From
to
Waterfront
in
the
Mapping
Watershed:
Greater
Toronto
a
Big Idea
Region
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
By
Linda C.Ciesielski
FEB 18 2011
B.S. in Landscape Architecture
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY (2005)
LIBRARIES
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
ARCHIVES
Master in City Planning
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
February 2011
@ 2011 Linda C.Ciesielski. All Rights Reserved
Linda Ciesielski here by grants to MIT the permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and
electronic copies of the thesis document in whole or in part.
Author
Linda C.Ciesielski
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
December 17, 2010
Certified by
Professor James L. Wescoat, Jr.
Department of Architecture
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Professor Joseph Ferreira
Chair, MCP Committee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Abstract
Today, Toronto is revered among Great Lakes' and waterfront cities for its environmental
planning: its massive re-investment in water and stormwater infrastructure; protected
headwaters of the region's rivers; realized waterfront plans; and more swimmable beaches.
Twenty years ago, the Metro area was designated a hotspot of pollution, the waterfront was
marked with vacant brownfields, while rampant development grew from the city's edge.
This thesis explores how Toronto transformed its relationship to water and Lake Ontario by
examining the work and legacy of a federal and provincial inquiry into the Future of
Toronto's Waterfront. While the Royal Commission's inquiry concluded nearly twenty years
ago, its impact and legacy on regional planning appears embedded in the Toronto's planning
today.
The Commission advanced an ecologically-based approach to planning by using the
established interest in the waterfront to leverage concerns for the region's watershed. The
process of the Commission inquiry served as a vehicle for garnering public support and
political will for policy change. The Commission's pragmatic approach to resolving growth
and development pressures alongside environmental concerns strengthened its appeal, and
contributed to the adoption of many of the Commission's recommendations at the federal,
provincial and municipal level. The Commission's work led to significant land use and policy
reform in the early 1990s, under the Liberal and New Democratic Parties. However, these
policies were rescinded under a change in federal and provincial power in 1995. They were
later re-adopted in the early-to-mid 2000s. Today, the language and ideas first presented by
the Commission appear to resonate to a certain degree in the region's and province's
planning policies.
While certain unique circumstances of Toronto and the Commission distinguish it from
other cities and regions, these exceptions do not detract from the fact that the Commission's
ecosystem and watershed solution for the region was exceptionally strong and persuasive.
The Commission's cohesive presentation of its ecological strategy largely resonated with
the public and politicians, leveraging policy change. The Commission's plan warrants
attention as an important case study for cities on the Great Lakes and waterfronts.
Acknowledgements
First, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Prof. Jim Wescoat, and reader, Prof. Brent
Ryan, both of whom provided insightful comments on this inquiry, and pushed me to
consider new questions, and deepen my understanding of the Toronto case and its broader
implications. Prof. Wescoat strongly supported this work through weekly meetings and was
always able to unfurl complexities into an organized analysis; I am indebted to your kind
support, guidance and knowledge!
I would also like to thank my academic advisor Prof. Larry Susskind for his ongoing support,
open door to all my questions, numerous thesis proposals, and helpful leads.
I would like to thank my interviewees for taking time from their busy schedules to speak
with me and expand my understanding of Toronto and the Commission inquiry.
Also, thank you DUSP classmates for sharing your own curiosities and enthusiasm with me
over the past few years; you have broadened my perspective on the world around me.
Thank you to my friends and family beyond the walls of MIT who always provided generous
support, encouragement, humor and a listening ear. Special gratitude goes to my parents,
and in particular my sister, Anna.
About the Author
This inquiry into Toronto comes from an outsiders' perspective: I grew up in Buffalo, New
York, across the lake from Toronto. Both Buffalo and Toronto shared an industrial port past,
the loss of manufacturing jobs, contaminated waterfront properties and waterways. But
today the cities appear very different: Toronto has a relationship to the waterfront, its
rivers, significant parkland, and a growing population; Buffalo does not.
My curiosity about what made Toronto "work" in part prompted this thesis, specifically its
relationship to water and watershed planning, unique among the Great Lakes cities. How
did Toronto transform itself from a polluted urban waterfront with derelict buildings and
degraded rivers, to something much better? How could other waterfront cities learn from
Toronto's story? This thesis sets out to unravel these questions by following significant
environmental and planning changes in the Toronto from the late 1980s through today.
Table of Contents
Abstract
Acknowledgements
List of Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms
List of Figures
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The Commission's "Ecosystem Approach" and Toronto Past and Present
1.2 Methodology and Analysis
8
12
12
Chapter 2: Background
2.1 Toronto's Geographic Context and Governance
2.2 Royal Commission Context
2.3 Royal Commission Term
17
17
21
24
Chapter 3: Advancing an Agenda
3.1 The Royal Commission's Argument
3.2 Showing a Region: The Bioregion Map
3.3 Royal Commission Recommendations
Planning Practice
Environmental Imperatives: Water
Environmental Imperatives: Shoreline
Environmental Imperatives: Greenways
Urban Watersheds
Municipalities
Regeneration and Recovery
30
30
35
38
39
47
61
67
73
82
85
Chapter 4: The Royal Commission's Impact
4.1 Publicity and the Commission's Narrative of Place
4.2 Commission Impacts
Planning Practice
Environmental Imperatives: Water
Environmental Imperatives: Shoreline
Environmental Imperatives: Greenways
Urban Watersheds
Municipalities
86
87
93
95
99
104
109
118
124
Chapter 5: Assessing the Commission's Ecosystem and Watershed Approach
128
Chapter 6: Toronto Today and the Legacy of the Royal Commission
6.1 Legacy of the Bioregion Map
6.2 Toronto, the Great Lakes and Waterfront Cities
6.3 Toronto's "Special" Circumstances
6.4 Conclusion
131
134
137
140
147
Bibliography
150
List of Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms
AOC
ARCH
COA
CPDR
CSO
EAA
EPA
GLWQA
GTA
IJC
MISA
MNR
MOE
(M)TRCA
MVVA
NEP
OMAH
OMB
ORM
PC
PPS
RAP
STORM
THC
TMDL
WRT
WWFMP
Area of Concern
Action to Restore a Clean Humber River
Canada-Ontario Agreement
Commission on Planning and Development Reform
Combined Sewer Overflow
Environmental Assessment Act
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
Greater Toronto Area
International Joint Commission
Municipal/Industrial Strategy for Abatement
Ministry of Natural Resources
Ministry of the Environment
(Metropolitan) Toronto and Region Conservation Authority
Michael van Valkenberg Associates
Niagara Escarpment Plan
Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing
Ontario Municipal Board
Oak Ridges Moraine
Progressive Conservative party
Provincial Policy Statements
Remedial Action Plan
Save the Oak Ridges Moraine Coalition
Toronto Harborfront Commissioners
Total Maximum Daily Load
Waterfront Regeneration Trust
Wet Weather Flow Master Plan
List of Figures
Figure 1: The GreaterToronto Bioregion Map
10
Figure 2: Toronto on GreatLakes
17
Figure3: Toronto and Region ConservationAuthority Managed Watersheds
20
Figure4: Metropolitan Toronto and regionalmunicipalities
29
Figure5: The Greater Toronto Bioregion Map
32
Figure 6: The GreaterToronto Bioregion Map from Watershed
36
Figure 7: The GreaterToronto Bioregion Map from Watershed
36
Figure 8: The GreaterToronto Bioregion Mapfrom Regeneration
48
Figure 9: The GreatLakes Basin and Areas of Concern
70
Figure 10: Greenways and Trails Conceptfor the GreaterToronto bioregion
83
Figure 11: "Places"Regions inlay shown by Commission
88
Figure 12: Map of Don River featured in Globe and Mail Toronto Magazine
103
Figure 13: Metro Toronto Area of Concern. RAP Clean Water, Clear Choices 1994
107
Figure 14: Waterfront Trail map
110
Figure 16: The Greater Toronto Bioregion Mapfrom Watershed 1990
114
Figure 17: Oak Ridges Moraine Designation2002
116
Figure 18: The GreaterToronto Bioregion Mapfrom Regeneration
116
Figure 19: The GreenbeltPlan 2005
126
Chapter 1: Introduction
Toronto sees water: in its waterfront master plans and urban wetlands, in its city-wide
stormwater management plan, and in the upper reaches of its watersheds, where the
headwaters of rivers are protected from development.
Toronto has transformed its relationship with Lake Ontario from an industrial port and
railroad corridor to publicly accessible trails, parks, mixed-use development, and more
swimmable beaches (Dempsey 2010).1
Many places in North America have begun to see water as well - through the mapping of
watersheds, the aid of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and investment in watershed
plans. Unfortunately, thousands of these watershed plans and maps sit on government or
agency shelves, not adopted into local plans or zoning ordinances; advisory but without
clout (U.S. EPA 2006).
Toronto was in a similar position in the 1980s. Even with provincially mandated watershed
plans, the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA), the managing agency of
regional water planning, found their plans on municipalities shelves (Haley interview
2010). What changed Toronto's planning regime to incorporate water?
Toronto now appears to be an example of broadly managing water and the environment,
with flexible solutions, public support, and political will - and some continuing challenges.
How did it get here?
Toronto 20 Years Ago. In the mid-1980s, the Metro Toronto Area and waterfront was
designated an "Area of Concern" for toxins and pollution by the Great Lakes International
Joint Commission (IJC). Moreover, rapid suburbanization to the north and east of downtown
Toronto proceeded in seven municipal regions with uncoordinated planning directives.
1A Toronto Star article described how seven of Toronto's beaches are rated among the best in the world by the
international Blue Flag Programme. Ontario has the strictest recreational water quality standards in North
America. If a beach measures above 100 parts E. coli in 100 ml of water it is classified not safe for swimming.
The national standard is set at 200 ppm and the U.S. standard is 235 ppm. Although for many, the memory of a
polluted Lake in the 1970s and 80s keeps them from contacting the water.
Toronto was facing a "development crisis" in conflict with streams and rivers and critical
lands covering the regions' headwaters (Barrett interview 2010).
These events unfolded just as the Federal government launched a Royal Commission
inquiry into the Future of Toronto's Waterfront. The study set to examine the jurisdictional
gridlock over the City's port lands, the local waterfront environment and public access
concerns.
Led by the former popular Toronto mayor and parliament member David Crombie, the
Royal Commission used the initial interest in the waterfront to leverage concerns for the
larger watershed. The Commission redefined the policy problem, arguing that the dire
condition of the waterfront reflected the region's impaired rivers and sprawling
development patterns, both a result of uncoordinated planning in the region and
jurisdictional gridlock. Waterfront improvement - aesthetic, biologic and economic - was
dependent on rectifying the health of the watershed and larger bioregion.
The concluding remarks of the Commission's first Interim Report in 1989 recommended a
"green strategy" for the region. The Commission's second report entitled Watershed,
recommended above all else, that the Greater Toronto Area adopt a "watershed" and
"ecosystem" approach to managing the health, livability and environment of the area. This
approach to planning was presented as the solution to the region's ills, and was further
articulated in the Commission's final 1992 report, Regeneration: Toronto's Waterfront and
the Sustainable City2 . The Regeneration Report included extensive recommendations that
argued for coordinating municipal planning efforts, protecting critical lands, resolving
jurisdictional gridlock at all levels of government, and negotiating a balance between public
and private interests (Laidley 2007).
Both the Watershed and Regeneration reports led with a map of the region, entitled the
Greater Toronto Bioregion:
2
From herein referred to as Regeneration
............. ............
.......
.
Figure1: The Greater Toronto Bioregion Map
The map shows Toronto and neighboring municipalities bound by Lake Ontario to the
south, the Niagara Escarpment to the west, the Oak Ridges Moraine to the north, and east by
the Trent River system. Rivers flow from the Moraine to the Lake, and pass over the dashed
red line of the former Lake edge, known as "Lake Iroquois." Toronto's central waterfront is
one element of this larger context.
The Bioregion Map was shown prominently in the Commission's public hearings and
forums, and appears as a conceptual centerpiece of the inquiry. The publication of the map
in Toronto's local press furthered the map's notoriety as a representation of the
Commission's main recommendation: an ecosystem approach to planning.
Importantly, while the Commission used the Bioregion Map to set up a spatial framework
for regional environmental planning, its recommendations were not restricted to this scale:
the Commission's agenda also addressed federal and provincial policies shaping the
landscape of the city. The Bioregion Map may have highlighted the "incompatibilities" of
natural systems overlapping jurisdictional boundaries (Desfor and Keil 2004: 46), but its
recommendations did not stop with the bounds of the map. The Royal Commission used the
....
....
....
..
map to show the "watershed" and bioregion, but also made recommendations that
translated this big idea into legislation.
Commission's Immediate Impacts. The endorsement of the Royal Commission's work by the
federal government and Province of Ontario leveraged the Commission's recommendations
into policy reform. An environmentally concerned public and supportive media pressed
upon local governments to follow suit. The Commission's expanded scope also rationalized
further Provincial studies and conservation plans to protect the region's headwaters and
river corridors.
Commission's Legacy. The legacy of the Commission's initial work has continued to
influence, to a certain extent, Toronto's regional environmental planning and legislation
over the past twenty years (Laidley 2007; Erickson 2005: 72; Boudreau, et al 2009: 144).
During this time, provincial and municipal planning efforts have oscillated from government
intervention, to market-driven privatization and continued suburbanization, to investment
in public infrastructure and conservation planning. Notably, the language of the "ecosystem
approach" and the region defined by the Commission has permeated these varied and
conflicting political climates.
The Commission's early 1990s successes were stymied by a change in governmental power
in 1995. The then newly elected conservative Provincial government argued for regional
governance, but as a cost-saving device - creating the "Megacity" of Toronto from
amalgamated municipalities (Boudreau, et al 2009). The language of the "ecosystem"
approach was shared under this conservative regime to attract private development to
Toronto's waterfront (Laidley 2007). Since 2003, neoliberal politics have resumed elements
of the planning agenda first established by the Royal Commission. 3 The Commission's
impact is most clearly evident in Toronto's waterfront redevelopment (Laidley 2007), and
the protection of the Oak Ridges Moraine (Barrett interview 2010; Boudreau, et al 2009).
Toronto continues to face the challenges of population growth, peripheral development and
water resource concerns. However, Toronto's story and the Commission's role in
environmental planning and policy offers insights for other waterfront cities and Great
3 Including
Provincial planning measures such as the GreenbeltAct and Places to Grow legislation of 2005, a
revised PlanningAct in 2005, and expanded regional transportation plan.
Lakes communities struggling to see water and ecosystem based planning in legislation and
regional governance.
1.1: The Commission's "Ecosystem Approach" and Toronto Past and Present
The Royal Canadian Commission's inquiry concluded nearly twenty years ago in 1992, but
its impact and legacy on regional planning appears embedded in the Greater Toronto Area
today. This thesis examines what the Royal Commission set out to do for the Toronto region,
how it advanced that agenda, and what it did and did not accomplish of that agenda.
Through a close reading and analysis of the plan itself, I argue that the Commission sought
to advance an "ecosystem" approach to regional planning through its final report,
Regeneration: Toronto's Waterfront and the Sustainable City, and its Greater Toronto
Bioregion Map. I then proceed to show that it accomplished a substantial portion of that
agenda 1) first, by using the established interest in the waterfront to leverage concerns for
the watershed, showing and articulating a rationale for more coordinated regional planning,
and, 2) second, through the adoption of many of its recommendations which resolved
jurisdictional conflicts and appealed to a wide range of interests.
I will show that the Commission's pragmatic approach to resolving growth and
development pressures alongside environmental concerns strengthened its appeal, and
contributed to the adoption of many of the Commission's recommendations at the federal,
provincial and municipal level. I will also assess the recommendations that were not
implemented to discern the limits of the plan.
1.2: Methodology and Analysis
I examine the Royal Commission's advancement of its agenda in four ways: first, through an
overview of Toronto prior to the Commission's inquiry; second, through a rigorous analysis
of the text of the Commission's final Regeneration Report and use of the Bioregion map;
third, through the adoption of the Regeneration recommendations; and lastly, through a
review of the current state of condition of four environmental categories outlined in the
Commission's report, including:
Water
- Shoreline
- Greenways, and
e Urban Watersheds
e
I have chosen not to evaluate the environmental category "Winter Waterfront" due to its
limited set of recommendations focused on Toronto's central waterfront. The purpose of
this paper is to consider those environmental categories and recommendations that
advanced a broader agenda for the region and "watershed".
In addition, due to the scope of this Master's thesis, I will not be evaluating the individual
recommendations created by the six other towns and municipalities outside the city of
Toronto in Part 3 of the Regeneration report.I will instead address those pieces of
legislation and policies that cut-across all municipalities and relate to the "ecosystem"
approach. This thesis focuses on the adoption or failed adoption of the Commission's
recommendations related to its central "ecosystem" agenda.
Background.The initial chapter provides an overview of Toronto geographic context and
governance structure, which shares a unique relation to the federal and provincial
governments. Here I provide a background of Greater Toronto Area's political,
environmental and development climate in the mid-to-late 1980s at the time of the
Commission Inquiry. This context is established through secondary literature, the
Commission's reports, and interviews with Commission staff and public officials serving at
the time of the inquiry.
I then introduce the federal government's request for a Royal Commission Inquiry into
Toronto's Waterfront. I provide an explanation of what constitutes a Royal Commission
Inquiry in Canada, the Commission's initial and expanded mandates, and its methods of
working and consultation. I introduce the key actors involved in the Commission and
federal and provincial governments.
The Commission'sArgument. The Royal Commission presented its initial argument for a
"watershed" approach to planning in its first interim report to the federal Canadian
government in 1989. This argument was reiterated in its second interim report, Watershed,
and in its final Regeneration report. The Regeneration report captures the entirety of the
Commission's work, including the recommendations and text of the earlier reports, and was
therefore chosen as the source for evaluating the Commission's agenda.
I examine how the Commission advanced an ecosystem approach to planning through a
vigorous analysis of text of its final Regeneration report. This includes how the Commission
defined "the problem" facing Toronto's waterfront and region and how it articulated "the
solution" and its case for the ecosystem approach and associated policies. The textual
analysis is based on an evaluation of ordinary language, with an understanding that certain
language may have different connotations now than it did twenty years ago. I also rely on
interviews with key Commission staff and secondary literature to further establish the
Commission's use of the waterfront as leverage to address the "watershed" and advocate for
regional planning.
I briefly consider the Commission's strategic use of the Greater Toronto Bioregion Map in
visually showing a rationale for coordinated regional planning. I analyze the Regeneration
report's description of what the Bioregion Map "shows". I include interpretations of the map
by key Commission staff and public servants in the planning and policy fields, as well as
descriptions of what the map "shows" and represents from Toronto's local press coverage
and secondary literature. This section incorporates literature on the power of maps.
Implementation.I evaluate the success or shortcomings of the Commission's agenda through
an analysis of the adoption and implementation of its recommendations, as they relate to
advancing a watershed or ecosystem agenda. I review which recommendations were or
were not adopted under the Regeneration report's four main "Environmental Imperatives":
-
Water
Shoreline
Greenways, and
Urban Watersheds
I assess which recommendations were adopted through a variety of sources, including:
Provincial and Federal endorsements following the Commission's reports; Provincial,
Federal and Municipal legislative documents; documents from the Toronto and Region
Conservation Authority and the Waterfront Regeneration Trust; secondary literature; and
interviews with former Commission staff, public servants from planning agencies, task force
groups, elected officials and academics in the planning and policy field.
I identify which key recommendations were not implemented mainly through interviews
and secondary literature, and the absence of specific legislation. 4
At the beginning of each "Environmental Imperative" section, I introduce the Bioregion Map
to frame each element in the larger regional context. The Bioregion Map serves as a thread
between the five categories. I also incorporate interview responses to what the map shows
or represents with respect to a particular category. In some instances, the map had little
relevance to the outcome of policy adoption, at which point I address the shortcomings of
spatially framing a region for planning, as presented by Desfor and Keil (2004).
At the end of each "Environmental Imperative" section, I summarize the current state of
each category in respect to the recommendations outlined and adoption by the Royal
Commission. This summary relies heavily on secondary literature and to a lesser degree
interviews with planning staff and academic experts in the environmental policy field.
From the Environmental Imperatives section emerges recommendations and legislation
that cut across the municipalities. I address what key regional "ecosystem" pieces of
legislation were or were not implemented, and how that relates to the condition of
municipalities today.
Legacy. In Part 3, I provide a brief picture of Toronto "Today" in terms of regional planning,
environmental health, and political and economic climate. This characterization is
established through secondary literature and interviews with planning staff, and academics
in the planning and policy field.
Lastly, I situate Toronto's story and the legacy of the Royal Commission alongside other
Great Lakes' and waterfront cities with the challenges of port pollution and impaired
watersheds. Two significant pieces of the Commission's work offer important insight and
direction for other cities with similar struggles: a shift in focus from the waterfront to the
4 Evidence to show which recommendations were not adopted is not as definitive as positive evidence of an
adopted recommendation. Negative evidence against the Commission's agenda, and those recommendations not
adopted, will in part rely on the lack of affirming evidence, as determined through interviews and secondary
sources.
watershed and regional planning, and strong recommendations to resolve jurisdictional
conflicts at all levels of government.
Chapter 2: Background
2.1: Toronto's Geographic Context and Governance
This chapter provides a brief overview of Toronto's geographic context, and political and
environmental governance regimes. Toronto's historic relation to water, flood control, and
its political importance have greatly informed the development of the city, and its local
environment.
Location. Toronto sits on the north shore of Lake Ontario, the easternmost Great Lake,
which empties into the St. Lawrence Seaway. The city is located just east of the Niagara
Escarpment, a steep geologic break that runs from Western New York and Niagara Falls to
the south, all the way north past the Georgian Bay. The Escarpment topographically splits
Toronto from the western portion of southern Ontario. To the north and east, Toronto is
bound by the Oak Ridges Moraine, a ridge of glacial till full of kettle lakes, wetlands, and
forest. The ridge is the collecting point of the region's headwaters; beneath it lays an
underground aquifer that feeds twenty river systems draining into Lake Ontario. The
porous geology of the ridge makes the aquifer water supply environmentally vulnerable to
the condition of the surrounding landscape and development (Desfor and Keil 2004: 78).
CANADA
0
UT
nt ario
SToronto
Michigan
New York
U N IT ED STATES
Figure 2: Toronto on GreatLakes
Environmental Governance.Toronto's environment is managed through multiple agencies.
Most prominent is the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA), an agency
chartered to create and implement regional watershed management plans, with authority
over Toronto's nine watersheds (Erickson 2005: 71). After the 100-year storm event
Hurricane Hazel hit southern Ontario in 1954, four local conservation authorities joined to
form the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (MTRCA) (Desfor and
Keil 2004: 84). Massive flooding in low-lying areas and river ravines destroyed homes and
infrastructure, and caused 81 deaths (Desfor and Keil 2004: 63; Environment Canada 2009).
Fear of future flooding resulted in the merging of several small conservation authorities
first created in 1946, into one regional authoritys to create a comprehensive flood control
plan (Desfor and Keil 2004: 63). After the Hurricane, heavily flooded lands and ravines were
expropriated into parkland (TRCA 2010: About 6; Desfor and Keil 2004: 84).
5The first conservation authorities were created by the Province of Ontario in the 1946 Conservation
Authorities Act.
6 TRCA has acquired over 32,000 acres for flood control purposes, and turned this land over to the parks
department for an integrated park system along waterways, "What began as a flood control project has helped
turned Toronto into a green and beautiful city".
In the aftermath of Hazel, flood control planning became a significant concern in the region
and province (Desfor and Keil 2004: 84). Heavily engineered sewage and channelized river
projects in the 1960s and 70s emphasized the quick drainage of stormwater to Lake Ontario
(Desfor and Keil 2004: 63; Boudreau, et al 2009: 147). This strategy slowed at the end of the
70s due to public protest and burgeoning construction costs (Boudreau, et al 2009). TRCA's
current watershed management strategy pursues both engineering solutions, and renaturalization projects and no-build "hazard land" designations and conservation
easements (TRCA 2010: Flood Protection 7; Haley interview 2010; Erickson 2005: 72).
The TRCA currently owns over 40,000 acres in the Toronto Region (TRCA 2010: About). Its
jurisdictional boundary includes nine watersheds 8 and six municipalities: the City of
Toronto, Regional Municipality of Durham, Regional Municipality of Peel, Regional
Municipality of York, Township of Adjala-Tosorontio, and the Town of Mono (TRCA 2010:
Jurisdictions and Participating Municipalities).
7 TRCA strategies include flood control structures, the creation of wetlands, and field monitoring of various
stormwater management technologies and natural systems.
8 The nine watersheds include: Carruthers Creek, Don River, Duffins Creek, Etobicoke and Mimico Creek,
Highland Creek, Humber River, Rouge River, Petticoat Creek.
...
..........
......
..
..
..............................................
..
.......
.........
Oak Ridges Moraine
Lake Ontario
-Downtown
Toronto
TRCAMANAGED
WATERSHEDS
7V
N
Figure 3: Toronto and Region ConservationAuthority Managed Watersheds
Federaland ProvincialGovernance. Toronto has a unique relationship with provincial and
federal governments, which is driven both by its importance in the financial sector and its
large population. Toronto is the financial capital of the Province of Ontario, and major
population center, with one-third of Ontario's population. Canada's federal system of
government gives Provinces the authority to oversee land-use planning. The province
legislates broad policies that municipalities implement through their individual Official
Plans (Erickson 2005: 71). These plans include Master Plans, zoning by-laws, development
procedures and compliance requirements.
Regional Governance. Prof. Gene Desfor at York University writes that Toronto's "urban
regime" has historically relied on "solutions of integration and comprehensive government,"
as reflected in the establishment of the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority,
mentioned above, and the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (Metro Toronto) in 1953
(Desfor and Keil 2004: 21). The Province created this municipal body initially to promote
economic regional growth, and established a Metro Toronto Council of municipal
representatives. The creation of Metro Toronto was aimed at re-balancing taxes collected
from the rich central core to support the infrastructural expansion of the suburbs
(Boudreau, et al 2009: 49). Boudreau states that this strategy was meant to be reversed as
the suburban tax base grew, but this did not happen (ibid: 50). Instead, the peripheral
suburbs became increasingly urbanized with a wealthy tax-base, while the city continued to
subsidize its expansion (ibid).
Metro Toronto existed until 1998, when the city and six neighboring municipalities were
amalgamated into a single municipality called the City of Toronto (colloquially known as the
"megacity") under conservative Ontario Premier Mike Harris (Boudreau 1999: 771).
2.2: Royal Commission Context
This chapter briefly lays out the background conditions of the Commission study and offers
insights into the underlying political, economic and social struggles of Toronto, the Province
of Ontario and the federal Canadian government in the late 1980s. The mid-to-end of the
1980s presented a potent atmosphere of public and inter-agency frustration, combined
with a struggling economy and frequent media coverage of environmental degradation. The
condition of Toronto's waterfront reflected this jurisdictional gridlock, the decline in
manufacturing and port jobs, and the legacy of industrial contamination in the harbor and
on the Great Lakes.
Politics. In 1984, the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada became the political
majority, led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (Laidley 2007: 263). The conservative party
championed private industries to improve the economy. The economic ideology that was
called "Reaganomics" in the United States was shared federally and in the Province of
Ontario (Boudreau, et al 2009: 24). This federal conservative government remained in
power through the early 1990s. In 1985, Ontario's Liberal Party formed a majority coalition
government with the National Democratic Party, led by Liberal Premier David Peterson.
The GreatLakes. In 1987, the Metro Toronto Area was designated an "Area of Concern"
(AOC) by the International Joint Commission (IJC) of the Great Lakes. Of the 43 designated
polluted areas on the Great Lakes, four were in Canada, Toronto representing the largest
city on the list (Crombie 1992: 98). In response, each AOC was required to submit a
Remedial Action Plan (RAP) outlining specific measures to improve the water quality of the
area. A challenge of water quality in urban and rural watersheds is non-point source
pollution, which collects over large areas of land and roadways. During storm events,
pollutants are carried by rainwater runoff into combined overflow sewer lines that empty,
untreated, directly into the region's rivers and Lake Ontario. An effective RAP would require
solutions for both point and non-source pollution.
The Waterfront.The industrial and manufacturing decline of the 1970s and 80s in the
region left the Toronto waterfront desolate and contaminated. The contaminated harbor
lands required expensive environmental clean-up and off-site disposal of hazardous
material. Many of the industries had gone bankrupt or no longer existed, leaving liability
and clean-up unresolved. The joint federal and municipal Board of Harbor Commissioners
owned much of the waterfront, and sat on the property as potential assets. The cashstrapped federal government began to sell the land to developers rather than transfer
property rights to the City of Toronto for redevelopment. Laidley states, "Media reports at
the time speculated that all federal lands were about to be sold, with the lion's share of
benefits accruing to private developers" (Laidley 2007: 263). Developers viewed the Lake
Ontario waterfront as an amenity, and through closed-bidding processes developers
transformed properties near the railroad commuter line into dominating high-rise condo
development (Laidley 2007). The federal Board of Harbor Commissioners and the City of
Toronto were in a political stand-off (Laidley 2007; Kerr 1986: A6). The public was
"dismay(ed)" over the renewed loss of public space and access to the waterfront immediately transitioning from an industrial port to new private residential properties
(Waterfront Regeneration Trust 2010: History).
Regional growth. North of the waterfront, the region was facing broader environmental
challenges. Of the seven municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area, four were experiencing
rapid (sub)urbanization to the north and east of downtown Toronto: York, Peel, Durham,
and Halton. None of the municipalities' planning efforts were coordinated.
In 1983, the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA), the governing body
managing conservation areas and water in the Metro Toronto region, had completed
watershed plans for all nine watersheds in the Greater Toronto Area. These watershed
plans fulfilled TRCA's mandate from the Province of Ontario, providing comprehensive
water management plans for flood control and waterways. However, these reports
remained on a shelf; regional municipalities did not adopt them into their Official Plans
(Haley interview 2010).
Ironically, the TRCA's highly engineered flood-control and water management projects from
the 1960s and 70s that had channelized many of the region's streams and rivers helped
secure developable land outside Toronto's central core. Growth was fostered by lower land
costs and an expansion of infrastructure subsidized by the City's tax base. While downtown
Toronto had not suffered from the same effect of suburban development as many other
North American cities experienced in the 1950s and 60s, growth in the central core paled
compared to that on the periphery (Boudreau, et al 2009: 57). By the end of the 1980s, the
region faced a "development crisis" (Barrett interview 2010).
This trend of rapid development was not unnoticed: local civic activists vocalized their
concerns through several groups, the most vocal included Save the Oak Ridges Moraine
(S.T.O.R.M.) and Bring Back the Don River. The Oak Ridges Moraine is a prominent ridge and
glacial outcrop 20 kilometers north of Toronto, and is the headwaters of the region's rivers
(Desfor and Keil 2004: 78). The Don River stretches from the Oak Ridges Moraine through
central Toronto and its industrial port area into Lake Ontario.
Environment in the news. Media coverage in Toronto wavered between environmental
degradation of the Great Lakes 9,10-11, central Toronto's port conflicts12,13,14,1s, 16,17,18 ,
9Chemicals may cause tumors on Great Lakes fish, study says. Toronto Star,June 25, 1985, A13
10 Lake pollution said no threat to water. Toronto Star,June 18, 1985, A02.
11Christie, Alan. 1985. U.S., Canada meeting to plan Niagara cleanup. Toronto Star,Oct. 23, A10.
12 Harbor officials, council will thrash out land sale. Toronto Star, September 9, 1986, A6.
13 Taylor, Sterling. 1985. What to do with the Leslie Spit? Two decades later fight still on. Toronto Star,Aug. 20,
A13.
14 Daw, James. 1986. Waterfront development plan turns into conflict of wills. Toronto Star,March 12, C1.
15Kerr, Tom. 1986. Harbor commission refuses demand for land sale details. Toronto Star, Aug. 29, A6.
