United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
January 16, 2013
Congressional Committees
Subject: Force Structure: Army’s Annual Report on Modularity Progress Needs More
Complete and Clear Information to Aid Decision Makers
The Army considers its modular force transformation, which began in 2004, the most
extensive restructuring it has undertaken since World War II. The foundation of the modular
force is the modular brigade combat team. A primary goal of the restructuring effort was to
increase the number of available brigade combat teams to meet operational requirements
while maintaining combat effectiveness equal to or better than previous division-housed
brigades. Restructuring the Army from a division-based force to one with the smaller
modular brigade combat team as the standard combat unit has required an investment in
“key enabler” equipment and personnel. “Key enabler” equipment and personnel—including
those used for embedded combat support functions such as military intelligence,
reconnaissance, and logistics—are defined as equipment and personnel that make a
modular force or unit as capable as or more capable than the non-modular force or unit it
replaced.
The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 1 which amended
the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 2 directed the
Army to report annually on its progress in fulfilling the key enabler requirements of its
modular units and in repairing, recapitalizing and replacing items used in support of
overseas contingency operations. Specifically, the law required the Army to include, among
other things, a comparison of the authorized level of key enabler equipment with the level of
such equipment on hand and planned purchases; an identification of the risks associated
with shortfalls, as well as mitigation strategies for addressing those risks; and the results of
Army assessments of modular force capabilities. See enclosure I for the full text of the
statutory reporting requirements. The law also directed us to review the report and to
provide information and recommendations deemed to be appropriate in light of our review.
The Army issued its fiscal year 2012 report in May 2012. In reviewing the Army’s fiscal year
2012 report, we evaluated the extent to which the Army included information in response to
the statutory reporting requirements and demonstrated progress in meeting modular force
requirements.
In our review of the Army’s fiscal year 2012 report on progress in fulfilling modularity
requirements, we reviewed the reporting requirement enacted by section 323 of the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, as amended by section
332 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. The current
1
Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 332 (2011).
2
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323 (2006).
GAO-13-183R Force Structure
requirements are set out in a note following 10 U.S.C. §229 (see encl. I). To determine the
extent to which the Army included information in response to the statutory reporting
requirements and demonstrated progress in meeting modular force requirements, two GAO
analysts independently reviewed the fiscal year 2012 report, comparing it with each element
required by the law and determining whether each required reporting element was included.
In the case of any conflicting determinations, a third GAO analyst adjudicated the difference.
To gain a full understanding of the elements included in the annual report and to discuss the
methodology used for collecting information and reporting on the Army’s progress toward
modular restructuring, we met with Army officials knowledgeable about compiling
information for the report, key enabler personnel and equipment, equipment reset, 3 doctrine,
and force structure changes. We also reviewed the Army’s fiscal year 2011 report on
progress in fulfilling modularity requirements to determine the extent to which the report
could be compared with the fiscal year 2012 report to determine the extent of progress in
fulfilling modularity requirements between fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Finally, we compared
information in the Army’s fiscal year 2012 report with our prior work on the usefulness of
agency performance information. 4 For the purposes of our review, we defined “performance
information” as data collected to measure progress toward achieving an agency’s
established mission or program-related goals.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to January 2013 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives.
Results in Brief
In its fiscal year 2012 report, the Army included information that responded to some of the
statutory reporting requirements, but did not include required information on the risks
associated with, and mitigation strategies for, any shortfalls in key enabler personnel and
equipment and a schedule for meeting personnel and equipment needs. The report
included, among other things, an assessment of the status of key enabler personnel and
equipment and information on assessments of modular force capabilities. However, the
Army did not present the information it included in a way that clearly demonstrated the
extent of progress toward meeting modular force requirements. While not explicitly required
by law, there were also a number of ways in which the Army could have presented the
information to better demonstrate the extent of progress toward meeting modularity
requirements. For example, the Army could have provided more explicit comparisons with
prior years to demonstrate the trend toward meeting key enabler equipment and personnel
requirements, but instead presented limited data for only one year. Army officials agreed
that some of the required information was omitted and that some of the information could
have been presented in a manner to more clearly demonstrate the extent of progress. A key
reason for the limitations in presentation, according to the officials in charge of compiling the
report, was that the various offices tasked with providing information needed to respond to
the statutory requirements used their own judgment about the amount and format of
3
Reset is defined as the repair, recapitalization, and replacement of equipment and materiel.
