19 4 7 CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXES MD
NO CIRCULATION RECORDS
4th Conclusions j, Minute 1 ­ Indias
Constitutional Position
(CoA.)
6th Conclusions, Minute 3
-
Palestine % Military Implications of
Future Policy,
(CoA*)
Minute 4
­
Palestine: Political Implications of
Future Policy,
(CoA,)
11th Conclusions, Minute 2 ­
Palestine?
Policy to be followed
at resumed London Conference
Constitutional Position,, (C Ac)
21st Conclusions, Minute 4
­
India?
23rd Conclusions
­
Princess Elizabeths
c
Birthday^
India;
­
80th Conclusions
­ Marriage of
(N.G.R.)
HoRoHo
Elizabeth,
­
Twenty-first
Constitutional Position,, (CoA.)
23rd Conclusions, Minute 1
96th Conclusions
(CoA.)
Precedence of
Edinburgh,
The Princess
(NoCoRc)
H.R.H.
(N0C0R0)
The Duke of
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C M . (1+7) 1+TH C O N C L U S I O N S . M I N U T E 1 ' Confidential
(8th J a n u a r y , 1 9 4 7
INDIA
Constitutional position., Annex -
10
a.m.) T h e C a b i n e t had b e f o r e them a memorandum b y the P r i m e M i n i s t e r (C. P. (1+7) 1) covering a revised draft of a statement of policy regarding the transfer of power in India. T H E P R I M E MINISTER said that this revised
Previous draft had been prepared "by the India and Burma
lef ersnce: C o m m i t t e e in the light of the Cabinet's discussion
::. (LG) 108th on 31st D e c e m b e r .
Since then there had b e e n
Conclusions) developments in the political position in Ind.ia*
C o n g r e s s had d e c i d e d to accept the interpretation
placed by H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government on the Cabinet
M i s s i o n ' s statement of 16th M a y ;
and the Muslim
L e a g u e were now to consider w h e t h e r , in v i e w of t h i s
d e c i s i o n , they w o u l d collaborate in the work: of the
Constituent A s s e m b l y .
There w a s therefore n o occasion
for the immediate issue of the statement
for the
purpose of o v e r c o m i n g a definite refusal b y the
M u s l i m League to co-operate in the framing of a
constitution.
B u t , while the C a b i n e t had felt that
the primary object of such a statement w o u l d be to
f o r c e the two Indian Parties to face the realities of
the situation, the V i c e r o y had attached primary
importance to the announcement of a definite plan for
a phased w i t h d r a w a l of British authority from India and
it w a s likely t h a t for this purpose he would still w i s h
an early statement to b e m a d e .
On the m e t h o d of
transferring power' in India, h o w e v e r , there was a
divergence of v i e w between the V i c e r o y and the m e m b e r s
of the India and B u r m a Committee.
The V i c e r o y
conceived this as a w i t h d r a w a l , planned on the lines
of a m i l i t a r y evacuation from hostile territory;
and
it w a s on this account that he hac attached such great .
importance to his original plan of withdrawing
Province by Province,
T h e India and Burma C o m m i t t e e ,
on the other hand, considered that our aim should b e to
secure a friendly transfer of power from B r i t i s h to
Indian a u t h o r i t i e s , with an increasing" acquiescence
by the Viceroy a n d British officials in the wishes of
the Indian G o v e r n m e n t s .
It was even probable t h a t ,
if discussions could b e opened on a friendly basis
about the m e a n s of transfex^ring p o w e r , we should be
asked to give continuing assistance in various forms
to the Indian G o v e r n m e n t s .
I f , however, the w h o l e
process w a s v i e w e d as a military operation of w i t h d r a w a l ,
it w a s possible that these questions would n e v e r be
discussed in a f r i e n d l y spirit w i t h the Indian G o v e r n m e n t s and that an atmosphere of hostility would h e created from the outset.
The difference b e t w e e n M i n i s t e r s and t h e .Viceroy w a s , f u n d a m e n t a l l y , one of approach;
and it seemed unlikely that the Viceroy's attitude could "be changed b y m e a n s of instructions conveyed b y telegram.
It w o u l d b e preferable that he should be asked to return to L o n d o n for further personal talks With M i n i s t e r s . In discussion there was general agreement w i t h the views expressed b y the P r i m e M i n i s t e r .
It w a s important that the senior European officers in the Indian Service should
also understand the attitude of H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government towards the forthcoming transfer of power in I n d i a ;
and
efforts m u s t b e m a d e , through the V i c e r o y , to ensure that they
approached this difficult task in the proper spirit*
Similar
considerations applied to European officers of the Indian Army;
and the earliest possible opportunity should be taken of discussing w i t h Indian leaders w h o would in future b e responsible for the control of the Indian Array, the b a s i s on which the C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f and some senior European officers
might be expected to continue to serve after the transfer of power.
T H E F O R E I G N SECRETARY said that, from his point of view, it w a s m o s t important that all possible efforts should be made to hold the Indian A r m y together and to make adequate provision for the future d e f e n c e of India. In further discussion
also m a d e : ­
the following
points
were (a)
T H E SECRETARY OP S T A T E FOR D O M I N I O N AFFAIRS recalled that at their discussion on 3'i st December the Cabinet had agreed that Dominion G o v e r n m e n t s should b e informed of our intentions in this m a t t e r at the earliest possible stage. As it was not n o w intended to make the proposed statement of policy at an early d a t e , lie doubted w h e t h e r
it w o u l d b e w i s e to communicate the text to Dominion G o v e r n m e n t s at the present time.
H e w o u l d , however, w i s h to give them some general information about our i n t e n t i o n s . (b)
It w a s agreed that t h e final sentence of paragraph 11+ of the draft statement a n n e x e d to C.P.(ii7) 1 should b e deleted.
It w a s further agreed that in the preceding sentence of this paragraph the emphasis on British interests in the development of Indian i n d u s t r y was open to m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and that the sentence should be redrafted so as to lay greater emphasis on the fact that the commercial connection between the United K i n g d o m and India had b e e n , and w o u l d continue to . b e , of m u t u a l advantage to b o t h countries. The C a b i n e t
­
(1) Agreed that the issue of the statement of
policy annexed to C P . (h-7) 1 should b e deferred for the time b e i n g ; (2) Approved the amendments of the draft statement noted in paragraph (b) a b o v e ;
and asked that M i n i s t e r s w i s h i n g to suggest any f u r t h e r a m e n d m e n t s of drafting s h o u l d communicate their suggestions to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ; (3) T o o k n o t e that the prime Minister, in consultation w i t h the jeerotcry of State for India, w o u l d arrange for the Viceroy to r e t u r n to London for further discussions wi Ministers; (d) T o o k n o t e that the Secretary of State for D o m i n i o n Affairs would consult the Prime M i n i s t e r about the nature of the general information to h o communicated to Dominion G o v e r n m e n t s at the present stage shout our i n t e n t i o n s regarding the transfer of power in I n d i a v
Cabinet O f f i c e , S.W.1* THES DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY^S GOVERNMENT
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C M . (47). 6TH C O N C L U S I O N S , MINUTE 5 C o nf i d e nt i a 1 A n n e x (15th J a n u a r y , 1947 - 10.30 a. m. ) PALESTINE (Previous
Reference:
C M . ( 4 6 ) 101st
Conclusions,
Minute 2 )
Military
Iraplicat ions
of Future
Policy ' THE P R I M E MINISTER said that it might b e c o m e necessary to Impose in Palestine a solution w h i c h would h e actively resisted by one or b o t h of the two communities there.
