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MIT
Sloan School of Management
Sloan Working Paper 4175-01
September 2001
UNIONS ON THE REBOUND:
SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF BUILDING TRADES LOCALS
Sean
C. Safford
and Richard M. Locke
The paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf7abstract id=283689
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3 2002
LiBFl'XRIES
UNIONS ON THE REBOUND:
SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND THE TRANSFORJVLATION
OF BUILDING TRADES LOCALS
SEAN SAFFORD
*Sean Safford
Employment
is
a
Ph.D. Candidate
at the
and
RICHARD
M.
LOCKE*
MIT-Sloan School of Management's
Research. Richard M. Locke
is
the Alvin
J.
Institute for
Work and
Siteman Professor of Entrepreneurship and
Poljucal Science at the Massachusetts Insdtute of Technology.
a grant from the MIT Organizadonal Learning Center as part of a larger
Locke on U.S. unions and their struggle to change for the modern era. Many
thanks to Corinne Bendersky, Diane Burton, Rachael Cobb, John Dunlop, Roberto Fernandez, Isabel
Fernandez-Mateo, Janice Fine, Tom Kochan, Jeff Grabelsky, Harry Katz, Marc Linder, Robert
McKersie, Michael O'Lear^', Paul Osterman, Jesper Sorensen, Michael Piore, David Weil and to the
parncipants in seminars at MIT's Insdtute for Work and Employment Research and at the 13* Annual
Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, Amsterdam, the Netherlands for
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Finally, we wish to thank the many people who agreed to be
interviewed as part of this project, especially Mark ErUch, Richard Kibbon and Matt Walters.
This paper was supported by
project led bv Richard
A data appendix with
computer programs used to generate the results
Work and Employment
Research, MIT-Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial
additional results and copies of the
presented in the paper are available from Sean Safford
Drive, Suite 580, Cambridge,
MA 02142.
at the Institute for
Email: ssafford(a).mit.edu
Abstract
This paper seeks to understand
economic
on
life
the "social
that
where
— can re-emerge
how US
as
labor unions
activit\' as
well as
Where unions
communities - notwithstanding genuine
efforts at launching
- they
are likely to stagnate.
of building trade locals
Pipetrades in the two
more
American
political
on union
revitalization,
and
literature
we hypothesize
unions are able to rebuild linkages to other local groups, they should be successful
revitalizing themselves organizationally.
organizations
institutions in
important and viable organizations. Building on the extensive
embeddedness" of economic
local
- once key
in
The paper
fail
to
embed themselves
new
strategies
reports the results of
Boston, Massachusetts, and Pordand, Oregon.
The other
cities.
objective information
on
set
the unions'
of cases focuses on the
embeddedness
in local
cities'
in their
broader
and rebuilding
two matched
One
set
at
their
own
pair case studies
of cases focuses on
Carpenters unions.
To
gain
networks we employed a survey that
identified approximately 100 industry stakeholder organizations including builders, architects, engineers,
major propern' owners, neighborhood and environmental groups,
banks and lenders.
were able
to
We
conduct
received responses from
a series
46%
local
and
state
governments, and
of the organizations we contacted from which we
of network analyses that complement our qualitative research.
Introduction
how US
This paper seeks to understand
economic
from
life
- can re-emerge
a height
of
Union
contradictory.
place in the
35%
economy
in
as
1955 to
decline
is
- once key
institudons in
11%
just
today.
The
from manufacturing to
services, increased international competition)
political allies in
historically in
We answer this
industn,'.
One
result
of
anti-
country',
tiiis
what
(if
we
ask:
Given the important
role unions
anything) can be done to reverse this situation?
question through an analysis of two matched pair case studies in the construction
set
of cases focuses on Pipetrades' unions located in Boston and Pordand, Oregon. The
economic contexts,
factor
endowments and use of tactics,
cities.
Despite their similar challenges,
these four local unions have experienced very
different organizational trajectories in recent years.
Whereas the Pordand Pipetrades'
membership, increased market
its
community,
respect to the
concerted
Washington (Goldfield 1987; Fantasia
other set of cases focuses on Carpenters unions in the same two
its
a
1998; Linder 1999). This paper does not seek to revisit or even to
contribute to the debate on union decline in the US. Instead,
have played
and
portrayed alternatively as the by-product of various secular trends taking
union strategy by corporate interests and their
al
political
explanations for this decline are multiple and often
(Freeman 1985; Western 1997; Farber and Western 2001; Allen 1988) or the
1988; Bronfenbrenner, et
American
important and viable organizations. Union membership has declined
the shift
(i.e.,
labor unions
its
and renewed
share,
local has gained
status as a significant contributor to the success
of
counterpart in Boston has continued to stagnate. Just the opposite occurred with
two Carpenters' unions
in these
two
cities.
Notwithstanding efforts by several highly
talented and energetic leaders, Pordand's Carpenters have languished. Their counterparts in Boston,
the other hand, have fought back
from the verge of collapse and
are
now
on
enjoying increasing wages and
strong employment levels as well as renewed political clout in both the industn' and the region generally.
How do we
we
explain
understand these divergent outcomes in the face of remarkably similar challenges?
why
embeddedness" of economic
activity' as
well as
on union
on
themselves in their local
social, political
the extensive literature
revitalization,
not unions can re-invigorate and re-launch themselves depends upon
'
how
and economic contexts. During
we
successfully they
their
We
include
all
of these
crafts
under the umbrella term "Pipetrades."
on
the
argue that whether or
embed
hey-day of power and
Local jurisdictions differ with respect to the combination of plumbing, pipefitting, sprinklerfitring and other
mechanical trades.
can
unions situated in almost identical economic, political and social contexts respond so
differendy to the challenges (and opportunities) they face? Building
"social
How
influence, unions were not simply
membership organizations but
rather central institutions in their
communities. Thev were central vehicles for the social integration of immigrant workers and the
political mobilization
of working
Schneirov and Suhrbur 1988, Kazin,
class citizens (Lichtenstein 1983,
economy, promoting
1989).
They
also played important roles in the
sectors
(e.g.,
garments), training and coordination functions in others
industrial upgrading in certain
(e.g.,
construction), and
economic
redistribuuon and benefit provision in most (Katz 1985, Fraser 1988, Jacoby 1991, Houlihan 1993).
Their
centralit)- in a
whole network of organizational and
and respected actors
members but
responsive not just to their
period, however,
they
became
communities but
in their local
many unions
to the
also well-informed
community
lost their centrality in the
increasingly insulated
institutional ties
at large.
nexus of
made them not only important
and responsive organizations —
Over
the course of the postwar
local organization linkages.
and isolated organizations, seen
As
a result,
as representing "special interests"
rather than broader societal goals.
Today, some unions are changing and re-emerging
revitalized unions
have been successful
at
as vital
and important organizations. These
own
changing because they have rebuilt not only their
organizational capacities (Piore, 1994; Grabelsky and
Hurd
1994; Juravich and Bronfenbrenner, 1999;
Turner 1999, Ganz 2000; Voss and Sherman, 2000; Frost, 2000, Katz, Batt and Keefe, 2001) but
their linkages to other organizations
nen.vork of social and institutional
and groups
ties
has been
in their
shown
communities. Being embedded in an articulated
of
to be important for the sharing
information (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1992; Podolny 1993, 1994; Uzzi 1996, 1997), the
communicate across and
identify with divergent
also
strategic
ability to
groups (Padgett and AnseU, 1993; Dutton and Dukarich,
1991; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990), and the capacity to build alliances and/or to engage in collective
action (Locke, 1995;
Drawing on
Locke and Jacoby,
this literature,
we
1997).
argue that the rebuilding of multiple, cross-cutting
insututions in the local communir\' provides unions with not just
information. This information
economic and
political
is
more but more
ties to
other groups and
varied and
more
key to helping unions both understand and respond to changes
more
representative range of stakeholders' interests. FinaUy,
also provides unions with potential allies
collective efforts.
in their
environments. Increased communication with multiple actors also helps local
unions better understand stakeholders vocabularies and concerns and thus transform in ways that
a
timely
Applying
tliis
and/or mediators
embeddedness
in future struggles
in the local
community
and partners
network theory to unions, we hypothesize that where
reflect
local
in future
unions are
able to rebuild linkages to other local groups, they should be successful at revitalizing themselves
organizationally. WTiere unions
fail
notwithstanding genuine efforts
at
to
embed themselves
launching
new
in their
broader communities -
and rebuilding
strategies
their
own
organizations
—
they are likely to stagnate.
Construction unions,
communities given
most other
like
that
craft unions,
have historically been closely
both product and labor markets were coterminous with the communities within
which building trades workers
roles not just in the local
lived
(Commons
economy but
1934,
Ulman
also in the social
1989, Schneirov and Suhrbur 1988,Jacoby 1991,
and
HouUhan
1955). Building trades unions played active
political life
1993).
of their communities (Kazin
Since the
economic and technological innovations have broadened the scope of the
beyond the
local labor
tied to their
market/communit\' while various
competition within the industr\' by introducing
a strong,
political
late
1970s, however,
industry's product
changes have altered the nature of
non-union
of actors. Given these changes,
set
building trades unions have had to reach out beyond their traditional interlocutors and build
broader
of community and industry actors
set
Whether or
not,
and
how, they
if so,
building trades unions, the
tradition)
other
most
can not rebuild their
umons
likely
ties to
in other sectors that are
unions are successful
what
to redefine their place in the
do so
is
among American
the central question of this paper. If even
unions (given their historical, craft-based
other actors in their communities, then what hope can there be for
much
at rebuilding their
actors in the industn,', then
ties to a
they are to regain their prominence in the industry.
if
are able to
market
less
geographically
community
insights
might
bound? However,
linkages and developing
their experience
new
if
building trades
relationships with
new
provide for other unions also struggling
new economy?
Methods
This paper reports the results of two matched pair case studies of building trade locals
in
Boston,
Massachusetts, and Portland, Oregon, in order to explore the role embeddedness plays in unions'
to transform themselves.
cases focuses
conducted
on the
as part
of
several national craft
^
One
cities'
of cases focuses on Pipetrades
in the
two
cities.-
The other
set
ongoing, project on union revitaUzation.
industrial labor unions in the
United
States.