4
GAO, Results-Oriented Management: Strengthening Key Practices at FEMA and Interior Could Promote
Greater Use of Performance Information, GAO-09-676 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2009).
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information they included, which resulted in inconsistencies in the level of detail provided
and the degree to which information was explained. Further, the Army did not ensure that
performance information was reported in a consistent manner and that all issues were
addressed and sufficiently explained by providing guidance on the level and type of detail
required or taking steps to ensure the information was clear and consistent. To be useful,
performance information must meet users’ needs for completeness, accuracy, consistency,
and ease of use. 5 Without guidance on how information should be reported to ensure the
collection of more complete and clear information, the Army’s future annual reports may not
provide clear and complete information that is useful to congressional decision makers.
Background
A significant change of the Army’s transition to a modular design was that each modular
brigade combat team would include two combat-focused, or maneuver, battalions, as
opposed to the three maneuver battalions that made up a combat brigade in the previous
divisional structure. However, the new modular brigades were envisioned to be just as
capable due to different equipment—including key enabler equipment such as advanced
communications and surveillance equipment—and specialized personnel. The Army
planned to reconfigure its total force—including both active and reserve components—into a
standardized modular design. These standardized modular unit designs were implemented
in the Army Reserves and National Guard with the same organizational structure,
equipment, and personnel requirements as active duty units. The Army expects that all its
brigades will convert to modular designs as of fiscal year 2013.
In September 2011 the Army issued a report that should have responded to section 332 of
the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, which amended the
reporting requirements in section 323 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007. In our review of that report, 6 however, we noted that the report had
addressed the outdated requirements set out in the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, rather than the amended requirements. Army officials
agreed, and in May 2012, the Army reissued the fiscal year 2011 report along with the fiscal
year 2012 report. The fiscal year 2012 report is based on data from the fiscal year 2013
President’s budget submission, and does not reflect any anticipated changes to the Army
budget or modular force structure not reflected in that budget. Through an initiative called
Army 2020, the Army is studying its future operational environment, roles and missions, and
changes to the structure of the modular forces. However, the Army has not yet made
decisions about the modular forces’ future organization and requirements.
Army Included Some Statutorily Required Information in Fiscal Year 2012 Report but
Did Not Clearly Demonstrate Extent of Progress Toward Meeting Modularity
Requirements
The Army included information related to the status of key enabler personnel and
equipment, assessments of modular force capabilities, the status of doctrine for the modular
forces, and comments of the Army Reserve and National Guard in its fiscal year 2012 report
in response to the statutory reporting requirements, but omitted other required items, such
5
GAO-09-676.
6
GAO, Force Structure: Assessment of Army Report on Fiscal Year 2011 Progress in Modular Restructuring,
GAO-12-527R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2012).
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as the risks and mitigation strategies associated with shortfalls in key enabler personnel and
equipment. In addition, the performance information the Army included did not clearly
demonstrate the extent to which the Army has made progress in meeting modular force
requirements. We have previously reported that to be useful, performance information must
meet users’ needs for completeness, accuracy, consistency, and ease of use. 7 We have
also reported that even in instances where agencies produce a great deal of performance
information, this information may not be presented in a manner that is useful for
congressional decision making. 8 Because the Army did not provide guidance on the level
and type of detail to be included in the report or take additional steps to ensure clarity and
consistency of information, the various offices providing information for the report used their
own judgment as to the amount and format of information. In the following sections we
examine the extent to which the Army included the statutorily required information as well as
the extent to which the information was presented in a way that is useful for assessing
progress in meeting modularity requirements.
Army Included Required Assessment of Key Enabler Equipment and Personnel, but Did Not
Clearly Communicate the Extent of Progress
The law required the Army to include in the report an assessment of the key enabler
personnel and equipment of the Army, including a comparison of the authorized levels of
key enabler equipment, the levels of key enabler equipment on hand, and the planned
purchases of key enabler equipment set forth in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
It also required the Army to include a comparison of the authorized and actual personnel
levels for personnel with key enabler personnel specialties with the requirements for those
specialties. In addition, the law required the Army to identify any shortfalls revealed by these
comparisons, and to include an assessment of the number and type of key enabler
equipment that the Army projects it will have on hand by the end of the FYDP that will
require repair, recapitalization, or replacement at or before the end of the time period
covered by the FYDP.
