INVESTIGATION OF CAUSES AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES
CONCERNING NUCLEAR RADIATION
by
Aditi Chandra
B.Tech, Mechanical and Automation Engineering (2012)
Amity University
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
JUNE 2014
,7SS
2014 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved.
HUSETTS INSTITUTE
JUL 2 9 2014
LABRPAIES
Signature of A uthor: ............................................
Signature
redacted ................
..
Aditi Chandra
Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
May 9, 2014
-Signature redacted
.......................................................................
Certified by: .!
1107
Michael W. Golay
Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Thesis Supervisor
Signature redacted
Certified by: .........
............................................................
R. Scott Kemp
Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Thesis Reader
Signature redacted
A ccepted by .........................
........................................
Mujid S. Kazimi
-ECO Professor of Nuclear Engineering
Chair, Department Committee on Graduate Students
INVESTIGATION OF CAUSES AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES
CONCERNING NUCLEAR RADIATION
by
Aditi Chandra
Submitted to the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
on May 9, 2014 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in
Nuclear Science and Engineering
ABSTRACT
An individual's perception of radiation, termed as "Radiation Attitudes" in this work, is vital for
understanding the stakeholder relationship dynamics for acceptance of controversial nuclear
technology projects. Attitudes towards nuclear technology have been found to be different from
those towards other technologies perceived as hazardous, such as hydraulic fracturing, genetic
engineering or biohazard facilities. Even within the subset of nuclear technology, different
applications invoke different reactions. Medical uses of the technology are generally viewed as
positive, whereas nuclear power plants and radioactive waste management facilities can
sometimes cause fear and anxiety in the minds of some people. This work explains the causes and
structure of Radiation Attitudes, and the dynamics of the various factors influencing them.
A historical analysis of the narratives concerning nuclear technology was used to identify the
complex, social, political, cognitive and technological factors that played a significant role in the
formation of Radiation Attitudes. A system dynamics approach was utilized to construct causal
loop diagrams depicting the cause-effect relationships and interdependencies between the
identified variables. Qualitative interviews were conducted to test the causal relationships
hypothesized in the model for Radiation Attitudes. The purpose of the interviews was to
understand individual beliefs that result in a particular Radiation Attitude, the bases for these
beliefs, and the process of their formation. The interviews enabled verification of the variables
and relationships in the model, and the identification of the most significant interdependencies
and links. The hypothesized model for Radiation Attitudes correlated well with the infonration
inferred from the interviews, making the first stage of validation a success.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael W. Golay
Title: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Thesis Reader: R. Scott Kemp
Title: Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Michael W. Golay, for his invaluable support
and guidance throughout the course of this work. Working with him for the past two years has
been an incredible learning experience, both professionally and academically. I would also like to
acknowledge the United States Department of Energy for providing the funding for this work.
I would like to thank my thesis reader, Professor R. Scott Kemp, for taking an interest in this work,
and whose feedback greatly improved the quality of this thesis. I would also like to acknowledge
the contribution made by Adam David Williams.
I would like to thank my parents, for supporting me in all my endeavours.
I would like to express gratitude to the all the professors and staff of the NSE department who have
taught me and guided me throughout the time I have been here.
I would also like to thank all my friends for helping me maintain a good work-life balance, and
making my experience at MIT a truly unforgettable one.
3
Contents
1
1.1
M otivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
1.2
Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
1.3
Conflicts of Risk Perception between Experts and Laymen
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
Cognitive Psychology Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
1.3.1
2
3
4
10
Introduction
System Dynamics Approach
16
2.1
Dynamics of Complex Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
2.2
System Dynamics Tools
17
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Models for Stakeholder Acceptance
19
3.1
Definition of Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
3.2
Definition of a Stakeholder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
3.3
Stock-Flow Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
3.4
Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level . . . . . . . .
23
3.5
Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level
.
26
3.6
Necessity for Addition of "Radiation Attitudes" to Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29
Identification of Variables for Causal Loop Diagram
30
4.1
Timeline of Nuclear Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30
4.1.1
Late 19th Century to Early 20th Century- An Era of Scientific Discovery
.
30
4.1.2
Discovery of Fission and the Manhattan Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
4.1.3
The 1950s- Atoms for Peace and the Atomic Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
4.1.4
The 1960s- The Cuban Missile Crisis and its After-Effects
35
4
. . . . . . . . .
4.2
5
6
7
4.1.5
The 1970's - Anti-Nuclear Movements Gain Momentum
4.1.6
Late 20th Century and the Chernobyl Accident
4.1.7
The Yucca Mountain Controversy
4.1.8
The 21st Century -Nuclear Proliferation in Iran and North Korea
4.1.9
The Fukushima Disaster and its Consequences
. . . . . . . . .
36
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
. . . . .
39
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
List of Important Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43
Construction of a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) for Radiation Attitudes
45
5.1
Methodology
45
5.2
Model Description
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
5.3
Description of Identified Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
5.4
Explanation of Important Interdependencies and Loops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
62
5.5
Testing the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
67
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Validation of Model by Interview Data
73
6.1
Interview Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
73
6.2
Interviews for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
74
6.3
Interviews for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level
. . . . . . .
74
6.4
Interviews for Determining Radiation Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75
6.5
Selection of Interviewees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
76
Interview Data and Analysis
77
7.1
Interview No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77
7.1.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops . . . . . . . . . .
78
7.1.2
Identification of Important Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
78
Interview No. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
7.2
5
. . . . . . . . . .
83
7.3.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops . . . . . . . . . .
83
7.3.2
Identification of Important Links . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
84
Interview No. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
86
7.4.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops . . . . . . . . . .
86
7.4.2
Identification of Important Links . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
86
Interview No. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
88
7.5.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops . . . . . . . . . .
88
7.5.2
Identification of Important Links . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
89
Interview No. 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
91
7.6.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops . . . . . . . . . .
91
7.6.2
Identification of Important Links . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
92
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
94
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
97
.
81
.
.
.
.
.
.
Interview No. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.7
Quantification of Responses
7.8
Results
Conclusions
99
8.1
99
.
Recommendations for Future Work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Variable Definition & Quantification Table for Local & State/Federal CLDs
101
B
Interview Questions
111
B. I
Interview Questions for Stakeholder Acceptance at a Local Level . . . . . . . . .
111
B.2
Interview Questions for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level
.
112
B.3
Interview Questions for Determining Radiation Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . .
113
.
.
A
.
8
80
. .........
.
7.6
Identification of Important Links . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
7.5
7.2.2
.
7.4
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops
.
7.3
7.2.1
6
C Description of MITR-II and Proposed Changes
116
D Detailed Interview Responses
119
D .1
Interview ee No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
119
D. 1.1
Responses to Questions related to the MIT Reactor and Proposed Fuel Change 119
D. 1.2
Summary of Responses to Questions related to Radiation Attitudes
. . . .
120
D .2 Interview N o. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
124
D .3
D.2.1
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects . .
124
D.2.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . .
124
Interview N o. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
127
D.3.1
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects . .
127
D.3.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
D .4 Interview N o. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
D .5
D.4.1
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects . . 130
D.4.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Interview N o. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
134
D.5.1
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects . . 134
D.5.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . .
134
D .6 Interview N o. 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
136
D.6.1
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects . .
136
D.6.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . .
137
References
140
7
List of Figures
Location of Nuclear Technology in the Spectrum of Human Cognitive Understand14
2
Stock-Flow Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance [2]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22
3
Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level [3] . . . . .
24
4
Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level [3]
27
5
Causal loop diagram for Radiation Attitudes
. . . . . . . . . .
47
6
Risk-Benefit Tradeoff
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
63
7
Social Trust Loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
63
8
Empowerment
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
64
9
Confidence and Control . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
65
10
Media Favourability Loop
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
66
11
Nuclear Context
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
66
12
Nuclear Dread
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
67
13
Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.1
. . . . . . . . . .
79
14
Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.2
. . . . . . . . . .
82
15
Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.3
. . . . . . . . . .
85
16
Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.4
. . . . . . . . . .
87
17
Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.5
. . . . . . . . . .
90
18
Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.6
. . . . . . . . . .
93
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
8
.
.
in g [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
1
List of Tables
1
CLD Variable Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56
2
Quantification of CLD Variables using Interview Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
94
3
Analysis of Interview Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
9
1
1.1
Introduction
Motivation
The nuclear enterprise has faced serious challenges over the course of history. Attitudes towards the
use of nuclear technology and radiation have been very different, depending on the application. The
majority of the public is accepting of nuclear technology and radiation when used for medical procedures like diagnostic imaging or radiation oncology. Uses of Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) and
inspection techniques like industrial radiography, and oil and gas exploration techniques like nuclear
well logging have also remained largely unopposed. However, strong negative reactions among the
lay public have been observed with regards to nuclear energy and fuel cycle facilities, including nuclear power plants, enrichment plants, reprocessing plants, and waste storage and disposal facilities.
Though other controversial projects like hydraulic fracturing and genetic engineering also face public opposition, the reactions to nuclear projects are more extreme. Nuclear power, which once held
the promise of power " too cheap to meter" now invokes images of mass destruction in the minds of
many people. The negative perception of nuclear technology has significantly affected national energy policies all over the world. Public acceptance of nuclear technology has deteriorated. This has
resulted in a stagnation of the nuclear enterprise in some, mostly wealthy, countries. This negative
perception of nuclear technology has, for a long time been associated with an alarming perception
of the risks associated with the technology. However, when it comes to practice, there seem to be
other factors besides risk perception that affect an individual's views of nuclear technology, and
hence his acceptance.
Approaches to understanding reactions to technologies viewed as risky can be classified into two
major subgroups - a technical or rational approach, and a normative or value approach. According to
the technical approach, risk decisions are the outcomes of a personal cost-benefit analysis informed
by scientific and technical data. This would imply that opposition to a technology that is widely
viewed by experts to be safe results from either a different private evaluation of costs and benefits,
or insufficient information. This is true in most cases, but this approach has proved to be insufficient
to explain the reactions to some technologies like nuclear. Lay opinion is not always formed by a
rationalist decision making process, but also incorporates qualitative dimensions like catastrophic
10
potential, controllability, technological unfamiliarity and risk to future generations while developing
attitudes towards risky technologies[4, 5, 6].
Within the nuclear enterprise, there exists a belief that information affects attitudes. This strategy
has been utilized by the nuclear enterprise to a large extent, but with little success.It has not only
been ineffective, but has also failed to explain why people accept radiation under some circumstances, whereas in other cases, the mere mention of the words "nuclear" or "radiation" engenders
dread in the minds of some people. New scientific evidence does little to mitigate such public fear.
The reaction provoked in an individual by radiation, which may range from active acceptance of
nuclear technology to a high level of anxiety, is termed as "Radiation Attitudes" in this work. How
and why these attitudes develop in the minds of some people is a question that the work reported
here aims at answering.
1.2
Objectives
This work is focused on answering the questions of why radiation provokes strong negative reactions under certain circumstances, and why the inconsistency in reactions exists. The objective of
this work is to understand the processes and structure of the influence of Radiation Attitudes upon
stakeholder acceptance concerning nuclear projects. This work aims to form a hypothesis on the formation process and structure of Radiation Attitudes. This is achieved by examination of complex,
social, economic, political, cognitive and technological components that combine to determine the
attitudes of individuals towards radiation, and their effects on the degree of acceptance of nuclear
projects.
This analysis results in identification of the factors that influence Radiation Attitudes. In order to
establish relationships between these variables, system dynamics modeling has been used. Causal
loop diagrams showing different linkages between variables enable determination of the influence
of different modes of causality upon different outcomes.
This work seeks to refine and validate these models via interviews with relevant stakeholders associated with nuclear facilities. The ultimate goal is to help in developing strategies that provide a clear
understanding of factors affecting acceptance of nuclear- related projects. Radiation Attitudes are
a vital element of this model since they strongly influence public opinion, thereby affecting policy
11
decisions and ultimately project success. Unless this threat perception and its causes are clearly
understood, nuclear energy will continue to be opposed. This could slow down the rate of development of new nuclear projects or even result in abandonment of some projects, bringing the nuclear
enterprise to a complete standstill.
1.3
Conflicts of Risk Perception between Experts and Laymen
In addition to understanding the social, political, economic and technical factors that influence an
individual's attitudes towards radiation, it is important to understand why these factors invoke different responses in the lay public vs. experts in the field. This section aims to aid understanding of
why some of the public follows a different approach towards formation of attitudes, as opposed to
the fact based approach followed by experts.
It must be noted that the lay public isn't always risk averse. There are instances where risks are
knowingly accepted, contrary to the expert opinion. Some examples are smoking, eating junk food,
not wearing seat-belts etc. In some cases, this is due to willful disregard for expert advice. At
other times, the laymen may believe that the experts are wrong, or simply lying to them. But the
disagreements between experts and laymen do not seem to be rooted in facts or logic. Moreover, it
is not the norm for experts and the laymen to disagree. The lay public trusts medical experts when it
comes to their health, legal experts for law advice and pilots to fly airplanes. But nuclear technology
is one field where there is a huge gap in risk perception between experts and a vast majority of the
public.
The widely used narrative among nuclear experts is that that the conflict between experts and laymen
arises due to a lack of trust. Lack of trust in experts could stem from a general distrust of authority.
When expert statements are made in support of a particular technology, laymen could believe that
the experts have their personal agenda with regards to the technology, and that they seek to serve
their own interests rather than those of the laymen[1]. A history of expert incompetency could also
lead to public distrust.
Another theory, the theory of rival rationality, hypothesizes that what the lay public means by dangerous is not the same as what an expert is likely to mean by dangerous, which results in conflicts[7].
12
Experts aim to be precise and logical, and might overlook some intangible factors which are important to the lay public. Experts judge risk based on scientific factors like probability of a loss of
coolant accident, the expected number of deaths, dose rate etc. The public rationale, on the other
hand, is that of a general sense of well being. They wish for a "pristine" environment, where even
the smallest radiation dose or a single death is unacceptable. Lay intuition is driven by qualitative
features, sometimes ignoring quantitative features entirely.
However, these theories are not sufficient to explain how the lay public makes judgments and why
the intensely negative attitude towards all things nuclear, or "nuclear dread"exists. In order to understand why nuclear dread exists, we need a model that is not just predictive, but also explanatory.
We need to understand an individual's process of making judgments, which will explain why in
some cases there is an expert-lay conflict, while in other cases there is not. A cognitive psychology
approach is necessary to study this phenomenon further.
1.3.1
Cognitive Psychology Approach
The cognitive psychology approach is based of the idea that different cognitive patterns illicit different responses in experts and in laymen. Howard Margolis, in "Dealing with Risk: Why the Public
and the Experts Disagree on Environmental Issues", proposed that the spectrum of the issues that
human beings encounter in their lives can be represented by Figure 1. The Figure shows that human problems can be classified into 3 main types, ranging from the narrow contexts of puzzles and
experiments, continuing through ordinary personal experience, and then reaching the broad contexts of large social issues. Problems at the laboratory scale, at the extreme left of the spectrum
in Figure 1, are unfamiliar to the average individual and he has limited experience with them. His
cognitive patterns do not recognize these problems, and hence limit his capability of making judgments concerning problems in this range. At the social scale, at the broad end of the spectrum, the
problems are outside the scope of individual experience. The consequences of actions are often so
diffuse, ambiguous or delayed that close correlation of choices to experiences cannot occur. It is on
the normal human scale, that one can expect close correlation between actions and consequences.
These are the problems that an individual encounters in his everyday life, and there are recognizable
cognitive patterns in accordance to which the individual reacts to the problems[l].
13
Social
Normal
Lab
Nuclear
X
Technology
Level of Human
Understanding
Scale of Problems
Figure 1: Location of Nuclear Technology in the Spectrum of Human Cognitive Understanding [1]
14
Nuclear technology lies on the broad end of the scale. It is a social problem, often outside the realm
of understanding of a layman. This could explain why the attitudes towards radiations and nuclear
technology do not seem to be affected by logical reasoning. This indicates that one must go beyond
the conventional risk-benefit approach in order to understand the formation of these attitudes.
15
2
System Dynamics Approach
System dynamics modeling is used to represent the dynamic behavior of stakeholder acceptance
and Radiation Attitudes. It forms the basis of our modeling systems for understanding the complex
interactions between the numerous factors that influence public attitudes towards radiation, and
stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects. System dynamics, a technique based upon engineering
control modeling that emphasizes the simultaneous interaction of multiple important causal factors
in system feedbacks, was developed at MIT in the 1960s. Jay Forrester, the founder of system dynamics defined it as follows- "Industrial [System] dynamics is the study of the information-feedback
characteristics of industrial activity to how organizational structure, amplification (in policies), and
time delays (in decision and actions) interact to influence the success of the enterprise." [8]
System dynamics is currently being used by many public and private sector organizations to help
managers understand and forecast the effects of their decisions and actions on the behavior of a
system. System dynamics is based on the principle of dynamic, ever-evolving relationships between
system components. It can be used to analyze organizational, market, or other behavior which arises
from the dynamic interaction, over time, of many interrelated variables. It simulates system behavior
using explicit models of the internal cause-and-effect interactions of the system components. These
models are recursive and deterministic. They are primarily distinguished from other types of models
by their rich treatment of non-linear relationships, including feedback loops[9].
System dynamics can serve as an effective tool for understanding and counteracting problems in
a system. According to the system dynamics approach, the solution to a problem lies in systems
thinking-the ability to see the world as a complex system, in which we understand that outcomes
are not independent and that a high degree of interconnectivity exists between all of the components
of a system. With a holistic worldview, system dynamics enables faster learning and effective
identification of the high leverage points in systems. A systemic perspective also enables us to
make decisions consistent with our long-term best interests and the long-term best interests of the
system as a whole[10].
16
2.1
Dynamics of Complex Systems
Sterman argues that real world systems are dynamic, since they possess some complex characteristics. Systems, and their components are constantly changing, sometimes at different rates. At
the same time, the individual components are tightly coupled to each other as well as the external
environment. Feedback is one of the most important characteristics of a system. It is defined as
the modification or control of a process or system by its results or effects. Feedback may result
in positive or negative reinforcing loops. Systems are governed by feedback which results in their
dynamic behavior.
Another important characteristic is the time delay in feedback systems. There is often a time delay
between the moment a decision or action is taken, and the moment its effects on the system. Delays
in feedback loops create instability and increase the tendency of systems to oscillate. As a result,
decision makers often continue to intervene to correct apparent discrepancies between the desired
and actual state of the system long after sufficient corrective actions have been taken to restore the
system to equilibrium. Thus, time delays can create problems and result in misjudgment of results.
Non-linearity in a system arises due to the fact that cause and effect are not always directly proportional. There are multiple factors that interact to result in a particular outcome. Systems are
also largely dependent on the history of events. Past actions and decisions can determine the future
course of events. Some events are irreversible, which can affect the dynamics of a system.
The dynamics of systems arise spontaneously from their internal structure. Often, small, random
perturbations are amplified and molded by the feedback structure, generating patterns in space and
time and creating path dependence. However, despite dependence on history and internal structure,
a system is constantly evolving over time. The characteristics of the system and its components
change and adapt due to factors both internal and external to the system[10].
2.2
System Dynamics Tools
The various system dynamics tools that can be used to model a complex system are described below.
1. Stock-Flow Diagrams
17
A Stock and flow diagram helps in studying and analyzing a system in a quantitative way. A stock
is defined as a component of the system that accumulates or depletes over time. A flow is defined
as the rate of accumulation or depletion of the stock. Stock Flow diagrams are effective tools for
quantitatively defining relationships between variables and effects of positive and negative feedback.
2. Causal Loop Diagrams
A causal loop diagram effectively maps the different components of a system and their interactions.
It is a tool for understanding the structure of a system. It consists of cause- effect relationships
between different variables. The relationships are represented by feedback loops. The overall dynamics of the system depend on which feedback loops are dominant.
3. Equations
After a causal loop diagram has been constructed and the dominant feedback loops have been identified, equations can be developed to mathematically represent the interactions within a system.
These equations serve as a tool for the next step, which is simulation.
4. Simulations
Simulations are analyses for modeling system behavior. The stock-flow diagrams and causal loops
diagrams can be used to describe the system, the behaviour of which can be simulated using the
formulated equations. This enables sensitivity analysis, optimization, and calibration to data to be
automated, greatly increasing efficiency.
System dynamics, due to its ability to model complex systems was selected for this work as the
tool to be used to portray the logic of stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects and attitudes towards radiation. System dynamics effectively captures the nonlinearities, heterogeneity, temporality, asymmetry and micro/macro scale effects of the complex system we are attempting to represent.
Causal loop diagrams are the primary system dynamics tool used to create the aforementioned
models. Stock-Flow diagrams are used to depict the different states of stakeholder acceptance and
movement from one state to another. System dynamics modeling will ultimately serve as a tool for
testing mechanisms to increase acceptance of new nuclear projects for various stakeholders.
18
3
3.1
Models for Stakeholder Acceptance
Definition of Acceptance
Acceptance is defined as a "condition where a project is allowed to proceed, given specific (tolerable) constraints". Acceptance does not necessarily imply support for the project, or that the
stakeholder no longer has any concerns or objections regarding the project. It implies that given
a particular stakeholder attitude, he believes that the project should be allowed to continue. The
constraints may be related to costs, time delays, environmental concerns, restrictions on behaviour,
etc[ 11].
3.2
Definition of a Stakeholder
A stakeholder for a particular project is defined is an individual, group or organization which can
affect (or can be affected by) the project under consideration, either directly or indirectly. For
nuclear related projects, we can classify stakeholders into four main categories based on their sphere
of influence.
1. Local level stakeholders
Local level stakeholders are those who are in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear facility and are
most likely directly affected by it. This could include the following groups.
a) Local bystanders- These are people who live in close proximity to the facility. They are not
directly involved in the operations or administration of the facility, but are affected by it. They may
or may not be knowledgeable about the facility.
b) Project builders and employees- These are individuals related to and employed by the commercial
enterprise looking to construct and operate the proposed nuclear facility. They are generally better
informed about the facility than the local bystanders.
c) Local decision- makers- Individuals living in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear facility site
and who hold official leadership positions within the local government or firms. (e.g., energy-related
utility companies or construction-related businesses).
19
d) Local opposition- These are individuals or groups operating at the local level who express a
strong sentiment against the nuclear facility. They may actively demonstrate against the facility,
seeking project cancellation.
e) Facility neighbours- These are individuals living close to the facility, but not in the immediate
vicinity. They are usually decision makers, or bystanders from towns neighbouring the one where
the facility is to be constructed. They may not be as highly affected as the local groups, but in some
cases, it has been found that their influence is strong.
2. State level stakeholders
State level stakeholders are stakeholders who have the ability to influence the project, or are affected
by it, at the state level. These includea) State level bystanders- State level bystanders may not be directly affected by the project, but they
might have an opinion about having a nuclear facility in their state.
b) State level decision makers- These are usually politicians and other state level government officials who hold leadership positions and have influence over the project.
c) State level opposition- These are groups opposed to the project, operating at the state level
d) State level organizations These could be industrial or labour organizations operating at the state
level. These also include non-governmental organizations.
3. National level stakeholders
National level stakeholders are individuals or groups who have the ability to influence the project,
or are affected by it, at the national level. These includea) National level bystanders- National level bystanders are not related to the proposed facility in any
way. However, they are significantly influenced by national public opinion polls and may hold a
particular view about the proposed facility as a part of the national nuclear policy in general. They
may see themselves as potential local bystanders.
b) National level decision makers- These include individuals who hold official leadership positions
within the national government. They are the policy makers and regulatory bodies who manage
nuclear issues at the national level.
20
c) National level opposition- These are groups oppose the nuclear facility from a national level. The
are usually large environmental or anti-nuclear organizations who are opposed to nuclear energy.
Some examples are the union of concerned scientists, federation of American scientists, sierra club
etc
d) Nuclear enterprise- This group represents the collective of individuals related to or employed by
various nuclear facilities nationwide, including, but not limited to, nuclear power plants, enrichment
plants, waste disposal facilities etc. It also includes agencies like the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI).
e) Academics- This group includes scientists, researchers and other academics who study nuclear
science and technology.
4. International level stakeholders
a) International opposition- Anti- nuclear groups operating internationally fall into this category.