He asked for the v i e w s of the Chiefs of St;
on the question whether law a nd order could be pre; ervea
m
P a l e s t i n e in such circumstances. JHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL G E N E R A L if there were active opposition said that
or
Arabs alone, the situation i r om e11 her J ew s
could h e handled w i t h the military forces now If there were active a v a i l a b l e in Pale t ine.
oth
c
o
m
m
u
n
i t i e s , the situation o p p o s i t i o n from h
could not h e hand led w i t h o u t military r e i n f o r c e ­
ments.
He would propose that these should h e provided at the e xpense of our forces of occupation in
ermanyj
and he
considered that this could in the last resor t he done without retarding tin d emoh i1i s at i on
scheme. THE P R I M E MINISTER then.asked for the v i e w s of the Chiefs of Staff on the strategic importance of Palestine as a factor i n the defence of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth. THE CHIEF OF T H E AIR STAFF said that it was the considered view of the Chiefs of S t a f f that there were three cardinal requirements f o r the future defence of the British Commonwealth (i)
the defence of the United Kingdom and its development as a base for a n offensive;
(ii)
the
m a i n t e n a n c e of our sea communications;
and
( i i i ) the r e t e n t i o n of our existing p o s i t i o n and influence in the Middle E a s t .
T h e s e were the three v i t a l p r o p s of our defensive position: they were all inter-dependent and if any one w e r e lost the w h o l e structure would he imperilled. F u r t h e r , these w e r e the fundamental principles They would b e
ox our d sfensive strategy
unaffect ?d b y any technical changes in the
)-hi
nature
and use of weapons.
Equally, they
remained unaffected whatever assumption w a s m a d e about the p o t e n t i a l enemy. It was essential to our defence that w e should b e able to fight from the Middle East in w a r .
It followed that w e must m a i n t a i n our foothold there in p e a c e , for without that we should h e unable to develop w i t h sufficient speed a strong military p o s i t i o n there in war.
This
did not m e a n that large forces must b e stationed there in peace: w e m u s t , however, r e t a i n there b a s e s and other facilities w h i c h , though lightly manned in p e a c e , could b e used for the rapid deployment of greater force against a threat of war.
The importance of our ability to m o v e forces rapidly to check a threat of aggression had b e e n strikingly demonstrated b y the recent d e s p a t c h of a force to Basra.
In future we should not be able to use India as a b a s e for such deployment of force:
it was the more e s s e n t i a l , t h e r e f o r e , that we should r e t a i n other­
b a s e s in the M i d d l e East for this p u r p o s e . P a l e s t i n e w a s of special importance in this g e n e r a l scheme of defence.
In w a r , Egypt would be our k e y p o s i t i o n in the Middle East;
and it was necessary that w e should hold Palestine as a s c r e e n for the defence of Egypt. In p e a c e , since we had undertaken to withdraw from E g y p t , w e m u s t b e able to use P a l e s t i n e as a b a s e for the m o b i l e reserve of troops which m u s t b e kept ready to meet any emergency throughout
t h e M i d die S a s t. In r e p l y to specific questions put to him by M i n i s t e r s , THE CHIEF O P THE AIR STAFF m a d e the foliow ing f urther statements ; ­
(a)
of A l l i a n c e
to meet our
It would b e
even though
t h r o u gh o u t
The f a c i l i t i e s afforded b y our Treaty w i t h Trans Jordan would not alone' suffice m i l i t a r y requirements in this area. n e c e s s a r y to r e t a i n those facilities we secured full m i l i t a r y facilities Palestine.. (b ) If P a l e s t i n e were divided into an Arab S t a t e , a Jewish State and a Jerusalem Enclave under B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the military facilitie required b y the C h i e f s of Staff could not b e secured w i t h i n the J e r u s a l e m Enclave alone.
Nor
would it b e sufficient to secure m i l i t a r y facilities f r o m either the A r a b or the Jewish State:
it would b e n e c e s s a r y , in order to secure full use of the p o r t s , airfields and communications, to o b t a i n m i l i t a r y facilities b y treaty arrangements w i t h b o t h States. (c) So long as the necessary m i l i t a r y facilities w e r e obtained throughout P a l e s t i n e , it was immaterial from the m i l i t a r y angle whether Palestine was divided into two independent States or b e c a m e a single Independent State. ( d ) The m i l i t a r y situation would, of c o u r s e , h e greatly eased if a political solution could h e found w h i c h was acceptable" to "both communities and b r o u g h t to an end the existing state of tension in Palestine.
If, however, one of the two communities had' to he antagonised, it w a s p r e f e r a b l e , from the purely military angle, that a s o l u t i o n should he found which did not involve the continuing hostility of the Arahsj f o r in that event our difficulties would not he confined to P a l e s t i n e out would extend throughout the w h o l e of the Middle East. ( e ) T h e strategic policy for the Middle E a s t outlined on b e h a l f of the Chiefs of Staff was not wholly dependent on preserving the f r i e n d s h i p of Spain,, Italy, Greece and other countries b o r d e r i n g the northern seaboard of the Mediterranean.
Our line of communication through the M e d i t e r r a n e a n would still b e of substantial v a l u e to u s , even though some of these countries w e r e h o s t i l e , provided that the countries o n the southern, shore of the Mediterranean, were not also hostile. THE PRIME MINISTER thanked the C h i e f s of Staff for this expression of their v i e w s on the strategic importance of P a l e s t i n e and of our p o s i t i o n in the Middle East. Cabinet
Office, S.'7. 1. 15th January, 1947. . J JTvEENT IS THE PROPERTY. OF HlCgBBITAliNIC MAJESTY'S (K)VERNMENT
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C M . (47)
6TH C O N C L U S I O N S , MINUTE 4
Confidential Annex ( 1 5 t h January, 1947 - 10.30 a.m. )
The C a b i n e t h a d before them two m e m o r a n d a by the F o r e i g n Secretary:­
PALESTINE
(previous
Reference:
C M . ( 4 6 ) 101 st
Conclusions,
Minute 2)
Political
Implications
of F u t u r e
policy C P . ( 4 7 ) 2 8 : on the question whether it
would be legally possible for H i s Majesty' s
Government to impose a solution of the
Palestine p r o b l e m , either by way of
partition or by the introduction of a system of P r o v i n c i a l A u t o n o m y , without first obtaining the sanction of the United Nations.
C P . ( 4 7 ) 3 0 : reviewing three alternative
p o l i c i e s for Palestine and discussing the
line to be taken on the resumption of the
Palestine C o n f e r e n c e .
THE F O R E I G N SECRETARY explained that the first of these m e m o r a n d a had been prepared by the legal advisers of the Foreign Office and the C o l o n i a l Office and that both the L o r d Chancellor and the A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l were in agreement with the conclusions reached.
