Regarding U.S. relief and reconstruction plans, programs, and
operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction provides independent and objective:
• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, inspections,
and investigations
• advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness
• prevention, detection, and deterrence of fraud, waste, and abuse
• information and analysis to the Congress, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, and the American people
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., was appointed Inspector General in January 2004. This past August,
the IG completed his 20th trip to Iraq to review progress on the reconstruction effort.
A Nascent Normalcy in Iraq
outcomes achieved. The lesson from this audit is that the success of large “soft program” contracts depends on the government’s ability to closely oversee the contract and to track
outcomes.
Three new convictions and one new indictment this quarter
highlight the ongoing work of SIGIR’s Investigations directorate, which continues to pursue actions in more than 67 open
cases, in conjunction with an array of law enforcement partners.
Although Iraq still struggles to meet increased electricity demand, average daily electricity production set a post-war record this quarter. Since
2003, the United States has expended about $4.4 billion to improve
Iraq’s electricity sector. One U.S.-supported project, the Diwaniyah 132kV
AIS Substation in Qadissiya, was completed this quarter. (USACE photo)
The role of private security contractors in Iraq remains controversial. A new SIGIR review lists more than 300 companies that
have provided security services in Iraq at a cost of about
$6 billion. The difficulty SIGIR encountered in accomplishing
this review underscores the need to implement better systems for tracking security costs. Moreover, the role of security
contractors in Iraq could be subject to significant change if the
SOFA lifts contractor immunity.
Relief and reconstruction funding in Iraq supports a significant
amount of non-construction work, such as the nearly $2 billion
allocated for democracy-building programs. SIGIR reviewed
the U.S. strategy for these programs this quarter and found that,
although there were clear goals and performance measures,
three areas needed strengthening: invoice review, outcome
accountability, and integration with Iraqi and international
organizations. The audit reported on two U.S. Agency for International Development contracts, amounting to nearly $600
million in investment provided through its Local Governance
Program. Although improvements occurred over the life of the
contracts, SIGIR’s auditors found it difficult to determine
Corruption
Corruption affected progress on several Iraq-funded projects
overseen by the United States. SIGIR’s inspections of three
I-CERP schools in Sadr City found that, although the construction work was generally acceptable, one of the Iraqi contractors
had quit because of repeated solicitations for bribes by Iraqi
officials—and threats after he refused to pay. Iraq’s Commission
on Integrity reported to SIGIR this quarter that it had a large
number of cases eliminated by operation of the new Amnesty
Law.
Reconstruction Reform
On October 14, 2008, the Reconstruction and Stabilization
Civilian Management Act (RSCMA) became law. Some five
years into the Iraq reconstruction experience, lessons identified by SIGIR, the General Accountability Office, and others
have now produced congressional action promoting systemic
change in the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations. Much remains to be done, though, before
this reform effort stabilizes the U.S. approach to this critical
mission—but the RSCMA is a good start. SIGIR will add a significant contribution to this reform effort in early 2009 when it
releases its comprehensive report on lessons learned from Iraq
reconstruction.
TO OBTAIN A FULL REPORT
Visit the SIGIR Website www.sigir.mil • email PublicAffairs@sigir.mil • call 703.428.1100
Improved security through U.S. support of Iraq’s police and
army, rising funding for reconstruction by the Government of
Iraq, incremental political progress reflected in the passage of
the new Provincial Election Law, and better service delivery
evidenced by record electricity outputs: these are among the
indicators of a nascent normalcy that may be taking hold in
Iraq. But the country remains in fragile condition. If security
again devolves, the slowly improving situation could quickly
reverse itself.
SIGIR Oversight
SIGIR continued its expansive oversight efforts this quarter, providing 14 new audit recommendations and 3 lessons
learned. Key among new SIGIR audits is an examination of
the Embassy’s reconstruction information systems requested
by Ambassador Ryan Crocker after he discovered a breakdown in reporting on problems that were afflicting the Falluja
Wastewater Treatment Plant. The Embassy has acted on SIGIR’s
recommendation to establish new policies that will ensure all
reconstruction projects,
Evolving U.S. Assistance
regardless of funding
This year has witnessed
source, are accurately
an evolution in U.S. assisand adequately reported
tance to Iraq, which may be
to the Ambassador. Apaccelerated in the coming
proximately 83% of onmonths by the passage of
going projects are within
the pending Status of Forces
the purview of the
Agreement (SOFA). The
Department of Defense,
SOFA could dramatically
meaning that these new
alter the scope of continuing
measures must aim at
U.S. assistance, particularly
enhancing coordination
if it lifts immunity for U.S.