We interviewed
the leadership of
These interviews yielded
a
Local jurisdictions differ with respect to the terminology and grouping of plumbing, pipefitting, steamfitting,
sprinklerfitting
"pipetrades."
of
Carpenters umons. These locals were identified from a series of interviews
a larger,
and
set
abilit)'
and other mechanical
crafts.
For
clarity,
we
include
all
of these trades under the umbrella term
list
of
"innovatixc" local uaions that included various craft locals in Boston, Chattanooga, Houston, Kansas
City,
Las Vegas, Long Island, Los Angeles, Mobile,
examining several of these unions, we chose
New York Cit\',
to concentrate
on two
Portland, Seatde and Toledo. After
of locals
sets
in
Boston and Pordand,
given the comparabilit)' of their economic, social and political contexts.'
In
November 1999 and June
2000,
we
interviewed twenty union leaders, builders, government
neighborhood leaders and major propert)' owners
actors in
Boston between
hours. (An appendix
at
Fall
the
in
We interviewed
Boston.
2000 and Spring 2001. Each interview
end of the paper
lists
lasted
officials,
twenty-three industry
between one and three
individuals interviewed in both cides.)
In addition,
we
read thirty years worth of the Labor Press Pordand's longstanding labor newspaper of record for
.
background information. For the Boston
on
several first
cities'
histories
compiled by
is
no comparable labor newspaper, we
local trade unionists
more
objective information
on
the unions'
.
embeddedness
in local
networks we employed
sun-ev that identified approximately 100 organizations representing important construction industry
stakeholders in each
These included
city.
neighborhood and environmental groups,
received responses from
series
46%
builders, architects, engineers,
local
of network analyses that complement our
The Construction
The construction
this
industn,' has
among
we
governments, and banks and lenders.
contacted from which
We
qualitative research.
industr\' before
turmng
we were
turn
to the
now
two case
we
outline, in highly stylized form, a
how
industry', characterized
it
to a brief discussion
pairs.
has shaped union strength and strategy.
by myriad contractors, sub-contractors and unions
various craft jurisdictions, emerged at the turn of die twentieth century as a by-product of
1972a). Within the industry', a "system" developed in
new
able to conduct a
few of the major dimensions
the nation's industrialization and urbanization processes (Christie 1956; Fine 1953;
construct
We
evolved and changed along several important fronts over the course of the
evolution has proceeded and
The modern construction
divided
state
major propert)' owners,
Industry in Transition
twentieth century. In this section,
along wlxich
and
of the organizations
of the changing context of the construction
which
properr\'
Galenson 1983; MiUs
owners entered into agreements
to
buildings with general contractors, and the contractors, in turn, entered into agreements
with various sub-contractors
^
relied
and conducted keyword searches of the
two major newspapers, the Boston Globe and the Boston Herald
Finally, to gain
a
hand
cases, since there
See Cobb and Locke 2001 for
who
a
actually did the work.
Initially,
the union's role within the industry' was
comparison of healthcare workers' unions
in
Boston and Los Angeles, another
set
largely
one of enforcing
common
wages and working conditions among die contractors of a given
geographic region (Houlihan 1993). By the 1930s, however, the unions had developed several additional
roles within the industr)', including job
placement and the provision of training and apprendceships.
Through union
were able
hiring halls contractors
minimum permanent
to maintain only a
staff,
and
contract with workers on a project-by-project basis (Jacoby 1991; Mills 1972a; Ross 1972).
During the
first
70 years of the twentieth
In the 1930s, massive federally funded public
craft-based structure.
level
of employers
centur\', the industry slowly
who competed
for the largest projects
on
evolved within
this traditional
works projects gave
a national scale.
By
the
rise to a
second
Second World War,
these contractors had developed reladonships with the national unions and negotiated separate
agreements that applied
specifically to their projects (Mills 1972a;
Wolf
At the same
1996).
time, the
industry (which had previously been undifferendated) sub-divided into four main categories: residendal,
commercial/insdtudonal, industrial and heavy/high-way (Mills 1972a).
For the most
part, the building trade unions' structure
place in the industr^^
developed
their
own
In response to the
staff
and strategy evolved to match the changes taking
emergence of national
level contractors, the national
unions
and organizational capacities to deal with both national contractors and to
lobby politicians and regulators in Washington on issues concerning the industry (Mills 1972a; GaUenson
1983). National contracts
responsibilities
as local
between
emerged
local
in the
1930s (Haber 1971). By the 1960s, however, the bifurcation of
and national unions had generated considerable tensions within the unions
unions began to lose the autonomy and power they had previously enjoyed (Mills 1972a; Dunlop
1961). Nevertheless, with time, local unions learned to adapt to this
change by ensuring continued
control over local hiring halls which guaranteed their indispensabilit}' to national contractors. At the
same
time, the locals learned to exploit national contracts
these lucrative jobs in the event of a strike. In
at the
many
by shifting
politically
cases, this allowed
them
important members onto
to oudast local employers
bargaining table.
The segmentation of the
industry also created problems for the unions. Before the Second
most construction unions were well represented
residential
segment declined significandy
in the residential market.
after the
War
(Erlich 1988;
the segments in which the unions had maintained a strong presence
industrial
and
large-scale infrastructure projects
—
labor and coordinators of multiple project teams.
of unions studied as part of this project.
World War,
But the union's grip on the
Northrup and Foster 1975). Within
—commercial,
institutional,
the unions remained essential as suppliers of skilled
The union
hiring halls continued to provide
contractors with flexible staffing arrangements and the unions continued to provide access to collective
goods such
as health care
and pension benefits which were made available to employers and workers
contractors had
come up through
the ranks and thus been socialized into the industry through union
apprenticeship programs. These programs, in turn, provided a
information transfer and trust
changes in the construction
industn,' for
All
a
most construction
Relations between the unions and contractors were strong, especially since
alike.
of
this
whole
much of the
among
industn,',
common ground
for
communication,
the contractors and union leaders. In short, in spite of various
unions continued to occupy a central role in the governance of the
twentieth century (Ichniowski and Preston 1989).
began to change
in the early 1970s.
Although
inflation rates increased for the
US economy
as
1960s and early 1970s, wages/prices in the construction industry rose even more.
in the late
Between July 1969 and July 1971 construction workers' wages rose by
increase in the manufacturing sector.
As
a result, the federal
25%
as
compared
government stepped
to a
12%
in to control
wages
in
1971. According to government leaders, the structure of collective bargaining in the construction
Both "featherbedding" labor
industry' created "perverse incentives" for excessive wage-price increases.
contracts with extraneous work-related expenses and "leapfrogging"
(i.e.,
seeking higher wages than their neighbors in another jurisdiction) were
(Mills
common
practices in the industry
1972b; Galenson 1983). Higher wages were passed on to customers because there was
oversight bv major property' owners
industn' in these years.
36%
unions in one jurisdiction
of
all
War
the federal
government included.
Between 1968 and 1970, 3000
strike acdvity in the
industn,' since the
-
United
States.
strikes
Strike rates
took place
in the industry,
also high in the
represendng
This was almost double the rate that had prevailed in the
(Linder 1999; Lipsky and Farber 1976). Altogether, the industry (and
had developed a reputadon for being unruly, expensive, unproductive, and
Pardy in response
were
to these issues, a
litde
in
many
its
unions)
cases, corrupt.
committee of major national property owners convened
in order to
address what were perceived to be a set of "structural inefficiencies" that had crept into the industry over
the course of
its
development. That committee, which eventually became incorporated into the Business
Roundtable, issued a
series
of reports which recommended significant changes in the organization of the
industry (Linder 1999). In addition to the industry's collective bargaining structure, the committee also
identified an overall decline in productivity' generated
by the increasing complexity of major projects,
inadequate management on the part of contractors and property owners, and inefficient use of
technology.
The Roundtable generated
a
number of recommendations
These included the creation of university and college based
training
in
order to address these issues.
programs
for
managers and
productivity related research and protocols for project managers' oversight of major projects. However,
among
the
most important changes advocated by the Business Roundtable was
the
development of a
cohort of professional construction managers and construction management firms. Over the course of
the last thirtv years, these firms have largely replaced the system of general contractors in the industry.
No longer do
shift
size deal directly
with contractors. Instead, construction managers
They employ no construction workers of
organization.
This
owners of any
of properrv owners during the construction process, administering every
act as agents
directly with
propert\'
their
both sub-contractors and suppliers to build structures.
has generated several important consequences for unions in the industry. First, the advent of
new
building technologies, has
encouraged further specialization among sub-contractors. This specialization,
contractors to seek out projects
competed
for
work within
their
on
a
wider geographic
home
led to the erosion
of specialization
separated the different crafts.
steelworkers and the
in certain parts
down
Whereas
in the past
most contractors
management and technological innovations have
also
of the industry. In the past, clear boundaries
The work of carpenters,
work of pipefitters was
an effort to drive
scale.
in turn, has forced
geographic areas, today contractors increasingly bid for projects
across several state lines. Conversely, construction
in
of a project's
own. Construction managers contract
construction management, in conjunction with the introduction of
both
detail
for example,
distinguishable
from
was
that
costs and because of changes in the
boundaries are increasingly blurred. This has exacerbated tensions
distinct
from
that
of
of sheet-metal workers. Today,
way
buildings are built, these craft
among
the unions,
which have found
themselves fighting with one another over competing jurisdictions.
In the early 1970s, the Associated Builders and Contractors
(ABC) emerged
as a significant lobbying
and
education force within the industry with a mission to promote and support non-union or "open shop"
construction (Northrup and Foster 1975).
their
prominence within the
which
sets a
wage
industry'
The
ABC
it
saw
out to dislodge the building trades unions from
by undermining union legislation such
floor tied to the union scale for
attacked licensing laws that
set
as favoring
government
projects.
as the
At the
Davis-Bacon Act,
state level, the
union sponsored training programs. At the same time, the
organization set out to create an alternative set of institutions to those in which the unions had
central.
