Applying Technology Strategy with Enterprise Architecting: A Case Study in
Transformation Planning for Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into
the National Airspace
by
MASSACHUSETT S INSTITUTE
OF TECHN( )LOGY
Kristina L. Richardson
SEP 2 3 2009
Bachelor of Science in Environmental Engineering &
Field of Study in French and Spanish
United States Military Academy, 1999
LIBRAFRIES
Submitted to the System Design and Management Program
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
ARCHIVES
Master of Science in Engineering and Management
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
May 2009
Signature of Author
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and Management Program
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Donna Rhodes
Thesis Supervisor
Engineering Systems Division
Principal Research Scientist, Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initiative (SEARI)
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Patrick Hale
Director
System Design and Management Program
President, International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE)
Disclaimer -- The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Departmentof Defense.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Applying Technology Strategy with Enterprise Architecting: A Case Study in
Transformation Planning for Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the
National Airspace
Kristina L. Richardson
Submitted to the System Design and Management Program
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Engineering and Management
Abstract
The research presented in this thesis combines Enterprise Architecture and Technology Strategy
for analyzing, evaluating, and recommending appropriate solutions for integrating Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The thesis is organized into
four sections. Section 1 introduces the strategic background, enterprise description, definitions
of key terms, and the issues and interest surrounding UAS operations. Section 2 involves
architecting the enterprise at its current state, which includes the vision, strategic objectives,
enterprise layout, stakeholder analysis, and concludes with the architectural views of the current
state. Section 3 discusses the vision and design for the future of the NAS enterprise, the current
near-term efforts, the long-term preferred future state, and the transformation plan to achieve
successful integration of UAS flight in the NAS. Finally, Section 4 concludes with the
importance of leadership for success, final thoughts, recommendations, and future work.
Technology Strategy coupled with Engineering Architecture emphasizes the development and
application of ways of thinking that bring clarity to the complex co-evolution of technological
innovation, the demand opportunity, systems architecture, business ecosystems, and decisionmaking and execution within the business. Architecting the current state of the NAS enterprise
and then applying the technology strategy framework in an incremental systems approach to
fully understand the future state of the NAS involves figuring out how to create and capture
value, anticipating and deciding how to respond to the behavior of customers, complimentors
and competitors, and develop and deliver technologies, platforms, and products.
Thesis Supervisor: Donna Rhodes
Title: Principal Research Scientist, Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initiative
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the National Airspace
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TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Table of Contents
A b stract ..................................................................................................................................................
2
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................
6
List of T ables...........................................................................................................................................
7
Acknowledgement ........................
8
.......................................
10
Executive Summary ..........................................................................................................
13
Section 1: Strategic Background ..................................................................................................
13
System..............
Airspace
Enterprise Description: The United States National
15
Definition -What is an Unmanned Aircraft System? ........................................................................
Unmanned Aircraft System Technology - A Historical Perspective .................................... 16
Interest in Unmanned Aircraft Systems ........................................................................................ 19
............ 20
Issues Surrounding Unmanned Aircraft Systems .................................... .....
29
Section 2: Architecting the Enterprise ...................................
29
.........................................................................................................................
Vision ............................
Strategic Objectives ..................................................................................................................................... 30
........... 30
Enterprise Layout - U.S. National Airspace System .........................................
42
Stakeholders and Value ....................................................
Stak eh old ers...................................................................................................................................................................
Prioritize and Group the Stakeholders ...............................................................................................................
42
45
50
"As is" Architectural View .....................................................
Section 3: Transforming the Enterprise..........................................
Vision &Design for the Future Enterprise ..........................................................................................
Current Near-Term Efforts ................................................................................................................
Long Term Future State: Technology Strategy as the Preferred "tobe" Architecture.........
55
55
56
61
61
Tech n ology In n ovation ..............................................................................................................................................
63
..............................
.......................................
Envelopes
Key Parameters, Trade-Offs and Performance
Innovation Trajectory and Key Technologies .................................................................................................. 64
..........66
Evolution, Technological Limits and Disruption Potential .................................... ..
Key Customer Segments and Applications ....................................................................................................... 66
Customer Needs, Diffusion and Adoption ......................................................................................................... 68
70
Technology Stages and Episodes in Evolution ........................................
74
Key Niches, Players, and Roles ......................................................
76
Business Models and Capturing Value ........................................
78Other
.................................................................................................................................................................
Factors........................................
Other Factors
Transformation Plan ................................................
80
.. .... ... . . .
Technology Innovation: Where to Go from Here? .............................................................................
Building the Ecosystem .............................................................................................................................................
eCreation ...............................................................................................................................................................
Value Creation........................................
Valu e Cap ture .................................................................................................................................................................
Recommendations .....................................................
Section 4: Conclusion ..................................................
80
83
85Value
89
91
93
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Leadership for Success ......................................................
Final Thoughts .............................................................................................................................................
93
94
Referen ces ............................................................................................................................................
96
Appendix 1: Complete Stakeholder List [76] .....................................
105
Appendix 2: Stakeholder Salience: Power, Legitimacy, & Urgency [52] ......................
112
List of Figures
Figure 1: World UAS Forecast[15]
19
Figure 2: UAS Accident Rate & Monthly FlightHours [16]
Figure 3: Army Airworthiness Process [23]
Figure 4: UAS FlightAuthorization Levels [23]
20
25
26
Figure 5: Airspace Classificationin the NAS [25]
31
Figure 6: A Day's Worth of Traffic in the United States [27]
Figure 7: Vision of a High PerformanceAirspace [28]
32
33
Figure 8: FAA's OrganizationalStructure [29]
Figure 9: EnterpriseNetwork
Figure 10: EnterpriseArchitecture Views - Interrelationships[53]
34
36
51
Figure 11: Future Vision of Success [56]
Figure 12: IntegratedLife Cycle Approach [30]
56
57
Figure 13: GBSAA FunctionalEvolution [30]
Figure 14: GBSAA Conceptfor Safe UAS Operations[57]
58
59
Figure 15: Traditionalversus IrregularWarfare [60]
61
Figure 16: ISR Demand versus Capability[61]
62
Figure 17: UAS Budget and FlightHours Growth [60]
Figure 18: Military Aircraft and UAS ClassA Mishap Rates (Lifetime), 1986-2006 [31]_
63
65
Figure 19: UAS Spectrum by Weight [67]
Figure 20: Schematic ofAustrian "Balloon" Bombing Device, 1848 [68]
67
68
Figure21: Picture of the X-45 Air Vehicle 1 Test bed [69]
Figure 22: UAS Companies Entry and Exit Market Activity [73]
69
71
Figure23: UAS Companies Entries,Exits, and Totals [73]
Figure24: Patents Filedfor UAS designs [73]
Figure25: UAS Patents Grouped by Stakeholder [73]
Figure 26: Patents, Scientific Papers,andInvestments in UAS [73]
71
72
73
73
Figure 27: Total Flight Hoursper yearfor Army Helicopterand UAS [16]
74
Figure 28:
Figure 29:
Figure 30:
Figure 31:
Figure 32:
Figure 33:
Figure 34:
75
UAS Ecosystem
77
Price and Product Costs
79
Complimentary Goods Model
80
[84]
Grumman
Northrop
for
Opportunities
Investment
Market
Potential
81
Types ofInnovation Required with Respect to Various Market Segments [71]
82
TargetingCivil Airspace Marketsfor UAS Applications [90]
84
[31]__
NAS
the
to
Actual andAnticipatedRequests by the DoDfor UAS Access
Figure35: Potential UAS Applications and Market Niches [93]
Figure36: FAA Value Delivery andImportance in UAS Operations
Figure 37: Overview of Civil UAS OperationalRequirements [76]
85
86
87
Figure 38: Raytheon MTS-B Multispectral TargetingSystem [95]
88
Figure 39: The Durabilityof FirstMover Advantage in Various Types ofMarkets [79]
90
List of Tables
Table 1: Civil and Public Parallelsin Certification
Table 2: Stakeholders and Stakeholder Groups
24
46
Table 3: Stakeholder Salience Scoring
47
Table 4:
Table 5:
Table 6:
Table 7:
Stakeholder Saliency
NAS Enterprise - Stakeholder Value Exchange [39]
Stakeholder Importance & Performance
EnterpriseArchitecture - View Interactions
48
49
50
53
Acknowledgement
Attending graduate school, let alone the System Design and Management Program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology was never a thought or aspiration of mine. I left home
after graduating from high school to attend the United States Military Academy at West Point.
This decision catapulted me into "Army life", which has been full of opportunities, tremendous
experiences, global travel/living, and at times some steep learning curves. I have since realized
the amazing possibilities available in life and that you can truly do anything that you set your
mind and sights to achieve! I attribute four things to shaping me as a person: my education at a
small, college-preparatory, all girls high school - Notre Dame Academy in Los Angeles, my
Grandmother's constant encouragement and support, my experiences as an Army Aviator, and
now my time spent in the SDM program at MIT.
Growing up in a tumultuous household in Southern California, the one constant in my life
was my Grandmother. She was ahead of her time as a college educated, single mother, and
professional engineer. I attribute much of my success and drive for a better life to her strength,
understanding, and foresight.
On the professional side, I would like to thank LTC Dane Rideout who has known me
since I was a lowly cadet at West Point, and has helped me grow and develop into the
professional officer that I am now. He has greatly influenced my decision to continue to serve in
the Army today and truly understands my thinking.
I am greatly appreciative of Dr. Donna Rhodes for agreeing to supervise my thesis
research over the last year. I have learned so much from her expertise, keen thinking, and open
dialogue of research information. I hope to work with her in the future as I feel I have so much
more to learn!
Throughout my research, I encountered many intelligent and highly motivated
individuals who assisted me in gathering information, making new contacts, and over the course
of the last two years, provided invaluable face-to-face, phone, and email conversations. A
special thanks goes to MAJ Jason "Fitz" Kirkpatrick, CW4 (Ret.) David Sickmeier, and Mr.
David Hunnicutt. Additionally, I would like to thank MAJ Todd Buhr, LTC Dan Bailey, and
COL A.T. Ball for sparking my interest in the area of UAS technology and operations. Finally, I
am extremely gracious to the United States Army for funding both my undergraduate and
graduate degrees at West Point and MIT respectively. I also owe a great deal of appreciation to
the Department of Systems Engineering at West Point for investing in my abilities by selecting
me to join their faculty, which has allowed me to embark on a new phase in my Army career as
an Academic Instructor at West Point.
I am internally grateful to the System Design and Management staff and faculty: Pat Hale
- thanks for being flexible with my timeline in attending the SDM Program due to various
constraints involved in breaking away from the "operational Army" and having a "backup plan"
when I was extended in Iraq. Chris Bates, Bill Foley, and Brian Bulmer - your "behind the
scenes" work, help with the application process, registration, and IT assistance was fantastic!
Thank you SDM 08 - especially Luke, Michael, Maya, and Leigh - you are amazing and I am
thankful for your friendship.
I feel extremely privileged to have embarked on this journey through the SDM program
and very humbled by the extraordinary students, faculty, and staff at this great institution.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
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Executive Summary
Purpose and Motivation: The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have both triggered and
inspired change in the Army's tactical and strategic operations. Army Aviation has experienced
an incredible amount of transformation and the large increase in demand for real-time
information and the flexibility to react immediately to a threat has greatly expanded its role on
the battlefield. The Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) provides a platform to collect real-time
imagery and video for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) with almost no
limitations with respect to aircraft endurance, environment, and weather conditions. UASs have
been used for deception operations as well as maritime missions. As the electronics systems
grow in complexity, but shrink in size, new applications of use include electronic warfare and
signals intelligence. As such, the emergence of UASs in the military inventory and their
integration into the Aviation community has launched this technology to the forefront of the
general public's interest.
Combat Commanders demand and require real-time intelligence for successful operations on the
battlefield. UASs are a combat multiplier in today's conflict and their integration into the piloted
military airspace demonstrates the potential for UAS integration into the National Airspace
System (NAS). Similar to pilots, UAS operators return to "home station" after combat
operations in support of Operation Iraqi and/or Enduring Freedom and require the use of military
and civil airspace to maintain their "flight skills" in preparation for the next deployment.
Accessing the National Airspace is essential for UAS operators to sustain these perishable skills
and also expand military UAS operations for continuous support of the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT).
These military UAS core capabilities apply directly to many of the civil applications proposed.
Wild fire suppression missions where UASs are equipped with infrared sensors to detect forests
fires can notify ground stations and/or deliver fire suppression chemicals. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) are interested in UASs for border interdiction where they can be utilized to
patrol land and sea boarders. Search and Rescue for ship and aircraft accidents is a direct
transition from the military's use of UASs for battle damage assessment. Communications relay,
high altitude/long endurance (HALE) UAS could be used as satellite surrogates during
emergencies such as hurricane Katrina when most of the infrastructure has been destroyed. They
can also provide aerial platforms for cameras and real-time surveillance in events such as
earthquakes, disaster and emergency management. Research of environmental and atmospheric
pollution is also a viable application given the appropriate payload. Industrial applications such
as crop spraying, nuclear plant surveillance, and vessel escorts have also been proposed.
The introduction of UASs into the NAS is a challenging enterprise for the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the aviation community as a whole. UAS proponents have a growing
interest in expediting access to the NAS. There is an increase in the number and scope of UAS
flights in an already busy National Airspace System (NAS). The design of many UASs makes
them difficult to see, and adequate detect, sense and avoid technology is years away. Decisions
being made about UAS airworthiness and operational requirements must fully address safety
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
implications of UASs flying in the same airspace as piloted aircraft, and perhaps more
importantly, aircraft with passengers.
Context and Scope: The System Engineering frameworks utilized in this thesis include
Enterprise Architecture and Technology Strategy. Enterprise Architecture is a holistic way of
thinking which is essential to modem enterprises, such as the NAS, that have highly
interconnected systems. It is necessary to integrate management processes, lifecycle processes,
and enable infrastructure systems. Furthermore, enterprise architecting balances the needs of
multiple stakeholders working within and across boundaries and enables a full understanding of
their value exchange, expectations, needs, and interactions. Technology in the UAS industry is
advancing very rapidly and current military operations provide an optimal test bed for such
innovation, which will assist the transition of UAS operations within the civil and commercial
markets. Both Enterprise Architecture and Technology Strategy focus on a holistic approach and
integrate enterprise strategic objectives, value capture and creation, in a systematic approach to
achieve success in a complex, highly technical enterprise system.
This thesis is organized into four sections in order to fully examine and analyze the NAS as an
enterprise in its current state, identify the future vision, and develop a transformation plan to
achieve such a desired future state. Section 1 consists of the strategic background beginning
with defining the NAS enterprise and the UAS, a brief historical overview of UAS development,
and finally the interests and issues surrounding UAS operations. Section 2 architects the
enterprise to include a discussion of the current vision of the NAS, the strategic objectives, a
description of the enterprise layout, a full discussion of the multitude of stakeholders, their value
exchange, prioritization, and finally concluding with the "as is' architectural view utilizing the
eight views outlined in the Enterprise Architecting framework. The third section focuses on the
transformation plan and begins with a discussion of the vision and design for the future
enterprise, a discussion of the current near-term efforts, and the plan of action to achieve the
long-term future state utilizing technology strategy as the preferred "to be" architecture.
Furthermore, this section includes a detailed discussion of technology innovation, key
parameters, customer segments, civil and commercial applications, building the business
ecoysystem, value creation, and value capture. The final section covers the conclusions, the role
of leadership in this enterprise, a discussion of the UAS industry in comparison to the emergence
of the airline industry, and final thoughts.
Conclusion: Interest in UASs continues to grow worldwide. Recent advances in computer
technology, software development, light weight materials, global navigation, advanced data
links, sophisticated sensors, and component miniaturization are strengthening capabilities and
fueling the demand for UASs. The new UAS technologies under development today will have a
profound impact on the entire aviation industry. The investments and the technological advances
made by military organizations have generated a growing interest in their potential use for civil
government, scientific research, and commercial applications. Enabling routine access to the
NAS by leveraging existing procedures for piloted flight operations, and using current guidance
for unique military operations will yield a path for NAS integration and significant growth in the
civil and commercial UAS market will immediately follow.
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
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TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the National Airspace
Section 1: Strategic Background
Enterprise Description: The United States National Airspace System
Since the Wright brothers ushered in the age of powered flight and essentially launched an entire
industry over 100 years ago, safety of flight has been a top priority to all involved. Pilots take
seriously the responsibilities associated with operating an aircraft. As aviation evolved from a
handful of experimental aircraft in the early 20th century, to more than 600,000 certified aircraft
sharing the skies today, the air traffic system also advanced to maintain a high degree of safety
and efficiency. From no regulations in 1903 to strict regulatory oversight under the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) today, pilots fly in accordance with regulations that have served
well, as evidenced by the fact that the United States has the safest aviation system in the world
[1].
The state of the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) resembles the early days of aviation. During
that time, creative minds, engineering talent, and entrepreneurial spirit converged to produce new
technologies and designs that spawned a new market, brought aviation to the general public, and
altered forever the transportation landscape. Today that same spirit permeates within the UAS
industry as innovators are vying to enter and dominate in a new and potentially lucrative market
[2]. However, unlike the early years of Aviation, UASs have the challenge of entering a mature
civil aviation system consisting of many aircraft, controlled by complex monitoring equipment,
dominated primarily by commercial sectors, interest groups, and a large regulatory structure.
Integration of UASs into the National Airspace System (NAS) and their potential market success
depends on a complex set of technical, economic, political, and legal factors.
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 launched the Federal government's fundamental role in
regulating civil aviation. Leaders within the aviation industry believed that aircraft could not
reach its full commercial potential without government action so they urged passing this
legislation in order to improve and maintain safety standards. The Act charged the Secretary of
Commerce with fostering air commerce, issuing and enforcing air traffic rules, licensing pilots,
certifying aircraft, establishing airways, and operating and maintaining aids to air navigation [3].
The new Aeronautics Branch within the Department of Commerce initially concentrated on
functions such as rules surrounding safety and the certification of pilots and aircraft. It assumed
responsibility for the building and operation of the nation's system of lighted airways, a task
previously conducted by the Post Office Department [4]. The Department of Commerce
improved aeronautical radio communications, and introduced radio beacons as an effective aid
for air navigation.
The Aeronautics Branch was renamed the Bureau of Air Commerce to reflect its enhanced status
within the Department. As commercial flying increased, the Bureau expanded the ATC system
and the initial air traffic controllers used maps, blackboards, and mental calculations to ensure
the safe separation of aircraft traveling along designated routes between departure and arrival
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the National Airspace
locations. Then in 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act transferred the federal civil aviation
responsibilities from the Commerce Department to a new independent agency, the Civil
Aeronautics Authority (CAA). The legislation also expanded the government's role by giving the
CAA the power to regulate airline fares and to determine the routes that air carriers would serve
[4]. Soon after, President Franklin Roosevelt split the CAA into two agencies, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The new CAA was
responsible for air traffic control (ATC), airman and aircraft certification, safety enforcement,
The CAB was entrusted with safety regulations, accident
and airway development.
investigation, and economic regulation of the airlines. Both organizations were components of
the Department of Commerce. However, unlike the CAA, the CAB functioned completely
independent of the Secretary of Commerce.
Just prior to United States' entry into World War II, the CAA began to extend its ATC
responsibilities to include departure and landing operations at airports. This expanded role
eventually became permanent after the war. The introduction of radar applications to ATC
operations helped controllers to advance as the postwar boom in commercial air transportation
increased. The approaching introduction of jet airliners and a series of midair collisions
launched passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. This legislation transferred the CAA's
functions to a new independent organization, the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), which had
broader authority to impede aviation hazards. The Act took responsibility of making safety rules
from the CAB and entrusted it to the FAA. Furthermore, it gave the FAA sole responsibility for
developing and maintaining a common civil-military system of air navigation and air traffic
control, a responsibility previously shared between the CAA and other interested parties.
Congress authorized the creation of a cabinet department that would combine major federal
transportation responsibilities, which is known today as the Department of Transportation
(DOT). The FAA gradually assumed responsibilities not originally devised by the Federal
Aviation Act, to include the field of aviation security and aircraft noise standards. By the mid1970s, the FAA achieved a semi-automated air traffic control system based on a combination of
radar and computer technology. To meet the challenge of traffic growth, mainly due to the
competitive market created by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the FAA unveiled the
National Airspace System (NAS) Plan in January 1982 [5]. The new plan required more
advanced systems for enroute and terminal ATC, modernized flight service stations, and
improvements in ground-to-air surveillance and communication.
The FAA's organizational structure has continually evolved to since its creation from a
centralized management system under which federal government officials exercised direct
control over programs in the field to a decentralization process that transferred much authority to
regional organizations. In the late 1990s, a re-organization structured the FAA along its seven
key lines of business in order to make better use of resources. This included the Office of
Commercial Space Transportation in which the FAA was responsible for regulatory
responsibilities concerning the launching of space payloads by the private sector. Following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress created a new Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) that succeeded the FAA as the agency with primary responsibility for civil
aviation security.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
The FAA addressed a wide variety of technical issues as the aviation industry continued to
rapidly evolve. The Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988 mandated greater emphasis on longrange research planning and on study of such issues as aging aircraft structures and human
factors affecting safety [3]. In February 1991, the FAA replaced the National Airspace System
Plan with the more comprehensive Capital Investment Plan (CIP). The new plan included higher
levels of automation as well as new radar, communications, and weather forecasting systems.
As the modernization program evolved, problems in developing ambitious automation systems
prompted a change in strategy. The FAA shifted its emphasis toward enhancing the air traffic
control system through more manageable, incremental improvements. One example is the use of
"Free Flight", an innovative concept aimed at providing greater flexibility to fly direct routes [3].
At the onset of the 21st Century, Free Flight's initial phase delivered benefits that added to the
efficiency of air transportation. At the same time, the FAA worked to push the application of the
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite technology to civil aeronautics. Similarly, the FAA's
current efforts to successfully integrate UAS into the NAS involve incremental steps with a very
systematic approach as well.
Definition - What is an Unmanned Aircraft System?
Unmanned aircraft are a product of the military. Their success in Iraq and Afghanistan in
support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) demonstrates their worth. Militaries
worldwide, are committing increasingly large funds to researching and acquiring these systems.
The investments and the technological advances made by military organizations have generated a
growing interest in their potential use for civil government, scientific research, and commercial
applications. However, the most significant barrier to the development of these markets is the
lack of access to civil airspace.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) are sometimes called "unmanned aerial vehicles, UASs,
remotely operated aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, or just unmanned aircraft" [3]. UASs
come in a variety of shapes, sizes, and purposes. They can have a wingspan as large as a Boeing
737 or be as small as a radio-controlled model airplane. Some are programmed to fly and
navigate a substantial part of the flight autonomously or by a computer program. Other
operations are flown entirely by an outside operator, referred to as the Pilot-in-Command.
Because no human pilot is actually onboard the aircraft, UASs must get information about their
external environment through electronic sensors. The input from the sensors is either processed
onboard, so the aircraft's computers can evaluate and monitor the flight environment and
forward the data to the Pilot-in-Command controlling the aircraft, or all information can be
processed on the ground normally from an operations center [6]
Generally, an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is any aircraft capable of flight without a
human on board. Does this include balloons, model aircraft, missiles? Civil Aviation
authorities, Department of Defense, International organizations, and various working groups all
have different definitions of what constitutes a UAS, yet none are universally accepted or
standard.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
CanadianDefinition: Section 101.01 of the CanadianAviation Regulations (CARs) states,
"UnmannedAir Vehicle" means a power driven aircraft, other than a model aircraft,that
is operatedwithout aflight crew-member on board [7].
FAA's Definition: Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (public vs. civil vs. model
aircraft)states that a UAS is the unmanned aircraft(UA) and all of the associatedsupport
equipment, control station, data links, telemetry, communications and navigation
equipment, etc., necessary to operate the unmanned aircraft [6]. An Unmanned Aircraft
System is a device used or intendedfor flight in the air that has no onboardpilot. This
includes all classes of airplanes, helicopters, airships, and translationallift aircraft that
have no onboardpilot. Unmanned aircraft are understood to include only those aircraft
controllable in three axes and therefore, exclude traditionalballoons [8].
Department of Defense: A powered aerialvehicle that does not carry a human operator,
uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted
remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethalpayload
[9].
