United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
on Military Readiness, Committee on
National Security, House of
Representatives
November 1995
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
Improvements in C-5
Mission Capability Can
Help Meet Airlift
Requirements
GAO/NSIAD-96-43
GAO
United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
National Security and
International Affairs Division
B-265876
November 20, 1995
The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Under the new national military strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD)
must be capable of rapidly deploying armed forces to respond to
contingency and humanitarian operations around the world. Military
strategic airlift aircraft provide the capability to fly the critical, early
arriving troops and cargo for overseas deployments. Since DOD is
increasingly relying on the C-5 aircraft as its primary airlifter, we assessed
the reliability and mission capability of the aircraft and DOD’s current plan
for modifying the C-5.
This review was requested by the Honorable Earl Hutto, former Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services. We
are addressing this report to you as the current Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Military Readiness.
Background
The Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC) has 104 C-5, 199 C-141, and
16 C-17 strategic airlift aircraft in its fleet. It also has 54 KC-10 and 448
KC-135 tanker aircraft, which can carry cargo. The C-5 aircraft, the largest
airlifter, can carry 73 troops and 36 standard cargo pallets or outsize cargo,
such as tanks and helicopters. The Air Force received its C-5A models
from 1969 to 1973 and its C-5B models from 1986 to 1989. The C-5B model
incorporates over 100 reliability and maintainability changes from the
previous model and has substantially higher mission capable rates.
The C-5 has been used more than planned since Operation Desert Storm in
response to various contingencies as well as shortages of C-141 aircraft
and delays in C-17 deliveries. AMC developed a plan to guide the
modernization of the C-5 aircraft into the next century and help ensure
that the C-5 remains a viable mobility asset. AMC officials believe this
modernization effort is important to address concerns regarding the aging
aircraft and improve the aircraft’s reliability and maintainability.
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In addition to being a major command of the Air Force, AMC is a
component of the U.S. Transportation Command, a unified command that
provides air, land, and sea transportation for DOD. As a component, AMC is
responsible for providing global airlift services and air refueling
operations. AMC developed a mission capability rate goal for the C-5 fleet of
75 percent, which means that C-5s must be able to perform one of their
major missions 75 percent of the time.1 Mission capability is a standard
used on all military aircraft that allows for easier comparisons among
aircraft. Although Air Force planners count on increasing aircraft mission
availability in wartime by adding more maintenance personnel and
deferring some maintenance inspections, little can be done to increase the
spare parts initially available for each plane. Peacetime mission capability
rates, especially as they are affected by adequate spare parts availability,
are therefore good predictors of likely wartime aircraft mission capability.
AMC currently estimates that C-5 aircraft can attain a 14.6 million ton miles
per day airlift capability, which would represent almost one-half of the Air
Force’s total military aircraft airlift capacity.
Results in Brief
is counting on the C-5 to deliver almost half of the cargo carried by
military aircraft in wartime, but its mission capable rates have generally
been below AMC’s 75 percent goal over the last several years. In addition,
C-5 mission capable rates are considerably below those of other military
airlift aircraft, including the C-141, KC-10, and KC-135. In recent years,
between one-quarter and one-half of the C-5 total not mission capable time
was due to the lack of spare parts. Officials from the C-5 manufacturer
believe that improving the C-5 spares processes, particularly by scheduling
repairs of spare parts based on their impact on mission capability, could
substantially improve the mission capable rate.
DOD
The C-5 mission capable rate could also be improved if the Air Force
conducted a readiness evaluation similar to one recently completed for the
B-1B aircraft. That evaluation found that the B-1B’s mission capable rates
could increase if spare parts support were to improve. Air Force officials
attribute the substantially improved mission capable rates recently
achieved by the B-1B fleet (an increase of 9 percentage points) primarily
to improved spares availability.
1
We use mission capability in this report as the primary indicator of the C-5’s ability to deliver cargo.
We recognize that mission capability rates are not a perfect measure of an aircraft’s ability to perform
its mission. For example, an aircraft may be classified as mission capable but may break down during
preflight checks, thus rendering the aircraft not mission capable.
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The Air Force has not prioritized proposed C-5 modifications according to
which one would contribute most to improving mission capability. As a
result, decisionmakers cannot fully assess the impact proposed
improvements could have on overall aircraft mission capability or total
airlift capability.