In
many
jurisdictional
Over
cities,
the
ABC
open shop created
its
own
training programs, hiring hall
become
mechanisms,
and administrative boundaries, government lobbyists, and healthcare and pension plans.
the course of the 1970s and 1980s, this so-called
by establishing
a
"open shop movement" spread from
city to city
foothold in suburban areas and then targeting union strongholds in the center
cities
(Northrup and Foster 1975; Northrup 1984; Erlich 1985). Contractors were forced to chose whether to
remain
with the union-dominated set of institutions or shift to those offered by the open shop.
affiliated
Since 1970, in
cir\'
ABC itself grew
after city, that decision has
from
a
23,000 members todav.
plummeted over
tliis
more often than not been
in favor
membership of 3,000 contractors and 17 chapters
More
importantly, as
Graph
1
same period from approximately
***
Graph
1
in
of the open shop. The
1970 (Erlich 1986) to
shows, union coverage in the industry has
41%
in
1970 to
just
18%
over
nationally today.
here ***
The Unions Response
'
National construction unions and their local
shop challenge
bargaimng
in a variety
in the late
affiliates
of ways. The unions
have responded to these changes and to the open-
initially
1970s and early 1980s. Yet, these had
litde effect
on
a different tack
into the
umons' ranks rather than focusing on the more
traditional "top
convince contractors to sign union contracts. As part of
down" approach
this effort, the
unions
of exclusion - which
is
that attempts
unions implemented the
COMET program, an innovative attempt to educate rank-and-file members about both
histor)'
Some
their decline.
by intensifying "bottom up" organizing which brings non-union workers direcdy
pursued
to
reacted to their losses with concessionary
the unions'
portrayed as the underlying causes of the unions' decline - and on ways
the unions could use organizing to
remedy
its
past mistakes. Others, have sought to respond by
reducing their costs and offering contractors a variety of concessions or even subsidies for their projects.
These "targeted funds"
facing significant
set aside a portion
non-umon competition.
as use various labor
many unions have
and
OSHA
of workers' wages in order to subsidize union contractors
Still
others have sought to
combine both approaches
regulations to pressure contractors into signing
umon
contracts.
as well
Finally,
simply redoubled their emphasis on superior training as an inducement to contractors.
Regardless of the particular mix of strategies employed, the results of these efforts have been, at best,
mixed. While the unions' coverage in the industry increased briefly
boom
in the late 1990s, as
Notwithstanding
graph
this generally
1
at
the height of the construction
shows, membership density has again started to decline.
dismal picture, however, a
more disaggregated examination of
construction union activity and membership rates reveals significant variation at the
some
local construction
We now
level.
In
fact,
unions have successfully rebounded in recent years. Facing the same pattern of
declining market share and diminished political presence, these few unions
renewal.
local
show
signs of organizational
turn to an examination of four local cases in order to account for these different
outcomes.
10
Pipetrades in Boston and Portland:
Plumbers and
Fitters'
A Tale
of Two Locals
Loca/ 290 in Port/and, Oregon
With the onset of the Great Depression, Portland became the
including the massive BooneviUe
the U.S. entered the
the federal
cir\-
at
industrialist
to build ships for the
the juncture of the
of several major public works projects
located eighty miles east of
Second World War,
government
of Pordand
Dam
site
war
Pordand on
the
Columbia
As
Hiver.
Henry J. Kaiser was awarded major contracts from
effort.
Kaiser located his operations just outside the
Columbia and Willamette
Rivers.
Over
the course of the War, the
Kaiser slup yards along with a few other smaller operations produced over 1,000 liberty ships.
Membership
massive
in the building trades,
At the height of the war,
effort.
in the countn,'
with over 10,000
Pordand area lumber miUs and
area seeking
which had been strong before the war, skyrocketed
work
building trades'
in the ship yards.
work
Building and maintaining these
By
political leaders in the
In the 1970s, however, the
was the
facilities
who had
community (Abbot
open shop movement began
had
1983).
to establish a foothold in the region.
from the open shop movement took place outside of Pordand,
Much
of
As
in the outiying areas.
and focused instead on several major projects that
The
cities.
of these projects was the 5400 million dollar Trojan nuclear power plant located outside Pordand.
Events took
a serious turn for the
worse
in
1981 as the region descended into the deepest recession
had seen since the 1930s. The open shop, which had been gathering strength
years,
largest
formed the core of the
allowed the unions to maintain employment levels for their existing membership in the major
largest
this
relocated to the
the 1950s and 1960s, Pordand's building trades
a result, the unions' leadership ignored this challenge
of
1990; Wollner 1990; Abbott 1983). After the War,
absorbed the thousands of workers
in the post- War years.
become economic and
the competition
for example, Pordand's electrical workers union
members (Kesselman
factories
as a result
took advantage of the
crisis
it
in the state for several
(Wollner 1990). As the open shop entrenched
itself
more deeply
into
Pordand's construction economy, major contractors were faced with the stark choice between
maintaining their
umon
affiliation
and shifting to the open shop.
Some
split
the
bill
by creating "double-
breasted" operations with both union-signatory and open shop subsidiaries. This allowed contractors to
selectively bid
on work depending on
the location and politics of the project (Northrup 1995).
Nevertheless, union contractor's share of the market plunged from
1979 to
just
61%
in
1981 (Nordirup 1984).
11
91%
of non-residential projects
in
Coincident with the recession ot the early 1980s and the
pipefitters'
unions were engaged
rise
of the open shop, the local plumbers' and
in a bitter jurisdicdonal fight.
Plumbers tradidonallv work on potable
water systems. Pipefitters generally handle hearing and cooling. The changing nature of the industry
began
to blur the
boundaries benveen these ru'o
This was especially true
crafts.
in the area
of high tech
manufacturing which requires special plumbing systems for delivering purified water to clean rooms.
Manufacturing, of
laid
all
kinds,
had tradidonally been the province of the
claim to lucradve high-technology related
plumbing systems were within
work arguing
their jurisdicuon.
When
that "clean
The plumbers, however,
rooms" requiring
special
the state descended into deep recession in the
benveen the two facdons turned into an open turf war. The two groups, which
early 1980s, the rift
then had joindy bargained a single statewide wage
settied for $0.74 less than the fitters
rate,
and thus threatened
to lure contractors
with violence erupting on a
began
fitters'
away from
to picket
until
The plumbers'
negotiated separately in 1983.
counterparts. Faced with the prospect of dramatic losses, the
sites
fitters.
their fitter
plumbers' work
number of occasions.
In 1982, the national union stepped in to resolve the situation.
The
plan called for a complete
consolidation of the state's various locals under the auspices of the newly created Local 290. Interim
leadership, mainly taken
from the existing plumbers union leadership,
contractors. Frightened by the
set out to
mend
growing number of defections, the union engaged
with individual contractors to strike
more
lucrative arrangements.
relationships with
in ad
hoc bargaining
Eventually, these ad hoc agreements
extended to individual projects and included non-signator)' contractors. However, these agreements
created greater problems for the unions as contractors threatened to defect from the union contract
unless they received
In 1988, a
new
more
leader.
agreements and
set
Matt Walters, took over the
about introducing
the business manager.
contractors' profit
favorable terms.
At
making
the
same
abilities.
a
new
set
local's reigns.
of internal
of showcase apprenticeship training
to rebuilding ties to traditional contractors
work
practices that
facilities in
years of insularity
and
decline.
in the office
the
Pordand area and around the
many of whom had been
However, Walters was
12
to restrict
initiated a
state.
and cleaning up internal union practices, Walters
officials,
of
a plan to create a
of $0.10 per hour worked. The fund
build relationships with key leaders in the industry' in various parts of the state.
major contractors and government
power
ad hoc
all
were thought
approached contractors with
training fund fueled by an unusually large contribution
series
immediately rescinded
rules that consolidated
time, the local loosened
Finally, Walters
He
In addition
set
out to
These contacts included
alienated by the union's
many
also careful to cultivate relationships with a
whole
new
set stakeholders, including propert)'
owners, architects and engineers, and building materials
suppliers.
announced
In 1993, the Intel Corporation
chip manufacturing
facilities in
the area already.
promised to bring
a new- level
where
contractors
on
this
had decided to locate
time
at the
of economic
in the
Intel's
its
a
new
dollar facility the
Pordand area construcdon
-
the largest
computer
company had
just
several
announced
The company, however, had
typically
After the announcement, Walters
sites.
headquarters are located, to personally
meedng
plant
Pordand suburbs. The company had
acdvit\' to the region.
massive project. Prior to his
engineering consultant
-
However, the muld-billion
used non-union contractors on
flew to San Jose,
world
in the
tacilit\'
it
make
the case for using union
with Intel, Walters met with a chemical
named Reinhardt Hanselka. Hanselka had worked
for several years
on
quality
control and had acquired both inside knowledge of Intel's decision-making processes and in depth
understanding of the specific knowledge,
sophisdcated manufacturing
workers'
safet\'
facilides.
skills
and capabilides required to construct the most
Walters learned that Intel was pardcularly concerned with
and carried those concerns over
to
construction projects.
its
exceptional safety compliance measures of its contractors.
company was
which
Its
receptive to ideas that
operations were located.
would portray
it
At
the
same
time, he learned that the
quality
its
project, Intel
company
inclined
to
make
the case that
it
was
in the
first place.
To
in
roles in
gain approval
communit}''s best interests to invite the
to build there.
Walters used
simple:
had
communities
of life played important
securing the tax-abatements that had been responsible for luring Intel in the
for
The company expected
in a favorable light within the
Economic well-being and
its
this
information in his pitch to
usmg union
contractors
- craftsmen
to
construction
Intel access to the
management team. The message was
most highly
skilled
— and hence
safety
In addition, by allying with the union, Walters argued that Intel
improving community' standards by teaching building-trades workers valuable
high-tech related construction
The company
would ensure
in the region.
would be contributing
Intel's
agreed to build
skills.
In short,
its facility
it
would be
a perfect match.
with union plumbers and
fitters.