Some examples are Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, etc.
b) International nuclear organizations international bodies like the International Atomic Energy
Agency fall under this category. They are not affected by a particular nuclear facility but have
influence over nuclear acceptance from the point of view of safety and security. They are also
responsible for emergency measures in the event of an accident of the facility[ 11].
3.3
Stock-Flow Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance
We assume that stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects ranges across a spectrum from active
rejection to active acceptance. The 5 states of stakeholder acceptance are represented as stocks,
meaning they can increase or decrease depending on feedback. They are defined as follows1. Active Reject- A stakeholder in this group would actively oppose a new nuclear project.
2. Passive Reject- A stakeholder in this group would not actively oppose a new nuclear project, but
would not be accepting of the project either
3. Undecided- A stakeholder in this group is one who has not yet formed an opinion about whether
he supports or opposes the project
4. Passive Accept- A stakeholder in this group would not oppose a new nuclear project, but neither
would he actively promote the project.
21
A ive
pas$Ie
c
et Nepative
Advocatn
Decreasing Negative
Advocatitg
87
Passive
U-mi
t
Poiie
Actv
Accp
Negative
Posi"iv
UdsadIRe
Untenstanding
Advocatig
Decreasin Positive
Understanding
Decreasitg Posve
Avocati
Decrasu Negatve
Understanix
Figure 2: Stock-Flow Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance [2]
5. Active Accept- A stakeholder in this group would actively promote a new nuclear project.
The flows from one stock to another represent mobilization of a stakeholder from one state of
acceptance to another. There are 2 main modes of mobilization1. Understanding
As shown in Figure 2, an increase in positive understanding mobilizes a stakeholder from the undecided stock to the passive acceptance stock, while a decrease in positive understanding results
in mobilization from passive acceptance to undecided. An increase in negative understanding mobilizes a stakeholder from the undecided stock to the passive rejection stock, while a decrease in
negative understanding mobilizes a stakeholder from the passive rejection stock to the undecided
stock. From the undecided stock, the stakeholder can then be mobilized to passive acceptance by
increase in positive understanding, as explained earlier.
2. Advocating
Mobilizing stakeholders to and from the "active" stocks cannot be achieved by changes in understanding alone. Advocating is necessary to bring about these movements. An increase in positive
advocating mobilizes stakeholders from passive acceptance to active acceptance, while a decrease
in positive advocating mobilizes stakeholders from active acceptance to passive acceptance. Similarly, an increase in negative advocating mobilizes a stakeholder from the passive rejection stock to
the active rejection stock, while a decrease in negative advocating mobilizes a stakeholder from the
active rejection stock to the passive rejection stock.
The base chain system dynamics model shown in Figure 2 illustrates a need to understand the initial
causes of, mechanisms for maintaining, and strategies for recovering stakeholder acceptance[2].
With this aim in mind, factors contributing to stakeholder acceptance were identified, and causal
22
loop diagrams describing their relationships were constructed.
3.4
Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level
The causal loop diagram in Figure 3 shows variables affecting stakeholder acceptance of a new
nuclear project at the local level. An arrow pointing from one variable to the other denotes an
influence of the former on the latter. A positive sign next to an arrow denotes that an increase in
the upstream variable causes an increase in the downstream one. A negative sign indicates that an
increase in the upstream variable causes a decrease in the downstream one, and vice versa.
The variables are defined in Appendix A. Following are the important cause-effect loops that determine stakeholder acceptance[3].
1. Danger/Risk Loop
This loop describes the reinforcing nature of tangible danger on fungibility and perceived risk. Fungibility is defined by Margolis as the ability to make a reasonable judgment by seeking a balance
between the advantages of boldness and the advantages of caution[ 1]. In other words, it is the extent
to which stakeholders consider risk as an opportunity, or risk as a danger. An increased sense of danger decreases fungibility. A decrease in fungibility increases the perceived risk from project, which
decreases stakeholder acceptance. A decreased value of stakeholder acceptance further increases
the sense of danger.
2. Benefit Loop
The benefit loop describes the effect of social trust and competency of the project implementer on
the perceived benefit from project, and hence stakeholder acceptance. An increase in perceived
probability of competent project execution increases social trust in project implementer. This increases the perceived probability that the benefit is received, which in turn increases the perceived
benefit from project. An increase in perceived benefit from the project increases stakeholder acceptance.
3. Fungibility Loop
The fungibility loop shows that fungibility is a cognitive mechanism that serves as a 'gatekeeper'
for countering perceived risk. It reinforces any sense of opportunity that exists. An increase in
23
vs rmn
Probability
Nuclear Waste
Issue is
Resolved
Familiarity
withNuclear
S&T
R9:
Waste
Loop
Perceived
Threat of
Perceived
Pride in
to
Frequency
Resources Provided hy
Nationa Anti-Nuclear NGOs
Ippositioni
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+
+ Qppo+
It
LoopCognitive
Fur-ibty Perceived Risk
Lty
from Project
.
Perceived
Danger/
Risk LoopR7
Frequency
+
+
Stakeholder
Inclusiof
IncL
Loop
R5: Freq.
Perceived Benefit
from Project
+
Received
Probability
Benefit is
R12:
Benefit
Loop
+
+
+
+
+
Social Trust in
er PStakeholder
Perceived Probability of
Competent Execution
Stakeholder_---Acecptance
.
+
ecie
pec
of Project
Implementer
R7ia
Trust
Loop
+
Projec t Implementer
Publicized Mistake is from the
Probability First Reporting of
Stakeholder
Importance of
Publicized
Degree ofProject
Implementer Awareness of
Values
Figure 3: Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level [3]
Perceived
Positive
Environmental
Effects
Local
Socioeconomic
Condition
+
Project
Implementer
~ Mistake
to
Fungibility
+
Probability Safety &
Security Concerns are
Met
Media
Favorability
opRadiation
Extreme Nuclear-RI:
Daer
Events
+ +
Fairness
+
R4:
+
Framing
vs.F Framing
Loop
(Negative)
R6:
Knowledge
Confidence -
Knowledge
Controversy li-om
Suppoting Specific Nuclear
PrOjee
<Political
R8: Media
Opinion
Credibility of
Loop
Negtive Nuclear Weapons
Framing
Association
Source of
Media/
Information
sense of opportunity increases fungibility. An increase in fungibility decreases perceived risk from
project, which therefore increases sense of opportunity.
4. Framing Loop
Framing is defined as a 'force multiplier' between risk as danger and risk as opportunity [1]. The
framing loop describes the reinforcing effect of negative framing on tangible danger. An increase
in negative framing increases the sense of danger, which decreases fungibility. A decrease in fungibility increases negative framing.
5. Frequency Inclusion Loop
This loop describes the relationship between benefits and perceived frequency of events. As the perceived benefit from project increases, cognitive inclusion of frequency increases, which decreases
the perceived frequency of events. This increases perceived benefit from project.
6. Knowledge vs. Framing Loop
This loop represents the insufficiency of 'education only' strategies that have been widely used
with the objective of increasing stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects. Facts and objective
knowledge can be easily co-opted or overwhelmed by framing of the project. An increased negative framing decreases knowledge confidence. As knowledge confidence decreases, credibility of
negative framing increases, which again increases negative framing.
7. Social Trust Loop
The social trust loop illustrates the importance of alignment of project implementer with stakeholder
values. It emphasizes the importance of transparency and effective handling of publicized mistakes
by the project implementer. As the project implementer's awareness of stakeholder values increases,
the stakeholder's social trust in project implementer increases. This reduces the importance of
publicized mistake to stakeholder.
8. Media Opinion Loop
This loop shows the influence of the source of message, as well as the message itself, on tangible
danger and stakeholder acceptance. It also shows how framing and perceived danger affect media
opinion. An increase in media favourability decreases the credibility of negative framing, which
25
in turn decreases negative framing. A decrease in negative framing decreases the sense of danger,
which increases media favourability.
9. Waste Loop
Resolving the nuclear waste problem is vital for increasing stakeholder acceptance. The waste loop
describes how the unresolved nuclear waste problem serves as a strong argument against nuclear
technology, thereby strengthening the influence of opposition groups. A decreasing probability
that the nuclear waste problem is resolved results in an increase in negative framing. An increase in
negative framing represents an increase in the degree of opposition awareness of stakeholder values.
This decreases the perceived probability of the nuclear waste problem being resolved.
3.5
Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level
The causal loop diagram in Figure 4 shows variables affecting stakeholder acceptance of a new
nuclear project at the state and federal level.
The variables are defined in Appendix A. Following are the important cause-effect loops that determine stakeholder acceptance[3].
1. Consensus/Controversy Loop
The consensus/controversy loop explains the reinforcing influence of social controversy attached
to a specific nuclear project on constituent support. A constituent could be a local voter etc. It
also emphasizes the importance of stakeholder consensus for increasing support. An increase in
stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project decreases the political controversy
from supporting the specific nuclear project. A decrease in political controversy from supporting
the specific nuclear project increases constituent support for the specific nuclear project, which
increases stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project.
2. Political Support Loop
The political support loop shows the importance of acceptance of nuclear projects by the state
government and state-specific representatives in the federal government, and its effect on political
controversy. An increase in stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project decreases
26
ResourcesNuclear
Provided by
National
Anti-Nuclear
NGOs to Local
Opposition
National
Anti-Nuclear
NGO Activities
+
)
+
inAdditional
Sp
National Pro-Nuclear
NGO Activities
R(S)4: PolKical
AcQephnc"
-ikskle
Confdence &
Expectations
op
Imipiernmer
R(S)2: Project
Perceived Project
License
Quality
National Economic
Nuclear Facilities
Degree of National
Opinion Poll Data
Cost of Viability of
Continuing the Nuclear
Project
Political Benefit of
Supporting Specific
Nuclear Project
Increasing Probability of
Politician Re-Election
from Supporting Specific
Nuclear Project
Proect trnplernter
Project Implementer
Ability to Meet NRC
Expectations
&License
Approval
Loop
n+n+eApplication
Time for NRC to
Consider License
Figure 4: Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level [3]
-
R(S)1:
Specific Nuclear Project
Consensu/Condition
Co vers
-
Specific Nuclear Project by
State Governcot
LoP
Poi(a):
+s
Expectations
o
LicnseImplementer
NRC License
Politician Support of
Perceived National
Socioeconomic Benefits
Constituent Support for
Stakeholder Consensus in
teApoeval o Cppsens i
+Politial
Showing
Supportfor
Project
Likelihood of Specific
Nuclear Project Receiving
the Permit or License
Aproval
Implmentr
Legal,
Social Actions
Opposition
eApplication
Additional Cost to Project
Fnu
Political Controversy from
Supporting Specific
Nuclear Project -
peSupportfor Specific
R(S)5: Cost
&License
Perceived National
Costs from Project
e
+
Probability of
Criticism ofNRC
Implenenter
NRC Confidence in
Pr
the political controversy from supporting the specific nuclear project. A decrease in political controversy from supporting the specific nuclear project increases constituent support for the specific
nuclear project, which increases probability of politician re-election from supporting the specific
nuclear project. This increases politician support of specific nuclear project by state government,
which further increases stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project.
3. Project Implementer Confidence and Expectations Loop
This loop describes the influence of the credibility of the project implementer and the confidence of
regulatory bodies in the capability of the project implementer to execute the project. An increasing
NRC confidence in project implementer increases the project implementer ability to meet NRC
expectations, which increases perceived project implementer license application quality. This in
turn increases NRC confidence in project implementer.
4. Political Benefit Loop
The political benefit loop shows the influence of political controversy on the political benefit to
representatives concerned with maintaining constituent votes. An increasing political benefit of
supporting specific nuclear project increases politician support of specific nuclear project by state
government, which increases stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project. This
decreases political controversy from supporting the specific nuclear project, thereby increasing political benefit of supporting specific nuclear project.
5. Benefits and License Approval Loop
The benefits and license approval loop captures the effect of time delays in the regulatory process
on the nuclear project. A decrease in additional NRC license expectations increases the project implementer ability to meet NRC expectations, which increases perceived project implementer license
application quality. This increases NRC confidence in project implementer, which in turn decreases
the time for NRC to consider license application. A decrease in time for NRC to consider license
application decreases additional NRC license expectations.
6. Cost and License Approval Loop
This loop describes the reinforcing influence of cost perceptions on the time required to gain a license, with political controversy as a force multiplier. An increasing political controversy from sup28
porting specific nuclear project increases the perceived national costs from the project. An increase
in perceived national costs from the project decreases the likelihood of specific nuclear project
receiving the permit or license, which further increases the political controversy from supporting
specific nuclear project.
3.6
Necessity for Addition of "Radiation Attitudes" to Model
Though the above causal loop diagrams provide a logical idea of the factors affecting nuclear project
acceptance, they do not explain why some individuals fear nuclear technology more than other
hazardous technologies. It also does not explain why reactions to some nuclear technologies are
stronger than others. For example, nuclear power or nuclear waste handling facilities invoke reactions that are stronger than reactions towards nuclear medicine or imaging technologies.
These shortcomings necessitate the addition of another factor, which provides an explanation for
the inconsistencies described above. This factor, specific to nuclear technology has been termed
as "Radiation Attitudes", since the fear of nuclear technologies is primarily from an underlying
fear of radiation. The "Radiation Attitudes" variable causes nuclear technology to be treated differently, and must therefore be included in the overall nuclear project acceptance model to reflect this
phenomenon.
29
4
Identification of Variables for Causal Loop Diagram
In order to construct a model describing the formation of Radiation Attitudes, it is necessary to
identify the factors which influence these attitudes. The identified factors serve as the variables
for the causal loop diagram for Radiation Attitudes. A historical analysis of Radiation Attitudes
at different stages over time not only results in identification of the variables, but also enables a
hypothesis to be formed regarding their interdependencies.
4.1
Timeline of Nuclear Technology
Tracing the history of narratives on nuclear technology, from the discovery of radioactivity in the
early 20th century to the present day is essential for understanding how attitudes towards radiation
and nuclear technology have evolved over time. Nuclear technology is a term that encompasses
technologies ranging from medical imaging, cancer treatment and detection equipment to nuclear
power plants, nuclear weapons, fuel cycle facilities and spent fuel handling facilities. Attitudes towards use of these technologies differ, and the strongest negative reactions are evoked by nuclear
weapons, power plants, fuel cycle facilities and waste disposal facilities. Hence, the historical approach described below is focused more on these technologies. Defining events like the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima clearly
played major roles in solidifying the stance of the nuclear opposition pressure groups and cementing
public fear. However, they are not sufficient to describe the outright rejection of factual information when dealing with nuclear technologies or radiation effects. Identifying the key discontinuities
in the nuclear narrative can help in identification of factors causing nuclear dread, and serve as a
starting point for formulating ways to understand them.
4.1.1
Late 19th Century to Early 20th Century- An Era of Scientific Discovery
The discovery of ionizing radiation in 1895 by Wilhelm Roentgen marked the beginning of a period
of new discoveries in the field of nuclear science. In 1896, Henri Becquerel found that pitchblende, an ore containing radium and uranium caused a photographic plate to darken. He went on to
demonstrate that this was due to beta radiation (electrons) and alpha particles (helium nuclei) being
30
emitted. Villard found a third type of radiation from pitchblende- gamma rays. Pierre and Marie
Curie gave the name 'radioactivity' to this phenomenon, for which they were awarded the Nobel
Prize in Physics. In 1898, polonium and radium were first isolated from the pitchblende. Radium
was later used in medical treatment. Samuel Prescott showed that radiation destroyed bacteria in
food[12].
Further advances in the study of radioactivity were seen in the early 20th century. Ernest Rutherford,
in 1902, demonstrated that radioactivity involved the spontaneous disintegration of atoms into other
types of atoms, by emission of an alpha or beta particle. Rutherford also discovered the concept
of radioactive half-life. In 1911, Frederick Soddy discovered that naturally radioactive elements
had a number of different isotopes (radionuclides), with the same chemistry. George de Hevesy
showed that such radionuclides were invaluable as tracers, because minute amounts could readily
be detected with simple instruments.
In 1932, Cockcroft and Walton produced nuclear transformations by bombarding atoms with accelerated protons, and Irene Curie and Frederic Joliot found that some such transformations created
artificial radionuclides. In 1935, Enrico Fermi found that a much greater variety of artificial radionuclides could be formed when neutrons were used instead of protons. Fermi received the Nobel Prize
in Physics for his "demonstrations of the existence of new radioactive elements produced by neutron
irradiation, and for his related discovery of nuclear reactions brought about by slow neutrons." 13]
4.1.2
Discovery of Fission and the Manhattan Project
In 1939, physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann of Germany, along with Lise Meitner of Austria
and her nephew Otto Frisch, split uranium atoms in a process known as fission. This proved Einstein's special theory of relativity, put forward in 1905, establishing the equivalence between mass
and energy.
Francis Perrin introduced the concept of the critical mass of uranium required to produce a selfsustaining release of energy. Perrin's group in Paris continued their studies and demonstrated that a
chain reaction could be sustained in a uranium-water provided external neutrons were injected into
the system. They also demonstrated the idea of introducing neutron-absorbing material to limit the
multiplication of neutrons and thus control the nuclear reaction, which is the basis for the operation
31
of a nuclear power station. Philip Abelson and Edwin McMillan demonstrated that neutrons captured by uranium-238 lead to the creation of elements 93 and 94, neptunium and plutonium. A new
element with atomic number 94, was found and named plutonium. American physicists confirmed
that plutonium was fissionable, thus usable for a bomb.
In the summer of 1939, at the request of Leo Szilard, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Roosevelt, warning him about the possibility of development of nuclear weapons by Nazi Germany, and
suggesting that the US should initiate its own nuclear programme. This letter prompted President
Roosevelt to take action, which eventually laid the groundwork for the Manhattan Project [14].
In 1941, the MAUD Committee on the Use of Uranium for a Bomb reported that, "It will be possible
to make an effective uranium bomb which, containing some 25 lb of active material, would be
equivalent as regards destructive effect to 1,800 tons of T.N.T. and would also release large quantities
of radioactive substance, which would make places near to where the bomb exploded dangerous to
human life for a long period [15]." The Manhattan Project was formed in the United States in 1942
to build the atomic bomb for use in World War II. The first self-sustaining, controlled nuclear chain
reaction led by Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard and other scientists at the University of Chicago on 2nd
December 1942. It was called Chicago Pile-I or CP-1. The first nuclear weapons test conducted as
a part of the Manhattan project was an implosion type bomb, code-named Trinity. It was conducted
at New Mexico's Alamogordo Bombing and Gunnery Range on 16 July 1945. A uranium gun-type
atomic bomb, Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, followed by a plutonium
implosion-type bomb, Fat Man on the city of Nagasaki on August 9. Japan surrendered less than
two weeks later, ending World War II.
The devastation caused by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alerted the public about the
effects of radiation, and played an important role in the formation of Radiation Attitudes of the
generation [16, 17, 18]. The first demonstrations against nuclear testing were held in Times Square,
New York, in 1946.
The doomsday clock appeared on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, representing an
ominous oscillating countdown to global catastrophe. In 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its first
atomic device, marking the beginning of a nuclear arms race. The monopoly of the United States
over nuclear weapons no longerexisted, and the government and public believed that the US was
32
vulnerable to a nuclear attack. In 1951, during the first big Civil Defense push of the Cold War;
the movie Duck and Cover, produced by the Federal Civil Defense Administration was shown in
schools all over the country, and Duck and cover drills became a part of school life.
4.1.3
The 1950s- Atoms for Peace and the Atomic Age
Despite the nuclear weapons race, nuclear technology showed great promise in the 1950s. The
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had been established to explore the use of nuclear technology
for peaceful purposes. The 1950s saw huge advancements in civilian uses of nuclear technology,
and a positive attitude towards nuclear technology.
In 1951, an experimental breeder reactor (EBR-I) in Idaho produced the first usable electric power
from the atom, lighting four light bulbs. President Eisenhower, in 1953, made his famous "Atoms
for Peace" speech, signifying an important moment in political history which brought the atomic
issue which had been kept quiet for "national security" into the public eye. The Atoms for Peace
Program opened up nuclear research to civilians and countries that had not previously possessed
nuclear technology, and proposed an international agency to develop peaceful nuclear technologies.
In 1953, the first nuclear-powered submarine, the U.S.S. Nautilus, was launched. The first Boiling
Reactor Experiment reactor was built in Idaho. It demonstrated that steam bubbles in the reactor
core did not cause an instability problem. It was, instead, a rapid, reliable, and effective mechanism
for limiting power. This could protect a reactor against "runaway" events. The Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 was passed, which gave the civilian nuclear energy program further access to nuclear
technology.
The AEC announced the beginning of a cooperative program between government
and enterprise to develop nuclear power plants. In 1955, Arco, Idaho, became the first U.S. town
powered by nuclear energy, by an experimental reactor, BORAX III, at the Idaho National Energy
Laboratory. The United Nations sponsored the first international conference on the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, held in Geneva, Switzerland. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was
formed in 1957 as a part of the Atoms for Peace Programme, with 18 member countries, to promote
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
On December 18, 1957, the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, "the world's first full-scale atomic
electric power plant devoted exclusively to peacetime uses" started generating electricity for com33
mercial use [19]. With these advancements, it was believed that nuclear technology was the future of the world. There was a general feeling that there would be an age of peace and plenty in
which atomic energy would "provide the power needed to desalinate water for the thirsty, irrigate
the deserts for the hungry, and fuel interstellar travel deep into outer space[20]." Lewis Strauss,
Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission presented his speech about electricity
"too cheap to meter" in 1954. Public sentiment in favour of nuclear technology grew, and the term
"Atomic Age" gained widespread popularity. Radiation held a particular fascination with the public,
with radiation spas promising miraculous health cures springing up in several locations. Irradiated
food was believed to have medical benefits. Radium nail polish became popular with women. Shoe
stores had x-ray machines where one could see the structure of the foot inside a shoe. Ford displayed
the Ford Nucleon concept car to the public. Walt Disney Productions released the film Our Friend
the Atom describing the marvelous benefits of atomic power. This film was also shown to almost
all baby boomers in their public school auditoriums or their science classes and was instrumental in
creating within that generation a mostly favorable attitude toward nuclear power[2 1].
However, these positive Radiation Attitudes would not last long. The adverse effects of radiation
were gradually coming to light, and eventually would overpower any benefit an individual perceived
from radiation. Popular media began to depict the effects of radiation in science fiction movies like
Godzilla.
In 1954, the crew of the Japanese fishing vessel Daigo Fukury5 Maru ("Lucky Dragon No. 5"),
was contaminated by fallout from the Castle Bravo test, killing one crew member and resulting
in an international incident, and creating widespread concern about weapons testing [22, 23, 24].
In 1955, the United Kingdom announced the decision to develop thermonuclear weapons. Nevil
Shute's post apocalyptic novel, On the Beach was published in 1957, showing the last remnants of
humanity in Australia awaiting the end of the human race after a nuclear war. The New York Times
called it "the most haunting evocation we have of a world dying of radiation after an atomic war
[25]." The Guardian commented that "fictions such as On the Beach played an important role in
raising awareness about the threat of nuclear war."
From November 1958 to September 1961, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) observed an informal moratorium on nuclear tests[26].
34
The Atomium was constructed for the Brussels World's Fair in 1958. The Peace Symbol was designed for the British nuclear disarmament movement by Gerald Holtom.
4.1.4
The 1960s- The Cuban Missile Crisis and its After-Effects
The Cold War between the United States and Russia reached its peak in the 1960s, which greatly
in creased the fear of nuclear war in the minds of the public. In 1961, an article by Gilbert Burck
appeared in Fortune magazine, outlining the plans of Nelson Rockefeller, Edward Teller, Herman
Kahn, and Chet Holifield for the construction of an enormous network of concrete lined underground fallout shelters throughout the United States sufficient to shelter millions of people to serve
as a refuge in case of nuclear war[27]. As the anti-nuclear weapons sentiment grew, Project Plowshare was initiated in the United States for the development of techniques to use nuclear explosives
for peaceful purposes. This did little to mitigate public fear. On November 1, 1961, at the height
of the Cold War, about 50,000 women brought together by Women Strike for Peace marched in
60 cities in the United States to demonstrate against nuclear weapons. It was the largest national
women's peace protest of the 20th century.