16 Kerr, Tom. 1986. Irate city councillors start headhunting over harbor land deal. Toronto Star,Oct. 7, A6.
17 Kerr, Tom. 1986. Council to probe harbor deal in private. Toronto Star, Sept. 24, A6.
development at the edge of Toronto 19,20,21, air pollution, and acid rain in the northeastern
provinces 2 2,23
24
. Acid rain was deteriorating forests and lakes in western Ontario and
Quebec, a result of unregulated emissions from coal power plants in the mid-west United
States (Layzer 2005). At the end of 1988, a significant oil spill off the coast of Washington
State polluted the harbor of Vancouver, British Columbia. Soon into 1989, headlines were
captured by the major Exxon Valdez oil spill off the Alaskan coast. In April 1989, a few
weeks before Earth Day, Toronto journalist Pat Ohlendorf-Moffat published an extensive
piece on deplorable state of Toronto's Don River in the Globe and Mail's supplemental
"Toronto Magazine". This article advertised an upcoming public forum at the Ontario Place
and Science Centre, focused on the environment of Toronto. This event appeared as a
catalyst for action around the Don River and the Bring Back the Don River activist group
(Mark Wilson interview 2010).
2.3 The Royal Commission Term
This section provides an overview of the Commission's three-year term from March 1988 to
December 1991, its series of mandates, and important biographical information on the
Commissioner who led the study. All these factors contribute to understanding the motives
and content of the Commission's agenda and recommendations.
The Crombie Commission
In 1987, David Crombie, a former popular Mayor of Toronto from 1972 to 1978, was
serving as Secretary of State and Minister of Multiculturalism in Ottawa. As a member of the
minority Red Tory 25 party in a conservative majority, Crombie decided not to run in the
1988 election. Instead, Crombie approached his colleague then-Ontario Premier David
Peterson and requested to return to Toronto. In particular, Crombie was interested in what
was happening on Toronto's waterfront (Crombie interview 2010).
18 $24.6 million land sale on hold as City stalls Harbor Commission. Toronto Star,Oct. 2, 1986, A6.
19 Speirs, Rosemary. 1987. Housing vs. farmland in Pickering battle. Toronto Star,June 15, A13.
20 White, Stephen. 1986. King becoming a bedroom community. Toronto Star,July 22, N8.
21 Cahill, Jack. 1987. Planners see Metro as a 'spread city': Soon Toronto will be core to a circle of satellite
communities. Toronto Star, June 22, A22.
22 Goodspeed, Peter. 1986. U.S. cool to acid rain report Environmentalists, politicians call joint study
'disappointing'. Toronto Star,January 9, A14.
23 Walker, Bill. 1985. U.S. must take action on acid rain Davis says. Toronto Star, Dec. 4, A10.
24 Hepburn, Bob. 1987. No use counting on the President to fight acid rain. Toronto Star, January 15, A23.
25 Red Tories are noted as Progressive Conservatives, "fiscally conservative and socially progressive." They are
distinct from neoconservatives and social conservatism.
In March 1988, the federal government announced a Royal Commission Inquiry on the
Future of Toronto's Waterfront.The Commission's mandate was to review and develop
recommendations for the federal government on the following issues: federal land and
jurisdiction over Toronto's port lands, Toronto Island and Airport, environmental issues
and economic interests surrounding the waterfront.
A Royal Commission Inquiry is the highest form of federal Canadian investigation. Royal
Commission studies have a long tradition in Canada (Boudreau, et al 2009: 50). The federal
government establishes an independent body to examine specific issue and provide
recommendations, but its findings are non-binding to the government (Laidley 2007: 263).
The scope of federal government's mandate on the Future of Toronto's Waterfront was not
strictly defined, as noted by the Commission in its final 1992 report, Regeneration:
"Fortunately, the Commission had not been given specific boundaries as part of its original
mandate. Therefore, work groups were encouraged to draw whatever boundaries they felt
were necessary in considering the issues before them" (Crombie 1992: 4). At this initial
phase of the inquiry, the Commission remained largely focused on the waterfront of the
Regional Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, which includes the municipalities of
Etobicoke, Scarborough and Toronto (ibid).
..............
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,r...........
....
.......
..
...
..
Figure 4: Metropolitan Toronto and Regional municipalities
Commission Staff
The Commission's staff included several young and progressive members, who reinforced
this ecosystem approach to planning in their own professional work (Crombie interview
2010). This included two Toronto landscape architects known for ecological planning:
Suzanne Barrett and Michael Hough. Ms. Barrett, schooled at Berkeley, worked on
international conservation plans while teaching at York University. Michael Hough was
influenced by his mentor Ian McHarg at the University of Pennsylvania. McHarg is best
known for his ecological planning philosophy embedded in his 1969 publication, Design
with Nature. Hough developed University of Toronto's undergraduate landscape
architecture program, and in 1984 published, City Form and Natural Process,a book on
integrating cities with and natural systems.
At different times, both Barrett and Hough led the Environmental Studies research for the
Commission, and incorporated the language and ideas of an ecological approach to
planning. Gene Desfor, professor of Environmental Studies at the York University, was later
hired as a consultant, with an expertise on urban waterfronts. Prof. Desfor's work and
writings on Toronto's environment and waterfront continues today, and is referenced
extensively in this thesis.
Initial Work
The Crombie Commission began its investigation with seven preliminary reports 26 on key
aspects of the Waterfront: the Environment, Housing, Public Access, Parks and Amenities,
Jobs and Economic Opportunities, the Board of Toronto Harbor Commissioners 27, and the
Toronto Island Airport (Crombie 1992: 2). These reports were developed by Commission
staff and presented at public hearings and several stakeholder workshops as initial analyses
of the issues and frameworks for discussion.
The Commission stated that through public hearings, it became clear that the public wanted
the immediate waterfront concerns to be resolved, and also wanted the Commission to
address broader environmental concerns (Crombie 1992: 2; Laidley 2007: 263). The
Commission submitted its first Interim Report in 1989, and provided over sixty
recommendations, half of which addressed the environment (Crombie 1992: 6). The Interim
Report concluded with the recommendation that "a watershed approach be adopted to
protect Toronto's ecosystem," and to promote economic growth (quotation from Crombie
1992: 6; Laidley 2007: 263).
The then-Prime Minister and federal government endorsed the findings and
recommendations of the report, as did the Province of Ontario. The then-Ontario Premier
David Peterson of the Liberal Party, requested that the Commission's investigate further
Provincial concerns, notably: waterfront development issues along the western edge of
Lake Ontario, from Halton to Durham, strategies to "integrat(e) the waterfront to the
upstream watersheds throughout the Greater Toronto region," and "initiatives to preserve
and enhance the quality of the environment and quality of life for people living in the
region" (Crombie 1992: 9-10) (See Figure 4). With both government endorsements and an
expanded scope of inquiry, the Commission began its second phase of work, moving from
the waterfront to the watershed.
26 The seven reports: Environment and Health: Issues on the Toronto Waterfront; Housing and Neighbourhoods:
The Liveable Waterfront;Access and Movement; Parks, Pleasuresand PublicAmenities; Jobs, Opportunitesand
Economic Growth; Persistence and Change: WaterfrontIssues and the Board of Toronto HarbourCommissioners;
and The Future of the Toronto IslandAirport.
27 A joint federal and municipal governing body and landowner of much of the port lands.
Importantly, the Commission's initial loose federal mandate, and later provincial mandate,
allowed it to frame a larger context of study - not only of a stressed region - but also of the
political actors and relationships that were failing to address systemic environmental
concerns. The Commission stated in its InitialReport that no one level of government can
singularly resolve the problems of the waterfront, and the extended inquiry permitted the
Commission to further address the role of the Province and local municipalities in its next
phase (Crombie 1992: 9). The Commission's scope now extended to 17 local municipalities,
six conservation authorities, and four waterfront counties (ibid: 10).
The Commission continued its inquiry through "work groups, independent analysis, public
hearings and consultations with interested parties" (Crombie 1992: 10). The "work groups"
published three additional reports: A Green Strategyfor the Greater Toronto Waterfront;
Waterfront Transportationin the Context of Regional Transportation;and East Bayfront/Port
IndustrialArea:Environment in Transition.Through public hearings, meetings, consultations
and a newsletter, the Commission gathered comments and feedback informing its work.
Suzanne Barrett, a key staff member of the Commission, stated the importance of the public
engagement component of the inquiry and in building will for change:
... (W)hile we were hoping and expecting that policy makers and politicians would act on the
recommendations in the [Regeneration] report, public support was a very important
foundation for that. In the States you don't have things called Royal Commissions, but the
whole idea behind a Royal Commission is that the public can come to speak to the people
who are inquiring into something, so we gained an enormous amount of political strength
from the citizens who participated in the inquiry of the Royal Commission.... [For] the
reports it was very important, let me emphasize, that everything be very people-friendly,
and anyone with an interest in these matters could pick it up and read it - not cover-to-cover,
but the bits that they were interested in. And so the communications were very important to
what was there, and I think that's why we got such good support for the work that was there
(Barrett interview 2010).
The Commission held municipal workshops equipped with Commission staff, experts and
planning consultants, and reassured local governments that the Commission had no
intention to expropriate land or exercise autonomy over local actors (Crombie interview
2010). The Commission's second report Watershed, published in 1990, again received a
prompt endorsement of the federal and provincial governments.
..................................................................
.........
As revealed by the title of the report, Watershed articulated the Commission's agenda for
regional planning, at the scale of the "watersheds" in the "biological region, or bioregion"
(Crombie 1992: 11). The Greater Toronto Bioregion was described and shown in a map; the
boundary of this map was subtlety expanded and featured again in the final 1992 report
Regeneration.
Figure5: The GreaterToronto Bioregion Map
The Watershed report immediately introduced the concept of the "ecosystem," as the
interrelated systems of air, land, water, biotic and abiotic life, and recommended adopting
an "ecosystem" approach to planning "to deal effectively with the environmental problems...
and manag(e) human activities" (Crombie 1992: 11). The recommendations of this report
dealt with the Great Lakes Water Quality Act, Toronto's Remedial Action Plan (RAP), a
waterfront trail system, and protected lands designation extending from the waterfront to
the headwaters of the region's rivers. The Commission's work was again endorsed, and the
Province requested that the Commission recommend additional policies to "regenerate" the
shoreline (ibid: 16).28
The Commission's final report, Regeneration: Toronto's Waterfront and the Sustainable City
was published in 1992, and included all of the Commission's work and recommendations
during its three-year inquiry from 1988-1991. The last section of this report is devoted to
municipalities and towns with individual recommendations. The municipalities developed
these recommendations themselves, with the support and consultation of Commission staff;
the recommendations were "strong," but not particularly controversial at the time of the
report's publication (Barrett interview 2010).
During the three-year inquiry, the Royal Commission specified provincial, federal and
municipal policy recommendations to enable the ecosystem approach to managing the
region. Its recommendations included incentives and mandates for local municipalities to
adopt measures to protect sensitive lands, and create a waterfront trail and greenway
system. The Commission's articulation of its ecosystem agenda and the implementation of
its work are examined below.
Chapter 3: Advancing an Agenda
3.1: The Royal Commission's Argument
This chapter discusses how the Royal Commission defined the environmental policy
problems facing Toronto and presented an ecosystem approach to planning as a solution for
the region. This analysis employs the text of the Regeneration report to understand the
Commission's logic. I argue that the Royal Commission advanced an ecosystem approach by
showing and articulating a rationale for more coordinated regional planning.
Regeneration Report: Building a Case.
The Royal Commission's initial geographic scope and mandate was primarily focused on
Toronto's central waterfront. The Commission's 1989 Interim Report first noted the
problems facing the waterfront as those of a larger region: "Unswimmable beaches,
In addition, the Commission was asked to investigate the feasibility of relocating the Gardiner Expressway,
and the "pooling of lands and the integration of future plans for the Canadian National Exhibition, Ontario Place,
Fork York and HMCS York" with relevant agencies.
28
undrinkable water, and unfishable rivers that have become sewers are the visible, touchable
signposts of environmental carelessness and degradation....the waterfront and its river
valleys are as environmentally interdependent as they are economically linked...." (Crombie
1989: 9-10).
While the final paragraphs of this report mentioned a "green strategy" for managing the
region, it is "essentially a footnote" (Laidley 2007: 263.) The "watershed" approach was
introduced, but at a theoretical level; its recommendations were not addressed at this
"watershed" scale of planning. Instead, they focused on the Toronto Board of Harbor
Commissioners, the Toronto Island Airport, soil contamination, lake filling, waterfront-wide
heritage and public access plan.
The Commission's second interim report, Watershed, provided the initial guidance for this
"green strategy" and "watershed" approach to planning. A great portion of the text is
devoted to explaining an "ecosystem" and defining the Greater Toronto "bioregion." Here,
the Commission introduced its first map of the scope of the area to be considered in
regional planning.
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Figure 6: The Greater Toronto Bioregion Mapfrom Watershed
This report advised pieces of an ecosystem approach and included nine guiding principles
for a clean, green, useable, diverse, open, accessible, connected, affordable and attractive
waterfront. These guidelines are repeated in Regeneration. However, the final Regeneration
report added to the strategies and recommendations for regional planning.
The Preface of Regeneration concisely summarized the Commission's argument of an
ecosystem approach to regional planning. The Preface is adapted from an article published
in Ecodecision Magazine29 at the end of 1991, written by the Head Commissioner, David
Crombie, and Ronald L. Doering, Executive Director and Counsel of the Commission. The
Commission's work responded to governments, but also spoke to a more general reader,
including practitioners, civic activists, and agencies.
The Preface heading mounted the Commission's agenda and hopeful promise to the reader:
"An Ecosystem Approach to the Regeneration of Cities." What began as a study on the
Future of Toronto's Waterfront became a strategy for the "regeneration of cities" at the
scale of the "ecosystem" (Crombie 1992: i).
As noted in Regeneration,the Preface is adapted from article published in EcodecisionMagazine. No.3.
December 1991.
29
The subheading stated that "(t)he city should be regarded as a natural ecosystem, requiring
an integrated approach for addressing its problems" (Crombie 1992: xix). The city is
analogous with nature, fit to "regenerat(e)" itself through biologic re-growth to a previous
state. The constructed city is not inherently in conflict with a natural order, but rather
requires integration with the environment to solve its problems. Just as Kevin Lynch
described in Managing a Sense of Region (1980), "urban and rural areas" are not separated
because they are "art of the continuous spectrum of human habitats and are becoming
progressively more difficult to distinguish".... "Our senses are local, which our experience is
regional"... Access and territory are aspects of the mental image of space"(Lynch 1980:
10)... "the identification of places, as well as their organization into mental structures, not
only allows people to function effectively, but is also a source of emotional security,
pleasure and understanding. Orientation in space (and time) is the framework of cognition"
(Lynch 1980: 23). We take delight in physically distinctive, recognizable locales and attach
our feelings and meanings to them. They make us feel at home, grounded. Indeed, a strong
sense of place supports our sense of personal identity. For that reason, familiar features of a
landscape are often fiercely defended" (ibid).
In the first two lines of the report, the Commission stated both its perception of Toronto and
the Waterfront, and its solution to the city's problems. First, the city is part of a natural
system; second, the city needed regeneration; and lastly, that an integrated "ecosystem"
approach is the answer.
The Commission angled its broad appeal by casting cities as valuable places for social
entrepreneurship and economic exchange; cities are desirable places to live. A city is not
removed from nature, but follows the shape of the land, immersed in vegetation, water
bodies and climate:
Based on this understanding, we must begin the regeneration of our cities and
waterfronts in the next decade. Only by understanding the city as part of nature can we
deal with the wounds inflicted on it, mend its ways, and design its form so that it
functions sustainably to satisfy the needs without diminishing opportunities for future
generations (Crombie 1992: xx).
Here, the Commission linked the established interest in "waterfronts" to the regeneration of
cities; the waterfront was the impetus for the big idea of a "sustainabl(e)" city. The
Commission's objectives - to repair the city and pursue "sustainability" for future
generations - are nearly commonplace in politics and cities today, as reflected in the
proliferation of "Office(s) of Sustainability" throughout North America 30. At the time,
however, these goals were more novel and resonated with the public's concern for the
environment. A 1989 national poll by Environics found the environment was the top
concern of Canadians (Laidley 2007: 263). The Commission's strategy for Toronto reflected
this concern. The Commission described an "Environmental Revolution" in government
policies, companies and individuals' consciousness, that supported this ecosystem
approach: "...the idea of using an ecosystem approach to the regeneration of cities has
gained increased acceptance" (Crombie 1992: xxi).
The "ecosystem" concept had been advocated for some time by ecologists and scientific
practitioners, but until the 1990s this concept was not well known beyond academic circles
(Erickson 2005: 27). Sustainable development was the dominating concept for management
(ibid).
The Commission defined an ecosystem as the summation of air, water, land, biotic and
abiotic life, and the interaction between these systems. The ecosystem applies to human
interactions: social, economic, political and environmental. Decisions and actions of one
sector or part of the system affect the others and the whole (Crombie 1992: xxi).
The ecosystem approach to planning is characterized as "dynamic," and considers "carrying
capacity, resilience, and sustainability," based on natural geographic units such as
watersheds rather than jurisdictional boundaries (Crombie 1992: xxi). This approach
transcends scales of governance, with a breadth that is both "necessary and appropriate"
(Crombie 1992: xxi). This approach is "appropriate," specifically because it seeks to remedy
the apparent conflict between natural systems and jurisdictional governance, a central
theme of the Commission's recommendations.
From the skeleton of the Commission's agenda in the Preface, the Commission moves to
explain how the Regeneration Report includes all of the Royal Commission's work since its
initial inquiry into the Future of Toronto's Waterfront. The Federal and Provincial
30 Including Vancouver, British Columbia, New York City, Chicago, Portland, Oregon, Baltimore, Cleveland,
Milwaukee, among others.
governments remain the main clients of the inquiry, but the Report also addresses regional
municipalities and agencies, citizen activists, practitioners, and a more general reader.
Those who participated in the Commission's public hearings and municipal forums are
looking to validate their input and views through the report (Barrett interview 2010). The
organization of the report conveys this inclusive balancing act by addressing issues at the
federal and provincial scale of the "ecosystem" and the smaller integral components of
municipalities and urban watersheds.
Part One of the report introduces the "Ecosystem Approach"; followed by its application in
"Planning Practice" in Part Two; and then "Environmental Imperatives" (including water,
shoreline, greenways, urban watersheds) with recommendations for all levels of
government in Part Three; and concludes at the scale of municipalities or "Places" in Part
Four.
3.2 Showing a Region: The Bioregion Map
Within the first few pages of Part One, an "Ecosystem Approach", the Commission defines
Toronto's ecosystem as a Greater Toronto biological region, or "bioregion". The extent of
the bioregion is both shown on a map and described. This map is nearly identical to one
shown in the Commission's earlier report Watershed, published in 1990.
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I'll
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LAKEMMCOE
Figure 7: GreaterToronto Bioregion Map from Watershed
Figure8: GreaterToronto Bioregion Mapfrom Regeneration
Both maps show the Greater Toronto region bounded by the Niagara Escarpment to the
west, the glacial outcrop of the Oak Ridges Moraine to the north and east, and Lake Ontario
to the south, and the political boundaries of the region's municipalities. The map featured in
the Regeneration Report features a slightly expanded boundary from the one featured in
Watershed, and includes the extent of the Niagara Escarpment, from Toronto to Niagara
Falls.
According to David Crombie, a similar map was published in 1943 by the City of Toronto.
According to the City Planning archive, this plan was not adopted by the city.
The Commission articulates its expanded scope in the region:
The original mandate of the Royal Commission was to examine the shoreline: the
Greater Toronto waterfront. But a growing understanding of ecological principles led
inexorably to expanding the scope of the Commission's enquiry to encompass the
watersheds, Lake Ontario, and the Great Lakes Basin.... Regeneration of the waterfront
depends on restoring the environmental health of Lake Ontario's waters, its shoreline,
and the river valleys. Therefore, we take an ecosystem approach to examining current
problems, and to recommendations for regeneration. Because of the interdependence of
ecosystems, a comprehensive strategy for regeneration must combine many objectives,
so that each action fills a variety of needs, and complements actions being taken
elsewhere (Crombie 1992: 95).
The Bioregion map image effectively repositioned Toronto's waterfront to part of a larger
natural system. The map shifts focus from the initial study area of Toronto's central
waterfront to the concept of the watershed: water that begins in the highlands drains
through the city, to the waterfront and into Lake Ontario. Notably, the map showed critical
lands and systems largely unprotected from development at the time of the Report's
publication. In effect, this map conveys the Commission's underlying "ecosystem approach"
to planning: that existing political jurisdictions and natural systems are inner-linked and
overlap. The map underlines the Commission's approach to act at multiple scales of political
interaction and planning.
The textual and visual description of the Greater Toronto ecosystem and bioregion also
affirms those ideas presented in Kevin Lynch's, Managing a Sense of Region (1980). He notes
that while, "[o]ur senses are local...our experience is regional" (Lynch 1980: 10). Lynch
states that, "the identification of places, as well as their organization into mental structures,
not only allows people to function effectively, but is also a source of emotional security...
and understanding. Orientation in space (and time) is the framework of cognition" (Lynch
1980: 23). The Commission's identification of place - the Greater Toronto bioregion sought to create a framework for this "sense of place," and orient the public and political
actors into a larger environmental and political territory. While this geographic and
ecosystem-based region established a concrete and mapped spatial orientation, as noted by
Desfor and Keil, geographic-based management does not necessarily reflect the economic
and political relations that define the state of the city (2004). The Commission's
recommendations, however, did not stop at the boundaries of the map - and did address
federal and provincial policies that affected the Greater Toronto Region and the Great Lakes.
The Preface and Part One of Regeneration situated Toronto in a big picture: geographically,
socially, economically, and politically. The Commission advocated its agenda from a large
context, while addressing conflicts at the local level. It physically and politically mapped its
Big Idea.
3.3: The Royal Commission Recommendations
I argue that the Royal Commission advanced the ecosystem approach through the adoption
of a substantial portion of its recommendations, which resolved underlying jurisdictional
conflicts and appealed to a wide range of interest groups and agencies. This chapter
examines this argument through an analysis of the recommendations put forth by the
Commission, and the implementation of its agenda. I evaluate the success or shortcomings
of the Commission's agenda through an analysis of the adoption and implementation of its
recommendations, as they relate to advancing a watershed or ecosystem agenda.
I review which recommendations were or were not adopted through an analysis of two
main parts of the Commission's Regeneration report: "Planning Practice" and
"Environmental Imperatives". "Planning Practice" discusses the barriers to the ecosystem
approach, and provides recommendations aimed at the legal and institutional arrangements
responsible for enabling an ecosystem approach to planning. The "Environmental
Imperatives" section includes recommendations for five categories, of which I will be
evaluating the following four 31 :
31 As stated earlier, I have chosen not to evaluate the environmental category "Winter Waterfront" due to its
limited set of recommendations for Toronto's central waterfront. The purpose of this paper is to consider those
- Water
- Shoreline
- Greenways, and
e Urban Watersheds
I assess which recommendations were adopted through a variety of sources, including:
Province and Federal endorsements following the Commission's reports; Provincial, Federal
and Municipal legislative documents; documents from the Toronto and Region
Conservation Authority and the Waterfront Regeneration Trust; secondary literature; and
interviews with former Commission staff, public servants from planning agencies, task force
groups, elected officials and academics in the planning and policy field.
I identify which key recommendations were not implemented mainly through interviews
and secondary literature, and the absence of specific legislation. 32
At the beginning of each "Environmental Imperative" section, I introduce the Bioregion Map
to frame each element in the larger regional context. The Bioregion Map serves as a thread
between the five categories. I also incorporate interview responses to what the map shows
or represents with respect to a particular category. In some instances, the map had little
relevance to the outcome of policy adoption, at which point I address the shortcomings of
spatially framing a region for planning, as presented by Desfor and Keil (2004).
At the end of each "Environmental Imperative" section, I summarize the current state of
each category in respect to the recommendations outlined and adoption by the Royal
Commission. These summary sections rely heavily on secondary literature and to a lesser
degree on interviews with planning staff and academic experts in the environmental policy
field.
"Planning Practice"
Part two of Regeneration begins with "Planning Practice," a chapter focused on translating
the "ecosystem approach" into planning and policy. The Commission reflected on current
environmental categories and recommendations that advanced a broader agenda for the region and
"watershed".
32 Evidence showing that a recommendation was not adopted is not as definitive as positive evidence of an
adopted recommendation. This "negative evidence" of recommendations not adopted will in part rely on the
lack of affirming evidence, as determined through interviews and secondary sources.
planning practices, and provided recommendations to move policy and planning to an
ecosystem-based approach, at the federal, provincial and local level.
The Commission strongly asserted that current land-use planning and environmental
management procedures did not offer "even minimal environmental protection, let alone
the 'ecosystem approach to restoring and regenerating the Greater Toronto region"'
(Crombie 1992: 63). While the Province of Ontario, municipalities and the federal
government had recently begun to address the shortcomings of conventional planning
techniques to protect or enhance the environment, further action needed to be taken.
In Canada, land-use planning is guided by policy at the provincial level, and therefore
pivotal in affecting land-use planning of regions and municipalities. The Provincial Planning
Act, a key policy on land-use planning, "in theory provides opportunities for integrating
environmental considerations into land-use planning and development control," but in
practice, "...its provisions are not being used effectively for this purpose" (Crombie 1992:
63). The Province lacked clear environmental priorities contributing to a weak Planning Act
(ibid). This Planning Act merely required municipal to obtain a procedural "check-mark" in
approving new development proposals, without sufficient assessment of environmental
impacts or cumulative effects. For example, the Province's Wetlands Policy Statement did
little to protect wetlands from being filled in by new development, nor required set-backs
for adjacent development (Crombie 1992: 68).
At the municipal and regional government levels, the adoption of "Official Plans" are
required for land-use planning and development, but had little incentive for municipalities
to develop long-term planning strategies. The Province required development in areas only
with secured municipal services. As a result, municipalities updated their Official Plans
incrementally with infrastructural expansion to accommodate new development proposals;
strategic long-term planning was absent from the Official Plans.
Second, the municipal planning process failed to adequately address natural systems that
cut across jurisdictional boundaries. No incentives existed for municipalities to coordinate
planning efforts with other jurisdictions or conservation authorities. The Commission
suggested the Province remedy this problem by establishing requirements, funding
mechanisms or through capital projects related to regional planning efforts.
Up until 1991, the only ecologically-based coordinated planning action in the Province was
the Niagara Escarpment Plan from 1985, which was created through special legislation.
Following the recommendations of the Commission's previous Watershed report in 1990,
the Province began two-year long planning study for the Oak Ridges Moraine, another
significant regional ecological feature. (This study commenced in June 1990 and extended
through 1993). The Commission stated that this study signaled a Provincial
acknowledgement of the need to plan on an "ecosystem basis" (Crombie 1992: 70).
The Commission summarized the challenge to pursue its "ecosystem-based planning"
approach:
On a whole, however, it appears difficult to implement ecosystem-based efforts such
as watershed and remedial action planning. Despite the fact that all Ontario
conservation authorities created plans in 1983, implementation has been hampered
by lack of coordination and commitment among jurisdictions involved, and because
the Province does not require that watershed plan recommendations and strategies
be incorporated into municipal planning and development control processes
(Crombie 1992: 70-71).
Without legislative action, the trajectory of municipal growth and uncoordinated planning
would likely continue. Municipalities required a mandate or incentive to incorporate those
plans of the local conservation authorities, which were perceived as advisory.
Finally, the Commission assessed the Environmental Assessment Act (EAA), which required
any municipal infrastructure project, such as roads or sewers, to provide an impact
assessment. While infrastructural expansion often resulted from new development
proposals, the EAA process was not incorporated with the planning and approval process of
new development (Crombie 1992: 74). Oftentimes, development applications were already
adopted into a municipality's Official Plan, prior to the completion of an EAA. The
cumulative impact of the development and its associated infrastructure was not considered
from the outset - causing delay in the construction of the development, and also little
opportunity for public feedback on the proposal. Furthermore, the EAA review is based on
individual-project impacts, which fails to address cumulative impacts of many
developments over time, such as habitat fragmentation and loss of water quality. An EAA
required a proposal pursue a course of least harm to the environment, rather than create a
benefit. The Commission criticized the EAA as a conventional planning tool established to
address environmental concerns, but instead created a narrow, relatively ineffective and
inefficient tool for managing the environment.
The Commission insists that the condition of the local environment demands the adoption
of an ecosystem approach, that moves beyond a narrow focus to a holistic view of the
environment and planning (Crombie 1992: 75). Current planning practices were unable to
plan on an ecosystem basis because of "municipal, politically defined boundaries, and by
jurisdictional gridlock that frustrates attempts at cooperation" (Crombie 1992: 76).
The Commission proposed alternatives to this traditional planning regime, in its report
Planningfor Sustainability,and the technical paper Towards Ecosystem Based Planning:A
Planning Perspective on Cumulative Effects. Both include concrete examples of planning
"holistically," citing planning in the Don River Urban Watershed. Ecosystem planning
considers the interactions between land-use patterns, the economy and environmental
systems, such as water quality and air pollution. This strategy moved beyond "traditional
planning", focused on "distributing land uses in accordance with social and economic
imperatives" (Crombie 1992: 76). In addition, an ecosystem approach broadened the timeframe of planning from immediate impacts or within ten years, to long-term and cumulative
effects.
Key to this long-term view is also a broader spatial view: "In ecosystem planning, the limits
of areas being studied are decided on the basis of natural features and processes, rather
than merely on political jurisdictions" (Crombie 1992: 80). Importantly, "(e)xpanding the
boundaries of research does not necessarily mean increasing planning beyond one's own
jurisdiction" (ibid). The Commission cited the Regional Municipality of Metropolitan
Toronto for using a concept called "geo-sheds" to address watershed, engineered and
natural drainage systems, and the processes along the coast of Lake Ontario: "While this
(approach) means studying ecological processes in jurisdictions beyond Metro's
boundaries... it does not mean planning for those other jurisdictions" (ibid). However, in
certain cases, planning beyond one jurisdiction is essential for the health of the whole
system. The Don River watershed required this coordinated approach because water
quality upstream greatly affected the health of the lower reaches on the river.
The Commission suggested a general framework for ecosystem-based planning that could
be applied to Oak Ridges Moraine, the Metro Toronto Remedial Action Plan in Area of
Concerns on the Great Lakes, or a single watershed plan (ibid). This framework included
twelve steps that are "aspects of planning and environmental assessment that are normally
part of specific legislation.... (and) (i)t does not imply specific recommendations for
changing the laws, only creative ways of combining activities to achieve the overall goal of
ecosystem planning." (Crombie 1992: 82). Commission suggested testing this approach
through demonstration projects.
The basic steps of the framework follow: 1. Define the purpose and scope of the plan; 2.
Define roles and responsibilities of participants; 3. Establish goals based on a communities'
unique long-term interests, its economy, and the environment; 4. Gather information; 5.
Assess ecosystem health, limits and values; 6. Design and assess alternative future
scenarios; 7. Reach consensus on fair and useful decisions; 8. Review and approvals; 9.
Make commitments for implementation; 10. Monitoring; 11. Ensure that projects comply
with plans; and 12. Evaluate and revise the plan.
Beneath this generic framework are specific provincial recommendations, many of which
were included in the Commission's report, Planningfor Sustainability.At the time of
publication of Regeneration,the Province had followed through on the recommendation to
investigate provincial land use and environmental protection planning process in a twoyear study. This study included urban sprawl, environmental protection and cumulative
effects, the future of rural land, meaningful public participation, integrating the Planning Act
and Environmental Assessment Act (Crombie 1992: 85). The Commission insisted that
other Provincial actions need to be taken, and offered a long list of policy recommendations.