These were t h a t , before p u t t i n g into effect a Partition solution,' we should be legally obliged to obtain the approval of the United Nations;
that we should n o t , from the strictly legal point of v i e w , be obliged to obtain su&h p r e v i o u s approval for the introduction of the Provincial A u t o n o m y plan;
but that it would be politically inexpedient to attempt to introduce either solution without first bringing the matter before the United N a t i o n s . The C o l o n i a l Office h a d not been consulted in the- preparation of the second memorandum.
The F o r e i g n Secretary said that he w a s sorry that he h a d not been able to find time for such consultation;
and h e also apologised to h i s c o l l e a g u e s for c i r c u l a t i n g this paper on the m o r n i n g of the C a b i n e t ' s m e e t i n g .
H e h a d thought, h o w e v e r , that it might assist the Cabinet in their discussion to have before them a paper which f o c u s s e d , as this w a s designed to d o , the main issues for d i s c u s s i o n . The F o r e i g n Secretary recalled the v a r i o u s stages in the consideration of the Palestine problem since the latter part of the late w a r . The Coalition Government had then f a v o u r e d Partition as a solution;
and it w a s possible that this might have been carried into effect without great difficulty if" it h a d been imposed shortly before the end of the weir.
This opportunity h a d , h o w e v e r , been lost.
When the present Government assumed office, their first endeavour h a d been to break away from the terms of the white paper of 1 9 3 9 . They had sought A r a b acquiescence in the continuance of Jewish immigration at the rate of 1,500 a m o n t h ; and they h a d aimed to get the Palestine problem reviewed afresh against the background of Jewish sufferings in E u r o p e .
A t that time there was reason to believe that the J e w s would have been content w i t h immigration at the rate of h , 0 0 0 a month.
T h i s policy was making some p r o g r e s s when President Truman intervened with his demand for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews to P a l e s t i n e . This encouraged J e w i s h a m b i t i o n s and led to the appointment of the Anglo-American C o m m i t t e e of Enquiry.
When that C o m m i t t e e reported, H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government had b e e n ready to give sympathetic consideration to its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , if they w e r e taken a s a w h o l e ;
but they h a d found it n e c e s s a r y to stand f i r m against president Truman's desire that immediate effect should be' given to the recommendation in favour of the admission of 100,000 J e w s to Palestine in advance of full consideration of the remaining recommendations of the report.
T h u s , the approaches which H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government h a d originally made towards a solution of this p r o b l e m h a d been d e f l e c t e d by President T r u m a n ' s intervention.
The position had also been made more difficult by the decision of the Labour P a r t y , at their Annual C o n f e r e n c e , to endorse the Zionist demand for the creation of an independent Jewish State in P a l e s t i n e .
We h a d now to contend with the f u r t h e r complication that we must find a solution which w a s likely to be endorsed by the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
E v e n if we d i d not ourselves think it necessary to seek the approval of the United N a t i o n s , he had no doubt that the m a t t e r would be referred to the United Nations by some Government which d i s l i k e d the solution which we adopted.
It w a s h i s opinion that a solution by way of partition would not command the support of a two-thirds m a j o r i t y in the United Nations.
If we- advocated par Li Lion, we were likely to find ourselves with n o effective support except from the United S t a t e s .
A s against such a solution, the Arab States would advocate their plan for an independent unitary s t a t e , which they would defend as being in accordance w i t h established democratic principles;
and it w a s h i s v i e w , based on h i s practical experience of discussions in the A s s e m b l y , that there would be a wide measure of support for the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s to which the A r a b s w o u l d appeal in support of their plan.
On the other h a n d , h - believed that there was a reasonable prospect of securing majority support in the United N a t i o n s for a solution on the general lines of the Provincial A u t o n o m y p l a n , especially if it could be adjusted to meet some of the o b j e c t i o n s which had been raised against it by both A r a b s and Jews. c
If we attempted to impose a solution, in pursuance of our powers as Mandatory, without reference to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , there would, be w i d e s p r e a d disorder in Palestine.
One or other of the interested G o v e r n m e n t s would regard this as constituting a "situation" endangering world peace and would bring the m a t t e r before the Security Council.
This would create for u s difficulties even greater than those which we should have to meet if v/e ourselves brought the problem before the General Assembly. He had at one stage hoped that a solution might be found on the basis of a "transitional period" during which Palestine would remain, under M a n d a t e , as a b i - n a t i o n a l unitary State but provision would be m a d e that either of two provinces (Arab and J e w i s h ) would have a right of secession after a fixed period of y e a r s .
He had bulieved that, if such a system could, be established, the two communities might during the transition period come to see the a d v a n t a g e s of collaboration and that pressure for the creation of a separate J e w i s h State w o u l d subside.
He was told, however, that the lack of f i n a l i t y in this solution would result in continuing d i s o r d e r , to an extent which might cause a breakdown of our administration in Palestine.
Nevertheless,
he w o u l d still like to explore the possibilities of such a solution when the Palestine Conference was resumed. There w a s no doubt that the situation would be eased if other countries could be persuaded to admit a number of Jewish immigrants f r o m E u r o p e . H e had. for some" time been pressing the United States A d m i n i s t r a t i o n to make such a gesture;
and he was g l a d to see that President Truman h a d now included in h i s Message to C o n g r e s s a proposal for a special immigration quota for displaced p e r s o n s , including Jews.
H.M. A m b a s s a d o r in Washington had been asked to enquire how soon Congress might be e x p e c t e d to pass the necessary legislation,
It
would be most h e l p f u l if this lead could be f o l l o w e d by other c o u n t r i e s , including the British Dominions.
H i t h e r t o we had had no success in the e f f o r t s which we h a d made to persua.de Dominion G o v e r n m e n t s to accept a proportion of these refugees. In c o n c l u s i o n , the Foreign Secretary said that he d i d not expect the Cabinet at their present meeting to reach final conclusions on this difficult issue.
He would, h o w e v e r , be glad to have the advantage of hearing the views of h i s colleague s. -2.
"2£ T H E SECRETARY OR STATE F O R T H E C O L O N I E S said that he would like m o r e time to consider the proposals in the F o r e i g n Secretary's latest m e m o r a n d u m ( C P . (47) 3 0 ) . -
He informed t h e Cabinet of negotiations w h i c h had taken p l a c e w i t h the Jewish Agency since the Zionist Congress at Basle.
The Congress had decided that the E x e c u t i v e of the J e w i s h Agency should not take part in the London Conference unless "a change should take place In the situation".
Mr. B e n G u r i o n , w h e n he had sub­
sequent ly visited London, had pressed that His M a j e s t y ' s Government should take some action, for instance as to the rate of immigration to P a l e s t i n e , w h i c h would constitute a change in the situation.
H e had told Mr. B e n G u r i o n that no f r e s h policy could he announced b e f o r e the C o n f e r e n c e , hut he had succeeded in a r r a n g i n g w i t h him that the responsible m e m b e r s of the E x e c u t i v e would in fact assemble p r i v a t e l y in L o n d o n at the time of the C o n f e r e n c e , so that they would he available for informal discussions w h i l e it was going on. The C o l o n i a l Secretary said that representatives sent b y the Palestine Arab Higher Committee would attend the Conference.