In the process the union
established a direct relationship with a major property owner, by-passing the typical arrangement in
which the building contractor (and more recendy, construction managers) stood between the union and
the customer. In doing so, the union gained direct access to information about technological
innovations and
new
building requirements while at the same time developing
13
new
relationships with
—
whom
property owners, consultants, engineers and architects - actors with
it
had previously not
interacted.
These new relationships had positive
over effects for the union. By the mid-1990s, fifteen other
spill
major chip-manufacturing related projects were launched
of building and construction investments
theoredcallv have been built with
Local 290 used
its
new
ties to
to the Intel project, about
segment of the
work with
By embedding
the union.
Local 290 reinvented
in high tech construction.
local industry.
The
results
itself into the
1990s Pordand became a major destination for traveling plumbers and
had developed
time, the capabilities the union
its
other plumbers' and
training
program
fitters' locals
—
in the course
already
among
alike
—
fitters.
an
all
new
By
the mid-
At the same
fitters nationally.
of staffing increasingly sophisticated projects
—
the best funded in the country
nationwide. Today, a majority of plumbers and
both uruon and non-uruon workers
team of
itself as
were impressive: since 1993
chip manufacturing projects in the Pordand area have employed union plumbers and
helped transform
50% were -
the architects, engineers, and consultants specialized in high-tech
and regional companies specializing
essential player in this
- and prior
labors
construction to convince these companies to
local
Although each of these projects could
(Ertel 1996).
non-umon
Portland area bringing nearly $16 billion
in the
into a
fitters in
receive ongoing training at the union's training
model
for
the region
facilities,
financed by a SO. 86 hourly levy against members' wages.
Walters reputation in the community' today
following representative
All this goes
comment from an
back to
about the industry.
the leading edge.
that kind
is
unique.
a
is
that
of
a progressive
and effective labor leader,
as the
area contractor suggests:
group of contractors fifteen years ago that started a dialogue
wanted to focus on education and things that would keep us on
We
As
a contractor,
you go into bargaining with great ideas about getting
of stuff into an agreement. [UA Local 290 Business Manager] Matt [Walters]
He
guy, he'd be
has built a culture where that kind of thing
someone
I
In 1998, uruon signatory' contractors had captured
the had existed prior to the
is
possible. If
I
was
a
union
want representing me.
89%
of the region's large projects, matching the
levels
open shop offensive (Bureau of Labor and Industries 1999).
Plumbers' lj)cal 12 in Boston, Massachusetts
By
the
Second World War, Boston was widely recognized
as a
major center of education, commerce,
shipping, and naval operations. Manufacturing, however, had been
more
generally in
New
England
for
many
years.
The
on
the decline both in the city and
post- War years brought significant demographic
14
shifts in the region as tlie
development
construction of suburban highways and tax incentives that encouraged
oud^ing areas began drawing people and jobs out of the
in
Notwithstanding construction sector growth
tradesmen
in the
government
of Boston were working
cit)'
at
or near
led efforts to generate investment in the
including the Prudential Center and
1999).
in the 1960s,
At the same time, however,
challenge union shops for the
employment
in these years, bolstered
by
with the construction of large scale projects
Government Center complexes (Boston Redevelopment
a
most
union membership stagnated. Building
full
cit)'
city.
Authority'
cadre of non-union contractors had set up shop and began to
lucrative
work outside
the city Limits
where new housing and some
commercial development were locating (Erlich 1990).
After suffering along with the rest of the countrv' through the stagflation of the 1970s, the Massachusetts
economy boomed
in the early 1980s.
High-tech giants such as Digital Computer,
and the Raytheon Corporation located
the Route 128 Corridor. In the
ser\'ices sectors
that sprouted
up
in these years
cirv'
As
of Boston
itself,
the financial, insurance, real estate and professional
built
most of
the
downtown
skyscrapers
while non-union companies built the vast majority of the high-tech-
a result, the "Massachusetts Miracle" kept
in their respective
Laboratories
oudying areas of Lexington, Concord and Newton, along
saw tremendous growth. Union contractors
related structures.
employed
cit\'
in the
Wang
umon and non-union
both
geographic domains. Nevertheless, the suburbs grew
and thus the gap between the
clVf
middle of the 1980s, 70 percent of the
much
workers
faster than the
based unions and the open shop in the suburbs increased. By the
state's
construction workers were working non-union (Erlich
1990).
In 1989, the area's economic fortunes took a turn for the worse as the Route 128 corridor was hit hard
by the downturn
in the
computer industry (Saxenian
1994).
1990s had a particularly heavy impact on the financial and
Unemployment soared
17% and
as the
At the same dme, the recession of the
real estate related firms located in the
Massachusetts Miracle crumbled.
Downtown
construction both in the city and in the suburbs ground to a
vacancy
rates
early
cit}'.
climbed to
halt.
Like other unions in the area. Plumbers Local 12 had been losing strength in the Boston suburbs for
several years. \)CTien
Agents and
Kevin Cotter took the reigns of Local 12
set out to restructure the union's
responsibilities
in 1985,
he hired two more Business
governance by consolidadng management and financial
under the office of the business manager. During the short-lived "Massachusetts
Miracle" the local's main
tactic for
securing
work was
15
to ensure they
were well integrated into the
regulatory processes that govern land use planning in Massachusetts. Property owners often approached
the building trades for support in the planning process in return for a
project with union contractors. Cotter, by
all
accounts,
and forged strong relationships with many of the
area's
commitment
became comfortable
prominent
to
complete the
in the halls
politicians.
of government
These relationships were
instrumental in maintaining die union's presence in the city of Boston.
Unfortunately, however, these reladonships were not successful at expanding the fortunes of the union
to the suburbs
outside the
cirv',
was forced
to negotiate ad
Notwithstanding these
where the majont\' of work was being performed. As
hoc arrangements with contractors
efforts, signatory contractors
work was located outside of the
implemented
projects.
a joint
city's
The labor-management
keep pro-union contractors
trust
its
if their
immediate suburbs. In 1994, the union
fund used to subsidize contractors bids on targeted
project funded contractors' participation in trade
in contact with
the local
order to keep them in the union fold.
continued to leave the union, especially
urban core and
labor-management
in
a result,
owners, suppliers and architects.
shows
It also
in order to
allowed the local to
provide funds to contractors engaged in head-to- head bids against open shop contractors.
Despite their efforts, the local (which represents only Plumbers, the Pipefitters and Sprinklerfitters are
separate locals and enjoy even less favorable reputations in the
community) did not escape
somewhat backward and
that the local
prior mistakes.
ineffective.
Area contractors believe
As one contractor from
a rural part
of the
state
put
its
image
as
union did not learn from
its
it:
WTien the economy was poor [in the early 1990s] a lot of mechanical guys went to work
in the open shop. As the economy started to pick up, they all came back to the union.
Now they don't have enough apprentices and so, up go the wages. They are headed in
the same direction in terms of organizing. PLAs [Project Labor Agreements, employed
on major infrastructure projects such as the Big Dig, Deer Island and reconstruction at
Logan Airport] are their last hurrah. The [plumbers and fitters unions] have seen that in
downtown there are some fairly large contractors coming in to do downtown work. But,
they can't get their people interested in pay cuts. [As a result] they are still doing lots of
side agreements.
The
local union, in turn, sees contractors in equally critical terms.
"They
are
busy servicing customers,"
Cotter explained, "but they don't go outside their clique." In short, unlike their counterparts in Pordand,
the
Boston uruon did not
same time build new
actively seek to redefine old relationships with existing contractors while at the
relationships with
new
actors, outside the
poliucians that had been the union's traditional
allies.
16
narrow group of contractors and
Cotter himself reports he has few occasions to
interact with property' owners.
manager the owner plans
The
In general, he
to use in order to figure
contrast with the Pipetrades in Portland
companies
expand
to
mainly concerned with finding out which construction
is
is
out a strategy to secure the work for his members.
best illustrated by the decision of several high tech
go non union. In 1994, Sun Microsystems and the Cisco Company announced plans to
Boston suburb of Boxborough. The structures were the
their facilities in the
of many plant
first
expansions planned over several years; expansions that the manufacturers would eventually accelerate
order to meet the increasing
demand
for their products during the high tech
Both companies had previously used union contractors on such major
particular projects each selected
undermine the union's standing among
firms threatened to
result,
non-union contractors. Cotter
all
felt
boom
projects.
of the
that the decisions
1990s.
late
However,
for these
by these two major
Boston area major property owners. As
he sought to change the companies' plans by using the unions' leverage both on the various
planning boards as well
as a
in
major shareholder (through the union pension plans)
in these
a
local
two
companies. Cotter ultimately succeeded in reversing the decision by Sun and Cisco to employ non-union
contractors, but the basic message
key contractors in the
area.
was
clear: the local
Only through
In contrast to Pordand, there
Pipetrades unions had lost their standing
old-style pressure tactics could the
union reverse the
among
situation.
was none of the sharing of information and close linkages with property
owners, engineers, architects or consultants that could have helped the Boston local regain
its
centrality
in the local construction industry.
Notwithstanding
a
booming market
led
by public works projects such
treatment plant and by high-tech and hospital related construction -
numbers of
skilled
plumbers and
(see table 1, below).
At
the
same
fitters
nonvithstanding similar overall trends
itself as a
to reverse
key player
its
for these
time, plumbers' and
demand
despite the overall growth in die area's
was not able
- wages
all
massive
new sewage
of which demand significant
workers in and around Boston have stagnated
fitters'
union membership has merely held steady
for construction
in the local
as a
workers
economies and
(see
graph
2,
below). In short,
similar use of tactics, the
Boston
local
organizational fortunes while the Pordand local was successful at re-launching
in the local
construction industry.
How do we account
for these differences?
Explaining the Different Outcomes
One's
first
reflections
insunct would suggest that the outcomes observed between the two locals are, in
of deeper, more structural differences between the two
local fared better
than
its
cities.
fact,
In other words, the Pordand
Boston peer because Pordand's economy was stronger and or the demand
17
for
skilled
plumbers and
Or, perhaps, Portland
fitters greater.
thus the challenges faced bv
local
its
explanations, however, reveals their
a
is
more union
friendly
environment and
unions were not as great. Closer examination of these possible
inability' to
sufficiendy account for the divergent
outcomes discussed
above.