U.S. Army's Definition: The acronym UAS refers to the system as a whole (unmanned
aircraft [UA], payload, and all direct support equipment). Direct support equipment
includes the ground control station (GCS), ground data terminal (GDT), launch and
recovery (L/R) system, transport and logistics vehicles, operators and maintainers, unit
leadership, and others. The acronym UA refers to the unmanned aircraft exclusively and
does not include the payload unless stated otherwise [10]. The Army tends to use the terms
UAS and UA V interchangeablywhen referringto systems definedpreviously as UAS.
Since the scope of this thesis addresses UAS issues in the military, civil, and commercial
communities, the following definition will be used to strike a balance:
"Unmanned aircraftoperate without an on-boardpilot or crew. Unmanned aircraft can
either be remotely controlled from the ground by an operator or preprogrammed to
conduct the entireflight without intervention. In addition to the UAS, other components,
such as a controlfacility, data links, and any other apparatus,all combine to create an
unmanned aircraftsystem (UAS) " [ 11].
Unmanned Aircraft System Technology - A Historical Perspective
There have been several instances of UASs in past military conflicts beginning with the use of
During war-time eras new
unmanned balloons in Europe in the eighteenth century.
developments in unmanned technology emerged, and then subsided again during peacetime often
due to lack of practical application for civil use. In the 1930s and leading up to the second
World War, the interest in UASs re-emerged for the purpose of target practice to train antiaircraft gunners in both Britain and the United States [2]. However, Germany made the greatest
advances in UAS development during WWII with the V-1 bomber, an aircraft capable of
autonomous control. Following this success, during both the Korean and Vietnam wars, the
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
United States focused their UAS technological advances on surveillance capabilities, and today
this is still the primary mission of the UAS.
After Vietnam, the United States went back to the peacetime trend of both reduced funding and
interest for projects involving military technology and saw no value in UAS technology possibly
having civil applications. Simultaneously, other countries continued to develop UAS technology
with Israel in particular pioneering several new vehicles that were eventually integrated into the
fleets of other countries between the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the first Gulf War, the
United States utilized UAS technology again and there was a large interest in the capabilities of
UAS and the expanded usage beyond just surveillance. The mass media exposure and increased
interest in UAS technology catapulted the military's use of UASs into the public view during the
current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, some scientists recognized the success of
UASs in military operations, the value of UASs, and the possibility of prospective applications in
the civil and commercial sectors. However, due to limitation on the movement of UASs within
the National Airspace System, these ideas were difficult to translate into reality, so the majority
of progress with UAS technology has remained within the military community.
The United States Armed Forces have all embraced the usage of UAS technology in the
battlefield environment with the U.S. Army taking the lead. The Army has taken bold steps in
integrating UAS technology into the operational structure of daily airspace coordination.
Initially, UASs were used only for reconnaissance/surveillance pictures and video feeds in
advanced preparation for missions not during mission execution. A new demand has emerged
which includes "providing tactical commanders near-real time, highly accurate, Reconnaissance,
Surveillance and Target Acquisition. This mission is growing to include weaponization,
communications relay, specialty payloads, small unmanned aircraft systems, and the linkage to
manned aircraft" [12]. As a result, in December 2006 the Army Transformation plan specified
that UASs would be organized and managed in Modular Combat Brigades, within the Special
Troops Battalion (STB), and under the Military Intelligence Company (MICO). This proved very
quickly to be an unsuccessful organizational structure for UASs. Several issues emerged as
Military Intelligence Company Commanders tried to maintain command and control of their
UASs, the associated maintenance and logistics requirements, and the exponential increase in
demand of UAS support for combat operations dictated directly from the Division Headquarters.
The UASs seemed out of place and also out of control in the MICO as the demand for real-time
imagery, video, analysis, and rapid action increased. Along with an increase in demand, UAS
technology advanced with varying sizes, capabilities, and associated system equipment
requirements, resulting in numerous UASs invading military airspace. As a result, the Army
adjusted its Transformation Plan and reorganized UASs under the Aviation Brigade. Since
Aviation Brigades are self-sufficient (maintenance, logistics, etc.), not organic to the Modular
Combat Brigades (ground troops), and receive all missions and directions from their immediate
higher command, the Division Headquarters, the UASs fit right into the maintenance, logistical,
and operational flow of the Aviation Brigade. This strategic move enabled the UAS mission to
evolve rapidly and reply more effectively to the need for rapid responsiveness to today's modem
threat in combat as seen in both Operation Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.
Besides the maintenance and logistical aspects of UASs aligning with the Aviation Brigades, the
Aviation Brigade Commander (06/Colonel) also provides a more efficient command and control
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
of UAS missions. An Aviation Brigade Commander has a large staff of operational, analytical,
and planning individuals, which does not exist in the MICO for a Company Commander
(03/Captain). The most recent effort to streamline the integration of UASs into the Aviation
world while still maintaining the technical and analytical expertise of the Military Intelligence
Community is the introduction of the newest Aviation Battalion - Task Force ODIN (Observer,
Detect, Identify, Neutralize). Chartered in August 2006, first employed in February 2007 in the
2 5 th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) in Tikrit Iraq, Task Force (TF) ODIN is a high priority
Army Vice Chief of Staff Initiative, driven by the critical requirements to "win back the roads"
using Army Aviation assets to maintain a persistent stare over demonstrated at-risk areas for
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) [13]. This unit consists of a network of UASs, ten
modified C12 surveillance planes, ground stations, and approximately 100 soldiers all to spot
and destroy IEDs and the people who plant them [14]. Integration into the 2 5 th CAB facilitated
the development of the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for both piloted and
unpiloted Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting, and Acquisition (RSTA) assets in TF ODIN
to team with the 25 th CAB's piloted rotary wing aircraft across the battle-space to detect,
illuminate, designate, and engage valid targets with the weapon systems of the 2 5 th CAB
helicopters. Tremendous synergy is created by this manned-unmanned teaming of Army
Aviation assets in the Counter-IED flight, increasing the kinetic effects of the 25th CAB, while
allowing the rotary wing aircraft to engage from standoff ranges and thereby improving aircraft
survivability and reducing the threat to the pilot in the loop. These manned-unmannedteamings
or more recently coined Sensor-to-Shooter TTPs will pave the way for additional aviation
organizations, systems and platforms to maintain a preeminent role in counterinsurgency
campaigns like the one being fought in Iraq today. General (Ret.) Richard Cody (Former Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army) acknowledged the tremendous success of integrating UASs into the
Aviation Brigade in Iraq:
"ODIN is a one-of-a-kind,proof-of-principle outfit that we built... We are moving
UASs to Afghanistan to the aviation brigade to replicate the same capabilities
that we have learnedfrom ODIN" [13].
The next step underway is to continue improving UAS, video, and bandwidth capabilities so that
operators and pilots no longer have to rely on receiving data by voice, but instead can transmit
the UAS video feed directly into the cockpit of Army helicopters.
The technology generated as a result of war-time development have all launched a side benefit to
society as a whole. WWI yielded the biplane and aircraft carriers, which fostered significant
growth in the Aviation and logistical support industries for both military and civilian sectors.
WWII further expanded the Aviation realm with the advent of helicopters, jet engines, and
missile technology. Korea launched the air ambulance and expanded helicopter usage within the
military community, which all directly translated into the civil community adopting the use of
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters as well. Vietnam ushered in the further expansion
of helicopter technology with the introduction of attack helicopters and also remarkable medical
advances for trauma. The first Gulf War (Desert Storm) launched "beyond line of sight"
technology and the digital command post, which began the transition into the digital-world as we
now know it. Finally, with the incidents surrounding September 11, 2001 and the current
ongoing conflict in the Middle East, UAS is the new focus. The military has the opportunity to
TransformationPlanningfor IntegratingUnmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
fully utilize this technology and there is unlimited potential for UAS operations to merge into the
civil and commercial markets in the near future.
Interest in Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Interest in UASs continues to grow worldwide. Recent advances in computer technology,
software development, light weight materials, global navigation, advanced data links,
sophisticated sensors, and component miniaturization are strengthening capabilities and fueling
the demand for UASs. Currently, there are at least 32 countries developing UASs and the
projected spending and Research and Development (R&D) continues to increase over the next
decade (see Figure 1 below).
World UAV Forecast
2008
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Figure 1: World IAS Forecast 1151
Of these, the United States is leading in terms of the size, variety, and sophistication of UAS
systems, with Israel at a close second as they have a very strong market for its military UASs,
some of which have been purchased by the United States for military and homeland security.
The U.S. Army has demonstrated significant strides towards integrating UASs into full spectrum
operations, to include airspace integration with piloted aircraft. This essentially paves the way
for civil and commercial applications of UASs to emerge in the National Airspace System.
Furthermore, the Army's integration of UASs into the Military Aviation community greatly
enhanced the safety of UAS flight and also required that the UAS community comply with flight
standards, processes, and procedures required for piloted aircraft. As a result, even with the
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
rapid increase in UAS flight hours, the accident rate has decreased greatly since its integration
into the Military Aviation Community and abiding by the respective safety protocols (See Figure
2 for UAS Program Summary below).
UAS Program Summary
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Figure 2:' "AS Accid(lent Rate & Monthly Flight Htours I 16
This demonstrates a significant step towards fully integrating UASs into the civil aviation
community and the National Airspace System, rather than leaving UASs to operate as an
exception. The question is whether the current state of UAS operations within the military
community can successfully translate into the civilian and commercial sectors and operate safely
within the National Airspace.
Issues Surrounding Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UASs are rapidly being developed and deployed and there are currently 5,331 unmanned aircraft
in the U.S. Military inventory - almost double the amount of piloted military aircraft [17]. In
February 2007, the FAA published a UAS policy to outline how these aircraft can be used in the
National Airspace System [18]. The rules vary depending on if the UAS is operated as a public
aircraft (operated by the government) or as a civil aircraft. Public aircraft operate under
individual waivers or Certificates of Authorization (COAs), which are issued after an FAA
review of the program and its safety protocols. The FAA issued 102 COAs in 2006, 85 in 2007,
and 164 in 2008. As of February 23 2009, the agency has issued 17 COAs and has 62
applications pending [19]. Civil aircraft must operate under experimental airworthiness
certificates.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
At issue is the fact that there is no FAA certification or regulatory standards for operating UASs
in the National Airspace System. Instead, the FAA issues COAs for each and every UAS
operation. The COA establishes limitations and requirements intended to prevent accidents
between UASs and piloted aircraft. However, many stakeholders within the enterprise feel that
UASs need to meet the same certification and operational standards as piloted aircraft, and they
must fit into the existing National Airspace System without any negative impact on general
aviation operations.
With the exception of UASs, there is not an aircraft operating in the NAS today that has not
complied with strict Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) governing its certification and
maintenance. And again, with the exception of UAS operators, there is not a pilot operating
today that has not undergone rigorous pilot certification training and testing.
Pilots also comply with very strict FAA general operating and flight rules as outlined in the
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), including the FAA's important see and avoid mandate.
These regulations provide the historical foundation of the FAA regulations governing the
aviation system. The three major issues that UASs fail to comply with in regard to the FAA
regulation CFR91 include See andAvoid, Command and Control, andAirworthiness:
See and Avoid: A key requirement for routine access to the NAS is UAS compliance
with CFR 91.113, Right-of-Way Rules: Except Water Operations. This section contains the
phrase, see and avoid, and is the primary restriction to normal operations of UASs. The intent of
see and avoid is for pilots to use their eyes (as sensors) and other tools to find and maintain
situational awareness of other air traffic and to yield the right-of-way, in accordance with the
rules, when there is a traffic conflict. Since the purpose of this regulation is to avoid mid-air
collisions, this should be the focus of technological efforts to address the issue as it relates to
UASs rather than trying to mimic and/or duplicate human vision. Meaningful sense and avoid
(S&A) performance must alert the operator to local air traffic at ranges sufficient for reaction
time and avoidance actions by safe margins. Furthermore, UAV operations beyond Line-ofSight (LOS) may require an automated sense and avoid system due to potential communications
latencies or failures.
The FAA does not provide a quantitative definition of see and avoid, largely due to the number
of combinations of pilot vision, collision vectors, sky background, and aircraft paint schemes
involved in seeing oncoming traffic. Having a sufficient field of regard (FOR) for a UAS sense
and avoid system is fundamental to meeting the goal of assured air traffic separation.
Interestingly, the FAA does provide a cockpit field of regard recommendation in its Advisory
Circular 25.773-1, but the purpose of AC 25.773-1 does not specifically mention see and avoid.
Although an ambiguous issue, one fact is completely clear - the challenge with the sense and
avoid requirement is based on a capability constraint, not a regulatory one. Therefore, a possible
definition for sense and avoid systems emerges: Sense and avoid is the onboard, self-contained
ability to:
= Detect traffic that may be a conflict
=
Evaluate flight paths
=
Determine traffic right-of-way
~II
s_
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
= Maneuver well clear according to the rules in CRF91.113, or
= Maneuver as required in accordance with CFR91.111.
Once the "sense " portion of sense and avoid is satisfied, the UAS must use this information to
execute an avoidance maneuver. The latency between seeing and avoiding for the pilot of a
manned aircraft ranges from 10 to 12.5 seconds according to FAA and DoD studies [20]. If
relying on a ground operator to see and avoid, the UAS incurs the same human latency, but adds
the latency of the data link bringing the image to the ground for a decision and the avoidance
command back to the UAS. This added latency can range from less than a second for line-ofsight links to more for satellite links.
Closely tied to see and avoid, is the issue of UAS reliability. This refers to UAS mishaps, which
as discussed previously are much greater than manned aircraft mishaps (See Figure 2).
Improving reliability is necessary for winning the confidence of various stakeholders such as the
general public, the acceptance of other aviation constituencies (airlines, general aviation,
business aviation, etc.), and the willingness of the FAA to accept UAS flight. Acceptance of
UAS operations by the FAA also should lead to acceptance by international (ICAO) and foreign
civil aviation authorities of UAS operations. Such acceptance will greatly facilitate obtaining
over-flight and landing privileges when the United States military's larger, endurance UASs
deploy in support of contingencies. In addition, acceptance will save time and resources within
both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the FAA by providing one standardized, rapid
process for granting flight clearances. Finally, acceptance will encourage the use of UASs in
civil and commercial applications, resulting in potentially lower acquisition costs to military
UAS procurement programs and eventually demonstrate the same trend with a UASs explosion
in the civil and commercial sectors as well.
Command and Control: In general, the two main areas of concern when considering link
security surrounds inadvertent or hostile interference during the uplink and downlink process.
The uplink controls the activities of the UAS platform itself and the payload hardware. This
command and control link requires a sufficient degree of security to ensure that only authorized
agents have access to the control mechanisms of the platform, which is an imperative for flights
in the NAS given the events of September 11, 2001. The return or downlink transmits critical
data from the UAS platform payload to the war-fighter or analyst on the ground or in the pilot in
the air. System health and status information must also be delivered to the ground control station
or UAS operator without compromise.
The air navigation environment is changing partly due to the demands of the increase in aircraft
activity in the NAS. In order to maintain control, ATC has reduced allowances for deviation
from intended flight paths and encouraging the usage of standard departure and arrival
procedures. This provides another means for increasing air traffic capacity as airways and
standard departures and approaches can be constructed with less separation. As tolerances for
navigational deviation decrease, the need to precisely maintain course increases. All aircraft
must ensure that they have robust navigational means (i.e. GPS, VHF Omni-directional Range or
VOR, Automatic Direction Finder or ADF). Historically, this robustness has been achieved by
the installation of redundant navigational systems. The need for dependable, precise navigation
reinforced the redundancy requirements. The Federal Radio Navigation Plan, signed March
2002, established the following national policies [22]:
TransformationPlanningfor IntegratingUnmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
-
Un-augmented, properly certified GPS is approved as a primary system for use in
oceanic and remote airspace.
-
Properly certified GPS is approved as a supplemental system for domestic en route and
terminal navigation, and for non-precision approach and landing operations.
-
The FAA's phase-down plan for ground-based Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) retains
at least a minimum operational network of ground-based NAVAIDS for the foreseeable
future.
-
Sufficient ground-based NAVAIDS will be maintained to provide the FAA and the
airspace users with a safe recovery and sustained operations capability in the event of a
disruption in satellite navigation service.
These policies apply, as a minimum, to all aircraft flying in civil airspace. With GPS, the
prospect for relief of complete redundancy requirements in piloted aircraft may be an option in
the future. However, UASs have a diminished prospect for relief since, unlike piloted aircraft, a
UAS cannot readily fallback on dead reckoning, contact navigation, and map reading in the same
sense that a pilot can.
Airworthiness: The FAA's airworthiness regulations are meant to ensure that aircraft are
built and maintained so as to minimize their hazard to aircrew, passengers, and people and
property on the ground. Airworthiness is concerned with the material and construction integrity
of the individual aircraft and the prevention of it coming apart in mid-air and/or causing damage
to people or property on the ground.
FAA regulations do not require public aircraft (government-owned or operated) to be certified
airworthy to FAA standards. Because most non-military public aircraft are versions of aircraft
previously certified for commercial or private use, the only public aircraft not related to FAA
certification standards in some way are almost always military aircraft. Instead, these aircraft are
certified through the military's internal airworthiness certification/flight release processes.
There are five self-certifying agencies recognized in the United States - the Army, Navy, Air
Force, NASA, and the FAA. Military UASs follow the well-established airworthiness
certification processes. The Army requirement is defined in the Army Regulation (AR) 70-62 as
"a demonstrated capability of an aircraft or aircraft subsystem or component to function
satisfactorily when used and maintained within prescribed limits". As shown in Table 1, the
certifying official for Army Aircraft is the Commanding General (CG) at the United States Army
Aviation and Missile Command (USAAMCOM) located in Huntsville Alabama. The Aviation
Engineering Directorate (AED) is an organization within USAAMCOM and is the compliance
agent. The CG at USAAMCOM is the approving authority for the airworthiness of Army
aircraft for which USAAMCOM has the engineering cognizance and he then delegates this
responsibility to the Aviation Engineering Directorate.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Civil (14 CFR) Process
Public (OSS&E)
Process
Airline
Major
Command
Major Command
(MAJCOM)
Certification Authority
FAA
Commanding General,
United States Army
Aviation and Missile
Command
(USAAMCOM)
Compliance Agent
FAA or designee
Aviation Engineering
Directorate
Maintenance/ Operational
Criteria
14 CFR Parts 43, 91, 121, 135,
145
AR70-92
Certification Criteria
14 CFR Parts 23, 25, 33
Airworthiness
Certification Criteria
(MIL-HDBK-516A)
Customer
Table 1: (Ci il and Public Parallels in Certification
The Army Airworthiness Process is illustrated in Figure 3 and involves the aircraft requirements
from the specific Program Manager (PM), the development of the Airworthiness Qualification
Plan (AQP) and the Airworthiness Qualification Specifications (AQS), the negotiations for
substantial methods and data to be used in the AQS, the testing and analysis phase, the
development of aircraft and component test plans, the complete testing and addressing problems
during the testing phase, the test flight release (TFR), test results delivered to AED, AED review
of results, and finally issuing the Statement of Airworthiness Qualification (SAQ).
Transformation Planningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
'igure 3: Arny
Airvworthiness Process 1231
A Tri-Service memorandum of agreement describes the responsibilities and actions associated
with mutual acceptance of airworthiness certifications for piloted aircraft and UAS within the
same certified design configuration, performance envelope, parameters, and usage limits
certified by the originating Service. Similar to piloted military aircraft, unmanned military
aircraft are also subject to the airworthiness certification and flight release process. The
operational requirements for UAS operations in civil airspace specify that flight over populated
areas must not raise airworthiness concerns. Therefore, UAS standards cannot vary widely from
those for piloted aircraft without raising public and regulatory concerns. There are three levels
of authorization for UAS flight which vary from certification standards equivalent to piloted
aircraft and those with a minimum acceptable level of safety for small UAS and not equivalent to
aircraft, yet all require a UAS Flight Release which is obtained through the airworthiness process
described previously. Level 1 certifies to standards equivalent to piloted aircraft yet tailored for
UASs, so it has minimum reliability requirements equivalent to General Aviation. Level 2
authorizes standards less stringent than those for piloted systems and is the lowest level of
classification for UASs with weapon systems. Level 3 authorizes to a minimum acceptable level
of safety for small UASs, targets, drones, and R&D assets yet it requires AED review and
appropriate risk-level approval. Army UAS platforms by type, what airspace they currently
operate in, and at what level of authorization is listed in Figure.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
National
Airspace
FAA Class
DE G
AB C,0
Max
Max
Regulatory
Weight
Speed
Guidance
(Ibs)
(kts)
Sovereign
U1
Existing
Army
Int'l
Airspace
Med/Large
Fixed Wing
ERIMP,
Hunter
Part 23, 25
>1320
>200
Med/Large
Rotary Wing
Fire Scout
(Class-IV)
Part 27, 29
>1320
NIA
Light
F/W and R1W
Shadow,
Class-Ill
Sport
Aircraft 1
Up to
1320
200
Small I Mini
/Micro
Raven,
SUAV,
Up to 55
120
F/W and RlW
Class -II
DoD Airspace
-
Resttced
Lv1
L
I
L
Shp
Controlled
Areas &
Combat
Zones
Lvel1
Lvl 2
Le1
2
Ultralight
AMA
Figure :
IAS
F'lght !Authorizationltvels I231
The problem the FAA faces is that UASs challenge this historic foundation because they operate
by remote control and without an onboard pilot, which is unlike any other aircraft in the airspace
system. As a result, the FAA continues to grant COAs in lieu of creating new regulations for the
UAS community.
Recently this has become a significant issue due to civil security agencies operating these
unregulated UASs in the National Airspace System without the FAA introducing regulations to
dictate UAS operations in the NAS. For example, the FAA is working with urban police
departments in Houston and Miami on pilot test programs involving unmanned aircraft. The
goal is to begin identifying the challenges that UASs will bring into this environment and what
type of operations can safely be conducted by civil law enforcement. The FAA granted COAs to
authorize the Houston Police Department to conduct one demonstration flight, which took place
on November 16, 2007. Operations were limited to a radius of two nautical miles from a specific
point in an unpopulated area. The agency continues to work with the Miami-Dade Police
Department on their proposal for UAS demonstration flights. Most likely, a COA would permit
a limited number and type of tests in an unpopulated area near the Everglades, and eventually
provide a way to continue flights for training purposes [19]. Such UAS operations have resulted
in large-scale flight restrictions while subverting progress toward regulations and proper
integration of the UAS into the National Airspace System. Flight restrictions prohibit flights
within a specific area of airspace defined by ground references and are in effect for stated dates
and times. Flight restrictions for UAS operations are generally inefficient, restrict other airspace
users, and a short-term approach to addressing the important operational and safety issues
surrounding the integration of UASs in the NAS. Overall, the COA process is lengthy,
laborious, inefficient, and does not support the Army's need for a robust UAS training program.
Although the FAA is utilizing COAs for current UAS operations, it is also working with various
agencies on an incremental approach to develop policies and procedures to address UAS
operational issues in the NAS.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
The introduction of UASs into the NAS is a challenging enterprise for the FAA and the aviation
community as a whole. UAS proponents have a growing interest in expediting access to the
NAS. There is an increase in the number and scope of UAS flights in an already busy NAS. The
design of many UASs makes them difficult to see, and adequate detect, sense and avoid
technology is years away. Decisions being made about UAS airworthiness and operational
requirements must fully address safety implications of UASs flying in the same airspace as
piloted aircraft, and perhaps more importantly, aircraft with passengers.
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)
Section 2: Architecting the Enterprise
Vision
The joint efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Federal Aviation
Administration (OSD-FAA) must develop policies, procedures, and an approval process to
enable operations of Unmanned Aircraft Systems [24]. Their vision is to have "File and Fly"
(F&F) access for appropriately equipped UASs while maintaining an equivalent level of safety
(ELOS) to that of an aircraft with a pilot onboard [21]. For military operations, UASs will
operate with piloted aircraft in and around airfields using concepts of operation that make on or
off-board distinctions transparent to air traffic control authorities and airspace regulators. The
operations tempo at mixed airfields will not be diminished by the integration of UASs. Positive
aircraft control must be assured through secure communications and established procedures for
UASs operating in the NAS.