In October 1962, the Soviet Union shipped nuclear missiles to Cuba, in an attempt to deter any future
invasion of Cuba by the United States. Upon discovery of the missiles, the United States demanded
that they be removed. The Kennedy administration held only a slim hope that the Kremlin would
agree to their demands, and expected a military confrontation. These fears were underpinned by
the October 24, 1962 letter of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to President John F. Kennedy, in which
he stated that the US blockade of "navigation in international waters and air space" constituted "an
act of aggression propelling human kind into the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war [28]". For
two weeks, the world was thrust to the brink of nuclear war, until Moscow agreed to remove the
missiles. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world came to mutually assured destruction,
and was a key factor in inducing a fear of nuclear weapons in the public.
The fear of nuclear war was also portrayed in popular culture. The film "Dr. Strangelove, or: How
I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb" was released, which was a black comedy directed
by Stanley Kubrick about an accidentally triggered nuclear war.
Another important factor that indirectly resulted in an anti-nuclear sentiment was the Vietnam War.
35
Large scale movements and demonstrations against the Vietnam War began in the United States in
1964. The protests against the war manifested as protests against government policies in general, of
which the nuclear power programme was a major part. The plans for the Bodega Bay power plant
were abandoned due to anti nuclear protests led by Sierra Club. Historian Thomas Wellock traced
the birth of the anti-nuclear movement in the United States to the controversy over Bodega Bay[29].
In 1968, the the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was adopted, which called for halting the
spread of nuclear weapon capabilities.
4.1.5
The 1970's - Anti-Nuclear Movements Gain Momentum
By the 1970's the term "atomic age" was no longer being used in the positive sense. However, in the
early 70's the US nuclear power enterprise grew substantially. In 1973, the Arab Oil Embargo occurred, in which several Arab nations in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
embargoed, or stopped selling, oil to the United States to protest their support of Israel in the ArabIsraeli "Yom Kippur" War. Arab OPEC production was cut by 25%, which caused some temporary
shortages and helped oil prices to triple. This contributed to an increased interest in alternatives
to petroleum, including nuclear power. U.S. utilities ordered 41 nuclear power plants, a one-year
record[30, 26].
In 1974, the first 1,000-megawatt nuclear plant, Commonwealth Edison's Zion Nuclear Power
Plant, Unit lwent into service. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 split the Atomic Energy
Commission into the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). ERDA's responsibilities include overseeing the development and
refinement of nuclear power, while the NRC takes up the problem of safe handling of nuclear
materials[30, 26].
But the rapid growth in the US nuclear enterprise came to a halt with the accident at the Three Mile
Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, on March 28, 1979.
TMI was the most serious in the U.S. nuclear power plant industry's operating history. Equipment
malfunctions, design-related problems, and human error led to a partial meltdown of the TMI-2
reactor core but only very minute releases of radioactivity. Although no deaths or injuries resulted,
the accident brought about sweeping changes in emergency response planning, reactor operator
36
training, human factors engineering, radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear power
plant operations. It also led to a public realization of the dangers of a nuclear meltdown. The public
sense of danger was especially intensified because "The China Syndrome", a movie about safety
coverups in the nuclear enterprise, which resulted in a meltdown, had been released only 12 days
before TMI.
The accident at Three Mile Island changed the landscape of the US nuclear power enterprise. Before
TMI, protests had largely been directed against nuclear weapons, and the biggest public concern was
that of nuclear war. However, this accident highlighted the potential risks of nuclear power, and led
to mass protests against nuclear as a source of energy. 65,000 people demonstrated against nuclear
power in Washington DC [31], and almost 200,000 people attended a protest against nuclear power
in New York City after TMI[32].
4.1.6
Late 20th Century and the Chernobyl Accident
In the 1980's nuclear energy generated more electricity than oil and natural gas in the United States.
Nuclear replaced hydropower as the second-largest source of electricity, after coal. However, antinuclear protests continued. In 1982, one million people demonstrated in New York City's Central
Park against nuclear weapons and for an end to the cold war arms race. It was the largest anti-nuclear
protest and the largest political demonstration in American history[33].
On April 26, 1986, a catastrophic nuclear disaster occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in
Ukraine. The Number Four RBMK reactor went out of control during a test at low-power, leading
to an explosion and fire that demolished the reactor building and released large amounts of radiation
into the atmosphere. Safety measures were ignored, the uranium fuel in the reactor overheated and
melted through the protective barriers. Radioactive elements including plutonium, iodine, strontium
and cesium were scattered over a wide area. In addition, the graphite blocks used as a moderating
material in the RBMK caught fire at high temperature as air entered the reactor core, which contributed to emission of radioactive materials into the environment, that drifted over much of the
European continent [34]. Approximately 100,000 km 2 of land was significantly contaminated with
fallout, with the worst hit regions being in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. In the aftermath of the accident, 237 people suffered from acute radiation sickness (ARS)[35]. Twenty-eight of the firemen
37
and emergency clean-up workers died in the first three months after the explosion from Acute Radiation Sickness and one of cardiac arrest. There have been at least 1800 documented cases of thyroid
cancer children who were between 0 and 14 years of age when the accident occurred., which is far
higher than normal. Health studies of the registered cleanup workers called in have failed to show
any direct correlation between their radiation exposure and an increase in other forms of cancer
or disease. The psychological affects of Chernobyl were and remain widespread and profound, and
have resulted for instance in suicides, drinking problems and apathy.The Chernobyl accident greatly
influenced the formation of negative attitudes towards radiation, and is still quoted as an example of
the dangers of nuclear technology [34].
Nuclear power programmes in several nations were affected by the Chernobyl disaster. The United
States was especially sensitive after the Three Mile Island accident. After the accident at TMI, the
percentage of respondents opposed to the building of more nuclear power plants in the United States
jumped and then leveled off. This new plateau brought the opponents of nuclear power to more than
40%. According to a Gallup poll, 73% of Americans polled after the Chernobyl accident said they
would oppose construction of nuclear power plants within 5 miles (8 km) of where they live. This
is more than 10% higher than a similar poll taken in 1979 [36]. In other nations, nuclear power
continued to advance. In 1996, Tokyo Electric Power Co Inc (TEPCO), Japan's biggest power
utility, started commercial operation of the world's first advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR).
4.1.7
The Yucca Mountain Controversy
In 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter had banned reprocessing due to proliferation concerns. In
1981, President Ronald Reagan lifted this ban, and called for the development of a high level radioactive waste storage facility. In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA),
establishing a timeline for a permanent underground facility for nuclear waste disposal. In 1984, the
Department of Energy selected ten locations in six states for consideration as potential repository
sites, based on data collected for nearly ten years. President Reagan approved three sites, Hanford,
Washington; Deaf Smith County, Texas; and Yucca Mountain for site characterization. In 1987, the
NWPA Amendments were passes, naming Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be characterized for
development of a repository. In 2002 President Bush designated, and Congress approved, Yucca
38
Mountain as the repository location.
The U.S. Department of Energy was to begin accepting spent fuel at the Yucca Mountain repository
by January 31, 1998. However, the repository is not yet functional due to on-going litigation and
opposition. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (NV), has been a prominent public figure opposing
the repository. The project is also widely opposed in Nevada and is very controversial national
topic. The 1987 legislation halting study of Hanford and Texas as potential sites for the waste
repository has been often been termed as the "Screw Nevada Bill," since the people of Nevada felt
that the decision was unfair. However, the local county in which the proposed facility is located,
Nye County, supported the development of the repository.
In 2010, the DOE suspended the license application for Yucca Mountain and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future was established to provide recommendations for developing
a safe, long-term solution to managing used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The FY2011 budget
eliminated funding for Yucca Mountain, and future of the repository remains highly uncertain.
4.1.8
The 21st Century -Nuclear Proliferation in Iran and North Korea
The beginning of the 21st century saw a renewed threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, especially
from Iran and North Korea. The threat had now shifted from that of a nuclear war between US
and Russia, to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations with unstable internal politics. The
possibility of nuclear terrorism also became apparent.
North Korea
In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence reportedly discovered evidence of trans-
fers of HEU technology and materials from Pakistan to North Korea in exchange for ballistic missiles technology. In 2003, it was found that the 8000 spent fuel rods in the storage pool had been
reprocessed for manufacturing weapons grade plutonium[37]. Six party talks including North Korea, US, Japan, China, Russia and ROK began in August 2003 but failed to prevent a nuclear North
Korea. Despite international pressure, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9,
2006[38]. The seismic data collected by South Korean, Japanese and US institutes estimated the
yield to be less than 1 kT, but Russian estimates were between 5-15kT. On 25 May 2009, North
Korea conducted its second underground nuclear test. The yield was estimated to range from 2-8
39
kT[39]. In 2010, US nuclear expert Siegfried Hecker confirmed that North Korea was actively pursuing its nuclear programme, and had completed the construction of a uranium enrichment facility
at Yongbyon with 2,000 P-2 centrifuges in six cascades. After the death of Kim Jong I in 2011,
his son Kim Jong Un was declared North Korea's new leader. The situation in North Korea has not
shown signs of being resolved, and on 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear
test, with a yield estimated between 6-9 kT[40].
Iran
The US, in 2002, accused Iran of seeking to develop a secret nuclear weapons programme
and published satellite images of two nuclear sites under construction at Natanz and Arak. IAEA
head Mohammed ElBaradei stated that inspections showed "Iran failed to report certain nuclear
materials and activities" and urged "co-operative actions" on the part of Iran. International pressure
and strict sanctions seemed to have little effect on the Iranian programme. In 2006, the International
Atomic Energy Agency voted to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council over concerns that the
country was trying to develop nuclear weapons.
In the quarterly report in November 2012, the IAEA said that Iran had to enrich uranium to up
to 20% U-235, and was "not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing
its Additional Protocol, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material
in Iran was in peaceful activities [41]." The Iranian nuclear programme, like North Korea, has
continued despite mounting international pressure and sanctions. The active proliferation of nuclear
weapons by Iran, and the failure of the IAEA and the international community to prevent it, has led
to increased public concern regarding nuclear weapons.
4.1.9
The Fukushima Disaster and its Consequences
A 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011 wrecked the Fukushima nuclear plant
in Japan, triggering three nuclear reactor meltdowns that contaminated food and water and forced
mass evacuations.
Nearly 18,000 people were killed in the earthquake and the tsunami.
The
Fukushima Daiichi units Ito 4 were written off and are to be decommissioned. The accident resulted in a massive decline in the operating capacity of nuclear power plants in Japan. By mid-May
40
2011, only 17 out of Japan's 50 remaining nuclear power reactors (apart from Monju and writtenoff Fukushima Daiichi 1-4) were in operation. This represented 15,493 MWe, or 35%, of the total
remaining nuclear generating capacity of 44,396 MWe. Twenty units, with a combined capacity
of 17,705 MWe (40% of total nuclear capacity) were not operating as they had been shut for periodic inspections, while another two units (1700 MWe) had been shut for unplanned inspections or
equipment replacement [42]. Units 4&5 at Chubu Electric's Hamaoka plant were shut down at the
government's request in May 2011 to increase their resistance to tsunamis [43]. The other nine units
- with a combined capacity of 8826 MWe (20% of total nuclear capacity) - were shut down during
the 11 March earthquake and have not restarted. They are in cold shutdown and were progressively
joined by others as maintenance outages came due [42]. In 2012, Japan shut its last working nuclear
power reactor following the nuclear disaster, leaving it without nuclear power for the first time since
1970.
The Japanese Energy & Environment Council (ENECAN) set up by the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) released the "Innovative Energy and Environment Strategy" in September 2012, recommending a phase-out of nuclear power by 2040. In the short term, reactors currently operable but shut
down would be allowed to restart once they gained permission from the incoming Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), but a 40-year operating limit would be imposed. This provoked a strong and
wide reaction from the Japanese industry, with a consensus that 20-25% nuclear was necessary to
avoid very severe economic effects, not to mention high domestic electricity prices. The Keidanren
(Japan Business Federation) and the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) both said
that the Enecan phase-out policy was irresponsible [44]. Four days after indicating general approval
of the Enecan plan, the DPJ cabinet backed away from it, relegating it as "a reference document"
and the prime minister explained that flexibility was important in considering energy policy [45].
In December 2012, the LDP came into power and said it would take responsibility for allowing
reactor restarts after the Nuclear Regulation Authority issued new safety standards and confirmed
the safety of individual units [46]. In February 2014, the Basic Energy Plan was proposed, which
listed nuclear as an important one of four base-load options, the others being hydro, geothermal and
coal. The plan stated that nuclear power was an "important power source that supports the stability
of the energy supply and demand structure [47]."
41
The ambivalence among the various stakeholders in Japan after the Fukushima accident led to a
paralysis of the nuclear enterprise in the country. There was disagreement about the future energy
policy, which led delays in the decision making process. This could explain the long time taken to
restart the reactors, and the difficulty n allowing people to return to the previously evacuated areas
which have now been declared safe.
Large scale anti nuclear demonstrations began all over the world after the Fukushima accident. 600
people gathered for a weekend protest outside the Vermont Yankee plant[48]. In 2012, activists
protested at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station to mark the one-year anniversary of the nuclear
meltdowns in Fukushima. The international reactions to the Fukushima disaster with regards to
nuclear energy policy were extreme, but short lived. Some positions were taken politically, but later
reconsidered.
In June 2011, Italy held a national referendum, in which 94 percent voted against the government's
plan to build new nuclear power plants. The strong pro-nuclear government in France was defeated
in national elections, in favour of a government that promised to radically reduce dependence on
nuclear energy. However, a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the government in both Italy and
France could suggest that the vote was influenced by the dislike of the government rather than the
nuclear energy policy.
Germany closed down its oldest nuclear power reactors and decided to phase the rest out by 2022.
In May 2011, the Swiss government decided to abandon plans to build new nuclear reactors. The
country's five existing reactors will be allowed to continue operating, but will not be replaced at
the end of their life span. The last will go offline in 2034 [49].
The Fukushima disaster also
affected nuclear policy in Belgium, and may have influenced the decision to shut down all reactors
by 2025. However, all these decisions are long term, and it often happens that policy decisions are
not enforced due to several reasons like government changes, economic considerations, etc.
Nuclear power growth estimates decreased significantly in China. But United Kingdom, Russia and
India are still pursuing active nuclear programmes. According to the World Nuclear Organization
(WNO), as of April 2014, over 45 countries are actively considering embarking upon nuclear power
programs, the front runners being Iran, UAE, Turkey, Vietnam, Belarus, Poland and possibly Jordan
[50].
42
The Fukushima Daiichi accident and the consequent reactions portrayed that nuclear technology
issues almost always become entwined with domestic political issues. Decisions that affect nuclear
policy, are seldom purely technological in nature. Political influences play a significant role in the
decision making process.
In 2013, the documentary, Pandora's Promise was released, which featured several notable individuals, some of whom were once vehemently opposed to nuclear power but who now spoke in
favor of it. There have been positive responses to nuclear technology recently, due to the everincreasing concern about global climate change and the necessity for a zero-emission, sustainable
energy source. However, the majority of the public continues to be wary of nuclear technology and
radiation.
4.2
List of Important Variables
Based on the historical analysis, the important variables influencing Radiation Attitudes have been
identified below. Using these variables, a causal loop diagram (CLD) was constructed. The CLD is
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. The variables are described in detail in Section 5.3.
1. Nuclear Context
2. Proximity to Extreme Nuclear Event
3. Weapons Association
4. Probability of Threat being Viewed as "Man-Made"
5. Socially Catastrophic Potential
6. Fear of Long Term Effects
7. Fear of "Nuclear-Winter"
8. Exposure to Apocalyptic Film and Literature
9. Media Favourability
10. Media Credibility
43
11. Trust in Opposition Groups
The following variables were added based on discussions with experts in academia and the nuclear
enterprise.
1. Trust in Nuclear Enterprise
2. Transparency in Industrial Practices
3. Perceived Probability of Competent Project Execution
4. Exposure to Expert Communication
5. Scientific Agreement
A review of existing literature on risk perception resulted in the selection of the following variables
for the causal loop diagram [6, 4, 51, 52, 53].
1. Familiarity with Nuclear Science and Technology
2. Level of Education
3. Socio-Economic Status
4. Sense of Control
5. Knowledge Confidence
6. Sense of Uncertainty
7. Perceived Detectability of Radiation
8. Perceived Personal Benefit
9. Perceived Personal Cost
44
5
Construction of a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) for Radiation Attitudes
5.1
Methodology
The qualitative analyses in the previous chapter led to a clearer understanding of the significant
factors contributing towards the development of Radiation Attitudes. Once the variables were identified, the next step was to establish a relationship between these factors and to study their interdependencies. System dynamics modeling was used for this purpose. Using VENSIM software,
a causal loop diagram (CLD) was developed, which is shown in Figure 5. This diagram shows
the different linkages between the variables. The initial CLD was constructed based on extensive
literature review and discussions with experts. The CLD went through several iterations based on
feedback by experts.
5.2
Model Description
The causal loop diagram links the identified variables based on their interdependencies. This can
enable determination of the influence of different modes of causality on different outcomes. The
identified variables are listed in Table I along with the scale on which their values can range. The
meaning of the highest and lowest value on the scale is explained. Variables are categorized as
dependent or independent. Independent variables are those which are not affected by change in
value of any other variable in the diagram. In case of dependent variables, the level of dependency
i.e. the extent to which a variable is affected by the surrounding factors is noted. Finally, the weight
of each variable, i.e. the extent of its influence on other variables in the diagram is listed.
Interviews were conducted to test this model and validate the dependencies. The interviews were
used to determine the relative strengths of the influencing factors. They also helped in identifying
the most important links in the model, which can then be used as a basis for decision makers seeking
to develop strategies for managing stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects.
The developed Radiation Attitudes model will ultimately feed into the larger model for stakeholder
acceptance of new nuclear projects and help provide a better understanding of how Radiation Atti45
tudes influences project acceptance.
5.3
Description of Identified Variables
The variables shown in Figure 5 are described below. The relationships between the variables are
also explained.
1. Radiation Attitudes
An extensive literature review and field studies have revealed that attitudes of individuals towards
nuclear technology are not the same as attitudes towards other technologies, even if the technologies
are hazardous. Nuclear technology can prompt a largely negative response, which is primarily due
to the fear of radiation. Negative reactions to nuclear technology have created hindrances for future
nuclear projects, and resistance against existing ones. They must be better understood if project
has to be successfully executed and operated with stakeholder approval at all levels, local, state and
federal.
An individual's perception of radiation, which ultimately determines an individual's level of acceptance of nuclear technology, is defined as Radiation Attitude. A positive Radiation Attitude indicates
that the individual has a favourable perception of radiation and its applications. A negative Radiation Attitude signifies fear and anxiety concerning radiation and nuclear technology. In this research
project, we are primarily concerned with understanding how negative Radiation Attitudes influence
stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects.
2. Perceived Personal Benefit
Perceived Personal Benefit is defined as a sense of advantage associated with nuclear technology.
This could be an economic benefit in terms of employment at nuclear facilities. Other examples are
decreased power shortages due to nuclear power plants, economic development in the vicinity of
a nuclear facility, increase in property values etc. There could also be an environmental benefit in
terms of nuclear energy being viewed as a possible mitigator for global climate change by reduction
in fossil fuel consumption leading to lower carbon emissions.
If an individual perceived a potential benefit, it was found that the value of Radiation Attitudes
became more positive, even though the risks still existed. A sense of benefit is therefore vital for
46
pe rceived
detectability of
ra diation
+
-
+
winter"
fear of "nuclear
fear of long term
effects of radiation
association
weapons
nuclear context
exposure to
apocalyptic film and
literature
potential+
+
proximi
extreme nucar
event
probability of threat
being viewed as
"man-madeel
socially catastrophic +
+
Figure 5: Causal loop diagram for Radiation Attitudes
execution
perceived probability of
competent project
transparency in
industrial practices
+
enter rise
trusttrsin
-
ATTITUDES
personal risk
-
RADIATION
+ nnuclearmei
socio-political
awareness and
involvement
perceived
trust in
opposition groups
event>
<proximity to
extreme nuclear
+
perceived
personal benefit
sense of control
+s
sense of
+
evei of
education
socio-economic
status
uncertainty
confidence
knowledge
+
technology
nuclear science and
scientific
agreement
expost re to expert
com nunication
+lvlo
fmiliarity with
-141,
-
+edia
media
credibility
overcoming the fear of nuclear technology. However, a negative attitude towards radiation can
decrease the value of an individual's perceived personal benefit.
3. Perceived Personal Risk
This variable represents the potential cost that an individual associates with nuclear technology. Research has shown that this perceived risk is primarily due to fear of radiation. Concerns regarding
health effects of radiation and contamination of the environment are the major factors contributing
to the perception of radiation risk. This risk perception increases with temporal proximity to an
extreme nuclear event. For example, individuals who experienced Three Mile Island or Chernobyl,
or who live close to the areas where these accidents occurred, sometimes perceive a higher risk associated with nuclear technology. Risks from activities that are not very well known or are uncertain
are judged to be greater.
However, a perceived personal benefit greatly reduces the influence of this risk. A sense of control
also decreases this risk perception. Another important factor that must be taken into consideration
is trust in the nuclear enterprise. If the enterprise establishing or running a nuclear facility has a
good track record, people are less likely to view the facility as risky.
4. Trust in Nuclear Enterprise
Trust in nuclear enterprise is defined as the extent to which individuals are willing to rely on the
nuclear enterprise to make sound decisions, maintain safety and security, and safeguard public interests. Trust in the nuclear enterprise decreases the perceived personal risk. Discussions with several
experts led to the conclusion that trust in enterprise was the most important factor for gaining stakeholder acceptance for a new nuclear facility. Trust can be increased by transparency in industrial
practices and a history of competent project execution.
However, contradictory information by opposition groups undermines trust in the nuclear enterprise.
A negative attitude towards radiation itself causes distrust.
5. Trust in Opposition Groups
Trust in opposition groups is a variable that denotes the extent to which individuals are willing to
rely on anti-nuclear groups, activists and environmental organizations to safeguard their interests.
As discussed previously, a lack of scientific agreement concerning information about nuclear tech48
nology and radiation, increases trust in opposition groups and decreases trust in nuclear enterprise.
Also, if the perceived probability of competent project execution decreases, the trust in opposition
groups increases.
6. Transparency in Industrial Practices
Transparency in industrial practices is defined as the accountability, openness, and sense of responsibility of the enterprise. If the enterprise is transparent in its practices, it increases public trust in
the enterprise.
7. Perceived Probability of Competent Project Execution
Perceived Probability of Competent Project Execution is the probability that an individual believes
that the enterprise has the necessary ability, resources and skills to successfully execute and maintain a project from start to finish. Competent execution encompasses various factors like timely
execution, cost considerations, safety requirements and environmental consciousness.
An increase in perceived probability of competent project execution decreases trust in opposition
groups and increases trust in the nuclear enterprise.
8. Scientific Agreement
This variable is defined as consistency and compatibility between different sources of scientific
information.
Often, the lay public is faced with contradictory data and findings, which causes
uncertainty. This may lead to the lay public placing their trust in opposition groups and other
independent environmental organizations as opposed to the scientific community.
9. Sense of Control
This variable represents controllability, or the amount of influence an individual feels he can have
on a process and its outcome. Better socio-economic conditions and a higher level of education
generally increase the sense of control felt by an individual, thereby decreasing perceived personal
risk. A greater awareness of socio-political issues and involvement in the community also increases
the sense of control. On the other hand, a negative Radiation Attitude can result in a person experiencing loss of controllability.
A high sense of control results in in a decrease in perceived personal risk. It also increases knowledge confidence.
49
10. Socio-Political Awareness and Involvement
Socio-political awareness and involvement is defined as the extent to which an individual is aware of
the social and political issues around him, and the level of his contribution or participation in community affairs. An increasing socio-political awareness and involvement is necessary for increasing
the sense of control.
11. Socio-Economic Status
Socio-economic status is an economic and sociological combined total measure of a person's work
experience and of an individual's or family's economic and social position in relation to others,
based on income, education, and occupation [54]. A higher socio-economic status increases an individual's sense of control. Individuals from a higher socio-economic background also have access
to better educational facilities, generally resulting in a higher level of education.