First, with regards to the PlanningAct, the province needed to establish clear expectations
regarding land use, settlement patterns and environmental protection. "Section 3 of the
Planning Act, which gives the Province the opportunity to develop polities on matters of
Provincial interest, has been little used so far" (Crombie 1992: 86). The Commission
recommended that the Province prepare a comprehensive, integrated set of ecosystem
based policy statements under Section 3 of the Planning Act, to include:
Waterfront planning and development
Greenway concepts
Watershed management
Natural heritage protection
Integration and conservation of cultural heritage
Rural lands and agriculture
Compact forms of development and redevelopment
Transportation and land use
Resource conservation
j. Protection and rehabilitation of air, water, and soil quality
k. Land-use compatibility
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
In addition to the creation of these provincial policy statements, the Commission stated that
all planning jurisdictions on the waterfront should incorporate the ecosystem approach and
the waterfront regeneration principles (Crombie 1992: 87).
Secondly, the Province should provide guidelines for ecosystem-based planning and
development approval processes to inform regional and municipal Official Plans, Secondary
Plans, along with waterfront and watershed plans. These guidelines should be developed in
consultation with municipalities, other agencies and professionals. Similarly, provincial
guidelines should be developed on environmental performance requirements, such as
standards for setbacks and buffers, green space protection and habitat restoration.
As mentioned early, the Commission stated that the Province's Wetland Policy Statement
needed to be strengthened by: designating full protection for all classes of provincially
significant wetlands (class 1 to 3); prohibiting the loss or impairment of "significant"
wetland functions; requiring buffer zones, and having consistent requirements for public
and private adjacent land owners. The Province should also "encourage" municipalities to
protect wetlands of local significance (class 4 to 7), clarify "compatible" uses for
development near wetlands, and create timelines for updating planning documents for
wetland policy.
The province should take measures to strengthen the Trees Act and the Topsoil
Preservation Act. The Trees Act enabled municipalities to pass by-laws restricting the
destruction of trees, but most municipalities have not passed restrictions, perhaps because
such by-laws were difficult to enforce. The Topsoil Preservation Act should be strengthened
to require municipalities to regulate removal of trees and other vegetation, and grading,
filling, and drainage procedures.
The Commission stated that the provincial Niagara Escarpment Plan is up for its first 5-year
review. The Commission recommended that the Plan be strengthened and amended to
"embody the ecosystem approach". This included establishing long-term monitoring along
the Escarpment to document the effectiveness of the plan in protecting and rehabilitating
the environment. The Province should reflect on how the Niagara Escarpment Commission
approach to planning could inform ecological planning in all jurisdictions, on large features
that cross jurisdictions, such as the Oak Ridges Moraine (Crombie 1992: 91).
The Oak Ridges Moraine, as described earlier, is of great ecological significance for the
regions headwaters, underground aquifers and groundwater supply. The Commission
reiterated its recommendation in the Watershed report for the Province to undertake a
planning study regarding the conservation, groundwater protection, trail locations,
cumulative effects and future development in the Moraine. Following Watershed, in July
1990, the government expressed a Provincial Interest in the Moraine. One year later,
guidelines for interim protection of the Moraine were published, and a two-year planning
study was initiated to develop a long-term strategy for protecting and managing the
Moraine (ibid). The Commission noted its disappointment in the scope of the guidelines and
planning study are limited to the area considered in the Greater Toronto Area, rather than
the full extent of the Moraine to the west and east.
The Commission recommended that the province extend its Provincial Interest and
protection guidelines to include the entire Moraine, referencing the Greater Toronto
Bioregion for the boundaries, "See Map 1.1". Furthermore, the Province, Ontario Municipal
Board (OMB) and the municipalities in the Oak Ridges Moraine should to ensure "strict
compliance" with the interim protection guidelines, and these bodies "carefully scrutinize
(development) proposals that could be exempted" from the guidelines (Crombie 1992: 92).
The Commission noted that a proposed suburban development was exempt from these new
guidelines because the OMB found the guidelines to have no legal status under the Planning
Act. The guidelines also failed to restrict potentially harmful activities such as aggregate
extraction, minor variances, and building permits. Lastly, the current Oak Ridges Moraine
planning study should be expanded to include a description and evaluation method of
possible implementation mechanism for the long-term strategy for its protection, as
proposed for the Niagara Escarpment Plan.
The Commission's final recommendation surrounded Watershed Planning and
Management. The recommendations put forth in Watershed are reiterated, including a
Provincial review of the mandate and functions of the conservation authorities, and a
recommendation to increase the conservation authorities role in watershed planning and
habitat protection, with secured funding.
At the time, the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) provided comments on the
conservation authorities current activities, rather than more boldly envisioning the
potential of the authorities "to employ a watershed perspective in protecting and managing
resources" (Crombie 1992: 93). The Commission stated that conservation authorities seem
prime agents to further ecosystem conservation, but their current regulatory powers are
focused on flood and erosion control, which undermine its ability "to undertake
comprehensive, proactive watershed planning and management" (ibid). An expanded
mandate, however, would require expanding staff capacity and budgets. Capacity could be
expanded through the partnerships between individual conservation authorities and other
government agencies, to coordinate programs and pool resources.
Of significance, the Commission noted that the heads of conservation authorities are
appointed by municipal councils, and are typically municipal politicians and staff aligned to
municipal city objectives, but without "appropriate training or commitment for ecosystem
based planning and natural resource management" (Crombie 1992: 94). Watershed
strategies prepared by conservation authorities are often "not necessarily integrated with
municipal land-use planning and development approval processes. As a result, ecosystembased watershed management may be thwarted, resources may be haphazardly expended,
and opportunities to protect, restore, and/or enhance ecosystems may be lost" (ibid). In
1988, the ministries of the Environment and Natural Resources began consulting with the
Ministry of Municipal Affairs, conservation authorities, and municipalities, to address these
problems and integrate water resource management objectives into municipal plans.
The Commission offered three recommendations to the Province, in consultation with
conservation authorities, municipalities, and non-government organizations. First, to
"recognize ecosystem-based watershed management and conservation as a primary role of
conservation authorities and amend Section 28 of the Conservation Authorities Act to give
them regulatory powers consistent with this role" (ibid). Second, to revise the requirements
for appointing members to the conservation authorities board, to include more
representatives of local non-government environmental or conservation groups, while
maintaining municipal representation. Lastly, municipalities should work with Remedial
Action Plan teams and conservation authorities to integrate remedial action plans and
watershed strategies into land-use planning and development approval processes. All of
these recommendations will foster an ecosystem approach to planning, by linking
watershed planning to land-use planning and development activities.
"Environmental Imperatives"
Overview. Part two of the Regeneration report focuses on "Environmental Imperatives" or
components of the ecosystem. The Commission reported on each component and provided
a set of recommendations, addressed to multiple levels of government so as to realize a
"comprehensive strategy of regeneration" (Crombie 1992: 95). I examine the impact of the
Commission's agenda by analyzing which recommendations were or were not adopted. The
four imperatives examined below include: Water, Shoreline, Greenways, and Urban
Watersheds. The Commission's report moved from the broadest category of water, to the
more focused scale of the shoreline, greenway networks, and concluded with the single
urban watershed of the Don River.
Water
Water is the first and broadest Environmental Imperative, and examined the state of Lake
Ontario and the Great Lakes Basin. The Chapter began with a reiteration of the
Commission's strategy: "Early in its work, the Royal Commission realized that it could not
consider the Greater Toronto waterfront in isolation from the area surrounding it.... (the)
waterfront is part of a much greater whole - in fact many greater 'wholes"' (Crombie 1992:
97). These 'wholes' include the Greater Toronto bioregion, Lake Ontario, and the Great
Lakes Basin. The waterfront is a stepping-stone to larger scales of region and sense of place.
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Immediately, the report referred the reader to a map of the Great Lakes Basin, locating
Toronto as one of forty-three "Areas of Concern" designated by the International Joint
Commission (IJC) a joint-governing body of the Great Lakes.
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Figure 9: The Great Lakes Basin and Areas of Concern
In small letters, Toronto is labeled as a black circle with the white number 37. The edges of
the Great Lakes are marked with forty-two other black circles, relating Toronto's water
quality to the other cities, showing a systemic challenge across the Basin. Lake Ontario, the
fifth and last Great Lake, is downstream of 80 percent of the basin's flow. The water quality
of the Lake and the Toronto waterfront is therefore largely subject to the health of the Basin
(Crombie 1992: 97). The Commission articulated that, "we can do little, acting
independently, to tackle the problems of persistent toxic chemicals throughout the waters
of the basin. That kind of problem requires a much broader perspective, one that can be
gained only by examining the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem" (Crombie 1992: 97, italics
added). Again, the Commission relied on this "ecosystem" approach to analyze the problems
facing all the facets of "water".
Thick black lines outline the extent of the Great Lakes basin watersheds. Around Toronto,
these lines follow the topographic edge of the Niagara Escarpment and Oak Ridges Moraine,
shown in the Commission's Greater Toronto Bioregion Map.
The Greater Toronto Bioregion Map, however, is at a significantly different scale from that
of the Great Lakes basin. A section of Lake Ontario is featured in the map, but does not place
the Toronto in the larger context of the Great Lakes. This additional map of the Great Lakes
basin supplemented the Commission's broad scope of an inner-connected "ecosystem"
approach - not only to show water flowing from Superior to Ontario - but also highlighting
the poor water quality faced by many places on the Lakes.
The Commission described the water quality of the Great Lakes in great detail, and cited the
first study of the International Joint Commission in 1912 to examine the problems of
waterborne disease and sewage contamination issues in the Great Lakes. Sewage treatment
facilities were implemented in most urban areas to combat this problem and control
nutrient loads. Phosphorus and nitrogen were the main causes of eutrophication in the
Lakes - uncontrolled growth of water vegetation, decreased oxygen levels, and ultimately
fish die-offs (Crombie 1992: 102). Other nutrients, oils and greases from rivers and streams
poured untreated into the lakes: Oil slicks in harbors and rivers caught fire in Cleveland,
Buffalo and Toronto. The 1972 Great Lakes Quality Agreement (GLWQA) created by the IJC
specifically was aimed at the eutrophication of Lake Erie and Ontario (Crombie 1992: 103).
This Agreement sought to control and limit pollution from entering the lakes by establishing
effluent targets for sewage treatment plants. The federal Canadian government restricted
phosphates in detergents and financed sewage treatment plant upgrades. The Province of
Ontario further restricted effluent discharge from treatment plants and financed capital
improvements to treatment facilities. Gradually, the water quality of Lake Erie improved:
algae growth declined and fish populations returned.
However, at the time of the Commission's report, the Toronto waterfront remained a site
with high phosphorous levels, and bacterial contamination from combined sewer overflows
that empty into Lake Ontario during storm events. As a result, Toronto and 41 other urban
areas along the Great Lakes are required to develop water quality improvement plans or
"Remedial Action Plans" (RAPs) for the International Joint Commission.
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978 set forth to restore the "chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem," which significantly
broadened its earlier scope (Crombie 1992: 104). The IJC Water Quality Board developed a
list of chemicals and toxins in the Lakes, many of them synthetic by-products and pesticides.
The danger of these chemicals and toxins lies in their persistence in the environment, as
well as their effects on "human health and wildlife, even in very low concentrations (quote
from IJC Great Lakes Water Quality Board 1991, in Crombie 1992: 106).
The Commission further explained the dangers of these pollutants, and their
"biomagnification" in the environment, as they are absorbed and consumed through the
food chain, from phytoplankton to fish and fowl, and ultimately, to humans (Crombie 1992:
106). Exposure to chemicals and toxins may have a subtle effect on human's neurological
and reproductive systems (ibid). The environmental quality of the water, air, and land of the
Great Lakes basin has an impact on the health of humans - and this exposure to chemicals
and toxins in the Great Lakes raises the risk of health-related problems, and raises reason to
be concerned for the control and prevention of chemicals present in the ecosystem
(Crombie 1992: 111).
The condition of the rivers and wetlands of the Great Lakes basin have a significant impact
on the health of the entire system. The Commission noted that no comprehensive
examination of the health of the inland water bodies and rivers in Ontario had ever been
performed. Threats to the water quality included the acidification of lakes in the north,
agricultural related run-off in the south, and urban run-off from streets, parking lots, and
effluent releases from sewage treatment plants.
As of 1991, urban rivers such as the Don River, suffered from pollution from stormwater
run-off, as well as the degradation of its natural integrity; urban rivers' banks have been
altered and channelized. While some rivers in the Greater Toronto bioregion still supported
spawning areas for fish and aquatic life, these water bodies required protection to maintain
and restore critical habitat (Crombie 1992: 112). Wetlands, which support critical habitat
for wildlife and plant communities, similarly required protection. Left undisturbed and
intact, wetlands filter pollutants from upstream water bodies and adjacent lands, support
groundwater infiltration, and flood-protection. Loss of wetlands due to in-filling for
development and agriculture posed a significant threat to native habitats and local water
quality (ibid). While the IJC has expressed the value of wetlands in its 1987 Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, and the need to identify, preserve and restore significant
wetlands, there had been no "action" on the matter: "To date [1991] those parties have
failed to develop a basin-wide inventory of wetlands and their health" (ibid).
The Commission notes that the Canadian government's Green Plan "ignore [d] wetland
issues," and that the draft Wetland Policy Statement fell far short of providing the clear
direction necessary to protect wetlands in Ontario" (Crombie 1992: 113). The
Commission's report, A Green Strategyfor the GreaterToronto Waterfront (1990), offered
recommendations for the wetlands along the waterfront and identified critical habitats
requiring restoration (ibid).
Not only was water quality a concern of the Great Lakes basin and the Greater Toronto
bioregion, but also water quantity: "we continue to use the waters in the Great Lakes Basin
as if they were unlimited. People in Canada and the United States use more water per capita
than those in any other of the world's countries - as they use more energy and many other
natural resources. On average, an Ontario resident uses 360 liters (95 gallons) of water a
day - water use has risen steadily over the past 20 years" (ibid). (In 2001, Toronto Water
reported a resident's average daily water consumption was 320 liters (84.5 gallons) (City of
Toronto 2002); in 2008 consumption measured 315 liters (83 gallons) per person per day
(City of Toronto 2010: Toronto Infrastructure).
The Commission noted that water supply problems were a concern, and that parts of the
Greater Toronto Region were depleting groundwater sources faster than they were being
recharged, particularly in the rapidly growing regions of Halton, York, Peel and Durham
(Crombie 1992: 113). The groundwater supplies beneath the Oak Ridges Moraine, which
feed the headwaters of 40 percent of the water flowing in Southern Ontario, faced pressure
from competing interests including residential development, industry, and agriculture. A
decline in water available to the natural flow regimes would compromise the health of
fisheries and native habitat.
The Commission furthered that the cost of "safe, clean water" is not cheap; the water and
sewage infrastructure in the region is considerable, and yet, "much of this investment is
crumbling" with leakage rates as high as 30 percent (Crombie 1992: 114). Many
municipalities have outdated combined sewer systems, which contributed to bacterial and
chemical loading in the region's waterways. The replacement costs for these systems was
estimated at $20 billion (in 1991 CN dollars).
Ontario residents were not paying for the "true costs of the water," because many
municipalities charged a flat rate regardless of usage, whereas others are charged a
declining block rate (the more consumed, the cost per "unit" consumed decreases). In 1990,
less than one-third of the residences in the region paid a metered rate. (In 2009, thirteen
percent residents were not metered. In 2010, the city began to distribute meters to all flatrate customers and upgrading the meters of all other users (City of Toronto 2010:
Infrastructure).
The current cost-structure of water-pricing, combined with crumbling infrastructure and
the illusion of unlimited supply were contributing to the deterioration of the Lakes as a
resource. The Commission recommended increasing water efficiency, to reduce the amount
of water withdrawn, pumped and treated. The Commission cited that as of 1991, the
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and many regional municipalities were developing
water-efficiency plans.
The Commission stated that the obstacles facing the health of the Great Lakes included: 1)
the use of chemicals and toxins, improper treatment and disposal into waterways and the
lakes, 2) water quality contamination from land-use development patterns, and 3) wasteful,
inefficient water infrastructure, cheap water prices and high user demand. Water quality
and quantity issues, and detrimental land-use patterns reflected six larger institutional
failings: fragmented jurisdictions, lack of accountability, reactive policies, lack of
enforcement and information, and a lack of "ecosystem thinking".
FragmentedJurisdictions.The Commission stated that jurisdictional fragmentation blocked
progress on improving the Lakes. The management and regulation of the Canadian
environment suffered from "duplication... fragment[ation], with different instruments
governing separate aspects of the environment which makes it difficult to apply ecosystem
goals and principles" (Crombie 1992: 115). Five layers of government were involved in the
Great Lakes Basin, with more than a hundred agencies in the Greater Toronto bioregion
alone, making it difficult to trace accountability to the poor condition of the lakes (ibid).
While the International Joint Commission (IJC) was created to "bring together officials and
technical personnel from different levels of governments and other institution in both
countries," the IJC, in fact asks experts to wear "two hats" one of the IJC Committee member
and the other as a government bureaucrat (Crombie 1992: 116). The effectiveness of the IJC
as an independent body was therefore compromised, and undermined the possible
achievement of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (ibid).
The Remedial Action Plans (RAPs), which are local planning efforts to restore toxic "hot
spots" around the lakes, were characterized by slow bureaucratic process. A 1991
Environics poll conducted in the Greater Toronto Area found that a significant number of
those polled "believe(d) that bureaucratic complexities and lack of political will - not money
or technology - [stood] in the way of progress on environmental clean-up" (Crombie 1992:
130).
Lack of an Ecosystem Approach. The redundancy of agencies and bureaucratic fractioning
over the Great Lakes undermined the objective of restoring the basin. An ecosystem
approach was required to manage and rehabilitate the Lakes, which involved
"comprehensive and systematic planning; management based on ecological units rather
than political boundaries; an emphasis on long-term planning; and respect for the needs of
future generations" (Crombie 1992: 118). Instead, the basin suffered from inconsistent
water quality standards across the basin, and a lack of comprehensive management plans.
Environmental plans were disconnected from other land-use planning initiatives: Remedial
Action Plans around the Great Lakes basin were being developed without relation to landuse or transportation plans, or fisheries or habitat management plans (Crombie 1992: 119).
Planning efforts were concerned with immediately visible problems and short-term
solutions because there was "little political payoff today for long-range anticipatory
planning that will yield benefits only at some indefinite time in the future" (Crombie 1992:
120). (In 2010, planning for the long-term remains a challenge - although notably, in 2003,
the city of Toronto government passed a 25-year water infrastructure plan, 33 largely the
result of public and political will, and the Province passed significant long-term legislation
for a protected greenbelt around the Greater Toronto Area in 2005.)
Lack ofAccountabilty. The clean-up of the Great Lakes basin was also being compromised by
a lack of accountability: bi-national interim target levels to reduce toxic loadings had not
been established, nor had there been compliance with timetables established under the
Great Lakes Water Quality Act (GLWQA). At the Provincial level, the 1984 Municipal/
Industrial Strategy for Abatement (MISA) program, created to develop discharge
restrictions for toxins, had yet to establish a regulation. Industries and municipal facilities
were continuing to dispose of pollutants into the Lake and waterways.
Reactive Policies.As of 1991, the Great Lakes basin and the Greater Toronto bioregion was
managed defensively. Pollution control relied on "end of the pipe" solutions, such as larger
sewage treatment facilities. The only chemicals to have declined in the Great Lakes
ecosystem were those severely restricted or prohibited. Pollution prevention initiatives
relied upon voluntary actions of industries, waste facilities and through proactive
communities (Crombie 1992: 124). The IJC insisted that discretionary pollution prevention
were not effective in controlling the majority of pollutants: "There must be an end to the
'business as usual' attitude: there must be strict application and enforcement of zero
33 Known as the Wet Weather Flow Master Plan, this plan to revamp water and stormwater
infrastructure gained momentum and support following the Walkerton Tragedy of 2001, where
seven people died from an E.Coli outbreak in a public water supply system under private
management. The 25-year Flow Plan passed in 2003 and is financed through an annual homeowner
fee.
discharge and other restrictions as appropriate, and meaningful penalties and restrictions"
(ibid). Enforced regulatory standards were necessary to reduce and prevent pollution.
Lack of Information. Informed policy required information, yet as of 1991, there existed no
inventory on the amount of toxins in the Lakes. In fact, the disclosure of toxic chemicals
around the Great Lakes in the U.S. was likely incomplete "because of the exemptions
allowed in the U.S. reporting system, this (total) may account for as little as five per cent of
the total releases" (Crombie 1992: 125). In Canada, industrial figures on pollutant loadings
would not be available until 1994 (Crombie 1992: 125). While a great deal of research was
being conducted around the lakes, the research was restricted to small areas; there was no
broad spatial analysis to monitor trends. A broad scale of analysis was necessary for a
comprehensive understanding of the lakes' condition and in monitoring remedial action
plans - but this required significant funding.
Lack of Enforcement. Existing laws to control pollution were not being enforced. Notably,
thirty percent of Ontario's own municipal sewage treatment plants failed to meet provincial
guidelines for conventional pollutants. Those violators were not being penalized or
prosecuted. The Commission stated that both the Province and the federal government
could take action through the federal Environmental Protection Act, to manage chemicals
and inspect facilities. The Fisheries Act could be enforced to control plants' effluent releases.
Lack of Funding. The federal government not only needed to enforce regulations, but also
fund the clean-up of land and water. In 1991, the federal government only financed clean-up
directly related to federal lands or federal agencies (Crombie 1992: 128). The Commission
insisted that "(I)f Canada commits to an international agreement to restore and maintain
Great Lakes Water Quality, and if the federal government is to take credit for such an
initiative, it cannot avoid paying its way" (Jackson and Runnalls 1991, Crombie 1992: 128).
The federal and provincial governments have attempted to pass costs onto the tax-payer,
non-government entities, or through industrial discretion. Environmental inaction was then
attributed to the "public('s) refus(al) to pay" (Crombie 1992: 129). The Commission
admitted that personal responsibility and behavioral change were needed to improve the
Lakes, but that the public "need(ed) guidance from governments, and assurance that
governments are doing their part" (ibid). Only governments would be able to upgrade
sewage treatment plants and regulate industrial discharge. Governments were the primary
financiers of the lakes' condition, and the enforcement body - and the federal and provincial
government needed to fulfill its responsibilities.
Combined Failingsand the Metro Toronto Remedial Action Plan. These six institutional
failings resonated most clearly at the scale of the Metro Toronto Remedial Action Plan
(RAP), initiated in 1985. The Commission strongly criticized Metro Toronto's RAP - and
underlined the importance of remedying this plan in order to realize any improvement in
the region's water and ecosystem. The RAP required an ecosystem and watershed approach
to remediating the Metro Toronto Area, and yet it failed to incorporate this concept. In
addition, the RAP lacked funding, comprehensive information and stakeholders,
jurisdictional coordination, accountability and enforcement of timelines.
A Remedial Action Plan is a "blueprint" for guiding the restoration of a contaminated hot
spot around the Great Lake, and was "to be developed using an ecosystem approach"
(Crombie 1992: 130). The completion of remedial action plans is required by the 1987
GreatLakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA). Metro's RAP boundaries included the
watersheds of Etobicoke, Mimico, and Highlands creeks, the Humber, Don and Rouge rivers,
and crossed five regional governments and 17 local municipalities. The RAP team was
composed of experts, representatives from government agencies and municipalities.
The Commission articulated that the Metro Toronto RAP appeared as the most complex of
all the Canadian area of concerns, due to its physical scope and large population. The area's
largest sources of pollution included sewage treatment plants discharge, combined sewage
overflows and stormwater run-off. Agricultural run-off and an altered natural environment
- by development and infrastructure, river dam impoundments and channelization - further
contributed to water pollution. A century of lake-filling activities and wetland in-fill
rendered the natural shoreline indecipherable.
This challenging landscape required an effective and accessible RAP process and document.
The Commission criticized the RAP 1990 Draft Discussion Paperas "unintelligible to the
average reader and not useful for the process of selecting remedial options" (Crombie 1992:
133). The Commission insisted that the Draft be re-written to be understandable and
reorganized on a watershed basis, and "clearly" address RAP goals and remedial options.
The Commission stated that the RAP would likely be an extremely expensive proposition,
and therefore required public support. As of 1991, there was a lack of public outreach by
the RAP Team. Upstream regions and municipalities had been excluded from the process.
This lack of full stakeholder involvement was tragically combined with a lack of an
ecosystem approach: the RAP Draft emphasized the waterfront while ignoring issues of the
watersheds, wildlife habitat and land-use patterns.
The Commission's strongest critique of the Toronto RAP was that "the information collected
to date, and the potential remedial options are not organized on a watershed basis. Instead,
the Metro RAP area is treated as a 2,000-square-kilometer (772-square-mile) monolithic
block" (Crombie 1992: 134). The RAP approach was therefore not capable of providing
meaningful recommendations.
The Commission acknowledged that grassroots efforts were initiated in the recent past,
aimed at cleaning the water bodies in the Metro RAP region. These included the Task Force
to Bring Back the Don, the Black Creek Project, Save the Rouge Valley System and Action to
Restore a Clean Humber (ARCH). These groups formed "to fill what was perceived as a void
in government action" (Crombie 1992: 136). This attitude reflects broader public sentiment
that the government is not meeting its responsibilities to the Lakes and the GLWQA.
For example, the members of ARCH stated that "we know how to clean up the Humber
River, and that the impediments to progress are not technical or scientific, but institutional"
(Crombie 1992: 136). This group developed an unsolicited proposal to the Metro Toronto
RAP team to implement watershed-based remedial actions on the Humber (ibid). ARCH
sought to use the Humber River as a "prototype for implementation based on the
'watershed partnerships,' as articulated by the Royal Commission in Watershed" and serve
as a model for other watersheds (Crombie 1992: 137). ARCH's proposal received approval
from Environment Canada, the Ontario Ministry of Education and Metro Toronto. While
ARCH's dedication and work was laudable, the Commission noted that is "unfortunate that
ARCH is having to develop a prototype for implementation in the advance of the actual plan
- the RAP" (ibid). The Commission credited ARCH's success to its inclusion of all
stakeholders and the "use of a watershed approach"(ibid) The group sought to manage the
river at a comprehensive scale, that of the watershed: "Watershed planning is firmly
grounded in a scale people can comprehend, where they can feel a sense of stewardship"
(Crombie 1992: 138). The work of ARCH can serve as a model to the RAP team - by
including all relevant stakeholders, engaging public citizens, and working at the scale of the
watershed.
Commission's Recommendations. In summary, the Commission stated that "(t)he health of
the Greater Toronto waterfront, as measured by the quality of the water, is inextricably tied
to the health of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. If we are going to clean up our waterfront,
we must act regionally (perhaps even globally) as well as locally" (ibid). The Commission
listed eight recommendations "to accelerate the process of regeneration" (Crombie 1992:
139).
At the federal level, the Commission stated that in order to fulfill the agreement of the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA), there needed to be 1.) a more effective IJC and
2.) a better Canada/Ontario Agreement.
In 1987, the International Joint Commission, the independent body overseeing
environmental matters in the Great Lakes, lost substantial funding and staff. In addition, the
IJC committee system was restructured, leaving the IJC "unsure even of its role" (Crombie
1992: 140). The Commission recommended that the Canadian government work with the
U.S. and the IJC to strengthen its role and clarify its responsibilities, to ensure that the IJC
has sufficient and multi-year funding, and also to establish a standing Citizens' Advisory
Committee to provide ongoing advice to the IJC (ibid).
The Commission stated that the fulfillment of the GLWQA was contingent on the
renegotiation of the Canada/Ontario Agreement (COA). The COA "is one of the best-kept
secrets in the environmental world, almost unknown to the general public, and little
understood even by many environmental groups active on issues in the Great Lakes
Basin...the COA is the key (on the Canadian side) to implementing the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement.... (t)he COA spells out federal and provincial government
responsibilities in cleaning them up" (Crombie 1992: 141). The fundamental objectives of
the COA mirror the GLWQA to eliminate persistent toxic substances, and coordinate the
control of pollution and restore the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. Importantly, the
agreement established "the cost-sharing of specific programs which Ontario will undertake
to assist Canada in meeting those obligations" (COA 1985). The Commission recommended
that the COA be renegotiated - publicly - with stricter guidance on results, implementation
and specific responsibilities. This renegotiation would develop full price-costs to meet
objectives, including water and sewer services, apportion costs of the clean-up between
parties, develop a set of progress indicators for the RAP, reporting annually to the Canadian
public on progress made and money spent, and finally, include the public on COA activities
and monitoring.
At the Provincial level, the Commission recommended that the Municipal/Industrial
Strategy for Abatement (MISA) program (to reduce flow of toxic pollutants in Ontario's
waterways), be developed and implemented. During its six-year existence, there had been
little progress made on the program. MISA needed to set regulations for municipal and
industrial discharge.
The Commission's remaining recommendations were directed at the level of the RAP. The
Commission stated that the success of the Canadian RAPs, overall were dependent on a
renegotiated Canada/Ontario Agreement. Without funding dedicated to the clean-up of the
areas "itwill be impossible to implement RAP's effectively" (Crombie 1992: 144).
However, the Metro Toronto RAP initial work also deserved criticism. The RAP's most
fundamental flaw problems was its "lack of a true ecosystem approach to tackling Metro's
waterfront and watersheds" (ibid 144). The RAP process followed conventional
"compartmentalized approach to environmental protection, concerned with managing the
external environment" and required a "fundamental shift from traditional ways of
thinking... to integration... based on managing human activities within a natural system of
which we are just one part" (original emphasis, ibid). The Commission offered two specific
recommendations to help the RAP process move to an ecosystem approach: 1). The RAP
problem definition Stage 1 needed to be "updated and reorganized on a watershed basis"
before it moved into Stage 2 phase of remedial action recommendations. The Commission
argued that "watershed ideas are the building blocks needed in order to select remedial
options for the final plan" and therefore need to be worked out prior to the RAP's next
phase; 2). As stated in Watershed, "a watershed approach" should be taken in the Metro
Toronto RAP, which included linking remedial options to "restoring water quality in each of
the six major watersheds, coordinated and integrated by the overall RAP" (ibid). The
municipalities within the six watersheds needed to be incorporated into the RAP process
"as true partners" (ibid).
Furthermore, the RAP process required "solid public backing" to achieve funding and
implementation (ibid). To date, the RAP "never effectively reached out to the general public
to elicit support for cleaning up the watersheds and waterfront. However, broad public
acceptance and support of the RAP is critical to implementing it successfully. Without it, a
plan - however worthy - is likely to sit on a shelf gathering dust" (ibid). The Commission
here highlighted the threat to this important plan - a lack of public will would result in
political inaction and a shelved report. The RAP's public outreach only occurred at the time
of a documents' release, rather than an ongoing campaign. A successful outreach component
would be best achieved through focusing people on their own watershed, "creating
enthusiasm in people for cleaning up their own river, creek or stretch of waterfront"
(Crombie 1992: 145). Lastly, delays in the RAP process threaten the potency of the RAP
plan. A slow RAP allowed current development and municipalities to continue
independently without a guiding framework. The RAP needed to meet its Stage 2 deadline
(in late 1992).
Finally, the Commission stated that a "Research and Information Network" for the Greater
Toronto Bioregion be established to share information with all interested parties and
stakeholders in an integrated way, to support "ecosystem-based decision-making" (Crombie
1992: 146). The Commission insisted that such a network "has great potential to begin the
vital process of building cooperation among governments, institutions, the private sector,
and non-government organizations" (Crombie 1992: 147).
Summary. The Commission's reach across the Great Lakes basin, the Greater Toronto
Bioregion, and the Metro Toronto area of concern, shows the complexity of addressing
water at an ecosystem-based scale. The role of the federal Canadian government, jointly
with the U.S. and the IJC would dictate the future of comprehensive basin-wide
improvements. At the same time, the Canadian federal government needed to fulfill its legal
and financial obligations to the Great Lakes and Province of Ontario to achieve the
objectives of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. While the federal government and
province were reluctant to fund the remediation or regulate discharge, environmental
problems have continued - alongside increased urbanization and further stress on the
ecosystem.
In the vacuum of government presence, grassroots organizations have stepped in to develop
their own ecosystem restoration efforts for rivers and watersheds. While laudable, the scale
of these efforts would never be equivalent to those financially and institutionally possible
through government action.
The Commission recommendations addressed multiple scales of water management,
seeking to push for an integrated approach to restoring and managing the Great Lakes basin
and the water bodies of the Toronto bioregion.