This was satisfactory, though the persons chosen were not as w i d e l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or as suitable personally as m i g h t have b e e n hoped. The H i g h Commissioner for Palestine was anxious tha-t the Government should realise the urgency of f i n d i n g a solution;
the
administration and the m i l i t a r y forces in P a l e s t i n e w e r e w o r k i n g under great s t r a i n and early action to relieve this w a s , in his view, essential.
The
H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r ^ o w n o p i n i o n was t h a t , despite the difficulties involved b y the need for o b t a i n i n g the a p p r o v a l of the United N a t i o n s , s o m e form of p a r t i t i o n provided the only pr a c t i c ah 1 e solution. T h e Secretary of State said that he h i m s e l f was m o r e and m o r e inclined to share this v i e w , which he felt sure would also command more g e n e r a l acceptance in this country than, any . other solution.
He appreciated that there would b e difficulties in the United N a t i o n s , b u t these w o u l d also arise over any other possible solution. If the scheme w e r e not accepted b y the A s s e m b l y , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would then be on the Assembly to find a b e t t e r solution. He himself could see no solution on the lines of the Arab p l a n for a unitary State, for illegal immigration of Jews would continue and the present state of tension would b e perpetuated; and w e should s t i l l r e m a i n responsible for law and order. Nor did he favour the plan for P r o v i n c i a l Autonomy.
The Jews would not accept as satisfactory any scheme w h i c h did not provide for a Jewish national S t a t e , whose nationals would have a Jewish nationality.
He would circulate to the Cabinet a m e m o r a n d u m setting out other difficulties w h i c h the High Commissioner saw in this scheme. A s r e g a r d s P a r t i t i o n m u c h would denend on the b o u n d a r i e s drawn and on the size of the areas given to the two communities. The C a b i n e t first considered., whether a s o l u t i o n on the lines of Partition was likely to command the support of a two-thirds majority of the United N a t i o n s . It w a s explained that the Charter itself did not provide that a two-thirds m a j o r i t y should b e required for a n issue of this kind.
it w a s , however, open to any member State to propose that an important Issue should b e determined b y a two­
thirds m a j o r i t y , and this p r o p o s a l was certain to b e m a d e in respect of the Palestine issue.
While
it was true that for this point of procedure only a simple m a j o r i t y was required, it would always be difficult to secure e v e n a simple m a j o r i t y against a p r o p o s a l that a n important issue should b e decided by a two-thirds majority, T H E FOREIGN SECRETARY said that the Arab States w o u l d certainly oppose Partition;
and
he believed that the Soviet Government and the Slav group would also oppose it, partly because of a desir-e-to..-suppnj?t,, the Arabs against u s , and p a r t l y b e c a u s e they would expect u s , in the event of P a r t i t i o n , to secure military facilities by-
Treaty with the two independent States.
It
was unlikely that- the United States would b e able to secure the support of China for a P a r t i t i o n solution;
and India w a s also likely to vote against it.
In these circumstances he saw no prospect of o b t a i n i n g a two-thirds m a j o r i t y in favour of Partition. In d i s c u s s i o n the view was expressed that,
if the Soviet Government must b e expected to v o t e against P a r t i t i o n for the second reason given, b y the F o r e i g n Secretary, there could be no assurance that they would support the alternative of P r o v i n c i a l Autonomy.
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY t h o u g h t , however, that in certain circumstances the Arab States might support such a solution and that some of the Slew/ States might also be persuaded to support it. -a­
The v l e w was also expressed, in discussion, that i f all the a r g u m e n t s in favour of Partition were set forth in the discussions at the A s s e m b l y , and the d i s a d v a n t a g e s of the alternative courses were fully explained, the possibility could not be wholly excluded t h a t , by a combination of skilful debating and tactical manoeuvring of the interested S t a t e s , the necessary majority in support of this solution could be obtained. THE CHANCELLOR OP T H E EXCHEQUER stressed the urgency of finding some early solution w h i c h would terminate the existing c o n d i t i o n s of disorder in P a l e s t i n e '
He suggested that the Cabinet should first consider w h a t w a s the best solution on the merits arid should then discuss separately the practical p r o s p e c t s of carrying that solution into effect.
H i s own view w a s t h a t , on the m e r i t s , the best solution war. Partition.
E v e n t s had shown that J e w s and A r a b s could n o t , and w o u l d n o t , work together in Palestine.
It w a s also clear that the Z i o n i s t s wore determined to insist on the right of J e w s to enter as i m m i g r a n t s , subject only to the control of a purely J e w i s h a u t h o r i t y , some purely Jewish area in P a l e s t i n e , however small it might be.
That determination in effect ruled out a l l solutions other than p a r t i t i o n .
If the C a b i n e t were agreed ttu t partition w a s the right solution, he could not believe it impossible to find, w a y s and m a e n s of carrying that solution into effect. THE MINISTER OP HEALTH endorsed the views expressed by the C h a n c e l l o r of the E x c h e q u e r . It w a s essential that an early solution should be found.
If it were n o t , the c o n s e q u e n c e s would be continuing disorder in P a l e s t i n e , which we should be caviled upon to r e p r e s s by f o r c e , a.nd a general outbreak of anti-Semitism.
T h i s w a s a. situation which this Government could not c o n t e m p l a t e .
He
considered that partition was the right solution; and he could not believe that it would be rejected by the U n i t e d N a t i o n s if it were supported by the United K i n g d o m a n d the B r i t i s h D o m i n i o n s , by the United S t a t e s , and, as seemed p r o b a b l e , b y some at least of the Governments of W e s t e r n E u r o p e .
A t the m o m e n t responsible J e w s were ready to accept Partition as a solution.
T h i s , therefore, w a s t h e ' moment at which to put it f o r w a r d .
For it must be remembered that, for the J e w s , partition w a s a compromise solution;
and t h a t , because of the delays which had o c c u r r e d in dealing w i t h this p r o b l e m , Jewish leadership was already p a s s i n g into l e s s moderate h a n d s .
if we failed to seize this opportunity, it was likely that the leadership of the e w s would p a s s to men who would advocate m o r e extreme solutions and more violent c o u r s e s . J
- The M i n i s t e r also challenged the view that, from the angle of our strategic interest, it must he cur objective to avoid estranging the Arab S t a t e s .
In h i s v i e w , a friendly Jewish State in Palestine would give u s a safer military base than any we shouia find in an A r a b State.
The
Jews were under the continuing influence of countries friendly to ourselves.
If, h o w e v e r , India-and other M u s l i m countries passed under Russian i n f l u e n c e , for h o w long could we expect to retain a secure military base in an Arab Palestine? THE M I N I S T E R 01 DEFENCE said that he too would favour partition as a solution if it were possible to g e t both Arabs and Jews to accept it.
He differed, h o w e v e r , from the M i n i s t e r of Health on the strategic issues involved.
If it came to a choice between antagonising A r a b s or J e w s , he thought there could be no doubt that from the point of view of our own strategic interest it would be more disadvantageous to us to Incur the continuing hostility of the Arab States.
For in that event the- Soviet Government would undoubtedly support them, with the intention of undermining the position of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth and the United States in the Persian Gulf area.
e thought it most important t h a t , throughout their d i s c u s s i o n s , the Cabinet should keep it in m i n e that it w a s to the strategic advantage of Russia to win the Arabs over to their side.