The OSD-FAA has established certain guiding principles in pursuit of this vision, which include
[21]:
Do no harm: "Avoid new initiatives; enacting regulations for the military user that would
adversely impact.
1. The military's right to self-certify aircraft and aircrews
2. Air traffic control practices or procedures
3. Piloted aviation continuous operations (CONOPs) or tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs); or unnecessarily restrict civilian or commercial
flights.
Where feasible, leave 'hooks' in place to facilitate the adaptation of these regulations for civil
use. This also applies to recognizing that 'one size does NOT fit all' when it comes to
establishing regulations for the wide range in size and performance of DoD UASs."
Conform rather than create: "Interpret the existing Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) (formerly known as Federal Aviation Regulations, or FARs) to also cover unmanned
aviation and avoid the creation of dedicated UAS regulations as much as possible. The goal is to
achieve transparent flight operations in the NAS."
Establish the precedent: "Although focused on domestic use, any regulations enacted will
likely lead and/or conform to similar regulations governing UAS flight in International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and foreign airspace."
As a result, the joint OSD-FAA effort focuses on enabling routine access to the NAS by
leveraging existing procedures for piloted flight operations and using current guidance for unique
military operations as a path for NAS integration [42]. Furthermore, the OSD-FAA plans to
define the standards for DoD sense and avoid (S&A) system and finally demonstrate the F&F
process and S&A system in a serious of UAS flights among FAA regions.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Strategic Objectives
The driving forces in the external environment of the National Airspace enterprise include a very
high operational tempo of the United States Army Aviation assets and subsequent aircraft
maintenance. Additionally, as previously stated the demand for UAS technology as a fully
integrated asset into daily combat and peacetime operations is expanding and will continue to
expand long into the future. Based on current guidance, this expansion will not result in a
corresponding increase in access to additional civil airspace. This represents a significant
challenge to the successful expansion of UAS operations for the military as they continue to
expand the usage of UASs in Iraq and Afghanistan, then require additional airspace in the NAS
for sustainment and continuation training as units redeploy from the current conflict.
Furthermore, as the civil and commercial demand for UAS usage increases, this is an additional
group of stakeholders who will push for access to the NAS.
At the Department of the Army (DA), the DoD, and national levels, there are cycles in terms of
priorities and resources. The aviation component of the Army has been resourced significantly
well to support on-going operations. As experienced in the early part of the current decade,
significant increases in operational and maintenance requirements for Army Aviation related
equipment, to include the emergence of increased UAS usage, were not matched with adequate
resources. Currently, the defense industry is generally meeting the demands for operational and
logistical support of UAS activity at the strategic and tactical level in support of the current
conflict in the Middle East. However, demand analysis has shown that the dynamics can have
drastic effect with changes in this environment.
Strategic Objectives for the National Airspace System:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Increased safety
Greater capacity
International leadership
Organizational excellence
Enterprise Layout - U.S. National Airspace System
The National Airspace System (NAS) is the network of United States airspace, which includes
air navigation facilities, equipment, services, airports or landing areas, aeronautical charts,
information/services, rules, regulations, procedures, technical information, manpower, and
material [25]. Included are system components shared jointly with the military. The system's
present configuration is a reflection of the technological advances concerning speed and altitude
capability of jet aircraft, as well as the complexity of microchip and satellite-based navigational
equipment. To conform to international aviation standards, the United States adopted the
primary elements of the airspace classification system developed by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) as shown in Figure 5.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
I Airspace Classification
1,ilisii
;Y
(
ill the NASS 1"25!
fil
br ;h.iioi
The NAS is one of the most complex aviation systems in the world consisting of thousands of
people, procedures, facilities, and pieces of equipment that enables safe and expeditious air travel
in the United States and over large portions of the world's oceans. The NAS requires 14,500 air
traffic controllers, 4,500 aviation safety inspectors, and 5,800 technicians to operate and maintain
services. It has more than 19,000 airports and 600 air traffic control facilities with over 41,000
NAS operational facilities. In addition, there are over 71,000 pieces of equipment, ranging from
radar systems to communication relay stations and approximately 50,000 flights each day utilize
the NAS (see Figure 6) [26].
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Figur
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6: A Ia
\orth of I raffic in the inited Stites 1271
's W\
In today's National Airspace System, air traffic control depends on voice communications to
relay a wide array of critical information between aircrews and controllers. The use of voice
communication is labor intensive and limits the ability of the NAS to effectively meet future
traffic demand. In order to achieve the vision and meet the strategic objectives previously
discussed, Data Communications (Data Comm) will assume an ever-increasing role in controller
to flight crew communication, contributing significantly to increased efficiency, capacity, and
safety of the National Airspace. The evolution of Data Comm in the operational environment
will be based upon the incremental implementation of advanced communication capabilities.
Data Comm represents the first phase of the transition from the current analog voice system to an
ICAO compliant system in which digital communication becomes an alternate and eventually
predominant mode of communication. As depicted in Figure 7, the operations and services
enabled by Data Comm will allow air traffic controllers to manage more traffic, increase the
capacity of the NAS, increase airspace user efficiency, enhance safety, and evolve into a high
performance airspace - all strategic objectives of the enterprise.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
a0
Figure 7: Vision of a Iigh PIerformance Airspace 1281
External: When examining the National Airspace System, there are several external entities that
must be considered and should be satisfied. These are stakeholders who have a significant
influence on the internal participants, can impose constraints, or request services but do not have
direct control. The following comprises a list of those external to the enterprise:
Applicant: The issue at hand is integration of UAS into the NAS and the applicant consists of
someone who is applying for a Certificate of Authorization (COA) for a new UAS in order to
access the NAS. The applicant remains external to the enterprise layout. Once they are granted
a COA and access the NAS with a UAS, they then become end users and are internal to the
enterprise.
FederalAviation Administration (FAA): The FAA's primary mission is the safety, security, and
efficiency of the National Airspace System. It is a highly complex and large organization and
there are a few specific offices within the organizational structure that are directly involved in
the integration of UAS into the NAS as external players. See the organizational chart in Figure 8
for an overview of the FAA's structure.
TransformationPlanningfor IntegratingUnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
PIEDERAL AVIATION
ADMNISTRATIO
Figure 8: FAA's Organizational Structure [291
The Air Traffic Airspace (ATA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (UAS) is the primary group
within the FAA that deals with reviewing proposed UAS applications and works with the
Unmanned Aircraft Program Office (UAPO) on actually approving applicants seeking a
Certificate of Authorization (COA). Since the ATA UAS coordinates with applicants and is
involved in the review and granting of COAs, they remain as an external component of the
enterprise.
Internal: Those stakeholders who must be considered and satisfied and represent those who are
internal to the specified enterprise primary boundary. Internal entities are normally primary
participants in the NAS and they have some ability to control aspects of the enterprise design and
operation.
NAS users are mainly military, civil, commercial, and private pilots who access the airspace
whether controlled or uncontrolled.
UAS end users are mainly DoD associated organizations, such as the Army, Air Force, and the
Navy who all have various types of UASs. There are a select few civil organizations that are
also considered end users on a very limited basis, such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and various local police
organizations who have been granted limited COAs to fly UAS in the NAS.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
FAA Offices that deal with the end users once they receive an approved COA regarding
certification and integration of their UAS into the NAS. These organizations within the FAA
include the Aviation Safety Division (AVS), the Aircraft Certification Service (AIR), and the
UnmannedAircraft Programoffice (UAPO).
Extended network: This portion of the enterprise consists of those stakeholders who should be
considered and might be satisfied. Furthermore, it is an area when discussing the enterprise for
those with an identified interest and who may, under specific conditions, influence one or more
of the internal stakeholders.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is an organization that falls under the United
Nations agency concerned with civil Aviation issues. ICAO works to achieve its vision of safe,
secure, and sustainable development of civil aviation through cooperation amongst its member
States.
General Public Interest represents anyone living within the National Airspace boundaries
whether participants or non-participants, who are concerned with achieving the full benefits of
UAS operations while still preserving safety through effective mitigation of risks with the least
possible restrictions.
Various NAS User Associations: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), Airline Pilots
Association, Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI)
Potential Civil and Commercial Market End Users: such as the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), Department of Transportation (DOT), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP),
United Parcel Service (UPS), etc.
Figure 9 is an illustration to summarize the enterprise network and each component.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Extended Network
Figure 9: Enterprise Network
Enterprise system issues
When discussing UAS technology, it is important to first address the notion that replacing a
human pilot with technology increases the risk involved. The general public perception that a
UAS is more dangerous than a piloted aircraft can be mitigated by recognizing that a UAS
possesses the following inherent advantages, which contribute to flying safety:
=-
Many piloted aircraft mishaps occur during the take-off and landing phases of flight, when
human decisions and control inputs are substantial factors. Robotic aircraft are not
programmed to take chances; either preprogrammed conditions are met to land, or the
system goes around.
= Since human support systems are not carried, mishaps from failed life support systems
(oxygen, pressure, temperature, etc.) will not occur.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
-
Smoke from malfunctioning, but non-vital, onboard systems do not pose the same threat of
loss. Smoke in the cockpit of a piloted aircraft can distract operators and lead to obscured
vision or breathing difficulties.
=>
Automated take-offs and landings eliminate the need for pattern work, resulting in reduced
exposure to mishaps, particularly in the area surrounding main operating bases.
The preceding points are useful to keep in mind when considering the various technology issues
surrounding airspace integration of UASs. It is also important to remember that 14 CFR Part 91
does not directly prohibit military UASs from flying as long as they can comply with existing
regulations [21]. This makes such compliance a technical rather than exclusively a regulatory
issue.
Allowing routine and safe access of UASs to the National Airspace involves numerous issues
that touch on nearly every aspect of the Enterprise. These issues are organized into five major
groupings: safety, security, regulations/standardizations, air traffic/integration, socio-economic,
and leadership. An expanded discussion on the issues of safety and security is detailed below as
they most directly pertain to the scope of this thesis
Safety
In the past, UASs were treated like ground vehicles with all safety measures maintained on the
ground side of the FAA's Safety Center. Therefore, there was little to no Aviation culture within
the small UAS community, as they were treated more like a radio controlled model rather than
performing functions that the human would normally do - fly [30]. Humans still perform control
and visual tasks, but no longer actually fly or pilot the aircraft with the exception of those UASs
that require manual departures and landings. Successful integration of UASs in the National
Airspace will require assurances that they can safely operate within the constructs of a
commonly shared aviation system and environment. As such, UASs must demonstrate that they
do not pose an undue hazard to other aircraft or personnel on the ground. They must provide for
an equivalent level of safety to piloted aircraft. But defining this equivalency in terms of
requirements is difficult. UASs operate differently from piloted aircraft. And because the pilot
is no longer at risk in a UAS accident, the question arises as whether UAS systems can or should
be held to the same safety standard as piloted aircraft.
Safety risks are pervasive in the design and operations of any complex system and UASs are no
exception. Identifying, organizing, and defining the numerous individual safety risk factors and
their interrelationships is a difficult task. However safety is the most important issue
surrounding UASs flying in the National Airspace and this section will focus on the high-level
safety issues such as collision avoidance, system reliability, human factors, and weather.
Collision avoidance is chosen for its potential to result in catastrophic accidents, while system
reliability, human factors, and weather hazards are existing weak links [2].
The FAA's main concern about UAS operations in civil airspace is safety. It is critical that these
vehicles do not come too close to aircraft carrying people or compromise the safety of anyone on
the ground. Many in the aviation community have expressed concern over the safety of UASs
operating routinely in civil airspace. This concern is not completely unfounded. Based on the
military's experience, UASs initially had a poor safety record. However, as shown previously in
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Figure 2, examining the number of accidents per 100,000 flight hours monthly over each year,
UAS accident rates have recently decreased as flight hours increased. This demonstrates that as
technology matures, safety measures increase and less malfunctions occur. Compared to a
piloted aircraft, such as the Army's AH64D Longbow Apache, the Army's tactical UASs have a
greater rate of accidents. This can be attributed to the fact that the Apache helicopter is already a
mature technology in which pilot training, tactics, and maintenance standards are well
established. In contrast, the UAS is a relatively immature technology and such a rate is expected
at this technological level. However, UAS accident rates have demonstrated a downward trend
in the last couple of years (again reference Figure 2) since its integration into Army Aviation and
all flight standards associated with piloted aircraft.
The UAS community is aware of the safety concerns and has moved aggressively to improve this
record. They understand that any public trust and political support for UASs that exists today
will rapidly erode should a UAS be involved in a fatal accident in the air or on the ground,
regardless of fault. Therefore, safety remains foremost on the minds of manufacturers, operators,
airspace users, and regulators.
While much attention focuses on safety risks posed by UASs, considerably less attention is given
to potential safety benefits. Many of the new technologies and procedures being researched for
UASs have the potential to improve safety for both piloted aircraft and unmanned aircraft.
Advances in UAS automation, sensor detection systems, communications, data exchange
networks, and monitoring systems will have direct and positive influences on all aircraft. Much
of this is outlined in the DoD's UAS Roadmap [31 ].
While reliability, human factors, and weather, are all concerns, the most pressing safety concern
is collision avoidance, which is the problem of detecting and avoiding aircraft and other objects.
UASs must have a see and avoid capability, which is often referred to as sense and avoid or
detect and avoid. This ability to detect and safely steer clear of aircraft and other obstructions is
outlined for pilots in the FAA advisory circular 90-48C Pilot's role in collision avoidance. A
similar directive for UASs, outlined in FAA Directive 7610.4J, called Special Military
Operations states that UAS operations require the "comparable see and avoid requirementsfor
manned aircraft". Furthermore, FAR Part 91.113 Right of way rules states that regardless of
whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance
shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft [32].
To satisfy the requirements, all UASs must be able to reliably avoid collisions with all aircraft
both cooperative and non-cooperative at all times. This capability will fall to sensors that can
effectively detect aircraft that do not explicitly or actively make their presence known.
Interestingly, most of today's mid-air collisions occur during clear daylight and typically near
uncontrolled airports, which points to the human failings of the see and avoid requirements [33].
See and avoid is a challenge due to differences in human skills, abilities, and habits. Not all
pilots have the same visual acuity or depth perception, nor do they spend equal time looking out
the window and following consistent scanning techniques. Furthermore, the FAA indicates that
most mid-air collisions that occur in the conditions described previously are a result of an aircraft
overtaken by a faster aircraft. Such incidents account for less than one percent of all aviation
accidents, so out of approximately sixty million flights per year in the United States, there are on
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
average thirty mid-air collisions per year [34]. Although pilots have limited to no visibility to the
rear of their aircraft, a UAS can have a 360 degree viewing range depending on sensor type and
placement, which quite possibly gives the UAS a better collision avoidance system then a piloted
aircraft.
Work on sense and avoid standards is underway but beyond the difficulty of developing a
standard is the challenge of finding a sensor that could meet that standard. Most UAS optical
systems in use today require good weather, are susceptible to obscurants such as smog and
smoke, and the search rates are often slow and may not be sufficient for traffic detection. UASs
must also have a cooperative surveillance system such as a transponder, Traffic Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS), or Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). There
are numerous technology solutions being explored for sense and avoid systems. Some
researchers continue to work with existing sensors and surveillance technologies to see how they
may work in a UAS context. Others possibilities for smaller UASs hold promise due to
advances being made in miniaturization and subsystem capability improvements. With the
advent of high performing digital processors, field programmable gate-arrays, and radio
frequency and baseband analog electronics; small, low-cost, low-power radars may are also a
possibility [35]. Finally, there are others seeking novel ways to fuse information from these
sensors as well as to develop new sensor/surveillance technologies specifically designed for
UASs. The Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) and the Defense Research Associates developed a
model that calculates the detection range required to avoid a collision for both piloted aircraft
and unmanned aircraft to meet the FAA see and avoid requirement. The model allows variation
in sensor and target velocities; initial separation and look angle; latencies associated with
communications, decisions, and maneuvers; a safety factor (final miss distance); and specific
UAS maneuvering capabilities (flight speeds, climb rates, and turn rates as a function of
altitude). Directorate engineers applied this model to the Air Force's Global Hawk and Army's
Predator UAS to determine the detection requirements for a see and avoid system placed on each
of these platforms. After completing the requirements definition phase and flight demonstration
of an aircraft detection system, directorate engineers compared the results of both. The UAS air
traffic detection system performance exceeded that of a trained human pilot [36]. Recently,
AFRL and Northrop Grumman teamed to study attributes of a see and avoid sensing architecture
to define the way data is collected from various sensors and how such data could be fused to
create an integrated view of the airborne environment. They are also working collaboratively
with various government, associations, and industry organizations to address civil sensing
requirements under a newly formed Autonomous Flight Control Sensing Technology program.
This initiative will examine past mid-air accidents and compare them to airspace tasks for UAS
operations in the NAS.
Assuming that conflicts can be detected, whether by optical or electronic means, there remains
the issue of how the ground operator or vehicle itself reacts to avoid that conflict. Should the
UAS act autonomously or should the ground operator (or even the air traffic controller) redirect
the vehicle? Latencies associated with the air/ground communications link may also present a
problem. Despite the statistical rationale indicating low probabilities, numbers mean little when
it comes to public perception and political acceptance. One of the first necessary steps is to
develop a sensible baseline measure for a see and avoid requirement that can be translated into a
Minimum Performance Standard (MPS). This MPS should be sensitive to and flexible enough to
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
account for the range of UAS types, missions, and operating environments. Any requirement
evolving from an MPS should not be technology specific, nor should the requirement expect a
near-perfect system where none exists today. And because future UAS operations will involve
international boundary crossings, the requirement should be internationally adopted in ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and manuals. Encounter scenarios should be
detailed to validate the requirement, and costs and complexity must be factored in. The key issue
preventing acceptance of any collision avoidance requirement will probably not be technical in
nature, but rather involve issues of cost and implementation feasibility.
Another major challenge in developing a reasonable see and avoid requirement will be to address
the unique issues associated with small UASs. Because pilots flying aircraft will have a greater
difficulty in seeing these small vehicles, there may be an argument for the development of a
cooperative sensor/surveillance system that can assist both piloted aircraft and UAS
vehicles/operators in identifying and avoiding proximate traffic. Such a solution must be
sensitive to cost, weight, and power consumption so as to be acceptable to small-piloted aircraft
and small-unmanned aircraft. There is reason for optimism that see and avoid solutions will be
found for all UAS types. Research conducted and advances in existing technologies indicate that
detection devices will continue to diminish both in size and power requirements while
concurrently increasing in capability and affordability. New technologies being explored will
not only benefit the UAS community, but will migrate to piloted aircraft and may eventually
reduce the risk of collisions for all aircraft.
Security
The wide variation in flight environments, missions, and vehicle sizes makes the secure control
of UAS flights a unique challenge. Security requirements of the ground control station, data link
infrastructure, vehicle and even the data must be a fundamental consideration in system design
and operational policies and procedures of UASs. In addition to being vulnerable to security
breaches, UASs themselves are also a potential security threat. And as the cost of UAS systems
decrease and the capabilities improve, the wide availability of highly capable UASs could further
exacerbate security concerns.
The operation of UASs is generally conducted from ground-based facilities, which can vary in
size from small mobile units such as the U.S. Army's Raven to elaborate interconnected global
systems such as the U.S. Air Force's Global Hawk. This has prompted the development of
security requirements for these controlling facilities and becomes quite complex when ground
operations are distributed over various locations worldwide. The amount of security depends on
the size of the UAS, the airspace utilized, and the mission at hand. Large centralized operations
are obviously easier to secure and control than small, mobile facilities but the communication
infrastructure must also have built in redundancy to ensure that alternate paths exist as well.
UASs are dependent on ground-based links, which are often times widely distributed
These links are used for vehicle control, monitoring, and air traffic
geographically.
communications and can be vulnerable to jamming and interference or attempts to usurp control.
To prevent this, a system of high-integrity, secure data links between the aircraft, the ground
control stations, and air traffic facilities is fundamental to UAS operation in the NAS. Modern
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
encryption and authentication technology tools, including augmented versions, may mitigate the
issue. However, high power jamming will also pose a hazard even with modem encryption and
authentication technologies.
Communications security depends on the frequency used, the communications media, the
encryption technology employed, and the associative properties of the communication link.
Typically, encryption with a lower frequency and low bandwidth poses more of an issue than
with higher frequencies and high bandwidths. There is also a tradeoff concerning security,
performance, and cost - the higher the security, the less the performance, and the greater the cost.
The military has established technologies to ensure adequate encryption of Satellite
Communications (SATCOM) data links for its larger UASs. These systems tend to be expensive
and may not be available for civil use. It is possible, however, that some civil variant of the
military systems will be made available for UASs. Beyond the military systems, there are
number of encryption technologies available in the civil environment to enhance data-link
security, but many of these may not be available, effective, or practical for all the communication
links currently being explored for UASs. The security requirements of the communication
system and the components that it links should be considered at the beginning. This should
entail the production of a security policy that contains an evaluation of the threat to the system,
security level of the communication data, an assessment of the vulnerability of the system, and
requirements as to how the system should be protected.
The Department of Defense has a critical growing dependence on information systems that are
part of its network-centric environment. To address data security concerns, the DoD is
developing a suite of technologies and programs to prevent cyber attacks, while providing
managers of the information system an ability to see, counter, tolerate, and survive such attacks.
The Aviation community can adopt these programs from the military to protect data that will be
vital to future aviation operations to include UAS operations.
Data management initiatives are being designed to address data security and integrity issues. The
issue of data security and control is already being addressed as it affects modem piloted aircraft.
There is an increased reliance on navigational data for onboard systems, as well as other data
used for mission planning and dynamic updates. Controlling the data input process, where good
data may be intentionally altered prior to downloading into a UAS flight management system,
may be the greatest challenge.
UASs, especially the small UASs, are varied in the type of take-off and landing environments
and systems they use. Some UASs are capable of taking off vertically like a helicopter, launched
from building tops, projected from vehicles, or even hand launched. This versatility gives UASs
the opportunity to operate within virtually any environment, including urban areas. While this
operational flexibility is a plus, it also creates a security risk as surreptitious flights may be made
easier and UAS uses expand to include a platform for weapons systems. This threat poses issues
concerning the control of UAS operations and technologies and how this can be done without
imposing unnecessary restrictions on the market. There is a growing concern that advanced
technologies, specifically those pertaining to miniature sensors, advanced data links, and microminiature guidance and navigation components, will be used for nefarious activities [37]. The
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
use of UASs as weapons by terrorist or others may influence tighter controls that may result in
reduced or inhibited UAS capabilities and civil/commercial activities.
The issue of operational security and technology controls is, therefore, a law enforcement issue.
Restricting the use of UAS activities, or trying to regulate security, will do nothing to address the
issue. A person determined to use UASs for terrorism or other criminal activities will not seek
permission or obey any restrictions imposed by the government. The effect of such security
controls has a greater impact on hindering market expansion possibilities than on preventing
criminal acts. The issue to the UAS community is therefore one of supporting law enforcement
in developing plans to assist in identifying potentially nefarious activities. The government can
and should continue to prevent the proliferation of technologies that could be easily configured
for terrorist use, but this will becoming increasingly difficult as many of these technologies, or
close variants of them, become pervasive in the commercial markets.
Regulations and standardization applies across products, technology, & information
management. The absence of certification standards and regulations addressing UAS systems,
operations, and operator qualifications is also a significant issue that prevents progress in the
integration of UAS into the NAS. Finally, the lack of an effective and affordable collision
avoidance system capable of detecting non-transponder equipped aircraft is an essential step to
the future state of the NAS and UAS integration [2]. Much of this has been discussed
previously, but the main issue is the lack of consensus among stakeholders within the enterprise
on operational concepts, definitions, and classifications of UASs. A thorough understanding and
analysis of the enterprise stakeholders, their values, prioritization, and their interactions is
essential to a successful enterprise transformation.
Stakeholders and Value
Stakeholders
In any complex enterprise, there are numerous stakeholders representing a wide variety of needs
and values. Focusing on the enterprise level emphasizes the importance of being oriented
towards recognizing that all stakeholders are essential in the orientation of activities within a
given enterprise [38]. Similar to aerospace enterprises, the NAS enterprise is characterized by
the complexity of their stakeholders that often exhibit a high degree of interdependence, as well
as a complicated set of relationships that bind them together. Understanding the needs of all
stakeholders associated with the enterprise, their values, prioritization, and their influence or
control of enterprise activities is essential to the transformation process.
