by means of separate but p a r a l l e l d i s c u s s i o n s , a s w a s
constitutionally c o r r e c t .
He had emphasised to Mr L y n c h that, In
making this offer, he was showing greater consideration for the
point of view of the Government of the Republic than had been
conceded In this context by any previous B r i t i s h Government.
After their meeting Mr L y n c h had made a public statement
disparaging the United Kingdom Government's Initiative; and the
Social D e m o c r a t i c and Labour P a r t y ( S D L P ) in Northern Ireland
had announced that they would not participate in the proposed
Mr L y n c h had evidently
conference In present c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
misunderstood h i s proposal for a tripartite meeting; but he had
subsequently indicated that he would consider the possibility. It
would probably be d e s i r a b l e , therefore, to take steps to promote
such a meeting in the near future.
T H E H O M E S E C R E T A R Y said that, while the S D L P had initially
rejected the proposal for d i s c u s s i o n s under h i s c h a i r m a n s h i p , there
was some evidence that they might not maintain their Intransigent
attitude, even though they were l i k e l y to continue to insist that the
r e l e a s e of those who had recently been detained a s a p r e l i m i n a r y to
internment was an e s s e n t i a l condition of their co-operation.
He had
2
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SECRET been in touch with Mr G e r a r d F i t t , M P , the L e a d e r of the S D L P ,
who appeared personally to be better disposed towards the
conference than h i s colleagues in h i s P a r t y . The Northern Ireland
Labour P a r t y and the Northern Ireland Committee of the I r i s h
Congress of T r a d e s Unions had a l s o expressed support for the
initiative.
The right c o u r s e , therefore, was to c a r r y the
arrangements for the conference f o r w a r d , even if a l l those whom
we should w i s h to contribute were not initially prepared to
participate.
It was c l e a r l y n e c e s s a r y that the United Kingdom
Government should be seen to be prepared to consider any
suggestions which might be made for a solution of the problem of
minority participation in public affairs In Northern I r e l a n d .
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up a short d i s c u s s i o n , said that
the Cabinet agreed that he should invite Mr L y n c h to a meeting, to
be attended a l s o by Mr F a u l k n e r , at a s e a r l y a date a s p r a c t i c a b l e .
Meanwhile the Home S e c r e t a r y would p r e s s forward with
arrangements for the proposed conference under h i s c h a i r m a n s h i p .
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s
summing up of their d i s c u s s i o n .
T
Cabinet Office SW1
9 September 1971
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BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
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Copy No.
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(71) 47th Conclusions, Minute 3
Tuesday 21 September 1971 at 3. 30 pm
NORTHERN
IRELAND
Previous
Reference*
CM(71) 46th
Conclusions,
Minute 3
The Cabinet reviewed the latest developments in Northern I r e l a n d .
T H E H O M E S E C R E T A R Y said that there was little improvement
in the political situation.
The trade unions and the Northern Ireland
Labour P a r t y had responded to his offer to d i s c u s s with the minority
communities additional means of ensuring them an a c t i v e ,
permanent and guaranteed role in the life and public affairs of the
P r o v i n c e ; and the Government of Northern Ireland were a l s o
prepared to put forward v e r y reasonable proposals for this purpose.
But the Social Democratic and Labour P a r t y had maintained their
refusal to participate in these discussions until internment was
brought to an end.
T H E S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E F O R D E F E N C E said that the security
situation was equally discouraging.
It was too e a r l y to say that
internment had failed.
But it was known that recruitment to the
I r i s h Republican A r m y ( I R A ) in the Republic of Ireland was r i s i n g ;
and the task of the troops in Northern Ireland was becoming
increasingly difficult.
T h e r e was now one a r e a
in Londonderry which they could not enter; and it might be
n e c e s s a r y shortly to consider further action to bring this state of
affairs to an end, even though further substantial reinforcements
might be required for this purpose.
The morale of the A r m y
remained high; but it was open to question how far public opinion
In this country would tolerate the indefinite continuance of the
provocation and violence to which the troops were exposed.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that It was satisfactory that In the
event It had proved possible to arrange a tripartite meeting between
h i m s e l f , the P r i m e Minister of the I r i s h Republic, and the P r i m e
Minister of Northern Ireland at the beginning of the following week.