Improving the C-5 spares program and reprioritizing C-5 modernization
initiatives would increase C-5 mission capable rates. If peacetime C-5
mission capable rates could be raised to the current AMC goal of
75 percent, DOD could gain an additional 1.3 million ton miles per day of
C-5 wartime airlift capability—the equivalent of 10 C-17s. As a result, DOD
could come closer to meeting military airlift requirements.
Mission Capable
Rates Are Below
Standard
Table 1.1: Mission Capable Rates for
AMC Aircraft From July 1994 to
June 1995
Mission capable rates for AMC C-5 aircraft averaged just under 68 percent
from July 1994 to June 1995.2 These rates have been declining since
Operation Desert Storm, when AMC achieved mission capable rates of
75 percent or higher. In addition, the C-5 mission capable rates were
considerably below comparable airlift and tanker aircraft during the same
period, as shown in table 1.1. For example, AMC C-5 mission capable rates
averaged over 5 percentage points below those of the troubled C-141
aircraft, which is gradually being retired. Factors accounting for the
relatively poorer C-5 mission capable rates included inadequate spare
parts support, higher complexity associated with a large aircraft, and the
generally poorer reliability characteristics of the older C-5A model aircraft.
Figures in percent
Aircraft
Lack of Spares Affects
Mission Capable Rate
Mission
capable
rate
C-5
67.9
C-141
73.2
KC-10
88.7
KC-135
85.5
C-5 aircraft are classified as not mission capable when they are either
undergoing maintenance or lack spare parts. Between 25 and 50 percent of
all not mission capable problems in recent years have been due to a lack
of spare parts, as shown in figure 1.1.
2
During this same period, the mission capable rate for the entire Air Force C-5 fleet, including Reserve
and National Guard aircraft, averaged about 65 percent.
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Figure 1.1: Percent of C-5 Not Mission Capable Rates Attributable to a Lack of Spare Parts From October 1992 to June 1995
Percent
100
80
60
40
20
0
Oct. 92
Feb. 93 June 93 Oct. 93
Lack of spare parts
Feb. 94 June 94 Oct. 94
Feb. 95 June 95
Undergoing maintenance
has established a goal that the total not mission capable supply
(TNMCS) rate should not exceed 7 percent for its operational C-5 fleet.
Although the TNMCS rate has shown some improvement in the last few
years, it still remains considerably above AMC’s goal, as shown in figure 1.2.
AMC
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Figure 1.2: AMC C-5 TNMCS Rates From October 1991 to June 1995
Percent
18
AMC TNMCS
15
12
9
AMC goal
6
Oct. 91
Apr. 92
Oct. 92
Apr-93
Oct. 93
Apr. 94
Oct. 94
Apr. 95
Air Force officials said that the C-5 has historically not received enough
spare parts primarily because spare parts procurement was budgeted and
allocated based on the number of programmed flying hours. Also, the Air
Force funds C-5 spares based on a projected 12.6-percent TNMCS rate. Since
the C-5 has been exceeding the number of planned flying hours each year,
fleetwide TNMCS rates have been even higher than 12.6 percent; in fiscal
year 1994, for example, the rate was about 16.5 percent.
Air Force personnel are sometimes able to work around spare parts
shortages by taking parts from one aircraft and using them for another
(referred to as cannibalization). According to a recent C-5 Program
Management Review, cannibalization tends to decrease the life expectancy
of aircraft systems and consumes vast amounts of labor that could better
be employed elsewhere. AMC’s goal is one cannibalization action a month
per aircraft. Figure 1.3 shows that AMC C-5 aircraft cannibalization actions
have remained at a level well above the AMC standard for several years.
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Figure 1.3: Cannibalizations Per AMC C-5 Aircraft From October 1992 to June 1995
10
8
Number of cannibalizations per aircraft
6
4
2
AMC standard
0
Oct. 92
Feb. 93
June 93
Oct. 93
Feb 94
June 94
Oct. 94
Feb 95
June 95
To address the spare parts problem, the Air Force changed its calculation
method for fiscal year 1994 to recognize that the C-5 has been flying more
than its number of programmed hours. Also, for fiscal year 1994, the Air
Force allowed some high-priority weapon systems, such as the C-5, to
receive more spare parts funding than lower priority systems. These
changes may have partly accounted for the improved TNMCS rate during
fiscal year 1995. However, neither change had helped improve the
cannibalization rate.
For fiscal year 1996, the Air Force has proposed raising C-5 spares funding
to a level designed to achieve a 7.5-percent TNMCS rate rather than the
current 12.6-percent goal. Air Force officials expect raising the spares
support level will add about $4.6 million to annual C-5 spares costs.