A stakeholder is "any group or individualwho directly or indirectly affects or is affected by the
level of achievement of an enterprise's value creation processes" [39]. The process of
identifying those relevant stakeholders within the enterprise for the creation of value and clear
boundaries is the first step. In his 2003 thesis Stakeholder Analysis in the Context of the Lean
Enterprise, Ignacio Grossi presents a stakeholder identification model that involves the
identification of potential stakeholders and determining the salience of those stakeholders to
evaluate whether it is reasonable to consider them for the analysis [40]. Furthermore, this
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
methodology identifies enterprise system level value, focal organization, and potential groups
through an iterative process.
This is a highly complex enterprise with numerous stakeholders involved. Not only are there
several stakeholders, but there are also such a wide variety of stakeholders - from the UAS
operator to the members of Congress. However due to the scope of this thesis, I will limit the
stakeholder discussion and analysis to those with the most significant impact on Army UAS and
their integration into the NAS. The following is a list of stakeholders identified using Grossi's
identification model, then scoped to include only those stakeholders within the boundary of those
involved in the Army UAS integration into the NAS effort:
Applicant: includes all product design and development teams as well as support personnel and
resources; not necessarily the "end user"; examples include AAI, Aurora Flight Services, Cyber
Defense Systems, Raytheon, Telford, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, DoD [41].
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (See Figure 8 for Organizational Chart): is a
regulatory organization that acts as a gatekeeper for all Aviation Operations.
UAS program office (UAPO): is an office within the FAA responsible to safely integrate
Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the U.S. National Airspace System. This organization
is essentially a study group or research group tasked with devising a plan to integrate
UAS into the NAS.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Group: is the principal element within the Air Traffic
Airspace Management Program within the FAA responsible for authorizing unmanned
aircraft (UA) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). This office works in
close coordination with Aviation Safety's Unmanned Aircraft Program Office (UAPO) to
review proposed applications and ensure that approvals to fly unmanned aircraft,
regardless of size, do not compromise the high level of safety for other aviation, the
public, and property on the ground.
OSD-FAA: the joint OSD-FAA Airspace Integration Initiative is intended to facilitate military
UAV operations within the National Airspace System. The effort began in 2001 and focuses on
the technology concerning sense-and-avoid requirements, regulatory issues surrounding "file and
fly" procedures, and the implementation of UAS integration into the NAS for military, civil, and
commercial applications while maintaining the current level of safety. The OSD-FAA is
working through the DoD Policy Board on Federal Aviation (PBFA) and is engaged in
establishing the air traffic regulatory infrastructure for integrating military UAS into the NAS
[21]. By limiting this effort's focus to traffic management of domestic flight operations by
military UASs, they hope to establish a solid precedent that can be translated into public and
The PBFA outlines the DoD
civil UAS in the domestic and international airspace.
the FAA, and other
Transportation,
of
Department
the
with
interface
for
organizational structure
agencies on air traffic control and airspace management. In this capacity, the PBFA provides
policy and planning guidance for comprehensive airspace planning in order to ensure that the
Military Departments have sufficient airspace to fulfill military, training, and test and evaluation
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
requirements; cooperate with the FAA for the effective and efficient management of the NAS;
and ensure operational interoperability between the DoD and the FAA [43].
U.S. Army: primary end user of UAS (Shadow, Predator, Hunter)
US Army Aviation and Missile Command (USAAMCOM or AMCOM): a major
command element within the Army structure that encompasses the missions and
organizations of the Missile Command and Army Aviation and Troop Command, in a
joint effort to develop certain airborne missile systems to support the soldier in the field.
Project Manager UAS (PM UAS): is within the USAAMCOM organization and is
responsible for management of the entire fleet of Army UASs.
an organization within USAAMCOM
Aviation Engineering Directorate (AED):
responsible for ensuring that Army aircraft comply with airworthiness requirements.
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC): a major command within the Army structure
that develops the Army's Soldier and Civilian leaders and designs, develops and integrates
capabilities, concepts and doctrine in order to build a campaign-capable expeditionary Army in
support of joint war-fighting commanders through Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).
Air Force: primary end user of UAS (RQ-4 Global Hawk)
Navy/Marines: primary end user of UAS
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OSD) Acquisition, Technolovy, and Logistics
(AT&L) Task Force: OSD is the principal staff element of the Secretary of Defense in the
exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation
responsibilities [44].
Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center for Excellence (JUAS COE): works towards
standardization, integration and training for UAS and UAS products. This organization focuses
on joint UAS employment and training standards, providing support to the joint operator, the
services and combatant commands across all military services [45].
General Public Interest: represents anyone living within the National Airspace boundaries
whether participants or non-participants, who are concerned with achieving the full benefits of
UAS operations while still preserving safety through effective mitigation of risks with the least
possible restrictions.
Piloted Aircraft: any active aircraft with on-board pilots within the National Airspace. This
includes commercial, military, private, and recreational aircraft.
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) is a not-for-profit organization
individual membership association dedicated to general aviation. It is the largest most
influential aviation association in the world with over 415,000 members and proving
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
member services that range from representation at all government levels, legal services,
and advice [46]
Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) is the largest airline pilot union in the world and
represents nearly 52,250 pilots at 35 U.S. and Canadian airlines. It provides three critical
services to its members - airline safety and security, representation, and advocacy [47]
UAS Operators
Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) is the world's largest
non-profit organization devoted exclusively to advancing the unmanned systems
community. AUVSI has over 1400 member companies consisting of government
organizations, industry and academia, and is committed to fostering, developing, and
promoting unmanned systems and related technologies [48].
UAS Training/Flight Schools
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
Air Marine Operations Center
Federal Emergency management Agency (FEMA)
Exxon, Mobile, BP, Shell, UPS
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO): is a UN Specialized Agency that provides
a global forum for civil aviation. ICAO works to achieve its vision of safe, secure and
sustainable development of civil aviation through cooperation amongst its member States [49].
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA SC-203): is a private, not-for-profit
corporation that develops consensus-based recommendations regarding communications,
navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) system issues. RTCA
functions as a Federal Advisory Committee. Its recommendations are used by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) as the basis for policy, program, and regulatory decisions and by
the private sector as the basis for development, investment and other business decisions [50].
Prioritize and Group the Stakeholders
The National Airspace System is a complex enterprise with an extensive number of stakeholders.
An extension of the model presented by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, Grossi's stakeholder salience
methodology will be used to assess the relative ordering and ranking of stakeholders as they
relate to the integration of UASs into the National Airspace System [51]. Grossi's methodology
allows for a complete understanding of each stakeholder's influence and priority along with a
consistent categorization and treatment of various kinds of stakeholders while taking into
consideration their ability to influence or control enterprise activities. As discussed previously,
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
there are over 300 possible stakeholders involved in the integration of UASs into the National
Airspace but for the scope of this thesis, the focus is on those that directly affect the integration
of Army UAS into the NAS (See Appendix 1 for a full list of stakeholders). Table 2 below
summarizes those identified stakeholders, the rationale, importance to the enterprise, and the six
groups that emerged during the identification process previously discussed:
Rationale
includes all product design and development teams
as well as support personnel and resources; not
necessarily the "end user"
Group
Code
Stakeholder
S01
Applicant
502
Federal Aviation Administration - FAA
a regulatory organization that acts as a gatekeeper
for all Aviation Operations
FAA
S03
FAA UAS Program Office (UAPO)
To safely integrate Unmanned Aircraft Systems into
the U.S. National Airspace System.
the principal element within the Air Traffic Airspace
FAA
S04
FAA Unmanned Aircraft Systems Group
(UAPO)
FAA
S05
Office of the Secretary of Defense - Federal
Aviation Administration (OSD-FAA)
S06
S07
07
U.S. Army
Army UAS Project Manager (PM UAS)
Army UAS Project Manager (PM UAS)
Management Program responsible for authorizing
unmanned aircraft (UA) operations in the National
Airspace System (NAS)
the joint OSD-FAAAirspace Integration Initiative is
intended to facilitate military UAV operations within
the National Airspace System and works through the
DoD Policy Board on Federal Aviation (PBFA)
currently the lead end user of UASs
responsible for management of the entire fleet of
Army UASs
S08
S09
Sl0
S11
providing the right people, with the right skills, right
capabilities, at the right time and right place for
Training and Doctrine Command
today and tomorrow.
(TRADOC)
ArmyAviation Engineering Directorate (AED) determines airworthiness of Army aircraft
a significant end user of UAS
U.S. Air Force
a significant end user of UAS
U.S. Navy/Marines
is the principal staff element of the Secretary of
Applicant
FAA/Leadership
UAS End User
UAS End User
UAS End User
UAS End User
UAS End User
UAS End User
S12
OSD Acquisition, Technology & Logistics
Task Force (OSD AT&L)
Defense in the exercise of policy development,
planning, resource management, fiscal, and
program evaluation responsibilities
Leadership
S13
Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center for
Excellence (JUAS COE)
Association of Unmnanned Vehicle Systems
S14
nationa oUn
International (AUVSI)
works towards standardization, integration and
training for UAS and UAS products
the world's largest non-profit organization devoted
exclusively to advancing the unmanned systems
community.
Leadership
S15
Intemational Civil Aivation Organization
(ICAO)
is a UN Specialized Agency that provides a global
forum for civil aviation.
is a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops
Leadership
S16
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics consensus-based recommendations regarding
communications, navigation, surveillance, and air
(RTCA SC-203)
traffic management (CNS/ATM) system issues.
Association of Unmnanned Vehicle Systems the world's largest non-profit organization devoted
exclusively to advancing the unmanned systems
17
International (AUVSI)
community.
Leadership
S14
S17
Leadership
Leadership
S18
General Public Interest
often represented through the various organization
and in members of Congress
NAS User
S19
Piloted Aircraft
any certified pilot flying in the NAS (mlitary, civilian,
commercial, private, etc.)
NAS User
S20
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA)
Airline Pilots Association (ALPA)
DoD UAS Operators
DoD UAS Training/Flight Schools
NAS User
NAS User
NAS User
NAS User
End Users
Potential
S24
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
not-for-profit organization individual membership
association dedicated to general aviation
the largest airline pilot union in the world
currently military operators of UAS
currently military operators of UAS
potential
applications for maritime, border control,
etc.
S25
Customs &Border Patrol (CBP)
a subordinate organization within DHS
Potential End Users
S26
Air Marine Operations Center
Operations
Marine Center
Air
training requirements, and
funding,
Provide
requirements
m26
aintenance
Potential End Users
S27
Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)
Provide funding, training requirements, and
maintenance requirements
Potential End Users
S28
Commercial Companies: Exxon, Mobil, BP,
UPS
Provide funding, training requirements, and
maintenance requirements
Potential End Users
S21
S22
S23
'I able 2: Stlaleholders and Stakeholder ( roups
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
It was difficult to identify the importance of each stakeholder compared to the rest because
several appeared to have equal importance to the enterprise, and as expected each stakeholder
feels that they are the most important to the enterprise. In order to differentiate between
stakeholders, the concept of Stakeholder Salience is utilized. Furthermore, the relevance or
saliency of each stakeholder is accomplished using Grossi' s detailed set of considerations to help
quantify each stakeholder's score on the power, legitimacy and urgency scale. A stakeholder
demonstrates power in its relationship with the enterprise when it gains access to or can gain
access to coercive, utilitarian or symbolic means to impose its will in the relationship [52].
Coercive power refers to the use of physical resources of force, violence, or restraint. Utilitarian
power is based on the exchange of material or a financial transaction, while symbolic power is
such things as prestige, esteem, love, or acceptance. Legitimacy is defined as general perception
or assumption that the actions of a stakeholder are desirable and appropriate based on social
norms and values. Urgency exists when a relationship or claim is time-sensitive and when that
relationship or claim is important or critical to the stakeholder operations and strategies [52].
In order to identify the relative importance of the stakeholder to the enterprise and prioritize the
stakeholders, the stakeholders were asked to evaluate all identified enterprise stakeholders in a
qualitative manner. Instead of utilizing the ranking system (1-10) for power, legitimacy, and
urgency, qualitative descriptors were used as listed below to equate to the values of stakeholder
salience when polling the stakeholder. Also, Grossi provides different subtypes for each
attribute with associated qualitative descriptions for each point range (See Appendix 2). This
prevented the stakeholders from biasing the results and they were more comfortable using the
qualitative assessment en lieu of assigning specific values. Then the scale in Table 3 was used to
arrive at an ordinal scale.
Descriptor
Point Range
Excellent
8-10
Above average
6-8
Average
4-6
Below Average
2-4
Poor
0-2
Table 3: Stakeholder Salience Scoring
Once the stakeholders identified their relative importance to the enterprise based on power,
legitimacy, and urgency using the above classifications, the information was analyzed,
reconciled where necessary, and translated to the numerical method in the stakeholder salience
chart. With this method, stakeholder importance was better identified to the enterprise, but also
several groupings of stakeholders holding the same salience level emerged. Overall this method
provides a clear picture as to the actual importance of each stakeholder to the enterprise.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
Rationale
includes all product design and development teams
as well as support personnel and resources: not
necessarily the 'end user'
Power
Group
Rank
NSSI
Urgency
Legitimacy
Code
Stakeholder
SO1
Applicant
3
3
3
9.0
S02
Federal Aviation Administration - FAA
forall Aviation
FAA
10
10
9
93.3
1
S03
FAA UAS Program Office (UAPO)
03UAS Program Othe
To safely integrate Unmanned Aircraft Systems into
U.S. NationalAirspace System.
the principal element within the Air Traffic Airspace
FAA
FAA
8
10
8
74.7
2
504
FAA Unmanned Aircraft Systems Group
Management Program responsible for authorizing
unmanned aircraft (UA) operations in the National
Airspace System (NAS)
the joint OSD-FAAAirspace Integration Initiative is
intended to facilitate military UAV operations within
the National Airspace System and works through the
FAA
8
9
8
69.3
3
Office of the ecretary of Defense 05 ed eral
Aviati
Administration
o n
(OSDe
Federal Aviation Administration OSD
FAA)
Applicant
FA
eadership
DoD Policy Board on Federal Aviation (PBFA)
U.S. Army
currently the lead end user of UASs
UAS End User
S07
Army UAS Project Manager (PM UAS)
Army Trainingand Doctrine Command
responsible for management of the entire fleet of
Army UASs
providing the right people, with the right skills, right
capabilities, at the right time and right place for
today and tomorrow.
UAS End User
SO8
S06
ITRADOCI
24
7
8
8
58.7
4
3
7
7
30.3
11
4
7
5
27.7
14
UAS End User
2
6
3
12.0
22
UAS End User
5
5
2
15.0
21
a significant end user of UAS
UAS End User
3
7
7
30.3
12
a significant end user of UAS
UAS End User
2
7
7
25.7
15
4
8
8
42.7
6
3
8
6
300
4
8
9
46.7
2
2
8
12.0
20
5
8
5
35.0
10
7
4
16.7
19
8
41
41.00
7
7
SO9
ArmyAviation Engineering Directorate (AED) determines airworthiness of Army aircraft
S10
U.S, Air Force
S11
U.S. Navy/Marines
is the principal staff element of the Secretary of
S12
S13
14
15
16
OSD Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Defense in the exercise of policy development,
planning, resource management, fiscal, and
Task Force (OSD AT&L)
program evaluation responsibilities
Leadership
S13 Unmanned Aircraft System Center for
Joint
Excellence (JUASCOE)
ociation
of Unnanned Vehicle
nned hicle
Associatio of
Systems International (AUVSI)
Inteational Civil Aivation Organization
(ICAO)
Leadersh
works towards standardization, integration and
training for UAS and UAS products
the world's largest non-profit organization devoted
exclusively to advancing the unmanned systems
community
is a UN Specialized Agency that provides a global
forum for civil aviation.
is a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics consensus-based recommendations regarding
communications, navigation, surveillance, and air
(RTCA SC-203)
traffic management (CNSIATM)system issues.
ip
Leadership
5
Leadership
Leadership
S17
General Public Interest
represented through the various organization
often
and in members of Congress
NAS User
518
Piloted Aircraft
l
the NAS (mlitary, civilian,
any certified pilot flying
pnvate, etc.)
Commerciald8ucommeroal,
NAS User
r
N
2
3
9
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Assocation
(AOPA)
not-for-pro organization individual membership
association dedicated to general aviation
NAS User
1
5
4
97
23
S20
Aidine Pilots Association (ALPA)
the largest airline pilot union in the world
NAS User
1
5
7
15.7
20
S21
DoD UAS Operators
currently military operators of UAS
NAS User
3
8
8
37.3
8
S22
DoD UAS TrainingfFlight Schools
currently military operators of UAS
NAS User
3
8
8
37.3
9
S23
Departmentof Homeland Security (DHS)
potential applications for matime border control,
etc.
Potential End Users
5
5
5
25_0
S24
25
Customs & Border Patrol (CBP)
AirMarine Operations Center
25 Marine
Operations Center
a subordinate organization within DHS
Provide funding, training requirements, and
maintenance requirements
Potential End Users
Potential End Users
5
5
5
5
25.0
21.7
21.7
17
4
5
5
5
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Provide
funding,
training requirements, and
requirements
maintenance
(FEMA)
Commercial Companies: Exxon, Mobil, BP, Providefunding, training requirements, and
maintenance requirements
UPS
Potential
End Users
Ur35
PeaE
0
3
5.0
25
19
S26
S27
Potential End Users
16
16
18
1
26
0
3.0
ITable 4: St'ake l lder Saliente
The enterprise stakeholders are categorized and ranked based on their saliency index. As shown
in Table 4 above the most important stakeholders include the organizations within the FAA,
DoD, and NAS users. This framework provides a powerful tool for rigorously identifying which
stakeholders are the most important within an enterprise context. Furthermore, it also provides a
way to interface a large pool of enterprise stakeholders.
Further assessment of the saliency index provides for a straightforward method to categorize the
relative importance of each stakeholder. Logical groupings of the stakeholders into categories
help to assess the value received and delivered between the stakeholder group and the enterprise.
The stakeholder analysis results shown previously in Table 2 suggest that enterprise stakeholders
fall into one or many of the following general groups: Applicant, FAA, UAS End User, NAS
User, Leadership, and Potential End User. Listed in Table 5 shows each stakeholder group, a
description, and the value exchange between the groups and the enterprise:
48
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
Stehde
App ticant
(DoD NASA.
CBPi
FAA
(UAPO. UA
Group. OSDFAA)
UAS End User
Army AF, Navy)
NAS Users
jGeneral Public.
Pioled AC. UAS
Ft Tng.ALPA)
Laadershlp
(OSO-FAA.
JUAS COE.
AUVSI)
Po!tial End
Users
(FEMA. DHS.
UPS)
Valu
Fro
Dsrpto
The issue at hand is ntegration of UAS into the NAS and the
apowcant consists of someone who is applying for a
Certdicate of Autcozabon (COA) for a new UAS in order to
access the NAS. The applicent remains external to the
enterpnse layout Once they are granted a COA and access
the NAS wit' a UAS hey then become end users and are
ritemal In Ihe enteronse
Vu
Received
Syte
* Airspace access
* Command & control
* Flexbility tor training and operations
* Approval &standardizaion
D
To Syte
SAbilityto transUion controlled
arspace to messbor space
while maintarng status quo
* Maxirnze resources (cOSt
ana duration off ght
* Technology innovation
* Maintain status quo - safety
* Gatekeeper for airspace
safety
The FAA'spnrmary misson is the safety. security and
isa regr y
etticiency of the Natinw Awspace System It
compe x and large organization and there are a few specific
offices within the orga izatorsl structure that are evolved in
players
the integration of UAS into the NAS as extemal
* Maintain staus quo * Command &control
* Maximize resources
UAS end users are maaty DoD associated organizatons
such as theArmy Ar Force, and the Navy who alhave
few civil
venoustypes of UASs There are a select
orgazatmons that are also considered end users on a very
Wrilted basis. such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Admlnistrabon (NASA), the Department of Homeland Security
(DOS)ard various local poace organuizatns who have been
granted nited COM to fly UAS in the NAS
* Airspace access for training
* Command& Control
Encompasses a w'oe range of interests and obectives. NAS
users are quafied as either parcpatling trafficor nonparticpating traffic They are mainly military crv
conierca, and pnrivatepeots who access the aspace
wheter controlled or uncontrolled
*
Maintain status quo- safety
Procedurespolicies & regulations
* Approval & Standardantion
* Technology ireovatibo
* Maximize resources
* Recognltionbest practices
* Societal Preferences
Those organizations leading the efforts on promotlng UAS
operations in the NAS through their efforts on policy creation.
product innovation training, and resource support
*
Airspace Access
* Flexbllity
* Maintain status quo - Safety
* Estabished procedures policies&
regulations
*
independent reviewof safety and efficacy Faclitate diffllusion
by estaetehng standards But FDA very under-resourced
relatve to mandate. no single 'system owner' agency
operations
* Procedures poles &
regulations
*Approval & Standardization
&operations
Flexibility for traiing and operations
policies &regulations
* Procedures.
*
Access to airspace
Approval &standardizalon
* Technology innovation,
testing and mplementation
Abilitytotransition controlled
aspace to r sosonspace
Recognitiorvbest practices
Maximize resources
* Recognitiorvest practices
* Established procedures
poices. &regulations
* Technology lnvovation
*
Maximize resources
Technology innovation
Table 5: NAS Enterprise - Stakeholder Value Exchange 139J
Taking the stakeholder value exchange a step further, it is important to analyze each stakeholder
group's importance to value creation and their current performance within the enterprise.
Understanding this value exchange between the stakeholder groups demonstrates the strong
correlation between the enterprise objectives and the current performance of value delivery. A
summary of this analysis is shown in Table 6:
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Appllcant
(Do. NASA.COP)
FAA
(UAPO. UA Group
OSD-FAA)
alu
Vale Rceied
Staehoder
Deiveed
* Command&control
* Flex"ity fortranig and
operations
* Approval& standoardtzaton
* Abilityto transimtononroaed
arspece to mission space whee
maintarg statusquo
* Maximizeresources Icosl an
uration of flght?
* Technology innovation
Matain status quo - safety
• Command & control
* Maximize resources
stakusquo - safety
Matetmn
Gatekeeper for airspace
operalors
* Procedures poioes &
* Airspace access
rnpr-ice o Vlue
Medur - Uni the FAA approves an
applcent andesues a COA.me
applcant doe not greatly affect he
earerprise. However pooer is en
rumbers - he more applicants pushng
then the FAAwillbe orced to evaluate
currentlypolicies and regulatons.
CurentPerorm nc
Low - Bes oes DoDappicants
there arenot many cavlo
due tome
commercial applicants
onUAS
hesrancy to eWest
operabons unl Ime FAA
estabsrhed cearer policies and
standards
High - The FAAs thegatekeeper to the
Natw Airpace System. Esablihw g
policies, procedures. and standards for
UASaccess to theNAS is essential
Mebum -The FA ismoving
forward wenresearch groups.
reltabships wth DoD.and the
ofces within the FAA
oreation off
organizton to specaze t the
issues of airworthiess and
integration of UASrto theNAS
reguatons
* Approva & Standerdlzation
UAS End User
(Amy, AF.NavyI
* Aipace access tor traorng &
operatons
* Commanda Control
* Flexlblity fo aiig and
operations
* Procedures. poict , &
reguku-a
testg
* Technology Innovation.
and implementalon
Ably to transon controlled
arspaoe to mssion space
* Recognitiortiest practces
High - DoD s making rapd advances
wi h UAS technology but aso with
elegralonlnto n-lary airspace Much
of thIscaud be tansferred to the FAA
policIes and aso to cr and
commero applicatons
High - due to the GWOT.DoDis
longand fvested
heavey funded
term UAS technology No other
to
dive
agenoes have power
ciange or the current demand
AS Users
(General Pubc.
C UASFR
ALPA)
Trig.
*
Maintain status quo - safety
* Procedures. polices. &
regulatolrs
Approval & Standardizaon
* Technology
Innovation
Maximize resources
* Reogtnaornbet practlces
* Societal Pretrance
Leafedlum Ahough thecurren users rueooaitue
important hey do nothavee power
or Infuence to preventor alter me
possle intgraglon of UAS ntothe
NAS. They can earpty provide thee
view and are represented throughte
but re not an
vanous orgaUnizaons
nepral pero the Inialvalue crealon.