between the Departcontractors in Iraq. Anecdotments of Defense and
Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and Chief Justice Medhat cut the ceremonial ribbon opening
the new Rusafa Justice Palace in Baghdad on September 10, 2008. The U.S.-constructed,
ally reflective of the evoluState. SIGIR’s inspection
$11.3 million courthouse will serve more than one million citizens. (USACE photo)
tion in U.S. support, MNF-I
of the Falluja project,
expects to transfer much of the “Green Zone” to Iraqi control
also carried out at Ambassador Crocker’s request, details how
by the end of 2008. This year’s drop in U.S. funding is similarly
and why this important water-sector effort incurred a 200%
reflective of the changing U.S. mission, but the GOI’s current re- cost increase and will serve 60% fewer homes than originally
serves of approximately $34 billion mean that it is quite capable
planned. The project’s per capita cost per household will end up
of funding its future reconstruction activity.
being around $10,000, and city residents will have to connect to
the system themselves.
To progress beyond a nascent normalcy, Iraq must, among
other things, carry out new provincial elections in January 2009 SIGIR’s auditors reviewed more than 1,200 terminated contracts
and new parliamentary elections in December 2009. Within
this quarter, finding the need for better contractor screening to
these varying contexts, U.S. officials continue to tighten up
ensure that suspended or debarred contractors do not continue
targeted capacity building and technical assistance in support
to receive work from the federal government. Keeping track of
of Iraq’s efforts to move beyond what has been a violent and
and debarring poor performers is essential to avoiding needless
unstable period.
waste.
SIGIR
Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction
WEB: www.sigir.mil
PHONE: 703.428.1100
EMAIL: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil
Quarterly Report to Congress
October 2008
U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING
Balances by Major Fund ($ Billions)a
Appropriations by Fiscal Year ($ Billions)b
$19.6
$20
Obligated
$38.4
$15
$9.1
$10
IRRF 2 $0.5
$5
Unobligated
$5.26
ISFF $3.9
ESF $0.6
$0
$6.1
$5.7
2005
2006
$3.5
2003
2004
2007
$6.8
2008/09
CERP $0.3
Obligations by Reconstruction Areaa
Range and Median Cost of CERP Projectsc
$11.7 M
$9.9 M
$8.8 M
$22.1 B
$5.5 M
$11.0 B
$3.4 B
Security
Infrastructure
$3.7 M
Median
$18.5 K
$10
$1.3 B
Governance Economy
2004
Median
$33.5 K
Median
$42.0 K
$50
2005
Median
$45.4 K
$20
2006
$12
2007
Median
$47.0 K
$36
2008
PROGRESS IN IRAQ
Oil Prices (dollars per barrel)d
Security Incidents: Three Snapshots in Timeg
$160
$120
$80
$40
$0
1,600
Oct
2008
Jul
2003
1,200
800
400
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
January 2004
June 2007
Found and Cleared Bombs (IEDs and Mines)
Detonated Bombs (IEDs and Mines)
Oil Exports (millions of barrels per day)
e
September 2008
Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and
Other Small Arms Attacks
Attacks Against Iraqi Infrastructure
and Government Organizations
Mortar, Rocket, and Surface-to-Air Attacks
2.0
1.5
Security Incidents and Troop Trainingh
1.0
0.5
0.0
2004
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2005
2006
2007
2008
1,500
750
0
Electricity Production, Demand, and Capacity
f
Change from Same
Quarter Last Year
750
Trends (Monthly Averages)
120,000
Production Over Time
(MWh)
8%
100,000
Apr
2007
0
250,000
7%
175,000
Sep
2008
12%
Apr
9,000 2007
0
0
Sep
2008
750
0
Attacks Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations
2004
5,000 Apr
8%
Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms Attacks
1,500
8,000
Average Daily
Production
(MW)
Mortar, Rocket, and Surface-to-Air Attacks
750
Sep
2008
10,000
Feasible Generation
Capacity
(MW)
750
1,500
Apr
2007
100,000
Detonated Bombs (IEDs and Mines)
1,500
80,000
Demand
(MWh)
Found and Cleared Bombs (IEDs and Mines)
1,500
2005
2006
2007
2007
4,000
Sep
2008
3,000
600k
300k
0k
Total Trained Iraqi Security Forces, between July 2005 and August 2008
For the sources of information used to create this insert (notes a-h), please see the last endnote in this Report.
p r o f e s s ionali s m
p r o d u c t i v i t y
pe r s e v e r an c e
2008