In response to the statutory requirement to include an assessment of key enabler personnel,
the Army included a discussion of a number of key enabler specialties, providing
percentages of the personnel on hand for these specialties relative to the requirement.
However, while not explicitly required by the legislation, the Army’s progress in meeting
personnel requirements was not as clear as it could have been because the Army did not
include how many persons in the specialties are required or the actual numbers of persons
performing in these specialties. For example, the report stated that the number of
counterintelligence agents increased to 71 percent of the requirement. Without the number
of counterintelligence agents, it is difficult to determine the magnitude of the effect of the gap
in agents on the forces or the resources required to close the gap. The Army’s report stated
that overall, key enabler requirements stabilized after fiscal year 2011, allowing the Army to
progress in closing the gap in key enabler personnel shortfalls. However, the Army did not
provide comparisons with information from previous years on each personnel specialty,
which while not required by the legislation, would have more clearly demonstrated the extent
of progress. Further, inconsistencies in reporting on the personnel specialties with gaps
7
GAO-09-676.
8
GAO, Managing for Results: A Guide for Using the GPRA Modernization Act to Help Inform Congressional
Decision Making, GAO-12-621SP (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2012).
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between the fiscal year 2011 report and the fiscal year 2012 report hindered the ability to
assess progress by comparing the two reports.
The Army included required information on equipment levels in the following forms:
•
a section entitled “Army Equipment Modernization Update,” which listed 10 systems
in the fiscal year 2013 President’s budget request that the report said are critical to
the Army’s success in current and future operations
•
two appendixes listing key enabler systems, ranging from tractors to unmanned
aerial vehicles, with their associated funding levels for fiscal year 2012 and the
requested funding levels for fiscal year 2013
•
an appendix showing fiscal year 2017 (the end of the then-current FYDP) authorized
equipment, on-hand equipment, planned procurements, and anticipated shortages
for the Army’s “major capabilities” and “families of systems,” which the Army officials
told us are major groupings that encompass all the Army’s equipment spending and
include various systems.
However, the way the information was presented did not clearly communicate the extent to
which the Army has made progress toward meeting key enabler personnel and equipment
requirements. For example, the extent to which shortfalls exist for specific key enabler
equipment is not clearly demonstrated because the shortfalls are only shown by major
groupings of systems, thereby masking whether shortfalls exist in specific items that might
be critical to mission success. In addition, the report does not provide comparisons with
previous years, so it is difficult to determine from the report alone whether the Army has
made progress in fulfilling key enabler equipment requirements. Since the report does not
list shortfalls for specific key enabler systems, it is not possible to make a comparison with
the fiscal year 2011 report in order to observe a trend. While comparisons with prior years
were not explicitly required by the law, the ability to observe a trend would provide a better
picture of the extent to which progress has been made.
Army Included Information on Assessments of Modular Force Capabilities and Doctrine, but
Provided Few Details
The law required that the report include information about the results of Army assessments
of modular force capabilities, including lessons learned from existing modular units and any
modifications that have been made to modularity, and a description of the status of
development of doctrine on how the modular forces will train, be sustained, and fight.
The report stated that the results of Army assessments of modular force capabilities,
including lessons learned from existing modular units, have driven several modifications to
modularity but the report did not clarify the nature of the lessons learned from the
assessments and the nature of the doctrinal changes the Army has made. To date these
modifications have required only minor alterations to the design of modular units, although
the Army is studying the possibility of more significant changes, such as adding an
additional maneuver battalion to the modular brigade combat teams, bringing the total
number of maneuver battalions in each brigade combat team to three. According to the
report, one result of lessons learned was the identification of the need for increases in the
number of medical specialists, electronic warfare specialists, company intelligence support
teams, and unit supply specialists. Lessons learned have also led to changes in the way
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modular forces are equipped and trained and to doctrinal changes. The Army has an
ongoing process to collect and analyze lessons learned which has informed the revision of
Army doctrine, as well as training and educating the modular force in its core competencies.
However, beyond the details noted above, the report did not elaborate on the nature of the
lessons learned from assessments or the experiences of modular forces on the battlefield,
nor give examples of the changes made to doctrine. Army officials told us that they track all
lessons learned from experience with the modular forces, as well as all changes made to
modular force structure as a result of lessons learned. As a result, additional information is
available and could be reported. In addition, Army officials said that it would be possible to
provide details of the doctrinal changes in future annual reports.
