United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives
June 2003
DEFENSE
ACQUISITIONS
Matching Resources
with Requirements Is
Key to the Unmanned
Combat Air Vehicle
Program’s Success
GAO-03-598
June 2003
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Highlights of GAO-03-598, a report to the
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives
The Department of Defense (DOD)
is developing a new unmanned
combat air vehicle (UCAV) that can
suppress enemy air defenses and
conduct other air-to-ground
attacks, particularly against heavily
defended targets. Because it may
perform these missions at a
relatively low cost, the UCAV could
be used to replace some of DOD’s
aging tactical aircraft fleet. A key to
UCAV’s success will lie in DOD’s
ability to match users’ needs, or
requirements, with the developer’s
resources (technology and design
knowledge, money, and time) when
product development begins. Our
work shows that doing so can
prevent rework and save both time
and money. Therefore, we assessed
DOD’s ability to make this match.
GAO conducted its work on the
basis of the Comptroller General’s
authority and addresses the report
to the Subcommittee because of its
interest and jurisdiction in the
program.
We recommend that DOD develop
a joint UCAV acquisition approach
that balances requirements and
resources at the start of product
development. We also recommend
that the Secretary formalize the
UCAV management role performed
by his office, ensure that the
services are fully involved in the
process, and work to develop an
efficient approach to transition the
UCAV to the product development
phase so the needs of the war
fighter can be met more quickly.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-598.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Paul Francis at
(202) 512-2811 or francisp@gao.gov.
Matching Resources with Requirements
Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air
Vehicle Program’s Success
The UCAV program’s original performance objectives posed manageable
challenges to build an affordable, highly survivable, and lethal weapon
system. The Air Force, however, added requirements for electronic attack
and increased flying range after DOD accelerated the program’s product
development schedule by 3 years. These changes widened the gap between
the customer’s requirements and the developer’s resources, specifically time,
reducing the probability that the program would deliver production aircraft
on cost, on schedule, and with anticipated performance capabilities.
DOD has recently decided to adopt a new joint service approach to UCAV
development that provides more time to close the requirements—resource
gap before product development starts. It appears DOD may add new
content because it is proposing to build a new prototype that would be a
larger air vehicle, capable of flying and carrying out combat missions for
longer periods of time. To reduce technical risk, DOD anticipates delaying
the start of product development for several years in order to address new
requirements.
As a gap between resources and requirements widened in 2002, risks
projected for the start of product development with UCAV’s 15 technologies,
processes and system attributes increased significantly. The new joint plan
brings the risks back down. This action also allows competition back into
the UCAV development effort.
DOD will still face challenges in controlling joint, multimission requirements
and ensuring that both services continue to provide funds for the program
while also funding other large aircraft investments. If these challenges are
not met, the gap between requirements and resources could resurface.
DOD’s role will continue to be instrumental in helping to negotiate
requirements, assure resources are in place, and make difficult program
trade-offs.
Risk Levels Projected at Start of Product Development under Different UCAV Plans
Contents
Letter
Appendix I
1
Results in Brief
Background
Importance of Matching Resources with Requirements before
Product Development
Gap between UCAV Resources and Requirements Was Increased
in 2002
Recent DOD Decision to Restructure Program Can Reduce Risks
Conclusion
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Scope and Methodology
2
3
7
14
19
19
20
20
Comments from the Department of Defense
22
5
Tables
Table 1: Current Risk Level of UCAV Technologies, Processes, and
System Attributes
Table 2: Chronology of Changes to the Air Force UCAV Acquisition
Program Schedule Since 2000
Table 3: Comparisons of UCAV Variants
9
11
14
Figures
Figure 1: Boeing X-45A Demonstrator in Flight
Figure 2: Computer Rendition of the Boeing X-45B Prototype
Figure 3: Timing of the Match between Customer Requirements
and Resources
Figure 4: Effect of Accelerated Product Development Start on
Program Risk
Figure 5: Computer Rendition of the Boeing X-45C
Figure 6: Computer Rendition of the Northrop Grumman X-47B
Figure 7: Effect of Delayed Product Development Start on
Program Risk
Page i
4
5
7
13
15
16
17
GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
Abbreviations
DARPA
SEAD
UCAV
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
suppression of enemy air defenses
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
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Page ii
GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
June 30, 2003
The Honorable Curt Weldon
Chairman
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the initial stages of developing a
new unmanned air vehicle capable of suppressing enemy air defenses
and carrying out other types of air-to-ground attacks, particularly against
heavily defended targets. Because of its potential to perform these
missions at a relatively low cost, this new air vehicle could foster efforts
to replace DOD’s aging tactical aircraft fleet.