12. Level of Education
An individual's level of education refers to the degree of formal education he has received throughout his life. Better socio-economic conditions usually indicate a higher level of education, which
increases familiarity with nuclear science and technology.
An increase in level of education in-
creases an individual's sense of control.
13. Familiarity with Nuclear Science and Technology
Familiarity with nuclear science and technology is defined as the extent of an individual's understanding of, or experience with nuclear science and technology. A higher level of education and
greater exposure to expert communication increases familiarity with nuclear science and technology. As familiarity increases, knowledge confidence also increases, which is necessary for reducing
the sense of uncertainty associated with radiation.
14. Exposure to Expert Communication
This variable can be described in terms of the number and frequency of expert talks, research papers,
journals or meetings that an individual has experienced in his lifetime. An increase in exposure to
expert communication increases familiarity with nuclear science and technology.
15. Knowledge Confidence
50
Research has shown that merely communicating or providing information, is not sufficient to convince an individual about the merits or demerits of a technology. An individual needs to feel a
particular level of confidence in the technology, and the knowledge he possess concerning the technology. This is encompassed in the knowledge confidence variable.
An increase in the sense of control is one of the major factors which increases knowledge confidence. Knowledge confidence also increases with increasing familiarity with nuclear science and
technology. It is this confidence which results in a decrease in the sense of uncertainty associated
with nuclear technology and radiation, thereby reducing nuclear dread and improving Radiation
Attitudes.
16. Sense of Uncertainty
One cannot see, touch, taste or smell radiation. The lack of detectability of radiation by the human
senses leads to a very high sense of uncertainty. A lack of agreement in the scientific community
with regards to safe radiation levels also contributes to higher uncertainty.
An increase in sense of uncertainty directly increases the perceived personal risk. This sense of
uncertainty results from inadequate confidence in knowledge about nuclear technology.
17. Perceived Detectability of Radiation
Detectability is defined as the ease with which the presence or existence of a phenomenon can be
identified. Lack of detectability greatly increases the sense of uncertainty. Because an individual
does not perceive radiation as easily detectable, it breeds a greater sense of fear and uncertainty.
18. Media Favourability
Media favourability is defined as the overall evaluation of an enterprise or technology presented in
the media resulting from the stream of media stories about the enterprise or technology[55]. Media
discourse over the years, from television and radio to newspapers and social media has largely
shaped public opinion about nuclear technology. Portrayal of nuclear energy in a negative image in
the media is one of the key factors resulting in negative Radiation Attitudes among the lay public.
Negative media coverage directly leads to a negative context of nuclear technology and may result in
undue exaggeration of the catastrophic impact. Selectiveness in publishing news stories is a major
problem which can lead to the question of why scientifically factual stories are discounted in favour
51
of sensationalized accounts of incidents, especially in the case of nuclear events. On the other hand,
a positive image of a technology in the media can lead to a higher level of acceptance, and reduce
fear and anxiety.
It has been found that Radiation Attitudes and media favourability form a reinforcing loop as represented in the causal loop diagram. A decrease in media favourability decreases the value of
Radiation Attitudes, making them more negative. Negative Radiation Attitudes create an appetite
for negative stories in the media. Since the media today largely cater to popular demand, it results
in a further decrease in media favourability towards nuclear technology.
19. Media Credibility
Media credibility is defined as the quality of being trustworthy and convincing. Media credibility
is the factor that determines whether the media will play a role in shaping an individual's Radiation
Attitudes or not. Unless the individual trusts the source of information, the story, whether favourable
or unfavourable will have little effect on his views.
20. Nuclear Context
Nuclear context is defined as the pre existing narrative about nuclear technology that influences
an individual's risk perception and decision-making. Nuclear context is largely influenced by past
experiences and historic occurrences.
How an individual first learned about nuclear technology
can have a significant effect on the context in which he views the technology. For example, if an
individual's earliest memories about nuclear technology are those of the bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, or the arms race during the Cold War, he is likely to develop a negative context
concerning nuclear technology. A negative nuclear context results in a negative attitude towards
radiation.
Proximity to an extreme nuclear event may cause an individual to develop a negative nuclear context.
An increase in value of the weapons association variable can result in a negative nuclear context.
Media favourability can also influence nuclear context to a large extent. The greater the level of
media favourability, the more positive is the nuclear context.
21. Proximity to Extreme Nuclear Event
This variable is defined as the physical or psychological distance between an individual and an ex52
treme event at a nuclear facility. A physical proximity implies that the person was at a location close
to the event or may have been directly affected by it. An individual may experience a psychological
proximity to an extreme nuclear event if a person close to him was affected by the event. A psychological proximity could also arise if an individual assesses himself to be in a situation similar to the
event and sees a possibility of the same event occurring in his situation.
An extreme event could be either a design basis accident or a non design basis accident at a nuclear
facility. Proximity to an extreme nuclear event increases an individual's perception of personal risk.
It might also cause an individual to develop a negative context with respect to nuclear technology.
22. Weapons Association
The weapons association variable is defined as the action of making a cognitive connection between
nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. For the vast majority of the public, especially for older
persons, the first encounter with nuclear technology is when they learn about the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II. While it is true that the civilian nuclear power programme,
and nuclear medicine developed as an offshoot of the weapons programme, this association creates
psychological patterns in the minds of an individual which leads to a negative nuclear context.
An increase in weapons association may also cause an individual to overestimate the socially catastrophic potential of nuclear technology, despite scientific evidence to the contrary. An association
of nuclear energy with nuclear weapons also increases the probability that the radiation threat is
viewed as "man-made."
23. Probability of Threat Being Viewed as "Man-Made"
This variable is defined as the probability of a threat being viewed as occurring due to human
incompetence, negligence or failure. Accidents that are natural in origin do not induce the same
kind of fear as those of human origin. This is also the reason why exposure to geological radon or
cosmic rays is not perceived as risky as radiation from a nuclear power plant. Also, human actions
increase the total quantity of radioactive material in the environment.
An increase in the probability of the radiation threat being viewed as "man-made" makes Radiation
Attitudes negative. Increasing association of nuclear technology with nuclear weapons results in a
higher probability of the threat being viewed as "man-made".
53
24. Fear of Long Term Effects of Radiation
This variable is defined as the fear of the effects of nuclear technology on future generations. Radiation exposure from a nuclear facility may not have immediate health effects, but there are concerns
that it may lead to an increased risk of cancer in the future, or cause birth defects. This is mainly
due to the fact that radiation is perceived as persisting in the environment for extremely long periods
of time. The most important factors leading to this fear are concerns about long term nuclear waste
disposal and delayed health effects of radiation. A concern for progeny is the major factor which
adds to this fear.
A decrease in media favourability increases the fear of long term effects of radiation by using negative imagery. An increased fear of long term effects of radiation leads to an increase in socially
catastrophic potential.
25. Fear of "Nuclear Winter"
Fear of "nuclear winter" is defined as the fear of global devastation and extinction or near extinction
of the human race as a result of a nuclear detonation or an extreme nuclear accident. This fear
has been caused largely due to the portrayal of nuclear technology as the source of annihilation is
dystopic film and literature. A decrease in media favourability also adds to the fear of "nuclear
winter", which increases socially catastrophic potential.
26. Exposure To Apocalyptic Film And Literature
Exposure to apocalyptic film And literature is defined as the number and frequency of movies, books
or other popular media depicting nuclear technology as the cause of global destruction, which an
individual has encountered in his lifetime. An increase in exposure to apocalyptic film and literature
increases the fear of "nuclear winter".
27. Socially Catastrophic Potential
Socially catastrophic potential can be described as the potential of an event to cause great and often
sudden damage or suffering on a large scale. Nuclear accidents are usually perceived as socially
catastrophic by the general public, which is one of the main reasons why negative Radiation Attitudes arise. Socially catastrophic potential and Radiation Attitudes form a reinforcing loop where
54
an increase in socially catastrophic potential makes Radiation Attitudes negative, which further increases the perceived socially catastrophic potential of radiation.
The tone and frequency of the stories reported by the media have a significant effect on socially
catastrophic potential. A fear of long term effects of radiation and fear of a "nuclear winter" scenario
are the primary drivers of this variable.
55
Table 1: CLD Variable Descriptions
No CLD
Description of Variable
Range
Variable
I
Meaning of
Meaning of
Lowest Value
Highest Value
Radiation
An individual's outlook
-i to
-1 indicates a
1 indicates a
Attitudes
or perception of
1
highly negative
highly negative
radiation, influenced by
attitude towards
attitude towards
the various factors
radiation
radiation
D/I
D
described below
2
3
4
Perceived
Sense of economic,
0 to
0 indicates that the
1 indicates that the
Personal
social or environmental
1
individual
individual
Benefit
advantage associated
perceives no
perceives a large
with nuclear technology
personal benefit
personal benefit
from nuclear
from nuclear
technology
technology
Perceived
Sense of cost associated
0 to
0 indicates that the
1 indicates that the
Personal
with nuclear technology.
1
individual
individual
Risk
Costs could be
perceives no
perceives a large
economic,
personal risk from
personal risk from
environmental or health
nuclear
nuclear
effects of radiation.
technology
technology
Trust in
Extent to which an
-1 to
-I indicates
1 indicates 100%
Nuclear
individual is willing to
1
absolutely no trust
trust in the nuclear
Enterprise
rely on the nuclear
in the nuclear
enterprise
enterprise to make
enterprise
decisions, maintain
safety, security, and
safeguard public
interests.
56
D
D
D
5
Trust in
Extent to which an
-1 to
-1 indicates
1 indicates 100%
Opposition
individual is willing to
1
absolutely no trust
trust in opposition
Groups
rely on the opposition
in opposition
groups
groups to safeguard
groups
D
their interests
6
Transparency Accountability,
0 to
0 indicates a
1 indicates 100%
in
openness, and sense of
1
complete lack of
transparency in
Industrial
responsibility of the
transparency in
industrial
Practices
enterprise.
industrial
practices
practices
7
Perceived
Probability that an
0 to
0 indicates that the
1 indicates that the
Probability
individual believes that
1
perceived
perceived
of
the enterprise has the
probability of
probability of
Competent
necessary ability,
competent project
competent project
Project
resources and skills to
execution is 0
execution is 100%
Execution
successfully execute and
maintain a project
8
Scientific
Consistency and
0 to
0 indicates 100%
1 indicates
Agreement
compatibility between
1
agreement among
complete
scientific sources
disagreement
different sources of
scientific information
among scientific
sources
9
Sense of
Amount of influence an
0 to
0 indicates a
1 indicates 100%
Control
individual feels he can
1
complete lack of
sense of control
have on a process and
control
its outcome
57
D
10
Socio-
Extent of an individual's
0 to
0 indicates
1 indicates a high
Political
awareness of the social
1
absolutely no
level of
Awareness
and political issues
socio-political
socio-political
and In-
around him, and the
awareness or
awareness or
volvement
level of his contribution
involvement
involvement
I
in community affairs
11
Socio-
An individual's
0 to
0 indicates
1 indicates a high
Economic
economic and social
1
extremely poor
level of
Status
position in relation to
socio-economic
socio-economic
others, based on
conditions
conditions
I
income, education, and
occupation
12
Level of
Degree of formal
0 to
0 indicates that the
1 indicates an
Education
education received by
1
individual is
extremely high
uneducated
level of education
an individual
13
Familiarity
Extent of an individual's
0 to
0 indicates
1 indicates an
with
understanding of, or
1
absolutely no
extremely high
Nuclear
experience with nuclear
familiarity with
level of familiarity
Science
science and technology
nuclear science
with nuclear
and technology
science and
and Technology
14
D
D
technology
Exposure
Number and frequency
0 to
0 indicates no
1 indicates a high
to Expert
of expert talks, research
1
exposure to expert
level of exposure
Communi-
papers, journals or
communication
to expert
cation
meetings that an
communication
individual has
experienced in his
lifetime
58
D
15
Knowledge
Level of confidence in
0 to
0 indicates
1 indicates a high
Confidence
knowledge possessed by
1
absolutely no
level of
knowledge
confidence in
confidence
one's knowledge
an individual
16
17
18
Sense of
Sense of not knowing,
0 to
0 indicates that the
1 indicates that the
Uncer-
not being able to rely
1
individual
individual
tainty
on, or not being
experiences
experiences a high
completely sure of
absolutely no
sense of
something
uncertainty
uncertainty
Perceived
Ease with which the
0 to
0 indicates that
1 indicates that
Detectabil-
presence or existence of
1
radiation is
radiation is
ity of
a phenomenon can be
perceived as
perceived as
Radiation
identified by an
highly
completely
individual
undetectable
detectable
Media
Overall evaluation of an
-1 to
-1 indicates that
1 indicates that
Favourabil-
enterprise or technology
1
the media are
media are 100%
ity
presented in the media
highly
favourable
resulting from the
unfavourable
D
D
D
D
stream of related media
stories
19
Media
Quality of being
-1 to
-1 indicates that
1 indicates that
Credibility
trustworthy and
1
the media are
media are 100%
highly uncredible
credible
convincing
59
I
20
Nuclear
Pre existing narrative
-1 to
-1 indicates that
1 indicates that the
Context
about nuclear
1
the context in
context in which
technology that
which nuclear
nuclear
influences an
technology is
technology is
individual's risk
viewed is 100%
viewed is 100%
perception and
negative
positive
D
decision-making
21
Proximity
Physical or
0 to
0 indicates no
1 indicates an
to Extreme
psychological distance
I
connection to an
extremely close
Nuclear
between an individual
extreme nuclear
proximity to an
Event
and an extreme event at
event
extreme nuclear
a nuclear facility
22
23
event
Weapons
Action of making a
0 to
0 indicates
1 indicates the
Associa-
cognitive connection
1
absolutely no
highest degree of
tion
between nuclear
association of
association of
technology and nuclear
nuclear
nuclear
weapons
technology with
technology with
nuclear weapons
nuclear weapons
Probability
Probability of a threat
0 to
0 indicates that the
1 indicates that the
of Threat
being viewed as
1
probability of the
probability of the
being
occurring due to human
threat being
threat being
Viewed as
incompetence,
viewed as
viewed as
"Man-
negligence or failure
"man-made" is 0
"man-made" is
made"
24
D
100%
Fear of
Fear of the effects of
0 to
0 indicates
I indicates a high
Long Term
nuclear technology on
1
absolutely no fear
degree of fear of
Effects of
future generations
of long term
long term effects
effects of radiation
of radiation
Radiation
60
D
25
Fear of
Fear of global
0 to
0 indicates
1 indicates a high
"Nuclear
devastation and
1
absolutely no fear
degree of fear of
Winter"
extinction or near
of the "nuclear
the "nuclear
extinction of the human
winter" scenario
winter" scenario
D
race as a result of a
nuclear detonation or an
extreme nuclear
accident
26
Exposure
Number and frequency
0 to
0 indicates
1 indicates a high
to Apoca-
of movies, books or
1
absolutely no
degree of exposure
lyptic Film
popular media depicting
exposure to
to apocalyptic film
and
nuclear technology as
apocalyptic film
and literature
Literature
the cause of global
and literature
I
destruction encountered
by an individual
27
Socially
Potential of an event to
0 to
0 indicates that the
1 indicates that the
Catas-
cause a significant
1
perceived socially
perceived socially
trophic
number of deaths and
catastrophic
catastrophic
Potential
injuries in a small
potential of the
potential of the
amount of time
technology is 0
technology is
100%
Note: In Table 1, "D" denotes a dependent variable and "I" denotes an independent variable.
61
D
5.4
Explanation of Important Interdependencies and Loops
The causal loop diagram shows "Radiation Attitude" in the centre, surrounded by the variables
influencing it. The 6 key factors that directly influence Radiation Attitudes are1. Perceived Personal Risk
2. Perceived Personal Benefit
3. Media Favourability
4. Socially Catastrophic Potential
5. Nuclear Context
6. Probability of Threat Being Viewed as "Man-Made"
Seven important interacting variables within the main causal loop diagram have also been identified,
which explain the phenomena that affect Radiation Attitudes. These variable clusters are described
below.
1. Risk-Benefit Tradeoff
The risk-benefit tradeoff describes two of the critical factors that determine an individual's attitude
towards radiation.
The formation of a particular attitude towards radiation can be viewed as a
judgment made by an individual by weighing in the costs and the benefits that he perceives from
nuclear technology. When perceived benefits outweigh perceived risks, Radiation Attitudes lean
towards the positive side. When perceived risks outweigh perceived benefits, Radiation Attitudes
lean towards the negative side.
However, it must be noted that perceived personal benefit has an overshadowing influence on perceived personal risk, and hence all the factors that contribute towards it. If an individual perceives
a sense of benefit from the technology, be it economic, social or environmental, the strength of the
perceived personal risk variable, and its influence on Radiation Attitudes is reduced significantly.
2. Social Trust Loop
Social trust is a vital factor influencing Radiation Attitudes. The social trust loop describes the
reinforcing influence of trust in nuclear enterprise on an individual's attitude towards radiation.
62
perceived
personal benefit
perceived
personal risk
RADIATION
ATTITUDES
Figure 6: Risk-Benefit Tradeoff
perceived
personal risk
trust in nuclear
enterprise
RADIATION
ATTITUDES
+
-
Figure 7: Social Trust Loop
As trust in enterprise increases, perceived personal risk decreases. A reduced value of perceived
personal risk results in an increasing positive value of Radiation Attitudes, which further increases
trust in enterprise.
This loop emphasizes the importance of building up trust if stakeholder acceptance is to be achieved.
A negative value of trust in enterprise may result in a negative reinforcing loop which will drive
Radiation Attitudes to a highly negative value. Trust in enterprise can be increased b ensuring
transparency in industrial practices, and competent project execution. It is also necessary to reduce
the negative influence of opposition groups.
3. Empowerment
63
level of education
familiarity with
nuclear science and
technology
sense of control
knowledge confidence
Figure 8: Empowerment
The widely followed approach by the scientific community for overcoming public opposition has
been to provide information. Technical experts believe that if an individual is aware of the facts
and has the relevant information, then acceptance comes automatically. However, in practice, this
approach has not worked as desired. Despite providing extensive information, peoples' attitudes
towards radiation seldom change. One of the reasons for this could be the absence of a sense of
empowerment.
The model hypothesizes that providing information is not enough; an individual needs to feel confident in his knowledge about the technology. This confidence comes from a sense of control in
society, which is the result of an awareness of social and political issues, and an involvement in
society matters. Figure 8 describes this phenomenon.
An increase in level of education increases an individual's familiarity with nuclear science and
technology. It also a factor, along with socio-economic status and socio-political awareness and
involvement, that increases the sense of control. An increased familiarity with nuclear science and
technology and an increased sense of control together contribute towards increasing knowledge
confidence.
4. Confidence and Control
Figure 9 describes the influence of sense of control on perceived personal risk. An increased sense of
control reduces the perceived personal risk. An increased sense of control also increases knowledge
64
knowledge confidence
sense of control
perceived
personal risk
-
sense of uncertainty
Figure 9: Confidence and Control
confidence, which reduces the sense of uncertainty, which also reduces the perceived personal risk.
This shows that an increased sense of control is important, both directly and indirectly, for reducing
perceived personal risk.
5. Media Favourability Loop
The media favourability loop described the reinforcing nature of media favourability on Radiation
Attitudes.
An increase in media favourability increases the value of the nuclear context variable, making is
more positive. An increasing value of nuclear context increases the value of Radiation Attitudes,
makes it more positive. This further increases media favourability. This loop emphasizes the role
of the media in shaping public attitudes towards radiation. Negative media coverage could result
in a negative nuclear context, making Radiation Attitudes negative and thereby reducing media
favourability even more.
6. Nuclear Context
Figure 11 describes the influence of prevailing narratives about radiation and nuclear technology on
Radiation Attitudes.
Historical events play an important role in determining nuclear context, as discussed in Section 4.1.
If the earliest memories of nuclear technology are related to nuclear bombs and proliferation, the
nuclear context is shaped accordingly. The context in which an individual views radiation greatly
65
RADIATION
ATTITUDES
media favourability
nuclear context
Figure 10: Media Favourability Loop
nuclear context
RADIATION4
ATTITUDES
~
probability of threat
being viewed as
"man-made"
weapons association
Figure 11: Nuclear Context
effects his perception of radiation. As weapons association increases, the value of nuclear context
decrease, which decreases the value of Radiation Attitudes. An increase in weapons association also
increases the probability of the radiation threat being viewed as "man-made", further decreasing the
value of Radiation Attitudes.
7. Nuclear Dread
Figurel2 describes the role of negative imagery related to radiation and nuclear technology in inducing the fear of mass destruction in the minds of the public.
A decrease in media favourability and an increase in exposure to apocalyptic film and literature in-
creases the fear of "nuclear winter". This fear leads to an increase in socially catastrophic potential.
A decrease in media favourability also increases the fear of long term effects of radiation, thereby
66
fear of long term
+
socially catastrophic
potential
media favourability
+
effects of radiation
fear of "nuclear
winter"
Figure 12: Nuclear Dread
increasing socially catastrophic potential. An increase in socially catastrophic potential results in a
highly negative attitude towards radiation.
5.5
Testing the Model
The model was tested by considering the following scenarios-
1. Does the model explain the nuclear fear post Fukushima? Does it explain the Radiation
Attitudes and responses of the public after the accident? Does it explain the extensive negative
media coverage?
The Fukushima Daiichi incident is a recent example where all attempts at explaining the extremely
low levels of risk associated with nuclear power seem to fall of deaf ears. According to the dose
estimation report released by the WHO, using conservative assumptions, the assessment shows that
the total effective dose received by characteristic individuals in two locations of relatively high
exposure in Fukushima prefecture during the first year after the accident is within a dose band of
10 to 50 mSv. In the rest of Fukushima prefecture the effective dose was estimated to be within
a dose band of 1 to 10 mSv, and in the rest of Japan, with a few exceptions, at about 0.1-1 mSv.
By comparison, the average annual dose to a person from natural background radiation is about 2.4
mSv globally, rising to 13 mSv in some regions of the world [56]. Yet, the public as well as the
media seems to focus on the nuclear disaster rather than the estimated 18,000 deaths caused by the
67
earthquake and tsunami.
The selectiveness of the media could be explained by the theory of "cultural resonances", which
states that some media narratives have a natural advantage because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes. These resonances increase the appeal of the media discourse.
Thus, public opinion influences media discourse indirectly, through journalists' beliefs, sometimes
inaccurate, about what the public is thinking. In their commentary, journalists frequently attempt to
articulate and crystallize a set of responses that they hope or assume will be shared by their audience
[57]. This phenomenon is also reflected in the radiation attitudes-media favourability loop.
The "nuclear context" for nuclear technology in Japan is negative due to the bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki during World War II. However, this negative context did not play a very big role in
public acceptance of nuclear energy because the "perceived personal benefit" of nuclear power
outweighed the influence of "nuclear context" and "proximity to extreme nuclear event".
However, after the accident at Fukushima, the factors like "socially catastrophic potential", "perceived personal risk", "probability of threat being viewed as man-made" increased drastically in
value. The risk benefit tradeoff leaned highly towards an increased personal risk, thereby making
Radiation Attitudes negative. "Trust in nuclear enterprise" was diminished significantly. Moreover,
the "lack of scientific agreement" regarding post-accident health, safety and environmental issues
further affected the "trust in nuclear enterprise" and increased the "sense of uncertainty". "Trust in
opposition groups" increased and extremists ended up being more highly credited. The decrease in
"trust in nuclear enterprise" led to the reinforcement of negative Radiation Attitudes as described
by the social trust loop.
The loss of "sense of control" and increase in " sense of uncertainty" further increased the "perceived
personal risk". All these factors led to the development of highly negative "Radiation Attitudes" in
the public.
Thus, a negative "Radiation Attitudes" created an appetite for negative media coverage and better
news was discounted. The negative "media favourability" further increased the feeling of dread and
resulted in further decrease in value of "Radiation Attitudes", as described by the Media Favourability Loop. This cycle resulted in an amplification of the true damage caused by the accident.