Army Reserve and National Guard Commented on Some Aspects of the Report
The law required that the report include comments from the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau and the Chief of the Army Reserve on each of the other required reporting elements.
The Army’s report included the comments of the Director of the Army National Guard and
the Chief of the Army Reserve. Army officials told us that they included the comments of the
Director of the Army National Guard rather than the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
because the National Guard Bureau is a coordinating organization that includes both the
Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, while the Army National Guard has the
responsibility of training and equipping Army National Guard forces.
Both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve provided comments on some of the
required reporting elements, but some issues were not addressed. For example, the Army
Reserve stated that for key enabler equipment, it continues to improve equipment on hand
and modernization levels, and that by the end of fiscal year 2012, it expects to have 86
percent of equipment on hand and 66 percent modernization levels. The Army National
Guard also provided information on key enabler equipment, stating that equipment on hand
is at 89 percent and will continue to improve. However, the reserve components did not
comment on each of the required reporting elements. For example, the reserve components
did not comment on the comparison of actual personnel levels for key enabler specialties
with the requirements for those specialties.
Army Did Not Consistently Itemize Information by Component or Employ a Consistent
Definition of Key Enabler
The law requires the information presented in the report to be itemized by active component
and reserve component, and provides a definition of key enabler equipment and personnel
for purposes of the report. However, information was not clearly itemized throughout the
report, and it was unclear as to whether a common definition of key enabler was used
consistently. The Army itemized some of the information on key enabler equipment status by
component in the report, but Army officials told us that personnel information presented in
the report reflected only the active component. The Army did not clarify this in the report,
however. In addition, Army officials told us they tasked the personnel section of the report to
the personnel office of Army headquarters staff, which does not have access to all reserve
component personnel data. Finally, Army officials told us that the information reported on
the status of equipment reset reflected all Army components combined. The Army did not
clarify this in the report, however.
Regarding the statutory definition of “key enabler,” it was also unclear whether the Army
used a common definition of key enabler, consistent with the definition provided in the law,
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for the purposes of the report because information on equipment is presented inconsistently
throughout the report. One section of the report lists 10 key systems, two appendixes
provide longer lists of systems in which some but not all of the 10 key systems are included,
and another appendix lists major groupings of systems encompassing all the Army’s
equipment spending. As a result, it is unclear which systems are the key enablers and
whether the systems listed fit within the definition provided in the statute.
Army Did Not Address the Requirement to Identify Risks Associated with Shortfalls and
Strategies for Mitigation or Provide a Schedule for Meeting Personnel and Equipment Needs
The law required an identification of risks associated with identified shortfalls and mitigation
strategies to address those risks, as well as a schedule for fulfilling key enabler equipment
requirements and equipment reset.
While the Army’s fiscal year 2012 report did provide some information on shortfalls in key
enabler personnel and equipment, it did not discuss the risks, if any, to the forces of these
shortfalls, and did not identify a strategy by which the Army mitigates any such risks. Army
officials we spoke with agreed that this discussion was missing from the report and stated
that in future reports they would include this information. Furthermore, they told us some
reasons for shortfalls and steps the Army has taken to mitigate these shortfalls. In the case
of key enabler personnel, Army officials said that shortfalls have been caused by the growth
in requirements for certain key specialties needed for modular units, and that the Army has
had difficulty meeting these needs due to the time required to develop specialized skills.
Army officials told us that to compensate the Army has adopted strategies such as
increasing the personnel deployment tempo for key specialties or substituting with personnel
from related fields. In the case of key enabler equipment, officials said that the Army has in
some cases deliberately chosen not to meet stated requirements due to the costs involved.
Also, to meet deployed units’ equipment needs in these areas, the Army has positioned
some key equipment in theater, allowing units rotating into theater to obtain the equipment
there, and has positioned some of the same equipment at major training centers in the
United States to enable units to train with the equipment. Modular equipment requirements
were established in order to meet the needs of high-intensity combat, officials noted,
whereas in recent years the Army has been predominantly occupied with other types of
operations that had different equipping needs than those originally planned for.
In addition, the Army did not include a schedule for fulfilling key enabler equipment
requirements and for repairing, recapitalizing, and replacing equipment and materiel used in
support of overseas contingency operations and their associated sustainment. Army officials
stated that the Army has chosen to equip forces as efficiently as possible by selectively
purchasing key enabler equipment to share among units for training and by meeting
deployed forces’ needs by providing key enabler equipment in the theater of operations.