Shoreline
The Commission shifts scales from the Water of the Great Lakes basin to the Shoreline of
Lake Ontario. The section focused on the current state of the shore, which had been
dramatically impacted over the past century by lake-filling projects and coastal hardening.
The Commission offered federal, provincial and municipal recommendations to improve the
environmental quality of the shore and Lake Ontario.
The Commission first provided an overview of the Lake Ontario shoreline in 1991, whose
lake-fill projects and engineered edges had altered natural coastal processes, and reduced
erosion in one location and accelerated it elsewhere. Based on reports prepared for the
Ministry of the Environment, lake-fill soil was often contaminated with heavy metals and
other organic contaminants. As of 1991, no comprehensive assessment had been conducted
on the cumulative impact of lake-filling on Toronto's waterfront (Crombie 1992: 149).
These statements were first published in the Commission's Watershed report, and called for
a moratorium on new large lake-filling projects, until the Province presented
comprehensive lake-fill policies for public review (ibid).
Following the 1990 release of Watershed,the Province of Ontario requested the
Commission further its investigation of the shoreline, focusing on "policies, practices,
technology and methods available to regenerate the shoreline areas" (ibid). The
Commission took this request to "regenerate the shoreline" as "a desire to establish a
shoreline healthier and more beneficial to the surrounding community" (Crombie 1992:
150). The Commission published specific shoreline recommendations in Shoreline
Regenerationforthe GreaterToronto Bioregion (1990).
Shoreline Background. The history of the Lake Ontario shoreline remained relatively similar
from the retreat of the glaciers 15,000 years ago, until the European settlers in the 18th
century. Prior to their arrival, indigenous populations adjusted the changing banks. The
mouths of rivers and streams along the Lake were "lush and vibrant natural communities"
with fish and aquatic life - which ultimately attracted the European settlers to establish in
the area.
These settlers built piers and dug away the shoreline and beach stone as ballast for ships,
leading to rapid shoreline erosion and the destruction of fish habitat and shoreline
farmland. As population grew, the "shape of the Greater Toronto bioregion's shore" was
dramatically altered (Crombie 1992: 152). In 1912, the Board of the Toronto Harbor
Commissioners (THC) implemented its first massive waterfront plan, and filled in over
1,000 acres of the Ashbridge's Bay Marsh for industry and recreational use. The fill included
dredged soil, city garbage, sewage sludge and construction debris (ibid). The 1967 Toronto
Waterfront Plan included "massive lake-filling" for artificial islands, marinas and public
open space (ibid). The lake-fill projects complete since the 1950s have resulted in a decline
in water quality (ibid).
Shoreline at time of Commission. As of 1991, the western shore of Lake Ontario showed
intense development, lined with hard coverings, stone, and jetties used to reduce erosion.
The Commission assessed several coastal communities, including Oakville, Point Credit,
Toronto, Oshawa and Port Darlington. The shoreline of Toronto included a break-wall, lakefill structures, with the Inner Harbor for shipping and industry completely shelled in
vertical concrete and steel (Crombie 1992: 156).
The Commission stated that modification of the shoreline was not all negative, and had
"provided substantial benefits to the region," citing example of downtown Toronto cultural
facilities and parks constructed on lake-fill. These areas supported cultural and economic
activities, and to some degree improved public access and wildlife habitat (Crombie 1992:
155). In addition, lake-fill projects enabled downtown construction with inexpensive
disposal for excavation activities - although at a price. Overall, the physical filling of the
lake, and dumping of contaminated soil had "damaged much of the natural habitat above
and below the water line" (Crombie 1992: 156). The Commission found that the
"environmental price was higher than necessary, and sometimes outweighed apparent
benefits" (ibid).
The Commission further articulated the negative effects of shoreline modification and lakefilling: the loss and damage of aquatic and terrestrial habitat; alteration of sand movement
and erosion processes; change in aesthetics, access, views and recreation; and negative
cumulative effects on the ecosystem. The Commission cited that 90 percent of aquatic life
depends on the shallow waters near the shore, and this landscape had been destroyed by
many of these activities.
The Commission stated that current lake-filling or "open water disposal" guidelines were
weak and not enforced. The Ministry of the Environment (MOE) "Sediment Guidelines" for
maximum levels of contaminated soils were administered by the Metropolitan Toronto
Region and Conservation Authority (TRCA) through soil sampling. TRCA reported that in
1989 twenty-five percent of soil samples approved for lake-filling were found above these
set standards and 15 percent of the time in 1990. The Commission stated that existing
evidence shows contaminants in lake sediment move to nearby plants and fish - and further
up the food chain - is reason to be concerned.
Recommendations.The Commission recommended that the Province adopt new sediment
guidelines for open-water disposal, and should establish contaminant limits at levels that
will protect aquatic ecosystems. The Ministry of the Environment and the Metropolitan
Toronto Region and Conservation Authority should review and improve its process for
controlling lake-fill material.
The Commission highlighted that marine construction and shoreline hardening are another
concern of the shoreline. The Commission recommended that the federal and provincial
governments develop standards for lake-fill projects and erosion control structures, in
consultation with marine construction engineers, academics and experts. The Commission
insisted that the waste from excavation sites cannot simply be dumped into the lake; a new
"restricted fill" waste classification must be established for soils unsuitable for open water
disposal. This fill could be used in other locations, such as creating screening berms. The
Commission suggested reducing excavated materials from downtown sites by reducing the
amount of underground parking lots, and instead build parking garages, reduce the number
of parking spaces, or improve public transit.
The Commission proposed an alternative to shoreline hardening: purchasing hazard lands.
This strategy "may prove less costly and improve public access" (Crombie 1992: 164). This
proposal would expand public ownership of near-shore "hazard lands" with unstable banks,
and increase the "opportunities for natural links between stream valleys" (ibid). The
Commission argued that shoreline regeneration "can contribute to the economic vigour of
the waterfront" (emphasis added, sic, ibid). Cleaner water and restored habitat might
increase boating related services, while less sewage and litter would raise the attractiveness
for tourism, recreation, and real estate values.
Entrenched in a restored shoreline is also a new approach to "landscaping" away from
mowed lawns: "traditional management and landscaping of public lands limits habitats.
Variety in landscaping... providing areas with native wild grasses, flowering plants, shrubs,
and trees, as well as formal park settings, will increase diversity of habitat and species"
(ibid).
The Commission stated that a new relationship to the shoreline also required public access,
which is currently limited by "transportation corridors parallel to the shore, such as
railways and expressways..." (Crombie 1992: 165). The waterfront "is hidden behind a wall
of industrial, public or private fences provid(ing) few public benefits" (ibid). While lakefilling to increase recreational opportunities may appear less expensive than acquiring land
along the shoreline, the environmental costs must be added for a fair comparison against
the cost of land (Crombie 1992: 166).
The Commission added that shoreline modification is both a problem and solution to
shoreline regeneration. But without any assessment of the cumulative effects of individual
modifications on the Greater Toronto bioregion shoreline, it was impossible to estimate the
local carrying capacity of these changes (Crombie 1992: 169). The lack of comprehensive
studies stemmed from multiple jurisdictions of municipalities, conservation authorities,
regional governments, federal and provincial ministries, and harbor commissions. This field
of governance created a "patchwork" of regulation, and no means to evaluate the whole
shore at an ecosystem scale (168). The Commission insisted that the provincial and federal
governments take action to resolve "intra-municipal planning issues," where there existed
no incentives for agencies to work together or share common goals: "The waterfront is
plagued by jurisdictional gridlock" (Crombie 1992: 169).
Remedying the shoreline was both possible and worthwhile: "Ahealthy shoreline is a
priceless asset for the Greater Toronto bioregion: it offers drinkable water, recreation, rest
and solace at the doorstep of millions, and is an exciting stimulant for commerce, tourism,
and the economy" (ibid). The expected increase in regional population will likely add strain
to the waterfront and its natural systems, and therefore demands a coordinated framework:
"positive measures must be taken soon to preserve the benefits we enjoy today" (ibid).
The Commission recommended that the province, in consultation with municipalities and
agencies, develop a Shoreline Regeneration Plan "to protect and regenerate the shoreline
for the Greater Toronto bioregion, employing an ecosystem approach" (p.172). This plan
would provide the opportunity to consider the cumulative development effects along the
shoreline, rehabilitate degraded areas, protect natural areas and improve public access and
recreational opportunities (ibid). First, a coordinating agency needed to be established with
a "mandate, will and skill to involve all responsible parties in planning and acting on
shoreline regeneration" (Crombie 1992: 169). This plan required clear positive goals and
actions to support shoreline regeneration, and restrict "certain types of development
activities to ensure a healthy, resilient, productive shoreline with increased aesthetic, social
and economic value to the community" (ibid). The Commission cited the San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Development Commission as an example of broad coordinated planning,
along with the U.S. Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) as a mechanism to create
incentives and partnerships on the Great Lakes. In Canada, the Fraser River Estuary
Management Plan (FREMP) had previously been used to protect and develop waterfront
resources by coordinating agencies, Native bands, harbor commissions, federal and
provincial government and local municipalities.
The Commission articulated the proposed over-seeing agency for the Shoreline
Regeneration Plan: "(it) should pursue only those shoreline modifications that met
ecological criteria and ensure that newly created lands remain in public ownership for the
benefit of future generations" (Crombie 1992: 170). Critical areas would be "zoned" and
prohibit lake-filling or development. The plan would feature clear boundaries, an efficient
approval and control process, with a consultative development and public review process,
with authority to protect natural areas. To ensure the implementation of the plan, rewards
and incentives were needed to be break the jurisdictional "log-jam" (172).
In the immediate term, the Commission recommended a moratorium on all major new lakefill and shoreline erosion control projects, pending the approval of the Shoreline
Regeneration Plan. Large projects "may create unnecessary harm and foreclose options for
future benefits" (174). Given that the Shoreline Plan may take years, the Ministry of the
Environment should immediately revisit and revise its standards and procedures for small
shoreline projects currently underway.
Summary. The Lake Ontario shoreline is a difficult environment to manage and restore
without a comprehensive and ecosystem based approach. The current shoreline is lined
with individual projects that have altered natural processes of erosion and deposition,
destroyed habitat and contributed to the contamination of the lake. The Commission called
for a moratorium on major lake-fill development projects and coastal hardening until a
coordinated provincial Shoreline Regeneration Plan was put into place. Along with a
comprehensive plan, the Commission demanded stricter standards for waterfront projects,
and enforcement of existing regulations. Without a coordinated plan and agreed upon
standards, the condition and instability of the shoreline would only continue and possibly
worsen.
Greenways
From the edge of the waterfront, the Commission shifted upstream along the bioregion's
rivers, and proposed a network of greenways. The Commission presented a case for
greenways based on the projection of increasing population in the Greater Toronto Area:
"We face a more crowded future" from the current four million to nearly six million by 2020
(Crombie 1992: 177). Development pressures to accommodate new people and
infrastructure would make it "difficult for most people to find a quite refuge, an unpolluted
stream, a place to walk among the trees" (ibid). The Commission explained how many of the
area's wild plants are already rare, and "streams that leave the Oak Ridges Moraine as cool,
clean homes for aristocratic brook trout arrive at the waterfront chocked with filth" (ibid).
The Commission stated that there was immense challenge to meet the needs of a growing
population and protect the "vulnerable ecosystem," but that one strategy to address this
challenge was through a network of "greenways" (ibid). Greenways are corridors of
protected green space that extend from the city to the rural landscape: "Greenways do not
pit humankind against nature; rather they serve the needs of both, protecting the quality of
the natural environment while providing recreation and quite places to call home" (ibid).
The greenways proposal "fits neatly" into the Commission's principles for the waterfront:
"clean, green, useable, diverse, open, accessible, connected, affordable and attractive" (ibid).
At the time, greenways were gaining "prominence, in part because there is a lack of funding
for acquiring traditional parklands" and there was less land available in the urban
landscape. Greenways "provide equally good or better recreational opportunities (than
traditional parklands), as well as vital ecological benefits, at a much lower cost" (Crombie
1992: 178).
The Commission recommended a greenways system of trails along the waterfront, river
valleys and through the Oak Ridges Moraine, to "cast a green net over the Greater Toronto
Area, making the public open spaces far more accessible and attractive" (ibid). The Ministry
of the Environment endorsed the Commission's initial Waterfront Trail proposal in featured
in the Commission's Watershed report. As of 1991, the Province had completed a study for
the alignment of the waterfront trail, and included recommendations for several "green
nodes" to be acquired to link a corridor of greenspace (Crombie 1992: 179). In addition, the
community group Citizens for a Lakeshore Greenway (GFLAG) formed to further pursue the
lakeshore greenway.
Greenways Background. The Commission distinguished a greenway from a conventional
trail system, as being wider than a trail with continuous vegetation and open space.
Adjacent private lands or ecologically sensitive might prohibit a continuous trail system. A
greenway was valuable beyond the typical purchase of isolated parkland in urban areas,
because it offered a continuous ecological presence (ibid).
The Commission credited the modern greenway system to William H.Whyte, an urban
planner. Contemporary examples of greenway systems included the nearby Niagara
Escarpment, which has an ecological plan administered by the Niagara Escarpment
Commission (NEC), the Ottawa Greenbelt, the Bay and Ridge trails by San Francisco, and the
Willamette River Greenway in Oregon. The Commission noted the proliferation of greenway
trails in America was not the result of large public costs, but rather "from strong individual
and public commitment to that vision. Creating a greenway can foster a strong sense of
pride and accomplishment within a community, and help local people focus more clearly on
the kind of place they want to leave to their children" (Crombie 1992: 180-181).
From a regional perspective, greenways offered substantial benefit, "in a landscape rapidly
filling with humankind's infrastructure, greenways provide the natural infrastructure vital
to an environmentally sustainable region" (Crombie 1992: 181). Greenways could
counteract ecological degradation typically associated with fragmented habitats in urban
areas, provide habitat for a diverse number of species, and potentially offer increased
opportunities for human interactions with wildlife and the natural landscape.
Importantly, greenways also enhanced water quality. Regionally, pollution often occurred
through non-point sources including stormwater runoff from streets, roofs and fertilized
landscapes, and construction activities adjacent to rivers and streams. Greenways serve to
buffer to filter and capture sediments and pollutants. Stormwater detention ponds and
wetlands could also be sited on a greenway, and further enhance local water quality.
Oak Ridges Moraine.The Commission noted that greenways were important areas of
groundwater recharge, particularly in the Oak Ridges Moraine. The Moraine was "identified
as a major recharge area for groundwater, and as a source for more than 30 major
watercourses. The water quality in the upper sections of these streams is excellent.... To
maintain water quality in these streams, and to protect the associated cold-water fishery, it
is vital to safeguard the moraine" (Crombie 1992: 183). The Commission stated that the
Province "recognized this need by expressing a Provincial Interest in the Oak Ridges
Moraine, issuing interim guidelines for planning decisions, and intitaing a two-year study to
produce a long-term strategy for the moraine" (ibid). The protection of the vegetative cover
on the Moraine was essential to maintain groundwater recharge and water quality in the
"bioregion's streams," otherwise, "it will be impossible to restore the water quality in their
lower reaches" (ibid). The Commission stated that greenways could not be the sole solution
to water quality restoration, and that other pollution control methods were needed in a
planning process to reduce stormwater flows and contaminants.
Public Support.The Commission cited its background studies and polls of area residents on
greenways as public amenities, and found that there was broad support for longer,
interconnected trails within 8 kilometers or 5 miles of a residence. Greenways located near
residential areas were more likely to be utilized by all income groups, for both short and
long outings. Greenways could also be a source of economic stimulus for local communities
as users on the trail stop for services, food and rest. The Commission cited that the Bruce
Trail, along the Niagara Escarpment, was estimated to generate $30 million Canadian
dollars a year. A trail system might be incompatible with certain ecologically sensitive areas,
and certain land-owners, and should be considered in the planning process.
The process of planning a greenway offered an opportunity to build partnerships among
community groups, government agencies and non-profits, and could led to a "more
cohesive approach to the waterfront, the major valleys, and the Oak Ridges Moraine"
(Crombie 1992: 188). The greenways planning process could incorporate other existing
programs, including wetland protections and floodplains.
The Commission provided a Greenways and Trails concept map for the bioregion, showing a
greenway hugging the lakeshore, as well as greenways connecting up the river valleys and
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across the Oak Ridges Moraine and Niagara Escarpment. Greenways operated on two
levels: arterial greenways that established the large framework and local connectors that
linked nearby communities.
Figure 10. Greenways and Trails Conceptfor the GreaterToronto bioregion
The Commission noted that many greenways strategies were being developed around the
region, and conveyed local interest in this concept. The Commission urged the Province to
support these efforts with assistance through the Ministry of Tourism and Recreation.
Greenways did not need to be all publicly held lands - some sensitive areas would be better
as protected lands, without public access. Conservation easements would support this
effort, as would the regulatory powers of municipalities and conservation authorities.
Implementation. The implementation of greenways required the partnership of many
agencies, non-profits and the public. Successful implementation of a greenways trail
systems, "must strongly involve the community at its grass roots. In the context of the
bioregion, it is vital to have a strong emphasis on watersheds as a planning level for
greenways" (Crombie 1992: 192). The Commission called on the Province to use its current
regulatory tools to foster the greenway trails system, and create incentives for
municipalities and land-owners involvement.
Recommendations.The Commission provided recommendations for three categories of
greenways system: the waterfront, the Oak Ridges Moraine and those along the river
valleys. First, the Commission encouraged the Province to continue with its initial
endorsement of the waterfront and greenways trails, by "co-ordinat(ing) intergovernmental
policies and programs along the waterfront.... An area where creating some greenways links
will be particularly challenging" (Crombie 1992: 193). The Commission suggested the
Province create Partnership Agreements with municipalities, conservation authorities and
others. The proposed Shoreline Regeneration Plan should include the "basic design and
policy for a waterfront greenway," and have "sufficient scope to incorporate the
recommended interim and optimum routes for the Waterfront Trail" (194). Furthermore,
policies for public lands along the waterfront should support the Waterfront Trail as the
"highest land use", whereas policies for private lands should encourage "landowner
participation in ecological restoration" (ibid). In the case of "major blocks of private
waterfront lands" the Province should negotiate public access. For all new waterfront
development, a provision for the public trail should be required. Finally, the Commission
stated that the Province should establish a resource center for technical assistance on the
construction of greenways, conservation easements, to any agency or citizen's group in the
bioregion.
Second, the Commission commented on the Province's June 1991 Implementation
Guidelines on the Provincial Interest in the Oak Ridges Moraine Area, aimed at restricting
development in the Moraine during a two-year planning study. The Commission insisted
that the ecological importance of the Moraine is similar to the Niagara Escarpment, the eastwest connection of a greenway in the Moraine faced obstacles, including the amount of
current development, numerous jurisdictions, limited publicly owned lands, and a landform
that is less obstructive to development (unlike the cliff of the Niagara Escarpment). The
Commission recommended that plans for a greenway across the full extent of the Oak
Ridges Moraine be incorporated into the work of the Oak Ridges Moraine Technical
Working Committee.
Lastly, the Commission recommended that greenways be developed along the river valleys:
"(i)mplementing a greenway system in the bioregion's valleylands and communities means
finding a balance between and ecosystem-based, cross-jurisdictional system, and the desire
for a grass-roots, community-based approach" (Crombie 1992: 198). This required a great
deal of cooperation between various groups, as well as "a great deal of provincial
supervision and coordination" (ibid). The Commission noted that the geographic starting
point for considering a greenway trail is the watershed. Many watersheds in the bioregion
crossed municipal boundaries, and greenway leadership would likely come from the
conservation authority or a citizens' group. Critical to the success of developing and
implementing a greenway plan was a shared vision and the presence of all stakeholders.
The Commission suggested naming these groups Community Greenways Alliances, as
entities with government, private and public groups, who come together to develop and
implement a greenways strategy. With full involvement of the local jurisdiction, the
completed greenway plan would be adopted in a municipal Official Plan. The Commission
noted the importance of community involvement and municipal participation to ensure the
adoption and implementation of the plan.
Role of Province and FederalGovernments. The Province played a central role in the
development of the greenways. The Commission quoted Ruth Grier, Minister of the
Environment, and her endorsement of the ecosystem approach to planning, that the
Province intends to apply the Commission's work "as a guide, not only for the waterfront,
but to move beyond the waterfront - to the GTA urban structure process" (Crombie 1992:
202). The Commission stated that greenways be viewed as a key component of urban
infrastructure "the same emphasis as ...roads, sewers, electricity, and other essential
services" (ibid). To implement greenways, the Province needed to provide legislation and
policy backing for relevant municipalities and conservation authorities. The Province
needed to be directly involved in greenways implementation along the waterfront and Oak
Ridges Moraine, with financial and technical assistance for planning activities and to acquire
critical lands and coordinate the greenways effort throughout the bioregion (Crombie 1992:
203). The Commission suggested various ways to create municipal incentives to create
greenways, and financial strategies to leverage a greenways fund.
The Commission recommended that the Province pursue amendments to relevant
legislation to support greenways implementation, including the Conservation Authorities
Act to clarify the mandate of conservation authorities to "undertake environmental
protection and recreation activities related to greenways" (Crombie 1992: 204). Similarly,
the PlanningAct should be amended to require that, in areas of development, "valleylands,
wetlands and other significant natural environments be dedicated to a public agency, or
protected in private hands through such mechanisms as conservation easements" (Crombie
1992: 205). In addition, the Province should introduce legislation to enable non-profit
conservation groups, municipalities and conservation authorities to hold conservation
easements (ibid). The Commission further recommended that the PlanningAct include a
policy to address the incorporation of greenway strategies into municipal Official Plans. A
Provincial 'greenways unit' should be created in a relevant ministry to oversee policies and
programs, and provide technical support to local jurisdictions.
The Federal government was also needed in the creation of greenways. The Commission
recommended that the government encourage greenways on federal lands, by retaining
ownership of abandoned railroad right-of-ways as potential greenway corridors, and
introducing legislation or amendments to permit the donation of lands to a qualified
organization without capital gains taxes.
Summary. Greenways presented a strategy to expand greenspace and natural corridors in
an urban environment, while reducing non-point source pollution into streams and rivers.
The Commission presented greenways as an emblematic ecosystem strategy to link the
waterfront to the backbone of the region's headwaters, and protect all the water bodies in
the bioregion. The benefit of greenways is ecological, and has the support of the public. The
Province and federal government would be the key actors in negotiating these plans across
jurisdictional boundaries and creating the incentives for their development and
implementation.
Urban Watersheds
Following the overarching environmental categories of water, shoreline, greenways, the
Commission concluded Part II of the report with the "Healing of an Urban Watershed: The
Story of the Don." This section was strategically centered in the Regeneration report, full of
color photos, colored illustrations of the Don River watershed, and plans for its
regeneration. The Don was the physical centerpiece of the report, distinguished by a blue
stripe across the bottom of each page by the page number, unlike any other section of the
report. The Commission also removed its voice from the narrative of the Don, re-emerging
only in the section of "Applying Regeneration to the Don".
The Story of the Don began with this:
The stream that once gurgled through cool forests and flashed with salmon is a
storm sewer today....Much of what was once a lovely corridor and repository for road
salt, dirty snow, and illegally dumped garbage. The river's lower stretch is straitjacketed in steel and concrete, while chain-link fences discourage strolls along its
degraded banks. Long gone is its natural mouth, an expansive delta that once teemed
with life. Instead, a contorted right-angle turn and a tangle of expressways and railway
tracks mark the river's entrance into the lake.
But with help, this sad watershed can regenerate, creating a healthier human
community as it does so (Crombie 1992: 227).
Below this description were two aerial images: one a photo of the current mouth of the Don
River, a channelized waterbody lying beneath an expressway and adjacent to industrial
lands and parking lots. Beneath was a hand-drawn colored illustration of the same scene,
but depicting "Arestored Ashbridge's Marsh," a water body with soft vegetative edges
flowing over what the previous industrial site. These two images suggested that there was a
vision and will already underway to transform the Don.
The Don is an urban river, and similar to those of other North American cities. This river
was the focus of many advocates because it was the most degraded of rivers in the Metro
Toronto area, the result of being the center of Toronto's earliest development and growth
under European settlers. The restoration of the Don River required a holistic view of
restoring the watershed: "healing the whole, not just some of its parts" (Crombie 1992:
228). The Don's flow starts in the Oak Ridges Moraine and flows south into Lake Ontario.
Restoring the Don would support a cleaner environment for Toronto and contribute to a
healthier Great Lakes.
Background. Historically, Native populations inhabited the Don and "lived gently off the
land" consuming salmon and other fish, wild rice in the delta and corn in the flatlands
(Crombie 1992: 233). Europeans settlers "brought with them an attitude toward natural
radically different from that of the native peoples" and sought to control the land and the
Don River. In 1787 the British purchased Toronto from the Mississauga Indians for a small
fee and settlement in the Don Watershed quickly grew. City surveyors created a geometric
grid of streets, casting city blocks over creeks that were soon filled and covered. This story
mirrors those of many rivers in North American cities.
The River was a resource for transportation, energy, mills and industry. The bay was mined
for sand and clay for building construction, and the land deforested for lumber. Without
vegetative cover, flooding was an increasing problem. Engineers channelized the last five
kilometers (3 miles) of the river before 1900. Soon into the century, the Ashbridge's Marsh
(featured in the introductory illustration), was filled in for port lands. In 1954, Hurricane
Hazel ripped through the Don and Humber river valleys causing severe flooding, destroying
bridges and homes, and killed 84 people. The Don River Expressway and Bayview Extension
were constructed in the 1950s, adjacent to the river, further degraded the river with
roadway pollution.
Today. At the time of publication in 1991, the Don watershed was 70 percent urbanized
with 800,000 people. The upper reaches of the Don River watershed were more rural, but
largely owned by private developers.
The healing of the Don first required a change in "attitude that nature is merely a resource
to be used, and abused, by human beings" (Crombie 1992: 236). This attitude persisted in
the region - notably in the Oak Ridges Moraine - the valuable headwaters of the Don, where
much of the land has been developed into "tract housing, monster homes industries,
shopping malls and parking lots" (ibid). Cumulatively, development caused massive
sedimentation into streams, and contributed to the waste that flows into storm-sewers that
flow untreated directly into the river (ibid). Over 1,000 storm-sewers emptied into the Don
River, and nearly 95 percent of the Don's pollution originated north of the City of Toronto.
Upstream pollution and urban runoff were the main concerns of the Don, as well as
industrial discharge poorly treated at the outdated North Toronto Sewage Treatment Plant.
Amazingly, the water quality of the Don has actually improved from half a century ago, at a
time when industrial discharge flowed unregulated and untreated into the river. Vocal
activists from the Task Force to Bring Back the Don and Save the Oak Ridges Moraine
(STORM) have pushed for environmental policies on the river.
Principlesof Regeneration.The health of the environment was described as reflecting the
health of the city: "Ahealthy city depends on a healthy environment: you can't have one
without the other" (Crombie 1992: 238). Improvement to the Don River and its watershed
required both a change in attitude to value nature and change in the environment policy, to
be given "a higher priority in planning decisions than short-term human gains" (ibid).
Eight guiding principles were described to regenerate the Don and the entire ecosystem.
First, natural and cultural features needed to be protected including the Oak Ridges
Moraine, wetlands, woodlands, and even old industrial buildings, where artists work and
new businesses begin (Crombie 1992: 239). The second principle required natural
topography to define the form of cities and development patterns: "(u)rban sprawl has
imposed a sameness over the North American landscape... obliterating any local sense of
place with monotonous tracts of housing and shopping malls" (ibid). This development
pattern must be prohibited on the headwater moraines or any other sensitive groundwater
recharge area (ibid). Development should instead occur in existing town centers with
existing sewer systems services, and elsewhere with buildings clustered on the least
sensitive land. Higher density construction would preserve open space, agricultural lands,
streams and habitat. The third guideline required development to "adhere to a policy of
zero increases in pollution siltation and run-off" and aim to improve stream health and
strengthen greenway corridors (Crombie 1992: 240). Wetlands should be protected or
restored. Urban storm-sewers should be replaced overtime "by biological treatment"
including a network of wetlands and storage ponds in existing floodplains which could also
increase wildlife habitat (ibid). Below this third principle are two sketched diagrams, one
showing a parking lot and low building alongside a channelized stream, and the second
showing the same lot being infilled by multiple buildings, and the stream meandering
through vegetation.
The fourth principle stated that development should be compact, "conventional suburbs
(which) waste space" (ibid). Parking lots should be in-filled with smaller development;
zoning by-laws can be relaxed to permit splitting homes and building basement apartments.
This development would protect streams from being developed and reduce the impacts of
greenfield construction. The fifth principle encouraged "maintaining rural traditions" of
farmland and local agriculture. Without these lands the "city loses its connection to its rural
base," and its associated local economies (Crombie 1992: 241). Furthermore, zoning in the
suburbs and urban centers should encourage vegetable gardens, which reconnects
communities to "sustainable rural traditions" (ibid). By instilling a relationship and
stewardship to the land, the health of the watershed will improve (ibid). The sixth principle
stated actions should "Work with Nature." This strategy encouraged natural regeneration of
eroded banks, the "re-naturalization" of property edges, and parklands, which overtime
would improve water quality. "Engineering" must be kept to a minimum, and "it must work
with, never against, the processes of nature" (Crombie 1992: 242).A colored illustration
depicts the cross section of a concrete channelized waterway transformed into a
meandering stream with sloping banks of vegetation.
The seventh principle was to "Encourage Watershed Consciousness" among the people who
live in an urban watershed. Partnered with planners, citizens could work closely with
experts to initiative stream clean-ups, and restorative plantings. This would happen "when
people have an investment in the health of their own local area, and is encouraged when
authorities ensure access to ravines and river valleys" (ibid). Community groups could act
as "watchdogs" for vandalism, dumping, and also share knowledge with other citizens on
the effects of household chemical and fertilizers on local water quality. These efforts
required "new mechanisms" to foster "stewardship programs" with local citizens, including
"shared funding," and support to coordinate citizens' groups throughout the watershed
(ibid).
Healing the Don. Enacting these principles would be essential to regenerating the Don
watershed. With increasing population pressures, it was essential to "protect the health of
the natural system and the human communities that are a part of it" (ibid). Central to the
health of the watershed is the protection of the Oak Ridges Moraine and its agricultural
slopes: "Not only is the moraine the source of many of southern Ontario's rivers, it is a rare
and beautiful area enjoyed by hikers, school groups, and naturalists from every part of the
Greater Toronto bioregion" (ibid). The Commission supported the efforts of the joint
citizens' and provincial committee to develop a strategy to protect the entire Moraine.
The Commission recommends direct aid to farmers to retain agricultural farmland from
suburban development, which would support farming related activities, through land-
stewardship programs, conservation deeds, land banking or tax relief (Crombie 1992: 243).
New development could be redirected to existing suburbs, the city center or former
industrial areas.
Stormwater management in the Don watershed required an overhaul, to "enhance, rather
than destroy, aquatic habitats" (ibid). A plan to "give the Don back its natural mouth would
regenerate the lower river and the Toronto waterfront for wildlife and people alike" (ibid).
Each of the overarching seven principles was described in further detail and through
colored hand illustrations. The illustrations were paired to show current or "conventional"
development and proposed new development following the "ecosystem" approach to
planning.
First, the Countryside was depicted in four illustrations, first showing a "Traditional rural
village in the moraine" with a small hamlet center at the intersection of two roads, a
meandering stream through woodlands, surrounded by farmlands and a couple scattered
farmhouses. The second scene showed the "Village and farmland obliterated by
conventional development," where the small hamlet was now surrounded by single-family
homes on large lots delineated by black lines, and a stream channelized in concrete. Third,
the Commission proposed what an alternative to conventional suburban development could
look like, through "Clustering new development around existing hamlet." This scene shows
increased buildings of various height and configuration centered around the main hamlet,
preserving the peripheral farmland and farmhouses, and the vegetation surrounding the
meandering stream. Stormwater ponds are labeled behind a portion of the development
near the stream. A "market garden" is labeled adjacent to the central hamlet. The fourth
image showed a close-up of the clustered development around the existing hamlet,
depicting "Mixed-use in new residential areas" with corner stores and two to three storey
homes close together, narrow streets wide sidewalks lined with trees and community and
market gardens behind the houses.