68
2. Does the model explain public acceptance of radiation from medical procedures?
The public acceptance of medical procedures that involve radiation can be explained by the causal
loop diagram for Radiation Attitudes. The most significant loop to be considered is the Risk-Benefit
Tradeoff Loop. An individual perceives an extremely high "personal benefit" from medical procedures. In fact, he would not be undergoing a medical procedure unless it was absolutely necessary.
A desire to be healthy trumps any risk from radiation that the individual might perceive. Because of
this, "Radiation Attitudes" tend to lean away from the negative side, the magnitude depending on
the individual.
Another factor which leads to positive "Radiation Attitudes" when it comes to medical radiation is
the social trust. On average, the public trusts doctors much more than nuclear project implementers.
As explained by the Social Trust Loop, this trust reduces "perceived personal risk", thereby increasing the value of "Radiation Attitudes", which further reinforces " trust in enterprise".
The "sense of control" that an individual experiences during a medical procedure is also high, since
the individual chooses to undergo the procedure voluntarily. The increased " sense of control" also
reduces "perceived personal risk".
Another variable that differentiates medical radiation is the "nuclear context". Medicinal application
of radiation do not have a negative historical context associated with them. There is no history of
accidents, and the public does not associate it with weapons. The value of " socially catastrophic
potential" is also extremely low since there is no threat of a large scale disaster resulting from
medical procedures involving radiation.
"Media favourability" also plays an important role in increasing public acceptance of medical radiation. The public is constantly bombarded with stories about every minor event at nuclear facilities.
Even the smallest faults are highlighted. The overall image of the nuclear enterprise in the media
tends to be highly negative. However, medical radiation does not suffer this disadvantage.
Ar-
ticles warning the public about the dangers of irradiation from medical procedures are extremely
infrequent.
Thus, due to all the factors and causal relationships described above, Radiation Attitudes concerning
radiation from medical applications tend to be on the positive side.
69
3. Does the model explain widespread opposition to nuclear waste repositories?
Nuclear waste repositories provoke a different response among the public than nuclear power plants.
On one hand, the lay public is concerned with the long term disposal of spent fuel, and recognizes
the logical necessity of developing a solution. On the other hand, they seem to be strongly opposition
building a spent fuel repository in their surroundings. This could be a manifestation of the NIMBY
(Not In My Back Yard) phenomenon, but the Radiation Attitudes model further explains the reasons
for this opposition.
The first step is to look at the Risk-Benefit Tradeoff Loop. The lay public does not perceive any
benefit from having a spent fuel repository in their surroundings. The merits of implementing a
solution for safe handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel is not something most individuals
can relate to personally. There would be no tangible benefits like electricity from nuclear power
plants. Due to these reasons, the "perceived personal benefit" variable would be low. However,
the lay public would view the facility as a hazard in terms of increased levels of radiation in the
surroundings. This would increase the "perceived personal risk". The mechanics of nuclear waste
disposal are not fully understood by the lay public, even less than operations of a nuclear power
plant. The low level of "familiarity" results in low " knowledge confidence". The radiation threat,
through extremely low, is perceived as dangerous.
Another factor that must be considered is the idea that the spent fuel would remain in the repository
for generations. This greatly increases the "fear of long term effects of radiation". The public fears
that even though there might not be immediate consequences, the facility could pose a risk in the
future. The fear of long term effects explains why facilities which may be located in remote areas
face opposition. Even though a layman would not perceive a risk to himself in his lifetime, he could
be concerned about the potential hazards posed by the facility to future generations. A sense of
responsibility towards preserving the environment could also be an influencing factor.
All these factors lead to the formation of negative "Radiation Attitudes" concerning waste repositories.
70
4. Does the model explain the Radiation Attitudes of the stakeholders in Carlsbad, New Mexico, after the radiation leak at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in February 2014?
The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a deep geologic
repository for permanent disposal nuclear waste from the nation's nuclear defense program. WIPP is
the nation's only repository for the disposal of mostly o- emitting transuranic (TRU) waste, consisting of clothing, tools, rags, residues, debris, soil and other items contaminated with small amounts
of plutonium and other man-made radioactive elements. Deep geological disposal in salt beds was
chosen for the long-lived TRU waste[58].It is interesting to consider the example of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) which is around 42 km from Carlsbad, New Mexico. The stakeholders in
this region have extremely favourable attitudes towards the plant. The stakeholders in this region realize the long term benefits of having DOE projects in the area, and have a high " perceived personal
benefit". Their "trust in enterprise" is also extremely high. Since the WIPP has been operating in the
region for several years, the stakeholders are more familiar with such a facility than stakeholders in
regions that do not have nuclear facilities. This increases their "familiarity with nuclear science and
technology", and hence increases " knowledge confidence". The overall "Radiation Attitudes" are
positive, which explains why a new facility would receive a high level of stakeholder acceptance.
The positive attitude of the leaders and residents of Carlsbad was tested in March 2014, after a
radiation leak due to which isotopes of americium and plutonium were found on above-ground
air filters. Preliminary test results indicated 13 employees working above ground that day had
inhaled or ingested radioactive material. But it was the first serious incident in WIPP's history, and
Carlsbad still appears to have confidence in the site. WIPP has been a stable economic base for
lifelong residents. About 1,000 people in Carlsbad, which is a city of 26,000, are employed by
WIPP or related contractors, and the site's annual budget is about $215m per year. Eddy County
Commissioner Susan Crockett, who represents Carlsbad has been quoted as saying, "Those are our
high-paying jobs, they support our baseball teams, they are part of our community". This clearly
implies that the "perceived personal benefit" is high enough to outweigh any "perceived personal
risk".
In fact, town officials are hoping their corner of New Mexico can be the home of even more nuclear
wastes. Eddy County and the neighbouring Lea County have formed the Eddy-Lea Energy Alliance
71
(ELEA), proposing an aboveground interim storage site for spent fuel produced by power plants
awaiting a permanent US repository. When asked recently whether the leak would affect ELEA's
future, Mr. John Waters, the city development director said that it was a separate project that would
have to "stand on its own merits anyway." "Moving forward, their safety record is going to be phenomenal," Ms Crockett said. "There's no reason for us to not feel safe having WIPP there[59]."
The "trust in nuclear enterprise" has maintained its levels inspite of the accident. The single event
has not significantly changed the values of " sense of control", "knowledge confidence" or sense of
uncertainty". High "perceived personal benefit", high " familiarity with nuclear science and technology" and high "trust in nuclear enterprise" remain the dominant factors shaping public attitudes
towards radiation.
Thus even, though there is an increase in public concern regarding safety, which is fair given the
circumstances, the overall attitude towards radiation continues to remain positive, and support for
ELEA does not seem to have diminished.
72
6
Validation of Model by Interview Data
The interviews conducted as a part of this work represent the first stage of the validation of the
model for Radiation Attitudes. The hypothesized causal relationships in the model were tested by
conducting interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to understand an individual's beliefs, the
bases for these beliefs, and the process of their formation. The interviews enabled verification of
the variables and relationships in the model. The most significant interdependencies and links in the
causal loop diagram were also identified.
Interview protocols were also developed for the refinement and verification of the models for stakeholder acceptance at the local, state and federal level. However, testing of these models will be
carried out in the next stages of validation, and is beyond the scope of this work.
6.1
Interview Method
Recognizing the sensitivity of individuals when it comes to issues related to nuclear technology
and radiation, an unconventional approach was necessary for gathering relevant data. Surveys or
questionnaires as a means of understanding formation of attitudes were ruled out, since data from
such surveys rarely shed light on the root causes of a particular phenomenon. Such quantitative
studies pay a price for their standardized precision. Because they ask the same questions in the
same order of every respondent, they do not obtain the full picture. Instead, the information that
they obtain from any one person is fragmented, made up of bits and pieces of attitudes, observations
and appraisals[60].
In order to determine the origins of Radiation Attitudes among the public, we needed more from respondents than a choice among categories. The interview questions were dynamically refined based
on their responses during the interview. A set of reference questions was used as a guideline, but the
interviews were conducted in a conversational manner. This method for conducting interviews has
been termed as "qualitative interviewing". The analysis of these interviews relies less on counting
and correlating, and more on interpretation, summary and integration. This method enables one to
gain in the coherence, depth and density of the material which each respondent provides[60].
73
All interviews were governed by the MIT protocols for use of human subjects, among which is
assurance of confidentiality for all interviewees.
6.2
Interviews for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level
In order to understand the level of acceptance and the individual factors affecting stakeholder acceptance at a local level, the approach taken is described as follows.
The first step was to provide the interviewee with information about the particular nuclear facility.
To begin with, questions would be asked to get a general idea of how the individual views the
facility, and his level of acceptance. Then, questions would be asked regarding the variables directly
affecting acceptance, mainly the factors that affect perception of risk and benefit. Subsequently, the
questions would lead to the to the end variables.
The facility of intent would be discussed within the context of the set of facilities for hazardous
or controversial projects, (e.g., hydraulic fracturing, construction of new electrical transmission
facilities, biohazard laboratories, etc.)
The responses would be analyzed to estimate the degree of correlation between the hypothesized
links in the causal loop diagram and the interviewee responses. The dominant links and loops would
be noted. The relative weight of each variable in influencing stakeholder acceptance would also be
determined. This process would enable drawing a conclusion on the level of acceptance for the
facility, which would be correlated with the initial views that the interviewee expressed. The comparison between an interviewee's initial response regarding acceptance and the conclusion drawn
on the basis on his responses regarding influencing factors would be valuable for understanding the
mechanism by which individuals form opinions about a particular facility.
The reference questions for analyzing stakeholder acceptance at a local level are given in Appendix
B. 1. The questions are formulated based on the causal loop diagram in Figure 3.
6.3
Interviews for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level
In order to understand the level of acceptance and the individual factors affecting stakeholder acceptance at the state and federal level, the approach taken is described as follows.
74
The first step, similar to the local level acceptance interview, was to provide the interviewee with
information about the nuclear facility being considered. To begin with, questions would be asked
to get a general idea of how the individual views the facility, and his level of acceptance. Then,
questions would be asked regarding the variables directly affecting acceptance. In the case of stakeholders at the state and federal level, these variables are different from those at the local level. But
the approach would be the same, starting with the variables considered to be most important and
then working through the causal loops. The analysis of responses would be carried out in the same
manner as described for interviews at the local level.
The reference questions for analyzing stakeholder acceptance at the state and federal level are given
in Appendix B.2. The questions are formulated based on the causal loop diagram in Figure 4.
6.4
Interviews for Determining Radiation Attitudes
In order to understand the formation of Radiation Attitudes, and the individual factors that may alter
or affect these attitudes, the approach taken is described as follows.
The interview approach for determining Radiation Attitudes would be similar to the previous two
cases. The first step would be to get a general overview of the interviewee's opinion of radiation and
nuclear technology. Then questions would be asked regarding the influencing factors, with a view
of extracting information, not only about the effects of a particular Radiation Attitude, but more
importantly about the root causes of the attitude.
For individuals that display a high perception of risks and low perception of benefits, the aim would
be to find out if the Radiation Attitudes are indeed negative, and if so, understand why. The interview would then seek to gain information about variables other than risk and benefit, which shape
Radiation Attitudes. A conclusion regarding the interviewee's Radiation Attitude would be drawn
based on this analysis. A comparison between an interviewee's initial response regarding attitude
towards radiation, and the conclusion drawn on the basis on his responses regarding influencing factors would be valuable for understanding the mechanism by which Radiation Attitudes are formed.
The reference questions for analyzing attitudes of individuals towards nuclear technology and radiation are given in Appendix B.3. The questions are formulated based on the causal loop diagram in
75
Figure 5.
6.5
Selection of Interviewees
Individuals belonging to the stakeholder groups discussed in Section 3.2 are ideal candidates for
interviews aimed at determining stakeholder acceptance of a facility and Radiation Attitudes. However, one of the major challenges encountered was getting the consent of these stakeholders to
participate in the interview process. Requests made to local and state level government stakeholders
were not answered. The anti-nuclear opposition groups, both at the local and state level refused to
participate. These difficulties in arranging the interviews were unanticipated.
The interviews conducted for the purpose of this work were focused on understanding the dynamics underlying the formation or Radiation Attitudes. The interviewees selected for this purpose
were residents of Massachusetts, USA. They were well educated individuals, from a good socioeconomic background. Their level of knowledge related to nuclear science and technology was
very low. The interview candidates were men and women, belonging to an age group of 50 to 80
years. These individuals were selected because they could be potential stakeholders if a new nuclear project was proposed in their region. The age group selected would enable validation of the
hypothesized historical factors affecting the formation of Radiation Attitudes.
Details about the interviewees are not included in this work in accordance with the confidentiality
guidelines put forth by the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES).
76
7
Interview Data and Analysis
The objective of the interviews was to determine the relative strength of the causal linkages in
the models for stakeholder acceptance and Radiation Attitudes. The interviewees' responses were
compared to the causal loop diagrams for nuclear project acceptance and Radiation Attitudes. The
degree of correlation of the interviewee responses with the model was evaluated, and important
variables and links were identified.
7.1
Interview No. 1
The MIT Reactor was selected as the first case for conducting interviews to test the model. There
was a proposal to convert the reactor from high enriched uranium to low enriched uranium, which
would result in a redesign of the fuel matrix and change in operating parameters.
The aim of
the interview was to determine the attitude of the interviewee towards this proposed change in
terms of acceptance of the facility. After determining the views of the interviewee with regards
to acceptance, the objective was to gain an understanding of the interviewee's attitude towards
radiation and nuclear technology on a broader scale.
The interview was initiated by providing a brief description of the MIT reactor and the proposed
fuel change. The description is outlined in Appendix C. The detailed responses
The first part of the interview was conducted using the questions in Appendix B.1 as a guideline.
The aim was to gain an understanding of the interviewee's views about the MIT Reactor and the
interviewee's reaction to the proposed fuel change. A summary of the interviewee's responses is
given in Appendix D. 1.1. The next part of the interview focused on gaining a general understanding of the interviewee's views towards radiation and nuclear technology. The reference questions
used for conducting the interview are outlined in Appendix B.3. A summary of the interviewee's
responses is given in Appendix D.1.2. Since the interviewee was well educated and from a good
socio-economic background but had little familiarity with nuclear science and technology, he represented the large subset of the population whose attitudes the model aims to understand.
77
7.1.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops
Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.
1. Nuclear Context
The most significant interdependencies that were identified based on the interviewee's responses
were those related to nuclear context. Most of the interviewee's opinions of radiation and the threat
of nuclear war were formed due to early exposure to situations and circumstances that resulted in
an extremely negative nuclear context. Growing up during the cold war and living through the
Cuban missile crisis, fear of a nuclear war was a part of the interviewee's daily life. This made
the weapons association extremely high. "duck and cover" drills in school and talk of protective
bunkers further increased the fear of nuclear weapons, which translated to a negative context when
it came to nuclear technology in general. Radiation provoked a feeling of dread in the interviewee,
making his Radiation Attitude negative.
2. Confidence and Control
Another factor that was emphasized throughout the interview was the lack of knowledge when it
came to nuclear technology. The interviewee was unfamiliar with many aspects of radiation and
nuclear technology and did not have confidence in his knowledge. The sense of uncertainty was
very high with regards to the effects of radiation. Several questions came up regarding the safety
levels, safe doses, extent of contamination and other characteristics of radiation. The low value of
knowledge confidence and high sense of uncertainty led to an extremely high value of perceived
personal risk, which resulted in negative Radiation Attitudes.
7.1.2
Identification of Important Links
The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 13. Their
description is provided below.
1. Low familiarity with nuclear science and technology leads to low knowledge confidence
2. Low knowledge confidence and low perceived detectability of radiation lead to high sense of
uncertainty
78
ved
sense of
uncertainty
scientific agreement
detectabi lity of
radiatj on
percei
expos ire to expert
com nunication
+
+
_
potentia +
fear of "nuclear
winter"
-
fear of long term
effects of radiation
weapons
association
nuclear context
nuclearevent
xtreme
probability of threat
being viewed as
"man-made"
exposure to
apocalyptic film and
literature
socially catastrophic
RADIATION
ATTITUDES
awareness and
involvement
Figure 13: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.1
perceived probability of
competent project
execution
-
transparency in
industrial practices
trust in nuclear
enterprise
-perceive
ersonal risk
perceived
personal benefit +
sense of control
level of eucalion
trust in opposition
_
groups
<prox imity to
extreme nuclear
event>
-
knowledge
confidence
familiarity with nuclear
science and technology
munictionsocio-political
socio-economic
status
-
media favourakility
media credibility
3. High sense of uncertainty results in high perceived personal risk
4. An extremely high weapons association and proximity to extreme nuclear event leads to an
extremely negative value of nuclear context.
5. An extremely high weapons association leads to a high value of socially catastrophic potential
6. Low media favourability leads to a high value of fear of long term effects
7. High value of fear of long term effects leads to increased socially catastrophic potential
8. Low perceived personal benefit, high perceived personal risk, negative nuclear context, low
media favourability and high socially catastrophic potential lead to negative Radiation Attitudes
7.2
Interview No. 2
The aim of the first part of the interview was to gain a general understanding of projects that the
interviewee considered hazardous. Questions were asked to understand the interviewee's perceived
costs and benefits related to these projects. The interview questions were focused on understanding
the basis for the interviewee's attitudes, and the process by which these attitudes are formed. A
comparison of attitudes towards controversial projects in general, and nuclear projects was useful
for determining the role and significance of Radiation Attitudes.
The next part of the interview focused on gaining a general understanding of the interviewee's views
towards radiation and nuclear technology. The reference questions used for conducting the interview
are outlined in Appendix B.3. A summary of the interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.2.
7.2.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops
Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.
1. Social Trust Loop
Social trust was a very important factor influencing the formation of the interviewee's attitudes
towards radiation. He displayed a general distrust of authority, which could be a result of lack of
80
transparency in industrial practices. He believed that industries and government agencies sacrificed
public interest in favour of personal profit motives. The fact that most of the information that the
public could gather was provided by these sources also increases his sense of mistrust. He felt the
need for gaining accurate information, but did not trust media sources to provide it. These beliefs
led to an extremely low value of trust in nuclear enterprise, which greatly increased his perception
of risk, and were a significant factor contributing to negative Radiation Attitudes.
An interesting link highlighted by the interviewee was the positive influence of presence of opposition groups. His belief that opposition groups asked questions which resulted in better analysis of
the project or technology and resulted in higher accountability of the project implementers.
7.2.2
Identification of Important Links
The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 14. Their
description is provided below.
1. Lack of scientific agreement leads to a high sense of uncertainty
2. Trust in opposition groups increased perceived probability of competent project execution (contrary to model hypothesis)
3. Low probability of threat being viewed as "man-made" results in increase in positive value of
Radiation Attitudes
4. Low media favourability results in negative nuclear context
5. Negative nuclear context decreases the value of Radiation Attitudes
6. High proximity to extreme nuclear event results in increased perceived personal risk
7. Decreased transparency in industrial practices decreases trust in nuclear enterprise
8. Decrease in trust in nuclear enterprise increases perceived personal risk
9. Increasing perceived personal benefit decreases perceived personal risk
10. Increasing sense of control decreases perceived personal risk
11. Decreasing perceived personal risk increases value of Radiation Attitudes
81
00
scientific agreement
percei ved
detectabi lity of
radiati on
sense of uncertainty
exposure t( expert
communi cationsoi-oica
+
+
-
transparency in
ente
industrialpractices
ise
potenti
fear of "nuclear
winter"
+
fear of long term
effects of radiation
exposure to
apocalyptic film and
literature
+
+
-
weapons association
nuclear contexW
proximity to extreme
nuclear event
probability of threat
being viewed as
"man-made"
socially catastrophic
risemedia
RADIATION
ATTITUDES
awareness and
involvement
socio-political
Figure 14: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.2
perceived probability of
competent project
execution
ente
trust in nuclear
-
perceive
ersonal risk
personal benefit
sense of control
level of education
trust in opposition
groups
proximiIy to
extreme nuclear
xet
-
knowledge
confidence
+~'
familiarity with nuclear
science and technology
socio-economic
status
media credibility
favouruaility
+
12. Increasing perceived personal benefit increases value of Radiation Attitudes
13. Positive Radiation Attitude increases trust in enterprise
7.3
Interview No. 3
The interview was conducted based on the same approach as Interview No. 2. A summary of the
interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.3.
7.3.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops
Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.
1. Risk Benefit Tradeoff
The interviewee formed his attitude towards radiation based on a tradeoff between the risks and
benefits of nuclear technology. In his case, the extremely high perception of risk, caused by lack of
trust in enterprise, low sense of control, high uncertainty regarding radiation, and an extremely low
sense of benefit resulted in highly negative Radiation Attitudes.The negative Radiation Attitudes
further decreased the interviewee's sense of benefit, resulting in an extremely high risk-low benefit
scenario.
2. Social Trust Loop
The importance of the trust variable was highlighted in the interviewee's responses. The reinforcing
nature of the social trust loop described in Figure 7 was clearly visible in the attitude of the interviewee. The interviewee was adamantly distrustful of the nuclear enterprise as well as government
agencies, believing that they rarely protected public interests. The low trust in nuclear enterprise
increased his risk perception and resulted in negative Radiation Attitudes, further decreasing trust
in enterprise. The interviewee's connection with prominent opposition groups also played a role in
his negative image of the nuclear enterprise.
3. Nuclear Context
Another important phenomenon influencing the interviewee's Radiation Attitudes was his context of
nuclear technology. Historical background had greatly influenced his views, specially the exposure
83
to the threat of nuclear weapons at an early age. This caused the interviewee to be anxious about
the dangers of radiation causing large scale destruction.
7.3.2
Identification of Important Links
The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 15. Their
description is provided below.
1. Increasing trust in opposition groups decreases trust in nuclear enterprise
2. Decreasing transparency in industrial practices decreases trust in nuclear enterprise
3. Decreasing trust in nuclear enterprise increases perceived personal risk
4. Decreasing perceived personal benefit increases perceived personal risk
5. Increasing perceived personal risk and decreasing perceived personal benefit result in negative
Radiation Attitudes
6. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases perceived personal benefit
7. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases trust in nuclear enterprise
8. Lack of scientific agreement increases sense of uncertainty
9. Increase in sense of uncertainty and low sense of control increase perceived personal risk
10. Increasing Weapons association leads to negative nuclear context
11. Negative nuclear context results in negative Radiation Attitudes
12. Increasing Weapons association increases socially catastrophic potential
13. Fear of long term effects of radiation increases socially catastrophic potential
14. Fear of nuclear winter increases socially catastrophic potential
15. Increasing socially catastrophic potential leads to negative Radiation Attitudes
16. Negative Radiation Attitudes result in increase in socially catastrophic potential
84
00
percei ved
detectabi lity of
radiati on
/
exposure to expert
communi cation
scientific
agreement
sense of
uncertainty
+
+
*nncea
+
+
weapons
association
fear of "nuclear
winter"
-
fear of long term
effects of radiation
probability of threat
being viewed as
"man-made"+
nuclearcontext
proximity t extreme
nuclear event
exposure to
apocalyptic film and
literature
potentia +
sociallycatastrophic
RADIATION
TTITUDES
SOC u-Pu L ca
awareness and
involvement
Figure 15: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.3
perceived probability of
competent project
execution
transparency in
-
industrialpractices
ente se
ent nre
trust
-
-perceive
ersonal risk
perceived
personal benefit
sense of control
levelofeducation
trust in opposition
groups
evenlI>
proximity o
extreme nuclear
knowledge
confidence
familiarity with +nuclear
science and technology
socio-economic
status
-
mediafavourablity
media cre dibility
7.4
Interview No. 4
The interview was conducted based on the same approach as Interview No. 2. A summary of the
interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.4.
7.4.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops
Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.
1. Risk Benefit Tradeoff
The interviewee said that in order to form an opinion, one must look at the tradeoffs between nuclear
energy and other forms of energy, to see which has greater negative consequences. His responses
indicated that he weighed the costs and benefits of the technology before forming an opinion. The
risk-benefit tradeoff was the most important factor influencing his final attitude. Variables like trust
in enterprise, and benefits of nuclear energy, in terms of efficiency and reduced emissions reduced
his perceived personal risk. The positive Radiation Attitude also reinforced his sense of benefit,
further reducing perceived personal risk. The negative historical context associated with nuclear
technology was overpowered by the low perceived personal risk and high perceived personal benefit.