In initially refusing the invitation to this meeting Mr L y n c h , the
P r i m e Minister of the I r i s h Republic, had c l e a r l y miscalculated
the strength of his position.
In subsequently agreeing to be present
he had Implicitly withdrawn not only his e a r l i e r stipulation that he
TOP
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TOP SECRET would not attend any meeting of this kind while Internment lasted
but a l s o his refusal to concede to Mr F a u l k n e r the status of P r i m e
Minister of Northern Ireland.
Moreover, it was c l e a r that he
could no longer maintain h i s c l a i m to speak for the Opposition in
the Six Counties, who had refused to acknowledge h i m in this
capacity.
It might therefore be possible to Induce h i m , during the
meeting, to give h i s support in some degree to the Home S e c r e t a r y s
d i s c u s s i o n s with the minority communities; and It was equally
Important that the Government of Northern I r e l a n d , for their p a r t ,
should be willing to consider any reasonable proposal which was
consistent with the maintenance of the constitutional status of the
Province.
T
In d i s c u s s i o n the following main points were made ­
a.
If the tripartite meeting failed to achieve any
Improvement In the situation and law and order subsequently
came under even graver threat, we might rapidly be d r i v e n
to Impose d i r e c t rule on the P r o v i n c e . T h i s would be liable
to be opposed a s bitterly by the Protestant a s by the
Roman Catholic faction; but It would represent a course
of action which would be forced on us unless we were
prepared to accept an extreme Protestant Government In
place of the present Administration.
b.
Some speculation appeared to be current about the
possibility of an alliance between the extreme Protestant
and the extreme Roman Catholic factions.
T h i s might not
be wholly u n r e a l i s t i c ; but, if s o , It must emerge a s an
arrangement made by I r i s h m e n t h e m s e l v e s , not a s an
a r t i f i c i a l creation Imposed on them by the Government of
the United Kingdom.
c.
It was possible to believe that the only solution of
the problem which would ultimately prove to be r e a l i s t i c
would l i e in a p h y s i c a l separation of the Protestant and
Roman Catholic factions or in some transfer of population
But an
f r o m the P r o v i n c e to the I r i s h Republic.
arrangement of this kind would prove Impracticable In a
city such a s Belfast, where the two communities were
c l o s e l y Intermingled; and It would encounter the most
bitter opposition.
d.
F o r the purpose of the Home S e c r e t a r y ' s d i s c u s s i o n s
It was Important to distinguish between the constitutional
status of Northern Ireland a s a n integral part of the United
Kingdom and the constitutional arrangements within the
Province In the sense of the f o r m and scope of Its
P a r l i a m e n t a r y and administrative organs.
Provided that
the constitutional status of the P r o v i n c e was not called In
2
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arrangements which could not properly be brought under
review during the exchanges which the Home S e c r e t a r y was
conducting.
But, if proportional representation was
ventilated i n this context, we should r e m e m b e r that its
most probable r e s u l t would be to aggravate, rather than
to r e c o n c i l e , extremist tendencies.
e.
T h e proposal by the Opposition at Westminster for
the appointment of a Joint P a r l i a m e n t a r y C o m m i s s i o n to
supervise c e r t a i n aspects of Government business in
Northern Ireland should a l s o be approached with caution.
It appeared not to have been elaborated in any detail; and
It was open to the c r i t i c a l objection that it would tend to
confuse responsibility in a r e a s where it w a s important that
the allocation of functions should be p r e c i s e l y defined.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up the d i s c u s s i o n , said that the
Cabinet would need to give further thought to the situation after h i s
forthcoming meeting with the P r i m e Ministers of the I r i s h Republic
and of Northern I r e l a n d .
Cabinet Office
22 September 1971
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T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T
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R SECTION 5.1 OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
ECORDS ACT 1958
CM(71) 48th Conclusions^" Minute 2
Wednesday 29 September 1971 at 11.45 a m
ESTHER*
POLAND
r ^ l ) 4Tth
3
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that his discussions with Mr L y n c h , the
P r i m e Minister of the I r i s h R e p u b l i c , and Mr F a u l k n e r , the P r i m e
Minister of Northern I r e l a n d , at Chequers on 27 and 28 September
had been frank and friendly in tone.