The air vehicle is being developed under the Unmanned Combat Air
Vehicle (UCAV) program. This is an advanced technology demonstration
program, still in a pre-acquisition phase, with two demonstrator UCAVs
being flown to assess technologies and capabilities. Launch of a formal
product development program was expected to occur next fiscal year
but has since been delayed. We conducted our work on the basis of the
Comptroller General’s authority and have addressed the report to you
because your expressed interest in the program as a committee of
jurisdiction.
The start of product development—signified by a Milestone B decision—
represents the point at which program managers make a commitment to
DOD and the Congress that the UCAV will perform as required and be
delivered on time and within estimated costs. Our work has shown
that programs are more likely to succeed if program managers are
able to achieve a match between user needs, which eventually become
requirements, and resources (technology, design and production
knowledge, money, and time) at the start of product development.
Conversely, if they do not match requirements with resources, cost
overruns and schedule delays are likely to occur, reducing DOD’s buying
power in other areas.
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GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
Consequently, this report analyzes requirements1 and schedule changes
made during pre-acquisition and their effects on DOD’s ability to achieve
this match. The report also assesses a recent decision to expand the
program—both in terms of the military services that will be involved with
it and in terms of the design and capability of the air vehicle—and that
decision’s effect on DOD’s ability to match requirements to resources.
Our report focuses on the UCAV program managed by the Air Force and
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA
has also been working with the Navy on a UCAV, but until recently its
transition to the product development phase was further off in the future.
We did not assess the Navy’s effort except to the extent that it was
included in the recently established joint program.
Results in Brief
From 2000 through 2002, decisions to get more capability in less time
widened the gap between UCAV resources and requirements. The UCAV
program’s original requirements posed significant, but manageable
challenges to build an air vehicle that is affordable throughout its life
cycle, highly survivable, and lethal. Subsequently, however, the Air Force
added requirements for an electronic attack mission and increased flying
range. Also, DOD accelerated the program’s product development
schedule by 3 years. Those actions widened the gap between requirements
and resources and increased the challenge for the development program.
DOD has recently decided to adopt a new joint Air Force and Navy
approach to UCAV development that provides more time to close the
requirements-resource gap before product development starts. Details
concerning the new acquisition strategy behind this approach have not
yet been worked out. However, the program could increase requirements
since DOD is proposing to develop a new prototype that would essentially
be a larger air vehicle, capable of carrying out combat missions for longer
periods of time. DOD currently anticipates delaying product development
by several years in order to address new requirements. This delay would
help to reduce technical risks, but initial fielding of the new air vehicle
would be delayed as well. Having the Air Force and the Navy work jointly
on a UCAV program is more efficient than two separate programs. At the
1
Formal requirements for the UCAV program have not yet been established. However,
program objectives based on customer expectations have been established for specific
missions the UCAV is expected to perform. We refer to these as requirements in this report.
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GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
same time, the participation of two services will increase the challenges
of sustaining funding and managing requirements.
GAO is making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on
maintaining flexibility to make the tradeoffs necessary to bring and
keep the UCAV’s requirements and resources in balance and to ensure his
office maintains the constructive role it has played in the program so far.
Background
DOD has been successfully using unmanned air vehicles such as the
Global Hawk and Predator to gather intelligence and perform surveillance
and reconnaissance missions for military purposes. Beginning in the
mid-1990s, DOD began to conceive of a different type of unmanned air
vehicle—the unmanned combat air vehicle or UCAV—which would be
capable of performing dangerous, lethal combat missions, including
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).2 Unlike other unmanned air
vehicles, UCAVs would carry weapons as well as electronic jammers to
confuse enemy radars. DOD also envisioned that the air vehicle would
operate more autonomously than other unmanned air vehicles, requiring
little or no human input from ground stations to complete their missions
or change flight paths. In addition, UCAVs would be stealthy and capable
of flying in groups or with manned aircraft.