2. Social Trust Loop
The main factor that resulted in a low perceived personal risk and hence a positive Radiation Attitude
was the interviewee's trust in the nuclear enterprise. The high level of trust was an outcome of his
perceived competency of the enterprise, transparency in industrial practices, and positive historical
view of the technology. The interviewee recognized the fact that the frequency of accidents in the
nuclear enterprise had been very low, and this led to his high level of trust.
7.4.2
Identification of Important Links
The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 16. Their
description is provided below.
1. Increasing perceived personal benefit decreases perceived personal risk
2. Decreasing perceived personal risk increases value of Radiation Attitudes
86
00
percei' ved
detectabi lity of
radiati on
exposure t expert
communi cation
scientific
agreement
sense of
uncertainty
+
+
4-
+
weapons
-
fear of "nuclear
winter"
fear of long term
eifdfects of radiation
probability of threat
being viewed as
"man-made"+
nuclearcontext
-
proximity to extreme
nuclear event
exposure to
apocalyptic film and
literature
potential +
+
socially catastrophic
mediafavourability
-
RADIAT
ATTITUE
A
socio-political
p
awareness and
involvement
Figure 16: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.4
perceived probability of
competent project
execution
transparency in
industrialpractices
trust in nuclear
teru
n e rassociation
ente
jse
perceive
personal risk
perceived
personal benefit
sense of control
level of education
trust in opposition
groups
evenlt
proxnnity to
extreme UCleiear
knowledge
confidence
.,"
familiarity with nuclear
science and technology
socio-economic
status
-
media cre dibility
3. Increasing perceived personal benefit increases value of Radiation Attitudes
4. Positive Radiation Attitudes increase trust in enterprise
5. Increased transparency in industrial practices increases trust in nuclear enterprise
6. Increase in trust in nuclear enterprise decreases perceived personal risk
7. Low media favourability results in negative nuclear context
8. Weapons association results in negative nuclear context
9. Negative nuclear context decreases the value of Radiation Attitudes
10. High weapons association results in increase in socially catastrophic potential
11. Low media favourability results in negative Radiation Attitudes
12. Lack of scientific agreement increases sense of uncertainty
7.5
Interview No. 5
The interview was conducted based on the same approach as Interview No. 2. A summary of the
interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.5.
7.5.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops
Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.
1. Risk Benefit Tradeoff
The interviewee perceived a very low level of benefit and a high sense of risk, which led to extremely
negative Radiation Attitudes.
2. Social Trust Loop
Lack of trust in the nuclear enterprise played an important role in shaping the interviewee's Radiation Attitudes. The low level of trust was a result of low perceived competency of the enterprise,
and lack of transparency in industrial practices. The negative Radiation Attitudes further reinforced
the low levels of trusts and increased the values of perceived personal risk.
88
3. Confidence and Control
The interviewee felt no control over the outcomes of technology.
The lack of control and low
familiarity with the technology decreased his knowledge confidence.He also experienced a high
level of uncertainty with regards to the effects of radiation. These factors further increased the
perceived personal risk.
7.5.2
Identification of Important Links
The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 17. Their
description is provided below.
1. Lack of scientific agreement leads to a high sense of uncertainty
2. High sense of uncertainty results in high perceived personal risk
3. Decreasing sense of control results in high perceived personal risk
4. Decreasing sense of control decreases knowledge confidence
5. Low familiarity with nuclear science and technology decreases knowledge confidence
6. Decreasing transparency in industrial practices decreases trust in nuclear enterprise
7. Decreasing trust in nuclear enterprise increases perceived personal risk
8. Decreasing perceived personal benefit increases perceived personal risk
9. Increasing perceived personal risk and decreasing perceived personal benefit result in negative
Radiation Attitudes
10. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases trust in nuclear enterprise
11. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases sense of control
12. Fear of nuclear winter increases socially catastrophic potential
13. Increasing socially catastrophic potential leads to negative Radiation Attitudes
14. Negative Radiation Attitudes result in increase in socially catastrophic potential
15. Increasing Weapons association leads to negative nuclear context
16. Negative nuclear context results in negative Radiation Attitudes
89
detectabi lity of
radiat ion
percei ved
exposure t expert
communi cation
scientific
agreement
sense of
uncertainty
transparency in
industrialpractices
'e
+
potenti
exposure to
winter"
fear of "nuclear
fear of long term
effects of radiation
apocalyptic film and
literature
+
association
weapons
x
proximity t extreme
nuclear event
of threat
being viewed as
"man-made"+
socially catastrophic
+
RADIATION
TTITUDES
+
involvement
socopolitical
awareness and
Figure 17: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.5
competent project
execution
perceived probability of
rsops
groups
ent
trust in nuclear
-_
perceive
ersonal risk
+
-probability
+
personal benefit
perceived
sense of control
level of educaTion
trust in opposition
proximity to
extreme nujCear
v enh>
knowledge
confidence
+
+'
familiarity with nuclear
science and technology
status
socio-economic
-
media favourability
media cre dibility
7.6
Interview No. 6
The interview was conducted based on the same approach as Interview No. 2. A summary of the
interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.6.
7.6.1
Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops
1. Risk Benefit Tradeoff
The interviewee's low perception of benefits, and the high perception of risks from a nuclear project,
was one of the main reasons for the formation of negative Radiation Attitudes. The interviewee was
very concerned about both physical and emotional costs of a nuclear disaster. The risk of a nuclear
meltdown clearly outweighed any potential benefits.
2. Social Trust Loop
The interview responses showed that trust plays a vital role in the formation of Radiation Attitudes.
In the case of Interviewee no. 6, the low level of trust in the nuclear enterprise and the positive view
of opposition groups resulted in extremely negative Radiation Attitudes. Lack of transparency in
the nuclear industry was one of the reasons for the low level of trust.
3. Nuclear Context
The context in which the interviewee viewed nuclear technology was extremely negative due to
his past experiences. The events he encountered in his childhood, significantly affected his views
f nuclear technology and radiation. The interviewee's introduction to radiation was in the context
of nuclear bombs being dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which resulted in a high weapons
association. The talk of bomb shelters during the Cold War further strengthened this association.
This resulted in a highly negative nuclear context, which led to a negative attitude towards radiation.
4. Media Favourability Loop
The negative tone of the media reinforced the negative nuclear context. The fact that the media
was selective in the stories that were published, focusing more on the negative aspects of nuclear
technology, contributed to the interviewee's negative nuclear context. The negative nuclear context
91
led to a negative attitude towards radiation. The negative Radiation Attitudes resulted in further
decrease in media favourability.
7.6.2
Identification of Important Links
The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 18. Their
description is provided below.
1. Low familiarity with nuclear science and technology results in low knowledge confidence
2. Low knowledge confidence leads to a high sense of uncertainty
3. High sense of uncertainty results in high perceived personal risk
4. Decreasing transparency in industrial practices decreases trust in nuclear enterprise
5. High level of trust in opposition groups results in decrease in trust in nuclear enterprise
6. Decreasing trust in nuclear enterprise increases perceived personal risk
7. Decreasing perceived personal benefit increases perceived personal risk
8. Increasing perceived personal risk and decreasing perceived personal benefit result in negative
Radiation Attitudes
9. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases trust in nuclear enterprise
10. Fear of long term effects of radiation increases socially catastrophic potential
11. Increasing socially catastrophic potential leads to negative Radiation Attitudes
12. Negative Radiation Attitudes result in increase in socially catastrophic potential
13. High weapons association leads to increase in socially catastrophic potential
14. High weapons association leads to a higher probability of the threat being viewed as "manmade"
15. High weapons association leads to negative nuclear context
16. Low media favourability leads to negative nuclear context
17. Negative nuclear context results in negative Radiation Attitudes
18. Negative Radiation Attitudes lead to decrease in media favourability
92
sense of
uncertainty
scientific agreement
perceived
detectability of
radiation
exposure to expert
communication
++
+
+
industrialpractices
transparency in
+
fear of "nuclear
winter"
fear of long term
effects of radiation
literature
exposure to
apocalyptic film and
potentia +
"man-made"
weapons
association
nuclear context
proximity to xtreme
nuclear event
probability of threat
being viewed as
socially catastrophic +
RADIATION
ATTITUDES
awareness and
involvement
Figure 18: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.6
perceived probability of
competent project
execution
+
n nuca
ente 7i e
perceived
personal benefit
trust in nuclear
perceived
ersonal risk
-
+
sense of control
level of education
trust in opposition
groups
proximity n
extreme nuclear
event>
-
knowledge
confidence
+
+
familiarity with nuclear
science and technology
commnicaionsoclo-political
socio-economic
status
-
inediafavourability
media credibility
7.7
Quantification of Responses
The interview responses were used to quantify the variables in the causal loop diagram and the
results are produced in Table 2.
Table 2: Quantification of CLD Variables using Interview Data
No.
1
CLD Variable
Radiation
Range
Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview
1
2
3
4
5
6
-1 to 1
-0.7
0.5
-1
0.6
-0.9
-0.9
0 to 1
0.2
0.8
0
0.7
0.5
0.1
0 to 1
0.9
0.5
1
0.5
0.9
0.8
-1 to 1
0.5
-0.5
0
0.9
-0.2
-0.7
-1 to 1
0.2
0.5
0.7
0.1
0
0.9
0 to 1
0.2
0.3
0
0.8
0.2
0
0 to 1
0.5
0.8
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
Attitudes
2
Perceived
Personal
Benefit
3
Perceived
Personal Risk
4
Trust in Nuclear
Enterprise
5
Trust in
Opposition
Groups
6
Transparency in
Industrial
Practices
7
Perceived
Probability of
Competent
Project
Execution
94
8
Scientific
0 to 1
0.5
0
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.5
0 to 1
0.7
0.7
0.2
0.6
0.1
0.5
0 to 1
0.8
0.7
1
0.8
0.5
1
0 to I
1
1
1
1
1
1
Oto l
1
1
1
1
1
1
0 to 1
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.3
0.3
0
0 to 1
0.3
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.1
0
0 to 1
0.2
0.4
1
0.5
0.2
0.3
0 to 1
1
0.8
0.4
0.5
0.7
0.9
0 to 1
0
0.3
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.5
-1 to 1
-0.5
-0.5
-1
-0.5
-0.5
-1
Agreement
9
Sense of
Control
10
Socio-Political
Awareness and
Involvement
11
SocioEconomic
Status
12
Levelof
Education
13
Familiarity with
Nuclear
Science and
Technology
14
Exposure to
Expert
Communication
15
Knowledge
Confidence
16
Sense of
Uncertainty
17
Perceived
Detectability of
Radiation
18
Media
Favourability
95
19
Media
-1 to 1
-0.5
-0.7
1
0
-0.5
0.2
-1 to 1
-1
-1
-1
-0.1
-0.5
-I
0 to 1
0.5
0.3
0.5
0
0
0
0 to 1
1
0
1
0.9
0.9
1
0 to 1
0.5
0
1
0.5
0.6
0.9
0 to 1
1
0.1
1
0.9
0.2
1
0 to 1
0.2
0.2
1
0.1
0.9
1
0 to 1
0.1
0
0.2
0
0
0
0 to 1
1
0.5
1
0.3
0.9
1
Credibility
20
Nuclear
Context
21
Proximity to
Extreme
Nuclear Event
22
Weapons
Association
23
Probability of
Threat being
Viewed as
"Man-made"
24
Fear of Long
Term Effects of
Radiation
25
Fear of
"Nuclear
Winter"
26
Exposure to
Apocalyptic
Film and
Literature
27
Socially
Catastrophic
Potential
96
7.8
Results
The most significant interdependencies across the set of interviews conducted are listed in Table 3.
The values assigned for each interviewee range from 0 to 1. A value of "1" represents the highest
level of significance of a particular interdependency for the interviewee, while "0" represents the
lowest. The proportion of interviewees who considered a particular interdependency to be important
is also shown. Since the sample size is small, a triangular distribution was assumed. The confidence
intervals were calculated about the mean values, using the following method.
Confidence Interval
=
p+z
p is the mean of the sample
a is the standard deviation
a is the significance level, for a 95% confidence level, a= 0.05
z is the (1 - a) percentile of the standard normal distribution, for a 95% confidence level, z=1.96
c is the number of positive responses
n is the sample size, or number of people interviewed
Significant Interdependency
Interviewee No.1
Interviewee No.2
Interviewee No.3
Interviewee No.4
Interviewee No.5
Interviewee No.6
Sample size "n"
Sample mean "p"
Standard deviation "or"
Significance level "a"
Confidence interval
Lower limit
Upper limit
Risk
Benefit
Tradeoff
Social
Trust Loop
Nuclear
Context
Confidence
and
Control
Media
Favourability
Loop
0.3
0.1
1
0.5
0.5
0.9
6
0.5500
0.3450
0.05
0.2760
0.2740
0.8260
0.1
0.9
1
0.6
0.7
0.9
6
0.7000
0.3286
0.05
0.2630
0.4370
0.9630
0.8
0.5
1
0.1
0.2
0.7
6
0.5500
0.3507
0.05
0.2806
0.2694
0.8306
1
0.2
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.1
6
0.4500
0.3146
0.05
0.2518
0.1982
0.7018
0.4
0
0.6
0
0.5
0.8
6
0.3833
0.3251
0.05
0.2601
0.1232
0.6434
Table 3: Analysis of Interview Data
97
Social Trust was the most important factor influencing Radiation Attitudes, followed by RiskBenefit Tradeoff. Nuclear Context also played an important role, but more interviewees across
different age groups need to be conducted to determine its significance. Confidence and Control,
and Media Favourability were the other important interdependencies that were identified.
The cause-effect relationships in the model correspond well with interviewee responses. However,
one phenomenon that the model did not capture was the positive influence of opposition groups. For
Interviewee no. 2, as indicted in his responses in Appendix D.2.2, the presence of opposition groups
increased perceived probability of competent project execution, contrary to what was hypothesized.
More interviews need to be conducted to determine whether this effect is a significant factor for the
general population, or whether it was an exception.
A new variable, "socio-political awareness and involvement" was added, which did not exist in
the initial version of the model. This variable was found to influence the "sense of control." Sociopolitical awareness and involvement was identified when "level of education" and "socio-economicbackground" proved insufficient to account for the sense of control experienced by an interviewee.
98
8
Conclusions
The first stage of validation of the model for Radiation Attitudes was successful. The interviews
provided a means for testing the causal relationships hypothesized in the model. Some links were
found to be stronger than others, as illustrated in the causal loop diagrams. The model for Radiation Attitudes correlated well with the information inferred from the interviews. The hypothesized
variables and relationships in the causal loop diagram were also consistent with the interview data.
Apart from the addition of the variable "socio-political awareness and involvement", no modifications were made in the model.
This work is the first step towards objectively defining the causes and structure of the emotional
responses to radiation and nuclear technology, which influence stakeholder acceptance of a nuclear
project. This work provide a framework for individuals or organizations seeking to understand
the dynamics of the formation of Radiation Attitudes. This understanding could be translated to
policies and strategies during planning and execution of nuclear projects which adequately account
for stakeholder values in the decision making process.
8.1
Recommendations for Future Work
Complete validation of the model describing Radiation Attitudes is an iterative process which requires more interviews to be conducted. Future interviews should be conducted across a variety
of age groups and socio-economic backgrounds. Interviews conducted with individuals from a
younger age group will enable examination of the relative importance of historical factors in shaping Radiation Attitudes. A larger sample size will enable more accurate results to be obtained.
Analysis of interview data from several sources can ultimately help in quantifying the factors described in the model. The data from interviews conducted as a part of this work, and from future
interviews will enable assignment of weights or betas to the different links in the model, thus quantitatively representing the level of influence of one variable on another. Regression algorithms can
be used to analyze the data and identify the variables which have a statistically significant impact.
The developed Radiation Attitudes model will ultimately influence the broader models for stakeholder acceptance of new nuclear projects, (Figures 3 and 4), and help provide a better understand-
99
ing of the effect of Radiation Attitudes on nuclear project acceptance.
Interviews across other stakeholder groups have also been planned, and the protocols have been laid
out in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The reference questions have been provided in Appendix B. 1 and
Appendix B.2. These interviews will enable validation of the models for stakeholder acceptance at
the state, local and federal level.
The challenges faced in this work, primarily the reluctance of certain stakeholders to participate in
interviews have provided valuable lessons for future work. Care must be taken while approaching
potential interview candidates, and the work must be explained in an unbiased manner. The interviewer should also acknowledge the possibility of confirmation bias in the data, since the interviews
conducted are qualitative. The interview questions and method can be further refined in an attempt
to overcome the confirmation bias.
100
A
Variable Definition & Quantification Table for Local & State/Federal
CLDs
The following table was produced by Adam David Williams [3], as a part of the research project
titled "Scholarship for Nuclear Communications and Methods for Evaluation of Nuclear Project
Acceptability". The project is aimed at developing a deeper understanding of stakeholder relationship dynamics for acceptance of controversial technology projects - like nuclear facilities, electrical
transmission facilities, hydraulic fracturing operations, etc.
101
Stock/Flow Variable
CLD Variable
Stock
Description
Meaning of Lowest Value
Meaning of Highest Value
Range
LOCAL CLD VARIABLES
Stakeholder
Acceptance
Extent to which stakeholder
group supports a specific
nuclear project
0 to I
Local Socioeconomic
Condition (i)
Comparison of local social and
economic factors to national
averages
0 to 1
Perceived Pride in
Nuclear Facility (i)
Degree of intrinsic value of the
nuclear project felt by
stakeholder group
Perceived Positive
Environmental Event
Extent to which nuclear energy
has a net positive impact on the
(i)
environment
Media Favorability (c)
Extent to which media reports
are positive, neutral or negative
Source of
Media/Information (i)
Credibility of Negative
Framing
Y
'0' indicates active rejection of (e.g.,
actively protesting against) a
specific nuclear project
'1' indicates active acceptance of
(e.g., actively lobbying for) a
specific nuclear project
'0' indicates local economic
'1' indicates sustained local
stagnation (e.g., high poverty, high
unemployment - above national
averages)
economic growth (e.g., low poverty,
low unemployment - below national
averages)
0 to 1
'0' indicates no intrinsic value from
nuclear project
'1' indicates absolute intrinsic value
from nuclear project
-1 to I
'-I' indicates belief that nuclear
energy only has net negative impact
on the environment
'1' indicates belief that nuclear
energy only has net positive impact
on the environment
-I to I
'-I' indicates prejudicially negative
(e.g., demonizing) tone
'I' indicates extremely positive
(e.g., canonizing) tone
Extent to which stakeholder
trusts or feels their values align
with source of information
0 to 1
'0' indicates absolutely no
alignment between stakeholder
values and source of information
'1' indicates absolute alignment
between stakeholder values and
source of information
Extent to which negative
framing of nuclear project is
considered credible or
0 to 1
'0' indicates negative framing of
nuclear project is considered 100%
'l' indicates negative framing of
nuclear project is considered 0%
trustworthy
trustworthy
trustworthy
Framing (Negative) (c)
Extent to which the dominant
perspective of stakeholders
toward a nuclear project is
negative
-1 to 0
'-1' indicates that the dominant
perspective of stakeholders is 100%
positive toward a nuclear project
'0' indicates that the dominant
perspective of stakeholders is 100%
negative toward a nuclear project
Perceived Risk from
Project
Probability of fatality to
individual from the nuclear
project
-1 to 0
'-1' indicates 100% perceived
likelihood of fatality to the
individual
'0' indicates 0% perceived
likelihood of fatality to the
individual
Perceived Benefit from
Project
Comparison of new/old local
net benefit from nuclear project
-i to I
'-I' indicates complete loss of net
benefit (e.g., decreased property
values & tax revenue, increased
unemployment) from nuclear
project
'1' indicates perfect gain of net
benefit (e.g., increased property
values & tax revenue, decreased
unemployment) from nuclear
project
Danger (c)
Cumulative measure of
objective risks associated with
a nuclear project
-1 to 0
Y
'-1' indicates accumulation of
objective risks equals the maximum
objective value of each input
variable
'0' indicates accumulation of
objective risks equals the minimum
objective value of each input
variable
Opportunity
Cumulative measure of
objective benefits associated
with a nuclear project
-i to
0
Y
'0' indicates accumulation of
objective benefits equals the
maximum objective value of each
'I' indicates accumulation of
objective benefits equals the
minimum objective value of each
input variable
input variable
'-1' indicates risk only considers
'1' indicates risk only considers sum
sum of associated dangers
of associated benefits
'0' indicates complete rejection of
frequency of threatening events
'1' indicates complete inclusion of
frequency of threatening events
Fungibility
Extent to which stakeholders
-1 to 1
consider risk as danger or as
opportunity
Cognitive Inclusion of
Perceived Threat
Extent to which low frequency
of adverse events at nuclear
facilities are included in
0 to 1
Frequency
stakeholder group risk
determination ['S' Curve
threshold benefit value];
from nuclear project
from nuclear project
@
Perceived Frequency
Relative expected time between
event occurrences
0 to 1
'0' indicates no time between
expected events (e.g., continuously
occurring events)
'I' indicates infinite time between
expected events (e.g., never
occurring events)
Probability the Benefit
is Realized
Extent to which a stakeholder
group realizes
publicized/expected benefits
from the nuclear project ['S'
Curve @ threshold social trust
value]
0 to 1
'0' indicates absolutely no
realization of publicized benefits
'I' indicates complete realization of
publicized benefits
Probability Project
Safety and Security
Expectations are Met
Extent to which desired levels
of safety and security are
achieved by the nuclear project
0 to 1
'0' indicates absolutely no level of
desired safety/security reached
'1' indicates level of desired
safety/security perfectly reached
Perceived Threat of
Radiation (i)
Probability of fatality to
individual from radiation
-i to
'-1' indicates any exposure to
radiation will cause death
'1' indicates any exposure to
radiation will enhance health
Fairness (i)
Extent to which dangers
associated with nuclear project
are equally shared by
public/stakeholders
0 to 1
'0' indicates that all dangers are
localized and experienced by a small
subset of the public
'I' indicates that all dangers are
equally experienced the entire
public
Extreme Events at
Nuclear Facilities (i)
Extent to which adverse events
at nuclear facilities are included
in attitude formation
0 to 1
'0' indicates 0% inclusion of past
adverse events in attitude formation
'0' indicates 100% inclusion of past
adverse events in attitude formation
Probability Nuclear
Waste Issue is
Extent to which the nuclear
waste storage and security issue
is resolved to satisfaction of
-l to 0
'-1' indicates nuclear waste issue
completely unresolved
'0' indicates nuclear waste issue
completely resolved
1
Resolved
stakeholders
Nuclear Weapons
Association (i)
Degree to which the specific
nuclear project is associated
with nuclear weapons
0 to 1
'0' indicates 0% association of
nuclear project with weapons
'' indicates 100% association of
nuclear project with weapons
Perceived Probability
of Competent
Execution
Extent to which stakeholder
group desired levels of
competent project
implementation are achieved
by the nuclear project
0 to 1
'0' indicates absolutely no level of
desired competent implementation
reached
'1' indicates level of desired
competent implementation reached
perfectly reached
Perceived
Transparency of
Project Implementer
Extent to which stakeholder
group desired levels of project
implerenter transparency are
achieved
0 to 1
'0' indicates absolutely no level of
desired transparency reached
'1' indicates level of desired
transparency reached perfectly
reached
Probability First
Reporting of
Publicized Mistake is
from the Project
Implementer (i)
Extent to which the project
implementer is first to report to
stakeholders ['S' curve
behavior? Where is the
threshold?]