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A Readiness Evaluation
Could Lead to Higher C-5
Mission Capability Rates
The C-5’s mission capability rates could increase if the Air Force were to
conduct a readiness evaluation similar to the operational readiness
assessment conducted for B-1B bomber aircraft. That assessment,
conducted by the Secretary of the Air Force at the direction of the 1994
National Defense Authorization Act, was to determine if the B-1B could
sustain a 75-percent readiness rate, about 18 percentage points higher than
it was achieving at that time. The Air Force Operational Test and
Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) was enlisted as an independent agent to direct
the test and report on the assessment activities. An AFOTEC official
estimated the total costs of conducting the assessment was about
$2.2 million.
During the B-1B operational assessment, AFOTEC used the results from a
test wing to project that the B-1B fleet could achieve mission capable rates
of 75 percent by better managing spare parts repair cycles and making
better use of existing spares with few new assets. AFOTEC also found that
these changes would increase annual program funding by $11 million to
$12 million over and above funds already committed for various
improvements, initiatives, and spare parts. AFOTEC’s findings were
evaluated by the DOD Operational Test and Evaluation Agency as well as by
us.3 Both evaluations supported AFOTEC’s conclusions.
After the assessment was completed, the test wing’s mission capable rate
rose to 84 percent, and the entire fleet mission capable rate rose to
66 percent. According to the DOD Operational Test and Evaluation Agency,
the primary reason the mission capable rate increased was better spares
support—that is, more spares available at the test location and faster
turnaround at the intermediate or depot levels. Leadership attention and
the significance of the test were important motivating factors, but the
mission capable rate could not have been raised without spare parts
improvements. Maintenance downtime was reduced when spares were
immediately available, and more spares lessened the chance that parts
would have to be cannibalized.
One of the major factors accounting for better B-1B spare parts support
was the use of the Distribution and Repair in Variable Environments
(DRIVE) model. DRIVE manages repair requirements by prioritizing repairs
based on their effect on mission capable rates. Current systems, including
the one used for the C-5, prioritize repairs based only on the amount of
time the part has been in the repair process. In addition, a 1992 Rand
3
B-1B Bomber: Evaluation of Air Force Report on B-1B Operational Readiness Assessment
(GAO/NSIAD-95-151, July 18, 1995).
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report advocated using the DRIVE model to emphasize the effect of repairs
on mission capability rather than relying on more traditional indicators.4
The Air Force mandated use of the DRIVE system at its depots in
January 1994, but the system has not yet been implemented by the San
Antonio Air Logistics Center, the C-5 depot.
Although the C-5 and B-1B are different aircraft with different missions,
we believe a C-5 readiness evaluation could yield similar results to those
experienced during the B-1B evaluation. For example, both aircraft have
had historically low mission capable rates and poor spare parts support.
Also, before the B-1B test, Air Force officials did not think the mission
capable rate for the B-1B could be raised nearly as high as the evaluation
later demonstrated. However, the officials are now projecting a fleetwide
increase in B-1B mission capable rates of 15 percentage points. Air Force
airlift officials have stated that improvements to the spares process would
have little impact on C-5 mission capability. However, we think
improvements similar to the B-1B spare parts process changes could be
applied to the C-5 spares process as well.
Officials from the C-5 manufacturer stated that improving the C-5 spares
process by analyzing parts that most affect mission capable rates, similar
to the DRIVE model philosophy, and improving the spare parts pipeline
could result in a 40-percent reduction in TNMCS rates. That reduction would
increase the mission capable rate fleetwide by about 6.6 percentage points.
An increase of this magnitude would give DOD an additional 1.3 million ton
miles a day of cargo-carrying capability—the equivalent of 10 C-17 aircraft.
officials identified several difficulties in reducing TNMCS rates for the
C-5 aircraft by 40 percent. Officials noted that the practical requirement to
maintain an aircraft at each of the two active bases for cannibalization
constitutes a significant portion of the TNMCS rate. They further noted that
aircraft undergoing refurbishment or unit inspections also contribute to
the TNMCS rate. Notwithstanding this position, we note that if AMC achieved
its 7-percent TNMCS goal, it would have accomplished about a 40-percent
reduction in the TNMCS rate—which C-5 manufacturer officials projected.