Our first task must be. to try to find a solution which would do justice to both A r a b s and J e w s .
If, h o w e v e r , that proved impossible we should look to our own strategic interests;
and f r o m that angle there could be no doubt that it was vital to us to retain the goodwill of the Arab world. s
n
THE M I N I S T E R OF F U E L Aim POWER said that it was also important that we should not f o l l o w a course of action which would alienate the United tates.
They too had important interests at stake in the Middle E a s t ;
ana it had btei our policy to try to induce them to shoulder increased r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , together with u s , in that area. Their support would, h o w e v e r , bo- given to a solution by way of partition. D
F o r his p a r t , he had always hoped in the past that the J e w s in Palestine would follow a policy of assimilation.'
N o progress had been m a d e , however, in that direction:
and it w a s n o w quite clear that the J e w s were determined to secure a political State, h o w e v e r , small, of their own.
To attempt to establish, against that determination, a u n i t a r y State in Palestine which provided no outlet for the aspirations of Zionism could only result In continued and increasing d i s o r d e r s In Palestine which would bring great discredit on the M a n d a t o r y Power.
His
conclusion w a s , t h e r e f o r e , that H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government should advocate Partition and should strive to get that solution endorsed by the Un i t e d Nat i o n s . The Cabinet
;:
­
Agreed to resume their
at a later m e e t i n g . C ab ine t Office , 3. V/. 1 .
discussion THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MA3ESTY'S GOVERNMENT
The
circulation
of this
paper
has
It is issued for the personal use
been strictly
of.
Copy N o . . 1
I S E C R E T
(22.nd January, 19^7 -
JLESTINE limited.
12 N o o n )
-1 ,
Cahi.net resumed their discussion of
the -line b O be taken on b e h a ] " f of His M a n e s t y s
G o v e r n m e n t in the P a l e s t i n e
Conference and in the
informal conversation
w h i c h were to h e held at the
same time with J e w i s h
representativeSo T h
e
1
revious
Iference: L ( U 7 ) 6th
snclusionsj
mute 1+) !
jlicy to he
llowed at
tinned L o n d o n pferance. T h e y had before them two memoranda bv
Secretary of state for the C o l o n i e s : ­
C P , / -1,-7 \31
the giving the comments of the H i g h
Commissioner for
Palestine on t h; plan
for P r o v i n c i a l Autonomy;
and C P . (h7) 32: giving the v i e w s of the Secretary of S t a t e on the relative m e r i t s of the four main solutions w h i c h had b e e n put f o r w a r d , and suggesting that the aim of our D e l e g a t e s , in the forthcoming
discussions, should be to explore with both parties the various p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,
explain the iculties w h i c h each presented, a n d try to lead them in t h e direction of a reasonable scheme of P a r t i t i o n as b e i n g the b e s t and moi it equitable solution. T H E F O R E I G N SECRETARY said that he h a d
considered v e r y carefully, in the light of t h e
C a b i n e t ' s discussion on 15th January, how he should,
handle the f o r t h c o m i n g d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
of the A r a b s and the J e w s .
He. himself w a s n o t
opposed in principle to a solution b y w a y of
Partition;
h u t he was impressed h y the difficulty
of imposing any solution against the active opposition
of either community in P a l e s t i n e ,
If it came to the
point of using force against the A r a b s , he was not
sure how t h i s w o u l d b e accepted b y public opinion
in this country.
A n d he w a s certain that such
action w o u l d create a "situation" in Palestine w h i c h
w o u l d be brought to the n o t i c e of the Security
Council as likely to endanger world, peace,,
He
considered, t h e r e f o r e , that a further effort should be m a d e b y negotiation to b r i n g the two parties somewhat n e a r e r together.
If this attempt f a i l e d the question w o u l d have to h e b r o u g h t in some form b e f o r e the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
H e hoped,, however, that the Cabinet w o u l d not attempt to decide, before the negotiations b e g a n , w h a t recommendation they would make to the United Nations if they failed, in this last attempt to secure .an agreed settlement.
A n d he thought it w o u l d b e a mistake f o r the Cabinet to commit themselves to support of any particular solution before M i n i s t e r s entered upon the negotiations. T H E COLONIAL SECRETARY agreed that the Cabinet should n o t n o w be asked to decide what policy should b e f o l l o w e d if the conversations broke down.
He hoped that the Cabinet w o u l d leave the negotiators as m u c h latitude as possible.
T h e i r object should b e to move b o t h the Jews and the A r a b s from their present irreconcilable positions., in the hope that as a result there w o u l d emerge some conclusion which we could put forward with some hope that It would not be wholly unacceptable to either of the two parties,., He himself f e l t that such a solution must b e along the l i n e s of P a r t i t i o n .
H e could n o t see any prospect of agreement on any other l i n e .
It had b e e n argued that Partition could not give a v i a b l e State to b o t h Jew and ;-.rab, but he w a s not convinced of t h i s .
There should be no great difficulty in making the Jewish share reasonably viable, while the A r a b share might b e c o m e viable if it were linked with T r a n s - J o r d a n .
It had also been argued that Partition would a l i e n a t e the Arab w o r l d .
He was not convinced that this w o u l d necessarily follow.
The Arab States were bound to us b y economic and strategic interests; . and, while some Arab c o u n t r i e s would n o doubt oppose P a r t i t i o n , he was "by no m e a n s certain that they would, all be united in that policy for long.
T r a n s - J o r d a n , for instance, m i g h t favour Partition, since she stood herself to gain .from it, while there w e r e some indications that Ihn Saud might not b e wholly opposed, to it. T H E MINISTER OP F U E L AND POWER said that he -was in favour of p a r t i t i o n .
This policy would., among other t h i n g s , have the advantage that it w o u l d be acceptable to the United States.
If it was n e c e s s a r y to choose between the friendship of the Jews and of the Arab world, he felt that on a long v i e w the friendship of the Jews was more valuable to us than that of the A r a b s .
Recent experiences in Egypt and. India should warn us that, if a unitary State with an Arab m a j o r i t y were e s t a b l i s h e d in P a l e s t i n e , it would n o t necessarily remain f r i e n d l y towards us or willing to allow us to maintain a strategic base in P a l e s t i n e . In subsequent discussion Ministers agreed that, failing an agreed settlement, any solution of this problem would have to come b e f o r e the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
The General Assembly was not due to meet until September;
and, although a special meeting c o u l d n o doubt b e called, earlier, the atmosphere would probably b e m o r e favourable at the September meeting.
On the o t h e r hand, if the forthcoming discussions produced no a g r e e m e n t , it w a s doubtful whether the internal situation in P a l e s t i n e could be held until September. D i s c u s s i o n in the United- N a t i o n s , whether at the General A s s e m b l y or in the T r u s t e e s h i p C o u n c i l , w a s bound to be embarrassing.
There w o u l d b e much, discussion of the various promises that had been made on b e h a l f of His M a j e s t y ' s Government, not all of which w e r e easy to reconcile with one another, and critics would dwell on the long history of our failure to find a solution of the problem b y ourselveso Some Ministers felt t h a t , if we were unable to secure an agreed settlement) there w o u l d be much to be. said for leaving it to the United N a t i o n s to find a solution^
On
the other h a n d , we could not lightly talcs such a course, w h i c h might mean that we should h e unable to secure the m i l i t a r y facilities in Palestine which w e r e necessary to our strategic position in the M i d d l e E a s t . As regards oil s u p p l i e s , the two ports at which the pipe-lines terminated or w o u l d terminate were Haifa and Gaza.