Differences in
Demand
Periods of increasing employment are thought to favor unions since ught labor market condidons
are believed to strengthen unions
and weaken employer resistance to them (Farber and Western
2001; Ashenfelter and Pencavel 1969; McKersie and
Brown
one would expect employers concerned about securing
would turn
more
to the unions
readily, thus
1963). In the construction industry,
a sufficient supply
of skilled tradesmen
strengthening the union's position (MiUs 1972a).
Were
labor market conditions significandv different in these two cities?
Graph
in
3
shows
unemployment
that
rates in the 1980s for construction
both Massachusetts and Oregon.'* However,
1990s as
reliable
a result
of the technology led building
information
and Boston were
is
available,
unemployment
identical at just 7.5%.
unemployment
rates
unemployment
rates were
between these two unions
local
was
just
in
it
in
as
in these
same
we wiH
were high
4%
it is
in the
date for which
both Pordand
historically
low
important to note that construction
between 1994 and 1996, two key years
unemployment
rates surely
tor
had some impact on the
alone can not explain the very significant differences
Pordand's local grew by over
8%. Moreover,
last
rates in the construction industries in
membership growth
Carpenters), also enjoying these
themselves
so that by 1998, the
Anecdotal evidence suggests that
4% difference
divergent outcomes of our two locals,
in
boom
lower in Oregon by about
this
in general
both areas, construction employment grew
have continued through 2000. Yet,
our narrative. Although
membership
in
workers
that
took place in these same years. Whereas
50% between 1994 and
see later, other
1999, growth
is
Pordand construction unions
same favorable labor-market conditions, were not
the
Boston
(e.g.,
the
able to revitalize
years.
l^gal and Regulatory Context
Another important
alternative explanation
would hold
that changes in the legal
and regulatory
context might explain differences between the two locals (Freeman 1985; Fantasia 1993; Goldfield
1987; Erlich 1988; Northrup 1991;
^
Data on unemployment
rates for
AUen
1988, 1994, 1995; Linder 1999). In other words, unions
plumbers and
fitters in
both ciues does not
proxy.
18
exist.
This measure
is
the best available
situated in
more umon-tricndly environments
more
better than their peers in other,
could be considered a
Whereas
in Massachussetts, prevailing
makes
it
easier for
at
wage
legislation applies across the state, in
the union scale only
non-union contractors
to
states
have a
where union contractors
compete
in outlying parts
Oregon
of electing government
officials at
both the
generally favorable to unions, Oregon's strong environmentalist
significant political conflicts for pro-labor politicians.
of the
and
is
not
movement
do not appear
a licensed trade
both
local level that are
has generated
Similar pressures have not
strongly in Massachusetts. Political and regulatory contexts
At the same
state.
Finally, while
fitters.
state
Oregon,
are in the majority. This
since pipefitting
Massachusetts requires licenses for both plumbers and
histor\'
however, Oregon
and regulatory environment than Massachusetts.
time, barriers to entn,- into the industry are lower in
in that state.
severe challenges and thus perform
less
l:'ace
hostile political environments. If anything,
less favorable political
prevailing wages are set
will
emerged
as
be a significant
to
determinant of the different outcomes.
Strategies
and Union
In contrast to the
Capacities
economic and
political explanations
above
—both of which
generally attempt to
explain union decline and the possibilities for renewal as a function of the external environment in
which unions are embedded
capacities, leadership
and
—
organizational and social
strategies to explain the rise
Keefe, 2001; Voss and Sherman 2000;
1998; Graebelsky and
Hurd
reveals that strategies
and
between our two
the
open shop
locals.
in the
Ganz 2000;
movement accounts
and
fall
of unions
focus on union
in the U.S. (Katz, Batt
and
Frost 2000; Turner 1999; Bronfenbrenner, at
al
1994; Goldfield 1987). However, careful analysis of the two cases
tactics
alone also
fail
to adequately explain the
observed differences
In both Pordand and Boston, the unions responded to the
initial
surge of
1970s and early 1980s with similar rounds of wage concessions. These had
Utde to no effect on the emigration of contractors to the ranks of the open shop. Both locals then
turned to ad hoc, one-on-one bargaining with union and non-union contractors. Essentially,
signaled the unions' willingness to
promise to
undermine the union
staff individual projects with
undermine the unions' position
as
union workers.
scale in
Ad hoc
exchange for
this
a contractor's
bargaining only served to further
long time signatory contractors became upset with the special
treatment afforded their competitors and workers grew increasingly frustrated with the
unpredictable wages and working conditions they found from one job to the next.
19
In the late 198()s, the unions turned to
more innovative and even
created targeted funding arrangements that taxed uaion
that essentially
was used
members' wages
to subsidize signatory contractors
shop contractors. Both uruons reformed
Both unions
radical approaches.
when bidding
endowment
to create an
against lower-cost
open
more
their internal structures giving their top leaders
decision making authorin,'. Finally, the Pipetradcs locals in both cities redoubled dieir training
each case, involved the construction of impressive showcase training
programs which,
in
stocked with the
latest
—
manufacturing
facilities
equipment. Pordand's
facilities
rooms required
especially the clean
focus
on
facilities
the needs of high technology
—while Boston's
for chip manufacturing
concentrates on large scale insdtutional construction projects such as hospitals and
universit)' research facilities.
In short, both unions employed similar tactics but, as
we
saw, with
vet)' different results.
Embeddedness and
Social
Our
field
thev are
Its
Impact on Union Strategy
research suggests that the key difference between these two local unions
embedded
in their local
the degree to which
is
communities. Indeed, the degree of embeddedness appears to explain
Our many
the effectiveness of the tactics each union employed.
interviews with local union leaders and
other local stakeholders revealed that Pordand's local purposefully reached out in the
1990s to a
set
of actors -
materials suppliers
- with
in particular, to
whom
major property owners,
architects, engineers,
among major
narrow group of industn,' actors with
relations with other stakeholders
a result
all
contractors,
whom
it
it
ties
1980s and early
and building
In Boston, our
the union had not previously been in close contact.
interviews indicated that although the local Pipetrades unions had strong
establishment as well as
late
both within the regulatory
did not actively seek to develop
ties
outside of the
had been dealing for decades. Moreover, the unions'
took place within
official arenas:
of joint membership on governance committees or
as allies
within the context of bargaining, as
before community planning boards.
In Portiand, interactions between the local union and other actors occurred not just within official arenas
but also within a context of cooperative interaction either in developing
playing an intermediary role between
In order to obtain a
more
new
community environmental groups and
skills
or with the union
builders.
objective picture of the nature and character of these
ties,
we conducted
a
survey of major construction industry stakeholders in both Portiand and Massachusetts. Specifically,
identified three separate
that stand to profit
(those
who
live
communities of stakeholders:
(1)
property owners (consisting of organizations
from the ownership of developed properties),
and work
in the built
environment), and
20
we
(3)
(2)
neighborhoods and communities
builders (organizations that are responsible
for constructing the built environment).
Within each of these major stakeholder groups, we identified
the following categories of industry participants in order to determine the appropriate sample space
based on Burt's (1992) formulation of structural equivalence:
(1)
Building trade unions, sub-divided for the purposes of the study into:
(a)
(2)
pipetrade locals; and,
(c)
other building trade locals including state and local building trade councils;
Building contractors (including construction managers, general contractors, sub-contractors
and
(3)
carpenters locals;
(b)
specialty' contractors);
Government (mcluding
state
and
local
construction as well as agencies that
government agencies responsible for regulaung
large amounts of construction services such
demand
as
highway departments);
(4)
Major property owners, sub-divided into:
(a) propert}' managers and developers,
(b)
manufacturers; and,
(c)
universides and health care providers;
(5)
Utilides;
(6)
Environmental, community planning and neighborhood organizations;
(7)
Architects and Engineers; and,
(8)
Banks and Lenders.
We compiled
a
list
finally,
of the most prominent organizations within each category for each
We
contained approximately 200 organizations.
then contacted
all
an actual and on-going relationship
sur\'ey
The
Of these, we
responses in Pordand, for a total of 93 organizations in
total) that
were
list
They were asked
to indicate
-
received 41 responses in Boston and about 52
all
-
a response rate
either over the telephone,
survey delivered through regular mail - which
of 46%.
among
'
do you or someone
An
in
else in
the organizations listed
would they consider
depth discussion of methodology' used
in defining the
at the
to be
We entered
boundaries of the network, the design and administration
end of the paper.
21
a
"which organizations on the
your organization communicate with on a regular basis."
of the survey appears in the methods appendix found
their
though an on-line survey or on
"in their organization's network." Specifically, they were asked to identify,
list
suitable for
of these organizations became both the
Respondents within each organization were personally contacted by telephone to request
participation.
list
was determined by whether or not an organization had
to the industry.
instrument and the survey universe.
Each
of these organizations and ultimately
idenufied 101 of these organizations in Portland and 103 in Boston (204 in
inclusion within our network analysis. Suitability
city.^
Freeman
these data into Ucinct 5 (Borgatti, Everett and
matrix representing
ties
A
within the neKvork.
given for the absence of a possible
tie.
the data as well as to present the entire
The
one
(1)
1999), a
computer program
indicates the existence
make
resulting matrix allows us to
"map" of network
of
that
a tie
produces
and
a
zero
a
(0) is
from
several inferences
graphically.
ties
Table 2 shows several measures of network centrality for the two Plumbers and Fitters unions. The two
reported
centralit)'
in different
wavs.
the organizations.
measures gauge the degree to which actors
The
first,
Our
"degree"
centralit\' in
organization
is
among
is
network are connected
to
one another
number of ties
to
and from
simply a measure of the
data allow us to measure both "in-ties" and "out-ties", that
from organizations and those
degree of
centrality,
in a
that are received
from
others. Tltis
is,
ties that are sent
asymmetry allows us
to interpret the
terms of prestige or prominence. The higher the score, the more prestigious the
actors in the network.