The text reflects the story told by the images: that conventional development has nearly
wiped out the traditional farmland landscape, destroying upland streams and the
vegetation surrounding the streams which keep the waters cool and clean for fish and
wildlife. Instead of following traditional suburban development methods, clustered housing
was recommended to retain the integrity of natural systems, while providing nearby stores
and farmers' markets for food. Narrow streets would slow traffic, and give more room to
pedestrians on wider sidewalks. Hedgerows, old railroad tracks and river corridors should
remain intact as pathways for people and wildlife.
This clustered pattern of development contrasted with existing suburbs, dominated by cars,
constructed of low-density housing requiring extensive infrastructure including roads and
sewer lines, and making mass transportation cost-prohibitive. However, suburbs could be
modified and re-densified through changes in zoning regulations, to permit additional small
homes on a lot, a "granny house," and basement apartments. Narrowing the suburban street
would provide more space for pedestrian traffic and allow pathways through the
community.
Underutilized clean industrial and commercial sites would also be prime location for other
housing options. This would also permit people to live closer to where they work. Some
land or rooftops could be converted into gardens or wetlands, providing habitat and
intensify uses.
Next, the "Ecosystem Approach to Development" is both described and shown through
illustrations. Three illustrations show an aerial perspective view of the existing landscape in
the upper Don watershed, that same landscape under "conventional" development and
"mixed-development intensified along major routes" (Crombie 1992: 247).
The Commission told a story of the farmland being bought by developers. The developers
would bulldoze the landscape and fertile soil into a flat landscape, possibly filling in
wetlands along the way. During this phase of development, "which may last up to four
years" local streams would become full of silt from eroded banks (Crombie 1992: 248).
Streams might be channelized in concrete. Roads would be laid out, sewer lines constructed
and gas lines installed. Then the land will be sold to commercial and housing developers,
erecting low-density buildings with parking and single-family homes, and planting "lollipop
trees" along the streets (ibid).
The Commission stated that this type of development does not have to be the only option:
"with some imagination and sensitivity to natural systems, this development could protect
and fit into the countryside and its inhabitants" (Crombie 1992: 248). Clustered, highdensity buildings could be constructed in particular areas of the site, preserving the
vegetative cover over streams, retaining wetlands and some farmland. Stormwater runoff
would be directed into retention ponds or wetlands, instead of directly into streams. This
development "follows all the guidelines of regeneration," by protecting nature and the rural
landscape, conforms to the existing topography, clusters building on the least sensitive
lands and "enhances environmental health" (ibid). Ultimately, the people who come to live
here "cannot help but develop a watershed consciousness" (Crombie 1992: 249).
Furthermore, "given the rate at which urbanization is steamrolling countryside in the Don
watershed, it is crucial that developments follow this new pattern" (ibid).
Conventional stormwater management also needed to be revisited: "radical changes" were
required to ensure the regeneration of aquatic life and habitats (Crombie 1992: 250).
Currently, stormwater discharge from across the watershed flowed directly into the Don
River, and the rivers main source of pollution and high flows, raising the risk of flash floods.
The stormwater infrastructure on the city streets efficiently moved water into the river and
the lake, carrying with it oil, garbage, pesticides and animal waste. A solution to this is to
first stop the pollutants at its source, by changing chemicals and applications used everyday,
including road salt, fertilizers, reducing car usage, and fining those who ignore cleaning up
after their pets. The stormwater management system could also change to treat pollutants
through detention ponds, replacing impervious surfaces with porous materials, re-creating
or restoring wetlands and natural ditches. Reforestation in the city, and importantly, along
water bodies would slow runoff by retaining water in the soil. Stormwater should no longer
be viewed as waste, but an opportunity to recharge and regenerate urban areas for both
humans and natural communities (Crombie 1992: 251).
The Commission also outlined its recommendations for the "Lower Don Delta," which it first
discussed in its Watershed report, to transform the current Port Industrial Area into
parkland and green industry. The City of Toronto's Task Force to Bring Back the Don
presented a proposal in 1991 to return the Lower Don into a marshland and delta, removing
the port lands and reestablishing habitat and a "large naturalized greenspace at the Toronto
waterfront for city dwellers to enjoy" (Crombie 1992: 252). The Commission stated that the
Don River is constantly forming its own delta through sedimentation - and that annually the
Board of Harbor Commissioners has to dredge 100,000 cubic meters (over 3 million cubic
feet) of silt at a cost of $600,000 Canadian dollars. With a marshland, this cost would be
greatly reduced. Ultimately, "(t)his vision for the Don would transform Toronto's
waterfront. It would make the river the focus of the city, rather than a sewer to be ignored"
(Crombie 1992: 253). This plan has a long-term vision of 20 to 40 years to be realized, along
with a research and education center in the port lands to understand the delta system.
The restoration of the Don delta required human intervention: if the delta is allowed to silt
naturally, it will take out the bridges and infrastructure in the lower portions of the river. As
a solution, initial studies by the Don Task Force showed that the river grade needs to be
steeper to reach the river's mouth in the port lands. The past engineering efforts of the Don
required engineering work to return it to a more natural state. This required the
construction of a weir at the Rosedale Flats, which would operate like a beaver dam, filling
with sediment and allowing the water to flow over and out to the port. An illustration
showed the Don meandering to a weir, overflowing as a small falls, with vegetated banks
and a marsh.
The channelized portion of the Don would prove more difficult to re-naturalize, as it is
abutted by railroad tracks and expressways and has steel and concrete banks. Still,
vegetative plantings were still possible with willows and poplars tolerant of difficult sites.
Next, the Commission described the importance of connected public access through the Don
watershed. Access is the "mobilizing force for restoration" (Crombie 1992: 256). By
providing access, people would be able to connect to the river valley, building "a watershed
consciousness" through the connection of trail systems and parklands. These connections
could serve as a corridor for wildlife and a respite for people.
To achieve the vision of a restored Don required the coordinated actions of many.
Regeneration cannot be achieved through the continued independent actions of cities and
towns, whose individual actions may degrade the watershed further. Furthermore, the
process of restoring the river cannot rely on experts alone "(d)ictating regeneration from
above" by governments or agencies without public support (Crombie 1992: 258). Citizens
are already involved with the restoration process, through plantings and clean-ups. Their
local actions are central to the regeneration of the watershed.
Summary. The Commission elevated the recent citizen actions around the Don River to
highlight the detailed struggles facing the river, and many urban water bodies. The Don, one
of sixty rivers in the Greater Toronto bioregion, served as a microcosm of water pollution
and environmental degradation - but also as one river being evaluated at the scale of the
watershed and ecosystem. The Commission's guiding principles to regenerate the Don
broadly addressed urban and suburban development patterns, and called for the
prohibition of development on the Oak Ridges Moraine, agricultural land, and policy and
zoning reform. Healing the Don required the revamping of regional development,
stormwater management and a change in attitude toward the environment as an inner
connected system of people, economies and nature.
The Commission moved from the scale of the Great Lakes basin, to the shoreline, to
greenways, to the urban watershed and the patterns of neighborhood development. The
geographic extent of the element or area is becoming more localized - but constantly steps
back to the bioregion and lake. The actors involve citizen groups, municipalities,
conservation authorities, public works, and the province. The ecosystem approach is
required to navigate through these scales of place and political actors.
Municipalities
Following Environmental Imperatives and Urban Watersheds, Part Three of the
Commission's report focused on the individual "Places" along the waterfront from Halton to
Durham. Each "Place" Chapter is introduced with a map of the Greater Toronto Area,
showing regional boundaries, and highlighted a specific region in green with the area rivers
outlined in black. The Commission moved from west to east along the waterfront.
...............
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Figure11. "Places"Regions inlay shown by Commission
This section provided a specific review of the development patterns along the waterfront, as
well as environmental characteristics and challenges. The Commission provided an update
on each area's planning process since the Commission's publication of Watershed in 1990.
Each city or town provided a response to the Commission's work and recommendations and
provided an update of their plans, and recommendations for further work.
The Commission recommendations were similar to most of the regions and waterfront
areas. This included the recommendation that each area enter into a Waterfront
Partnership Agreement with the Province to coordinate waterfront development and a
waterfront trail. In addition, the Commission recommended that waterfront lands held by
the federal government or province should be sold to local public agencies for a nominal
cost, where they are needed for public access. Additionally, regions should develop
strategies for green corridors up creeks and rivers, as well as act to preserve or enhance
natural creek mouths emptying into the lake. All regions were invited to participate in the
Shoreline Regeneration Plan with the province and relevant agencies. Regions and the
province should also act to provide additional protection to river valleys and adjacent edges
in a Parkway Belt Open Space Plan, assuring setbacks for new development. The
Commission recommended that all regions develop and adopt a greenways plan in their
local and Region Official Plans.
The Commission expressed similar concerns in several of the regions and towns. In the late
1980s, several waterfront communities proposed extensive lakefill projects, without regard
to cumulative effects on the shoreline. Certain regions and towns lacked approved Official
Plans, and had resulted in uncoordinated "patchwork" development with "no clear regionwide strategy to protect and enhance natural features," including the waterfront, river
valleys and the Oak Ridges Moraine (Crombie 1992: 286). The Commission recommended
that the Province place a moratorium on new large lakefill projects, until a comprehensive
Shoreline Regeneration Plan is created and adopted.
The Central Toronto Waterfront received extensive recommendations from the
Commission, which included the removal of the elevated Gardiner Expressway (still exists
in 2010); and improvements to the railroad corridor that runs along the lakefront, to
overcome the current "physical, visual and psychological barrier" between downtown
Toronto and the Central Waterfront. The Commission recommended extending mass transit
options in the Central Waterfront district, and additional "green infrastructure" of parks and
open spaces.
The Commission's earliest report also reviewed and made recommendations to the role and
mandate of the federal Harborfront Corporation and the Toronto Harbor Commissioners
(THC), large land-owners of waterfront properties. The THC had two mandates: to
redevelop lands, and develop programs to attract people to the area. The Commission found
the THC mainly interested in real estate development to offset programmatic costs, and
maintain financial stability. However, those real estate transactions, "ultimately manifested
in high-rise building on the site" (Crombie 1992: 371). The Commission stated that the
public's increasing concern over the privatization of the waterfront caused the city to halt
development activities in 1987. The Commission recommended that the federal
government review the competing mandates of the Board, and instead be transformed into
a Foundation exempt from real estate transactions.
Summary. The Municipalities section of the report reinforced the Commission's main
assurance to local governments that the Commission did not seek to usurp local authority.
While the mandates of the Commission came from the federal and provincial governments,
the Commission's ecosystem strategy was closely dependent on the decisions of local
municipalities. This section enabled local municipalities to highlight their own actions many of which developed through Commission roundtable meetings and consultations with
Commission staff. The participation of municipalities in the Commission established a sense
of support at all levels of government.
Regeneration and Recovery
The Commission's report concluded with the chapter "Regeneration and Recovery." This
chapter restated that the economy and the environment are mutually dependent, and that
development and quality of life cannot be sustained in a compromised environment. The
Commission's summarized its six strategies to regional recovery: 1. Adopt the ecosystem
approach to planning and its nine guiding "waterfront principles" (clean, green, useable,
diverse, open, accessible, connected, affordable, attractive); 2. Establish or revise waterfront
plans to reflect the ecosystem approach; 3. Ensure "intergovernmental co-operation,"
through necessary agreements and commitments to accomplish these goals; 4. Consolidate
budgets and pool resources to move projects forward; 5. Create a framework for privatesector involvement, and utilize its creativity and investment capital; and 6. Form
partnerships between government agencies and the public and private sectors (Crombie
1992: 457).
The ecosystem approach was both "a way of doing things as well as a way of thinking," and
would enable a transformation away from the current status quo of fragmented policies,
jurisdictional gridlock and lack of regional accountability. Rather than consolidate
governments to oversee the waterfront or region, responsibilities by federal, provincial and
local governments need to be reexamined to address the complexity of the waterfront and
the region. The waterfront was "too complex... to be left in one pair or even in several sets
of hands" and shared administration and a roundtable process of participation is essential
to bring all stakeholders to the table to determine a course of action and to ensure
accountability (Crombie 1992: 460).
Following the Commission's interim report Watershed (1990), the Province adopted several
of these strategies, including, the Commission writes, "adopting the ecosystem approach
and the nine principles as waterfront policy; approving and acting on the Waterfront
Greenway/Trail; and agreeing to set up the Waterfront Regeneration Trust and to enter into
such Waterfront Partnership Agreements with municipalities, the federal government, and
other parties as necessary to achieve waterfront goals" (Crombie 1992: 461-462). The
Federal government also acted on the Commission's recommendations, and "adopted the
ecosystem approach" in its Green Plan, as applied to the Greater Toronto region.
Furthermore, the federal government made organizational changes to the Harborfront
Corporation and Toronto Board of Harbor Commissioners (ibid). Already, waterfront land
transactions were underway from federal bodies to local municipalities and regions.
Regional Conservation Authorities were working with regions and towns to develop
waterfront and river valley parks.
Summary. The Commission's final chapter highlighted that the ecosystem approach to
restoring the environment and the economy of the Greater Toronto bioregion was already
underway. This adoption of this holistic vision was both the glue and incentive to act
strategically.
Chapter 4: The Royal Commission's Impact
The Royal Commission had immediate and on-going political impact during and after its
term from 1988 to 1992. After the publications of its reports, including its initial Interim
Report in 1989, Watershed in 1990, Regeneration in 1992, and numerous supplemental
reports, the federal government and province endorsed the Commission's
recommendations and began to follow-through on implementation.
The Commissioner's case was supported by extensive and generally favorable media
coverage both of the Commission and its Commissioner, David Crombie. Major newspapers
described the Commission's vision and narrative of place of the Greater Toronto bioregion,
watershed and ecosystem to its readers, as the solution to the region's problems. The
Commission's readable and accessible story appealed to a broad audience. This story - in
tandem with public concern for the environment - helped generate will for policy change.
This was reflected in the adoption of many of the Commission's recommendations - many
of which challenged the status quo of development practices and institutional relations.
The Commission was described and perceived as a defendant of public interest along the
Toronto waterfront, and a jurisdictional negotiator. I explore the reception of the
Commission's work first through media coverage and interviews with activists and staff of
the Commission. Second, I discuss those recommendations that were adopted and
implemented which fulfilled the Commission's "ecosystem" and "watershed" agenda.
4.1 Publicity and the Commission's Narrative of Place
The extensive and favorable media coverage of the Royal Commission, David Crombie and
the "ecosystem" and "watershed" solution to the Greater Toronto region, elevated public
and political will for policy change. Since its inception in 1988, the Toronto Star and Globe &
Mail newspapers featured the Royal Commission every few weeks, including its
"ecosystem" solution to the region's ills, emphasis on the "watershed" and river clean-ups,
heated debates with the Toronto Board of Harbor Commissioners, along with the responses
of governments and regional politicians. The news played a key role in sharing the vision of
the Commission and explaining the language of the "watershed" and "ecosystem" approach
with its readers.
Crombie's former position as a popular Toronto Mayor from 1972 to1978, likely enhanced
coverage, as reflected in one headline on the Commission from the Toronto Star in 1989,
"Crombie: still prince of the city" (Byers 1989: A29). Crombie's notoriety as Toronto's "tiny
perfect mayor" during his mayoral term was in reinstated (Landsberg 1990: Cl), as he
negotiated through jurisdictional gridlock and private development dominating the
waterfront (Wright 1990: E2; "Waterfront study hits" 1991: B4).
Alongside coverage on the Commission, the news featured the condition of Toronto's local
environment and rapid development outside the central core. In April 1989, Pat OhlendorfMoffat published a long article titled "Rebirth of a River" on the degraded and "shame(ful)"
condition of Don River in The Globe and Mail supplemental Toronto magazine (Desfor and
Keil 2004: 87). The article came out a few days prior to a public forum on the Don River at
the Ontario Science Center (which overlooks the Don River Valley). This publicity was
credited to raising the profile of the polluted Don River, the problems of urban runoff and
its engineered profile. University of York Prof. Gene Desfor writes that "(a)ttendance at the
forum was much greater than expected, and it brought together people with different
perspectives to share their mutual interests, as it turns out, to begin building a social
movement" (Desfor and Keil 2004: 87). Mark Wilson, who later became chair of the Don
...........
............
Task Force, described that this news coverage sparked his interest in the Don and brought
him to the OSC event; this was the first step toward his involvement on the river (Mark
Wilson interview 2010).
The Ohldendorf-Moffat article summarized the polluted history of the Don, the contributing
problems of urban runoff, combined sewer overflows, and perception of the river as a
sewer. However, she offered hopeful recommendations for change, including the protection
of the river's headwaters, community involvement, and the public to urge politicians to
clean-up the river. These general ideas were reaffirmed a few months later by the Royal
Commission's initial report.34 The article included color photos of the Don River, past and
present, as well as a full-page illustrative map of the Don River watershed, depicting the city
grid painted over the meandering tributaries of the river. Key landmarks and streets were
labeled for orientation.
Figure 12. Map of Don River featured in Globe and Mail Toronto Magazine by Edward Wallace
The Commission's Interim Report, while not specifically mentioning the Don River, made this similar
recommendations to the Province and federal government as important actions to clean-up Toronto's
environment and pursue a "green" strategy of managing the region by protecting the headwaters and
rivervalleys. pp. 195-196.
34
The illustrative quality of the map created a story of the river: home to birds and fish, with
green banks on its upper reaches, bridges, and industry at the waterfront. This depiction of
the Don, while gestural and interpretive, nonetheless acted to show readers the river's
relationship to the city and the environment. Local activism around the Don River
watershed and the Bring Back the Don citizens' group was further promoted by its coverage
in the Commission's Watershed report the following summer of 1990. The Bring Back the
Don was centrally featured in Regeneration as an exemplary civic group that was
coordinating its work with multiple agencies and governments, through the vision of the
"watershed" approach. The Commission's endorsement of the group encouraged Toronto's
city council to financially support restoration projects in the Don watershed. 35
In 1990, news coverage of the activities of the Commission was frequent and favorable moving from a few articles a month in each paper, to an article every few days following the
release of Watershed in September. 36 In January 1990, six-months prior to the release of
Watershed, an article in the Toronto Star already articulated the Commission's watershed
concept for the region: "Crombie is now investigating environmental issues in the entire
Toronto watershed - an area that stretches from Burlington in the west to Newcastle in the
east and north from Lake Ontario two-thirds of the way to Lake Simcoe. One out of six
Canadians lives in this Toronto watershed, which generates 20 per cent of the national
income" (Stevens 1990: B3). While no map of the region was featured alongside the text, the
description of the region's conceptual "watershed" - far beyond the boundaries of the
Greater Toronto Area - conveyed the Commission's bioregional agenda. The concept
introduced readers to the environment at a large scale - a broad region connected through
a shared "watershed". In actuality, nine watersheds constituted this same geographic area,
but shared the headwaters of the Oak Ridges Moraine or the Niagara Escarpment. The
introduction of the article also tied in the economic importance of the regional
environmental: "20 per cent of the national income" resides in the watershed. The article
captured the region as it was depicted by the Commission: the economic viability of the
region was linked to the condition of the environment.
The City of Toronto began sponsoring the Task Force to Bring Back the Don in 1990, and continues to receive
financial and institutional support from the city for restoration projects, twenty years later.
36 This news analysis focused on the Toronto Star and the Globe and Mail and relied upon the papers' online
archives, as well as Google's news archive timeline feature. The frequency of coverage may actually be
underrepresented by the archives and search engine.
35
Six months later, immediately after the release of Watershed in September 1990, the
Commission's agenda was further described, under the headline: "Crombie study reflects
love of environment" (Landsberg 1990: Cl). The report was revered as coming at a critical
time in Toronto's political history:
The 'Watershed' interim report from the Royal Commission on the Future of the
Toronto Waterfront couldn't be more aptly named and timed: not only does this
entrancing and unorthodox report express the greening of David Crombie, our tiny
imperfectly Tory commissioner, but it arrives smack on the hour of a watershed in
Toronto's political history. Enter Crombie, whose vision of the waterfront embraces
the whole of Toronto's "bio-region" and would hand control back to the
communities - while safeguarding the public interest. It's amazing to read an official
report that uses wavy, watery lines in its table of contents, quotes lavishly and
tantalizingly from important nature writers, vows to double the number of
Toronto's trees, and opens with a charming, impressionistic account of a July rainfall
(ibid).
Indeed the language of the report was "entrancing and unorthodox" in its readability and
accessibility to multiple audiences. This report moved beyond convention both in language
and scope - referencing "nature writers" while instilling a "vision of the waterfront that
embraces the whole... bioregion." The condition of the waterfront required consideration of
a larger context. The report title, Watershed, delineated a geographic concept and also
suggested that region's economic and environmental future is at a critical watershed
moment (Crombie 1990). This article summarized the Commission's agenda, and urged
political action to protect "the public interest."
Coverage of Watershed flourished after its publication in September 1990 - as did the
responses of politicians to the Commission's report. The federal and provincial government
quickly endorsed its recommendations (Crombie 1992). Suzanne Barrett noted that
because the Commission worked closely with municipalities, the recommendations
"weren't terribly controversial. With a few notable exceptions: [In the region of] Etobicoke
there were some big issues at that time..." (Barrett interview 2010, and author's
clarification).
The City Council of the region of Etobicoke initially barraged the Commission's call for a
provincial moratorium on lake-fill projects (Byrne 1990: W9), and a "provincial interest" in
the Etobicoke waterfront to place a hold on development (Byrne 1990: A16). At the time,
Etobicoke had a number of large private development lake-fill projects in the pipeline,
expected to double Etobicoke's lake-front population to about 80,000 (Byrne 1990: A6). The
project was aimed to attract people to the city, which had been declining in population since
the 1960s. The proposed development site, a motel strip, was a haven for prostitutes and
drug dealers (Brent 1991: A7). The new development proposed expensive condominiums, a
boardwalk, retail stores, and some 800 affordable housing units.
Etobicoke councilor members stated that the plans for development had been underway for
three years, and included professional planners and public meetings (ibid). Furthermore,
the Council argued that the Commission's recommendations would cause developers to be
fearful that their plans would be shelved. These public hearings were however, contentious;
residents called the proposal a future 'Habourfront' (in reference to an exclusive enclave of
tall condominiums on Toronto's central waterfront) (Brent 1991: A6). In June 1990, the
Etobicoke city council unanimously approved the proposed project. The Commission's
report was released in September 1990, just two months prior to Etobicoke's scheduled
hearings on the development with the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB). In response the
Commission's recommendations, Etobicoke's council called on then-Premier Bob Rae to
respond regarding the city's waterfront.
However, within a month the Etobicoke's Council retracted its statements, and expressed a
working relation with the Commission (Byrne 1990: W1). However, the situation remained
tense: the province asked for time to respond to the Commission study, and as a result, the
Etobicoke city planning commission quit; the OMB hearings were postponed. In the spring
of 1991, the Province released its own proposal for the site, which included reduced
building heights, more parkland, and a street grid to increase waterfront access (ibid). The
province hired a consultant to develop a compromise plan with the city. Finally, in October,
a year after the conflict began, the city approved the plan, which included reduced building
heights. The province agreed to waive an environmental assessment on the project (ibid).
The situation in Etobicoke shows that the Commission's work was not completely without
controversy. It also demonstrated that the Commission's recommendations had political
clout at the provincial level and ramifications locally. The Commission's recommendations
challenged the status quo of development proposals at the time.
Suzanne Barrett commented that the Commission, "was quite influential in precipitating
some of the policy work that was done at the time" in Etobicoke (Barrett interview July
2010). The Commission's recommendations pushed the Province to act on a large and
controversial waterfront development proposal. The Province's relatively quick
intervention, proposed alternative, and political compromise still allowed development to
proceed on the waterfront, and avoided complete financial loss for developers under a
development moratorium. The final compromised proposal was supported by members of
city council because it still permitted development, and would inject life into an industrially
blighted and crime-ridden area.
Response to the Regeneration report
Two years later, the Commission's Regeneration report also received favorable coverage,
although not nearly the volume of coverage as Watershed. Many of the recommendations
put forth in Watershed were being acted upon. This final report, Regeneration,summarized
many of its previous recommendations and was a source for specific interests, such as the
Don River Watershed and municipalities and towns. Because the Commission worked with
municipalities and towns to craft recommendations for the final report, the reactions to the
report were not controversial; the staffs of municipalities had written their individual
sections (Barrett interview 2010).
After Regeneration,the media translated the ideas of the Commission to its readers. The
"watershed" concept for the region described in previous coverage was reintroduced as the
"ecosystem" approach in the Toronto Star: "The catchphrase for Crombie's philosophy is
ecosystem planning. That means studying the impact of development applications on
natural systems and processes, beyond political boundaries" (Funston 1992: BR1). In a
Sunday edition, Star journalist David Lewis Stein endorsed Crombie's work and character:
Crombie believes the city and the countryside can co-exist. He wants us to think of the
city as only one part of a "bioregion" in which "everything is connected to everything
else." So cities and towns should adopt "ecosystem-based decision making" in which
natural features such as creeks and groves of trees are preserved and accommodated
within the city.
...But there are so many levels of government and so many boards and agencies
operating on the waterfront, getting them to work together seems impossible.
Still, I read Crombie's report, which is so well written and so full of good ideas,
and I watch him at work, jacket off, sleeves rolled stylishly half way to the elbow, talking
and gesticulating, so confident about the future, and I think that if anybody can get
waterfrontpower brokers to co-operate, it has to be Crombie.
And I think of Crombie and Sewell together and the work they are doing really
seems so hopeful. It's called progress, I believe (Lewis Stein 1992: B1, emphasis added)
The journalist's trust in David Crombie and John Sewell - head of the new Commission for
Planning and Development Reform - to instill political change and jurisdictional
cooperation, emboldened the viability of the ecosystem agenda put forth by the Crombie
Commission. The Regeneration report is "so full of good ideas," including the concept of
"ecosystem-based decision making" by cities and towns, that the report's recommendations
represent "hop(e)" and "progress" for the bioregion. Solutions to the region's problems
were possible with the ideas and involvement of David Crombie. The extensive and
favorable media coverage of the Royal Commission and its vision for solving the region's
problems, appears to have generated the necessary public and political will for change.
4.2. Commission Recommendations Impacts and Implementation
As the capstone of the Royal Commission's work, many of the recommendations in
Regeneration were previously introduced in its other publications, including Watershed,
Planningfor Sustainability,and its initial Interim Report. The impact of the Commission was
already underway at the completion of Regeneration - through the beginnings of Provincial
Studies, federal negotiations, and another Royal Commission Inquiry into Planning and
Development Reform.
The Crombie Commission immediately succeeded on four levels: it prompted further
studies for environmental protection and planning reform; brought about a new institution
to negotiate waterfront planning and resolve jurisdictional conflict; leveraged the concerns
of environmental activist groups; and re-packaged sustainability concerns for a region by
establishing a broad narrative of place (Laidley 2007: 263; Erickson 2005: 72-73). The
extensive and rather favorable media coverage of the Royal Commission, David Crombie,
and the "ecosystem" and "watershed" solution to the region, elevated public and political
will for policy change.
The Commission succeeded in advancing its "ecosystem" agenda while the National
Democratic Party (NDP) was in power, from 1990 until May 1995. After which point, a
Conservative provincial government, led by then-Premier Mike Harris and Toronto Mayor
Mel Lastman, usurped the language of the "ecosystem" approach to equate economic
growth with environmental restoration, while at the same time rescinding progressive
social and environmental provincial legislation (Boudreau, et al 2009: 59). This change in
government reflected voter frustration over a deep recession, rising taxes, unemployment,
and austerity measures on public servants to cut government costs. Harris' Progressive
Conservative party gained a significant share of parliamentary seats from the wealthier
regions in the Greater Toronto Area, under the platform of a "Common Sense Revolution,"
aimed at cutting taxes and government spending (Boudreau et al 2009). It is not clear how
or if the Crombie and Sewell Commissions policy recommendations affected the election
results. The most significant legislative reform from the Commissions - the PlanningAct had just been passed in 1994 and early 1995 and not yet been implemented at a local level.
During the time frame from mid-1995 through 2001, Harris and Lastman lent favor to
environmental "clean-up"(Desfor 2004: 144-147)37 by government for private economic
development and urban competitiveness (Desfor 2004; Laidley 2007), the privatization of
public services (Desfor 2004: 22) and local authority over land development (Boudreau, et
al 2009). Harris's provincial government consolidated local and regional governments into
one geopolitical unit, the new City of Toronto - colloquially called the "Megacity" of Toronto
- with 2.5 million people (Desfor and Keil 2004: 21-22). While rationalized as a cost-savings
device, the amalgamation effectively re-balanced power away from downtown Toronto and the civic activist core - to the suburbs (ibid). This change in governance structure also
reflected a "move away from civic environmentalism to a more market-based, neoliberal
regulation of the local environment" (ibid).
In 2001, escalating concerns and protests over government cuts to public services,
development on the Oak Ridges Moraine, and the safety of privately managed municipal
drinking supplies 38 resulted in Premier Harris' resignation. Progressive politics reemerged,
as did the ideas put forth by the Crombie Commission a decade earlier. Mid-2001 to 2005
37 Government sponsored cleanup of sites was aimed only at those slated to be redeveloped. Cleanup was
mandatory when there will be a change in zoning on the land, or when the risk is deemed severe to the
environment and community. New cleanup guidelines adopted in 1994 and 1996 is based on the premise that
economic growth serves as a basis for environmental restoration. Site-specific risk assessments deemed a "safe"
level of contamination have lower costs associated with redeveloment, and ensure that contaminated sites don't
site idle for long periods of time.
38An EColi breakout at a privately managed municipal water supply in Walkerton, Ontario, resulted in 7 deaths
and 2,500 illnesses. Harris was largely blamed for the incident, due to severe cuts to public inspections and the
privitization of public services. He resigned a few months after the incident.
was a time of significant reform to water management, and regional planning efforts to
protect drinking supplies, agricultural lands, and direct urban growth.
In the following sections, I evaluate the impact of the Crombie Commission from 1990
through today, by evaluating the adoption of the key recommendations that reflected the
"ecosystem" and "watershed" approach to managing the region. This analysis follows the
organization of the Regeneration report: Planning Practice, Water, Shoreline, Greenways,
Urban Watersheds and Municipalities.
Planning Practice
The PlanningAct
In Canada, land-use planning authority is overseen at the Provincial level of government.
The uncoordinated and sprawling pattern of development throughout the Greater Toronto
bioregion was criticized by the Commission as one of the causes of the decline of the
region's environmental quality. The Province has the authority to direct municipalities to
protect the environment and pursue thoughtful development patterns.
The Commission's strongest planning recommendation called for the amendment to the
provincial PlanningAct to foster an ecosystem approach to planning. The Provincial
PlanningAct directs and authorizes procedures for land-use decisions on private and
municipal lands (Penfold 1998). In an interim report, 39 the Commission stated that the
PlanningAct failed to offer "even minimal protection for the environment" (Crombie 1992:
63). The same month of this report's publication, the Province authorized a separate
Commission Inquiry focused on Planning and Development Reform (known as the
Commission on Planning and Development Reform or CPDR). This new Commission was to
recommend changes to the PlanningAct and related policies that would "restore confidence
in the integrity of the planning process" (Sewell, et al, 1993: 1). While the Crombie
Commission's recommendations did not draw immediate policy reform, it prompted this
second Inquiry - many of whose final recommendations mirrored those presented by the
Crombie Commission - which did lead to legislative reform in 1994.