Low - normaNASoperabons
andUASs are granted
in e HASand
CO or
TFRs are normaly estabcshed
NAS partcipants must follow those
regulinrardoperate saley in
*eNAS However NAS
participants and non-partbcpants
have extensive expenence and
deas that may helpmold fure
policies andsuccessful mgrtbon
of UASInto heNAS
Learship
(OSO-FAAUAS
COE. AUVSI)
Access
* Airspace
* Flexily
statusquo * MaIe
*
Mame resources
Recogreonirest practices
Establshed procedures
polcies,. a rgulaon
Technology innovabon
High - thecurrent effortsfron me
various orgnizatons Involvedn UAS
megraton Intothe NAS have made
greO mde to provIdeaccessand yet
si maeitain e salety of e raspace
High - The arrenteaorts are
exceeri (especIally between the
FAAand OSO)b the focus must
contnueto be pokly and talgy
and no so much on me
issues
product or technology
*Access to arspace
* Approval &standarmation
* Maxaize
endusers do not have
Low - Polenta
themarkeng or inancal beckng to
push forwardas appicant They are
wang to Me whi progress DoO.me
govemment agencies
FA endomther
makteon movig lorward with
and
arwor ness pecy procedures for
UAS m me NAS.
Law - - The dile and conmmeral
applications arequs a wys oam
he fure Process, poicy, amd
beaddrea ed
Masg must dirt
ung puc aircra andthen he
success can trwlte to he
potential and users.
Noted
d
POtenl
Users
(FEMA.DHS. UPSI
Safety
. Estabtthed procedures.
polices &regulatons
resources
*Technology nnovation
Table 6: Stakeholder Importance & Performance
"As is"Architectural View
In order to analyze the enterprise in its current state, the National Airspace System enterprise is
individually evaluated based on the eight views of the enterprise: strategy, process, knowledge,
product, service, IT, information, and policy. Through the consideration of issues from these
respective lenses, one can best envision the enterprise from perspectives generally not considered
from an individual stakeholder's analysis or even that from a group of stakeholders when
together considering the issues at hand. The motivation behind utilizing enterprise architecting is
the need for a sufficiently robust approach that can address the full-spectrum issues surrounding
the National Airspace and the integration of UAS into this system. Enterprise architecture is a
holistic approach capable of addressing the complexities inherent in the Aviation Community in
a systematic manner. So what is enterprise architecture? As defined by Deborah Nightingale
and Donna Rhodes:
"Applying holistic thinking to design, evaluation, and select a preferred structure for a
future state enterprise to realize its value proposition and desired behavior "[39]
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Mliy
/E
'-LYrrssr~
intrltis Architeivr VtieWs - Itertelatiti
Figurte I(: I-
ships 153I1
This holistic approach fits within the broader value-creation framework and enables value
capture of the structure, value, and behavior within the enterprise.
In order to develop a systematic method for analyzing the "as-is" state, the general approach for
identifying the interrelationships seen in the enterprise architecting framework (Figure 10)
surrounds primarily the views of Policy, Strategy, Product, and Process Views. In the current
state of the NAS enterprise, Policy greatly influences the Product, Process, and Strategy views,
which ultimately drives the rest of the enterprise views and aligns other interrelationships.
However, Policy seems to be the one view that remains unchanged in the current state. As a
result, in order to comply with the current FAA Policies, one must view the entire enterprise
from the perspective of the Product view in order to evolve into the Future State. This will then
directly impact the Strategy and Process views and the rest of the views will follow suit. Since
Policy is not changing and will most likely not change in the near future, the focus is on Strategy,
Process, and Product views, their value exchange, and their affect the remaining views, in order
to develop a transformation plan for the future state (summarized in Table 7). The effect of
applying this methodology is to understand what the enterprise should look like when viewing it
from the Product view (followed by the rest of the Views), rather than how the Product is viewed
from the enterprise.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Policy/External Factors: This view represents the external regulatory, political, and societal
environments in which the enterprise operations [54]. Much of this view has been discuss in the
previous sections and the overall theme surrounding the Policy View is that it remains
unchanged in the current state and will not change in the near future. As outline in the Strategic
Objectives Section, the FAA prefers to "Conform rather than create" new policies to dedicated to
UAS operations in the NAS. Furthermore, the FAA prefers to avoid new initiatives just for the
DoD UAS training and operations in the NAS and have continued to utilize COAs for such
activity. As a result, Policy will not change in the immediate future, if at all to assist in the
integration of UAS in the NAS, rather process and products will influence the strategy view as
well.
Product/Services: This view represents the products produced or the services provided by the
enterprise [54]. The National Airspace is an enterprise that provides controlled and uncontrolled
operational airspace. The issue for UAS operation in the NAS surrounds equipage - the
see/sense and avoid functionality in order to comply with exisiting regulations. There are
various technologies available and many with the DoD community experimenting with products
to support the sense and avoid capability. Military UAS operations are significantly different
from UAS operations in the NAS. Military air operations do not change very much if UAS plan
to operate in the airspace with piloted military aircraft. However, UAS operations in the NAS
cause a degradation in the overall performance of the system due to the numerous "exceptions"
in the form of TFRs that cause other NAS participating traffic to maneuver around and adversely
affect normal day-to-day operations.
Strateav: This view represents goals, vision, and direction of the enterprise and includes the
business model and competitive environment. Since policy will not change and standards will
remain as they currently are, the focus for interested stakeholders is to develop a strategy to enter
the airspace with UAS operations utilizing the appropriate product and/or process. Furthermore,
addressing the proper strategy for achieving the goals of the enterprise described previously
under "Strategic Objectives" leads to the Process and Product views aligning, and the rest of the
views following suit. Ultimately, the strategy is to enable UAS operations in the NAS and
develop an appropriate business model to do so. Technology in the UAS community is
advancing rapidly so the interaction between strategy, product, and process will greatly propel
the enterprise forward. As a result, Technology Strategy is the business model that will be
discussed in a subsequent section that has the potential to transform the enterprise into the future
vision.
Process: This view represents the core processes by which the enterprise creates value for its
stakeholders. For the NAS enterprise, there exists many complex processes that are all tied to
the ever-constant Policy view. As discussed previously, such policies surround airspace
operations, airworthiness, and of course UAS integration procedures.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Organization
Into Tech
Service
Maintain the current level of safety with the
integration of UAS into the NAS. enable increased
capacity in the NAS.
Highly dependent on the Policy and Product views.
Conform rather than create, avoid separate policies
for UAS.
Unchanged in the present and will most likely remain
the same in the near term: Result. Strategy
Process, and Product highly coupled with Product
most directly having to conform to the Policy view.
Must link the process to the strategic goals and
product specifications eliminate communication
gap and encourage cross-talk among and across
organizations
Strong relationship to Policy and Product
architecture, complex processes exist for
airworthiness, airspace operations and integration of
UAS in to the NAS.
Numerous interested organizations. research
groups. and collaborative team members with
holistic perspective.
Determines knowledge requirements and must be
aligned with process architecture.
Requires a robust method for processing,
accepting verifying, and validating submitted data
Strong relationship with both product and org. arch.:
both influences and is supported by IT arch
Command and Control and security issues are
highly important as the NAS continues to progress
digitally
Highly coupled with Knowledge and supports
relevant product/process information shared
seamlessly across the enterprise
Sense and Avoid equipage requirements Modular
vs. integral design: Need an integrative design
with a large number of entrants to the market.
Strategy. Product. and Process views have high
interaction: driving metric for all views
Maintain safe airspace, increase capacity
Heavily drives product arch.: support requirements
inherent in knowledge employed by teams in Process
and Org. architectures
T'ale 7: Vint'rprisc Arceatiteint
u
-
Int atis siew
A number of recent and current efforts to integrate UAS into the national airspace provide the
context for the current enterprise activity. These efforts yield a significant degree of insight into
the difficulties associated with creating a sustained effort for solving this issue. The primary
views of concern include Policy, Strategy, Product, and Process. However, as demonstrated
previous, Policy remains stagnant in the current state of the enterprise with existing standards in
effect and no plan for creating separate regulations for UAS operations in the NAS. As a result,
the three most significant views of concern include Product and Process, which influence the
Strategic View. The remaining views are heavily influenced by the aforementioned views and it
is important to analyze the enterprise through all views because some are necessary for
functionality while others are important for optimization. Enterprise architecture requires a
collaborative effort especially among Strategy, Policy, Process, and Product views in order to
experience a successful transformation to the future vision of UAS flight in the NAS.
UASs are the technology of choice in numerous government agencies and departments and there
They are used more
is a growing interest among commercial companies for UAS usage.
frequently in the GWOT effort both at home and abroad. The DoD and Homeland Security are
developing plans to use UASs domestically. Unless these aircraft meet FAA certification
standards established, large airspace restrictions will be necessary to segregate piloted aircraft
from UASs.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
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TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Section 3: Transforming the Enterprise
Vision & Design for the Future Enterprise
At the core of delivering value is the need to move the enterprise from its current architecture to
the desired future state. An enterprise transformation plan describes in detail the actions and
results to be achieved in order to move the enterprise from its current position to the one
envisioned by the future enterprise architecture. So what does the future state look like for this
enterprise?
As discussed previously, the strategic objectives for the National Airspace System consist of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Increased safety
Greater capacity
International leadership
Organizational excellence
After a thorough analysis of these strategic objectives, the current enterprise architecture,
stakeholder values, and an assessment of the constraints, the following characteristics of the
future integration of UASs into the NAS emerge [55]:
1. Safety; conform to existing policy
2. Provide flexible airspace operations that enable mission execution and minimizes the
impact on airspace capacity
3. Implement and remain within resource constraints
4. Integrate policy, procedures, and technology for all airspace operations
5. Reduce cost and training/operational overhead
The future vision of success ultimately reflects routine UAS flights within the National Airspace
that seamlessly operate without hindering safety or airspace capacity (see Figure 12 below).
However, it is a long road to reaching this vision and will require an incremental systematic
approach to transition from the current "by exception" method of flight, to UAS fully integrated
and compliant with airspace regulations UAS operations.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Figure' I1 : Futture Vision
f Suiccess 1561
A simple, incremental systems approach is essential to fulfilling the previously mentioned
A
objectives and will drive rapid performance improvement with relatively minor changes.
thing
one
is
It
operations.
of
types
different
many
UAS collision-avoidance system must cover
for a remotely piloted Global Hawk to climb in restricted military airspace to altitudes above
Flight Level 180, where all air traffic is under positive ATC control, and then climb above
FL500, where there are very few aircraft. But it is more challenging to also support a wide range
of UAS sizes when the aircraft are below 18,000 ft. Here, piloted aircraft will often be flying
under visual flight rules (VFR) in a see and avoid environment.
Current Near-Term Efforts
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the FAA (a joint working group often referred
to as OSD-FAA) are working toward establishing UAS performance requirements, to include
equipment such as a detect, sense, and avoid collision-avoidance system that would allow UASs
to fly with a safety level equivalent to piloted aircraft. This was formerly an effort between the
FAA and the Joint Integrated Product Team (JIPT) until JIPT dissolved due to lack of funding.
However, JIPT made great strides to integrate UAS into the NAS and now the OSD-FAA
organization continues JIPT efforts. Developing an approach to collision avoidance that would
work with UASs flying near piloted aircraft is considered the intractable part of the problem for
gaining better access to civil airspace. But until the FAA specifies the requirements for such a
system, engineers cannot start designing an avionics box to fly on the aircraft.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the National Airspace
The limitations on DoD UAS Operations within the National Airspace System drastically affect
DoD's ability to meet operational needs. As deployed Army units with UASs return from
combat operations, they need access to the NAS in order to maintain operator proficiency and
prepare for their next combat deployment. As a result, the combined efforts of the FAA and
OSD can establish and initiate an effective and safe method for UAS operations to see/sense and
avoid other traffic. The immediate objective is to employ a system that safely and nonintrusively allows for access to specific areas of the NAS to meet specific operational objectives.
Next, build on initial capabilities to further expand access to night operations, no observers/chase
aircraft, and expanded airspace. Finally, the long-term objective is a fully integrated solution
that allows for unfettered access to the NAS so that DoD can meet all operational needs to
support combat and peacetime operations [30]. This integrated life cycle solution (shown in
Figure 12) includes a collision avoidance algorithm and sensor development and integration.
Furthermore, it enables a coordinated assessment of the policy, operational, procedural, and
acquisition related factors that weigh into the ability to achieve full airspace access.
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In 2006, the Project Manager for Proect Manager Unmanned Aircraft Systems (PM UAS)
described a potential early sensing system that integrated and fused radar data to provide
accurate, real-time situational awareness to a UAS operator. The operator would make decisions
to safely avoid other aircraft based on the sensor data being displayed in the ground control
station. The Army is working with the FAA and Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center for
Excellence (JUASCOB) to identify the technical and operational needs, and capabilities for the
development of standards and specifications for a sense and avoid system. As a result of efforts
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
from the now dissolved JIPT, the FAA, and PM UAS this plan has now evolved into a solution
called Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) led by the Project Manager Air Traffic Control
(PM ATC) [57]. PM ATC has formed a full-time GBSAA team to demonstrate a system-ofsystems solution that can be tailored to various installations and missions to include deployable
applications to serve the needs of all Military branches of Service.
GBSAA is a "ground based means of detecting an airborne intruder and declaring a threat, in
time to allow the UAS to adopt a safe state" [30]. It provides situational awareness information
to UAS operators on the ground (sense) to enable them to maintain separation by maneuvering
the unmanned aircraft away from the traffic (avoid). GBSAA functional evolution consists of
using existing sensors to create airways, supplemented with fixed based air traffic control and
military radars dispersed across the flight areas, and provides a fused and integrated picture of
the airspace (See Figure 13 below). Creating these airways and integrating GBSAA with
existing aircraft sensors may expand airspace operations, reduce restrictions, and assist in the
development of requirements for future onboard sense and avoid sensors.
Zero Carflict Airspace
Separating from other Aircraft
"Bubble"
'Tunnes & Bridges"
* Only fly in the airspace (Tunnel/Bubble)
if it is free and clear of other traffic.
* Based on analysis, be able to detect
a "threat" and return to safe state.
* Plan the UAS path to preserve the
bubble, minimize impact on operations and
keep the ability to return to a safe state.
* Based on analysis and coverage, be
able to detect a "threat", project its path and
either protect the integrity of the "traveling"
bubble or return to a safe state
(land/restricted or special use area):.
Figure 13: (;BSAA Functional Evolution 1301
GBSAA provides a protected airspace for UAS operations by monitoring a volume of airspace to
determine aircraft traffic and activity operating within the specified UAS operational area. This
volume of airspace is within the radius of the sensors and if no aircraft are operating within this
protected airspace, a UAS can be cleared for departure and begin its mission mode. If another
aircraft penetrates the UAS operational area, the UAS operator is alerted and can react to avoid a
conflict with another aircraft as necessary. To provide lateral and vertical safe separation
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
between aircraft, the ground-based sensors are combined with a complex traffic display to allow
conflict detection and alerting algorithms. Finally, combining an advanced traffic filtering
scheme to the ground sensors and complex traffic display provides collision avoidance logic
such as detection, tracking, threat declaration, prioritization, and maneuvering guidance to the
UAS operator. The illustration in Figure 14 depicts several ground-based radars observing
multiple targets with the radar feeds processed on the sensor fusion node. This process yields the
consolidated air picture, which provides the UAS operator with situational awareness to avoid
other air traffic in accordance with the FAA regulations.
UAS Telemery & Control
Radar data via RF LOS
Radar data via Termtrial Network
1 igure
14: (;BSAA (ionct
flir Sale I IAS
)le iatiiis 1571
Currently the U.S. Army is developing the GBSAA concept to provide a system of radars and
other sensor technologies, sensor processing, and a command and control display to show a
three-dimensional picture of all air traffic and protected airspace around the UAS. This provides
the UAS operator visual and audio alarms to warn of impending conflicts with the UAS. The
GBSAA mitigates some of the risks associated with flying UAS in the NAS and efforts are
underway to prove that it meets a satisfactory level of safety. GBSAA is currently in use at El
Mirage California and Fort Huachuca Arizona, with near term expansion to Fort Benning
Georgia, Fort Bragg North Carolina, Fort Campbell Kentucky, Fort Hood Texas, and Fort
Leonard Wood Missouri [57].
GBSAA addresses the minimum DoD specification for what is required in a sensor. The U.S.
Army plans to accelerate the sense and avoid capability through GBSAA and will most likely
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
integrate the Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) by 2012 using the Shadow UAS to execute
this integration [30]. Since the U.S. Army has a critical need for UAS flight within the NAS
from the surface to 18,000ft, they will refine ABSAA and/or a dynamic near term solution by
2014. This will propel the civil and commercial UAS industry to fully invest in this final
solution and propagate the viral growth of the UAS industry across all markets. Furthermore, the
FAA is beginning to create regulations for small UASs to fly in the airspace. An Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (ARC) compriised of industry, associations, and other government
agencies has been formed. This ARC will recommend defining and developing necessary interim
policy guidance with corresponding training material for operating a small size category UAS
within the National Airspace System.
So what will the UAS use as a sensor to mimic the human eye? No one knows yet, and therein
lies the challenge, but it does seem that a combination of ground and air sensors can provide
situational awareness to UAS operators and allow them to maneuver as necessary to maintain the
appropriate level of separation from other aircraft. UAS sensors will have to replicate the
performance and functions of the human eye to allow unmanned aircraft to operate in a visual
flight rules (VFR) environment. Seeing and avoiding non-cooperative traffic (aircraft with no
transponders) will require a real feat of engineering. Developing a UAS collision-avoidance
system will most likely be a more complex task than the development of TCAS, which took the
aviation community more than a decade and about $400 million to develop [58]. As Andrew
Lacher, UAS program lead at Missile Test and Readiness Equipment (MITRE) Corp, points out:
"Perhapsmost significantly, UAS collision avoidance is likely to need to function
in an autonomous mode (i.e., directly linked to flight controls without a pilot
being in the loop). This will complicate verification and certification. As a
community, we don't have good mechanisms for evaluating, verifying and
certifying software-intensive and nondeterministicsystems" [2].
In comparison if the U.S. Army succeeds at implementing and refining GBSAA technology with
military UAS operations, the total cost by 2014 will be approximately $44 million [30]. GBSAA
technology will yield additional supplemental technology systems such as Combat Airspace
Integration, Aircraft Survivability, and Missile Defense. The U.S. Army expects that the cost of
these complimentary systems along the cost of GBSAA will amount to approximately $78
million [30].
Until engineers can imbed sensors into UAS design, GBSAA allows UAS operations without
sensors on the actual aircraft and with existing technology, this reduces weight, drag, and fuel
consumption and complies with FAA guidance. Integrating GBSAA with existing aircraft
sensors will expand UAS operations and propagate the development of future on-board sense
and avoid technology. Such technology combined with integrated flight and mission computers
may yield a semi-autonomous UAS system, which enables a UAS to respond to hazards without
human input. Although many efforts are underway, the U.S. Army is leading in the integration
of UAS operations into the NAS with its efforts surrounding GBSAA. The U.S. Army's
initiatives with sense and avoid ventures and research with autonomy, airborne sensor packages,
and other payloads will help create a new horizon for UASs operations in the NAS in both the
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
near term and sustainable long-term future beyond the military sector and into the civil and
commercial markets.
Long Term Future State: Technology Strategy as the Preferred "to be" Architecture
Technology Strategy is a framework that enables the understanding of the structure and
dynamics of high-tech businesses, combined with an approach for their effective strategic
management. As such, the integration of UASs into the NAS is a highly complex issue and
involves a domain in which systems are important. UASs and the NAS are both part of larger
and more complex systems and are comprised of systems themselves.
Technology Strategy coupled with Engineering Architecture emphasizes the development and
application of ways of thinking that bring clarity to the complex co-evolution of technological
innovation, the demand opportunity, systems architecture, business ecosystems, and decisionmaking and execution within the business. Architecting the current state of the NAS enterprise
and then applying the technology strategy framework in an incremental systems approach to
fully understand the future state of the NAS involves figuring out how to create and capture
value, anticipating and deciding how to respond to the behavior of customers, complimentors
and competitors, and develop and deliver technologies, platforms, and products.
Technology Innovation
The emerging use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) by the Department of Defense (DoD) for
an ever-expanding number of roles and missions makes their use and successful integration a
topic of growing importance to the DoD, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and
Industry. Figure 15 depicts how the focus in DoD missions has shifted from defeating a known
enemy in conventional battle (Finish) to locating an unknown enemy in an asymmetric
engagement (Find).
FIND
FINISH
Traditional Warfare
*Minimal level of effort to find enemy
(Armored Division masses on border)
*Large, sustained effort to engage and defeat
(Conventional Warfare)
FIND
FINISH
Irregular Warfare
*Large level of effort to find enemy
(Difficult to find one person)
*Fewer resources required to engage
(Smaller footprint assets)
Figure 15: Traditional versus Irregular Warfare 1601
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
With the shift in emphasis as a result of the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), a new
premium on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities has emerged. A
recent survey of war-fighting commanders on the battlefield has demonstrated an overwhelming
need for this type of capability. Figure 16 demonstrates this need through a comparative
assessment of the various types of intelligence that military commanders are requesting and the
amount of products available for these demands. The practical effect of these combined forces is
the rapid escalation of additional ISR capabilities. It is in this capacity that UAS have seen the
most dramatic rise in usage over the past five years. Figure 17 demonstrates the increase in both
the flying hours and the budget allocated by DoD for the procurement and use of UAS platforms.
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TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
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As the number of UAS assets grows, and they become increasingly integrated into the military
infrastructure and operational picture, their importance to the conduct of successful missions
becomes paramount. Often times, war-fighting commanders will postpone or even cancel entire
missions if the capabilities provided by UAS ISR assets are not available [59]. Of particular
interest in the current investigation is the issue of how UAS assets are integrated into the overall
air traffic management structure and the technology development required to realize fully
integrated manned/unmanned operations.
Key Parameters, Trade-Offs and Performance Envelopes
The UAS is an unpiloted aircraft that can be remote controlled or fly autonomously. The key
performance parameters are safety, cost, payload capacity, degree of autonomy, flight time and
speed. The most important of these issues is currently safety. With respect to integrating UAS
into the existing airspace structure, the strategic performance parameters devolve into the ability
of the UAS to meet equipage requirements (especially for sensing and avoiding other aircraft),
respond to air traffic control (ATC) direction, and conform to the established "rules-of-the-road"
behaviors in accordance with existing FAA regulations. In the case of equipage requirements,
this can be measured largely in terms of safety, typically expressed in the number of accidents or
near mid-air collisions (NMACs) per flight hour. In other words, does the UAS have the
required equipage to maintain the needed separation between itself and other aircraft, can it see
and avoid other airborne objects that may pose mid-air collision hazards, can positive command
and control of the aircraft be maintained throughout its mission, and are there appropriate
emergency procedures in place should any of the above capabilities fail? The specified intent in
all of these actions is to ensure that the UAS does not collide with another aircraft or object, or in
the case of a UAS malfunction, it executes the appropriate procedures to prevent creating undue
hazard to those on the ground similar to piloted aircraft procedures.
hazard to those on the ground similar to piloted aircraft procedures.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
The ability to respond to ATC direction is measured in terms of the UAS transparency to air
traffic controllers that are directing the aircraft in their section of airspace. The kind of things
that are typically assessed include the need to provide the UAS with special handling or priority
routings because of aircraft performance limitations, increased separation standards between the
UAS and other aircraft due to the UAS' inability to see and avoid other air traffic, the ability of
the UAS to follow and maintain air traffic controller instructions for altitude, airspeed, and
heading directions, and the overall impact on the capacity of the controller and the airspace
structure for accommodating higher levels of airspace activity.