The second measure, "betweeness", computes
Here we
distance information must travel between different actors in the network.
the shortest
are interested in
seeing whether or not this information travels through the unions in question in order to assess whether
among
or not these unions control or broker the flow of information
are reported as standard deviation units,
standard deviation, allowing us to
anchored to the mean score
make comparisons between
the Pipetrades in Portiand are considerably
the
more prominent and
information to and from other actors in their
city
in
two
are a
The
actors in the network.
each
cities.
city
scores
and then divided by the
The
results indicate that
more important conduit of
than their counterparts in Boston by
two
at least
standard deviations from the mean.
Expressed graphically, the differences are even more evident. The responses were pooled into the
twelve categories indicated above from which
organizations in the network.
between the groups was
categor)'
Two
at least 0.5.
groups
we
in the
derived the density of
network were considered
This indicates that
at least
of actors regularly communicates with organizations
50%
among
ties
tied if the density
the "in-ties" to the two unions side-by-side.
The
figure
organizations in the network to the two unions, excluding
highlight the unions in question.
The Plumbers and
of in-ties including, importandy, significant
locals in
levels
all
in the other category.
shows the
other
of contacts
of the respondents within one
entered asymmetrically in order to differentiate between sending and receiving
show
the various groups of
ties
ties in
ties.
These data were
Figures
1
and 2
reported by other
the network in order to
Fitters in Portiand receive
by
far the larger
number
of communication from major property owners. The
Boston, on the other hand, were snubbed by
22
all
of the actors other than their fellow building
trades unions.
network.
set
1
show
Figures 3 ;ind 4
ties
going
The Pordand
Icre too, the differences are apparent.
of actors
network compared
in the
to the
narrow
*** Figures
These data allow us
narratives presented above,
The precedmg
1
,
2,
set
local reports des to a
much more
of contacts reported by the Boston
boom
it
suggests that the Pipefitters in
in the
Seen in
their local construction industry networks.
analysis strongly suggests that
Oregon were not simply
embeddedness played
light
of the
beneficiaries of the
Pordand and Boston. However,
locals in
a single
matched
is
pair case study
perhaps the
product of some broader difference between Boston and Pordand. In order to control for
a
degree to
a key role in explaining the divergent
can not entirely rule out that the differences observed between the two local unions
we conducted
locals.
taking place around them.
outcomes of the Pipetrades
effect",
diverse
3 and 4 here ***
conclude that our two local unions were significandy different
to
which thev were embedded within
high tech building
other direction, from the unions to others in the
in the
this "city
second matched pair case study of the carpenters' unions in these two
cities.
Carpenters Unions in Oregon and Massachusetts
Pacific-Northwest Council of Carpenters, Oregon District
In the late 1970s, Pordand's Carpenters' unions, realizing they faced a significant challenge from
shop
forces, attempted to shift to a
more
aggressive organizing posture.
organizer affiliated with the national union, headed up the
rural contractors for organizing
with one of the
first
new
uses of
Marc Furman,
initiative. ^
Furman
set
descended into recession
in the early 1980s, the
young
out to target large
"bottom-up" organizing techniques
focused efforts on organizing workers direcdy, rather than starting with their employers
as the state
a
open
first.
that
However,
union was forced to abandon these
innovative organizing efforts in order to focus exclusively on relieving the suffering of their existing
membership. At the height of the recession of the
reported
80% unemployment
major manufacturing presence
''
Furman would
late
later
become
a
rates.
early 1980s, several
Carpenters were especially hard
in the area
pioneer of
—
fell
many of the
of Oregon's carpenter locals
hit as the
lumber industry
—
the
into crisis (Wollner 1990).
innovative organizing tactics the union began to employ in the
1980s and early 1990s.
23
Desperate to get
wage
This had
cuts.
engaging
their
in
members back
litde effect
this strateg)-
membership grew
to those
employed by
result, the
union began
the Pipetrades locals.
locals against each other
unions suffered significant losses and their
increasingly frustrated with dramadcally variable
wages and working condiuons.
favoridsm unions manifest towards their former
signaton,' contractors also chaffed at die
(disloyal) colleagues
a result, the
and manipulated wages by playing
an effort to secure the best possible deal. As a
Long-dme
membership numbers. As
their declining
one-on-one ad hoc negodadons similar
Contractors took advantage of
in
on
round of deep
to work, Carpenters locals steeled themselves for a
and current compedtors.
Bv the mid-1980s, major contractors
in the
Pordand area began contemplating
a
switch to the open
shop. Several set up "double breasted" operations that allowed them to compete for
whichever regime best suited
their interests.
main contractors' association leading
contractors sided with the
union's market share declined from
This development prompted a bitter dispute with the
to a split within that organization.
open shop leading
90%
work under
A
in
of the
significant majority
The Carpenters
to a swift erosion in the union's position.
of non-residential construction
1980 to
city's
than
less
60%
in
1984 (Northrup 1984).
The
national Carpenters union
return to
many
Pordand
to
was forced
to step in to
remedy the
situation.
Marc Furman was asked
develop a new statewide structure intended to mitigate some of the problems the
The new
separate locals within the state had generated.
organization took fuU responsibility for
organizing workers and coordinating wage rates in different parts of the
union was restructured once again,
this time, as part
of
a
state.
In the early 1990s, the
major nationwide reorganization mandated by
international union headquarters. This second reorganization shifted control of the
multi-state regional organization headquartered in Seattle,
representational responsibilities shifted
Council director
who was
away from
Oregon and
a parts
of Northern
itself.
geographic areas,
Whereas
in
more
locals to a
managers and toward
new
a
new
District
organization renegotiated
into a regional pact covering
Washington
was
a response to the increasing regionalization
in the past carpenter contractors generally stayed within relatively
recent years, specialized contractors have
the entire Pacific-Northwest.
The
particularly in the Seatde region
State,
California.
In part, the regionalization of the union's structure
the industn,'
local business
them
Pordand
Washington. At the same time, direct
appointed by the national president. The
collective bargaining agreements, incorporating
Idaho,
to
24
a
narrow
begun bidding on work throughout
union's regionalization strategy has been
where the union has maintained
of
somewhat
successful,
strong political and economic
presence. However,
it
stemming the union's
that repeated
work
has not helped the union in securing
decline in the
Pordand
in outlying parts
Instead, contractors
area.
of Oregon or
in
and other stakeholders report
changes in leadership and lack of strong decision making authority weakened the
Carpenters' union in both Pordand and the rest of the state.
Graph
in
5
shows the percentage of carpenters who
Bureau of Labor
Statisdcs',
shows
cycle.
boom, before
members of the union
graph, which pools responses
that Pordand's Carpenters
share during the heaviest years of the building
end of the construcnon
The
Current Population Survey.
into several three vear time frames,
tail
identified themselves as
finally
union actually
gaining
lost
market
somewhat toward
the
Table 3 confirms the erosion of the Pordand Carpenters'
position showing that carpenters' real wages actually declined during the years of heaviest
demand. These data
did not benefit
all
indicate that the building
boom
Pordand experienced
diat
in the
Pordand area construcdon unions. For the Pordand Carpenters,
they were unable to take advantage of the market up-turn.
Degan, the union was "caught with
its
To
it
mid-1990s
looks as
quote one Carpenter leader,
if
Tim
pants down."
Inten-iews with both the Carpenters' union leadership and other informants in Pordand indicate
that as a result
of power batdes and multiple internal restructuring processes, the union has
alienated itself
from many of
their
most important
local parmers.
Discussions with contractors
and union leaders indicate that the union developed a reputation for indecision,
as
all
major
decisions were subjected to review by higher levels of the organizational hierarchy. Ultimately,
the union decided in the mid-1990s to seek
wherever
Its
it
became
membership,
available.
who
outside
traditional jurisdictional boundaries,
its
While potentially serving to bolster the employment prospects of
served to further alienate the local union from other regional
this action
building trade unions
work
felt
threatened by the Carpenters' encroachment of their jurisdictions.
***Graph
5
and Table
3 here ***
New England Council of Carpenters
The
strategies
of the Carpenter locals
tlrmly rooted in a "top
in
and around Boston
down" philosophy of organizing
that
incentives for contractors to sign-on to the union contract.
trouble in the mid-1980s,
floated
it
realized that
it
had
in the
lost its grip
1970s and early 1980s were
emphasized maximizing the
However,
as the
union ran into
over the workforce. Workers openly
between union and open shop contractors, accepting work with whatever firm offered
25
the best opportunity at any given
works
ot public
just as the
By
projects.
its
assault
on the
in the Carpenters' public
and to other decision makers
a diet
state's prevailing rate
law (Erlich
formidable grass-roots political operation to defeat the measure
and undertook significant efforts to root out criminal
exposed cracks
on
the state, surviving
the mid-1980s, several locals were embroiled in corruption scandals
open shop movement launched an
The union geared up
1990).
moment. Dozens of locals dotted
image.
It
activit)'.
became
But the events nevertheless
clear
in the industry diat the union's
both to the umons' leadership
power, even
in the city
of Boston,
had waned.
While the
rest
of the union was beginning to implement "bottom-up" organizing
Cambridge-based
affiliate
problem, which resulted
to
engage
company,
to locate
in a
new
in the incarceration
Rocked by
strategy.
a particularly egregious corruption
of several of the union's leaders, the new leadership decided
few carefuUy chosen clashes with
a leader in
its
searched for a
strategies, the union's
a
major high-technology employer, Biogen. The
bio-technology research and pharmaceuticals, had recendy announced
new headquarters and
its
technology intensive research
facilities in
the city's
its
decision
new Technology
Square neighborhood next to MIT.
The
local challenged the
enough
for the
company's request for
community'
as a whole.
began to work closely with the
town-gown
relations.
a tax
abatement on the grounds diat they were not doing
Simultaneously, the local increased
many community groups on
cir\''s
The uruon began
its
decided to take on the
city's
to ally with constituencies in the city regardless
two major academic
owners and construction consumers
hearings before the
city's
—
in the city
architecturally
and
in
When
terms of noise and
traffic.
highly trained and well paid union carpenters.