The potential of these weapons has garnered high interest from both
Congress and DOD. In the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act,
Congress set a goal that by 2010, one-third of DOD’s deep strike force be
unmanned in order to perform this dangerous mission.3 In addition to
the potential for saving lives on risky missions, the UCAV could provide
mission capability at less cost than manned aircraft. Program officials
initially aimed for the UCAV’s acquisition cost to be one-third of the joint
strike fighter and operations and support costs to be at least 75 percent
lower. Because of the promise of unmanned air vehicles, the Office of
Secretary of Defense has established a joint-service unmanned air vehicles
task force to help promote the development and fielding of these systems,
including making sure that there is multiservice cooperation. This task
2
Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions are those directed at destroying or
interrupting the ability of ground-based missiles, either fixed or mobile, to locate, target,
and/or destroy U.S. aircraft.
3
Pub. L. No. 106-398, Sec. 220 (2000).
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GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
force is responsible for outlining the future of DOD’s unmanned
air vehicles.
In the late 1990s, DARPA and the Air Force began pre-acquisition efforts
to conduct advanced technology demonstrations to show the technical
feasibility of using UCAVs to penetrate deeply into enemy territory to
attack enemy targets. Boeing Corporation was selected in 1999 to
develop and demonstrate two demonstrator UCAVs—designated X-45A.
(See fig. 1.)
Figure 1: Boeing X-45A Demonstrator in Flight
The DARPA-Air Force UCAV original plan also called for building and
demonstrating two prototypes during the pre-acquisition phase, called
X-45B, that are larger and incorporate low observable technology.
(See fig. 2.) These air vehicles were expected to be more representative
of the operational air vehicle that the Air Force planned to field. Initially,
the Air Combat Command, which establishes mission and performance
requirements, determined that the X-45B should be focused on performing
SEAD missions within the air superiority mission area. This decision
was made to address the limited inventory of current assets in the air
superiority mission area and to counter the challenges and deficiencies
associated with conducting SEAD missions.
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GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
Figure 2: Computer Rendition of the Boeing X-45B Prototype
As of February 2003, 55 of 160 planned demonstrations have been
completed. Most of the demonstrations designed to validate the basic
flight characteristics of the air vehicle have been completed. Only a small
number of the demonstrations needed to validate the ability of a single air
vehicle to perform a preemptive destruction mission have been completed.
The more demanding demonstrations—those designed to demonstrate
technologies and software for highly autonomous, multivehicle operations
(with both manned aircraft and unmanned air vehicles), and the more
difficult aspects of the SEAD mission against mobile targets—have not
begun.
Importance of
Matching Resources
with Requirements
before Product
Development
The product development decision that DOD is approaching for its
UCAV program represents a commitment by the product developer to
deliver a product at established cost, schedule, and performance targets
and identifies the amount of resources that will be necessary to do so.
Our studies of leading companies have shown that when requirements
and resources were matched before product development was started,
the more likely the development was able to meet performance, cost, and
schedule objectives.4 When this took place later, programs encountered
4
U.S. General Accounting Office, BEST PRACTICES: Better Matching of Needs and
Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GA0-01-288 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 8, 2001).
Page 5
GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
problems such as increased cost, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls.
A key to achieving this match is to ensure that the developer has the
resources—technology, design and production knowledge, money, and
time—needed to design, test, manufacture, and deliver the product. It is
not unusual for a customer to initially want a high-performing product that
does not cost much or take too long to develop. But such an expectation
may exceed the developer’s technology or engineering expertise, or it may
be more costly and time-consuming to create than the customer is willing
to accept. Therefore, a process of negotiations and trade-offs is usually
necessary to match customer requirements and developer resources
before firming requirements and committing to product development.
Our work has shown that successful programs will not commit to product
development until needed technologies are ready to satisfy product
requirements. In other words, technology development is separated from
product development. If technology is not sufficiently mature at the
beginning of a product development program, the program may need to
spend more time and money than anticipated to bring the technology to
the point to which it can meet the intended product’s performance
requirements.5
Testing is perhaps the main instrument used to gauge technology maturity.