The ability of the UAS to behave in a consistent manner with the established airspace procedures
goes directly to the issue of how predictable the UAS behavior is when compared to the piloted
aircraft standard procedures associated with flying. This parameter is typically assessed through
the overall "comfort factor" that both air traffic controllers and other aircraft pilots have that the
UAS will operate in a way that is highly predictable and stable within a prescribed set of
circumstances. A good example is the operational behavior of a UAS when it goes into a "lost
link" mode in which the unmanned aircraft component is fully functional, but it has lost the
command and control link that connects it to the ground station controlling its altitude, direction,
and airspeed. In this case, knowing exactly what the unmanned aircraft will do in this situation
is critical, and the more the behavior models a piloted aircraft equivalent situation, the better the
system can handle these exceptions to normal operations.
The key tradeoffs involved in the technology for these platforms is the decision about how much
of the performance deficit must be accounted for with additional equipage requirements versus
how much can be mitigated through procedural and policy "work arounds" that treat UAS as
special case aircraft rather than platforms that are required to meet existing piloted aircraft
regulatory guidance. The resulting performance envelope will have significant ramifications for
the operational flexibility of the system once it is in use. The better the equipage on the system,
the more capable the platform will be in terms of integrating with the existing airspace
management structure, and the greater the degree of flexibility allowed in the way it can be
operated. The more the system relies on special procedures and handling from air traffic
controllers, the more restricted the operations, and the greater the procedural limitations will be
in how it can be used in order to ensure the appropriate degree of safety is maintained in the
airspace.
Innovation Trajectory and Key Technologies
The progression of UAS can be characterized as predominantly an intermediating trajectory,
especially when considered in the light of piloted aircraft technology. In this case, the advances
made in avionics for such things as autopilots, inertial navigation systems, global positioning
systems, and command & control all represent assets from the piloted aircraft community that
are directly applicable in the UAS arena. However, the rudimentary manner in which these
assets are employed (i.e. the activity base) is fundamentally altered with the introduction of UAS
into the scene. In this case, the assets are relatively stable, but the activities themselves must be
reconsidered in light of new information. Anita McGahan characterizes this type of situation as
an intermediating change [62].
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
The key parameters are still in their infancy, and they have yet to be quantified in any systematic
fashion; however, there are several key factors that appear to be emerging from the field. The
first is the overall UAS reliability with respect to the number of mechanical failures that occur
per flight hour resulting in damage or loss of an unmanned aircraft (See Figure 18). The other
clear trend is the increasing insistence by those regulating the airspace structure that UAS
platforms must become better equipped to comply with existing regulatory requirements. As the
number of UAS platforms continue to increase, it becomes harder and harder to accommodate
their operations on a "by exception" basis.
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The UAS itself competes directly with piloted aircraft missions designed to provide similar
capabilities. It also competes with satellite systems for certain applications. In the case of their
primary competition, piloted aircraft, the UAS is competing on three primary factors: mission
capability, cost, and degree of operational flexibly. The advantage the UAS has over the
equivalent piloted aircraft is that it can remain on station (or in flight) for longer durations of
time because it is not limited by pilot flight duty restrictions. The UAS can also be built to much
lower safety factors because a flight failure does not result in the potential loss of a human life,
which means that the standards (and as a result the cost) to which the UAS is built can be
downgraded without increasing the risk to human life. On the other hand, piloted aircraft have
the advantage of much shorter mission planning times, flexibility to mission changes or current
65
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
situation, and they can be used in much less structured, more highly integrated and congested
airspace given the ability of the pilot on-board to de-conflict visually with other aircraft.
Evolution, Technological Limits and Disruption Potential
The current state of technology for UAS suggests that the technologies will continue to evolve
down the intermediating lines previously described. In addition, the performance requirements
currently outstrip the delivered capability by wide margins. In this environment, Christensen,
Raynor, and Verlind suggest that the most successful approach will be highly integrated,
interdependent, proprietary architectures [63]. Interestingly enough, the current UAS providers
of large, highly capable UAS platforms have yet to take advantage of this fact in their design and
implementation of equipage that could provide significant competitive advantage with respect to
the operational flexibility of their UAS over that of their competitors.
In all likelihood, there will be "natural technological limits" on what can be achieved with
equipage on UAS platforms-at least in the current airspace structure and management scheme.
The FAA's almost insatiable appetite for safer airspace operations suggests that it will be
difficult to arrive at a point in which the "customer" is over served by the technology being
implemented on UAS platforms. In this sense, it is hard to see there being significant
"disruptions" in the technology base, at least from an organic source. A comparison with the
development of piloted aircraft technologies would seem to bear out a comparable intermediating
trajectory for innovation in the UAS field. Two exceptions from external events are possible.
The first would be a major media event like a mid-air collision that could induce Congress to act
in a unilateral manner to further stipulate safety equipage requirements. The second would be a
major policy shift on the part of the FAA to eliminate all non-cooperative traffic, significantly
reducing the equipage requirements on UAS for seeing and avoiding other aircraft. This second
event is unlikely to happen within the next 15 years, however, and the military need for UAS
access is already outweighing any of these policy developments and will continue to do so over
the next five to ten years.
Key Customer Segments and Applications
There is a growing demand for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Most of the intensive
development of pilotless aircraft has been in the United States, which in 2005 accounted for
nearly 73% of the worldwide research and production spending on UAS [64]. There are plans to
continue increasing funding for U.S. military programs, and civil, as well as, international
interest has also grown since documented UAS successes in the Middle East.
In order to understand potential applications, it is helpful to employ the UAS categorization
scheme defined by the European Unmanned Vehicle Association, which uses a six-tiered
approach. There is the micro-UAS, which are tiny air vehicles with a wingspan and length of no
more than 15 cm. There is the close range group, which includes UASs that fly within a range of
less than 25 km and are usually hand-launched. The short-rangegroup operates at a range of 25100 km. Medium range UAS are able to fly out to 100-200 km. These aircraft generally have
more advanced control systems due to higher operational performance parameters. Long Range
UAS can fly out to 500 km, and these platforms generally have highly advanced communication
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
and guidance systems. Endurance class vehicles are able to operate at ranges well beyond 500
km,and they can stay in the air more than 20 hours. These are considered the most sophisticated
of the UAS family [65].
UAS may also be categorized by the function it performs such as logistics, reconnaissance,
research, civil, or combat. Another categorization is the altitude at which a UAS can fly. These
include medium altitude long endurance (MALE), that fly at an altitude up to 30,000 ft with a
range of over 200 km,and high altitude long endurance (HALE), UAS that fly above 30,000 ft
and have an indefinite range. There are others, such as Hypersonic, which are high-speed, suborbital with a range of over 200 km. As might be suspected, all of these categorization schemes
suggest that there is an extremely diverse set of ways that customer segments can be addressed.
For this report, we characterize the customer base in an outcome-oriented manner [66]. Is the
intended outcome defense related, civil government oriented, or commercial market in scope?
This categorization scheme provides an integrative perspective over and against the UAS vehicle
class categorization scheme described in the previous paragraph.
Aerovironment Black
Widow - 2.12 oz.
Boeing/Insit Scaneagle - 33 b
Gen. Atomics - Predator B - 7,000 Ib
Lockheed Marlin
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BAE Systems
Microstar - 3.0 oz.
lBoeing X45A UCAV - 12,195 Ib (est)
AN Shadow 200 - 328 Ib
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Figure 19: 1 AS Spectruin by Wkeight 1671
The U.S military has found UASs extremely effective for reconnaissance, surveillance and target
acquisition. They have been used for deception operations, as well as maritime missions such as
naval fire support, over the horizon targeting, anti-ship missile defense and ship classification.
Growing fields of use as the electronics systems grow in complexity, but shrink in size, include
electronic warfare and signals intelligence. UAS also facilitate special psychological operations,
radio and data relay functions. They have successfully accomplished meteorology missions,
battle damage assessment, and payload transport [31].
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
These core capabilities apply directly to many of the civil applications proposed. Wild fire
suppression missions where UAS are equipped with infrared sensors to detect forests fires can
notify ground stations and/or deliver fire suppression chemicals. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) are looking at utilizing UAS for border interdiction where they can be utilized to patrol
land and sea boarders. Search and Rescue for ship and aircraft accidents is a direct transition
from the military's use of UAS for battle damage assessment. Communications relay, HALE
UAS could be used as satellite surrogates during emergencies such as hurricane Katrina when
most of the infrastructure has been destroyed. They can also provide aerial platforms for
cameras and real time surveillance in events such as earthquakes, disaster and emergency
management. Research of environmental and atmospheric pollution is also a viable application
given the appropriate payload. Industrial applications such as crop spraying, nuclear plant
surveillance, and vessel escorts have also been proposed [65].
Customer Needs, Diffusion and Adoption
The evolution of customer needs in this context is both constant and expanding. Even from their
first use in 1849, UASs have provided military units with the ability to enhance their application
of the principle of maneuver. Not much has changed in the past 160 years from that standpoint.
The military is still using UAS assets to augment their ability to "take the high ground," to locate
the enemy, and use that collected information to create tactical and strategic advantages on the
battlefield.
Wam
n
Ct."gSaSAuut,
Figure 20: Schematic of Austrian "Balloon" Bombing Device, 1848 1681
While the overall intent or need may not have changed considerably in the military context (at
least from an operational perspective), the customer's expectation for how that need will be met
has evolved tremendously from those early days in 1849 when the Austrians were using balloons
to bomb Venice (See Figure 20). The degree of control, precision, and speed with which modem
battlefield commanders expect and anticipate the information needed to enable maneuver
I
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the National Airspace
warfare strategies and tactics in the
even 25 years ago.
2 1st
century are orders of magnitude beyond what they were
Hign r 21: Picture otf IhhX45 Air Vehicle I lest bed 1691
A basic understanding of this difference in customer expectation in the delivery or service of the
need to maintain the advantage of the principle of maneuver can be obtained by a simple
comparison between Figure 20 and 21. In contrast to a fairly well developed and documented
evolution in the military segment, the civil government and commercial sectors are just
beginning to recognize to the possibilities UASs could bring to their efforts.
The key elements in the diffusion and adoption of UAS were tied historically to three critical
aspects in the UAS technology development arena: automatic stabilization, remote control, and
autonomous navigation. The important point to note here is that UAS diffusion and adoption
was limited primarily by technological capability and not by military doctrine or operational
strategies and tactics [70]. As each of these technological hurdles was overcome, the use of UAS
continued to expand into broader fields of application. By 1918, the stabilization issue had been
resolved and the first successful flight of a powered unmanned aircraft occurred. By 1924, a
UAS could be commanded with a significant set of remote commands, and by the 1930's their
use had expanded significantly in the target drone arena. The German's made headway with
rudimentary navigation for V-1 rockets in World War II, and the inertial navigation system that
was perfected in the 1950's allowed the full potential of UAS assets to be realized.
The last five years in particular have seen a massive diffusion and adoption of UAS into
mainstream military operations, and the expansion into additional mission sets and operational
scenarios shows no sign of slowing in the immediate future. The use of UAS in the broader civil
69
TransformationPlanningfor IntegratingUnmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
sector has not been nearly so rapid, due primarily to the regulatory hurdles associated with flying
these platforms alongside piloted aircraft in the civil airspace. In a sense, this regulatory
requirement could be viewed as the fourth, and final, key element in UAS adoption and
diffusion. Unlike the first three, however, this last element is a complex and interwoven set of
policy, procedural, and technological issues. Once it is solved, there will literally be a floodgate
of UAS applications unleashed in the civil arena [2].
Technology Stages and Episodes in Evolution
As discussed previously, there are three markets for UAS technology, which include the military,
civil government, and commercial uses. UAS technology is mainly prospering in the military
community versus other markets due to its successful use in the first Gulf War and its continued
success, expansion, and value added in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United
States is leading in the UAS technological innovations and employment but ironically the current
restrictions on flying UAS in the National Airspace greatly hinder further progression in the civil
and commercial markets. As a result, the civil and commercial markets for the UAS evolution are
still in the early ferment phase due to the current obstacle of airspace restrictions and hesitant
investors who are not comfortable in moving forward on such a costly technology with a lack of
data to support success [71]. In contrast, the current stage of evolution for the UAS appears to be
transitioning from the earlyferment stage to the dominant design stage in the military market due
to recent advances in computer technology, software, navigation, data links, sensors, and light
weight structural components [2].
Some dominant designs have possibly emerged in several of the UAS categories. Based on the
Abernathy and Utterback dynamic model of innovation criteria, a dominant design emerges when
the number of companies entering the market is at its peak [72]. Examining the entrance and exits
of companies involved in the UAS market (depicted in Figures 22 and 23) reveals that the peak
number of companies occurred in 2000.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Companies Entries & Exits for UAV Markets
9
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Figure 22: 1 AS C(ompanies Lntr- and [sit Market Activity 1731
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Figure 23: [UAS Companies Entries, Exits, andi Totals 1731
The chart in Figure 23 demonstrates that the UAS market exhibited a FluidState pattern between
1980 to approximately 2000 at which time in the year 2000 the number of companies peaked.
However, between 2000 and 2006, the number of new entrants into the UAS market began a
decline which may suggest that the market is in transition and moving to the Transition State; an
M-
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
indication that a dominant design may have emerged or is beginning to emerge in each UAS
category in accordance with both the lifecycle of innovative markets and the Utterback model
[74].
Along with the metric of number of companies entering and exiting the UAS maiket, other
objective parameters that characterize each stage in the lifecycle of the UAS include: the number
of UAS designs by category and companies associated with those designs (Figures 25 and 26), the
number of patents and scientific journals (Figures 24, 25, 26), the UAS R&D spending/forecast
(Figure 1), number of flight hours (Figure 27), safety records/number of mishaps, and cost of
procurement/operation (Figure 2). Evaluating the various trends and changes of these metrics
throughout the life of the UAS technology will indicate the innovation trajectory, rate of adoption
of the technology, and movement between early ferment, dominant design, incremental innovation,
maturity, and eclipse/renewal stages [71]. Furthermore, the three different markets of military,
civil, and commercial will most likely experience these stages at different times with the military in
the lead and civil and commercial markets running generally parallel to each other, but behind the
military market.
There are a host of available mechanisms that may provide insight into the underlying life-cycle
state of UAS technology in each customer segment identified. What will be important in
deciphering these indicators is not to get trapped into making analogies between customer
segments, but rather going back to the fundamental drivers in each of these segments and
understanding what these metrics are saying about how the industry as a whole is moving. This
provides the opportunity to reassess mental models, and consider if there are fundamental changes
that are occurring that would be indicative of movement from one stage to another.
Patents Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - Google Patent Search
80
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Patents Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - Google Patent Search
Uigu re 24: Patents tFiled for 1I AS designs 1731
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
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TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
US Army
Accumulated annual flying hours helicopters and UAVs
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Figure 27: total Flight Hlours per year for Army lelicopter and ITAS 1161
Key Niches, Players, and Roles
As presented by Professor Michael A.M. Davies, a niche can be defined as follows:
1. A situation or activity specially suited to a person's interests, abilities, or nature
2. The position orfunction of an organism in a community ofplants and animals
3. The status of an organism within its environment and community (affecting its survival
as a species) [75].
The key niches within the UAS domain are as follows: aviate, navigate, communicate, operate,
safety, and size. The first three niches define the functional requirements of the UAS within the
broader context of flight operations, regardless of the type of aircraft being flown [76]. The
demands within the UAS flight arena, however, place specific requirements on the expertise and
capabilities of a UAS manufacturer to create distributed systems capable of specific levels of
performance. The peculiarities of each of these functional domains justify their categorization as
independent niches.
The fourth niche, operate, is specific to UAS operations in which the unmanned aircraft is being
used as a platform from which to accomplish some other function besides flight through the
airspace. For instance, the U.S. military uses UAS extensively as intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) platforms where sophisticated electro-optical, infrared, or radar sensors are
mounted on the UAS and used to collect intelligence information and/or real-time video in the
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
battle space. This functional requirement is completely distinct from the previous three, and it
engages a very different set of skills and expertise than the first three functions.
The safety niche is called out specifically because of the prominent role it takes in the broader
effort to push UAS into wider civil airspace usage, both from the military and commercial
industry. The result is that safety considerations play the dominant role in determining how the
ecosystem will evolve, or depending on the scenario, survive. Each of the four functional niches
previously described are conducted against this safety backdrop.
Finally, the size niche is distinct because it classifies different market segments, from small toy
size to UAS capable of flying at over 60,000 ft and the size of a Boeing 737. These distinctly
different niches share some functional similarities, but the manner in which the other niche
capabilities (aviate, navigate, communicate, etc) are delivered tend to be driven by
fundamentally different technology and business dynamics. As a result, size is categorized as its
own niche.
Within the United States, the current UAS ecosystem consists of the following types of players:
government customers (both federal and state), industry developers and manufacturers,
government research and development labs (and their associated federally funded research and
development centers or FFRDCs), airspace regulators, standards development organizations,
existing airspace users, academia, and the general public (See Figure 28 below). These same
types of players also extend to the international scene, but the leadership in certain categories
will shift depending on the country and the topic.
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TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Leadership roles in each of these categories are played by a number of organizations. From a
government customer standpoint, the military services are forging the way ahead on both
operational and technological advancement, making strong use of a significant amount of
funding ($25B plus annual budgets over the next several years) to shape both the capabilities,
type, and number of UAS in use [31]. Industry leadership is less clear; however, significant
market share in different UAS classes is readily apparent: Northrop Grumman in the highaltitude, long-endurance segment, General Atomics in the medium-altitude, long endurance
segment, AAI in the -500 lbs weight class, and then a number of smaller corporations producing
a large diversity of different platforms at the small UAS end of the spectrum. The Army
Research Lab, the Air Force Research Lab, MITRE Corporation's Center for Advanced Aviation
System Development (CAASD), and the MIT Lincoln Labs are the dominant organizations in
the research and development role as it relates to standards development. FAA UAS Program
Office (UAPO) along with FAA UAS Group are the two offices primarily responsible for the
airspace regulator category on the government side. The Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics (RTCA) is leading the standards development organizations. The University of
North Dakota and New Mexico State University both have a strong presence in the domain from
an academia standpoint. Existing airspace users are represented through strong and vocal
participants from the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association (AOPA) organizations. The public interest is currently under the purview of the
FAA's regulatory function, and there are currently no other "home grown" activist groups with
specific agendas or issues in the UAS domain.
The Department of Defense and the FAA are the primary organizations shaping the UAS
domain. The DoD has significant influence for two reasons: It has a tremendous level of
resources against which it is determining the technological evolution of these capabilities, and
secondly, under current regulatory conditions, the only authorized operators of UAS in the civil
airspace are public aircraft operators-which means that governmental organizations are the only
entities to whom commercial industry can legally sell UAS platforms. The FAA is the other
dominant influence in shaping the UAS domain through its role as the regulatory agency
governing the operation of UAS in the civil airspace. Many on the international scene are also
watching the FAA's handling of UAS before taking definitive action on their own, while some
countries such as Israel, Australia, and South Africa are moving forward on their own.
Specialist or follower roles are played by just about the entire remaining field of players from
those already identified as leaders in their respective fields. See Appendix 1 for a more complete
list of actively engaged organizations in the UAS ecosystem.
Business Models and Capturing Value
Because DOD is the primary driver for the UAS technology, two dominant business models for
companies delivering complete UAS systems rise to the surface. The first is the classic defense
industry business model in which the military provides a request for proposal on a required
capability and then awards a contract to a company that provides the best value contract to
develop the capability. Generally, a company captures value by underbidding the initial research
and development phase. They then plan to be able to make up the difference and profit during
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the National Airspace
the production phase of the effort. They also capture value through sustainment activities in
which they contract out to repair and maintain the assets once they are put in the field. The
biggest drawback to this type of business model is that the government typically owns a
significant degree of the intellectual property that results from these efforts since they fund the
bulk of the development activity. On the other hand, the tacit information required to
successfully build a design is difficult to acquire for complex systems, and the practical result is
that the government rarely changes contractors in mid-stream once it has made an award. This is
the business model that was used by Sikorsky in the production and sustainment of the UH60
Blackhawk helicopter, by Boeing in the production and sustainment of the AH64 Apache
Helicopter, and by Northrop Grumman in the production of the Global Hawk.
As John Sterman noted in his book Business Dynamics Systems Thinking and Modeling for a
Complex World, there are many ways of dispersing the up-front costs of development [78].
Examining the model below in Figure 29, it becomes apparent how these firms have gained the
cumulative experience, which sets them up for market leadership at the outset (Reference the R3
"Learning Curve" reinforcing loop). "This learning or experience curve has been documented in
a wide range of industries from commercial aircraft to broiler chickens" [78].
Investment in
Process
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The second business model is one in which the individual corporation has done the vast majority
of the development work themselves, and literally shows up on the government's doorstep with a
working UAS platform for sale. In this case, the corporation itself owns nearly all of the
intellectual property, as well as the risk in developing and marketing the product, so it has a
much more secure position with respect to the competition and future designs related to its work.
If the government acquires this platform, these companies typically have much higher margins as
well, since the government will usually buy the product on a firm fixed price contract rather than
the cost plus fixed fee arrangement described under the first business model. The downside is
that the corporation's risk exposure is large compared to that taken by the typical defense
contractor arrangement. This second business model is much more typical in the smaller UAS
domain where the cost of entry is much lower.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the National Airspace
Different businesses have failed in the UAS domain primarily as a result of not keeping up with
the innovation clock-speed, especially in the small UAS arena [78]. On the small UAS scene,
businesses must have a much faster turn-around time on innovation and fielding because the
platforms themselves are undergoing such rapid evolution. For this reason, a typical defense
contract business model, at least in this segment, has generally resulted in obsolescence rather
quickly since companies using this business model cannot maintain the same clock-speed on
innovation as a company employing the "build it and they will come" model. The small UAS
segment operates in the emergent dominant design stage in the technology life cycle or
alternatively, the expansion phase of a business ecosystem, and price is a key differentiator as the
available technology on the small platforms becomes more ubiquitous [71].
On the higher end UAS segments, the companies with incumbent status tend to have significant
first mover advantages since the cost of entry into the market is so high, and both the speed of
innovation and the rate at which the market is moving tends to be significantly slower than
within the small UAS segment [79]. At this point, there have been no significant business
failures, and the early entrants still maintain an almost total choke-hold in their respective
segments. As pointed out in previously, the overall trajectory of the high-end UAS domain is
still largely in the early ferment stage, and platform capability remains the key differentiator.
Other Factors
On the high end of the UAS segment (those of medium size or larger), the cost of entry into the
market is significant, and the availability of resources is a significant limiting factor in creating a
viable alternative to the existing platforms currently in use [80]. There is also a significant
amount of intellectual property in the command and control element of these platforms, as
different companies attempt to implement more robust and reliable systems with varying degrees
of autonomy.
The other major consideration is the issue of compatibility. As the number of assets continues to
increase, the switching cost with moving to a different architecture goes up with the total number
of assets in use [81]. This is especially true in the sustainment arena. In addition, the ability to
interface with the existing ISR infrastructure is critical, especially for those UASs used to collect
strategic intelligence. If the data collected from these platforms cannot be seamlessly integrated
into the existing tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination infrastructure, the utility of
the asset goes down radically. This is already occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan as UAS and
recon/attack helicopters are combined as "sensor-to-shooter" teams in order to rapidly provide
and exchange real-time video on the fluid battlefield. Thus far compatibility between sensors,
video display, bandwidth, and antennas has emerged as a priority for the intelligence, aviation,
and maneuver communities. Compatibility with the existing ISR infrastructure and the ability to
use existing ISR tools for exploitation are key elements to UAS functionality. Referring to
Sterman's model of complementary goods shown in Figure 30, it illustrates that the interface
standards would increase the ability for third party entry with complementary goods [77].
Technology in this "information age" is getting smaller, cheaper and more powerful almost
daily. Right now, however, the cost of entry for many possible third party venders at the highend UAS segment is limited because of the large upfront costs and the relatively "closed"
Transformation Planningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
military market. Until the FAA puts out UAS standards, it is unlikely that this situation will
change dramatically without a new acquisition program on the part of the DoD.
Industry
Demand
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Attractiveness of
Market to Third
Parties
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Transformation Plan
John Walker, co-chairman of RTCA Special Committee 203, equated UAS integration to the
billions of dollars and decades spent fielding TCAS on passenger aircraft. Developing a
comparable sense and avoid capability for unmanned aircraft will be more difficult than the
development of TCAS and require a rigorous systems engineering approach.
"The dates keep slipping to the right. The only way we're going to
have the dates go to the left is to have industry involvement"[82]
Technology Innovation: Where to Go from Here?