MIT
When
its
states
later the carpenter's
—MIT and Harvard, both major
the local could count
At
the
on
solid
allied witii
land
community support. In
community groups
interested
same
time, the union incorporated a call for the
ways that improved community standards by using
As
a result, the
union
won commitments from Harvard
major projects using union contractors.
the national union stepped in to implement a
England
from
to build
of whether the
were better integrated into surrounding neighborhoods both
universities to use their construction budgets in
and
institutions
planning board, the union successfully
in ensuring the universities' buildings
community housing and
issues such as
groups' agenda's had any cLrect bearing on pencLng construction projects.
local
intake of apprentices and
under one unified agreement
prior experiences to
its
new
new
regional structure covering the six
in the early 1990s, the
regional strategy.
26
As
New
union employed the lessons learned
regional union official
Mark
Erlich explained:
W'c had enough poliucal leverage so there was an intormal message to developers not to
on
pick
what
is
to use a
union or open shop general contractor.
legitimately union
the market.
We had
a
and what
few people
had to pay close attention to
The new
It
isn't.
in the
Its all
only decision
about perception of
who
realized earlier than
most
that
you
tliose perceptions.
embedded
in the
minds of property owners and contractors
its
new
on geographic mobility and
on
all
major properrv' owners. As
a result,
it is
now
to
many
state's
as to
In addition to loosening restrictions
in other parts
of the country.
universities,
community organizations and
generally agreed that the Carpenters union in and around
an organization one needs to take seriously
If
way
time, the regional leadership has carefully cultivated a wide range of relationships outside of
narrow confines of the industry including the
According
its
projects regardless of their location. This undermines the
of "double-breasting" that has hampered unions' efforts
IS
Building
blurring strict craft Lines, the union requires signatory contractors working
outside of Boston to use union labor
At the same
alike.
regional agreement in such a
entice contractors in oudying areas into signing the union contract.
Boston
.
has to do with perception of the strength of
union
reputation of strength in Boston, the union structured
the
.
regional organization has since actively taken steps to ensure that the perception of the union's
strength remains
practice
The owners'
But, \vc started to develop that perception early.
us.
whether
is
if
one hopes
to
buHd
a
major project
in the area.
one area contractor:
you
In the
are going top to
last
bottom, the Carpenters are the most effective union
in
Boston.
seven years the Carpenters have gone through huge changes. There just
wasn't the same effort in the 1980s. Then, they didn't care at
an organizing
fanatic.
He'U do what ever
it
all
about organizing. Dave
New
England Council of Carpenters] is
takes to get someone wrapped up. Boston is
[Bergeron, Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the
locked up for Carpenters, but not the other trades.
Graph 4 (above) confirms
this assertion
showing
that the Carpenters union's
market share has
increased steadily throughout die 1990s. Table 3 (above) shows that carpenters' wages have
reached historically high rates after recovering from the deep recession of the early 1990s.
Betweenjuly 1999 and June 2001, 466 new contractors signed the union's regional agreement.
The Carpenters Cases
in
Comparative Perspective
Again, the dominant explanations concerning union decline and renewal do not seem to explain
the Carpenters union's divergent outcomes. Unlike plumbing and pipefitdng, carpentry
Licensed trade and thus fewer barriers to workers' entry for this industry exist. This
easier for
workers to move between industries depending on where their
Graph 6 shows construction
industry
employment
as a percentage
27
of
sldlls
total
is
makes
not
a
it
are best rewarded.
employment
in both
Portland and Massachusetts from 1978 to 1999.
m
employed
A
high proportion of Oregon's workforce was
the construction industry just prior to the crash of the early 1980s. Later, however,
the sector gained workers culminating in historically high industry labor force participation in the
1990s.
late
Boston, on the odier hand,
off with relatively litde
starts
construcdon, but builds up as the area enters
participation plunges
indicator of
m the late
demand,
in the late 1990s.
this chart
Boston
would suggest
local
is
in
early
futilit)^
Labor force
Taken
later 1990s.
both states were
particularly high.
Graph
in
high
as
an
demand
In light of these facts, the
do not adequately explain the
6 here ***
outcomes between these two
different
1980s as the significance of the open shop threat became
the
in the 1980s.
in
especially impressive.
conceded wage and working conditions
As
boom
that carpenters in
Oregon was
***
Tactics alone also
economic
1980s before regaining strength in the
However, demand
greater success of the
its
employment
in
clear,
an effort to stem the
cases.
In the
each of the cides' Carpenters unions
flight
of contractors to the open shop.
of these efforts became evident, both unions made a decision to break away from strong
identification with the other building trades in their areas.
had bargained according to longstanding
government lobbying.
differentials
Officially, coordination
Previously, the building trades, as a whole,
and patterns and combined forces with respect
was accomplished through
joint
membership
in
to
an area's
Building Trades Council. Informally, however, the unions and contractors' associations had developed
pattern bargaining
bound
norms
wage
that maintained accepted
locals to strike in defense
differentials
among
the different crafts and
of maintaining jurisdictional boundaries. In both
cities,
however, the
Carpenters unions walked away from membership in Building Trades Councils and announced their
intention to bargain wages separately.
This
move away from
the other trades reflected changes that had been taking place in the structure of
the industry itself Traditionally, building trade unions have
sacrosanct.
A
carpenter caught doing
work
that
was considered
could e.xpect a bitter protest from the other union's
blurring craft boundaries and eliminating
local.
some of the
generate.
Non-union contractors employed lower
work
while maintaining divisions
site
among
the
vehemendy defended
to
The open shop,
in contrast, profited
from
inefficiencies that strict craft jurisdictions could
accomplish mundane tasks on the
skilled trades for
more complicated work. By
backing away from their close association with the other trades, the Carpenters
28
boundaries as
be within another union's jurisdiction
skilled laborers to
most
craft
in
both
cities
had decided
to
meet the open shop on
its
own
terms while,
at the
same time,
tacitly
challenging other unions'
complacency.
The Carpenters
locals in
both Boston and Portland also joined the front
throughout the countr)' employing innovative organizing
tactics
was
tlie
emplovment
the union.
loss
of
its
practice of "salting" in
at a
The
non-union contractor
tactic
some
in
a local sent
Among
most important of these
the
out-of-work union members to seek
an effort to convince the contractors' workers to sign on with
forced the contractor into signing the union contract by threatening
best workers, the chief source of a contractors competitive advantage.
efforts reflected a
force as a
which
tactics.
of building trade unions
line
"bottom-up" philosophy
whole rather than focusing on
success.
However, neither
that
full
The
him with
union's organizing
emphasized the importance of organizing the work
employment
for existing
more
local has ignored the
membership. These
Toward
tactics
found
"top-down" process of
generally accepted
attracting contractors to voluntarily sign-on to the union contract.
this end,
both of the
Carpenters unions have implemented policies designed to assist contractors by restructuring hiring
processes and loosening rules that
restrict access to
hall
pension and health care benefits for new contractors.
The new
Finally,
both unions have undertaken significant internal restructuring
made
possible to implement contracts that apply throughout the multi-state geographic regions
it
the
efforts.
structure has
covered bv the regional council. These contracts offer different wage rates for different parts of the
More importandy, however,
make
region depending
on
to take his or her
crew with them onto projects that are outside of their immediate geographic location.
local conditions.
they
it
possible for a contractor
This should help to attract non-union contractors located in oudying areas that want to break into the
lucrative city-based construction markets while at the
to travel with their
have been especially successful
show
existing contractors
crews intact as they bid on work outside their typical geographic confines.
Analyzing the network data helps to explain
from methods
same time allowing the union's
in
the various innovations
implemented
in
both
locals
Boston. Table 4 presents the centrality data for the two locals derived
identical to those reported
that the Carpenters in
whv
on above
for the
Boston enjoy much greater
construcuon industry stakeholders.
On
plumbers and
fitters
unions. Tliese data
centrality within the overall
average, the Massachusetts Carpenters are
network of construction industry stakeholders than are
their counterparts in
network of
more
central to the
Oregon by about one
standard deviation. Here too, the graphical representation provides a clear picture of what this centrality
looks like in terms of social structure. Figures 5 and 6 indicate that in-ties to the Boston Carpenters
include developers, major property owners,
community groups and
29
utilities.
In-ties to their counterparts
in
came onlv from other
Portland
unions. Similarlv, figures 7 and 8
show
diat out-ties
from the two
Carpenters locals differ significantly with the union in Massachusetts reaching out to the entire network
while the union in Portland maintains a ver)' restricted set of relationships.
*** Table
These
4,
Figures
5, 6,
7 and 8 here ***
data, read in conjunction with the cases, indicate that Massachusetts's Carpenters
merely lucky, "in the right place
within the industr,?, a
new
access to and information
set
union was not
Rather, as the process of regionalization unfolded
at the right time."
of important stakeholders emerged. The union's embeddedness gave
on these emerging stakeholder
interests
it
and thus opened up new
opportunities for the local to re-position itself as central to the emerging needs of the industry's players.
At the same
roles
time, the Carpenters'
and identides
that are
embeddedness has allowed
emerging
it
to negotiate a distinct identity
as the industry regionalized
throughout
New
among
the
England. Similar
processes of regionalizadon have taken place in the Pacific-Northwest. However, the Carpenters' lack of
embeddedness there has kept the union from fuUy integration into the
addition,
industry's
new
configuration. In
and perhaps more importandy, the unions' embeddedness has contributed to
new mission
its
of organizing unorganized carpenters. In the 1970s and 1980s both unions gained reputations
communities
further the
as
crony organizations whose leadership controlled access
narrow
interests
organizing posture in the
of themselves and
late
their
in
in their
ways that served only
to
membership. As both unions turned toward an
1980s and early 1990s, they each encountered resistance from communities
and from potential workers. By more effectively reaching out to those communities, the Massachusetts
carpenters have been able to rehabilitate their image in the community. This has brought
their efforts to secure lucrative projects as
same
time, carpenters
and employers
evidenced by the union's success
alike are
more wiUing
at
MIT and
to accept the unions' claims
them
allies in
Harvard. At the
of
transformation.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the
ability
vibrant organizations depends
upon how
respective social, political and
of building trades unions to reform and re-launch themselves
as
successful they are at (re-)embedding themselves in their
economic contexts. Through an
building trades unions in Boston and Portiand,
we have sought
analysis
to
show
of two matched pair cases of
that faced with similar
challenges and employing analogous tactics, those locals that truly succeeded in re-inventing themselves
30
(the Pipefitters in Portland
and the Carpenters
central positron within a dense
and
social
changes
were
of other
in their industn,'.
less successful at
strategies
network of local
ties.
on
their
Their embeddedness in an articulated network of
local stakeholders' needs,
The other two
local
and numerous
allies in their
their
own
struggles to adapt to
unions (Plumbers in Boston and Carpenters in Portland)
renewing themselves - notwithstanding genuine efforts
and rebuilding
rely
provided these more successful local unions with strategic information, a
institutional tics
better understanding
Boston) did so because they were able to
in
organizations
- because they had
failed to
at
launching
broaden
new
embeddness
their
within their local communities.