Testing new technologies before they enter into a product development
program, as DOD is doing now by demonstrating the two X-45A
demonstrators, enables organizations to discover and correct problems
before a considerable investment is made in the program. By contrast,
problems found late in development may require more time, money, and
effort to fix because they may require more extensive retrofitting and
redesign as well as retesting. These problems are further exacerbated
when the product development schedule requires a number of activities to
be done concurrently. The need to address one problem can slow down
other work on the weapon system.
Figure 3 illustrates the timing of the match between a customer’s
requirements and a product developer’s resources for successful and
problematic programs we have reviewed.
5
U.S. General Accounting Office, BEST PRACTICES: Better Management of
Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162
(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999).
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GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
Figure 3: Timing of the Match between Customer Requirements and Resources
Gap between UCAV
Resources and
Requirements Was
Increased in 2002
During 2002, significant requirements were added to the UCAV program
after the schedule was accelerated by 3 years. This step put the program at
considerable risk because it increased the gap between requirements and
resources. The program added two new requirements—one for electronic
attack capability and one for increased flying range—while reducing a
critical resource, time, to mature key UCAV technologies. As a result, the
Air Force and DARPA anticipated that most of the 15 key technologies,
system attributes, or processes supporting the aircraft’s basic capabilities
would move from all low risk to mostly medium risk of achieving desired
functionality by the time a product development decision was reached;
one would be at high risk.
UCAV Requirements
Increased During 2002
The UCAV program’s original requirements were difficult to meet because
they posed significant but manageable technical challenges to building
an air vehicle that is, at once, affordable throughout its life cycle, highly
survivable, and lethal. In the last year, both air vehicle and mission
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GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
equipment requirements were increased. The original requirements called
for a UCAV that would have
•
•
•
•
•
•
a low life-cycle cost, survivable design;
a mission control station that can fly single or multiple UCAVs at
one time;
a secure command, control, and communications network;
completely autonomous vehicle operation from takeoff to landing;
off-board and on-board sensors with which to locate targets; and
human involvement in targeting, weapons delivery, and target
damage assessment.
Once these requirements were established, the UCAV contractor identified
15 technologies, processes, and system attributes the UCAV would have
to possess to meet those requirements. These elements became a way to
gauge the level of knowledge (in terms of risk) that the contractors had.
Right now, technologies that support some of these capabilities, such as
autonomous operation, are not yet mature. We used their risk assessments
and criteria for the 15 technologies, processes, and system attributes to
determine current system integration risk as well as technology risk. We
believe technology readiness levels would have provided a more precise
gauge of technology maturity, but program officials did not provide them.6
Currently, 10 technologies, processes, and system attributes are
considered to be medium risk by the Air Force and DARPA. Medium risk
means that there is a 30 to 70 percent probability of achieving the desired
functionality for the initial operational UCAV. Moreover, 5 are currently
considered to be high risk, that is, there is less than 30 percent probability
of achieving their functionality. Table 1 provides the current risk level of
the 15 UCAV technologies, processes, and system attributes for original
UCAV objectives.
6
A good indicator of technology risk is technology readiness level, which is used by NASA
and some Air Force programs to define the level of risk from a technology given its level
of demonstration.
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Table 1: Current Risk Level of UCAV Technologies, Processes, and System
Attributes
Characteristics currently
at medium risk
•
Affordable air vehicle unit/
recurring flyaway cost
•
Weapons suspension and release
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Dynamic distributed
mission/vehicle control
Advanced cognitive aids
integration, mission planning
Force integration, interoperability,
and information assurance
Secure, robust communication
capability
Coordinated multivehicle
flight/motion
Affordable operating and support
cost, and integrated vehicle health
management
Mobility, rapid deployment, and
footprint
Sortie rate, turn time, and ground
Operations
Characteristics currently
at high risk
•
Survivable air vehicle integration
•
Advanced targeting and
engagement process
•
Low observable maintainability
•
Adaptive, autonomous operations
•
Affordable large-scale software
Source: DOD.