A c c o r d i n g to the Jewish ideas of P a r t i t i o n , both w o u l d be in the J e w i s h area, though it m i g h t be arranged that Gasa should be in the Arab area.
F o r the use of M i d d l e East o i l . however, we d e p e n d e d , not only on the security of the ports where the pipe-lines terminated, but on the friendship of the countries in w h i c h oil w a s produced and through, which the pipe-lines passed.
A p a r t from P e r s i a , all these countries were Arab countries^ The C a b i n e t * s conclusion w a s that it w o u l d be a mistake to decide at this stage what policy should b e f o l l o w e d if the forthcoming conversations broke d o w n . D u r i n g the c o n v e r s a t i o n s , Ministers should try t h e i r utmost to m o v e the two parties from their present irreconcilable positions.
T h e Cabinet should b e kept informed of the progress of the d i s c u s s i o n s ;
and they should, in particular, be consulted further before any indication was given to either A r a b s or Jews that His Majesty's Government would b e prepared to support any particular solution of the problem. C a b i n e t Office, S.W.1. THIS DOCtTKiDEIST IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRTTANUIC MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
CM. (47)
%Za
^^ryrr^rf^
2 4
wW-cs-ok?
21 ST C O N C L U S I O N S , M M U T E 4
Confidential Annex ( 1 3 t h F e b r u a r y , 1947
10
a.m.)
INDIA THE PRIME MINISTER recalled that at their
meeting on 8th January the Cabinet had agreed to
defer f o r the time being the issue of the proposed
Constitutional statement of policy declaring the G o v e r n m e n t s
intention to transfer power in India in the course
Position of 1 9 4 8 .
He h a d been keeping a close w a t c h on the
development of the constitutional position in India,
,(previous
in consultation with m e m b e r s of the India and B u r m a
Reference:
Committee;
and they were satisfied that the time
C M . (47) 4th
had now come to m a k e a final e f f o r t , by the issue
Conclusions,
of this s t a t e m e n t , to compel the two p o l i t i c a l
Minute 1 )
parties in India to face the realities of the
situation and collaborate in framing a new
constitution.
They therefore recommended that the
statement should be issued in the course of the
following week.
1
Various c h a n g e s of wording h a d been
ide
in the draft statement which had previously been
considered by the Cabinet ( C P . ( 4 7 ) 1 ) .
These
were of minor importance only.
There w a s , however,
one change of substance which required the approval
of the Cabinet,, v i z . that the date to be given f o r
the transfer of power in India should be "June 1948"
rather than "the m i d d l e of 1 9 4 8 " .
He was satisfied
that the statement would not "be fully effective
unless a definite date were given.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE F O R INDIA said
t h a t , while he concurred in this r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , he
thought it right to warn the Cabinet that it might
not be possible f o r the transfer of power to be
effected smoothly by J u n e , 1 9 4 8 .
Even though the
work of the Constituent Assembly proceeded without
further delay, it might well" be that by J u n e , 1948
there would be no Central Government to w h i c h power
could be transferred.
It w a s the view of the Cabinet that this consideration did not outweigh the a d v a n t a g e s , for the p u r p o s e s of the present statement, of specifying a definite d a t e .
It would do no harm if in the event the date h a d to be postponed because the Indians themselves were not ready to accept the transfer of p o w e r . The Cabinet ­
(1)
Agreed that the proposed statement of policy shoulu indicate the G o v e r n m e n t s intention to transfer power in India in J u n e , 1 9 4 8 . (2)
A u t h o r i s e d the P r i m e Liinister to arrange for the statement to be m a d e in both H o u s e s of Parliament in the course of the following week. C ab ine; t Off ice, S. W . 1 27
H O CIRCULATION
C M . (47)
23RD C O N C L U S I O N S
(18th F e b r u a r y , 1947
CE3S
AESTH RECORD -
11.0 a.m.]
THE PRIME M I N I S T E R recalled that
at the Cabinet's m e e t i n g on 7th N o v e m b e r h e h a d undertaken ty-fir st thday
vious
erence:
. ( 4 6 ) 95th
elusions;
to make further enquiries about
for celebrating
the arrangements
the twenty-first birthday of
Princess E l i z a b e t h .
When this m a t t e r had been mentioned'
p r e v i o u s l y , the Cabinet h a d been u n d e r the
impression that P r i n c e s s E l i z a b e t h could be
regarded a s h a v i n g come of age on h e r eighteenth
birthday, by virtue of the Regency A c t , 1943, a n d
that on this account it would be inappropriate to
take formal cognisance of her twenty-first
birthday.
He was n o w advised, h o w e v e r , that the A c t of 1943
merely enabled the heir apparent or presumptive
to act as a Counsellor of State f r o m age 1 8 and
did not £tlter the fact; that the heir to the T h r o n e ,
like any other subject, did not become of full age
until 21.
The Prime M i n i s t e r added t h a t he h a d been unable to find any precedent for any formal recognition, either by Parliament or by bhe G o v e r n m e n t ,
of t h e coming of age of the heir to the Throne. He raised the m a t t e r again, h o w e v e r , because h e understood that
proposing
the South A f r i c a n Government
were to m a k e a present to P r i n c e s s Elizabeth, on the occasion of her twenty-first
-1­
birthday.
6j A
short d i s c u s s i o n followed;, from, w h i c h
it appeared that it w a s the view of the C a b i n e t
that the Government should not -e stablish a new
precedent by taking any f o r m a l act in
of P r i n c e s s E l i z a b e t h ' s coming of a g e .
that there
should be n o resolution by
recognition
It followed
parliament
nor any present from H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t .
This need n o t , h o w e v e r , preclude the prime M i n i s t e r
f r o m sending a telegram conveying the
Government's
congratulations to P r i n c e s s Slizahetb. on the
occasion of her twenty-first
Cabinet Office, S.W. 1. birthday.
THIS wW!mWT!gTB THE
PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT .
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
&
&
H
e
-
3d
o
k
C..M. (h7)
23RD C O N C L U S I O N S , M I N U T E 1
Confidential
(18th F e b r u a r y ,
stitutional ition. 'evious erence: .(k7) 21st elusions, ute h ) .
Itt
"OP
IA
,
Annex 1 9U7 - 11
a.nu )
-r
THE P - r, - m T INISTER
recalled that at their meeting on 13th F e b r u a r y the Cabinet had agreed that he should make at an early date the p r o p o s e d statement of policy declaring the G o v e r n m e n t ' s intention to transfer power in India by J u n e , 19^4-8;
and he had arranged that this statement should h e m a d e to P a r l i a m e n t on Thursday, 20th F e b r u a r y .
D u r i n g the last
two d a y s , however, representations had b e e n received from the V i c e r o y urging that the G o v e r n m e n t should not at this stage make any declaration of their intention to transfer power by a specified d a t e .