Because the Army does not intend to purchase equipment to meet all key enabler
requirements, officials said they have not developed a schedule to meet all key enabler
equipment requirements. The Army presented its total planned procurements through fiscal
year 2017 in an appendix of the report. However, the information is not broken out by fiscal
year in the report, and it is not clear what percentage of the requirement for specific key
enabler systems the Army plans to acquire. Additionally, with regard to equipment reset,
Army officials stated that contingency operations and thus equipment repair or replacement
needs are unpredictable–such as the number of battle losses and the related amount of
wear-and-tear on equipment. The officials stated that this lack of predictability makes it
impossible to forecast future requirements for repair, recapitalization, and replacement of
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equipment used in contingency operations. Therefore, Army officials stated that the Army
cannot develop a schedule for meeting such future requirements.
Lack of Supplemental Guidance to Ensure Completeness Led to Insufficient Information
Army officials told us that they compiled the report using information they received from
Army offices with expertise in relevant areas such as personnel and equipment. Specifically,
the officials in these offices were provided with copies of the statute setting out the
requirements for the Army’s report, but the officials were not given additional guidance
specifying the format they should use when providing information to the officials compiling
the report or the level of detail expected. Army offices interpreted the statutory requirements
for themselves when concluding what information they should provide, and, as a result, the
information provided by the various offices was inconsistent in format and detail. Army
officials agreed that some of the required information was omitted and that some of the
information could have been presented in a manner to more clearly demonstrate progress.
Without more detailed guidance to the various offices providing the information, future
annual reports may not provide congressional decision makers with a clear understanding of
the extent to which the Army has made progress in meeting modular force requirements.
Conclusions
The Army expects that its forces will have completed the transition to modular designs by
the end of fiscal year 2013, and has received substantial funds to restructure and rebuild its
forces. However, the Army still has not reported clearly and completely on its progress in
meeting modularity requirements. The Army’s fiscal year 2012 report included some of the
information required by law, but the extent to which progress has been made is still unclear,
as are the types of tradeoffs and risk mitigation strategies the Army has adopted to meet the
needs of ongoing operations. Until the Army provides guidance to the offices submitting
information for the report specifying the level and type of detail required, decision makers in
Congress will not be in the best position to make program and funding decisions as the
Army considers and adopts further changes to its organization and force structure.
Recommendation for Executive Action
To better provide Congress with information needed to conduct oversight and make
decisions on programs and funding, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army provide
guidance on the level and type of detail needed to each office within the Army responsible
for providing information to officials compiling the annual report on the Army’s progress in
meeting modular force requirements. Such guidance should at a minimum ensure that future
reports provide comparisons with information from prior years to identify trends and
therefore the extent of progress made in fulfilling modular force requirements; identify
specific lessons learned and link them to key modifications made to modular forces; identify
key doctrinal changes made and their significance to the modular forces; use a consistent
definition of “key enabler” equipment and personnel, consistent with the statutory definition,
throughout the report; and include both active and reserve component information
throughout the report.
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Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Army for comment. In its written
comments, reproduced in enclosure II, the Army generally concurred with our findings that
additional, and more detailed, information could have added clarity to its report, but did not
identify any actions it planned to take in response to our recommendation. The Army
provided some additional information related to the legislative reporting requirements, but
did not specifically respond to our recommendation to provide guidance to each office within
the Army responsible for providing data for the report. In its comments, the Army identified
five items as GAO recommendations. Although each item was related to the contents of our
report, we did not make these specific recommendations. For example, the Army said that
GAO had recommended that the Army’s report include input from the Army Reserve and
Army National Guard leadership and stated that the Army did not agree because it had
included comments from the Army Reserve and Army National Guard leaders. However, we
made no such recommendation and noted that the Army’s report had included comments
from the Army Reserve and Army National Guard on some of the required reporting
elements. Instead, we noted that some areas of the Army’s report did not include reserve
component data, such as the comparison of key enabler personnel. We continue to believe
that the Army should develop guidance to ensure that future reports are clearer and more
complete. We have revised the wording of our recommendation to clarify that we are
recommending that the Army provide guidance on the level and type of detail required for
future reports. We also revised the wording of the recommendation to specify that the Army
should include both active and reserve component data throughout the report.
----We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Army and appropriate
congressional committees. The report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 6791816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in enclosure III.