The importance of embeddedness
is
not unique to our two sets of local unions, nor
industries with local, geographic scopes.
Its
is it
importance has been Ulustrated for other
restricted to
US
unions in other
Voss 1993, Rubinstein and Kochan 2001, Cobb and Locke 2001,
industrial settings (Cobble 1992,
Rubinstein and Hechscher, 2001) as well for unions elsewhere (Locke 1990, Streeck 1997). In other
words, regardless of whether the union
is
operating in a locally
bound industry or even
a
more
market, occupying a central position within an industry's expanded network of stakeholders
is
global
key to the
union's on-going strength and vibrancy.
This approach to understanding the shifting organizational fortunes of labor unions has significant
implications for both union strategy' and labor scholarship. For unions
it
implies a fundamental re-
thinking of their current strategies. Rather than focus primarily on a tool-kit of tactics (organizing,
lobbying,
etc.),
their industn'
of
political,
unions need also to work hard
- be they
local or global.
economic and
social
important not simply because
it
In other words,
groups
will
at rebuilding their place
in
US
within the networks that define
unions need to rebuild their
an array
order to regain their centrality within these networks. This
provide unions with strategic information and potential
more importandv because more frequent and open communication/interaction with
stimulate the unions to
ties to
become more open and responsive
organizations.
Only
allies
is
but
these groups wiU
in this
way
will they
earn
the central role they so desperately need to survive.
For labor
scholars, the
analytical perspective
argument advance
beyond the
internal
in this
paper suggests that
the contexts within which the unions are
do
much upon
depends
as
the context in
other local organizations and institutions as
This
is
too need to broaden our
dynamics or vicissitudes of the unions themselves and focus
more broadly on
it,
we
embedded. What unions do, how well they
which they are embedded and the linkages they develop with
it
does on their
own
organizational capacities and tactics.
perhaps even more so today, in a period of rapid technological change and globalization
31
when
the
contours of their industries are
in
constant
flux.
To
paraphrase a line from Tennessee Williams's
Streetcar Named Desin, in today's turbulent world, unions, like the rest
not
just
of strangers but of good neighbors
as
weU.
32
of
us,
A
can benefit for the kindness
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Graphs
Graph 1.
Construction Industry Union Membership and Coverage, 1966-2000
45
40
35
c
2
30
25
20
15
^
Graph
Carpenters' Market Share, Boston and Oregon, 1990-2001
4.
60%
50%
40%
IM assachu^etts
I ()
re g o n
IrFrr^D
The numbers are generated from raw monthly data
36 months per category) with the exception of the "99-01" category
Source: Current Population Survey basic monthly survey.
aggregated into three year intervals
which
Graph
is
based on 26 months
(all
(i.e.,
of 1999, 2000 and die
first
two months of 2001).
Construction employment as a percent of total employment: Oregon and
Massachusetts, 1978-1999
5.
-Oregon
-M assachusetis
.=f^
^oi^
/-
^c*"
^<,*
s^'*
^^
N^''
n'^'^'
N'f''°
Economic Census of the United States
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/us/US000.HTM
Source:
37
s'*'*
Tables
Tabl e 1. Plumber and
Year
Fitters'
Wages, Massachus etts and Oregon, 1982-1997
Figures
Figure
1.
In-ties to Pipetrades,
Mass.
Figure
5.
In-ties to Carpenters,
Mass.
Figure
6.
In-ties to Carpenters,
Other Unions
Other Unions
Carpenters
Oregon
Carpenters
Pipctrades
Pipe trades
Arch/Eng
Arch/Eng
Contractors
|Contractors
Ualiues
Ualities
Developers
Developers
Government
Property
Owners
Property'
Owners
Universities
Universities
Community'
Banks
Figure
7.
Out-ties from Carpenters, Mass.
Figure
8.
Out-ties from Carpenters,
Other Unions
Carpenters
Communit\'
BanEs
Otlier
Carpenters
Pipetrades
Oregon
Unions
Pipetrades
•
Arch/Ene
Arch/Eng
^Contractors
Utilities
Developers
Developers
Government
Property'
Owpers
Property'
Owners
Univ/Hosp
Univ/Hosp
Banks
Communit\'
Banks
40
Communit\'
Methods Appendix
The network
data are based
conducted
Boston.
analysis.
sur\'ev
in
All
The
on rwo site visits to Portland and an equivalent amount of field work
work identified the principle groups that were included in the network
field
of the building trade unions
in
were chosen based on the following
A.
Government
organizations
satellite cities
were contacted.
each
city
received a survey.
The
others identified in the
criteria:
In addition to the large urban areas, a sample of large towns and
.
We
asked to be connected to the
official
most responsible
for
construction. Tv'pically, a senior land-use planner, construction inspector or both responded. In
addition, a
number of state
agencies were identified including those overseeing the state's
highway department and transportation agencies. These agencies were asked
building codes,
its
to provide
of organizations represented on any
lists
official
committees advising the agency head
or in any of the major functional areas of the agency having to do with construction.
The organizations contacted were taken from each of the
Commerce "Book of Lists" which contains information on the city's largest
Property owners
B.
various sectors.
.
We
contacted the twenty-five largest of these in addition to
city's
Chamber of
property owners in
all
major
and teaching hospitals.
Banks and Lenders were identified in the same way as property owners.
Arcliitects and Engineers were identified in the same way as property owners.
Communir\' groups in Pordand were contacted from a list maintained by the Multnomah County
universities
C.
D.
E.
The List for Boston was compiled from the authors' familiarity with the area and
from interviewees.
Contractors In Pordand, contractors were chosen through contacts resulting from the field
interviews with a selection of union and open shop contractors included. Contractors in Boston
were chosen from among the largest contractors listed in the Chamber of Commerce "Book of
Public Library.
F.
.
Lists."
The
list
first
contacted each of the organizations by telephone to identify the person
of the organization's network
ties to
who had
researcher
the best knowledge
other construction industry stakeholders. Respondents had a choice
of completing the survey by hand (through the regular
line
A
of these organizations became both the survey instrument and the survey universe.
mail),
on the phone,
vial e-mil (hard
copy) or on-
over the Internet. About half of the surveys were completed on the phone, about one third were
completed over the Internet and the remainder were completed either by e-mail or by hand.
These data were entered into Ucinet 5 (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 1999), a computer program
designed to conduct network analyses, which resulted in a square matrix equal to the number of
responses squared. CentraUty measures were calculated on data from the full network of individual
organizations. See Wasserman and Faust (1993) and Freeman (1979) for a discussion of network
centrality measures. The figures were generated bv partitioning the matrix according to the categories
Listed in the text of the paper and then calculating the density of ties between cells of the resulting 12x12
matrix.
41
Interview Appendix
Nution^il
Mark Avers, Construction Department
IBEW AFL-CIO
Director,
John Dunlop, Professor Emeritas, Harvard Universit\'
Robert Georgine, President, Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD),
Jeff Grabelsky, Cornell University; Consultant to
BCTD, AFL-CIO
Richard Kibbon, Former Chief-of-Staff, Business Roundtable
Stephen Lerner, Organizing Director,
BCTD, AFL-CIO
JeriT Rhodes, United Brotherhood of Carpenters' National Organizing Director
Jim
Sala,
Internadonal Organizer, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
Boston
Bobbv Banks, Director of Apprendchip Training, Ironworkers Local
Mark Erlich, New England Council of Carpenters
Codey, Organizer,
Bill
7
IBEW Local
Joe Dart, President, Massachusetts Building Trade Council
Jav Hurlev, Business Manager, Ironworkers
Doug
Hugh
Husid, Goulston Storrs, P.C.
Kelleher, Plumbers Contractors Associadon
Jim Loud, Contractor
Joe Nigro, Business Manager, Boston Building Trades Council
Dave Powell, Sprinklerfitters Union
Leo Reed, Mechanical Contractors Associadon
Carl Tower, Project Manager, Kaiser Engineers
Bill Sullivan,
Ken
Six
Willis,
Contractor
Labor Reladons Manager, Kaiser Engineers
anonymous
contractors
Pordand
Ted Audland, Contractor, former head of the AGC
Jake Benshoof, Retired Plumber and Community Activist
Don
Bern.',
IBEW
Gerald Bruce, Business Manager,
Cliff Davis,
Member,
IBEW
IBEW
Tim Degan, United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
District Council
Eric Franklin, Organizer, Northwest District Council of Carpenters
Marc Furman,
International Organizer, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
Sharon Genaci, Environmental Activist
Tim
Gothier, President,
Otto Herman,
NECA
REBOUND, Building Trades
Council, Seatde, Washington
Bob Okano, General Contractor
Wally Mehrens, President, Columbia-Pacific Building Trades Council
John Molis, Business Manager, Bricklayers
Jim Moss, Past President, Plumbers' Union
Bob Shiprak, President, Oregon Building Trades Council
Bill Sikara, Representative, Plumbing and Pipetrades Contractors Council
Jim Stuckenschneider, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
Matt Walters, Business Manager, Plumbers and
Fitters
John Williams, Environmental Consultant
42
AFL-CIO
323?
Date Due
Lib-26-67
3 9080 02246 1229