Understanding how to make sense of one's time and to seize the opportunities it presents is
fundamental to the success and growth of a business or industry [83]. Northrop Grumman (NG)
is at an interesting position in the UAS technology domain with respect to its posture in the
High-Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft system (UAS) market segment.
Within the broader scope of the aerospace environment, the immediate context surrounds their
UAS product line and the direction they should take technology development efforts. Should
NG look to extend its position within the defense aerospace sector by focusing on the unmanned
air combat vehicle (UCAV) development effort by the Navy? Or would it be more profitable to
drive evolutionary developments by building on the success of the RQ-4 Global Hawk platform
and their recent win of the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) contract,
leveraging their experience with the HALE mission? Alternatively, they could also bolster the
efforts of the UAS industry as a whole in expanding the realm of UAS markets by aggressively
pursuing and aiding in the development of the appropriate equipage standards to access larger
government and civil markets with their technology. These scenarios, depicted in the illustration
below, can be categorized generally as new defense aerospace markets (UCAV), consolidation
and expansion of existing defense aerospace markets (HALE and MALE), and non-defense or
civil markets.
UCAV Mar
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Civil Market Segment
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To get to the bottom of these questions, both the demand opportunity and the technology
evolution and trajectory must be assessed. First, it is critical that the demand environment be
appropriately characterized for each of the three scenarios represented in the three questions
raised in the above paragraph. The UCAV market segment is considered to be an area of future
growth in the defense aerospace market segment, and one that many believe will ultimately
replace the manned bomber mission as the technologies continue to mature. The largest
uncertainty with the UCAV development effort is the long-term viability of the program itself.
Without getting into the history of the effort, the current situation has pitted NG and Boeing
Company against each other for what is sure to be a long, drawn-out acquisition program with
the Navy for a carrier-based UCAV capability that provides long-range, high-endurance, and low
observable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability to the fleet. Current
estimates put the expected number of total systems at around the 70 aircraft mark [85]. NG was
awarded one of the N-UCAS development contracts for a total of $637M, responding to a Navy
Request for Proposal (RFP) worth a total of $1.9B over the next 6-year technology
demonstration program [86].
The UCAS effort is squarely within the earlyferment stage of technological development and
NG would need to pursue an aggressive architectural or potentially radical innovation strategy to
be successful in this effort against Boeing [71]. In contrast, the technological innovation
required for improving on the existing Global Hawk and BAMS product line would shift the
focus to an incremental or potentially modular innovation effort (See Figure 32 below). In
addition, the higher degree of maturity in the Global Hawk technology puts the overall effort
further along the trajectory evolution path, with the emphasis shifting from providing purely
functional capabilities housed in highly integrative designs to a more incremental innovation
approach that capitalizes on NG's apparent dominant design with the Global Hawk.
UCAV Innovation
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TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
With the award of the BAMS contract, this also puts NG in a position to begin a "descent" into
the Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) market segment dominated up to this point by
General Atomics with the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper. In contrast to the UCAV market
segment, the HALE market segment is currently exclusively dominated by NG, and at least in
the immediate future, their position in this segment appears to be safe from any significant threat
from one of the other major defense aerospace contractors (assuming that Lockheed Martin's
protest of the BAMS contract award is unsuccessful). The biggest question is what the demand
opportunity is if NG stays in the HALE niche, even if it tries to expand into the upper end of the
MALE segment. The BAMS contract is worth $1.6B over an 89-month contract period to take
the program through system design and development (SDD) [87]. Total expenditures for the full
complement of 68 systems are budgeted for approximately $3B [88].
The third market segment is the non-defense aerospace sector with an expansion into other
governmental markets and beyond that into the commercial arena. This market segment is
completely uncharted territory and is unlikely to see any major penetration for some time to
come. The size of this market is difficult to estimate given the lack of any good analogous
information from anything other than the defense aerospace domain. Initial looks into various
niches of this broader market suggest orders of magnitude size differential in this segment than
those just cited for the defense sector (See Figure 33 for methodology on understanding UAS
markets within the civil airspace structure. For instance, in the small UAS segment, the law
enforcement application market potential was estimated at $3.5B, and this represents just a single
niche within one segment of UAS applications (NG also has highly successful UAS platforms in
the small UAS market segment, including the Hunter and Fire Scout) [89].
UAV as
substitute
(pQInuai competMian)
A"P
Applicaons that need
to be perftormd
(potential markets)
!fire
UAV
"capabllties
UAV as
enabler
33: Itareltinlg ( ivilAirslpace Miirkets for liAS Apllications (9)1
Given the access, the civil market potential is easily in the tens of billions of dollars with
significant headroom to continue to grow as the technology drives down cost and brings
performance up. The major hurdle to market penetration is the lack of FAA UAS type
certification standards for commercial UAS use. Without type certification standards, UAS
providers are limited to selling UAS platforms to self-certifying, public aircraft operators like the
DoD. Sales of UAS for civil and commercial applications cannot be done legally until the FAA
establishes the appropriate type certification standards and then provides the needed
certifications to requesting UAS manufacturers. Estimates on the publication of these standards
range from 2015 to 2025 depending on the scenario used and assumptions made about the
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
political and national security context within which the FAA operates the National Airspace
System (NAS) [91].
Clearly, the long-term payoff and market growth potential is within the commercial and civil
applications sector. Access to this untouched market space will be an arduous process that will
require a significant degree of insight into the broader UAS ecosystem and the value propositions
each of the major stakeholders have in bringing this market into play. A bold, well-played move
on the part of NG in this arena could pay dividends in the future that would make the UCAV and
HALE/MALE defense sectors look insignificant in comparison.
Building the Ecosystem
So what does NG need to implement in order to break into the civil market segment and capture
significant value for their efforts? First and foremost, NG must realize that it requires a longterm perspective on the growth potential in this market segment. The work done over the next 5
to 10 years will not show up in positive quarterly earnings statements for some time to come;
however, the ground work that is laid for establishing a viable civil UAS ecosystem will provide
intangible benefits in the future that will be difficult if not impossible for competitors to match
once the market finally opens up [92].
A key piece to building this ecosystem (see Figure 28 for UAS ecosystem) is to identify the other
key players and a transition path out of the current defense sector ecosystem into the new one. The
differences in these environments could scarcely be more diverse. In the DoD environment,
performance is paramount, and a significant amount of budget and schedule will be traded away to
get the last ounce of weight, speed, or range out of a design. Safety considerations, while
important, take a back seat to mission capability and effectiveness. The civil environment is a
different dynamic altogether. In fact, if the defense sector is likened to a heavily forested
landscape with plenty of "cover" in which to continue pushing the technology, the civil
environment is a veritable desert for the high degree of exposure it leaves the inhabitant to the
scrutiny and judgment of the existing civil airspace players.
The dominant presence on this civil landscape is the FAA. Their role as the regulator of civil
airspace puts them in a unique and powerful position with respect to the strategy NG will need to
pursue if they are to successfully penetrate this market. In addition to the FAA, the NG plan will
also need to address a myriad of other players, including existing civil airspace user lobbying
groups like the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA). The dearth of standards will also require active engagement with various standards
writing bodies like the RTCA, the federal advisory committee to the FAA on proposed rule
changes. NG will even need to build relationships with other UAS manufacturers and equipment
providers that may on the surface appear to be direct competitors in this market space. This would
include companies like General Atomics, Raytheon, Sierra Vista, and others that may have similar
motivations for seeing the civil airspace opened up for commercial UAS use.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
The one consistent element in the transition across this landscape from the defense sector to the
commercial environment is the DoD. Surprisingly, perhaps, the DoD has a keen interest in seeing
UAS flight capable in the NAS. (See Figure 34 below for historical and projected growth of DoD
requests for UAS access to the NAS). This provides a strong alliance and a technology/funding
bridge that NG may be able to leverage to their advantage in establishing themselves in this new
ecosystem. Having the DoD in the mix is not to be underestimated in considering the challenges
associated with trying to build a UAS presence in the civil airspace ecosystem. There is intense
competition for resources within this arena (both in terms of air traffic services and access to
airspace), and incumbents see the UAS capability itself as a program that will suck resources out of
the entire system.
MActual COAs
i Forecasted COAs
400
250
200
24
2004
102
119
2006
2007
55
2005
2008
2009
2010
Figure 34: Actual and Aniicip ed Requests IN the 1DoD for ljAS Access to the NAS 1311
In addition, there are a whole host of market niches (See Figure 35) that see the UAS as a potential
disruptive technology in their area of application because the UAS may be able to provide
comparable or better performance at significantly lower costs [63]. A major component to a
successful UAS transplant in the civil ecosystem will be a well-planned, symbiotic relationship
with the DoD, and solid alignment with a targeted civil UAS application niche that provides a way
to establish a foothold in the broader civil airspace.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Police &
Agriculture
Paramilitary
Fire Fighting
Power & Pipeline
Monitoring
Comu rucati ns
Fisheries
Protection
Protection
Disaster
Relief
Herd
Management
Imagery &
Mapping
R
b
Search &
Rescue
Researc
h
Media
Atmospheric
Border
Surveillance
Delivery
Services
Monitoring
The key considerations in light of these factors devolve primarily down two specific lines. The
first set of issues deal primarily with how NG relates to the FAA and the DoD in attempting to
build out the UAS civil ecosystem. The second pertains to the lateral and downward focused
relationships needed with the rest of the ecosystem players for the effort to be successful. As
might be imagined, these two arenas are highly coupled, and the constraints in the first set of
considerations will drive to a significant degree the strategy that will be recommended in the
second. These two sets of considerations can be thought of within the frameworks of creating
value versus capturing value.
Value Creation
Value creation occurs across the domains of demand opportunity, business ecosystems and
technological infrastructure [94]. The primary consideration for NG in the area of value creation
is how to go about delivering what is important to the decision makers holding the keys to civil
airspace access for UAS, primarily the FAA. Prior work accomplished in the area of FAA value
definition with respect to flying both military and civil UAS in the NAS very clearly established
the need for safe operations as the most critical factor in the FAA's considerations [55]. This
value priority with the FAA is depicted in Figure 36.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
High,
Stakeholder: FAA
0
oI
------------------------------------------------
Sj
Data on Platforms
Experience
Leverage Resources
Low
Stakeholder Relative Importance to Enterprise
High
!Figure 36: FAA Valuti! Deli)eI t-rN and Inimaportatce in I AS ()lOerations
The single largest barrier UAS face to the safety challenge is the ability to see and avoid other
aircraft, as defined in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 1, Part 91--General Operating
and Flight Rules. Essentially, the FAA wants assurance that a UAS will have the ability to comply
with this part of the regulations despite no longer having a pair of human eyes and the brain that
accompanies it in the aircraft. There are significant technological and legal challenges intertwined
in this topic, and both sets of issues must be resolved before the FAA's value proposition will be
sufficiently addressed to warrant opening the civil airspace up to commercial UAS use.
The technological piece required for the sense and avoid capability is the ability to sense other
aircraft on or in the proximity of the UAS flight path, determine the potential for a collision, and
then take the appropriate evasive maneuver to ensure that a collision does not occur. This must be
accomplished in all flight conditions for which the aircraft is certified, and it must be capable of
performing its function even when command and control links may have been lost with the ground
station, implying a level of autonomy in the flight control system that has never been required or
tested-at least as flight critical hardware and software. Figure 37 provides the overall structure
and considerations that must be addressed in the civil airspace environment.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Figure 37: ( )I erlivew of ( i i I IAS ()l)erational Requiremenits 1761
The legal issues pertain to the development, implementation, and "ownership" of the collision
avoidance algorithm by which the UAS will determine which actions to take for the avoidance
maneuver described above. Current collision avoidance systems aboard passenger aircraft employ
a system that was developed, tested, and mandated by the FAA under Congressionally mandated
requirements and at a cost of billions of dollars. These piloted aircraft collision avoidance
resolution advisories provide simple climb or descend instructions to the pilot who then determines
whether the course of action prescribed by the system is appropriate. The FAA owns all of the
liability associated with the proper functioning of these algorithms. In the UAS case, no such
ownership currently exists, and the FAA has not been funded by Congress to move forward and
develop an equivalent set of avoidance algorithms for UAS use.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Fortunately, developing solutions to these two very difficult challenges does not have to be done
by NG attempting to "go it alone." In fact, if done correctly, NG should be able to leverage many
of the previously mentioned contracts in place with the defense sector to underwrite significant
portions of this work. The Air Force already has several million dollars in contract with NG to
begin exploratory work on a true sense and avoid capability for Global Hawk, and it has budgeted
upward of $80M over the next four years to attempt a prototype implementation of an sense and
avoid system. In addition, the BAMS requirements document put out by the Navy also includes
the ability to do integrated airspace operations as a key performance parameter. Both of these
venues give NG a significant leg up on the competition when it comes to a funding stream for
sorting through the technology development challenges described above.
In addition, NG has also established strategic research and development efforts with the Army
Research Laboratory and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to expand the current flight
control algorithms to accept inputs from other feeds into the autopilot routines. An initial set of
tests were conducted with the FAA's participation back in the Summer and Fall of 2007, which
tested the overall performance of an electro-optical sensor package running a proprietary detection
algorithm and connected into the flight control algorithms used by Global Hawk. While the results
of the testing demonstrated that a significant amount of work remained before this particular sense
and avoid architecture would be viable, enough progress was made to convince the Air Force to
fund the more significant effort mentioned above. It also provided an opportunity for NG to
interface with a sense and avoid sensor provider to begin to understand a number of the processing
and size, weight and power (SWaP) requirements for this kind of a system. Perhaps the most
important conclusion to come out of this series of tests was the realization that a single sensor type
would not be sufficiently robust to meet the FAA's safety concerns. This pushed the technology
pursuits further afield to address multisensory fusion techniques (Example of this type of sensor
suite is shown in Figure 38 below). Interestingly, with the recent emergence of the Army's
GBSAA technology, NG could get involved in the Army's efforts with the Shadow UAS as well.
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Value creation is also possible for the sensor and algorithm subsystem providers. As additional
capability is sought to increase the sense and avoid performance, NG continues to investigate other
vendors' capabilities for potential applications or solutions. Viable alternative technologies in the
electro-optical, infrared, and radar arenas are actively being investigated and pursued. The
implementation of a successful sense and avoid capability would provide a path for several leading
contenders in the sensor subsystem and algorithm processing fields to contribute to advancing
UAS platforms into mainstream civil airspace use.
Value creation for NG can be considered as the locus between the demand opportunity represented
by the civil UAS airspace market, the on-going work NG is already on contract to perform for both
the Air Force and Navy within the military UAS ecosystem, and the technology insights that have
resulted from recent R&D efforts with AFRL and several sensor subsystem manufacturers. The
final issue is to describe how NG brings that value creation to materialization and captures a
significant amount of the profits as the fruit of its labors.
Value Capture
Achieving a significant capture of value in this endeavor will require NG to do a number of
things that may be well outside of its comfort zone. Essentially, NG must deal with the issues of
sense and avoid design and architecture in a way that allows it to balance the competing
demands of an integrated vs. modular architecture as it relates to a significant standards
development effort. No one wants to "own" the collision avoidance/sense and avoid algorithms
as a proprietary standard. In addition, NG must be very deliberate about how it creates the sense
and avoid architecture. As Christensen et al. indicate, NG must stay in the game where
significant performance gains are still needed. Christensen makes the following statement with
respect to anticipating where the profit is headed:
"The power to capture attractiveprofits will shift in the value chain to those activities
where the immediate customer is not yet satisfied with the functionality of available
products. It is in these stages that complex, interdependentintegration occurs-activities
that create steeper economies of scale andgreater opportunitiesfor differentiation" [63].
The implications of the above observations provide a clear path ahead for NG. First, the
collision avoidance algorithm should be "open sourced" on the part of NG. They already have a
significant position within the military UAS ecosystem with their flight control algorithms and
the additional work they have accomplished with AFRL on preliminary collision avoidance
algorithm integration. The smartest move they could make would be to offer up their control
algorithms to the community as a point of departure for a more robust, community-wide set of
algorithms that could eventually be transferred over to the FAA for safe keeping and
configuration control, just as the current piloted aircraft collision avoidance algorithms are.
Open sourcing the flight control algorithm opens additional resources up for NG to use in
pursuing those aspects of the value chain they do want to own, primarily the know-how to
integrate the entire system in a way that satisfies the FAA's demand for safety performance.
This is an area where the sum of the parts is almost always greater than the whole. The tacit
knowledge NG gains in this area as it develops and deploys initial sense and avoid capability on
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
the Air Force's Global Hawk will be both expensive and timely for others to attempt to replicate.
NG can also expand its expertise to the Army's efforts with GBSAA and the Shadow UAS. This
puts them in a position of inimitability and durability with respect to their end-to-end system
integration capabilities and provides them with a distinctive competence that few, if any others
will be able to claim. It also gives them potential first-mover advantages in the market, which,
when coupled with what will likely be a high degree of tacit knowledge, makes it plausible that
NG will be able to sustain this advantage for a considerable period of time (See Figure 39) [96].
The advantage they cultivate in the current "calm waters" market condition of the UAS civil.
The advantage they cultivate in the current calm waters market condition of the UAS civil
segment, however, will have to be jealously guarded by continuing investments in the
appropriate technology as the market opens up and the dynamic shifts to a technology leads
market place.
First-Mover Advantage
The Situation
Your Company Faces
i Calm Waters
Short-Lived
Durable
Key Resources
Required
Unlikely
fven if attainable,
advantaqe is not large.
Very likely
Movng first will almost
certainly pay off
Brand awareness
helpfu, but resources
iess crucial here
Very likely
Sven if you (an1't doimrinate
the atego'y, you sJKuld
be abie to hold onto ".).I
Likely
Large-scale marketing,
Make sure you have the
distribution, and pro-
resou ces to address all
market segment as
they emrerge
duction capacity
L
The Market Leads
L~ilir
Lk %i
The Technology
Leads
Rough Waters
' s
Very unlkely
A fast-changing technol.
ogy in a slow-growing
market is the enemy of
short4term gains.
Fast technolokgal
change will give later
entrants lots ofweapons
for attackinrg you.
Strong R&D and new
product development,
deep pockets
Large-scale marketing,
distribution, production, and strong R&D
(all at once)
Figure 39: The Durabhilit of First Mover Advantage in Various ]'pes of Markets 179I
Given their history in radar sensors, they may also consider the potential for developing a sense
and avoid targeted radar that is specifically designed to address the size, weight, and power
(SWaP), and performance needs of the sense and avoid space. Current radar technology has
been tuned for significantly greater ranges. There are currently no viable low-SWaP radars
capable of doing the sense and avoid mission. This would also meet Christensen's
recommendation to focus on those areas that are currently lacking the required functionality.
In the end, the success of this approach will depend to a significant degree on how well NG can
balance the performance needs of the sense and avoid system with the advantages that a modular
approach may provide to the broader ecosystem, and the resulting relationships that it needs to
establish with other sensor providers. This should occur in a phased approach that allows NG to
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the National Airspace
pursue fairly tightly integrated systems initially that then migrate to more modular architectures
as the technology improves and additional vendors begin to enter the market. Once the FAA
finally approves the standards, there will be a massive wave of new entrants into the market
space. If NG has not already transitioned to a modular approach for significant sensor providers,
it will face the very real possibility of losing much of the market share to faster moving, smaller
companies. A modular approach, while providing upfront performance challenges, provides for
a relatively quick and cheap way to "plug-and-play" different components in the architecture
should one fail, or another becomes available that is cheaper or does the job faster. As a result,
NG must establish and build the relationships that will help it preserve its unique market position
as the ecosystem leader by providing the motivation and mechanisms by which other subsystem
vendors can find niche markets and establish enduring relationships.
The final point to be made with respect to the modularity of the sense and avoid architecture
decision is the fact that the FAA evaluation approach will make doing highly integrated sense
and avoid systems a much more costly way of attempting development. Without a modular
architecture, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to decouple major elements of the system in
order to isolate the root cause of a problem. Beyond that, it will require the redesign of the entire
system to fix a shortfall or deficiency with the product. A modular approach, while providing
upfront performance challenges, provides for a relatively quick and cheap way to "plug-andplay" different components in the architecture should one fail, or another becomes available that
is cheaper for does the job faster.
To provide the needed overall direction and strategy to the effort, NG should employ a simple
rules strategy that focuses on a couple of critical processes and relies on a set of standard criteria
against which to make design and implementation decisions [97]. This approach works well
when there is a significant amount of uncertainty in the way in which the environment will
develop, and it provides a good match with recommendations for how the FAA and the DoD
themselves should consider addressing this issue [98]. By establishing a set of clear guiding
criteria for making resource allocations and design decisions, NG will put itself in a place where
others will begin using the same set of criteria, fostering a greater degree of unanimity in the
approaches and implementation paths taken in the community. By instituting several critical
processes with the FAA, DoD and other SAA subsystem providers, NG can stay on top of the
coordination and R&D game between interested and concerned parties.
Recommendations
To take full advantage of its current position on the HALE UAS defense sector, NG should
implement a pioneering approach to tackling the lack of FAA type certification standards. By
stepping up to provide a catalyst in the UAS civil market arena, NG has the potential of seeing
significant first mover advantages, as previously described. Specifically, NG should carefully
consider the move to putting its algorithm for flight control out in the open source community to
help foster transparency and begin the process of building to an industry wide standard. They
should leverage their existing work with the DoD to build their core expertise around the end-toend integration of systems, and pursue the subsystem design for specific sensor technologies
where it already has a strong presence, such as that for radars.
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Section 4: Conclusion
Leadership for Success
Context based leadership involves a lifecycle of opportunity structure spanning from
entrepreneurial, managerial, and leadership personnel. Each represents the early phase, growth
phase, and declining phase respectively of the traditional lifecycle of business opportunities [99].
Companies within the airline industry parallel this traditional lifecycle. In fact, many of the early
industry leaders were "larger than life" executives who helped create the foundation of the entire
industry [100]. As dominant business models emerged, a different type of executive was
attracted to the industry - those who could assist in the growth and maturity of the airline
industry. Moreover, the airline industry now dictates that it requires leaders who can reinvent
the business model and focus on realignment, restructuring, and cost management.
The airline business is an interesting example of an industry that has evolved as a result of not
only just the technological evolution of aviation operations but also the interdependencies of the
various leaders and the contextual factors. Interestingly, the emergence of the UAS industry and
the pursuit of their integration into the NAS appears to follow a similar trend in that leadership is
a significant factor for the business evolution. Furthermore, the UAS technology is currently in a
growth phase yet the actual operation of UAS is within the early phase of the traditional
lifecycle. However, since the UAS industry is emerging within the well-established aviation
community, UAS operations may push commercial airline operations through a regenerative
lifecycle as opposed to a complete decline. The majority of the current stakeholders and leaders
within the UAS community are also heavily involved in the commercial aviation community. As
a result, leadership roles are played by a number of organizations. The military services are
forging the way ahead on both operational and technological advancement, making strong use of
a significant amount of funding to shape both the capabilities, type, and number of UAS in use
[31].
UAS technology is quite advanced with some dominant designs beginning to emerge. Professor
Anthony Mayo makes the following observation with respect to the industry evolution of the
airline industry, which directly applies to the development and evolution UAS industry:
"Duringthese intense inflectionperiods within industries, leaders emerge to make sense of
the chaos and define a new business model that is more aligned with the changing
contextual landscape. This model may have the potential to become the new dominant
business model, or alternatively, it may set the stagefor a parallelopportunityfor success.
Leaders reintroduce variation and change into the stability of the past to create new
opportunitiesfor success, and in so doing they help to regeneratethe lifecycle of the entire
industry" [100].
The hindrance to the UAS industry is access to the commercial airspace, which requires
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
managerial activity to ensure efficiency and standardization as opposed to the entrepreneurial
activity normally associated with an industry in its early phase. Much of this is due to the rapid
technological advancement of UASs, their implementation into military operations due to global
events, and a lack of access to the tightly regulated aviation market and airspace. The
technology is ready, but the process is not, so a managerial leader with a touch of the
entrepreneurial spirit from a well-established aerospace business will help forge the integration
of UAS into the civil and commercial markets and continue to promote innovation throughout
the entire aviation industry.