Originally, the UCAV program was tasked with providing an air vehicle
that would perform both preemptive and reactive SEAD missions
against fixed and mobile targets that are extremely demanding from
both a mission and capability perspective. The reactive mission is more
demanding than the preemptive mission because the UCAV will have less
time to find and engage mobile targets. When DOD decided to accelerate
delivery of the initial UCAVs, the program was relieved of meeting the
requirement for reactive SEAD, making for a better balance between
requirements and available resources. However, requirements were
subsequently added that increased the challenge of matching requirements
with resources. These requirements include an electronic attack mission
and increased combat range and endurance.
•
Electronic attack: DOD’s electronic attack mission is currently
performed by the Navy’s aging EA-6B Prowler aircraft. Electronic
attack confuses enemy radars with electronic jammers. In 2001, the
Navy conducted an analysis of alternatives for replacing the Prowler.
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Air Combat Command planners determined that the UCAV could fill
portions of this role quickly and added the requirement to the program.
As currently structured, the program does not plan to demonstrate
electronic attack technologies on UCAV demonstrator or prototype
vehicles before product development begins. According to program
officials, the biggest additional challenge associated with this change
is the integration of existing electronic attack technologies into a
low observable air vehicle. Program officials are also concerned that
downsizing and repackaging current electronic warfare technology
to fit into a smaller space, with sufficient cooling and power, and
incorporating antennas and other apertures into the low observable
signature of the UCAV may pose additional challenges. Program
officials also stated that the addition of electronic attack adds
uncertainty to overall program costs. It may reduce the number of
initial UCAVs planned for initial production because additional work
will be required to integrate this capability into air vehicles, given the
current schedule and funding.
•
Schedule Compression
Created Greater Technical
and Cost Risks
Longer range and endurance: According to program officials, Air Force
leadership would like to have a larger UCAV with longer range and
greater endurance than that currently being designed in the X-45B to
perform strategic lethal strike and nonlethal intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance missions. However, increasing UCAV’s range
forced the program to abandon a key design concept expected to lower
operating and support costs significantly over that of a manned
aircraft—one of the program’s original critical requirements. The initial
UCAV concept was a design that allowed the wings to be detached
from the air vehicle and stored in a crate for up to 10 years, a concept
which was expected to contribute to a greater than 75 percent
reduction in operation and support costs. When needed, the UCAV
could be shipped to the theater of operations, assembled, and readied
for use. Adding range and endurance required redesigning the air
vehicle with fixed or permanently attached wings, in order that the
inside of the wings could be used as fuel tanks. This would allow the
UCAV to carry more fuel and give it the ability to fly farther. Since the
wings would no longer be detachable, the long-term storage approach
had to be abandoned.
The schedule for the UCAV program has changed several times during the
pre-acquisition phase. In 2000, the Air Force anticipated that product
development would start in 2007 and initial deliveries would begin in 2011.
After several schedule changes, the Air Force set product development in
2004 and initial delivery of aircraft in 2007. (See table 2.) The net effect of
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the changes was a 3-year reduction in time to mature technologies before
product development. This reduction created the potential for costly and
time-consuming rework in product development since the Air Force would
still be in the process of maturing technologies as it undertook other
product development activities. Moreover, the concurrency that comes
with the schedule changes would have left little room for error.
Table 2: Chronology of Changes to the Air Force UCAV Acquisition Program Schedule Since 2000
Program
strategy as of
End of technology and
military utility
demonstrations (FY)
Start product
development (FY)
Initial deliveries (FY)
UCAV capabilities
Preemptive SEAD; reactive
SEAD
2000
2007
2007
2011
Preemptive SEAD; reactive
SEAD
2001
2006
2005
2010
Explanation of change: To meet Air Force expectations for delivering capabilities to the war fighter earlier than 2011, the product
launch date was moved up by 2 years to 2005 and initial delivery up 1 year to 2010.
Preemptive SEAD
2002
2006
2003
2007
Explanation of change: The schedule was changed by direction of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to further accelerate delivery
of initial operational UCAVs to the customer. The program attempted to balance this decision by deferring the most challenging
requirements for conducting reactive SEAD against mobile targets to a future version of UCAV.