T h e Viceroy suggested instead an alternative plan u n d e r which B r i t i s h authority w o u l d b e progressively withdrawn in India, the Secretary of State Services b e i n g first withdrawn and the B r i t i s h troops thereafter, and the Governors of the P r o v i n c e s w o u l d be placed in a position c o m p a r a b l e to that of G o v e r n o r s - G e n e r a l in Dominions.
T h i s plan c o n t e m p l a t e d that an announcement
should be made in J u n e , 19U/7, that power w o u l d be finally t r a n s f e r r e d to Indian hands at the end of 19d8. IF
TV
TAT -J-
The V i c e r o y ' s representations had been considered b y the India and Burma C o m m i t t e e , who were satisfied that his a l t e r n a t i v e plan w a s impracticable. It w o u l d necessitate a new interim constitution for India d u r i n g the period in which B r i t i s h power was being w i t h d r a w n , and. it took n o account of the P a r l i a m e n t a r y and legislative d i f f i c u l t i e s which such a p r o p o s a l w o u l d involve in this country.
Moreover,
it a s s u m e d that the Interim Government could b e informed in confidence of the date p r o p o s e d for the ultimate transfer of power;
and the C o m m i t t e e were satisfied that, once this partial d i s c l o s u r e had been m a d e , -rumours of the impending British w i t h d r a w a l were likely to spread throughout India. Quite opart, however, from the impracticability
of the V i c e r o y ' s alternative p l a n , the most d i s t u r b i n g element in the situation was the complete change in ,his attitude t o w a r d s the announcement of a defini to date f o r the t r a n s f e r of power.
T h i s had b e e n the e s s e n t i a l feature of the proposals w h i c h he had originally submitted to M i n i s t e r s in D e c e m b e r , 194b; and, although M i n i s t e r s had felt unable to accept hi; plan in the form in which it w a s the \ put forward, the whole of the 3 policy evolved in their d i s c u s s i o n s had been built round this central proposal f o r the early announcement of a definite d a t e f o r the transfer of power.
T h r o u g h o u t these c o n v e r s a t i o n s the V i c e r o y -1 had been insistent on the need for such an announcement, and
he hod assured Ministers that this v i e w was supported b y the
Commander-in-chief, the Governors of the Provinces and his
official advisers.
He had then given it as his considered
opinion that we should not in any event be able to carry on
our administration in India after 3 1 s t March, 1948, because
of the extent to which the European element in the Indian
Services and A r m e d F o r c e s hod decreased and the natural
tendency of the Indian members to look increasingly towards
the Indian political leaders rather than the B r i t i s h
Administration for their future advancement.In his latest
representations, however, the V i c e r o y had stressed the risk
that an early announcement of our intention to transfer power
b y a specified date might create a serious situation in India:
that, instead of forcing the two political parties to face the
realities of the situation and collaborate together in framing
a new constitution, it might encourage in each a tendency to
seize what power it could and thus inflame communal feeling
to an extent which might lead to widespread disorder.
He had
reported that the Commander-in-chief and the G o v e r n o r s of
B e n g a l , Punjab and the United P r o v i n c e s all now took a
pessimistic view of the situation;
and he recommended that we
should not at this stage make any declaration of our intention
to transfer power by a specified date.
Dominion G o v e r n m e n t s hod been informed of the proposed declaration towards the end of the previous week.
Strong
representations had now been received from the P r i m e M i n i s t e r of South A f r i c a , urging that w e should maintain British rule in India until communal differences hod been resolved and a unitary Government established.
No comments had yet b e e n received from any of the other D o m i n i o n s . M i n i s t e r s were thus faced with a very difficult decision.
If they decided to proceed with the policy on which they had previously agreed, they would hove to do so in the face of the latest advice of the Viceroy and. others holding responsible office in India - though, in weighing the views now expressed by the Provincial G o v e r n o r s , it must b e remembered that they had not b e e n informed of the precise t e r m s of the declaration which H i s Majesty's Government proposed to make and it w a s not altogether clear to w h a t proposition of the Viceroy their latest views were related.
On the other hand, the main object of m a k i n g the proposed declaration hod always been to force the two political parties in India to come together and act with a due sense of their responsibility for India's future;
and it was still the view of the India and Burma Committee that for this purpose it was essential to specify a definite dote for the transfer of power.
A
declaration without a date would not convince Indian politicians that we w e r e sincere in our intention to transfer power in the near future;
and w e should be suspected, as earlier Governments had b e e n , of making communal differences an excuse for continuing British rule in India.
Finally, the P r i m e Minister informed the Cabinet that the proposed declaration was to be accompanied by an announcement that a new Viceroy had been appointed who would proceed forthwith to India for the specific purpose of arranging for the transfer of power. This change of V i c e r o y was an essential element in this final attempt to induce a spirit of co-operation between the two political parties in India.
The now Viceroy had accepted this mission on the understanding that a definite date f o r the transfer of power w o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d and a n n o u n c e d before he went out to India;
and" it was v e r y doubtful w h e t h e r he w o u l d still be willing to undertake this exceptionally difficult duty
if it -were now d e c i d e d that no definite term should b e set to his m i s s i o n . In all the circumstances the P r i m e M i n i s t e r r e c o m m e n d e d
that the Cabinet should reaffirm their decision in favour of
announcing the G o v e r n m e n t s intention to t r a n s f e r power in
India by J u n e , 19U8, and that the statement of policy should,
h e m a d e , as previously proposed, on 20th F e b r u a r y .
In the discussion w h i c h followed a n u m b e r of M i n i s t e r s spoke in support of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .
Other
points made in the discussion were as f o l l o w s : ­
(a)
T H E SECRETARY OF S T A T E FOR D O M I N I O N AFFAIRS said that
he had serious misgivings about the form of paragraph 7 of the
proposed statement.
T h i s contemplated the possibility that
by J u n e , 19U8, no responsible authority w o u l d have emerged in
India to which power could, be transferred;
and he w a s gravely
concerned at the implication that, w h a t e v e r happened, we s h o u l d
leave India by the prescribed date even if this meant that the
country w o u l d be plunged, into chaos.
He w o u l d therefore
prefer to substitute, for the last sentence of this p a r a g r a p h ,
words to the effect that His M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , in view of
their definite intention to transfer power in India, had
appointed a new Viceroy "with an instruction that a r r a n g e m e n t s
must be made for the constitution of a responsible a l t e r n a t i v e
Government and for the transfer of power within a period, n o t
exceeding two years from the dote of his a p p o i n t m e n t .
51
In reply to this suggestion, it w a s pointed out that
the succeeding paragraphs of the proposed statement m a d e clear
the Government*s desire to transfer power to a responsible
Indian G o v e r n m e n t ;
and paragraph 10 referred to the alternative
possibilities w h i c h w o u l d be open if no central G o v e r n m e n t for
the w h o l e of B r i t i s h India had been established by the
prescribed date.
T h e statement did not envisage the possibility
of our leaving India without any G o v e r n m e n t at a l l .
On the
other hand, the formula proposed by the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs w o u l d be thought to imply t h a t , if the new
Viceroy failed to secure the establishment of a central
G o v e r n m e n t , we s h o u l d continue to maintain B r i t i s h rule in
India.