The CPDR commenced in June 1991, and was led by John Sewell, also a former Toronto
39 PlanningforSustainability:IntegratingEnvironmental Protection into Land-Use.
mayor. With an agenda to restore public confidence in the planning process, the Sewell
Commission proceeded with large public and agency outreach campaign. Two years later, in
1993, the Commission offered recommendations and a Comprehensive Set of Policy
Statements to the Province (Penfold 1998). Overall, the recommendations called for strong
provincial regulation on land-use planning, with guidelines for planning authorities such as
municipalities, provincial ministries, and the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB). The
Provincial Policy Statements - directives for local planning actions - included the protection
and enhancement of natural features and agricultural lands, the prohibition of sprawling
development, mandated affordable housing, and the promotion of energy and water
conservation. Planning decisions were to be made more publicly transparent and efficient.
Nearly all of its recommendations - many nearly identical to those of the Crombie
Commission 40 - were adopted into the PlanningAct in late 1994 and early 1995 (Penfold
1998).41
This new legislation empowered municipalities to pass by-laws prohibiting development on
all or parts of land with natural or environmental significance, such as contaminated soil or
groundwater recharge areas (Wood 1998). Now the Province had the power to prescribe
the contents of an Official Plan (Wood 1998: 2-3).42 Any county, region or municipalities'
land-use decision now had to "be consistent with" Provincial Policy Statements, which was
strengthened from the previous requirement for planning authorities to "have regard to"
these Statements (Wood 1998: 10). The Regeneration report specifically called for both
clear Provincial Policy Statements regarding the environment and natural systems, as well
as mandating local compliance with such statements (Crombie 1992: 63, 85).
The Sewell recommendations most closely tied to the Crombie Commission ideas of
ecosystem approach to planning are addressed in the CPDR report recommendations,
"Planning on a Watershed basis," "Natural Heritage and Ecosystem Protection and
Restoration Policies," as well as focus on Great Lakes (Sewell, et al 1993: 136-137). Identical
to the idea presented in Watershed,the Sewell Commission recommended that, "Planning
40 My review of the New Planning for Ontario document shares similar language and recommendations for the
Planning Act and Associated policies, including the Environmental Assessment Act, the Trees Act, Lakes and the
Municipal Act, first described in the Regeneration Report. p.75.
41 Bill 163 included these amendments. Many of the adoptions were to Section 3 of the Planning Act.
42 An Official Plan could be submitted by a municipalities or region. In Bill 20, this provincial power was revoked,
to the County level in which the Official Plan was a part.
Area boundaries should generally be based on natural boundaries such as watersheds"
(Sewell, et al 1993: 80). The requirements of a municipal plan were expanded to include
"...goals, objectives, and policies established primarily to manage and direct physical change
and the effects on the social, economic, and natural environment of the municipality...."
(Sewell, et al 1993: 74). Prior to this, municipal plans did not need to include goals for the
natural environment. In addition, municipal plans shall be required to "include maps or
descriptions of matters noted in provincial policies" (ibid). Interestingly, this requirement is
seeking planning authorities to spatially translate provincial policy statements into visual
maps or plans or descriptive text to address the protection of the natural features,
agricultural lands, and areas for affordable housing.
However, just a few months after the legislation was adopted in March 1995, a Conservative
Provincial government led by Premier Mike Harris came to power, and within a year the
legislation was undermined (Penfold 1998).43 The new government's reverted to the
previous tenants of land-use planning, preferring "(e)fficient, cost-effective development
and land-use patterns,"(Penfold 1998) which followed traditional suburban development
patterns (Boudreau, et al 2009: 59). The Province's briefly expanded planning powers were
transferred to local governments (ibid). This had significant repercussions on development
in the outer core of the city; development proceeded rapidly, and uncoordinated on
greenfields and the agricultural foothills of the Oak Ridges Moraine.
This Conservative government remained in power through the April 2002, after which the
PlanningAct was once again revised in 2005 to include the objectives introduced nearly a
decade before. Provincial authority over local planning directives was then reinstated.
Today, planning authorities are again required to be "consistent with" rather than "have
regard to" Provincial Policy Statements (PPS). These Policy Statements direct land-use
planning, environmental protection for wetlands, woodlands, habitat, water quality and
quantity requirements, transportation and infrastructure.
The Provincial Policy Statement includes a section "Wise Use and Management of
Resources" and instills language familiar to the Crombie Commission. The Policy Statement
"includes strong policy direction to protect the province's natural heritage, water,
43
Bill 20 effectively withdrew the previous amendments of bill 136.
agricultural, mineral, and cultural heritage and archaeological resources. The protection of
these important resources will help ensure Ontario's long-term prosperity, environmental
health and social well-being" (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2010:
Planning Act 2005 Introduction). Efficient development is encouraged in Settlement Areas
and away from sensitive areas (OMMAH 2010: Planning Act 2005 Sec 2.2 Water). Under
Section 2.2 Water, the PlanningAct calls for planning authorities to "protect, improve or
restore the quality and quantity of water by... using the watershed as the ecologically
meaningful scale for planning" (ibid). Furthermore, planning authorities shall restrict
development to "maintain linkages and related functions among surface water features,
ground water features, hydrological functions and natural heritage features and areas," as
well as "promote efficient and sustainable use of water resources, including practices for
water conservation and sustaining water quality," and "ensur(e) stormwater management
practices minimize stormwater volumes and contaminant loads, and maintain or increase
the extent of vegetative and pervious surfaces" (ibid). The current language of the Planning
Act instills those objectives passed in 1995, and again seeks to promote an ecosystem
approach to perceiving the linkages between the health of the environment and the
prosperity of the Province. The PlanningAct calls for a "coordinated, integrated and
comprehensive approach" for dealing with planning issues that cross jurisdictional
boundaries, including the management of development, natural heritage, 44 and "ecosystem,
shoreline and watershed related issues" (OMMAH 2010: Planning Act 2005 Sec 1.2
Coordination).
The course of the PlanningAct, as well as the adoption of other Commission's
recommendations, reflects the waves of political regimes - from a liberal agenda focused on
social welfare and the environment, to a conservative regime of fiscal amalgamation of
government and services and privatization, to reactionary progressive concerns over the
loss of public services, uncontrolled growth and environmental degradation.
Water
The Bioregion Map
The bioregion map showed water through the demarcation of the rivers running from Oak
Ridges Moraine south into Lake Ontario. This map showed one regional watershed,
44 "Natural
Heritage" includes natural systems and man-made cultural or archaeological resources.
bordered on the north and east by the Oak Ridges Moraine and west by the Niagara
Escarpment, and flowing south to the Toronto waterfront. Suzanne Barrett, a key staff
member of the Royal Commission and later the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, stated that
this map sought to show the connection between the waterfront and the watershed and the
rivers (Barrett interview 2010). She stated that at the time people were focusing on
lakefronts around the Great Lakes, including other areas of concern and the Toronto
Remedial Action Plan. This map sought to draw emphasis away from the waterfront to the
rivers of the watershed, and the Oak Ridges Moraine, the headwaters of the region. The
quality of watershed defined the condition of the waterfront, and the lakefronts across the
Great Lakes basin.
Barrett further stated that the Commission deliberately titled its previous report Watershed
to promote people "to see these connections between the waterfront and the watersheds
and the watersheds and the rivers" (ibid). The bioregion map showed the Commission's
rationale for coordinated ecosystem and watershed planning.
While Lake Ontario is shown at the bottom on the bioregion map, it does not readily convey
the region's relationship to the Great Lakes basin. The Commission relies on a separate map
of the Great Lakes basin to situate Toronto alongside other polluted hotspots (areas of
concern) on the Great Lakes.
Commission's Impact on Water Policy
The Commission's vision for water began with the Great Lakes Basin, and made two strong
recommendations to realize the ecosystem approach. First, the Commission called for a
renegotiated Canada-Ontario Agreement (COA) for stronger federal support in the clean-up
of the Great Lakes, and specifically Toronto, the largest and most complex of Canada's
"Areas of Concern." Second, the Commission advised the Toronto Remedial Action team to
revise the Metro Toronto and Region Remedial Action Plan (RAP) to follow the ecosystem
approach to remediating the region. Both recommendations were realized to varying
degrees of success. Re-negotiating the COA proved to be contentious and the process
spanned three years from 1991 to 1994, unlike previous negotiations. The Toronto
Remedial Action Plan, while on paper embraced the "ecosystem" approach, failed to realize
this vision, by excluding "peripheral" jurisdictions and not negotiating relations across
jurisdictions. Interestingly, activity surrounding both the COA and Toronto RAP followed
the political course of the PlanningAct: progressive legislation in the early 1990s went
dormant under the Harris government from mid-1995 until 2001, and were then followed
by renewed efforts.
The Canada-OntarioAgreement
The Crombie Commission recommended that the COA be renegotiated to allocate more
federal funding to clean-up activities, specifically RAPs. The Commission argued that
renegotiation was critical to realizing the goals of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
(GLWQA) and the restored health of the Toronto watershed. The Canada-Ontario
Agreement clarifies the jurisdictional relations, roles and financial responsibilities, of the
federal Canadian government and the Province of Ontario to realize the objectives of the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (Inscho and Durfee 1995: 51).
The substantive issues at play were over jurisdiction, money and the best strategy for
restoration. The Province favored federal support of "on-shore" cleanup for land-based
pollution sources, increased federal funding, particularly for local RAPs, and favored
prioritizing local Remedial Action Plans over Lakewide Management Plans. The federal
government did not want to be involved in on-shore liability of pollution sources generated
from Ontario (where the majority of lake pollution was generated), argued that Ontario
should self-finance the RAP process by adding a "user fee" to municipal water services, and
that priority should be placed on Lakewide Management Plans (ibid: 59). As a result, these
"non-negotiable" agenda items resulted in political standoff for three years.
The federal government also expressed concern that an expanded federal role in Ontario's
environment would be viewed as a constitutional precedent, whereby other Provinces
would seek to rearrange relations with the feds. The environment is not mentioned in
Canada's constitution, and therefore responsibilities between the province and federal
government fall into a "constitutional twilight zone" (ibid: 60). While these concerns
continued, a national election loomed in 1993, and the federal Progressive Conservative
(PC) government delayed on reaching a decision. The PC government lost power to the
Liberal party, and COA negotiations proceeded, finally reaching agreement in summer 1994.
The 1994 COA achieved several key objectives: 1. The federal government pledged $150
CDN million dollars over six-years in a Great Lakes 2000 Program, which would help
toward cleanup costs in Areas of Concern, and wetland restoration projects in Ontario; 2.
The Province and federal governments would equally share costs toward upgrading eight
primary and secondary sewage treatment facilities; 3. Completion of local RAPs is
prioritized over Lakewide Management Plans; and 4. A new provision for citizen
involvement in the RAP decision-making process and implementation phase (ibid: 66-67).
The American authors' of a 1995 study on the COA negotiation stated that the final results
of the Canada-OntarioAgreement Respecting the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem marked a
"major victory" for Ontario (ibid). They postulated that the Agreement may have reflected,
"the growing strength of the Canadian environmental groups" and "suggest(s) the likely
shape of any future GLWQA negotiations" (ibid). While several Ontario and Toronto-based
environmental groups lobbied strongly at the COA, the direction of "future" negotiations
was not mirrored when the Conservative Harris government came to power.
However, the renegotiated 1994 COA represented a significant partner from previous COAs.
Since the signing of the GLWQA in 1972, and the first COA, the federal Canadian government
had gradually withdrawn its financial contributions to Ontario's cleanup efforts. The
previous involvement of citizen input and presence of environmental interest groups were
negligible. The 1994 agreement clarified a joint federal and provincial strategy for
restoration, ensured more equitable cost-sharing for cleanup and restoration efforts, and
created opportunity for public involvement.
The Metro Toronto and Region RemedialAction Plan
The Metro Toronto and Region "Area of Concern" involves six watersheds, spans 772 square
miles (2000 sq. kilometers) of land, and involves eleven municipal jurisdictions. This Area
of Concern is required to develop and implement a Remedial Action Plan (RAP) to meet the
goals of outlined in the GLWQA. The Toronto and Region RAP Team released its Stage 1
report in 1988, defining the water pollution problems and their sources. The Royal
Commission criticized this report as being "unintelligible," not comprehensive, not
organized on a watershed basis, and without regard to relevant upstream jurisdictions. The
Commission recommended that the RAP Team revise this document to pursue the
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"ecosystem" approach to restoration, by addressing the watersheds and not simply the
waterfront, consider land-use patterns and wildlife habitat, and present remedial options
based on a watershed basis rather than for a "2,000-square-kilometer monolithic block"
(Crombie 1992: 134). The Metro Toronto RAP Team also needs a public outreach
component, and to produce a document that excites the public, both of which are necessary
to build support for its costly implementation.
In 1994, the Metro Toronto and Region RAP Team published its Stage 2 report Clean Water,
Clear Choices.This Stage 2 document establishes goals, specific remedial actions,
responsible parties, timetables, and a monitoring program to measure progress.
Interestingly, the format and language of the report appears responsive to some of the
Commission's criticism. The report includes many images, clear diagrams and call-out boxes
with simple language. The text mirrors the Commission's comments and "ecosystem"
approach: "Remedial Action Plans are intended to be community-based.... (t)he Metro
Toronto RAP reflects the work of many individuals inside and outside of government,"
referring to the Public Advisory Committee; "The RAP Goals for Ecosystem Restoration...
Metro Toronto's waterfront and watersheds should be a diverse, healthy, integrated
ecosystem. They should be managed using an ecosystem approach...." (Metro Toronto and
Region Remedial Action Plan 1994: 4-5). This approach is a comprehensive and "systematic
consideration of the interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms,
including humans" (ibid: 5). This approach should be adopted in regional and municipal
planning processes. The RAP's previous main emphasis on Toronto's waterfront has been
expanded to the entire watershed and "ecosystem."
The RAP report repeated recommendations presented by the Commission, including a
moratorium on lake-fill projects, priority for public access to water bodies and river valleys,
protection of the region's headwaters, coordination of RAP activities with regional planning
activities, and public awareness campaign and consultation during the RAP process. The
RAP Public Advisory Committee now includes representatives from all relevant
municipalities in the area of concern, which was previously not the case.
However, the Commission call for the RAP team to consider the Toronto Area of Concern
"not as a monolithic block," but as a system of individual watersheds is not met. Instead of
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organizing the report based on individual watersheds, the RAP offers general
recommendations to the entire area, presented as a spread of options for municipalities.
The area of concern is depicted graphically, and textually, as one watershed:
coMcon
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Figure 13: Metro Toronto Area of Concern. RAP Clean Water, Clear Choices 1994
The only individual watershed discussed in the report is the Don River watershed. The RAP
upholds the 1989 Ministry of the Environment study A Strategyfor Improvement of the Don
River Water Quality,which presents pollution sources, possible control measures, their
effective and costs, as a guide upon which Metro Toronto Remedial Action Plan can be
based. Instead, individual watershed plans be developed to meet RAP goals by working with
other agencies, such as the Metro Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (MTRCA).
RAP objectives can be dove-tailed with the planning activities of the Waterfront
Regeneration Trust, and MTRCA's Greenspace Plan and Valley and Stream Corridor
Management Plan.
While the RAP report clearly responded to the ideas presented by the Commission through
its language, formatting, and diagrams, it did not reorganize its approach to managing the
area of concern by individual watersheds. The RAP process remains subservient to the
governance activities of MTRCA, the Ministry of the Environment, and municipalities. The
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RAP team exists to develop recommendations for remedial strategies, and not as an agency
to see through implementation. Of significance, the RAP report shifted its previous focus
from the Toronto waterfront to the entire Area of Concern, and the watershed, and
"ecosystem" approach to coordinated planning.
Shoreline
The Bioregion Map
The Bioregion Map was used in the promotion of a coordinated waterfront trail across all
the municipalities on the waterfront. In municipal workshops and planning meetings, the
map was featured as a conceptual framework for this regional trail system (Barrett and
Crombie interviews 2010). While the map was conceptually agreed upon, municipalities
and locals were concerned about land ownership. The Commission had to reassure these
groups that the Commission was not established to expropriate local land, but rather to
provide a framework for municipal coordination.
The map was able to build conceptual support for a waterfront trail, but achieved this goal
with negotiation with local groups, local landowners, conservation authorities,
municipalities and tiers of government. A little provincial funding propelled the trail into
development.
John Wilson, current Chair of the Task Force to Bring Back the Don, pointed to the dashed
line of the Lake Iroquois shoreline, the shoreline cliff, as the high water mark during the
glacial period. David Crombie likewise commented on the dashed line of Lake Iroquois as
conveying the impermanence of the lakeshore edge. The hardening and manipulation of the
lakeshore had resulted in environmental degradation, and required a coordinated shoreline
plan.
Commission Impacts and Shoreline Coordination
Immediately following the completion of Regeneration,the Province created the Waterfront
Regeneration Trust to oversee implementation of the proposed waterfront trail, greenways
system and shoreline regeneration plan. The Trust was authorized to negotiate between
government bodies on planning projects, which had a strong impact on the development of
the Central Waterfront. The Trust continued with its public mandate until 1999, when it
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became a charitable foundation. In 1999, the conservative Lastman's city government
established a Toronto Waterfront Corporation, which followed a business-plan of
redevelopment, hinging on private development and a 2008 Olympic bid. The Corporation
has been pivotal in realizing a master plan for the waterfront, which includes the renaturalization of the mouth of the Don River designed by landscape architect Michael Van
Valkenburgh. The Waterfront Regeneration Trust, meanwhile, remains active in realizing
the goals of the waterfront trail and public greenway access, which now extends nearly 500
miles (800 kilometers) from St. Catharines to the border of Quebec.
WaterfrontRegeneration Trust
Following the Province's endorsement of Regeneration, the Province created the Toronto
Waterfront Regeneration Trust (the Trust) to facilitate the implementation of the
Commission's final recommendations for a waterfront trail, greenways system and
shoreline regeneration plan (Lawrence 1995: 15). David Crombie was named head of the
Trust, which reported to the Ontario Minister of the Environment and operated as a nonprofit agent of the Crown (Laidley 2007). Since its inception, the Trust "explicitly adopted
the Commission's ecosystem approach to all aspects of its work" (Laidley 2007: quotes
Suzanne Barrett of the Regeneration Trust in 2000). The Trust staff included many
members that had been involved with the Commission, including Suzanne Barrett, Marlaine
Koehler, and Joanna Kidd. This bridge of staff from the Commission to the Trust extended
the language of the ecosystem and watershed approach to planning, as reflected in its
publications.
The Trust was empowered to negotiate with government bodies over waterfront
development (Goldrick, M. and Merrens R. 1996), and thus the institution to address
jurisdictional conflict, zoning issues, and concerns over public access (Laidley 2007). In
many ways, the Trust's authorities enabled it to fulfill its ecosystem-based approach to
coordinated land-use and planning activities: "the Trust acted ... as a new model for
jurisdictional cooperation, pursuing a strategy of 'progressive incrementalism' to creatively
accommodate and facilitate a spatial response to economic change" (Laidley 2007).
Coordinated planning was viewed as a model for economic development; and economic
development, in turn, as an "environmental panacea" to cleaning-up contaminated sites
(Laidley 2007: 267).
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The Trust's status as a non-profit agent of the Crown ended in 1999 (Laidley 2007), but the
Trust continues to operate today as a charitable foundation (Waterfront Regeneration Trust
2010: History). Of the Trust's many accomplishments during its public term, I focus on its
implementation of its main ecosystem and watershed objectives to coordinate planning
along the waterfront and through greenways.
Waterfront Trail
The Waterfront Regeneration Trust was to foster dialogue between municipalities and
waterfront jurisdictions in the development and implementation a waterfront trail along
the northern shore of Lake Ontario. In some areas, municipalities and landowners were
reluctant to participate and were initially fearful of government expropriation of waterfront
properties. Overtime, these communities realized that this was not the case (Crombie
interview 2010). David Crombie assured them that a waterfront trail did not necessarily
have to be on the lake itself, so where the path met reluctant owners, the trail alignment
turned inland to meet public roads (ibid). The Waterfront Regeneration Trust had some
money to contribute to the creation on the trail, although "not much," but enough to
encourage municipalities to contribute matching funds (ibid). In 1995, the Trust opened a
nearly continuous waterfront trail for 220 miles (350 kilometers) from Stoney Creek to
Trenton (see Figure 15) (Waterfront Regeneration Trust 2010: Trail Facts). The trail
connects parks, wildlife habitats and places of cultural and historic interest. As the years
progressed, the trail expanded in coverage and more provisional access granted as private
lands were sold. The trail was viewed as an amenity and economic draw to local businesses
(ibid). In 2010, the designated trail extends 485 miles (780 kilometers) from St. Catharines
south of Toronto all the way to Quebec (see Figure 14) (ibid).
Illustrative regional maps have been present on the waterfront trail since the Trail opening
in 1995. Marlaine Koehler, Executive Director of the Regeneration Trust, who oversees the
Signage Program, stated that regional or inter-municipal maps of the trail are used
"wherever possible" to "stretch people's imaginations of how far they could go using the
trail and making plain that the trail did not end at any municipal boundary" (Koehler 2010,
personal correspondence). These maps have been updated and expanded alongside the
trail's expansion and with the establishment of greenway trails.
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Trust Transition
In the late 1990s, the Waterfront Trail was"proving insufficient to stimulate a
comprehensive transformation" of the Central Toronto Waterfront to the Lastman city
government. In 1999, the Waterfront Regeneration Trust became a non-profit charitable
trust, no longer connected to the provincial government. In its place, the City of Toronto
established the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, which followed a business
model of redeveloping the waterfront as an economic stimulus for downtown business and
global competitiveness (Laidley 2007).
The Corporation mirrored the Mayor's Office and Province's neoliberal economic
development strategies and attitudes toward environmental regulation. Environmental
improvement was presented as a public good, off-setting cleanup costs to the government
on land slated to be redeveloped. Developers and private interests were therefore attracted
to area for investment. Government funded cleanup was also rationalized for Toronto's
106
growth and global economic standing and 2008 Olympic bid (which it did not win) (Laidley
2007).
Shoreline Regeneration Plan
The shoreline regeneration plan would act to protect the remaining natural areas, instill a
plan for restoration, evaluate the cumulative effects of developments and lake-fill projects
on the shoreline, and lay the groundwork for a waterfront trail and improving public access
(Lawrence 1995: 15).
The Commission recommended that the Province extend a moratorium on new large
waterfront development projects, and a moratorium on lake-filling projects until a
Shoreline Regeneration Plan was formulated. The Province complied in instilling a
moratorium on lake-filling projects and set up a Waterfront Working group to barter
jurisdictional powers on the waterfront and develop a comprehensive shoreline plan.
This moratorium initially infuriated the city councilors of the region of Etobicoke, who had
several large lake-fill development projects in the works. Within a month of the City
Councilors denunciated of the Commission's moratorium, they retracted their comments
and committed to working with the Province and Commission on the shoreline plan.
Renegotiated Toronto HarborCommissionersMandate
The Royal Commission's initial interim report published in 1989, recommended that the
mandate of the federal Toronto Harbor Commissioners (THC) be reviewed and modified. At
the time, the THC was financially self-sustaining through the sale of federal port lands.
These sales funded THC's public programs and operational costs on the waterfront. The
Commission argued that THC's mandate to both develop and protect the port lands, posed a
conflict of interest. Moreover, THC's interest in real estate management seemed to be
dominating its activities (Crombie 1992: 371). The waterfront was being transformed into
high-rise condominiums to offset operational costs of a public entity (ibid).
The federal government conceded that this mandate needed review and revision. After
heated debates, the Toronto Harbor Commissioners mandate was modified to solely
oversee port related activities (Laidley 2007). The THC's land holdings were reduced from
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1,200 acres (486 hectares) to 100 (40 hec.), and the remaining property transferred to
Toronto's nascent economic development body (ibid). Laidley argued that the Commission's
role in negotiating this transfer of land and mandate change, resolved contentious
waterfront jurisdictional conflict, and guided the development trends and public access
plans on the Central waterfront during the 1990s through today (2007).
Greenways
The Bioregion Map
The bioregion map had an impact on promoting the protection and interest in the Oak
Ridges Moraine, the northern back-bone of the regional greenway system (Barrett
interview 2010). Unlike the Niagara Escarpment, which was Provincially protected from
development activities in 1985, the Oak Ridges Moraine continued to be rapidly developed.
David Crombie spoke that before the bioregion map, the Moraine was "not on the map" of
the region (Crombie interview 2010). This map brought the feature to light, and today is
provincially protected.
Likewise, Mark Wilson, former Chair of the Don Task Force, confirmed that this map was
seminal in the Oak Ridges Moraine campaign (Mark Wilson interview 2010). Don Haley,
senior engineer at the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, also contends that the
map brought political awareness to the Moraine (Haley interview 2010).
In Managing a Sense of Region Kevin Lynch wrote that people attach feelings and meanings
to "physically distinctive, recognizable locales" and that those features "make us feel at
home, grounded.... [a] strong sense of place supports our sense of personal identity. For that
reason, familiar features of a landscape are often fiercely defended" (1980: 23). The
showing of the Oak Ridges Moraine as a "distinctive" natural feature of the Toronto
Bioregion provided the demarcation of a central component of "home" and "sense of place."
The continued and fervent defense of the Oak Ridges Moraine by locals - described below likely stemmed from this threat to "home".
The Bioregion map did not convey the establishment of smaller greenways in the river
valleys; this was instead visualized by the Greenways and Trails Concept Map (Figure 15).
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This secondary map was introduced later in Regeneration,and been similarly presented by
the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority recent GreenspaceStrategy released in
1989. Several simultaneous publications on regional greenways by various agencies
reinforced this planning concept.
Commission Impacts
Greenways were discussed as a significant component of the ecosystem agenda, connecting
conservation lands along river valleys and significant natural features to promote
environmental protection and restoration. At the same time, these green linkages also
provided corridors for wildlife and recreational opportunities for people.
The greenways idea presented by the Commission received multiple avenues of support
and realization. First, the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Area (TRCA) had
developed and adopted a GreenspaceStrategy in 1989, which promoted greenways
throughout the TRCA watersheds, the Toronto waterfront, and the Oak Ridges Moraine.
Second, the publication of Ron Kanter's 1990 report to the Province, Space ForAll: Options
for a GreaterToronto Area GreenlandsStrategy, affirmed the TRCA proposal. Third, the
province's creation of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust in 1992 was critical in developing
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and implementing a "greenway" along the waterfront, as described earlier in the section
"Shoreline." Fourth, amendments to the PlanningAct in 1994 and 1995 required that
planning authorities integrate a greenways strategy in their Official Plans. In 1991, the
Commission's recommendation to protect the Oak Ridges Moraine resulted in the Province
declaring a public interest in the Moraine - the northern backbone of the greenways
proposal.
MTRCA The GreenspaceStrategy
The Metropolitan Toronto Region and Conservation Authority promoted the creation of
greenways in their 1989 publication The GreenspaceStrategy. The Strategy was in part
informed by the water pollution concerns of the Metro Toronto Remedial Action Plan of
1987, and sought to integrate conservation and environmental restoration efforts on a
watershed basis (TRCA 2001: 4). The report prescribed the establishment of individual
watershed task force groups, as the bodies to develop tailored watershed management
strategies for each TRCA watershed, the Oak Ridges Moraine, and the Toronto waterfront.
Greenways are promoted as tandem with remedial RAP efforts for erosion and flood
control. The report outlines a land acquisition strategy on vulnerable and sensitive lands, as
well as public trail linkages through TRCA-owned conservation lands (Metro Toronto
Remedial Action Plan 1994: 30-3 1).
At the same time, The GreenspaceStrategy "identified the need to link environmental
conditions and decisions with what was happening on the urban development front" (TRCA
2001: 4). By the end of the 1980s, urban development pressures mounted on upstream
water bodies, and municipalities had not adopted the TRCA watershed plans completed in
1983. This report encouraged the creation of task forces for watershed management
strategies - which would include watershed stakeholders, notably the municipalities
themselves.
The nearly simultaneous promotion of greenways one year later in the Commission's report
Watershed,and Ron Kanter's Space ForAll: Optionsfora GreaterToronto Area Greenlands
Strategy, helped to leverage this concept into planning practice. While amendments to the
PlanningAct in 1994 and 1995 were short-lived, many municipalities had begun to develop
greenways strategies in their Official Plans with TRCA.
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The realization of greenways implementation was negotiated on a watershed-by-watershed
basis. The Don River watershed and the Rouge River were the first to develop these
strategies through Task Forces. This was followed by a Humber Task Force strategy in
1997, Etobicoke and Mimico in 1999, and further updates by the previous groups in the late
1990s and 2000s.
Waterfront Regeneration Trust Greenways Strategy
The Waterfront Regeneration Trust (WRT) was also pivotal in the formation of a greenways
strategy for the region. In 1995, the Trust released its Lake Ontario Greenways Strategy
(LOGS), a "blueprint" for "protecting, restoring and enhancing the waterfront and bioregion"
(TRCA 2001: 4). LOGS presents a broad framework to connect parks, historical and cultural
sites, wildlife habitats and recreational areas (Erickson 2005: 78). The Lake Ontario
Greenways Strategy report utilizes the same language and guidelines put forth in
Regeneration.At the time of publication, many regional municipalities were under
developing their own waterfront strategies 45 - in tandem with the shoreline regeneration
plan - providing an opportunity to amend their plans to include greenway systems
(Waterfront Regeneration Trust 1995: 164).
At the time of publication, the WRT expressed that the implementation of the Lake Ontario
Greenways Strategy hinged on the revisions to the PlanningAct and bill 163, which were
adopted in March 1995. These amendments required that local governments plans be
"consistent with" Provincial Policy Statements, including the protection of natural corridors
and heritage sites, reasonable access to public lands and water bodies, the protection of
significant linear corridors (abandoned railways), and planning priority for biking, walking
and transit (Waterfront Regeneration Trust 1995: 165). Unfortunately, bill 163 was
effectively repealed in 1996 by the Conservative provincial government, and local planning
authorities were merely required to "have regard to" Provincial Policy Statements.
However, this original broad framework of LOGS remains a relevant planning guide; the
responsibility for implementing this plan instead lied with agencies such as the TRCA, nonprofits, municipalities and community groups (Erickson 2005: 78).
Including Metro Toronto, Durham Region, Burlington, Mississauga, Etobicoke, Ajax, Oshawa, Clarington, Port
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.
Hope, Cobourg, as noted in Lake Ontario Greenways Strategy. Waterfront Regeneration Trust. 1995. p.
45
Greenway trail planning continued through WRT negotiations with governments, agencies,
conservation authorities and private landowners on a project-by-project basis. The WRT
stated that the goals of watershed plans dove-tailed with the value of greenways to accept
stormwater runoff and serve as natural recharge areas.
The Oak Ridges Moraine
The Oak Ridges Moraine is a not only the northern backbone of Toronto's greenway plan, it
is also the headwaters source of the region's rivers. Concern over the environmental
degradation of the Moraine from development pressures was brought to public and
provincial attention in 1990 by strong activists groups, the Crombie Commission, and Ron
Kanter's provincially commissioned report, Spacefor All: Optionsfora GreaterToronto Area.
Kanter's report emphasized a greenways strategy to protect the Oak Ridges Moraine (Oak
Ridges Moraine Foundation 2010: History), and was referenced in Regeneration.
The Commission recommended provincial protection of the Oak Ridges Moraine (ORM) in
Watershed in 1990. Until this point, the Niagara Escarpment was the only distinct natural
ecological feature to receive Provincial attention and protection. The Commission's
demarcation of the Oak Ridges Moraine on the Greater Toronto Bioregion Map in Watershed
had nearly the same graphic weight as the Niagara Escarpment - showing it in the same
class of ecological importance. Several key Commission staff, public servants and activists
noted that the Bioregion Map put the Oak Ridges Moraine on the map - which had
previously not been shown in Toronto area maps.46
46
Interviews with Suzanne Barrett, David Crombie, Mark Wilson, and Don Haley shared this view. 2010.
II ..........