Neither of the v i s i t i n g P r i m e
M i n i s t e r s had sought unreasonably to l i m i t the scope of the
exchanges, which had ranged over the internal affairs of both
countries and had included many subjects not mentioned i n the
agreed statement published on 28 September.
Mr L y n c h now
had a better understanding of the reasons which made it impossible
for us to make some dramatic concession on internment for the sake
of satisfying the Northern Ireland S o c i a l Democratic and Labour P a r t y
( S D L P ) and thus inducing them to participate i n the Home S e c r e t a r y ' s
d i s c u s s i o n s on the future of the P r o v i n c e .
It seemed l i k e l y that he
would nevertheless be prepared privately to p r e s s the S D L P to depart
f r o m their present uncompromising r e f u s a l to take part i n those
discussions.
Mr L y n c h had frankly r e v e a l e d his difficulties as
r e g a r d s any intensification of security m e a s u r e s on the B o r d e r ,
But, despite the fact that the
matter was not mentioned i n the agreed statement, there was some
hope that f i r m e r action might now be taken against the various forms
of I r i s h Republican A r m y (IRA) activity inside the R e p u b l i c .
E q u a l l y , although there was no reference i n the public statement
to c l o s e r economic co-operation between Northern I r e l a n d and the
R e p u b l i c , there was r e a s o n to expect that, a s a r e s u l t of the
Chequers d i s c u s s i o n s , Mr L y n c h would seek to give more
encouragement to exchanges of this kind, at l e a s t between
the officials concerned.
He was unlikely, however, to depart
f r o m his r e s e r v a t i o n that co-operation at M i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l was
not possible a s long a s the minority i n Northern Ireland played
no effective part i n the Government at Stormont,
SECRET
SECRET Mr F a u l k n e r bad outlined the probable content of the Northern
Ireland Government's draft Green Paper on further constitutional
r e f o r m , which included a d i s c u s s i o n of proposals for the enlargement
of the Northern Ireland House of Commons and Senate and for the
introduction of proportional representation.
Our own strategy was
to make some limited d i s c l o s u r e of these possibilities a s a means of
inducing the S D L P to take part in the Home S e c r e t a r y ' s d i s c u s s i o n s ;
and we believed that to publish them i n detail before SDJLP
participation had been a s s u r e d would be to dissipate part of
their value.
In a l l the Chequers discussions had had some s u c c e s s in disabusing
both the I r i s h leaders of some of the suspicions which they
entertained; and they had helped to focus Mr l y n c h ' s mind
on the danger that, if the S D L P abdicated f r o m i t s leadership
of the minority group, this responsibility was likely to be assumed
by the I R A . It would be d e s i r a b l e , i n the aftermath of the recent
P a r l i a m e n t a r y debate and of the Chequers d i s c u s s i o n s , for the
Cabinet to r e v i e w our policy on Northern Ireland i n the near future.
In the course of a brief d i s c u s s i o n the following main points were
made ­
a.
The recent I R A attempts to use anti-tank rockets as
a t e r r o r i s t weapon were a disquieting development.
Heavy
casualties could r e s u l t once the t e r r o r i s t s discovered how to
use these weapons effectively.
b.
T h e r e would be obvious political advantages if further
I R A suspects could be charged with offences rather than
interned.
It was for consideration whether the need for
r e c o u r s e to internment might be reduced by c r e a t i n g , by
means of legislation at Stormont or at Westminster, special
courts operating under a procedure which reduced the dangers
of intimidation of witnesses and of j u r i e s .
c.
A P a r l i a m e n t a r y delegation would be visiting the
internment camp at Long Kesh during the following week.
It was important that this v i s i t should pass off without any
untoward incident.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval, of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s
statement.
Cabinet Office
29 September 1971 2
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(71) 49th Conclusions, Minute 4
Tuesday 12 October 1971 at 1L 00 a m
vio
I, - » c e :
>)48th
J
U 3
e
ute 2
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that he had held a farther meeting with
the P r i m e Minister of Northern I r e l a n d , Mr F a u l k n e r , on 7 October,
at which the Home S e c r e t a r y , the F o r e i g n and Commonwealth
S e c r e t a r y , the L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the Council and the S e c r e t a r y
of State for Defence were present.