Final Thoughts
Enterprise architecture is a holistic way of thinking which is essential to modem enterprises,
such as the National Airspace, that have highly interconnected systems. It is necessary to
integrate management processes, lifecycle processes, and enable infrastructure systems.
Furthermore, enterprise architecting balances the needs of multiple stakeholders working within
and across boundaries and enables a full understanding of the value exchange, expectations,
needs, and interactions. Technology in the UAS industry is advancing very rapidly and current
military operations provide an optimal test bed for such innovation, which will assist the
transition of UAS operations within the civil and commercial markets. Both Enterprise
Architecture and Technology Strategy focus on a holistic approach and integrate enterprise
strategic objectives, value capture and creation, in a systematic approach to achieve success in a
complex, highly technical enterprise system.
History has shown that technological advances associated with military aircraft eventually make
their way in the civilian sector [2]. Federal agencies are planning to increase their use of UASs.
State and local governments envision using UASs to aid in law enforcement and firefighting.
Potential commercial uses are also possible such as power and pipeline monitoring, search and
rescue, environmental monitoring, delivery services, and imaging/mapping. UASs could
perform some piloted aircraft missions with less noise and fewer emissions. The new UAS
technologies under development today will have a profound impact on the entire aviation
industry. The investments and the technological advances made by military organizations have
generated a growing interest in their potential use for civil government, scientific research, and
commercial applications. Enabling routine access to the NAS by leveraging existing procedures
for piloted flight operations, and using current guidance for unique military operations will yield
a path for NAS integration and significant growth in the civil and commercial UAS market will
immediately follow.
Revolutionary new technologies are not only being introduced in the current conflicts in the
Middle East, but also used in increasingly greater numbers with novel and unexpected effects.
Everything that seems so futuristic in the field of UAS development and artificial intelligence is
playing out in the current state, and parallels familiar historical patterns in past aviation
development. These new technologies are being used in ways that were previously thought
impossible, capabilities that were not possible before, and creating new issues as well as
complicating old ones. UASs are doing amazing things in Iraq and Afghanistan and this robotics
revolution forces many to reshape, reevaluate, and reconsider what the future holds for flight
operations and applications in the National Airspace System.
94
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26. National Airspace System. (2008, September 18). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia.
Retrieved 21:18, April 23, 2009, from
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30. Sickmeier, D. ProjectManager UnmannedAircraft Systems, ProjectIntegratorfor
GBSAA. Huntsville Alabama, March - April 2009. Email, Kristina Richardson.
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39. Nightingale, D. and D.H. Rhodes, Lecture 5- Value, Enterprise,& Stakeholders in
ESD.38 Enterprise Architecting. Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Cambridge, MA
20 February 2008.
40. Grossi, I., StakeholderAnalysis in the Context of the Lean Enterprise,in Engineering
Systems Division. 2003, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Cambridge, MA. p. 72.
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45. Joint UnmannedAircraft System Centerfor Excellence (JUAS COE). [Webpage] 2009
[cited 24 April 2009]; Website. Available from
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47. Airline Pilots Association International(ALPA). [Webpage] 2009 [cited 25 April 2009];
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48. Associationfor Unmanned Vehicle Systems International(A UVSI). [Webpage] 2009
[cited 25 April 2009]; Website. Available from http://www.auvsi.org/about/
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2009]; Website. Available from http://www.icao.int/icao/en/strategic objectives.htm
50. Radio Technical Commissionfor Aeronautics (RTCA). [Webpage] 2009 [cited 24 April
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51. Mitchell, R.K., B.R. Agle, and D.J. Wood, Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification
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52. Grossi, I., StakeholderAnalysis in the Context of the Lean Enterprise,Engineering
Systems Division. 2003, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Cambridge, MA.
53. Nightingale, D. and D.H. Rhodes, Lecture 7: Enterprise Views in ESD.38 Enterprise
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Architecting. Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Cambridge, MA 2009
54. Nightingale, D. and D.H. Rhodes, Lecture 5: Value, Enterprise,Stakeholders in ESD.38
Enterprise Architecting. Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Cambridge, MA 2008.
55. Blackburn, C., et al., Integratingthe FederalAviation Administration UnmannedAircraft
ExperimentalAircraft CertificationProcess. 2007, Massachusetts Institute of
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56. UAS Joint Integrated Product Team, UnmannedAircraft Systems Airspace Integration
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58. Hughes, D., UA Vs Face Hurdles in GainingAccess to Civil Airspace. [Webpage] 2007
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2 12 0 7 p1 .xml&headline=UAVs%2OFace%20Hurdles%20in%20Gainin%20Access% 2 0 t
o%20Civil%20Airspace
59. Connelly (now Richardson) K., et al., Assessing TechnologicalInnovation in the
Unmanned Aircraft System Domain. 15.905 Paper 1 Submission. Sloan School of
Business, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Cambridge MA: 2008.
60. Dertien, Evan C., and Eric J. Felt. PersistentSurveillance: Maximizing Airpower
Effectiveness in IrregularWarfare. Research Report. Air University, 2007.
61. OSD(AT&L)/PSA/Unmanned Warfare Office. DoD UnmannedAircraft Systems Task
Force Update. Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2008. AUVSI Briefing. pp 21.
62. McGahan, Anita M. How Industries Change. Harvard Business Review 1-23 (2004): 8.
63. Christensen, Clayton M., Michael E. Raynor, and Matthew Verlinden. Skate to Where the
Money Will Be. Harvard Business Review (2001): 10.
64. Miasnikov, E. Threat of Terrorism Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Moscow: Center
for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institue of Physics &
Technology, 2005.
65. Sarris, Z. Survey of UA VApplications in Civil Markets. Crete, Greece : Technical
University of Crete, 2001.
66. Turn Customer Input into Innovation. Ulwick, Anthony W. 2002, Harvard Business
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67. Weibel, Roland and Hansman, R. John. Barriers to Operational Approval of Air
Transportation System Capabilities. MIT InternationalCenterfor Air Transport.
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68. The Center for Telecommunications and Information Engineering, Monash University.
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InterdependentEvolutions and Histories.[Webpage] February 2, 2003. [Cited: April 15,
2008.]; Website. Available from
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69. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Front View of Air Vehicle 1. X-45 Hanger
Shots. [Webpage] Department of Defense, July 11, 2002. [Cited: April 15, 2008.];
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and
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71. Davies, Michael. Lecture 3: Demand Opportunity. 15.905 Technology Strategy.
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72. Afuah, Allen M. and Utterback, James M. The Emergence of a New Supercomputer
Architecture. Technological Forecastingand Social Change. 1991, Vol. 40.
73. Connelly (now Richardson) K., et al., UA V- Disruptive Technology? 15.365 Final Paper
Submission. Sloan School of Business, Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
Cambridge MA: 2008.
74. Weil, Henry. Many Markets Experience a Wave of Innovation. 15.365-Distruptive
Technology: Predatoror Prey? Cambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
2008.
75. Davies, Michael A.M. Lecture 6: Business Ecosystems. 15.905 - Technology Strategy.
Cambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008.
76. RTCA Special Committee 203. DO-304: Guidance Materialand Considerationsfor
Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Washington DC : RTCA, 2007.
77. Sterman, John D. Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking andModelingfor a Complex
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81. Silver, Matthew R. and de Weck, Olivier L. Time-Expanded Decision Networks: A
Framework for Designing Evolvable Complex Systems. Systems Engineering.2007, Vol.
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83. Mayo, A. and N. Nohria. In Their Time - Great Business Leaders of the 2 0 h Century,
Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation 2005. pg xv.
84. Connelly (now Richardson) K., et al. Creatingand Capturing Value: Next Moves for
Northrop Grumman in the Unmanned Aircraft System Domain. 15.905 Final Paper.
Sloan School of Business, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Cambridge MA: 2008.
85. OPNAV N8F. Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Planfor Constructionof
Naval Vessels for FY2008. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
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86. U.S. Navy Opens UCAS-D Contest. Military Aircraft. [Webpage] Air-Attack: News and
Facts on Military Aviation and Space Projects, February 26, 2007. [Cited: May 12,
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90. Basil, Papadales. Stimulating a Civil UA V Market in the UnitedStates. s.l. : Moire Inc.,
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102
U__(ll___al_____LIII__L____LIIIIIL
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91. Walker, John. Chairman,RTCA Special Committee 203: UnmannedAircraft Systems.
Philedelphia, PA, April 25, 2008.
92. Moore, James F. Predatorsand Prey: A New Ecology of Competition. Harvard Business
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Washington Internships for Students of Engineering, 2007.
94. Davies, Michael. Lecture 7: Business Ecosystems, Value Capture and StandardsBattles.
15.905 Technology Strategy. Cambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institutue of Technology,
2008.
95. Raytheon Company. Multi-Spectral Targeting System Information Pamphlet.
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96. Collis, David and Montgomery, Cynthia. Competing on Resources. Harvard Business
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98. Cropsey, Luke. IntegratingMilitary UnmannedAircraft into the National Airspace
System: An EnterpriseArchitecting Perspective. ESD.38-Enterprise Architecting Final
Report. Cambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008.
99. Mayo, Anthony. Lecture 4: Industry Evolution and the Role of Leadership. Harvard
Business School, 2009.
100. Mayo, A., Nitin Nohria and Mark Rennella. Entrepreneurs, Managers, and Leaders:
What the Airline Industry Can Teach Us About Leadership. Unpublished version.
103
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Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)
104
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
Appendix 1: Complete Stakeholder List [76]
iountry Name
Company
Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation
iARCAA)
AUSTRAL IA
S Ai ustratia
Cvii Aviation Safety Authority ,LCA1
V TOL Aerospace Pty Limited
AiST RA I A
AUJSTRAUIA
Exec-tve Board Mernber Techr ;ca!i!!,s
'vacketi Aerospace C:eintre
EUROCONTROL
Executive Board Memnber Techical Affairs
At S1 PA/L1A
BELGIUM
Belgium
Captain
Canadian Air Force
CANADA
Trade Cominnirssioner Aerospace )efeice and
SecuritL
Contributing Editor
Foreign Affairs and intenatiorial Trade Canada
CANADA
Jane's
CANADA
Systenms Engrinee
Unmanned Aircraft
M/A' Airborne Systems
CANADA
Aircraft Certification
Transport Canada
CANADA
Secretary Treasurer
Unmnanned Vehicle Systems Canada inc
CANADA
President
UVS Canada
CANADA
Chief Air Traffic Management
ICAO Air Navigation Bureau
Canada
CS Communication & Systemes
FRANCE
Dassault Aviation
FRANCE
DSNA/DTI
FRANCE
SAGEM Defense Securite
FRANCE
Ihales Alenia Space
FRANCE
UVS International
FRANCE
DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH
Germany
Military Air Systems (MAS)
EADS Deutschland GmbH, Willy Messerschmitt Strale
Germany
Head of Airspace Management Navigation and
Procedures
German Air Navigation Services Headquarters
Germany
industrieanlagen Betriebsgese!lschaft mbH
GERMANY
Manager Marketing and Sales
Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems
Germany
Airworthiness Manager
israel Aircraft Industries. Ltd
Israel
CTO Certification Policy Manager
Alenia Aeronautica S p A
ITALY
Ph D Candiate
Nara Institute of Science & Technology
JAPAN
R&D Engineer
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
NETHERLANDS
President
TGR Helicorp Ltd
NEW ZEALAND
Boeing Research and Technology Europe
Technology Expert
Boeing
BOEING RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY EUROPE S L
SPAIN
SPAIN
Product Manager. Airborne ATM
BAE Systems
Chief Airworthiness Engineer and Head of
Flight Safety
Managing Directoi
BAE SYSTEMS - Regional Aircraft
AirTraffic Standards Department
CA'.
UNITED
KINGDOM
UNITED
KINGDOM
UNITED
KINGDOM
UNITED
KINGDOM
TItle
Oueens and I r,-versit of I echnoloa,,
e S Oficer
Senior Ar!r thinesiz
UAS Busrness Developr'ent MarnaqeChiet Design Enginee"r
Senior Programme Manager
President
Barnard Microsystems Limited
105
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
Secretary
Eurocae WG73 UAV
ISRA PF£ residet I
ISRA!iine Pilot
Association President
OinetiQ
ihales
Thales UK
Chief Systemns Eneei
Polcy & 'Standa rds Safer
Regulatior G ur-oi
IUK CiviiAviation Authority
UNITED
KINGDOM
UNITED
KINGDOM
UNITED
KINGDOM
itNITED
KINGDOM
UN ITED
KINGDOM
UNITED
KINGDOM
Executive Director
AU.jVSi
UNITED
KINGDOM
LUNiTED STATES
Sr. Software System Safety Engineer
US Army AMRDECiSED Aviation Divisionr
UNITED STATES
University of Birmrigham
Director Advanced Technologies
AAI Corp
UNITED STATES
AAl Corporation
UNITED STATES
Academy of Model Aviation
UNITED STATES
Aviation Communication Surveillance Systems LLC
UNITED STATES
Staff Engineer
ACSS
Senior Systems Engineei
Adsystech
UNITED STATES
President
Advanced Ceramics Research
UNITED STATES
AERO&SPACE USA INC
UNITED STATES
Sr Systems Engineer
Aerodyne
UNITED STATES
Business Development Manager
Aerosonde
UNITED STATES
Editor
Aerospace Daily
UNITED STATES
CFO and CTO
Aerotonomy Inc
UNITED STATES
AeroVironment
UNITED STATES
AFRL
UNITED STATES
AFRL/HEAS
UNITED STATES
AFRL/UAC
UNITED STATES
AFRL/VACC -Control Systems Dev
UNITED STATES
A!A
UNITED STATES
Air Force
UNITED STATES
Air Force 452 FLTS/DO
UNITED STATES
Air Force, AFRLNACC
UNITED STATES
Air Force RSWiXRX
UNITED STATES
Air Line Pilots Association
UNITED STATES
Air War College
UNITED STATES
Consultant
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
UNITED STATES
Manager Regulatory Affairs
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
UNITED STATES
Airline Pilots Association
UNITED STATES
Alias Science
UNITED STATES
AmTech Center for Collaboration
UNITED STATES
Director Business Development
Analytical Graphics inc
UNITED STATES
Senior Analyst
ANSER
UNITED STATES
Lieutenant Colonel
106
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
:c
ivim
- nEhi
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i T
fr
1N TED STATES
,e
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T
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Specalu!,
ic,
geei
LNITED STAT ES
A ED Si
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:Manorae Manae
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UMITED STATES
t0aiW 1 es[ Ranges
Range Safety Team iead
Chef
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fii
UNITE
PFesdn t
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ti.s-:'ates
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Aviatin
Presiaent
Suppor Associates
D
STATES
UiTED STATES
UNTED ST ATES
LNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
BAE Systems-C:ommuIIations, Navigat n- ideIfilcatiLor and
Sernio Member of Tech Staff
Reconnaissance
Bai!sticRecovey Systems n,c
Batt!eSpace
Inc
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UlNITED STATES
FELi iHElUC:OP ER
UNITED STATES
BLR Group of Amernca Inc
UNITED STATES
Booz Aien iHaniitorn
UNITED STATES
Associate Professor
Brigham Young Uni.rs ty
UNITED STATES
UAS Project Office
CAS Inc
UNITED STATES
Center of Excelence'JJAS COiFNDGI
UNITED STATES
Certificatior Services. Inc.
UNITED STATES
Research and Advai nced Technolo
Cess na Aircraft Company
UNITED STATES
President
Cloud Cap Technology
UNITED STATES
Coast Guard
UNITED STATES
Computer Networks & Software inc
UNITED STATES
Executive Cotnsultant Aerospace
C(onsu!tant
UNITED STATES
Director. Systems Engineeing
CNS/ATM Engineer
Continental Airlines Inc
CSSI inc
DCS Corporation
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
Unmanned Aerial Systerms (UAS Programsn
Defense Research Associates Inc
Alaska Regional Director
Deparlement of the Interior
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
Department of Defense
UNITED STATES
Fight Technology E ain-ee
i[a
Lead
I
President
UNITED STATES
Deputy Director C3 ISR Plans & Policy
Department of Homeland Security US Customs and Border
Protection
Department of industrial and Systems Engieering Rutges
Unriversity
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
DHS CBP Air & Marine
DHS CBP Ait & Marine
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
DRA Inc
UNITED STATES
Drexel Univers ty Autn:ctmous Systemis Lab
UNIE D TATE S
107
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
UN!ITED STATES
V
(.;ilo tr]c~;i
PM2('2
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Frcfesso
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Senior Vice President
d
Enrieeing Fsyc'hoiogst
DFS Lialson Office! to tre Fedeai
Adiiiistration
UN Tr:D STATES
Lr,iN ETEST AES
F
vat
eogist Psy
Engineering Reseac!
Trajectoy Based Operation s rtegmatti
Manager
Standards Staff
Electrical Engineer
a I
at d
t:att
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A R
do
Ai i raff
stratorl
Aiidor-j:
Fedeai A-v-aon
0
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nente
Federa Aviat on Ad inistiratin Techca!
air..rrc
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.
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T-C,
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Aviatio
lai
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snrn
Ccmt
FTED STATES
UNi
UNITED STATES
U!I TED STATES
irectorate
Aniiis!rai Rot iraf
rnmrrirm i
Feder-.CtT
ES
UiT ED SIAIS
os ou,ranizalioi-
ce
(nfi
F ede"al viato- Adri rs,a ioT R[t ia limc
u
Fe deral Aviatio
SAT
liso
IUNITED STATES
FEDEX
F . etnei i Group inc
UNITED STATES
Flight Safety Technologies
UNITED STATES
Software Services Sales Managef
Foliage Software Systems ins
President
Frequentis Defense Inc
Garmin !nternatiornal
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UN TED STATES
UNI TED STATES
Inc
GE Aviation
UNITED STATES
General Atomics
UNITED STATES
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems
UNITED STATES
Airworthiness Project Engineer
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc
UNITED STATES
Program Manager
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. Inc
UNITED STATES
Systems Engineer
General Atomics. Aeronautical Systems
Program Manager UAS
UAS Operations Specialist
Consultant
GSA - MTA - FAIRS Coordinator
Senior Principal Engineer
Human Factors Engineer
Product Line Manager - D&S F- ght C:ontrois
Staff Engineer
Fefow
Major
!nc
UNITED STATES
General Atomics-ASi
General Dynamics Robotics Systems
UNITED STATES
UJNi T ED STATES
Geneva Aerospace
GKN & Associates
GSA -OGP- MT -MTC
GT Aeronautics LILC7
GulfStream Aerospace Corp
Hanchuck Conrsulting Services
Harris Corporation
Harris Technologies LLC
Hi-Tec Systems
Honeywe
Honeywell inc. Aerospace Electronic Systems
1Honeywei interrationai Inc
Standards
HQ AF iight
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNiTED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNT ED STATES
UNITED STATES
108
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
MO 1 Predatoir
Support
MQ 9 Reaper Prograinmatic
MS PE F IMP
Chief Engineer
;
ATC Marketing Manage
Deputy Director Washingion Office
Assistant Professor
HQ AF/A2C
UNITErD STATES
ICF internatonai
aboratory
idaho Natoai Ion
Innovative Solutions International !inc
17 industries
Japan International Transpotl institute
JiL information Systems
John D i)degard School of Aerospace Sciences Univeisity and
Tulane
LUNITED STATES
UNIT- D STAL ES
UNITED STATES
E ST A ES
NiElUNTED STATES
U4TiED STATES
IUNITED STATES
JNITED STATES
Associate Professo
John D Odega d School of Aerospace Sciences Univesity rof
Nortlh Dlakota
Senior Professional Staff
John Hopkins University! APL
johns Hopkins ULniversity Applied Physics Laboratory
Joint UAS Center of Excellence
Joint LUAS Center of Excellence. JFC OM
Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Center of Excellence (JUAS
COE)
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
JSWaIkei Group/Aviation Solutions Inc
JUS-ISAC LLC
Kansas UAV Consortium
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
Kutta, Inc
L-3 Communications Corp
Lockheed Martin
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Lockheed Martin Information Technology Services
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control
Lockheed Martin Systems Integration
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
Lead Communications Engineer
LuftKing Aerosolutions
Lycoming Engines
Metron Aviation
Milsys Technologies
MIT Lincoln Laboratory
MITRE
MITRE
MITRE CAASD
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
Project Team Mgr
Principal Engineer
Project Team Manager
MITRE Corporation
MITRE Corporation/CAASD
MITRE Corportation/CAASD
MITRE/CAASD
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
STATES
STATES
STATES
STATES
MITRE-CAASD
UNITED STATES
MITRE-CAASD
UNITED STATES
Modern Technology Solutions, Inc
Modern Technology Solutions Inc
Mosaic ATM
MTSI
Mulkerin Associates Inc
NASA
NASA Ames Research Center
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center
NASA Langley
NASA Langley Research Center
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
UNITED
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TransformationPlanningfor Integrating UnmannedAircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Appendix 2: Stakeholder Salience: Power, Legitimacy, & Urgency [52]
Power Facto
Factor
o o
ma
_Or
d
ueo,,ak i
mindersdubko
Disa
...
Level
Level DescriptionL
a
di
s
ue
Rarge
from d1
de
n
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&
myoder mtrain ource o tain duskid acuacm ffm te
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so abuain vAue firom de
ftbok Power Lfte
Power ArOsf (weigd) Averaop
112
TransformationPlanningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the NationalAirspace
Legitimacy
Factor
d ptrcepeian or assumpan d th
Broad
dcrtidon
Pr
Level
Level Description
Subtypes
Exchau
..
Letim.y
zflnMMOr
LMgiimacy
Wr
Ldw
stalboldr ar desiribkl, prper, or appropnate within
some sociay conmascd srtm of norm. values, beifs,
and dcrition.
Extent to which the a hodr Mains a w i.
d
yp of e ch~g)
(based on good, vi , or myrhr
the iiponane o
elationsp with the entrprie, andm
tse 2
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of whe r
m
the askeholder belps in dlin th
Exmnt to w
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d
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i submi s to thoe ikers beore itsn ao"r
D eeato which the stholder spredposed tosea or
Leitimacy
adopt
Ocenc,
emeprs vahus dema rsirtg
wthe
and tawewouineluss in thertionsi
honety,
010
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0 10
010
Pragmatic Legitmacy Average Level
am pemeived asound and od effam to achieve satn,
ai. i rvwhle,
ton&
as
the e tbyMs
0-10
Legitiacy
the
0.10
~Perb~
1giimacy
salheob
the leaderseo
~c
engeizaon are perceived a having the adequut
charism, PUS'ndkif, ad utoripy to perform te job
toddo rem erprise
the naleedissuppe
Moral Legitimacy Average Leve
cmpr*j7nsN
i eience ct odral modlstha provide
ee
siont for the staaboldwer pmnhcipaon n
expla
plausbl
Laimrmcy
Sucu1Thec
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stabolder i peceivedbav
by
which
ucm to perform its
Emal oniional
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xed wiho an
ppon
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t evalu"v
Cognitve Legitimacy Average Level
Legitimacy Atribute (Weghted) Average
113
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atied endeavon
Depre to whice leginimcy of te wwkeholdr iasaan
(
panwdfor
010
MO
Transformation Planningfor Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
Level Description
CriticalityCriticality
Factor
The siaehoder is tim insensible or has very low
_Urecy
reoe
dands
Level
Level
range
0,
for a uTiy
to its cdaims t risk inthe ente rnse
The stakekolde aslks or i nakes or values with enough anticipaion
the emerpse to attend them in a timely mnner
ow2-4
nqulres tention to s stakesin plulie or rtaso;nat times
..
...staholer
for a romp attention to the tak
achkr alls
The
4-6
at risk am the
ntCipse.
1e stakehokker demands -mmedie anttention to the Ls
the enterprise and their associated p!ffs0
icom
romwrin
8t10
Urgency Level
itput a risk in
lmpostanc
The al -holer has null or very lowdependencyon the
the eep
Thee StAholder shows low dependency on the vale; obtained
enteipr.e
om the
The
laeholder ries on thew values obind from the enterprise for its fut
Te
staleholer shows high dependency on the stas t c&nrbutes at risk in
2
2-4
46
actions or oerantioM
the eerTerise
Th stahoer demonustes very hih dependny on the stakes it puts a sk
in the enterprise and on the values obtained from it
Importance Level
Criticality Attribute (Weighted) Average
114
8-10