Figure16: The Greater Toronto Bioregion Mapfrom Watershed 1990
The Commission's recommendation to protect the Moraine prompted the province to
express Provincial Interest in the Moraine and form a Technical Working Committee to
study the ORM in the Greater Toronto Area. The Ministry of Natural Resources introduced
loose interim guidelines for development on the Moraine, pending further
recommendations to emerge from the Working Committee study (Crandall and Tilman
1998). The Commission lauded these first steps, but insisted that the Provincial Interest was
too limited in scope - its "Interest" terminated at the boundaries of the Greater Toronto
Area. In Regeneration the Commission asserted that the scope of Provincial Interest needed
to encompass the entire Oak Ridges Moraine, further east and west of the GTA boundaries,
as shown on the Greater Toronto Bioregion Map (Crombie 1992: 91).
In 1994, the Province's Oak Ridges Moraine Technical Working Committee concluded its
three- year $2 million dollar study, and submitted its long-term strategy to the Ministry of
Natural Resources in December (McAndrew 2000: Al). With an election looming in the
spring term, the then-natural resources minister Howard Hampton did not act on the study
(McAndrew 2000: Al). In July 1995, the Conservative Party came to power - and the study
was shelved (ibid). The inaction on the Oak Ridges Moraine Strategy and the Conservative
government's repeal of the PlanningAct amendments resulted in a continued vulnerable
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Moraine. Land-use planning decisions adjacent to and on the Moraine were left to local
governments and developers (Boudreau, et al 2009: 58-59).
While the activist coalition Save the Oak Ridges Moraine (STORM), founded in 1989,
continued to lobby municipalities and the province for protection after 1995, suburban
development proceeded across the Moraine. By the end of the 1990s, development
pressures were gathering concerned attention from the public and media (Hudson 1999:
Al). In early 1999, a development in Richmond Hill proposed subdivisions to accommodate
100,000 people across the Moraine. The proposal gathered protests from activists and even
the City of Toronto, outside of the Moraine's jurisdiction. The Richmond Hill developers
appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) in 2000 to approve the project, even while
local governments voiced their opposition. The Province intervened in May 2001, placing a
six-month moratorium on development on the Moraine. During this time, a "smart growth"
strategy was proposed to focus most development in a particular "Settlement Areas,"
occupying less than ten percent of the Moraine. Interestingly, this moratorium was put in
place under the Harris administration. This proposal was adopted into provincial legislation
as the Oak Ridges Moraine ConservationAct in 2001, and then the Oak Ridges Moraine
Conservation Plan in 2002 (Bocking 2002: 21-23).
The Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing describes the Oak Ridges Moraine
Conservation Plan as an "ecologically based plan," and seeks to protect the ecological and
hydrological integrity of the Moraine. 47 The Plan describes the Moraine in language similar
to that invoked by the Commission: "The Moraine has a unique concentration of
environmental, geological and hydrological features that make its ecosystem vital to southcentral Ontario" (ibid). This Plan protects the entire reach of the Moraine, from Peel to
North Umberland, as first mapped by the Crombie Commission.
47 Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan: Introduction.
Available online: http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page1707.aspx. Accessed October 17, 2010.
114
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Figure 18: The GreaterToronto Bioregion Mapfrom Regeneration 1991
The case of the Oak Ridges Moraine shows how the Commission's initial recommendations
were stymied by political inaction and by a change in provincial government. What is
noteworthy is how the continued activism of the STORM coalition and their tag-lining of the
Moraine as the "rain barrel of Southern Ontario" resonated with the public and media
115
coverage to bring attention to the issue (Hudson 1999: Al). While the Commission
prompted initial attention to the Moraine and STORM coalition, and leveraged the
Province's three-year study of the Moraine from 1990 to 1993, it required a highly
contentious development and public attention to result in Provincial action and legislative
reform.
The timing of the Oak Ridges Moraine development controversy coincided with the
infamous Walkerton Tragedy, both in May 2000. The municipal water supply of Walkerton,
Ontario, just west of the Greater Toronto Area, was contaminated with E. Coli and resulted
in the illness of 2,300 people and 7 deaths ("Inside Walkerton" 2010). The event was the
worst E.Coli break-out in the history of Canada, and pushed water quality and water
security into the public forum. The incident was in part blamed on the deregulation of water
services and cuts for inspections under the Conservative Harris regime (Boudreau, et al
2009: 60). The event contributed to the ousting of then-Conservative Premier Mike Harris
(ibid). During the Walkerton investigation, it was revealed that the water facility was
privately managed and a lack of public oversight and routine inspections of the facility
contributed to the outbreak. The public and the media reigned in the debate, contending
that Harris' cuts and privatization of public services jeopardized public health and welfare
("Walkerton marks 10th anniversary" 2010).
In light of Walkerton, the protection of water quality became a key public concern, and led
to major drinking water reform in Ontario (Boudreau, et al 2009: 60, 147).48 The tandem
concerns of the activists in the Oak Ridges Moraine - also a source of municipal
groundwater - leveraged the development activities on the Moraine into greater concern
(Bocking 2002: 21-23), and ultimately resulted in its protection under the Oak Ridges
Moraine ConservationAct and Plan in 2001 and 2002.
The Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan includes a continuous recreational trail through
the Moraine, and prohibits new aggregate mining activities in the natural core center
(Crandall 2006). This legislation does not stop current mining activities.
48 The Walkerton Tradegy leveraged support for Toronto's Wet Weather Flow Master Plan (WWFMP), a 25-year
effort to revamp the water and sewage infrastructure in the region. This includes both traditional large
infrastructure improvements (which continue to enable further suburban expansion) and more ecological
solutions of set-backs, infiltration basins and wetland restoration.
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While the Province is responsible for monitoring and implementing the Oak Ridges Moraine
Conservation Plan, as of 1994, this monitoring program had not begun (Crandall 2006).
Instead, STORM, Citizens' Environment Watch (CEW), and Centre for Community have
raised funds and founded the Monitoring the Moraine (MTM) project in 2005 (Crandall
2006).
Today, the STORM Coalition and the Oak Ridges Moraine Foundation share maps of the
Moraine on their website, and give credit to the Commission for bringing attention to the
Moraine (ORM Foundation 2010: History). Both link to the Ontario Ministry of Municipal
Affairs and Housing website, and its Oak Ridges Moraine Atlas, which enables viewers to
locate themselves in or around the Moraine through an interactive map (Accessible at
http://ormatlas.lrc.gov.on.ca/). Today, the proliferation of maps for the Moraine enables
one to easily identify herself in relation to the Moraine - but simplicity of the Commission's
Bioregion Map enabled many to understand the feature as a significant ecological feature
worthy of protection.
The NiagaraEscarpmentPlan
The Crombie Commission likewise expressed the need to strengthen the Niagara
EscarpmentPlan under review in 1990, to further integrate the "ecosystem approach to
planning." The Provincial designation of the Niagara Escarpment as a unique biological
ecosystem contributed to its designation as a UNESCO World Heritage site in February
1990. The NEP remains some of the strongest legislation in Canada, severely restricting
development and non-compatible uses, prohibiting development, landfills and activities
that could contribute to the degradation of water quality.
Urban Watersheds
The Bioregion Map
The Bioregion map advanced the concept for regional environmental planning, but had
limited impact on individual watersheds. The map does not show the region's
subwatersheds - notably the Don - which is specifically discussed in the Regeneration
Report.The map instead shows the region's rivers and tributaries draining from the Oak
Ridge Moraine into Lake Ontario as one single watershed. The aim of the map was to
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promote the big picture of the large and connected "watershed." As David Crombie stated,
today's proliferation of map-making technology (such as Google maps) promotes people to
become too localized, thereby missing the bigger picture (paraphrase Crombie interview
2010).
At the same time, local maps can promote local action. Mark Wilson, former Chair of the
Task Force to Bring Back the Don, commented that the Bioregion map appeals to people in
the abstract, but the scale is too big. One cannot identify the specific rivers on the map, and
it is hard to locate oneself in the ma The Don River itself is factioned into smaller parts of
local activity, such as the Lower Don, the West Don Lands, and the West Valley Don, all with
many local maps. An important sense of place is cultivated by being able perceive oneself as
belonging to a particular place - and being able to participate in that place.
While the bioregion map does not promote individual watersheds, the solution to the region
is presented as a concerted effort of regional watershed planning.
Commission Impacts
The Commission leveraged attention to the dire condition of urban watersheds in the region
in Watershed and Regeneration.The Don River watershed was centrally featured in the
Regeneration report, as an urban watershed degraded by the development of the city and
suburbs, industry and engineered flood protection. Urban runoff, combined sewer
overflows, outdated sewage treatment facilities, and development patterns continue to
impair the water quality, and habitat of this river, and ultimately the poor condition of the
waterfront. At the same time, the current condition of the Don was not presented as its
future course: the Don watershed was shown as an example of strong civic engagement and
government support, on its way to environmental restoration.
The Commission's coverage of the Don River watershed appears to have accomplished two
goals: First, it elevated the voice the citizens' group Bring Back the Don River to the public
and the City of Toronto, bringing financial support and technical support from the City, and
second, presented detailed solutions for new and existing development to improve the
condition of the urban watersheds, of which were absorbed into the revised PlanningAct
legislation in 1994.
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By the end of the 1980s, citizen's interest and involvement in the Don was growing. In 1989,
the East Don Valley received protection as a natural preserve in the Toronto Parks System.
The public forum at the Ontario Science Center on the Don River in April 1989, further
promoted concerns of the Don to the public. With 500 people in attendance, this event was
described as a "watershed" moment in public awareness of the Don (Bonnell 2010: 332).
The Commission published its first interim report in September 1989, the same month that
the City of Toronto established an Interim Task Force on the Don River Clean-Up. Through
the Commission's promotion of the Don citizens' group, and the internal momentum of the
group itself, the city established a citizens advisory committee Bring Back the Don River
Task Force in 1990. The Task Force advises city council on issues concerning the Don River
and its watershed, and also receives staff and financial support from the city. Twenty years
later, this Task Force remains in place.
Michael Hough, a practicing landscape architect and author of ecological design, was hired
by the Commission in 1988 to work on the Lower Don Lands. In 1991, he produced the
report "Bringing Back the Don," for the Task Force to Bring Back the Don. This plan was a
long-term planning strategy to restore the Don River, which became the backbone for the
future work of the Task Force to Bring Back the Don.
The Task Force has partnered with the Parks, Forestry and Recreation, to preserve and
enhance wetlands, create new ones, and participate in vegetative plantings to stabilize
riverbanks and improve local habitats. The Task Force has also been involved in the
monitoring water quality, conducting vegetative surveys and maintenance activities. Most
recently, the Task Force succeeded at obtaining signage for the river at all the bridges
crossing over the Don.
The Don River Task Force worked closely with the Toronto and Region Conservation Area
to develop goals and strategies for restoration. In addition, the complementary support of
the City of Toronto enabled the Task Force to realize the implementation of many of its
objectives. Public education and outreach was a strong component of the Don group's plans,
including many public surveys on their understanding of the watershed (Don River
Regeneration Council et al 1997 and 2003).
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Second, the Commission presented detailed development guidelines that would reduce
environmental impacts on the Don through the control of stormwater runoff, compact new
development, and the preservation of agricultural land and riparian corridors. These guides
were particularly aimed at protecting the upstream reaches of the Don's tributaries on the
slopes of the Oak Ridges Moraine.
While the Lower Don has improved its aesthetic condition over the past twenty years
through coordinated restoration efforts by civic activists, the TRCA and city of Toronto, the
Don River remains an impaired water body. This is largely a result of upstream suburban
development pressures that continued through the 1990s under the Harris and Lastman
regime. The Commission's planning principles embedded in the 1994 and 1995
amendments to the PlanningAct were rescinded in 1996, and largely ignored by the
suburban planning offices. Local planning authorities were to "have regard to" smart
growth, watershed plans, greenways systems, and protecting and enhancing habitat and
water bodies. Extended periods of public comment on the proposed development projects
were removed or shortened. Development activities were dominated by local governments
and planning boards.
Public concern over development climaxed in 1999 and 2000 over large development
proposals on the Oak Ridges Moraine, the headwaters of the Don. This led to legislative
reform in 2001 and 2002 to severely restrict development on the ORM. The Oak Ridges
Moraine ConservationAct placed a six-month moratorium on development until "smart
growth strategies" could be put into place to guide proposed development and land use
decisions. Following this, new guidelines were enacted through the Oak Ridges Moraine
Conservation Plan of 2002, restricting development to specific "Settlement Areas,"
overriding regional Official Plans and development proposals. The legislation sought to
protect, preserve and enhance the hydrologic and natural integrity of the Moraine. The
protection of the headwaters from development is aimed at ensuring water quality for local
drinking supplies, and the region's rivers.
Another significant piece of legislation affecting the water quality of the region's rivers and
waterfront is the 2003 Wet Weather Management Flow Master Plan (WWFMP). In 2003,
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after four years of deliberation, the City of Toronto adopted the 25-year Flow Plan, which is
a massive reinvestment in outdated water and sewage infrastructure, as well as a "green"
approach to stormwater control. 49 This plan is projected to cost over $1 CDN billion over
twenty-five years, and is financed by a home-owner "user fee" (City of Toronto 2010: Wet
Weather Flow Master Plan). Combined with restrictions on development in the upper
watershed by the Oak Ridges Moraine, the Flow plan will likely have significant impact on
the water quality of rivers and waterfront.
This piece of legislation cannot be attributed to the Commission, but rather to a strong
concern over "safe drinking water" (quote of Irene Jones, Chair of WWFMP in Reeves 2008).
At the end of the 1990s, privatization of municipal water supplies was becoming increasing
promoted as a cost-saving device for cities. Following the Walkerton Tragedy where seven
people died from an E. Coli breakout in a privately managed municipal drinking supply,
privatization was sharply criticized. The City of Toronto, previously considered privatizing
its supply, now found this option publically unpalatable; costly infrastructural reinvestment
in the city's water system was supported in the interest of preserving a public oversight
over a public resource.
The Lower Don
The Commission's chapter on the Don included the citizens' group's long-term vision for renaturalizing the mouth of the river. Michael Hough's groundwork for the Lower Don Lands
in Bringing Back the Don has been slowly realized over time. Twenty-years and two
international design competitions later, this Task Force's early vision is being realized in a
large urban wetland re-creation project, with parkland and mixed-use urban development.
The project has been a joint effort of the Waterfront Toronto, the Toronto and Region
Conservation Authority, and the landscape architecture office of Michael Van Valkenburgh
Associates.
Waterfront Toronto has had a significant impact on the realization of this vision, by first
promoting the international waterfront design competition, and overseeing the
redevelopment of the waterfront. Waterfront Toronto - formerly Toronto Waterfront
Revitalization Corporation - was created in 2001 as a tri-government funded corporation
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Including detention ponds, infiltration areas, and the re-creation of wetlands.
with a twenty-five year mandate to transform 800 hectares (2,000 acres) of waterfront
brownfield properties into "beautiful, sustainable mixed-used communities and dynamic
public spaces" (Waterfront Toronto 2010: About Us).
Central to the redevelopment of the Lower Don Lands is a revised, and simplified
requirement for brownfield cleanup (Desfor and Keil 2004). Contaminated soils of the
former industrial sites are not required to be removed, simply capped for redevelopment.
This reduces redevelopment costs and potentially expedites the project. This policy does
not "restore" the Lower Don Lands, but does simplify the Environmental Impact Assessment
for the site. In July 2010, Toronto City Council endorsed the Lower Don Lands Plan draft
Environmental Assessment.
While the development has been praised for transforming the waterfront, and recreating a
wetland and park space at the mouth of the Don, the MVVA project is not aimed at
reestablishing the original mouth of the Don (quote of MVVA project material in Bonnell
2010). Nor does the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority view this proposal as an
ecological restoration project (quote of TRCA manager of the Lower Don Lands in Bonnell
2010).
Waterfront Toronto, whose tag line reads, "building a new blue edge" presents an
aesthetically beautiful image of the waterfront with fly-over views of the proposed new
development. Economic development is paired with environmental improvement and
public access. While this philosophy reflects that one presented by the Commission, the
Waterfront Toronto development process follows a privatized business approach to the
design and redevelopment process - whereby plans and design decisions are more removed
from public comment (Boudreau, et al 2009). Furthermore, the condition of the underlying
contaminated soil in the area is not presented as a "risk" to future inhabitants of the space
(Desfor and Keil 2004). The proposed development is to be financed through public-private
partnerships, which creates ambiguity over public access.
The redevelopment of the Lower Don Lands into wetlands, parks and mixed-use
development, is a substantial and favorable change from the industrial Don Lands of
twenty-years ago. It presents a new aesthetic to the waterfront, favoring green-space, more
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naturalized landscapes and habitats. However, this project is achieved through
redevelopment that precludes actual site remediation. Risk assessment of contaminated
sites is a carefully managed perception, both from a scientific and financial perspective
(Desfor and Keil 2004). To the contaminated lower Don River and numerous contaminated
waterfront lots, questions of risk and liability are framed as economic costs and
redevelopment opportunities (Laidley 2007). Environmental improvement and site
improvement may be aesthetic - and dependent on imported clean soil. However, these
redeveloped lands will provide new habitats for wildlife and people, and a place to learn of
an environment that preceded port land industry.
Municipalities
The Bioregion Map
The Bioregion map depicts natural systems cutting across the political boundaries of
municipalities. Suzanne Barrett states that one of the objectives of the bioregion concept
"was to get people thinking about ecosystems and not about political jurisdictions - and
that was the big breakthrough I think we accomplished in preparing this map" (Barrett
interview 2010). Municipalities represent the backbone of land-use decisions and planning,
and this map sought to convey a rationale for coordinated planning, which was absent at the
time of its publication.
David Crombie discussed that this map was present at meetings with municipalities and
during workshops to promote the Waterfront Trail (Crombie interview 2010).
Conceptually, people agreed and liked the map, in part because it "gives a false sense that
people know where they're going" (ibid). It became a conceptual representation of the
Commission's ecosystem approach, and a reason to coordinate planning activities along the
waterfront, river valleys and natural features.
However, municipalities first required reassurance that this concept and the Commission
were not seeking to usurp local power or appropriate land. The main concern was about
land ownership. The map may have depicted a rationale for more coordinated regional
planning, but it took concerted effort between multiple agencies, levels of government and a
little funding to attract municipal cooperation along the waterfront. It took provincial
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legislative reform for municipalities to augment their official plans to address and protect
sensitive natural lands.
John Wilson, current Chair of the Task Force to Bring Back the Don, articulated that while at
first he could not recall the Bioregion map, upon seeing it he likened it to the Greenbelt
strategy and Places to Grow legislation: "the map itself had strong legs" (John Wilson
interview 2010). The map has been augmented with more aspects, and reproduced in
different ways, but ultimately it underlies these measures (ibid).
Politicalimpacts
The Commission's recommendations for municipalities largely followed their compliance
with the tenants introduced under "Environmental Imperatives." This included a
moratorium on lake-filling projects and waterfront development until a comprehensive
Shoreline Regeneration Plan was put in place. In addition, the Commission emphasized the
principles of thoughtful growth, integration of greenways, watershed management plans,
and planning holistically at the "ecosystem" scale.
The Commission on Planning and Development Reform (CPDR), which followed the
Crombie Commission, introduced an "ecosystem" and "watershed" approach to regional
planning in bill 163 adopted in the 1994 and 1995 PlanningAct. These planning principles
would be required in municipal Official Plans. The implementation of these principles was
never realized, as the legislation was revoked in 1996.
Since 2001, the Province has passed significant planning policy that trump municipal plans.
This includes the Oak Ridges MoraineAct of 2001 and Plan of 2002, The GreenbeltAct in
2005, and "Placesto Grow" in 2006. These pieces of legislation restrict growth and direct it
to designated settlement areas. While environmentalists and planners applauded the
Province's efforts, most contend that these measures are not very strong (Boudreau, et al
2009).
For example, the Greenbelt Act was established to protect and preserve valuable
agricultural lands surrounding Toronto. The Greenbelt Act defines a growth boundary;
however, this boundary is so far from the city line that it will likely not be reached for the
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........
- - ...
...
-,"I'll"
............
.............
next 25 years (Boudreau et al 2009). In addition, planners speculate that this boundary may
face legal challenges by rural landowners wishing to sell their land to new development,
similar to the litigation faced by City of Portland over its Urban Growth Boundary (ibid).
Figure 19: The Greenbelt Plan 2005
The 2006 legislation "Places to Grow" designates settlement areas for urban growth. These
areas were generalized in 2006 and refined at a parcel level in 2008. However, these
designated areas of higher density are advisory, and largely considered an area of last
resort for development (ibid). Proposed municipal development does not need to be
redirected into these locations.
While the Commission recommended similar planning guidelines in Regeneration for
restricted growth and protecting agricultural lands, it is not clear if this legislation fulfills
that vision. This legislation does represent the province exercising its authority to establish
environmental planning objectives, but the strength of this legislation is less than what
environmentalists and some planners advocated for (ibid).
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Municipalities' relations to the TRCA and watershed plans, however, are much changed
since the Commission first published Watershed.At the time, municipalities did not adopt
TRCA watershed plans in their Official Plans. Today, all nine watershed plans are integrated
in Official Plans. This change cannot be exclusively attributed to the recommendation of the
Commission, but rather through a renegotiated working relationship with the TRCA, Public
Advisory Committees, and strong public will for the protection of public drinking supplies.
Some suburban towns and regions have also pursued reform in land-use planning.
Boudreau writes that planners and city councilors in the suburban town of Markham "pride
themselves" on ecological building techniques in subdivision layouts and water
infrastructure. In the mid-1990s, the town adopted new urbanist planning principles, which
includes smaller and denser lots. This strategy was embraced to economize the cost of new
infrastructure, such as water and sewage lines. Stormwater retention ponds are standard in
new subdivision developments. Many, however, are admittedly "ill-placed relative to
adjacent streams," according to a town councilor (Boudreau, et al. 2009: 156-157).
Likewise, many of these ponds are now eutrophic pools of pollution from roads and
chemically treated lawns.
The town of Markham has sought other environmental planning measures, including the
establishment of an Environmental Sustainability Fund to finance programs aimed at
reducing pesticide use and promoting greenroof construction. In addition, the town has
contributed substantially to a Land Acquisition Fund, to purchase sensitive lands with the
province and local conservation authority (Boudreau, et al. 2009: 158). The town also
completed a draft study in 2007 on how best to protect, preserve and restore small streams,
which often run dry when adjacent land is developed (Town of Markham 2006).
Furthermore, many residents of Markham were involved in the campaign to protect the Oak
Ridges Moraine.
The challenge for Markham and similar suburban communities dependent on growth for
revenue, is the "attempt to build new and collective societal relationships with nature in a
place that appeared to be the quintessential expression of unhindered growth, the
privatization of space, social exclusion, and the maximization of consumption" (Boudreau,
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et al. 2009: 157). The ideas of the ecosystem and watershed approach are not necessarily
reflected in the existing built environment, nor in the one under construction.
Boudreau, et al, assert that "(i)n particular... developing new relationships with water will
be especially challenging. The lake is so far from Markham that it is difficult to make a
connection in the everyday lives of citizens... the lake that is both the source of the water
that comes out of all the taps and the recipient of all those flushing toilets. Water remains a
'concrete abstraction"' (quote of Fitzsimmons 1989 in Boudreau, et al. 2009: 157-158).
Suburban municipalities' and their residents' relation to water continues to be an obstacle,
just as it was at the time of the Royal Commission.
While land-use planners may now promote compact development and seek to restore small
streams, the underlying system of a distant water supply and treatment facility continues to
be a discreet, low-cost, and unperceivable service - one which enables furthers growth.
Combined with a landscape of dry streambeds and eutrophic stormwater detention ponds,
the everyday built environment reinforces this disconnect from the concept of the
watershed.
Chapter 5: Assessing the Commission's Ecosystem and Watershed
Approach
The Commission's agenda for policy change rested on the "ecosystem approach" as the
solution to the Greater Toronto bioregion. This term is frequently interchanged with the
term "watershed" in both the Watershed and Regeneration reports. This chapter sets out to
briefly clarify the Commission's ecosystem and watershed approach to planning, the
language upon which all of its recommendations rest. I assess how the approach relates to
the concept of landscape ecology, and how the term "ecosystem approach" fades in and out
of the Commission's plan, and is often replaced with the "watershed". I find the "ecosystem
approach" to planning as an operable term for applied urban ecology.
In both the Watershed and Regeneration reports, the Commission defined the ecosystem
concept as the interconnectedness of all things: land, water, air, biotic and abiotic life. A
change in one component would influence the others. An ecosystem is a physical unit or
area in which these components or communities reside. The ecosystem approach was
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presented as an extension of this natural law: a strategy to manage the region based on the
relations and interactions of the (human) built environment and natural systems. This
management strategy logically followed from the scientific understanding of the dynamic
and interdependent nature of all systems. Managing the region required policy and design
interventions to understand and respond to the environment through this dynamic and
ecological lens. The ecosystem approach was a policy and design ideal that mirrored the
principles of ecology.
The ecosystem approach initially appears similar to that of landscape ecology, which is a
practice of applied ecology. Landscape ecology is focused on the analysis and understanding
of "land mosaics" - the spatial arrangement of large heterogeneous areas - at the scale of a
region or landscape (Forman 2008: 16). This analysis explicitly integrates "nature and
people," and can be applied to understand and plan urban areas, forests, and agricultural
lands, etc. (17). Richard Forman, prominent landscape ecologist, describes that this spatial
analysis is based on three elements or patterns: the patch, corridor or background matrix
(see Forman 2008 for further definitions). The Commission's reports never proceeded to
this level of spatial analysis for the region, but instead described the interacting relations
between the built environment and natural systems. Most notably, this included the effects
of urban areas on water resources and the importance of "green" infrastructure through the
city. However, both the Commission's and Forman's vision for urban regions are the same,
whereby "built spaces are meshed with green spaces," to create sustainable environments
(Forman 2008: 18). The principles of the ecology guide both approaches, even if the
methodologies for achieving regional recommendations differ.
The Commission's ecosystem approach also implied a broader scale of intervention than is
suggested by landscape ecology. At the scale of the "ecosystem," there are dynamic
interactions across lakes, entire coastal environments, and habitats, well beyond the
boundaries of the Commission's Greater Toronto bioregion. The Commission does offer
recommendations at the scale of the Great Lakes, and for a comprehensive lakeshore plan in
Lake Ontario. However, the extent to which those larger recommendations were adopted
was to some degree less successful than those at the more local context. The Commission
used the "ecosystem" concept to situate Toronto in a broad context of interactions, but its
extent of actual intervention was much smaller.
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As described in Chapter One, several Commission staff members were well-versed in the
practice and teachings of Ian McHarg's Design with Nature, and urban ecology: the
integration of natural systems and the built environment. This included two Toronto
landscape architects and professors known for ecological planning: Suzanne Barrett and
Michael Hough. At different times, both Barrett and Hough led the Environmental Studies
research for the Commission, and incorporated the language and ideas of an ecological
approach to planning. The Commission's "ecosystem approach" appears analogous with the
principles of urban ecology - a smaller defined unit of intervention.
In Urban Regions (2008), Richard Forman touches on the challenge to determine the right
scale of intervention, when faced with managing a city or region: "Focus on a solution that is
big enough to have some chance of continued success, and small enough that your efforts
are visible" (Forman 2008: 2). In the Commission's case, the big solution for the Toronto
region was planning based on the concept of the ecosystem. However, generally speaking,
the scale of the Commission's intervention was in the bioregion's "watershed". The
watershed was a more comprehensive scale, and allowed the Commission's efforts to be
more "visible," and likely more politically tractable.
The interchanging of the "ecosystem approach" and the "watershed" in the Commission's
reports reflected its straddling between scales of policy recommendations. Many of the
regulations and factors contributing to the form of the urban landscape were beyond the
scale of the "watershed" and bioregion: they were defined by federal, provincial or
international policies. The Commission's recommendations for policies beyond the
geographic scope of the "watershed" were therefore described as in line with the
"ecosystem approach." When dealing with municipal policy recommendations, or the
greenways strategy, the "watershed" terminology was used instead. By utilizing both terms,
the Commission's strategy was not geographically restricted; it could move between macro
politics and the physical landscape.
While the ecosystem approach was stated as the Commission's guiding strategy for
managing the region, many of its adopted recommendations were at the smaller scale of the
bioregion. The Commission did prescribe policy interventions for the Great Lakes and the
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International Joint Commission, but those recommendations focused on issues at the scale
of the watershed appeared more politically tractable, and were adopted - if in the long-run.
The renegotiated Canada/Ontario Agreement for cost-sharing the clean-up of the Great
Lakes appeared to be the most substantial large-scale adoption of the Commission's
recommendations - which would affect the clean-up of Lake Erie, Huron, Ontario and the
Georgian Bay. However, clean-up activities on Lake Ontario remained focused on
designated areas of concern and Remedial Action Plans, rather than on Lake-wide
Management Plans.
Amendments to the ProvincialPlanningAct in 1994 did require municipal Official Plans to
include ecological planning principles, such as greenways, but did not instill this under a
provincial framework for spatial planning; the efforts were coordinated through the
geographically bound Metro Toronto and Region Conservation Authority. The Commission's
recommendations for greenways and protection of the Oak Ridges Moraine, both key pieces
for habitat networks, were within the designated bioregion and watershed.
The ecosystem approach appeared more as an umbrella term for the Commission's
ecological strategy, rather than physical interventions at the broad scale of ecosystems. The
extent of the Commission's accomplishments remain laudable, but do appear to resonate
most at the scale of the Greater Toronto bioregion and watershed.
Chapter 6: Toronto Today and the Commission's Legacy
Today, Toronto's waterfront is in the news as an answer to brownfield port lands and
channelized rivers. The City's Wet Weather Flow Management Plan is known as a
substantial infrastructural investment to protect drinking supplies and control stormwater
through more naturalized solutions. The region has passed progressive environmental
planning measures to protect agricultural lands, the region's headwaters, and direct urban
growth. Watershed plans are integral in municipal Official Plans. A waterfront trail extends
from Niagara Falls to Quebec. However, even with this apparent progress, concern remains
over suburban development, impaired water bodies, and the need for further public
education on how individual actions impact water resources and the environment.
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The impact and legacy of the Crombie Commission on the current state of the Greater
Toronto region resonates in certain planning and environmental measures. This is in part
because of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, a non-profit agency that emanated from the
Commission, as well as the extension of Commission staff into this agency and Toronto city
government. This continuity of Commission work through the WRT and Toronto agencies
prolonged the ecosystem and watershed vision into local planning activities. Nearly twentyyears after its publication of Regeneration, many of the ideas and recommendations
presented by the Commission now appear embedded in the language and doctrine of
politicians and municipal planners. These policy changes, however, took time - and faced
significant political dissent in the Province and city of Toronto governments from 1995
through 2001.
The Commission's success at advancing an ecosystem agenda was most clearly present from
1989 to 1995, during the reign of the provincial National Democratic Party (NDP) and the
Liberal federal government after 1993. Ontario successfully renegotiated clean-up funds for
the Great Lakes from the federal government, coordinated a shoreline regeneration plan,
funded a study to protect the Oak Ridges Moraine, resolved jurisdictional conflicts on the
Toronto waterfront, and instilled coordinated environmental and watershed planning
through amendments to the PlanningAct.
The Commission succeeded in advancing its agenda by showing and articulating a rationale
for coordinated planning. By arguing that the health of the environment has a direct
relationship the economic robustness and attractiveness of Toronto, quality of life, and the
health of the Great Lakes, the Commission was able to attract government agencies,
environmentalists and the public to its "ecosystem" and "watershed" solution. The
Commission's Greater Toronto Bioregion Map served as a conceptual framework for
coordinated planning across jurisdictional boundaries, and was described in the media as a
compelling approach to solving the region's ills.
Following 1995, Conservative federal, provincial and local governments significantly
undermined the Commission's work by rescinding key legislative reform to the Planning
Act, consolidating local governments into the amalgamated "megacity" of Toronto,
privatizing public services and shifting power to the suburbs of Toronto.
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Watershed planning activities did continue after 1995 through the Toronto and Region
Conservation Authority's relationship with local municipalities, local task forces and
citizens' groups. Even though certain municipalities adopted codes for compact
development and stormwater detention ponds, this shade of "pale green" did not
necessarily change the suburbs' relationship to water or Lake Ontario (quote of Markham
town Councilor in Boudreau, et al. 2009: 157-158).