A s the statement issued at
the end of that meeting had indicated, agreement had been reached
on further m i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s to deal with t e r r o r i s m , including the
despatch of three additional battalions to Northern Ireland.
Their
objectives, in order of p r i o r i t y , would be to intensify security
operations in Belfast, making full use of the intelligence which
had been r e c e i v e d as a r e s u l t of internment; more effectively
to control the Border v/ith the I r i s h Republic; and to deal with
the unsatisfactory situation in c e r t a i n parts of Londonderry.
The Border operation would entail c r a t e r i n g some 80 unapproved
roads with the object of making them impassable to wheeled traffic.
The P r i m e Minister of the I r i s h Republic, Mr L y n c h , whom we had
informed of this intention, had reacted v e r y c r i t i c a l l y , maintaining
that it would exacerbate the situation, which, in his view, could only
be improved by m e a s u r e s to promote a political solution.
We were
in fact maintaining p r e s s u r e on Mr F a u l k n e r to take some political
action, by including one or two representatives of the minority in
his Cabinet.
We had also agreed that the Northern Ireland
Government should publish their proposed G r e e n Paper on possible
P a r l i a m e n t a r y reforms with a view to giving the minority a stronger
r o l e in public administration.
In the c o u r s e of a brief d i s c u s s i o n it was suggested that we needed
to move with c i r c u m s p e c t i o n in the matter of political concessions
to the minority in Northern Ireland if they involved m e a s u r e s which,
although not sufficiently f a r - r e a c h i n g to influence the minority
l e a d e r s , were nevertheless unacceptable to Mr F a u l k n e r ' s supporters
and might therefore r e s u l t in his own overthrow.
The decisions of
the A d v i s o r y Committee who were hearing appeals against internment
1
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the Northern Ireland minority and i n helping to ensure that the
Opposition at Westminster continued i n general to lend their support
We should t h e r e ­
to the Government's policies in Northern Ireland,
fore seek to ensure that the A d v i s o r y Committee's recommendations
were regarded by the Northern Ireland Government a s having a
j u d i c i a l stamp and were only rejected for the most compelling
reasons.
T h e r e was no doubt, however, that the great majority
of internees were potentially dangerous and that their r e l e a s e would
have adverse effects on the morale of both the Northern Ireland
Government and the security f o r c e s .
The Cabinet Took note of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s statement.
Cabinet Office
12 October 1971
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CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
CM(71) 55th C o n c l u s i o n s , Minute 4
Thursday 11 November 1971 at 11.30 a m
NORTHERN
IRELAND
Previous
Reference:
CM(71) 49th
Conclusions,
Minute 4
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that a ComraUioe of Inquiry had baen
set up under the chairmanship of S i r Edmund Compton to
investigate allegations, by those a r r e s t e d on 9 August, under the
Northern I r e l a n d Special Powers A c t , of physical brutality.
The Committee had now presented their Report, which had been
Every
studied by the Ministers principally concerned.
individual who believed that he had grounds of complaint had had the
opportunity of putting his c a s e to the Committee; but nearly a l l
of those concerned had failed to take i t . The Committee had
received v e r y full o r a l and documentary evidence from m e m b e r s
of the security forces; but i n the majority of c a s e s they had set
against it no more than the unsubstantiated and uncorroborated
Nevertheless,
allegations which was a l l that they had before them.
Moreover,
they had found that there had been no p h y s i c a l brutality.
so far as the a r r e s t of individuals was concerned, the number of
the complaints of any substance was v e r y s m a l l ; and it was c l e a r
that the A r m y had conducted a difficult and dangerous operation
with commendable discipline and r e s t r a i n t . Publicity had tended
to concentrate, however, on allegations about the treatment of a
much s m a l l e r number of men who had been interrogated i n depth
after a r r e s t . Interrogation had been c a r r i e d out by the R o y a l
U l s t e r Constabulary ( R U C ) under the supervision of the A r m y ; and
they had n e c e s s a r i l y involved various m e a s u r e s which had had to be
taken for the purposes of s e c u r i t y and control.
T h u s , men
awaiting interrogation had been hooded and required to stand
against the w a l l ; and a continuous noise had been maintained i n
order to prevent them from talking to one another or overhearing
In addition, their diet had been r e s t r i c t e d to bread
conversations.
and water.