Preemptive SEAD;
Electronic attack;
Late 2002
2006
2004
2007
Extended range
Explanation of change: The timeline was changed to address added requirements for electronic attack and extended range. While 1
year was added to the start of product development, the date for initial deliveries did not change.
Source: GAO presentation of program data.
Under the original schedule, the UCAV program would essentially have
3 more years prior to the beginning of product development to test and
mature technologies. As a result, all 15 of the technologies, processes,
and system attributes would be at low risk by the launch of product
development indicating a match between requirements and resources.
By contrast, under the late 2002 schedule, the program would not have
enough time to mature technologies to a low risk prior to the launch of
product development in 2004. In fact, most technologies, processes,
and system attributes would still be either medium or high risk by the
time product development was launched indicating that requirements
exceeded resources.
The overlap of technology development and product development,
introduced by the acceleration of product development, also raised risks
for the UCAV program. The late 2002 schedule allowed less time for
discovering and correcting problems that may have arisen during
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technology demonstrations prior to product development launch.
Importantly, all of the air vehicle military utility demonstrations would
have been completed after the beginning of product development. Under
the original schedule most of these demonstrations would have been
completed prior to the start of product development.
Increasing the overlap of technology development and product
development added risk to the program. Problems found during
those demonstrations might have to be fixed during product
development—problems made more likely given the lower maturity
level of the key technologies. Figure 4 shows that the concurrency
between technology development and product development increased
by approximately 18 months under the late 2002 schedule—from a
6-month approximate overlap to a 24-month approximate overlap. Also,
this acceleration increased the program risk for the start of product
development from all low to mostly medium risk for the 15 technologies,
processes, and system attributes being tracked.
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Figure 4: Effect of Accelerated Product Development Start on Program Risk
As figure 4 indicates, the UCAV technology and product development
phases had been shortened from a plan with little concurrency between
technology and product development to a plan with significant
concurrency between the two. The push to deliver the product sooner
compressed the time in which technologies will be matured and integrated
into the UCAV weapon system. The resulting approximate 24-month
overlap between technology and product development caused by
accelerating the beginning of UCAV’s product development program had
the potential to create “late cycle churn,” or the scramble to fix significant
problems discovered late. We have found that when problems are
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uncovered late in product development, more time and money is required
to rework what is already finished.7
Recent DOD Decision
to Restructure
Program Can
Reduce Risks
The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently restructured the UCAV
program to a joint program structure to meet the needs of the Navy as
well as the Air Force. The Office of the Secretary of Defense cancelled
plans to build the X-45B prototypes and now anticipates that the joint
UCAV program will focus on a family of vehicles derived from the larger
Boeing X-45C and Northrop Grumman X-47B prototypes designs. The
details of the program are still being decided, but it appears likely that
while content will increase, the start of product development will be
delayed. This approach represents a substantial improvement over the
late 2002 plan in that it lowers risks significantly. However, keeping
requirements and resources in balance and funding intact until product
development starts will be a challenge.
The proposed prototypes will be larger than the X-45A or X-45B and thus
more capable of supporting requirements for greater combat range and
endurance. Also, both the proposed X-45C and X-47B prototypes will have
a larger wing area, allowing them to carry increased payload and internal
fuel. Just as the X-45B would have been more capable than the X-45A, the
X-45C is projected to be more capable than the X-45B as shown in Table 3
below. We did not obtain specific data on the X-47B prototype.
Table 3: Comparisons of UCAV Variants
Weight
Length
Wingspan
Payload
Ceiling
Speed
Endurance/combat
radius
X-45A
12,000 lb.
26.3 ft.
33.8 ft.
1,500 lb.
35,000 ft.
0.75 Mach
450 NM w/30
minutes loiter
X-45B
21,000 lb. (approx.)
32 ft.
47 ft.
2,000 lb.
40,000 ft.
0.85 Mach
850 NM w/30 minute
loiter (w/added
internal fuel)
X-45C
35,000 lb.
36 ft.
48 ft.
4,500 lb.
40,000 ft.
0.85 Mach
1100–1300 NM
w/30 minute loiter
Source: DOD.
7
U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach
Is Key to Better Weapon Systems Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-00-199 (Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2000).