John H. Pendleton, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
Enclosures - 3
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List of Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable James Inhofe
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Chairman
The Honorable Thad Cochran
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon
Chairman
The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable C.W. “Bill” Young
Chairman
The Honorable Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
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Enclosure I
Statutory Reporting Requirements
The following is the text of the legislative mandate for the Army’s annual report on progress
in meeting modularity requirements as well as the mandate for GAO to review the report. 9
(c) Annual report on Army progress.--(1) On the date on which the President submits to
Congress the budget for a fiscal year under 31 U.S.C. §1105, the Secretary of the Army
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the progress of
the Army in fulfilling the key enabler equipment requirements of modular units and in
repairing, recapitalizing, and replacing equipment and materiel used in support of overseas
contingency operations underway as of the date of such report, and associated sustainment.
Any information included in the report shall be itemized by active duty component and
reserve component.
“(2) Each such report shall include the following:
“(A) An assessment of the key enabler equipment and personnel of the army, including—
“(i) A comparison of—
“(I) the authorized level of key enabler equipment;
“(II) the level of key enabler equipment on hand; and
“(III) the planned purchases of key enabler equipment as set forth in the future-years
defense program submitted with the budget for such fiscal year;
“(ii) a comparison of the authorized and actual personnel levels for personnel with key
enabler personnel specialities with the requirements for key enabler personnel specialties;
“(iii) an identification of any shortfalls indicated by the comparisons in clauses (i) and (ii);
and
“(iv) an assessment of the number and type of key enabler equipment that the Army
projects it will have on hand by the end of such future-years defense program that will
require repair, recapitalization, or replacement at or before the end of the time period
covered by such future-years defense program (which assessment shall account for
additional repair, recapitalization, or replacement resulting from use of key enabler
equipment in overseas contingency operations).
“(B) If an assessment under subparagraph (A) identifies shortfalls that will exist within the
period covered by the future-years defense program submitted in such fiscal year, an
identification of the risks associated with such shortfalls and mitigation strategies to address
such risks.
“(C) A schedule for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in paragraph (1).
9
Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 332 (2011), which amended Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323 (2006). This language can be
found in a note following 10 U.S.C. §229.
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Enclosure I
“(D) The results of Army assessments of modular force capabilities, including lessons
learned from existing modular units and any modifications that have been made to
modularity.
“(E) A description of the status of the development of doctrine on how modular combat,
functional, and support forces will train, be sustained, and fight.
“(F) The comments of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of the Army
Reserve on each of the items described in subparagraphs (A) through (E).
“(d) Annual Comptroller General report on Army Progress.--Not later than 180 days
after the date on which the Secretary of the Army submits a report under subsection (c), the
Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report setting forth the Comptroller General's review of such report. Each
report under this subsection shall include such information and recommendations as the
Comptroller General considers appropriate in light of such review.
“(e) Definitions.--In this section:
“(1) The term ‘contingency operation’ has the meaning given that term in 10 U.S.C. 101
(a)(13). “(2) The term ‘key enabler’, in the case of equipment or personnel, means
equipment or personnel, as the case may be, that make a modular force or unit as capable
or more capable than the non-modular force or unit it replaced, including the following:
“(A) Equipment such as tactical and high frequency radio, tactical wheeled vehicles, battle
command systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, all-source analysis systems, analysis and
control elements, fire support sensor systems, firefinder radar, joint network nodes, longrange advanced scout surveillance systems, Trojan Spirit systems (or any successor
system), and any other equipment items identified by the Army as making a modular force or
unit as capable or more capable than the non-modular force or unit it replaced.
“(B) Personnel in specialties needed to operate or support the equipment specified in
subparagraph (A) and personnel in specialties relating to civil affairs, communication and
information systems operation, explosive ordinance disposal, military intelligence,
psychological operations, and any other personnel specialties identified by the Army as
making a modular force or unit as capable or more capable than the non-modular force or
unit it replaced.
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GAO-13-183R Force Structure
Enclosure II
Comments from the Department of the Army
Page 13
GAO-13-183R Force Structure
Enclosure II
Page 14
GAO-13-183R Force Structure
Enclosure II
Page 15
GAO-13-183R Force Structure
Enclosure III
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
John H. Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Chaneé
Gaskin; Simon Hirschfeld; Ashley Houston; Mae Jones; Kelly Rubin; and Nicole Willems
made significant contributions to this report.
(351756)
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GAO-13-183R Force Structure
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