During the Conservative Harris and Lastman regime, "green" development in the downtown
Toronto and particularly the central waterfront, was politically paired with economic
growth and the attractiveness of a competitive global city (Laidley 2007). "Ecological
modernization" - the marriage of building technology and environmental efficiency - was
presented by the Mayor's office as an urban amenity. This concept was realized in the form
of tall buildings designed by famous architects, exempt from local height and density
restrictions and full public review (Boudreau, et al 2009: 111-115). Likewise,
redevelopment process of waterfront brownfields was streamlined and simplified, so that in
many cases, contaminated soil could remain on-site (Desfor and Keil 2004). The condition
of the underlying contaminated soil in the area is not presented as a "risk" to future
inhabitants of the space (Desfor and Keil 2004). The surficial transformation of brownfields
and promotion of new development was still touted as the "ecosystem approach" to
revitalizing the city's economy and the environment (Laidley 2007).
As a reaction to cuts in public services, public servant strikes, limited public review of
proposed development, rampant suburban growth, and a locally contaminated publicdrinking supply, the Conservative government lost power in 2002. More progressive
politics returned, which included the passage of provincial protection of significant natural
lands, reinvestment in public water and sewage infrastructure, and natural stormwater
controls.
The reemergence of the ideas presented a decade earlier by the Crombie Commission and
the subsequent Sewell Commission, are most apparent in the protection of the Oak Ridges
Moraine in 2002, the designation of the Greenbelt Area in 2005, and "Places to Grow" in
2006. The concept of regional environmental planning presented in the Commission's
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bioregion map is rearticulated through these new plans and maps. One interviewee
commented that the bioregion map has been "augmented" with more information, but
remains the basis and boundaries of regional natural heritage and environmental planning
maps (John Wilson interview 2010). The PlanningAct of 2005 was once again amended to
include provincial guidelines for environmental protection in municipal Official Plans.
The Greater Toronto region continues to face challenges of suburban growth, and a
population disconnected physically and visually from its source of water - the lake - as well
as other local water bodies dried or degraded by new development. However, the public's
awareness of water and natural resources was elevated between 1998 and 2001, by the
contentious protests over the future of the Oak Ridges Moraine, and an E. Coli breakout in
the Walkerton municipal drinking supply which caused 2,500 people to become ill, and 7
deaths. Similar to the disastrous impression of Hurricane Hazel in 1954, which pushed for
the engineered control of stormwater and flood protection, the Walkerton Tragedy
prevented any further privatization of public water supplies in Toronto. The tragedy
leveraged the political will for costly reinvestment in the region's water and sewage
infrastructure (Boudreau, et al 2009; Reeves 2008). The Oak Ridges Moraine development
controversy prompted a moratorium on development in 2001 and the passage of provincial
legislation to protect the hydrologic and natural integrity of the Moraine later that same
year.
6.1 The Legacy of the Bioregion Map
The Commission's Greater Toronto Bioregion Map contributed to the advancement of the
"ecosystem" concept for regional environmental planning, particularly for the Oak Ridges
Moraine. All those interviewed credited the map to highlighting this ecological feature,
which previously had not been shown. The map had less impact on promoting attention to
individual watersheds, because it did not demarcate the region's nine subwatersheds notably the Don - which was specifically discussed in the Regeneration report. The aim of
the Bioregion map was to promote the big picture.
Suzanne Barrett, staff member of the Commission stated that, "one of the things we were
trying to do with the bioregion concept, was to get people thinking about ecosystems and
not about political jurisdictions - and that was the big break through I think we
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accomplished in preparing this map" (Barrett interview 2010). The purpose of the map
"...was really to change people's thinking about the region" (ibid).
David Crombie emphasized that the aim of the Bioregion map was to show the
connectedness of all things (Crombie interview 2010). He also commented that today's
proliferation of map-making technology (such as Google maps) promotes people to become
too localized, thereby miss the bigger picture (paraphrase Crombie interview 2010).
Map-making remains a potent means to coalesce support around regional planning. The
current Provincial Greenbelt Plan, "Places to Grow" Plan, and Oak Ridges Moraine
Conservation Plan,all rely on the visual conveyance of geographic information. These
regional plans share the foundational elements of the Greater Toronto Bioregion Map. John
Wilson, current Chair of the Bring Back the Don Task Force, stated that the Bioregion Map
had "strong legs," and has simply been augmented with more information in subsequent
natural heritage plans.
Mr. Crombie himself continues with regional mapping efforts, now promoting the Greater
Golden Horseshoe to extend along the Niagara Peninsula and Western New York, as the
third most significant economic region in North America. This vision to encompass the area
across the US-border has posed a challenge following 9/11, as tightened security at the
border has dramatically slowed transit time and regional relations (Crombie interview
2010).
The Power of Maps. The power of maps in politics and planning has been well established
by cartographic historians, as instruments of communication, persuasion and agendasetting (Wood 1992; Harley 1987; Boulding 1956). Maps can quickly reveal hidden
relationships and challenge existing ones, fueling public and political discussion (Thierstein
2008). The potency of maps lies in their visual nature: an image is more readily absorbed
than information encoded in other ways (Harley 1987). Through the image, a map
constructs a particular narrative of place, and has the potential to influence one's
perception of that place (Silbernagel 2005).
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Ecological mapping, in particular, can shift perceptions by highlighting discreet natural
systems underlying the built environment (Aberley 1993). Understanding the linkage
between the built human environment and natural systems is critical to ensuring
environmental quality and human health (Forman 2008; McHarg 1967; Wheeler 2009).
Urban areas, specifically, have a significant impact on local water quality because their vast
impervious surfaces concentrate pollutant runoff, and yet urban citizens are often
disconnected from understanding these impacts on the broader environment (France 2005;
Carr 2005). Watersheds have frequently been mapped to visualize the relationship between
urban areas and water quality (Toronto and Region Conservation Authority 2010; Forman
2008; Carr 2005).
Ecological mapping is not with controversy, however, because sensitive natural areas and
impaired water bodies often cross private lands and jurisdictional boundsaries, warranting
liability and municipal coordination (Ferreyra 2008; Lewis 1995).
Dennis Wood described that the power of maps - and cartographers - lies in the definition
of territory through selection that promotes an underlying agenda (1992: 24). Maps
construct - not reproduce - the world (ibid). In the case of the Commission, the Greater
Toronto Bioregion was presented as the worldview for the region, which showed nature
and ecology overlapping constructed political boundaries. But mapping is also "a way of
making experience of the environment sharable" (83). The inherent scale of the Bioregion
map suppressed the details of local context, but through the absence of detail, established a
common ecological context for the Greater Toronto region. The Commission's agenda is
codified in the map: the management of the region should not be defined by the black lines
of the region's jurisdictional boundaries, but rather consider the natural systems which
transcend this political landscape.
In Managing a Sense of Region, Kevin Lynch stated that access and territory are aspects of
the mental image of space (1980: 23). By defining the territory of the Bioregion, the
Commission acted to coalesce one's sense of place in Toronto with that of the regional
ecosystem. The Commission's push for public access to the region through greenways, along
the waterfront, and Oak Ridges Moraine aligned with further developing a sense of region.
Lynch wrote, "[T]he identification of places, as well as their organization into mental
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structures, not only allows people to function effectively, but is also a source of emotional
security, pleasure and understanding. Orientation in space (and time) is the framework of
cognition..."(1980: 10). The Bioregion Map sought to both orient the public and politicians
to a region and to the Commission's agenda, and develop an understanding of why the
"ecosystem" approach was an appropriate strategy for managing the region. Lynch further
noted that while an individual's senses are local, "our experience is regional" (10). This
regional "experience" is shown through the scale of the map and its suppression of local
features. While David Crombie recently doubted that the current general Toronto public
identified itself with this bioregion - the map did capture the Commission's concept of a
regional ecosystem approach (Crombie Interview 2010).
Regional mapping, as noted by Desfor and Keil (2004), does not capture all the political and
economic relations that construct and define the workings of a region. The Crombie
Commission was able to present the Bioregion Map to leverage a rationale for more
coordinate regional planning, but did not stop its recommendations at the boundaries of the
map. Instead, it instigated federal and provincial reform, which resulted in the
reorganization of the planning, jurisdictional authority and financial burdens at various
scales of governance. The Bioregion Map remained a conceptual framework for
municipalities and the public. Likewise, the map may not have leveraged the Commission's
agenda forward, but its conceptual simplicity was picked up by the local media and shared
with a receptive public.
6.2 Toronto, the Great Lakes, and Waterfront Cities
The two significant factors that emerged from the Commission's work - a shift in focus from
the waterfront to watershed and (bio)regional planning, and change in jurisdictional
relations - mark an important direction for other Great Lakes and waterfront cities facing
similar waterfront and watershed degradation.
Most Great Lakes cities share an industrial port past with Toronto and contaminated
waterfront (Ashworth 2003). The Toronto case shows that the health and transformation of
a waterfront is reinforced by a larger regional planning agenda. The health of the Great
Lakes basin requires complementary efforts by neighboring cities and regions.
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Further, Toronto's story is important for other waterfront cities because it demonstrated
how the health of the waterfront and watershed can serve as an economic driver for an
urban economy (Laidley 2007). The Commission's effectiveness in bringing about policy
change was in part because of its appeal to environmentalists and developers; the
"ecosystem" approach to planning was in the interest of both the public and private sectors.
As the Commission articulated in Regeneration,the federal government needed to help
finance the clean-up and restoration efforts of the Great Lakes. The Province of Ontario
could not solely finance efforts for Ontario, Erie, Huron, and the Georgian Bay. Through a
renegotiated Canada-Ontario Agreement, the federal government increased its financial
share in the clean-up cost burden. Notably, in 2009, President Barack Obama signed $475
million dollars into the Great Lakes restoration. Most of this funding is aimed at existing
programs. While financial support to existing programs on the Great Lakes are important,
legislative reform to land-use planning in Great Lakes communities, will likely provide the
greatest impact on controlling runoff and non-point source pollution (Ashworth 2003).
Public education and stewardship are key components of linking people to the health of
their local watershed and that of the Great Lakes (Eiger 1992; France 2005).
Areas of Concern
For many Great Lakes communities designated "areas of concern," the Commission's
comments and recommendations could aptly apply to their individual Remedial Action
Plans. The Commission's strong criticism of the Metro Toronto RAP Process - including its
lack of public outreach and full stakeholder involvement, inaccessible text, and treatment of
the region as one monolithic watershed - are not uncommon RAP shortcomings (Eiger
1992; Office of the Environmental Commissioner 2007; Great Lakes Commission 2005).
Without these attributes, there will be a lack of public understanding and interest in the
Remedial Action Plan, and subsequently no political will to support the costly clean-up.
Following the Commission's comments, the Metro RAP Stage 2 report was significantly
revamped in its legibility, organization and public appeal. While the 1993 renegotiated
Canada-Ontario Agreement was critical in leveraging some federal funds to the RAP cleanup, public outreach and support during the RAP process was equally important in the
Remedial Action Plan gaining political traction. Today, information on progress and status
of the Metro Toronto RAP is easily accessible through its website, managed by the Toronto
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and Region Conservation Authority (Metro Toronto Regional Action Plan 2010:
www.torontorap.ca).
Importantly, the Commission highlighted the inherent limitations of an "area of concern"
approach to restoring a region's watershed. An Area of Concern (AOC) designation by the
International Joint Commission (IJC) is derived by a metric of water quality, such as the
Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) of phosphorus in rivers and lakes, and the presence of
heavy metals. A Remedial Action Plan, which follows from an AOC designation, often
emphasizes monitoring water quality, upgrading sewage treatment facilities to eliminate
effluent loads, and closing combined sewage outfalls - all "end-of-the-pipe" solutions to
water quality. Areas of Concern are not engaged in land use problems or coastal
dimensions. Changes to land-use planning, the major source of non-point source pollution
in a given watershed, are often recommended in Remedial Action Plans as a Best
Management Practice (BMP), but this recommendation lacks teeth for actual reform.
The AOC designation brought attention to the condition of Metro Toronto's water, but the
Commission sharply drew attention to land-use and development patterns as the main
cause of the degradation of the environment and water. The Commission called for reform
to the Provincial PlanningAct, which spurred a separate Commission on Planning and
Development Reform, and eventually provincial planning guidelines in 1994 (re-adopted in
2005). The Commission Inquiry was a unique vehicle to push for land reform that would
otherwise have likely remained a RAP suggested Best Management Practice. The
Commission's emphasis on land use planning reform is what sets Metro Toronto apart from
other Areas of Concern - and what made the Commission's plan a great one.
Activist Groups
The Commission also strongly credited grassroots organizations for taking actions to
pursue restoration actions and plans based on an ecosystem or watershed scale. Those
organizations included the Action to Restore a Clean Humber (ARCH), the Task Force to
Bring Back the Don, and the Save the Oak Ridges Moraine Coalition (STORM), all of whom
acted as agents to bring stakeholders together to restore water bodies and natural features
and overcome what they perceived as institutional failings of government. While similar
organizations exist in other Great Lakes communities, the longevity of these groups' and
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their effectiveness can in part be attributed to government support and their incorporation
into official planning processes.
The Task Force to Bring Back the Don receives funding and staff support from the City of
Toronto, while former members of its board have been actively engaged in the development
of the Lower Don Lands and re-naturalization of the mouth of the river. Both the Task Force
and ARCH work with the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority in watershed-related
activities. The Save the Oak Ridges Moraine Coalition (STORM), was included in the early
1990 Provincial study to protect the Moraine. When government action waned in 1993, the
group continued its campaign, and rallied media attention and the public to their cause,
finally obtaining Provincial protection for the Moraine in 2001. The political validation of
grassroots organizations and their inclusion into planning processes is important to elevate
citizen engagement in the restoration of the environment - and push management at the
scale of ecosystem or watershed, which would otherwise be managed by disjointed
jurisdictions.
WaterfrontJurisdictionand Land Ownership
The Commission also played a central role in the redevelopment of the waterfront, by
recommending the federal Toronto Harborfront Commissioners sell its real estate holdings
to the City of Toronto, enabling the city and developers to remediate and redevelop vacant
brownfields. While this transaction promulgated city-led waterfront development, since
1999, development has been guided through a business-model of public private
partnerships, and not necessarily publically accessible spaces. Clean-up of contaminated
lands along the waterfront is often limited in thoroughness, and restricted to those lands
slated to be redeveloped.
An accessible waterfront beyond downtown Toronto can be credited to the Commission
through the creation of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust (WRT) - also led by David
Crombie, and former Commission staff, including Suzanne Barrett and Marlaine Koehler.
WRT was central in negotiating public and private interests in the development of a
waterfront trail, which now stretches from Quebec to Niagara Falls, and in the development
of greenways trail systems in concert with the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority.
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These trails are the realization of the "green infrastructure" proposed by the Commission,
which enable people and wildlife to move through and connect to the larger region.
The legacy of the Commission on Toronto today is due in part to the strength of its
recommendations, its former staff's on-going involvement with planning and policy in
Toronto, but also several other factors unique to the city and region. The section below
describes Toronto's "special" circumstances that enabled the ecosystem approach to be
largely adopted and remain a potent planning guide well after the Commission's inquiry.
6. 3 Toronto's "Special" Circumstances
Was Toronto's environmental future inevitable? Would the momentum of the 1980s
development and jurisdictional "crisis" have resulted in action and reform without the
vehicle of the Royal Commission, without David Crombie, his staff, the ecosystem and
watershed approaches, and the unique physical geography of the Greater Toronto Region?
At the end of the 1980s, there was momentum underfoot: the Toronto and Region
Conservation Authority was beginning to work municipalities to integrate watershed plans
into Official Plans; TRCA advocated for a greenways strategy; civic groups were actively
vocalizing their concerns for rivers and the Moraine, and talented environmental activists
and planners were already at work.
Below I reflect on the unique circumstances that separate Toronto from other Great Lakes
and waterfront cities, and may have contributed to the region's adoption the Commission's
ecosystem approach and its subsequent planning trajectory. I conclude that regardless of
Toronto's distinct features, the Commission's plan was still a good one wort
The Royal Commission Inquiry Process
The United States has no parallel process to a Royal Commission Inquiry. This unique
Canadian process allows a government-appointed independent body to seek extensive
public feedback on a concern or issue facing a region or government, and packages its
findings into recommendations for the provincial or federal government. While there is no
requirement that the government act on these recommendations, a Commission vocalizes
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the concerns of active citizens, agencies and stakeholders, often building public and political
will for action (Laidley 2007).
The uniqueness of the Commission's structure, relationship to government, and its
familiarity among the Canadian public, does not appear to be parallel to institutions in the
United States. Further research on the institutional arrangements of the Commission to
those of agencies in the United States would provide insight into the potential of a similarlyscaled public outreach and campaign for planning reform.
The Crombie Commission had the unique opportunity to expand its mandate and scope of
inquiry over several years, broadening and deepening its final recommendations for federal,
provincial and local government reform. The Commission took the concept of the
waterfront - the focus of nearly all Great Lakes and waterfront cities - to that of the
watershed. The condition of the waterfront was a reflection of the larger watershed.
The Commission's accessible and readable reports, presented an appealing case for
coordinated regional planning. The transformation of Toronto to its current position as a
progressive city of environmental planning, water management and beautiful waterfront
development, took time - nearly the twenty to forty years first envisioned by the
Commission.
The long-term strategy for the regional environmental planning began with significant
legislative reform, and a policy window to enable its negotiation and passage. A political
about-face in the mid-1990s removed this momentum, but the activism instilled in citizens'
groups during the Commission continued to draw attention to environmental concerns and
the headwaters of the region.
Crombie as ProfessionalPlannerand Politician
Leadership and staff on the Commission was critical to the realization of its agenda. David
Crombie was not only in federal politics just prior to the Commission, but was also a former
popular mayor of Toronto. Before his tenure as mayor, he taught urban affairs at Ryerson
University with the texts of Jane Jacobs, Ian McHarg, among others (Crombie interview
2010). Crombie's background and sympathies for thoughtful planning, combined with his
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pragmatism, garnered him political and professional allies during and after the inquiry. The
media generally portrayed his position and the Commission's work favorably.
Crombie was also supported by a capable staff. This included practicing landscape
architects, academics, and planners knowledgeable in the principles of urban ecology. Their
work contributed to the robustness and appeal of the Commission's recommendations.
Crombie had the advantage of being a "professional" planner and a politician. He had allies
at the provincial and federal levels, and knew the actors and workings of the Toronto
region. Yet, he had the advantage of not having to answer to constituents at election time.
The structure of the Commission served as a platform for a broad proposal beyond the scale
of the municipal region, and a typical mayor's scope.
While Crombie was important to the appeal of the Commission, the structure of the Royal
Commission was more important to the realization of its agenda. The Commission inquiry
was the vehicle for change in the region, province and the federal government. Crombie's
background bolstered the establishment of the inquiry, but required a federal and
provincial platform for policy reform and coordinated regional planning.
Canada'sEconomic Hub and PopulationCenter
The importance of Toronto as one of Canada's economic and population centers likely
contributed to the establishment of the Crombie Commission inquiry (and later Sewell
Commission), and continued financial support from the federal and provincial governments.
Toronto is the hub of Canadian media, broadcasting, and financial services. Toronto has
always been the largest urban area of Ontario and Canada, with a population of over 4.3
million in 1996 and 4.75 million in 2006 (Statistics Canada 2006). The management of the
Toronto region - both its environment and its economic attractiveness - is significant for
Ontario and Canada.
Toronto's Physical Geography
Toronto's physical geography is unique among many Great Lakes and waterfront cities.
Toronto is strongly oriented to Lake Ontario by the sloping Oak Ridges Moraine and Niagara
Escarpment, which form a distinct bowl-shaped watershed that flows into the lake. The
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boundaries of the "bioregion" are relatively clear and obvious. The physical geography
effectively creates a macro-metropolitan.
The Oak Ridges Moraine, the location of regions' headwaters, lies roughly 20 miles north of
the waterfront, a distance that allowed for urban development to continue without
encroachment on the Moraine, up until twenty years ago. The spatial extent of the Greater
Toronto region from waterfront to its headwaters, did not result in immediate conflict
between urban growth and environmentally sensitive lands. Had the Moraine been closer to
the city's central core, it may have been fully developed earlier in Toronto's history. The
protection of the Oak Ridges Moraine was possible both because of activism, but also likely
due to its relatively undeveloped state. The protection of conservation and agricultural
lands did not require immediate personal or economic sacrifice in the region (although a
few large private development plans were stopped by the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation
Act in 2001).
The Hamilton Anomaly
Toronto's physical geography is in direct contrast to its local neighbor, Hamilton, Ontario.
Hamilton is located just south of Toronto, at the elbow of Lake Ontario, where the Niagara
Escarpment closely hugs the lakeshore. The Niagara Escarpment is only a few miles inland
from Hamilton's and Burlington's northern shoreline, limiting development and also
setbacks or buffers from the shore. Hamilton, a historic and active industrial port, receives
little lakeshore flow or movement given the narrow angled coastline, which contributes to
the lingering of surface water pollutants from shipping and industry activities. Hamilton's
bioregion is immediately constrained, and forces a conflict between current land use and
the environment.
Like Metro Toronto, the Hamilton Harbor was designated an area of concern in the 1980s,
and developed a Remedial Action Plan to contain highly contaminated sediments, which
include polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) present in very high concentrations in
coal tar. The severity of the pollutants present, and its constrained geography, has garnered
attention from Environment Canada to assist in the expensive and complex clean-up.
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However, industrial and port activities monopolize economic activities in Hamilton, posing
on-going pollution concerns. Arguably, attention to the Hamilton Harbor Remedial Action
Plan from the federal government has helped expand its environmental planning role in the
recent past. Both its geographic uniqueness and industrial-port dominance has complicated
its progress.
Whereas Toronto's waterfront land uses moved away from industrial activities, allowing for
clean-up of contaminated soils and the reestablishment of wetland buffers with the lake,
these opportunities are more limited in Hamilton. The watershed approach to planning,
broadly speaking, is hindered by the limited space between the escarpment and the
waterfront, and the activities in the port. While Hamilton's port authority advertises its
campaign to be a "green" port, the possibilities for this promise are naturally restricted by
the lack of flushing by the lake, and the lingering presence of pollutants in the harbor's soils.
The Commission's watershed and ecosystem approach may not be applicable to Hamilton's
constrained site.
Buffalo, New York
Across the lake, Buffalo, New York, remains a stagnant post-industrial city, with a
decreasing population and extensive vacant brownfields along its waterfront. Unlike
Toronto, Buffalo's economic importance for the nation is likely negligible; for New York
State's economy, it lags behind the significance of New York City.
The city of Buffalo and neighboring towns also lack any incentive for regional cooperation.
There is antagonism between wealthy suburbs and the tax-base poor city, both vying for
businesses, new development and economic stimulus. The manipulation of former
agricultural fields and wetlands in the suburbs has also contributed to local flood concerns,
sinking foundations, and stormwater overflows into rivers and Lake Erie. Yet no growth
controls are in place, and downstream consequences are not in the headlines. A waterfront
redevelopment proposal for the city has been a common political promise for decades - but
remains elusive as cost-prohibitive, controversial, or both.
In 2003, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency transferred coordination efforts of the
Buffalo River Remedial Action Plan to the Buffalo Niagara Riverkeeper, a non-profit
144
organization. Five years later, the Riverkeeper received grants from the EPA to develop a
restoration plan for the Buffalo River, and map the region's watershed. This fledgling
momentum suggests that civic activist groups will be developing regional environmental
plans, but it is not clear how these efforts will be received or included in town master plans,
or funded for implementation. Without the integration of the Riverkeeper's actions into the
mainstream planning process, many of these recent efforts may be in vain.
Without incentives, the current political and economic climate in Buffalo casts doubt on
policy change or leadership from within. The realm of incentives for regional environmental
or watershed planning would likely instead come from the U.S. EPA, the New York State
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) or Conservation (DEC), or state or federal
economic development funding. Financial incentives might force municipalities to amend
their master plans and permitting process, but they would likely not stir the public's
attention to the condition of the region's waterways - and not push policymakers beyond
minimum compliance.
While the development of a waterfront-to-watershed strategy for Buffalo is beyond the
scope of this thesis, it is worth noting that a process that attracts and engages the public's
attention to the interconnectedness of Buffalo's economy and degraded environment is
critical for a long-term solution for the region. Both public outreach and policy change are
necessary for regional improvement. Defining and creating a vehicle or outlet for this
process is worthy of further study.
The Scare of Privatizationin Toronto
In 2001, public outrage over contaminated municipal drinking water - under the
management of a private company - changed the political trajectory to pass progressive
legislation in water infrastructure and public services. Toronto's relationship to water was
made visible through the work of the Royal Commission and other agencies in the early
50
1990s, and a decade later through controversy and loss of life. Unlike other Great Lakes
cities signing into privatization of public water supplies, Toronto's recent memory of the
Walkerton Tragedy precludes this as a politically salient option (Boudreau, et al 2009: 160).
50 The 2001 Walkerton drinking water tragedy resulted in seven deaths.
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This event also stirred political action over Toronto's city-wide Wet Weather Flow Master
Plan, in committee since 1999. The WWFMP, a 25-year long capital improvement project to
update and improve aging water and sewerage infrastructure, would be a financially costly.
In 2003, the WWFMP was adopted by Toronto as an investment in a safe drinking supply,
financed in part by an annual homeowner fee.
While Toronto's unique circumstance may have enabled the ecosystem agenda to be more
readily accepted by a receptive public, it does not discount the value of the Commission's
recommendations and plan for the region. The vehicle of the Royal Commission Inquiry was
important for gathering public input and support, and to frame the investigation as a
regional issue. The strength of the Commission's recommendations is reflected both in the
adoption of many of its recommendations and the longevity of many of the planning ideas
and civic groups promoted by the Commission.
6.4 Conclusion
Of all the Great Lakes cities, Toronto "works" and it succeeded in advancing environmental
policy and planning reform. This research illustrates how the Crombie Commission
advanced an ecosystem and watershed agenda for the region, which has to a certain extent,
influenced Toronto's planning over the past twenty years. I argue that regardless of the
unique circumstances of Toronto described above, the Royal Commission's presented a
particularly cohesive solution for the region, and was therefore persuasive in advancing its
agenda. The Commission leveraged the initial political and public interest in the waterfront
to the concept of the watershed: the "Future of Toronto's Waterfront" hinged on the future
of the region's watersheds, its headwaters, and the region's relation to its natural heritage.
The Royal Commission also served as the vehicle by which to present a compelling solution
to the region's problems. The extensive public and political outreach of the process enabled
the Commission to gather support, and frame its waterfront investigation as a regional
issue.
The watershed solution was a thoughtful argument for legislative reform to reduce
jurisdictional conflict, conflict between the built environment and the natural systems, and
enhance federal and provincial investment in environmental clean-up and protection. The
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Commission's "ecosystem approach" to planning was a policy and design ideal that
coincided with the principles of ecology, and served as a flexible term for moving between
macro-politics and landscape planning. The extent of the Commission's accomplishments
remained, however, appears to resonate most strongly at the smaller scale of the Toronto
bioregion and watershed, and not at the larger ecosystem-scale.
The language, structure, and accessibility of the Commission's reports to a wide audience,
furthered its potency. The Commission, and notably its popular Chair, David Crombie,
presented a compelling and hopeful vision of the region that would singularly resolve
jurisdictional conflict, environmental degradation, and economic ills. In general, the
Commission's work was received favorably by the media and public.
However, the Commission faced dissent from certain municipalities and agencies. The
contentious reaction Etobicoke city councilors to the Commission's call for a moratorium on
waterfront development showed that dissent existed where the financial stakes were high,
and the where proposed development faced local opposition. Swift Provincial intervention,
an alternative proposal and procedural compromise, resolved the debate and allowed
development to proceed with amendments within a year. Similarly, the Toronto
Harbourfront Commissioners also angrily rejected the Commission's recommendation for a
change to its federal mandate, which would remove the agency's ability to hold and sell
waterfront properties to finance its operations. After much debate, the mandate was
changed, which removed THC's burden to self-finance its operations, and allowed the City of
Toronto to have more control over development on its waterfront. The Commission's
recommendations had political clout, and therefore faced some resistance, but it also
pushed the province and federal governments to take action on issues of on-going conflict.
Finally, dissent appeared to come years later in the 1995 election when the New Democratic
Party lost federal and provincial elections to the Progressive Conservative Party. Just prior
to the election major legislative reform to the ProvincialPlanningAct was passed, which
would require municipalities to incorporate environmental guidelines into their Official
Plans - and potentially change the status quo of development patterns. With the economy
stagnant, unemployment and taxes high, and local politicians and developers facing new
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requirements, the election was portrayed as a return to "Common Sense" and fiscal and
legislative government restraint.
This research also showed how "progressive" and apparent revisionist policy changes even those supported by a public and multiple levels of government - are vulnerable under
new political regimes. The Province of Ontario and the city of Toronto saw significant
political changes and the repeal of the Commission's recommendations under the regimes
of Ontario Premier Mike Harris and Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman, from 1995 to 2001. In
reaction to the policies of these conservative governments, including privatization and
significant cuts to public services, as well as support for private land developers, the
political climate again shifted in 2001. Throughout this political oscillation, those citizen
groups initially leveraged by the Crombie Commission pursued their agendas for
environmental restoration and protection of natural systems. The stability and longevity of
these community and citizens groups was crucial in realizing watershed planning and
restoration efforts, and the protection of the Oak Ridges Moraine.
The Royal Commission advanced the ecosystem approach to planning through the adoption
of a substantial portion of its recommendations, of which resolved underlying jurisdictional
conflicts and appealed to a wide range of interest groups and agencies. The Commission's
work has continued to influence, to a certain extent, regional planning over the past twenty
years. The Commission's impact is most clearly evident in Toronto's waterfront
redevelopment (Laidley 2007), greenways development, and the protection of the Oak
Ridges Moraine (Desfor and Keil 2004). The visual synopsis of the Commission's
"ecosystem" agenda - the Greater Toronto Bioregion Map - has been augmented with more
information, but still resonates in Toronto's regional plans today. However, even with
Provincial legislation to protect critical areas in the region and direct urban growth, the
continuation of suburban expansion remains a significant regional environmental concern.
FurtherResearch. The success of the Commission to change policy extended from its unique
institutional arrangement with the Province of Ontario and federal Canadian government.
One of the most important extensions of this research would be to examine the parallels of
the Royal Commission to federal or state inquiries in the United States, to determine if there
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is an analogous institutional structure to examine a region and develop with a strong public
outreach campaign and stakeholder involvement. The Commission served as a vehicle to
advance a broad and politically ambitious agenda. Defining or creating a process or outlet
for public engagement and policy change is worth further study.
During this investigation and interview process, it also became difficult to discount the
variation in land-use law and property rights between Canada and the United States. The
success of the Commission and realization of its recommendations also rested on the
powers of the federal, provincial governments and conservation authorities to designate
non-developable "hazard lands" and negotiate for property and public access without the
extensive precedent of litigation found in the United States. A further study could examine
these cultural and legal differences, and the institutional barriers to watershed management
in the United States.
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Bibliography
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Interviews
Suzanne Barrett, Environmental consultant at Barrett Consulting, former Royal Commission
staff member. Telephone interview on July 12, 2010
Jennifer Bonnell, Doctoral Candidate, History of Education at the Ontario Institute for
Educational Studies, University of Toronto
Telephone interview on July 28, 2010
David Crombie, former Chair of the Royal Commission and head of the Waterfront
Regeneration Trust. In person interview on July 29, 2010.
Marcel Fortin, GIS and Map Librarian, University of Toronto. In person interview on July 29,
2010.
Don Haley, Senior Hydrologist, Toronto and Region Conservation Authority. In person
interview on July 27, 2010.
Marlaine Koehler, Executive Director of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust and former
Royal Commission staff member. Personal correspondence in November 2010.
John Wilson, current Chair of the Task Force to Bring Back the Don. In person interview on
July 27, 2010.
Mark Wilson, former Chair of the Task Force to Bring Back the Don.
In person interview on July 27, 2010.
155