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Further, by adopting a design that increases internal space on the air
vehicle, DOD could more readily incorporate electronic attack equipment
and other sensors and avionics. In addition, the plan would reintroduce
competition into the UCAV program by assessing two different designs.
This competition would increase DOD’s ability to pursue the best technical
solution. On the other hand, acquisition cost for the larger air vehicles are
expected to increase as will operating and support costs due to the
abandonment of the storage-in-the-box concept. Also, meeting the
Navy’s need for carrier-based operations could place additional demands
on the air vehicle design. Figures 5 and 6 show illustrations of Boeing and
Northrop Grumman proposed joint UCAV designs.
Figure 5: Computer Rendition of the Boeing X-45C
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GAO-03-598 UCAV Program's Success
Figure 6: Computer Rendition of the Northrop Grumman X-47B
In addition, more time will be added under the joint program to conduct
demonstrations by delaying the start of product development by several
years. Some of this added time—up to a year—will be needed to develop
and deliver the new prototypes. As shown in figure 7, delaying the
beginning of product development could reduce technical risks since DOD
would have more time to test prototypes.
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Figure 7: Effect of Delayed Product Development Start on Program Risk
However, these delays may postpone initial operational capability
beyond what DOD and the Congress originally anticipated, which
was at the end of the decade. But recognizing this upfront to put the
program on a sounder footing may be preferable to proposing a
higher risk approach—like the 2002 plan—that is more susceptible
to unplanned delays.
Drawing on the experience of the UCAV to date as well as other programs,
DOD will face challenges in keeping the requirements for the new joint
design balanced with available resources. One challenge relates to
requirements. As mentioned above, more demands could be made of the
air vehicle to meet the needs of both the Air Force and the Navy. Prior to
the new joint approach, the Navy’s top mission for the UCAV has been
conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. When
considering the Air Force’s missions of reactive and preemptive SEAD and
electronic attack, it is foreseeable that the program will face pressures to
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meet multiple missions. One approach to meeting this challenge is to delay
the start of product development until resources—such as technology
maturity—are available to meet all requirements. This would delay the
program significantly and could raise funding issues. Alternatively,
adhering to an evolutionary acquisition approach and developing the
different mission capabilities in sequence could meet the challenge, so
that the initial capability can be fielded sooner.
Another challenge relates to funding. Past and present programs have
been susceptible to such funding issues. Moreover, other programs
that dwarf the UCAV program—such as the F-22 and the Joint Strike
Fighter—will be competing for investment funds at the same time.
We have found in earlier work8 that although the Office of the Secretary
of Defense provides some funding for advanced technology development
efforts, the military services and defense agencies are ultimately
responsible for financing the acquisition and support of equipment or
items that result from the efforts. At times, however, the military services
have not wanted to fund the transition process. This action either slowed
down the acquisition process or resulted in no additional procurements.
Specifically, military services have not wanted to fund technologies
focusing on meeting joint requirements because those technologies do
not directly affect their individual missions, and there are specific projects
that they would prefer to fund. At the same time, Office of the Secretary
of Defense officials told us that they lack a mechanism for ensuring that
decisions on whether to acquire items with proven military utility are
made at the joint level, and not merely by the gaining organizations, and
that these acquisitions receive the proper priority.
The UCAV has already experienced some funding challenges. Recently,
during preparations for the fiscal year 2004 budget cycle, the Air Force
budget proposal eliminated all UCAV funding beyond that needed to finish
work on two prototypes already on contract. The Air Force based this
action on its belief that the X-45B UCAV was too small for the role the
Air Force believed was most needed.
8
U.S. General Accounting Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Factors Affecting
Outcomes of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, GAO-03-52
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 2002
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To keep the UCAV program on track, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense stepped in to resolve requirements and funding challenges and
maintained a strong oversight over it. While the Office of the Secretary
of Defense increased the challenge by accelerating the delivery date for
the first UCAVs, it allowed the Air Force to defer the reactive SEAD
requirement and fended off more radical changes to the UCAV’s missions.
In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has taken the lead in
brokering the agreement on the joint program proposal, adding
development time to the proposal and working out a joint effort that could
result in a single design for the Air Force and Navy. Sustaining the role
played by the Office of the Secretary of Defense is likely to be important to
meeting future challenges the UCAV may face.