0 to 1
'0' indicates project implementer
not able to issue first reports
'l' indicates project implementer is
able to issue first reports
Importance of
Publicized Mistake to
Stakeholder
Extent to which an additional
publicized mistake is
considered significant to a
stakeholder group [Exponential
curve vs. 'Probability of
Publicized Mistake']
0 to 1
'0' indicates absolutely no
significance of an additional mistake
'I' indicates absolute significance of
an additional mistake
Social Trust in Project
Implementer
Extent to which stakeholder
groups are willing to rely on
the project implementer of a
0 to I
'0' indicates absolutely no trust in
the project implementer to make
decisions
'I' indicates absolute trust in the
project implementer to make
decisions
V
specific nuclear project make
decisions in situations where
the group lacks the resources to
personally make a decision
Degree of Implementer
Awareness of
Stakeholder Values
Extent to which the project
implementer understands the
salient values of stakeholder
groups
0 to 1
Degree of Opposition
Awareness of
Stakeholder Values
Extent to which the nuclear
project opposition understands
the salient values of
stakeholder groups
-1 to
Stakeholder
Empowerment (i)
Extent to which stakeholder
groups can participate in
0 to 1
0
'0' indicates absolutely no
understanding of stakeholder group
values
'I' indicates complete
understanding of stakeholder group
values
'0' indicates absolutely no acts to
align with stakeholder group values
'1' indicates acts to perfectly align
with stakeholder group values
'0' indicates absolutely no
stakeholder group participation
'1' indicates complete stakeholder
group participation
'-1' indicates prejudicially negative
'1' indicates extremely positive use
(e.g., well informed proponents) of
nuclear S&T
decisions and actions of the
nuclear project
Knowledge Confidence
Extent to which knowledge of
-I to
1
use (e.g., well informed opponents)
of nuclear S&T
nuclear S&T is positively,
negatively or neutrally utilized
regarding a specific nuclear
project
Familiarity with
Nuclear S&T (i)
Extent to which a stakeholder
group has knowledge in and
comfort with technical aspects
of nuclear science and
technology
0 to 1
'0' indicates absolutely no
knowledge in or comfort with
nuclear S&T
STATE/FEDERAL CLD VARIABLES
'l' indicates perfect knowledge in
or comfort with nuclear S&T
Likelihood of Specific
Nuclear Project
Receiving the Permit
or License (c)
Expected probability of a
nuclear project receiving a
license or permit
0 to 1
'0' indicates absolutely no
likelihood of a license/permit being
received
'1' indicates absolute likelihood of a
license/permit being received
Perceived National
Socioeconomic
Benefits
Comparison of new/old
national economic benefit from
nuclear project
0 to 1
'0' indicates complete lack of
benefits (e.g., increased GHGs,
decreased energy security, loss of
high-tech jobs) from nuclear project
'1' indicates complete increase in
benefits (e.g., decreased GHGs,
increased energy security, gain of
high-tech jobs) from nuclear project
Perceived National
Costs from Project
Comparison of new/old
national costs from nuclear
project
'-l' indicates complete increase of
costs (e.g., political/social capital,
subsidies & upfront costs) from
nuclear project
'0' indicates complete lack of costs
(e.g., political/social capital,
subsidies & upfront costs) from
nuclear project
Additional Cost to
Project Implementer of
License Approval
Extent to which state/national
decision makers or processes
increase the cost of the nuclear
project to the project
implementer
0 to
'0' indicates no additional cost to
the project implementer
'I' indicates level of prohibitive
additional cost to the project
implementer (e.g., discontinue the
project)
Cost of Viability of
Continuing the Nuclear
Project
Extent to which the cost of
continuing the nuclear project
is no longer fiscally viable for
the project implementer
0 to 1
'0' indicates complete fiscal
viability of continuing to the project
implementer
'1' indicates absolutely no fiscal
viability of continuing to the project
implementer
Project Implementer
Ability to Meet NRC
Expectations
Extent to which the project
implementer meets the national
regulator expectations
regarding the nuclear project
0 to 1
'0' indicates complete lack of the
project implementer meeting
national regulator expectations
'I' indicates perfect achievement by
the project implementer of national
regulator expectations
Perceived Project
Implementer License
Extent to which the project
implementer submits a quality
0 to
'0' indicates extremely poor quality
license/permit submittal
'1' indicates perfect quality
license/permit submittal
-1 to 0
1
1
Application Quality
license/permit application
Additional NRC
License Expectations
Level of additional
license/permit expectations
expected by the national
regulator
0 to
Time for NRC to
Consider License
Application
Amount of time taken during
the license/permit application
process (during which the
project implementer is
expected to maintain progress
forward on the nuclear project)
['S' curve behavior? At a
threshold level of 'Probability
of Criticism of National
Regulator']
Probability of
Criticism of NRC
Level of criticism lobbied
toward the national regulator
regarding a specific nuclear
project
Opposition Legal,
Social Actions
1
'0' indicates zero additional
expectations form national regulator
'I' indicates prohibitive level of
additional expectations from
national regulator
0 to I
'0' indicates no additional time
taken during the applications
process
'1' indicates prohibitive amount of
time taken during the applications
process (e.g., long enough time to
where cumulative costs leads to
discontinuing the project)
0 to
1
'0' indicates no criticism of the
national regulator regarding a
specific nuclear project
'1' indicates prohibitive levels of
criticism of the national regulator
regarding a specific nuclear project
Extent to which oppositional
stakeholder groups are acting to
delay or stop progress on a
specific nuclear project
0 to
1
'0' indicates no oppositional actions
to delay or stop a specific nuclear
project
'l' indicates prohibitive levels of
oppositional actions to delay or stop
a specific nuclear project
National Anti-Nuclear
NGO Activities
Extent to which national antinuclear entities are acting
against nuclear projects
0 to
1
'0' indicates no national anti-nuclear
actions against nuclear projects
'I' indicates prohibitive levels of
national anti-nuclear actions against
nuclear projects
Resources Provided by
Extent to which national anti-
0 to I
'0' indicates no national anti-nuclear
'I' indicates prohibitive levels of
National Anti-Nuclear
NGOs to Local
Opposition (c)
nuclear entities provide
resources to local opposition
groups for a specific nuclear
project
Political Controversy
from Supporting
Specific Nuclear
Project (c)
Extent to which supporting a
specific nuclear project results
in political controversy
0 to
Constituent Support for
Specific Nuclear
Project
Extent to which a decisionmakers constituents support a
specific nuclear project
Stakeholder Consensus
in Support for Specific
Nuclear Project
resources provided to local
opposition of specific nuclear
projects
national anti-nuclear resources
provided to local opposition of
specific nuclear projects
1
'0' indicates no political controversy
associated with supporting a specific
nuclear project
'I' indicates prohibitive levels of
political controversy associated with
supporting a specific nuclear project
0 to
1
'0' indicates no constituent support
of a specific nuclear project
'' indicates complete constituent
support of a specific nuclear project
Extent to which different
stakeholder groups hold a
consensus in support for a
specific nuclear project
0 to
1
'0' indicates no stakeholder
consensus for a specific nuclear
project among stakeholder groups
'I' indicates complete stakeholder
consensus for a specific nuclear
project among stakeholder groups
Probability of
Politician Re-Election
from Supporting
Specific Nuclear
Project
Extent to which supporting a
specific nuclear project
increases the likelihood of a
politician's re-election
-1 to I
'-I' indicates increase in politician's
re-election with complete rejection
of a specific nuclear project
'I' indicates increase in politician's
re-election with complete support of
a specific nuclear project
Politician Support of
Specific Nuclear
Project by State
Government
Extent to which state
government politicians support
a specific nuclear project
-I to I
'-I' indicates absolute rejection of a
specific nuclear project by state
government
'I' indicates absolute support of a
specific nuclear project by state
government
Political benefit of
Supporting Specific
Nuclear Project
Extent to which political
benefit relates to supporting a
specific nuclear project
-I to
'-' indicates political benefit comes
from absolute rejection of a specific
nuclear project
'I' indicates political benefit comes
from absolute support of a specific
nuclear project
1
National Pro-Nuclear
NGO Activities (i)
Extent to which national pronuclear entities are acting in
support of nuclear projects
0 to
1
'0' indicates no national pro-nuclear
actions supporting nuclear projects
'' indicates significant levels of
national pro-nuclear actions
supporting nuclear projects
National Economic
Condition (i)
National averages of social and
economic factors
0 to
1
'0' indicates national economic
stagnation (e.g., high poverty, high
unemployment - above national
averages)
'l' indicates sustained national
economic growth (e.g., low poverty,
low unemployment - below national
averages)
Degree of National
Opinion Poll Data
Showing Support for
Nuclear Facilities (i)
Extent to which public opinion
polls show support for nuclear
facilities
0 to
1
'0' indicates absolutely no national
public support for nuclear facilities
'1' indicates absolute national
public support for nuclear facilities
Project Implementer
Capacity
Extent to which a project
implementer is capable of
completing the required tasks
for progressing the nuclear
project ['S' curve behavior? At
a threshold level of 'Additional
National Regulator License
Expectations']
0 to
1
'0' indicates severe insufficiency of
project implementer capacity
'1' indicates overabundance of
project implementer capacity
NRC Confidence in the
Project Implementer
Extent to which the NRC has
confidence in the Project
Implementer to successfully
operate a nuclear project
0 t ol
'0' indicates absolutely zero
confidence of the NRC in the
Project Implementer to successfully
operate a nuclear project
'I' indicates absolute confidence of
the NRC in the Project Implementer
to successfully operate a nuclear
project
***Perception = reality/expectations... from a conceptual to operational perspective
B
B.1
Interview Questions
Interview Questions for Stakeholder Acceptance at a Local Level
1. What is your view of the XYZ facility?
2. Why do you feel this way?
3. What do you think are the benefits of XYZ facility?
4. What according to you are the negative aspects of the facility?
5. What would your opinion be about the desirability of a government-approved nuclear project in
your city?
6. Do you see potential benefits from such a project?
7. What are your sources of information about nuclear technology?
8. Do you think the media are favourable? Why?
9. Do you think the media are acceptably credible? Why?
10. Do you trust the project implementer? Why?
11. Do you think the project implementer is acceptably transparent? Why?
12. Have there been any events of concern to yourself at the facility?
13. How did you learn about these mistakes?
14. How did these events change your views of the facility?
15. Do you think that the project implementer adequately takes into account the views of local
stakeholder groups?
16. Are you proud of having XYZ facility in your surroundings? Why?
17. Do you think there are any environmental benefits associated with XYZ facility? Why?
18. Do you perceive an immediate danger from the facility? Why?
19. Do you associate the facility with issues of concern about nuclear technology like weapons
proliferation? Why?
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20. Do you feel well informed about nuclear matters? Why?
21. Is nuclear waste an issue of concern to you? Why?
22. Do you think your safety and security concerns are being met by the project implementer?
23. What is your view of opposition groups? Why?
B.2
Interview Questions for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level
1. What is your view of the XYZ facility?
2. Why do you feel this way?
3. What do you think are the national socio-economic benefits of XYZ facility?
4. What according to you are the national costs of the facility?
5. What do you think is the likelihood of the project receiving a permit/license? Why?
6. What are your views of national anti-nuclear NGO's and their activities? Why?
7. Do you see a link between national anti-nuclear NGO's and local opposition groups?
8. What are your views of national pro-nuclear NGO's and their activities? Why?
9. Do you perceive a political benefit from supporting the project? Why?
10. Would opinion poll data showing public support of nuclear facilities influence your views?
11. Does your constituency support the project?
12. Is there consensus among stakeholder groups in support/opposition for the project?
13. Do you think the NRC has confidence in the project implementer? Why?
14. Do you think the project implementer is capable of meeting NRC expectations? Why?
15. What do you think would be the quality of the project implementer's license application? Why?
16. What do you think will be the approximate time required by NRC to consider the license
application? Why?
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B.3
Interview Questions for Determining Radiation Attitudes
1. How would you characterize nuclear technology?
2. If you were advising someone else about nuclear technology, what would you suggest to them?
3. How would you characterize the benefits of nuclear technology?
4. What do you think are some of the solutions for global climate change? Do you believe that
nuclear energy can help us to alleviate global warming? Should its use be encouraged? If yes, how;
if not, what else should be done?
5. How confident are you that serious global warming will be prevented? Why?
6. Do you believe nuclear energy is safe enough? Why?
7. Do you think there are negative aspects of nuclear technology?
8. How would you characterize these negative aspects?
9. What uncertainties related to nuclear technology are of concern to you?
10. What are your major concerns about nuclear facilities? How are they different for those used to
treat diseases, provide better industrial materials and provide energy?
11. Do you trust the nuclear enterprise? Why?
12. Do you think the nuclear enterprise is acceptably transparent in its practices? Why?
13. Do you trust government agencies to protect the public?
14. Do you trust anti nuclear activists and other environmental groups? Why?
15. Do you think the nuclear enterprise is competent in its execution of projects? Why?
16. Have you ever encountered lack of competence or dishonesty in the nuclear enterprise? A lack
of politeness?
17. Do you think there is a lack of scientific agreement when it comes to information about nuclear
technology?
18. Does this affect your views of nuclear technology?
19. Are you uncertain about the benefits or costs of nuclear technology? Why?
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20. Does the lack of detectability of radiation affect your views? Why?
21. Were you or your acquaintances ever affected by a nuclear accident?
22. Has this affected your views? Why?
23. How did you learn about radiation?
24. What are your views about radiation?
25. Do you fear radiation more than other things in life? Why?
26. Are you familiar with nuclear science and technology?
27. Are you confident with your level of knowledge? Why?
28. Have you been exposed to expert communication regarding nuclear technology?
29. Has this affected your views about nuclear technology?
30. Do you think your education has affected your views about nuclear technology? Why?
31. Do you think your socio-economic background has affected your views about nuclear technology? Why?
32. Do you think nuclear technology has a socially catastrophic potential? Why?
33. Do you think there are adverse long term effects of nuclear technology?
34. Does this affect your views of nuclear technology? Why?
35. Did the Fukushima/ Three Mile Island/ Chernobyl accidents change your views about nuclear
technology? Why?
36. Do you consider these disasters to be "man-made"? Why?
37. Do you associate nuclear technology with nuclear weapons? Why?
38. Did you read any books or watch any movies which related to nuclear technology?
39. Did this impact your opinion? Why?
40. Do you believe that a nuclear disaster could potentially lead to a "nuclear winter"?
41. Are there any historical factors which have shaped your opinion of nuclear technology? What
are these factors?
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42. Why did they affect your opinion?
43. Who do you believe is the most credible source of information about nuclear matters? About
other matters concerning energy and society?
44. Do you think the media are adequately credible? Why?
45. Do you think the media are favourable? Why?
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C
Description of MITR-II and Proposed Changes
The MITR-JI, the major experimental facility of the NRL, is a heavy-water reflected, light-water
cooled and moderated nuclear reactor that utilizes flat, plate-type, finned, aluminum-clad fuel elements. The average core power density is about 70 kW per liter. The maximum fast and thermal
neutron flux available to experimenters are 1.2 x 10 14and 6 x 10 13 neutrons/cm 2 s, respectively. Experimental facilities available at the MIT research reactor include two medical irradiation rooms,
beam ports, automatic transfer facilities (pneumatic tubes), and graphite-reflector irradiation facilities. In addition, several in-core experimental facilities (ICSAs) are available. It generally operates
24/7, except for planned outages for maintenance. The MITR-II encompasses a number of inherent
(i.e., passive) safety features, including negative reactivity temperature coefficients of both the fuel
and moderator; a negative void coefficient of reactivity; the location of the core within two concentric tanks; the use of anti-siphon valves to isolate the core from the effect of breaks in the coolant
piping; a core-tank design that promotes natural circulation in the event of a loss-of-flow accident;
and the presence of a full containment. These features make it an exceptionally safe facility[61].
Description of the Proposed Fuel Change
Concern about use of Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
in civilian nuclear facilities arose due to proliferation risks. The RERTR Program was initiated by
the U.S. Department of Energy in 1978. The Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors
(RERTR) Program develops technology necessary to enable the conversion of civilian facilities
using high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. During the Program's
existence, over 40 research reactors have been converted from HEU (= or >20% U-235) to LEU
(< 20% U-235) fuels, and processes have been developed for producing radioisotopes with LEU
targets[62].
However, some high performance research reactors like the MIT reactor have a compact core and
use HEU because they need a higher power density and higher neutron flux. MITR-II currently
has the same power density as an LWR, which enables simulations of LWR conditions.
Power
density would be significantly reduced if MITR-II was simply retrofitted with LEU. It would result
in significant reduction in criticality. In order to enable conversion from HEU to LEU, there is a
necessity of higher density LEU (approx. 5 times higher) to get the required U-235 density. The
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current fuel matrix is not qualified for this. A new matrix is being tested by RERTR.
Significance of Conversion to LEU
There is a proliferation risk associated with use of HEU in
civilian facilities, not just in the US, but also abroad. The US wants to serve as an example for other
countries to convert to LEU.
Challenges associated with Proposed Fuel Change
Maintaining high performance after switch-
ing to a lower enrichment will be a significant challenge. There have also been challenges in fuel
fabrication. A small amount of fuel was fabricated and tested in ATR, but there are concerns whether
it can be fabricated economically on a large scale. Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) would have to start
an entirely new fabrication line to produce this new fuel. Since the DOE assumes the responsibility
of providing university reactors with fuel free of charge, the LEU fuel, once qualified, would have
to be paid for by the DOE. This could be a problem if it is prohibitively expensive.
Reactions to Proposed Fuel Change
MIT fully supports the conversion to LEU. In the US, there
is no resistance to the conversion.
Implications of Proposed Fuel Change
Most other reactors in the US have converted directly
to LEU. However, since MITR-II is a high performance reactor, it will have to compensate for
loss of neutron flux. It is proposed that the power level will have to be increased to 7 MW. This
would require redesigning the fuel matrix. The current number of 15-plates/fuel element will have
to be increased to around 18-19 plates/fuel element. There will also be changes in the operating
parameters. In addition to higher power, the mass flow rate will increase by around 10%. The
operating temperatures will also be higher.
Using LEU calls for reduction of cladding thickness to compensate for lower fuel density. The
initial proposal was to reduce the thickness from 20 mil to 10 mil. However, B&W increased this
to 12 mil due to manufacturing constraints. There is also another engineering problem in terms
of cladding thickness. Currently, the MITR has a unique design feature consisting of longitudinal
fins on the surface of the cladding which increase the surface area by a factor of 2. The proposed
117
design calls for removal of these fins due to thinner cladding. The operating temperature and other
parameters will have to be adjusted to account for this.
The new design is being studied thoroughly by MIT and RERTR. The amendments to the core
design will be submitted to the NRC for their approval. The redesign is feasible from the engineering
point of view and there are no adverse safety implications.
However, the new fuel has to be qualified by RERTR. The economics and feasibility of fabrication
must also be taken into account.
Stakeholders
The stakeholders in the proposed conversion of MITR-II from high enriched ura-
nium to low enriched uranium are identified below.
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Operates the MITR-II and is responsible for the
design and engineering of the new fuel matrix in collaboration with RERTR
- Department of Energy (DOE) - Assumes the responsibility and cost of providing MITR-II with
fuel.
- Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program - Develops technology
necessary to enable the conversion of civilian facilities in the United States from HEU to LEU fuel.
New fuel matrix design will have to be qualified by RERTR
- Babcock and Wilcox (B&W)- Responsible for fuel fabrication.
- Cambridge residents - People living in the region around the MITR-II
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D
D.1
D.1.1
Detailed Interview Responses
Interviewee No. 1
Responses to Questions related to the MIT Reactor and Proposed Fuel Change
1. Knowledge about the MIT reactor
The interviewee was a resident of Cambridge, Massachusetts, where the MIT reactor is located.
Despite being well educated, the interviewee only found out about the MIT reactor about a year
ago. He also stated that he sometimes even forgot that the reactor exists. He felt that he did not
know a lot about nuclear technology but was reassured by his neighbor, a policewoman, that the
facility was secure.
2. Social Trust
The interviewee stated that he trusted MIT and felt more at ease since knowledgeable people were
working on the MIT reactor and proposed fuel change, but wanted assurances that safety is ensured.
He said he would feel much better knowing that it is MIT or an MIT- like institutions handling
matters related to nuclear technology. He did not fully trust government agencies.
3. Concern about Radiation
The interviewee was concerned about radiation and evacuating a densely populated area like Cambridge in the event of an accident at the MIT reactor. He was worried about an event like Fukushima
happening at the reactor since he believed that Massachusetts is also a seismically active area and
earthquakes that could potentially cause a reactor meltdown are beyond human control. He was
concerned about his family and the health effects of radiation. He had several questions about radiation like- What are the byproducts? Can it spread? How long is it around? Where does it go? How
is it contained? He was afraid that radiation could cause genetic defects and was very concerned
about the effects of radiation on future generations.
4. Perceived Sense of Benefit
The interviewee did not perceive any personal benefits to himself from the MIT reactor and stated
that sometimes he even forgot that it was there. He acknowledged that there were benefits in terms
119
of scientific and medical research. He said that he would like more information about the benefits
from the facility as he felt that he did not have complete knowledge about it. He also said that
benefits do not always justify the costs associated with a technology.
5. Need for Information
The interviewee believed that information was the key factor for preventing fear and imagination
from running wild when it came to a nuclear facility. He was not sure about accuracy of government
sources but thought that MIT would be a good source of information.
6. Acceptability of New Reactor
He stressed the fact that since the MIT reactor already existed, he was accepting of the facility and
did not oppose any fuel changes carried out by the university. However, the interviewee was not
sure how he would feel about a new reactor. He said that his unfamiliarity with radiation made
him edgy about a new facility. He would want information about any new project, to address his
concerns about radiation. He said that there was a lot of fear of nuclear war around him growing up,
and that his early experiences described below made him less acceptable of a new facility.
D.1.2
Summary of Responses to Questions related to Radiation Attitudes
1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology
When asked how he would characterize nuclear technology, the interviewee stated that nuclear
technology was necessary and beneficial in terms of energy and medical applications. He stated
that he did not think of nuclear reactors in the same terms as the technologies used in nuclear
medicine. He stressed the importance of implementing the technology knowledgeably and safely.
He emphasized the need to pay attention to public concerns.
2. Nuclear Context and Weapons Association
The interviewee first learned about radiation from nuclear weapons tests. He was concerned about
genetic effects of the radiation release from the Nevada test site and wondered where the radiation
went.
He remembered the "duck and cover" drills at his school and talk of protective bunkers
during the cold war which a factor that induced fear of being bombed. He also stated that the events
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at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were significant factors contributing to the fear. He said that these early
experiences were important in terms of his knowledge of risks and benefits.
He grew up listening to the church talk about nuclear war. He lived through the Cuban missile
crisis, and always had the sense of being seconds away from nuclear war. Because of this historical
association, whenever he thinks of radiation, he thinks of nuclear war.
However, the interview said that he was more comfortable now that atmospheric testing had stopped.
He also felt more comfortable with newer nuclear technology.
3. Risk-Benefit Tradeoff
The interviewee thought information about the benefits of nuclear technology would be helpful.
He also wanted to be assured about the safeguards and competence of the operators. He realized
that there had been accidents in other industries, like oil spills etc., but believes that the scale of
destruction and cost of human life is not as huge in those accidents.
4. Concern about Nuclear Wastes
The unresolved problem of disposal of nuclear wastes was a factor of concern for the interviewee.
He expressed a deep concern for the planet, and what was being dumped in the oceans. He did not
believe that any of the nuclear wastes disappeared harmlessly, but rather led to contamination of the
food chain and aquatic life. He again stressed that he wanted to know where exactly nuclear waste
goes and what is done with it. He also wanted information how much waste was produced, and
about safe levels of radiation. Some other questions he wanted answered were- Who is it affecting?
Are babies more affected? How are we affected? How is it stored? How protected is it? He
mentioned again that information about all these matters would be reassuring.
5. Influence of Media and Imagery
With regards to media, the interviewee believed that media get people riled up about some problems
which may be controversial. He relied on media for information but did not fully trust them. He
stated that during the Fukushima accident in Japan, there was a lot of uncertainty about the credibility of the stories. But he trusted the images of the disaster that were displayed and found them
quite "scary."
He felt that because the media constantly bombarded the public with stories about North Korea and
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Iran, he felt that the threat of nuclear bombs being used was present all the time, which increased
fear of the technology.
He also mentioned the recent radiation leak at WIPP, and said that images in the media like a father
holding his little child, worried about the effect of radiation on his child, caused him great concern.
6. Influence of Books and Popular Media on Radiation Attitudes
The interviewee remembered reading about Marie Curie and her husband, and their work related
to radiation.
He said that the fact that Marie Curie had died due to radiation scared him. He
acknowledged the fact that both our understanding of the phenomenon and safety measures are
far better today than in Marie Curie's time. However, the incident provided him a perspective on
radiation and its effect on human body.