The Committee of Inquiry had concluded that these
m e a s u r e s involved p h y s i c a l i l l - t r e a t m e n t .
It was proposed that the Report should be published on Tuesday,
16 November and that it should be prefaced by a statement
indicating the Government's v i e w s .
T h i s statement would emphasise
that i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which internment had had to be instituted
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and the I r i s h Republican A r m y (IRA) were conducting a campaign
of murder and intimidation it was vitally important to obtain
I n fact information of
intelligence with the maximum of speed.
great value had been obtained from the interrogations.
The
preface would also make i t c l e a r that the m e a s u r e s used i n
Northern I r e l a n d had been the same as those which had been
employed elsewhere over a long period of time and were i n a c c o r d
with procedures authorised for the interrogation of t e r r o r i s t s i n
1965 and r e v i s e d i n 1967 i n the light of an inquiry into i n t e r r o g a ­
tions i n Aden by Mr Roderick Bowen Q C . These procedures
stringently prohibited inhuman and degrading treatment.
The publication of the Report would be liable to prompt a demand
for an immediate P a r l i a m e n t a r y debate under Standing Order
No. 9, which might conveniently take place on Wednesday,
17 November.
The report brought out the difficulties i n
implementing the r u l e s i n detail at a time when intensive
interrogation was n e c e s s a r y ; and i t was therefore proposed to
indicate, simultaneously with its publication, tnat the Government
intended, with the concurrence of the Opposition, to establish a
Committee of P r i v y C o u n s e l l o r s to examine and provide
authoritative advice on the procedures for the interrogation of
persons suspected of involvement i n a t e r r o r i s t campaign,
including their custody while subject to interrogation, and on the
application of those procedures.
The c h a i r m a n would be a P r i v y
Counsellor with j u d i c i a l experience, supported by one P r i v y
Counsellor from the Government side and one from the
Opposition.
In an a r t i c l e on 17 October the Sunday T i m e s had r e f e r r e d to
further allegations of i l l - t r e a t m e n t i n the c a s e of 3 persons who
had been a r r e s t e d after 9 August, the operative date i n the t e r m s
of reference of the Committee of Inquiry. S i r Edmund Compton
had agreed to examine the facts relating to these allegations
without the support of his 2 colleagues on the Committee, who
had now discharged their functions; and his further Report would
be published at the same time as that of the Committee of Inquiry.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , summing up a short d i s c u s s i o n , said
that the Cabinet agreed that, although some of the acts i n
question might be open to challenge under the law of Northern
Ireland, the nature of the background against which interrogation
was c a r r i e d out justified the methods which had been used and
that it would be right vigorously to defend them against the
c r i t i c i s m which they would inevitably attract i n some quarters.
The allegations made i n a recent report by Amnesty International
had a l l been dealt with i n the Compton Report; and their gross
exaggeration wou Id be manifest.
The Cabinet Took note, with approval of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s
statement and of h i s summing up of their d i s c u s s i o n .
Cabinet Office
11 November 1971
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CM(73)_^2n,dConclusions T h u r s d a y 27th September, 1973 at 12 Noon T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that h i s colleagues w o u l d have noted the
e x t r e m e l y unfortunate i m p r e s s i o n c r e a t e d by a speech by L o r d R o t h s c h i l d
to the L e t c o m b e L a b o r a t o r y of the A g r i c u l t u r a l R e s e a r c h C o u n c i l on
24th S e p t e m b e r .
There w e r e two aspects to t h i s .
The f i r s t was that
L o r d R o t h s c h i l d was a P e r m a n e n t S e c r e t a r y and was thus bound by the
n o r m a l r u l e s under w h i c h c i v i l servants w e r e r e q u i r e d to c l e a r speeches
dealing w i t h o f f i c i a l m a t t e r s or d r a w i n g upon t h e i r o f f i c i a l e x p e r i e n c e .
T h i s o b l i g a t i o n had not been observed but L o r d R o t h s c h i l d had u n d e r t a k e n
The second was the apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n
to observe i t i n f u t u r e .
the speech w i t h the l i n e w h i c h M i n i s t e r s had been taking about the g r o w t h
T h i s was at least p a r t due to the l a c k of cohesion i n
of the economy.