Conclusion
UCAVs offer a potential for DOD to carry out dangerous missions without
putting lives at stake and to find cost-effective ways of replacing DOD’s
aging tactical aircraft fleet. However, up until recently, pre-acquisition
decisions had collectively increased requirements and reduced resources,
putting the program in a riskier position to succeed. The decision to create
a joint program could make for a better program if the gap between
resources and requirements can be closed. The joint program faces a
challenge in managing the demands of multimission requirements with
the desire to field an initial capability in a reasonable time. Accepting
increased requirements and accelerating fielding at the same time, as was
previously done, will hinder the ability of the joint UCAV program to
succeed. The program also faces the challenge of sustaining funding
support from both services at a time when it is competing against other
large aircraft investments. Regardless of which direction the new program
takes, the role played by the Office of the Secretary of Defense will
continue to be instrumental in helping to negotiate requirements, to assure
the right resources are provided, and to make further difficult tradeoff
decisions throughout the program.
Recommendations for
Executive Action
We recommend the Secretary of Defense develop an acquisition approach
for the joint UCAV program that enables requirements and resources to
be balanced at the start of product development. This approach should
provide mechanisms for brokering the demands of multiple missions, for
ensuring that the product developer maintains a voice in assessing the
resource implications of requirements, and for preserving the integrity of
evolutionary acquisition. Reinstating the use of technology readiness
levels may be very valuable in facilitating necessary tradeoffs.
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We also recommend that the Secretary formalize the management role
performed by his office and the attendant authority to perform that role;
ensure that the services are fully involved in the process; and work to
develop an efficient approach to transitioning the UCAV from DOD’s
technology development environment to the services’ acquisition
environment so the needs of the war fighter can be met more quickly.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report.
The comments appear in appendix I. DOD provided separate
technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
develop an acquisition approach for the joint UCAV program that
enables requirements and resources to be balanced at the start of product
development. It has directed the formation of a Joint Systems Management
Office to define near-term requirements and to conduct robust operational
assessments.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary
formalize a management role performed by his office and the attendant
authority to perform that role; ensure that the services are fully involved
in the process; and work to develop an efficient services’ acquisition
environment so the needs of the war fighter can be met more quickly.
DOD noted that the Secretary is organizing the management function as he
deems suitable. DOD did state that the department’s UAV Planning Task
Force would continue to provide oversight over all DOD UCAV program
activities. We believe this is important because it was this organization
that was instrumental in refocusing the DOD UCAV effort into a joint
program that we believe will significantly improve the probability of
successfully fielding UCAVs.
Scope and
Methodology
To achieve our objectives we examined Air Force UCAV program
solicitations and agreements, the demonstration master plan, trade
studies, technology demonstration plans and results, status of critical
technologies, plans to further enhance maturity of critical technologies,
and plans to move UCAV to the Air Force for product development. We
interviewed DARPA and Air Force program managers and technical
support officials at DARPA program offices in Arlington, Virginia, and the
Air Force’s Research Lab and Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright
Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, to document current development
efforts and the maturity status of critical technologies and other attributes.
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To determine options that may be available to UCAV program managers in
making changes to requirements or resources, we examined the program’s
risk assessments of its 15 technologies, processes, and system attributes to
identify risk associated with beginning product development at different
points in time. We interviewed Air Force Air Combat Command officials
at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, concerning UCAV requirements, and
air staff officials in Arlington, Virginia, concerning program objectives
and resources. We also interviewed a number of officials from the
Office of Secretary of Defense having responsibility for UCAV oversight
and funding.
We conducted our work from February 2002 through May 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget and other congressional defense committees. We
will also provide copies to others on request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-2811 if you or your staff has any questions
concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were Mike Sullivan,
Jerry Clark, Matt Lea, Kris Keener, Travis Masters, Cristina Chaplain, Lily
Chin, Bob Swierczek, and Maria-Alaina Rambus.
Paul Francis
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
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Appendix I: Comments from the Department
of Defense
Appendix I: Comments from the Department
of Defense
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Appendix I: Comments from the Department
of Defense
(120125)
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