After further d i s c u s s i o n , it was a g r e e d that
paragraph 7 of the draft statement should be amended so as to
read:­
"His M a j e s t y ' s Government desire to hand o v e r
their responsibility to authorities e s t a b l i s h e d by a
constitution approved by all parties i n " I n d i a ,
in accordance with the plan of the C a b i n e t M i s s i o n ,
but unfortunately there is at present no clear prospect
that s u c h a constitution and such a u t h o r i t i e s w i l l
emerge.
T h e present state of uncertainty is fraught
with danger and cannot b e indefinitely prolonged.
His M a j e s t y ' s Government wish to m a k e it clear that
it is their definite intention to effect the
transference of power to responsible Indian hand-S by
a dote not later than J u n e , 191+8."
It w a s the view of the Cabinet that the insertion of the w o r d s u n d e r l i n e d should remove any risk of the misunderstanding feared b y the Secretary of State for Dominion A f f a i r s . (b)
THE M I N I S T E R OP D E F E N C E said that he was sorry that
the Government had felt compelled to depart from the policy
w h i c h they had laid d o w n , in the telegram (CABIN 2 2 ) sent to
the Cabinet Mission in India on 6 t h J u n e , 194-6, that we should
retain British control in India until there was a responsible
Indian Government to which powers in respect of B r i t i s h India
could, be transferred.
The course of the discussions since
D e c e m b e r had, h o w e v e r , compelled him to the conclusion that the
Government had no alternative b u t to prescribe a definite date
for the transfer of power in India.
L i k e other M i n i s t e r s , he
had been specially influenced b y the Viceroy's w a r n i n g that we
should not in any event b e able to carry on our administration
efficiently after M a r c h , 1948, b y reason of the progressive
weakening of the European element in the Indian S e r v i c e s .
If the proposed declaration was in fact likely to produce a state of disorder in India, it was difficult to understand, the V i c e r o y ' s latest suggestion of postponing that situation until a date by which, on his own evidence, we should be l e s s able to deal with it.
The Minister therefore considered that the Cabinet had now no alternative b u t to proceed with the policy on which they had-previously agreed.
This w a s , h o w e v e r , a grave decision to take.
He hoped that the Secretary of State for India would arrange for an immediate study to be m a d e of the consequences which might follow if we were compelled to transfer power otherwise than to a central Government. (c)
The question was raised whether it would b e practicable to defer for a time the announcement of a definite date for the t r a n s f e r of power.
As it had been decided to appoint a new V i c e r o y , it would be natural to allow him to proceed to India and make his own assessment of the situation before a final decision w a s taken. As against this, it was pointed out that the new Viceroy w a s unwilling to accept appointment on that basis. Moreover, C o n g r e s s were still awaiting a reply to their request that, as the Muslim League would not join in the w o r k of the Constituent A s s e m b l y , the Muslim M i n i s t e r s should b e asked to resign from the Interim Government.
If the proposed declaration of policy were made at o n c e , a decision on this request could b e deferred until it was known whether the declaration had the effect of bringing the parties together. This was a strong argument against postponing the issue of the declaration. (d)
T H E SECRETARY OF S T A T E FOR INDIA said that, if the proposed declaration were m a d e , the Cabinet should decide, particularly in view of the latest warnings of possible disorders in India, whether additional shipping should be provided over the next few months to enable E u r o p e a n s to leave India and what guidance should be given to the President of the European Association on the question whether Europeans should be encouraged to leave, and discouraged from proceeding to, India. It was the view of the C a b i n e t that no encouragement should be given at this stage to the idea that there w o u l d b e a mass evacuation of E u r o p e a n s from India as soon, as the declaration of policy, w a s mode.
T h e Secretary of State for India might ask the M i n i s t e r of Transport to take unobtrusive steps to increase the shipping f a c i l i t i e s available for persons wishing to leave India over the next few m o n t h s .
It would, however, be inadvisable that any statement should b e m a d e at this stage about the desirability of E u r o p e a n s leaving, or proceeding t o , India. The Cabinet ­
(1) Reaffirmed their decision that the proposed
statement of policy on India should indicate
the G o v e r n m e n t s intention to transfer power
in India "by J u n e , 191+8.
1
(2) Agreed that the statement of policy (incorporating the amendment n o t e d in paragraph (a) above) should be m a d e in both Houses of P a r l i a m e n t on 20th F e b r u a r y ;
and
took note that the P r i m e Minister w o u l d arrange for the appointment of the new Viceroy to be announced in the same statement. ( 3 ) Took note that the P r i m e Minister w o u l d
communicate the text of the proposed statement',
before it was m a d e , to the L e a d e r s o f the
Opposition P a r t i e s .
(u) A u t h o r i s e d the Secretary of State for India to take unobtrusive steps to ensure that increased shipping facilities w e r e available
for Europeans w i s h i n g to leave India over the next few m o n t h s . Cabinet Office, 8.W.1. NO CIRCULATI ON L^Ooy^J
Ira
CrlmaMinisV-ei-
frsV
lnVorm*W(
G Mo(lj.7) 80th Conclusions s
(lhth October
3
1947
9
-
3*0 p.m.) THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that it had
"been suggested to hirn by the Marquess of Salisbury
that it would be fitting if arrangements could be
made for the House of Lords as a whole to give a
present to H c R * H . The Princess Elizabeth on the
occasion of Her marriage to Lieutenant Phillip
Hountbatten,
RoNo
He would be glad to have the
views of his colleagues on this suggestion
THE PRIME MINISTER said that on no previous occasion had either Hou-se of Parliament given a wedding present, to a Member of The Royal Family,,
It would certainly create embarrassment in the House of Commons if a wedding present were given to The Princess from the House of Lords. He would much prefer that no such presentation should be m a d e
9
and he thought that the Marquess of Salisbury should be discouraged from pursuing his suggestiono
He could be told that the Government had considered the possibility of presents from the two Hoxxses of Parliament hut had found that there were no precedents for such a course. The Cabinet endorsed the views expressed by the Prime Minister­
THE LOPJ) CHANCELLOR undertook to speak to the Marquess of Salisbury in the sense desired by the Cabinet. Cabinet Office
s
SoW*l* lil-TH OCTOBER, 19U7* C.M.(47) 96rii CONCLUSIONS
(l8th December, 1947 - 10 a.m.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that he had been asked bo advise on the precedence of; H.R.H. The Dike of Edinburgh,
He had come to the conclusion (in which the Master of the Rolls concurred) that the Duke of Edinburgh was not entitled to sit on the Cloth of Estate and in the order of precedence would rank after the Duke last created.
If it was desired that His Royal Highness should have, by legal right, the precedence of a Royal Duke, legislation would be required;
and a provision on this point might perhaps be included in the Princess Elizabeth's and the Duke of Edinburgn s Annuities Bill. !
On the other hand, His Majesty might think it unnecessary to have this point dealt with by legislation.
Queen Victoria had accorded the appropriate precedence to Prince Albert by her own decision, v/ithout legislation. The Lord Chancellor undertook to send to the Prime Minister: the opinions which he had given on the point of law involved. The general view of the Cabinet was that it would be inexpedient to include any provision on this point in the Annuities Bill;
and it would be preferable if His Majesty felt able to deal with the matter without legislation. Ce.binet Office, b.*7. 1.