L o r d R o t h s c h i l d ' s speech and his f a i l u r e to r e l a t e the actions w h i c h
M i n i s t e r s have taken to induce g r o w t h to the s i t u a t i o n w h i c h would have
r e s u l t e d i n the absence of t h e m .
I t w o u l d be best now to a l l o w the
m a t t e r to d r o p and f o r t h i s r e a s o n M i n i s t e r s m i g h t p r e f e r to a v o i d
speeches on this theme i n advance of the P a r t y Conference.
The Cabinet Took note.
Cabinet
Office
27 September 1973
NO C I R C U L A T I O N RECORD
Copy N o . 1 of 2 Copies
SECRET
M E E T I N G of M i n i s t e r s h e l d at 10 Downing S t r e e t
T U E S D A Y , 5 F E B R U A R Y 1974
at 7.45 p m
PRESENT
The R t Hon E d w a r d H e a t h M P
Prime Minister
The R t Hon L o r d H a i l s h a m of St M a r y l e b o n e
L o r d Chancellor
The R t Hon Anthony B a r b e r M P
C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer The R t Hon W i l l i a m W h i t e l a w M P S e c r e t a r y of State f o r E m p l o y m e n t
The R t Hon L o r d C a r r i n g t o n
S e c r e t a r y of State f o r Defence The R t Hon R o b e r t C a r r M P S e c r e t a r y of State f o r the Home D e p a r t m e n t
The R t Hon James P r i o r M P
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the C o u n c i l The R t Hon S i r K e i t h Joseph M P S e c r e t a r y of State for Social S e r v i c e s
The R t Hon Geoffrey Rippon QC M P
S e c r e t a r y of State f o r the E n v i r o n m e n t
The R t H o n M a r g a r e t Thatcher M P
S e c r e t a r y of State for E d u c a t i o n and Science
The Rt Hon Gordon C a m p b e l l M P
S e c r e t a r y of State f o r Scotland The R t Hon P e t e r W a l k e r M P S e c r e t a r y of State f o r T r a d e and I n d u s t r y
The R t Hon P e t e r Thomas QC M P
S e c r e t a r y of State for Wales
The R t H o n F r a n c i s P y m M P
S e c r e t a r y of State f o r N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
The R t Hon I a n G i l m o u r M P
S e c r e t a r y of State f o r Defence
The R t H o n M a u r i c e M a c m i l l a n M P
Paymaster General
The R t Hon Joseph Godber M P
M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e , F i s h e r i e s and
Food
The R t Hon S i r Geoffrey Howe QC M P
M i n i s t e r f o r T r a d e and Consumer A f f a i r s
The R t Hon L o r d W i n d l e s h a m
L o r d P r i v y Seal
ALSO PRESENT
The R t Hon H u m p h r e y A t k i n s M P
Parliamentary Secretary, Treasur
SECRETARY
S i r John Hunt
>
SECRET
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that accompanied by h i s colleagues d i r e c t l y
concerned, he had seen r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Trades Union Congress ( T U C )
and had p r e s s e d t h e m to accept the r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t w h i c h could then p r o v i d e
The TUC r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s had n e i t h e r
a basis f o r s e t t l i n g the m i n e r s ' d i s p u t e .
accepted n o r r e j e c t e d the r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t , but had continued to repeat that
the m i n e r s were a special case w h i c h should be settled w i t h o u t w a i t i n g f o r
d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t .
I t had been pointed out to
t h e m that a settlement on t h i s basis w o u l d not cover the e v e n t u a l i t y that other
unions m i g h t decide to f o l l o w the m i n e r s ' lead and use i n d u s t r i a l power to
p r e s s t h e i r wage demands: and S i r Sydney Green had not denied i t when i t had
been suggested that i f the m i n e r s ' c l a i m was settled i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m the
r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t the r a i l w a y unions w o u l d p r e s s f o r s i m i l a r t r e a t m e n t l a t e r
on.
F o l l o w i n g a b r i e f a d j o u r n m e n t , the TUC r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s had been
i n f o r m e d that the G o v e r n m e n t saw no point i n continuing these d i s c u s s i o n s and
w o u l d i n s t e a d have no a l t e r n a t i v e but to seek to discuss the r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t
d i r e c t w i t h the N a t i o n a l Union of M i n e w o r k e r s ( N U M ) .