7. Proximity to Nuclear Event
The interviewee felt very strongly about the effects of the Fukushima accident on the public. The
interviewee's sister and nephew had friends in Tokyo, so he personally knew people close to the
accident location. He said that he was extremely worried about the people in Japan.
8. Social Trust
The interviewee stressed the necessity of a particular level of technological expertise for running
a nuclear facility. He trusted experts and professionals, but was unsure about trusting government
agencies. He thought that there was a lack of transparency on the part of the concerned agencies in
Japan after the Fukushima accident.
9. View of Opposition Groups
With regards to opposition groups, the interviewee said that he listened to the views expressed by the
groups. In case of extreme groups, he made an effort to check the facts before forming an opinion.
He wished to separate fact from fiction, since he realized that not everything the opposition groups
said might be of real concern.
10. Perception of Nuclear Accidents as Primarily "Man-made"
The interviewee believed there was a human factor involved in some of the nuclear accidents. He
acknowledged that Fukushima was caused due to an earthquake and tsunami, but is not sure whether
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the authorities in Japan did a good job of managing it. He does not know if it was handled safely.
He also stated that now that we are aware of the design faults, we can improve them, but we cannot
control everything.
11. Sense of Control and Empowerment
The interviewee believed that as a citizen, he had a voice in the government. He felt that if he had
a concern, it would be addressed. He said that he had avenues for voicing his concerns, even if
there was no guarantee of the concerns being addressed. He also emphasized that groups have more
control than an individual. Hence, being a part of a group can increase an individual's sense of
empowerment.
12. Knowledge and Information
The interviewee mentioned several times throughout the interview that knowledge is the key factor
that would help address all his concerns. He had several unanswered questions and believed that
if information was provided, he would be able to make a better judgment. He said that his fear of
radiation is probably irrational, but there is always the possibility that "something could happen".
Having information was the most effective way of curbing this irrational fear.
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D.2
Interview No. 2
D.2.1
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects
The interviewee stated that he had a favourable attitude towards technology in general, but was
concerned about the misuse of technology. He was worried about technologies that pollute the
environment, giving the examples of oil spills and chemical spills. An important point of concern
was the fact that some project implementers do not provide accurate information to the public, or
even withhold information. It was the combination of environmental pollution, lack of transparency
by project implementers, and low level of awareness among the public, that caused him concern.
The interviewee recognized some benefits of technology, like increase in efficiency of industrial
processes, reduction in manual labour, better communication and faster travel.
D.2.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes
1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology
With regards to nuclear technology, the interviewee stated that he did not know too much about it.
He had heard people say that it is safe if nothing went wrong, but the consequences of an accident
were very severe. He characterized nuclear technology as clean, efficient and economical.
2. Risk Benefit Tradeoff
He thought nuclear power as a response to climate change was a great idea. He stated that he was not
very knowledgable about nuclear technology, but saw the benefits of reduced pollution and higher
efficiency. He was not worried about nuclear waste, since he believed that every technology has
some problems which need to be resolved.
3. Opinion of Medical Radiation
He did not have information about the differences between radiation from nuclear facilities and
radiation from medical and other applications. But he believed that government standards were acceptable, and he trusted the US regulatory authorities with regards to acceptable levels of exposure.
4. Trust
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The interviewee stated that project implementers usually had their personal profit motives. But
the public had no option but to trust that the companies were doing the right thing, and take the
information provided at face value. There were often different viewpoints related to a particular
problem. He said that this made it difficult for an individual to understand the real risks related
to a project. The interview did not trust government sources, and thought it was very difficult to
get accurate information through government channels. He thought that there was never enough
analysis that can be done, and one could never be 100% sure of a particular outcome.
5. Influence of Extreme Nuclear Events
The interviewee said that TMI had not made him anti nuclear, but if an accident occurred that was
closer to him, him reactions might be different. He also stated that he had more confidence in
projects regulated by the US and trusted US authorities more than those of less developed countries.
He found Fukushima really scary, because he felt that the radiation contamination would reach the
west coast of America. He was concerned about the people it affected. But he categorized the
disaster with natural disasters like hurricane Katrina, tsunamis, etc.
6. Nuclear Context and Weapons Association
The interviewee first learned about radiation as a child in school during the Cold War.
He re-
membered the radiation signs in school, and the fallout shelters in the 1960's. The bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II also scared him. However, he had a different opinion
of nuclear power plants vs nuclear warheads. He said he would rather have nuclear power plants
than hydraulic fracturing. He wished to learn more about both technologies, but said that nuclear
was much better in his opinion. He believed that his education and family background influenced
his positive views of technology.
7. Sources of Information
Some of the interviewee's sources of information are television news channels and newspapers. He
read some articles that provide in depth analysis of a situation. He also listed information he got
from him friends as a source of information. He believed that news was biased, and the media could
provide a dramatically different picture depending on the country or the audience. He read and
listened to a lot of information, but as a non-scientist, he said he did not have all the answers. In
125
order to form an opinion, he looked at a number of different sources of information. He believed
that the internet could provide information in an uncensored manner, and can reach a broad number
of people. But it also had the drawback of uncertainty in quality of information due to lack of
verification. He did not know about the MIT reactor, and being told that there was a reactor in
Cambridge made him nervous.
8. View of Opposition Groups
The interviewee believed that having opposition groups was extremely positive. He said that controversy encourages better evaluation of a situation, and can provide more confidence in good management. He believes that more questions asked result in higher accountability. Thus, existence of
opposition makes him more willing to accept the facility in question.
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D.3
D.3.1
Interview No. 3
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects
The interviewee considered any projects that damage the environment or human health as hazardous.
The irreversibility of the damage was a point he stressed upon. Some examples he gave were
biohazard facilities, nuclear power, and river dams.
When asked about any benefits from such projects, he stated that politicians and project implementers argue about benefits to try and convince people. But their arguments were not well balanced
and they tended to manipulate statistics. He said this made him skeptical of the projects from the
point of view of safety of the community.
He believed that in order for a project to be successful, multiple types of stakeholders should be
invited to voice their opinions, and their opinions must be taken into consideration. The decision
making process must be fair and unbiased. Safety issues must be addressed competently.
D.3.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes
1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology
The interviewee characterized nuclear technology as a tool for weapons and destruction. He stated
that uncontrolled radiation, even from nuclear power was extremely dangerous and could wreak
havoc.
2. Risk Benefit Tradeoff
The interviewee said that the long term costs of nuclear technology, especially nuclear waste, were
very high. The fact that we could not get rid of nuclear material was very dangerous. He was
very skeptical about the cost benefit tradeoff. He said that nuclear technology was scientifically
interesting, but its benefits were debatable. He mentioned that on considering the potential hazards
of nuclear waste, he did not know if the technology was worth it. He was also concerned about
nuclear material in the hands of unstable nations. He saw nuclear weapons proliferation as a major
problem in an unstable world.
127
The interviewee did not think that nuclear power could be a potential solution for global climate
change. He reiterated that some countries with unstable regimes should not be allowed access to
nuclear material. Even in the case of stable countries, he said that time and money should be put
into finding other renewable sources of energy.
He did not believe that nuclear energy was safe. He was not familiar with the level of hazard from
other applications of nuclear technology like medicine.
3. Trust
The interviewee's trust in the nuclear enterprise was very low. He believed that the nuclear enterprise, like every other enterprise, wanted to make money, and sacrificed safety for profits. Even if
it was a government run project, he said it wouldn't change his bottom line conviction. He said
that government agencies did not always protect public interests. What is stated as law isn't always
enforced. As an example, he said that EPA air and water safety standards were not always enforced.
He was concerned about problems like corruption in the enterprise. The interviewee said that he was
more likely to trust information that received collective acknowledgement from multiple parties. He
trusted organizations that he was aware of and had observed for a long time. He was wary of trusting
government sources. He listened to opposition groups, but did not take all of their information for
granted. His mother was active in the "women for nuclear disarmament " group, and he mentioned
it as one of the groups he trusted, since it was a well established organization.
4. Nuclear Context and Weapons Association
The interviewee first learned about the threat of radiation as a 5 year old during the Cold War.
He recalled vivid childhood experiences like the duck and cover drills in school when he was in
the 1st and 2nd grade. He thinks that our understanding of nuclear technology has increased now,
but he found it terrifying how misinformed public figures were in the past. He said that his early
childhood experiences greatly affected his views of nuclear technology. His mother was an activist
for disarmament and a friend of leading anti-nuclear activists, which also influenced his views.
5. Extreme Nuclear Events
He said that he found nuclear accidents like TMI, Fukushima and Chernobyl terrifying. He believed
that the public never really knows what happens. He was also worried about human error causing
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severe accidents leading to contamination of the environment.
6. Socially Catastrophic Potential
He firmly believed that there was political instability in several nations, and dysfunctional governments could not be relied on to deal with nuclear material, and could potentially lead to nuclear
disasters. He did not read any science fiction related to nuclear technology, but watched some documentaries that influenced his views. He was afraid of a nuclear disaster leading to a "nuclear winter"
scenario.
7. Influence of Media
He said he would consider academic experts as sources of information, but not trust a single individual as he could be unreliable. He generally found the media credible, specifically newspapers and
radio. The interviewee saw a study on the effects of radiation in Japan after the WWII bombings.
He found the images very graphic and something he cannot forget.
8. Uncertainty and Lack of Control
He found radiation more dangerous than other toxic wastes, because he believed that other wastes
can be contained, whereas radiation is long term phenomenon and cannot be contained. He was
more concerned about radiation than biohazards or hydraulic fracturing. He said that one of the
reasons could be a longer history of being made afraid of radiation, mentioning the duck and cover
drills during the cold war. He also said that the community could adequately handle a biohazard,
but nuclear weapons are more difficult to control.
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D.4
D.4.1
Interview No. 4
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects
The interviewee considered projects like hydraulic fracturing, nuclear power plants and wind turbines hazardous. He stated that two of the criteria that resulted in his classification of a project as
hazardous were his proximity to the project and presence of conflicting data. The interviewee had
more clearly formed thoughts about hydraulic fracturing than nuclear technology, and considered
some of the hazards to be water contamination, disturbances of the earth's crust, and the long term
effects of continued use of carbon based fuels in terms on climate change. The interviewee recognized some benefits of hydraulic fracturing, including reliability as a source of energy and reduction
in dependence on foreign energy. He also said that it was cleaner than burning coal and diesel oil
and could serve as a bridge to solar and wind energy. He also said there could be economic benefits
if gas was produced locally.
However, his overall attitude towards the technology, after weighing the costs and benefits, was
negative. He recognized that there was always some tradeoff between costs and benefits but for him
to accept a project, the benefits had to clearly outweigh the costs. He also said that projects would
need to be at worst neutral to environmental concerns of global warming. In order to combat global
warming, he suggested nuclear energy, wind and solar power as possible solutions.
D.4.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes
1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology
The interviewee characterized nuclear technology as controversial, but having a continuing sense
of promise. He said that the consequences of things going wrong or accidents occurring were very
severe. He perceived it as a high risk technology, especially after the Fukushima accident, but
considered it a learning experience, which influenced the design of future facilities. Not knowing
the long term consequences was a point of concern, and he was uncertain about ways of controlling
and storing nuclear material.
But his basic premise was that technology had come far enough in the nuclear field, and he was
willing to live with humanity moving forward, as long as no undue risks were taken. He did not
130
have much anxiety about nuclear technology. -He was aware of the presence of the MIT reactor in
Cambridge, but said that it did not create much concern.
2. Risk-Benefit Tradeoff
The interviewee said that nuclear energy was clean, resulted in no emissions, and was a good alternative for fossil fuels. His major concerns were the unsolved problem of nuclear waste and radiation
contamination due to accidents. He said that when everything was functioning correctly, fissionable
material did not make him anxious. In terms of medical applications of nuclear technology, he believed that the regulatory environment and medical professions were sufficiently tuned to storage
and disposal of medical waste safely.
3. Trust
In general the interviewee said he trusted the nuclear enterprise. However he had lost confidence
in federal oversight groups around mining, due to a history of accidents. He was anxious about the
rigour of their oversight, which applied to nuclear as well. But he was not specifically concerned
about nuclear energy. He said that since TMI, there had been no major nuclear catastrophe in the
US. He said that nuclear energy had been well managed and regulated. He had not heard about any
radiation release, and he wasn't very suspicious of nuclear regulatory bodies.
4. View of Opposition Groups
The interviewee believed that opposition groups were driven by fear. The had a tendency for overarching generalization, and did not look at data very well. They made a lot of noise but did not
provide alternatives. He said that they had the ability to stop good debate.
He looked at information provided by these groups skeptically. He listened for valid concerns and
gauged whether he viewed them as legitimate and accurate. In terms of reaction to anti-fracking
groups, he said he wished he had more information, but had no cause to disbelieve them. However
he always tried to figure out whether information was accurate. He noted that empirical data on
hydraulic fracturing was more prevalent than nuclear.
5. Sources of Information and Media Credibility
His main sources of information were newspapers like the Boston Globe and New Yorker, and
Television news. He did not use the internet as a source of information. He said that the media
131
served the public reasonably well, but were not perfectly credible.
When he came across conflicting information, he considered the sources where it was coming from
to judge credibility. However, it resulted in less certainty about his original point of view. He said
that if a source was clear about its point of view, he considered it more credible, since he could take
that into account. He said that if a bias was revealed or made explicit, he could interpret it through
that lens, which made him more comfortable with the information.
6. Knowledge of Radiation and Historical Context
The interviewee first learned about radiation through comic books. But he learned about the negative
consequences of radiation when he was introduced to foot X-rays at shoe stores and use of lead
jackets during medical X-ray procedures. However, the most graphic images he grew up with were
post war images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He was not sure when he became aware of nuclear
energy as a power source. But he said that World War II showed him that nuclear was a very
powerful source that could cause large scale destruction and lead to radiation poisoning.
7. Weapons Association
The interviewee felt an association between nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. He said that
the association would always exists because of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He said
that the link was not necessarily based on logic, but was present at an emotional level. He said that
it was exacerbated by the concerns of nuclear waste and the threat of use of dirty bombs by non
state actors.
8. Familiarity with Nuclear Science and Technology
The interviewee believed that having more information about the safe use of nuclear energy would
help in alleviating concerns. He felt that most negative reactions were due to the fact that people
knew very little about it.
9. View of Non-Nuclear Hazardous Materials
The interview said that anxiety about long term consequences did not show up in dialogue of chemical waste. He recognized that there could be a false assumption that it got neutralized, and could
be viewed as less harmful or less potent. He stated that the higher concern regarding nuclear waste
was not based on logic. He had the perception that nuclear wastes had extremely long half lives,
132
and could last forever, whereas he did not hear people talking about the half life of chemical waste.
He also mentioned that biohazards did not evoke same level of concern as radiation related hazards.
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D.5
D.5.1
Interview No. 5
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects
When asked about projects he considered hazardous, the interviewee said that nuclear projects were
at the top of the list. He was also concerned about transporting hazardous materials, and the threat
of terrorism, but stated that nuclear projects caused him most concern.
When asked about non-nuclear hazards, the interviewee said that the effects of other hazards were
not as long lived. He felt that there was an element of human control over other hazards, and
something could be done, but nuclear accidents were catastrophic and uncontrollable. He had a
more negative attitude towards genetic effects of radiation than genetically modified organisms. He
also said that nuclear waste was harder to contain than other pollutants. He was also concerned about
global warming, but not as much as the effects of nuclear technology. With respect to biohazards,
the interviewee said that they did not cause the same anxiety as radiation. He did not imagine a
large scale destruction scenario causing a massive number of deaths due to a bio hazard. He felt that
health effects due to biohazards could be cured, unlike radiation.
D.5.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes
1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology
The interview was of the opinion that nuclear technology was a two-pronged thing. He thought
it was clean and efficient, but was worried about nuclear accidents. He did not support nuclear
energy as a solution for global climate change, since He felt that the effects of climate change
would not harm him in his lifetime, but a nuclear meltdown could happen at any point in time. His
views towards a new nuclear facility in his surroundings would be very negative . He would be
uncomfortable with a nuclear facility even if it was producing medical isotopes. He felt that due to
the extreme dangers of radiation, such facilities should be in areas with low population densities.
2. Risk Benefit Tradeoff
The main costs that the interviewee listed related to nuclear technology were the danger of radiation
leakage or contamination. He was also concerned about nuclear accidents, costs associated with
134
nuclear security, and the costs of long term storage of nuclear waste. Transportation of nuclear
materials was also recognized as a serious problem. The interviewee was of the opinion that when
working properly, nuclear energy was not as polluting as fossil fuels. He recognized that it was
cleaner, but also more risky. This caused him to be very cautious about it. He said that nuclear
had killed lesser people than other industrial processes, but the danger was greater and there was no
recovery from a nuclear disaster.
3. Medical Applications of Radiation
The interviewee said that medical applications of radiation had a higher benefit than cost, and he
thought they were a good thing if needed. He said that the same issues of waste disposal existed,
but the benefit justified the cost.
4. Trust
The interviewee was highly concerned about the management of the nuclear enterprise, and felt
distrustful of enterprise in general. He said there was a lack of transparency in the enterprise.He
believed there was low competency in industrial practices, and the aftermath of the Fukushima accident was not managed adequately. He was not very concerned before Fukushima, but the accident
and its response caused him great concern. He stated that this was because of the fact that information about the accident was continuously changing, which led him to believe that the responsible
authorities were not telling the truth.
5. Sources of Information
The interviewee's main sources of information were the radio, television and newspapers like the
Boston Globe. He felt that these sources were credible, and helped raise questions about the technology. He believed in information that had been verified by various sources.
6. View of Opposition Groups
The interviewee understood the rationale behind opposition groups but felt that they did not have
a solution to the problems they brought up. He did not find them credible. He found people in
academia more credible than both people within the enterprise, and anti nuclear activists. The
interviewee had a friend who was adamantly against nuclear technology. He found the friend to be
an extremist, but couldn't dismiss everything he said.
135
7. Knowledge of Radiation and Nuclear Context
The interviewee was not very familiar with nuclear science and technology. He remembered being
told that nuclear power would be too cheap to meter. The interviewee first learned about radiation
in grade school, in the context of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He did not have duck
and cover drills at his school, but could not think of nuclear power without thinking of bombs. He
said that nuclear power was hardly ever presented alone, but always in terms of bombings. He said
that radiation created the same anxiety, whether it was coming from a power plant or weapons. The
interviewee recalled Homer Simpson when asked about books or movies related to radiation. He
also read John Hersey's novel, "Hiroshima".
8. Socially Catastrophic Potential
The interviewee believed that nuclear power hadn't worked out as well as people hoped. The consequences of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl were huge in his opinion. He had seen photographs
of people affected by the accidents, which alerted him about the dangers of radiation.
9. Sense of Control and Knowledge Confidence
The interviewee felt no sense of control regarding nuclear matters. He mentioned that he had no
ability to make judgements regarding safety. He thought that if a case was made that was understandable enough, it would be helpful and influence his decisions. He also said that information
about safety levels might alleviate some of his concerns. He also said that if radiation was treatable,
he would probably be less concerned.
D.6
D.6.1
Interview No. 6
Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects
The interviewee considered any projects that had human involvement as the most hazardous projects.
An example that he gave were modification of food, like irradiation, GMO, etc. He listed hydraulic
fracturing, large infrastructure projects and deep see oil drilling as hazardous to people and the environment. He said that energy related projects were the most harmful for the environment. Every
energy source had a downside, and some were more dangerous than others. The interviewee said
136
that he would be more accepting of a project or technology if it resulted in less damage to humans
and the environment.
Climate change was a concern that he expressed, and said that he would favour projects with low
carbon emissions. He considered solar energy a possible solution for global climate change, stating
that it had no negative consequences. He said that reduction in use of oil and gas could reduce emissions, and hydropower could be used. He did not see any potential hazards from hydroelectricity
He said that nuclear power concerned him most. He was unsure of whether nuclear energy was a
possible solution for global climate change, and was worried about meltdowns. The interviewee
said that technology had some benefits, if it was correctly managed, but felt that he couldn't trust
private companies to adhere to laws. He said that affordable energy made life more convenient. He
said that projects that reduced dependence on oil and foreign energy had benefits, but also had costs
associated with them.
The interviewee said that he would not want to live next door to a nuclear power plant or near land
being fracked. He said that he would protest against any such projects in his surroundings. He
said that if he didn't have a choice, he would want transparency and oversight, and would want to
educate herself about what was going on so that he could prepare himself if things went wrong.
D.6.2
Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes
1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology
The interviewee characterized nuclear energy as a clean source of energy, but was very concerned
about the threat of a meltdown. He said that he could not think of nuclear technology without
thinking of meltdowns. He said his initial reaction towards nuclear technology was that of fear, but
acknowledged that it might not be based on facts.
2. Risk Benefit Tradeoff
The interviewee was very anxious about nuclear meltdowns. He was afraid of dispersal of radioactive material in the event of a meltdown. He was also concerned about nuclear wastes and the
problem of their storage and disposal. The extremely long half lives of radioactive materials worried him, and he was anxious about the risks of cancer, especially to future generations. He said that
137
he was more afraid of prolonged suffering that death. The mental suffering that could be caused due
to trauma from a nuclear accident also concerned him. Nuclear weapons proliferation was another
problem that he was anxious about.
The interviewee said that he would accept a project if he believed that it was safe and was going
to make the US less dependent on oil overall. Reduction in damage to the environment was also a
potential benefit.
3. Views of Medical Radiation
The interviewee tried to use medical procedures involving radiation as little as possible. He only
accepted them when his doctors told him that it was absolutely necessary. He trusted the doctor's
opinion, and believed that he did not receive significant exposure to radiation from the procedures,
since they were very infrequent.
4. Trust in Nuclear Enterprise
Trust was a very important element for project acceptance for the interviewee. The interviewee did
not trust people or organizations, since he believed that most people were not moral or ethical. He
did not trust organizations to do their job responsibly. But he felt that human error was a more
important problem than unethical behavior. He also felt that industries withheld information about
the dangers of the technology from the people. He felt that transparency and oversight were important for the nuclear enterprise to generate trust. He also believed that the nuclear enterprise had
an obligation to educate people honestly about the mechanisms involved in the implementation of a
technology, and the potential risks.
5. Trust in Government Agencies
The interviewee felt that government agencies should be involved in oversight, but his trustworthiness was the same for government and private firms. The interviewee believed that there was not
sufficient transparency in industrial practices.
6. View of Opposition Groups
The interviewee respected opposition groups since they were willing to fight for what they believed.
He sometimes wished to join them, and believed that a protest against nuclear technology would be
positive.
138
7. Familiarity with Nuclear Science and Technology
The interviewee's familiarity with nuclear science and technology was extremely low.
8. Sources of Information
The interviewee said that he did not encounter stories about nuclear technology in the media very
often. His main source of information was newspapers. He treated information from opposition
groups like information from any other source. He preferred to make up his own mind regarding
a controversy, but felt that government agencies and academic experts were slightly more credible
than opposition groups.
9. Media Favourability and Credibility
The interviewee felt that the media image of nuclear technology was mostly negative. He said that
he only heard about nuclear disasters, or about the threat of weapons proliferation. He said that the
media focused on problems and disasters rather than other aspects of nuclear power plants because
that was what the public wanted to hear. He said that he was careful about what he read in the
media, because he was not entirely sure if the media were credible.
10. Nuclear Context and Weapons Association
The interviewee said that the fear of nuclear technology was bred into his psyche from the time he
was a child. He said that he was born around the time nuclear bombs were dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, and he heard several stories of terror. He said that the early trauma significantly
affected his views of radiation. He said that it "scared him to death", which is why he would not be
able to forget it. He said that as a kid, he remembered hearing that Russia could launch a nuclear
attack on the US. His family was encouraged to build bomb shelters. He strongly associated nuclear
technology with nuclear weapons, and felt that there could not be nuclear bombs without nuclear
power plants.
11. Probability of the Threat being Viewed as "Man-Made"
The interviewee considered human error an important factor affecting safety of nuclear technology.
He said that this belief was due to the nuclear accidents that occurred in the past.
139
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