The TUC had not l i k e d
t h i s and had said once again that i f only the G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d i n d i c a t e
w i l l i n g n e s s to put a d d i t i o n a l m o n e y i n t o the offer they would use t h e i r good
offices w i t h the N U M .
They had added that i f the S e c r e t a r y of State f o r
E m p l o y m e n t asked to see the N U M Executive he w o u l d be r e b u f f e d : and i t
had then become clear that, c o n t r a r y to what had been said e a r l i e r , the TUC
and the N U M w e r e i n v e r y close touch and that the f o r m e r ' s presence at
10 Downing Street was solely to explore the G o v e r n m e n t ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to put
f u r t h e r cash on the table now.
Indeed the question of backdating the
r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t to 1st M a r c h had not been m e n t i o n e d .
The M e e t i n g had
ended on the b a s i s that both sides would continue to study the r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t
but when M r . M u r r a y saw the P r e s s subsequently he appeared to have
r e j e c t e d the r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t o u t r i g h t . The S e c r e t a r y of State f o r E m p l o y m e n t
had subsequently i n v i t e d the N U M Executive to a m e e t i n g but they had declined
to come and had decided upon a n a t i o n a l s t r i k e s t a r t i n g f r o m the f o l l o w i n g Sunday.
He had then seen r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Confederation of B r i t i s h I n d u s t r y ( C B I ) .
The l a t t e r w e r e , i n p r i n c i p l e , p r e p a r e d to accept the r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t but
p r e f e r r e d to offer backdating to 1st M a r c h than take quick d e c i s i o n s on the
They had then said that t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p was
m a c h i n e r y and c r i t e r i a .
e x t r e m e l y w o r r i e d at the thought of going into a s t r i k e w h i c h the N U M m i g h t
win.
I n d u s t r y was a l r e a d y s u f f e r i n g s e v e r e l y and the cost of a s e t t l e m e n t at
They t h e r e f o r e w i s h e d both to state p u b l i c l y
a l a t e r stage m i g h t be even h i g h e r .
that they had r e p o r t e d these views to the G o v e r n m e n t and also to e m b a r k on
d i r e c t t a l k s w i t h the TUC about the basis f o r a s e t t l e m e n t .
After further
d i s c u s s i o n the C B I had agreed to make no such damaging public statement, but
i t was c l e a r that they intended to have b i l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the T U C .
They had been w a r n e d of the dangers and of the r i s k of being s t r u n g along f r o m
They had also been t o l d that r e c e n t events had shown
one concession to another.
that the TUC w e r e not i n fact t r y i n g to persuade the N U M to f a l l i n w i t h a
g e n e r a l p o l i c y to contain i n f l a t i o n , but w e r e i n f a c t s u p p o r t i n g t h e m i n t h e i r
struggle w i t h the G o v e r n m e n t .
The fact r e m a i n e d however that the C B I w e r e
frightened men.
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SECRET
I n d i s c u s s i o n t h e r e was g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t that only t h r e e c o u r s e s w e r e now
open to the G o v e r n m e n t .
They could a t t e m p t to sit the s t r i k e out u n t i l the
w i l l of the N U M c r a c k e d .
W i t h average weather and no s e r i o u s p i c k e t i n g and
i n c r e a s e d savings of e l e c t r i c i t y t h r o u g h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of r o t a cuts, f u e l
stocks w o u l d l a s t u n t i l the end of A p r i l on a 3-day week o r u n t i l the end of May
But the r i s k to s t e r l i n g and to the economy g e n e r a l l y w o u l d
on a 2-day week.
be v e r y g r e a t .
Even on a 3-day week, the d e f i c i t on c u r r e n t account i n the
f i r s t q u a r t e r of the y e a r was l i k e l y to be £1, 900 m i l l i o n c o m p a r e d w i t h a f i g u r e
The odds w e r e t h e r e f o r e
of £1, 500 m i l l i o n f o r the whole of the p r e v i o u s y e a r .
that, i r r e s p e c t i v e of f u e l endurance, other f a c t o r s i n the economy, w o u l d be
l i k e l y to f o r c e the G o v e r n m e n t to settle w i t h i n the t i m e f o r w h i c h the N U M
The second course was to negotiate the best possible
could sustain the s t r i k e .
s e t t l e m e n t f o r t h w i t h , r e c o g n i s i n g that t h i s m i g h t mean conceding the m i n e r s '
claim in full.
This w o u l d d e s t r o y the G o v e r n m e n t ' s c r e d i b i l i t y and w o u l d open
the way f o r the r a i l w a y unions to e x e r t s i m i l a r i n d u s t r i a l power i n a few w e e k s '
time.
The t h i r d course was to seek a D i s s o l u t i o n of P a r l i a m e n t . I t was
arguable that success i n a G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n would of i t s e l f change nothing but
i n p r a c t i c e i t w o u l d create a new s i t u a t i o n .
The e l e c t o r a t e as a whole w o u l d
have e x p r e s s e d t h e i r view on the need f o r a f i r m and f a i r i n c o m e s p o l i c y and
the unions w o u l d be dealing w i t h a G o v e r n m e n t w h i c h had both a c l e a r mandate
and five y e a r s to r u n i n s t e a d of a G o v e r n m e n t i n t h e i r l a s t y e a r of o f f i c e .
In f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n a l l the M i n i s t e r s p r e s e n t , w h i l e r e c o g n i s i n g that the f i n a l
decision was one w h i c h could only be taken by the P r i m e M i n i s t e r p e r s o n a l l y
i n the l i g h t of the developing s i t u a t i o n , i n d i c a t e d that they f a v o u r e d the course
of a G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n .
I f the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y w e r e then r e t u r n e d there
w o u l d be a b e t t e r chance of dealing e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h the s i t u a t i o n , and i f they
l o s t they w o u l d have done so i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h w o u l d p r e s e r v e both t h e i r
honour and P a r t y u n i t y .
I f however the P r i m e M i n i s t e r decided to seek a
D i s s o l u t i o n v e r y c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n w o u l d need to be given to the contents
of the m a n i f e s t o .
I t m i g h t have to ask f o r a r e l a t i v e l y f r e e hand to deal w i t h
the p r o b l e m s facing the n a t i o n : but i t w o u l d also need to show how the
G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d get the m i n e r s back to w o r k i f they won and to do t h i s i n a
way w h i c h w o u l d n e i t h e r i m p l y that an E l e c t i o n was unnecessary n o r c a r r y the
r i s k of the G o v e r n m e n t subsequently being i n b r e a c h of t h e i r E l e c t i o n pledge.
T h i s suggested the need to b u i l d on the r e l a t i v i t i e s r e p o r t and to e s t a b l i s h
I t would
m a c h i n e r y w h i c h could begin w o r k i n g d u r i n g the E l e c t i o n campaign.
also be n e c e s s a r y to s t r i k e the r i g h t balance i n the m a n i f e s t o between the need
on the one hand f o r f i r m G o v e r n m e n t i n the fact of i n d u s t r i a l power and on the
I t would
other f o r compassion t o w a r d s the l e s s f o r t u n a t e m e m b e r s of society.
also be wise to paint an honest p i c t u r e of the l i k e l y future course of the economy.
U r g e n t d e c i s i o n s w o u l d also be needed on such questions as w h e t h e r to make a
p u b l i c appeal to the N U M to c a l l off the s t r i k e d u r i n g the course of an E l e c t i o n
and how to deal w i t h the possible breakdown of the benefits s y s t e m i f the
s t r i k e continued and u n e m p l o y m e n t became v e r y w i d e s p r e a d .
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SECRET
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , s u m m i n g up the d i s c u s s i o n , said t h a t the s i t u a t i o n
He was g r a t e f u l
was one w h i c h had to be faced w i t h r e s o l u t i o n and u n i t y .
f o r the support of h i s colleagues and i n r e a c h i n g h i s decision he would of
course pay heed to the views w h i c h had been e x p r e s s e d .
The fact that the
m e e t i n g had taken place, and s t i l l m o r e the n a t u r e of t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n , should
be t r e a t e d as e n t i r e l y c o n f i d e n t i a l and should not be d i s c u s s e d w i t h M i n i s t e r s
outside the Cabinet.
I n the m e a n t i m e he w o u l d a r r a n g e f o r u r g e n t w o r k to
continue on b r i n g i n g the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y ' s E l e c t i o n M a n i f e s t o up to date.
Cabinet Office
27 F e b r u a r y 1974
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