AMC
4
DRIVE (Distribution and Repair in Variable Environments): Enhancing the Responsiveness of Depot
Repair, Rand Corporation, 1992.
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C-5 Modernization
Plan Needs
Reprioritization
Table 1.2: Impact of Top 10 Proposed
Modifications to the C-5 Aircraft
established a C-5 modernization plan to increase mission capability
rates and reduce personnel requirements and life-cycle costs. According to
AMC officials, modification initiatives are generally prioritized based on
potential reliability and maintainability improvements to the aircraft as
well as cost. The resulting priorities are later modified and updated by
various reviewing officials. AMC’s top 10 proposed modifications, at the
time of our review, and our estimate of their impact on mission capability,
are shown in table 1.2. Many of these modifications will not be funded
until at least the year 2000 and completed several years after that.
AMC
Dollars in millions
Cost
Our estimate of
increase in mission
capability rate
$263.2
0.5
355.0
0.7
5.0
0
6.2
0
86.1
0
Priority
Modification
1
Autopilot replacement
2
Engine turbine improvement
3
Engine vapor barrier
4
Floor corrosion prevention
5
Courier compartment flooring
6
Cabin outflow drain pan
1.3
0
7
D-sump lube line
0.6
0.1
8
Smart engine diagnostics
9.0
0.3
9
Nose landing gear door
0.3
0.1
10
Hydraulic valve replacement
2.2
1.1
$728.9
2.8
Total
Even though we were able to calculate potential mission capable rate
increases for each of the top priority modifications, AMC has not analyzed
how much the modifications would contribute to increasing mission
capability. Until AMC does that analysis, decisionmakers cannot consider
the impact that the proposed improvements could have on mission
capability or total airlift capability. Also, if AMC considered mission
capability increases as a key factor in prioritizing planned C-5
modifications, the current order of priorities would most likely change.
However, we recognize that AMC might have to consider other factors, such
as safety considerations, when it prioritizes modifications.
We identified the 10th-priority modification—hydraulic valve
replacement—as being relatively low in cost but having the most potential
for increasing aircraft mission capability. Failures associated with the
C-5’s hydraulic system are one of the leading causes of reliability
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problems. The hydraulic valve replacement is designed to eliminate surges
when opening selector valves on the landing gear, cargo doors, and ramps.
Because this modification was only recently identified as one of the top 10
priorities, it has not been scheduled for funding. However, AMC estimated
that the modification could be funded as early as fiscal year 1997.
The C-5 manufacturer estimates that failures in hydraulic system
plumbing, mounting fixtures, and components should decrease by
two-thirds to three-fourths when the hydraulic valve modification is
completed. More importantly, the 1.1-percentage point potential increase
in C-5 mission capability resulting from the modification would provide
DOD with an additional 0.18 million ton miles per day of cargo-carrying
capability—equating to 1.4 C-17 aircraft.
In comparison, the two top priority modifications—autopilot replacement
and engine turbine improvement—would likely only increase mission
capability a little at a relatively large cost. Other high-priority efforts, such
as floor corrosion prevention and courier compartment flooring, are
improvements that would not result in any potential increase in aircraft
mission capability.
has not been providing adequate funding to meet the original schedule
for proposed C-5 improvements. For example, two major upgrades to
improve the C-5’s reliability, the malfunction detection analysis and
recording system and the main landing gear actuator, were first identified
in fiscal year 1985 and scheduled to be completed by fiscal year 1994.
However, funding delays have stretched these modifications by 4 years to
fiscal year 1998. According to our 1992 report,5 one of the major factors
contributing to the C-141’s recent severe problems was inadequate funding
to implement necessary modifications. AMC stated in its 1995 Air Mobility
Master Plan that not completing scheduled improvements would degrade
capability and increase operating costs.
DOD
Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Air Force to (1) conduct a readiness evaluation to determine how C-5
peacetime mission capability can be improved and the costs of such
improvements and (2) assess the impact of proposed aircraft
modifications on C-5 mission capability and then reprioritize the proposals
according to the results of the assessment.
5
Military Airlift: Structural Problems Did Not Hamper C-141 Success in Desert Shield/Storm
(GAO/NSIAD-93-75, Dec. 29, 1992).
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We also recommend that the Secretary direct the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Transportation Command, to include in strategic mobility planning
the potential increase in airlift cargo capability made possible by a higher
C-5 mission capable rate.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
partially concurred with our report (see app. I). DOD stated that it has
initiated some actions that would satisfy the intent of our recommendation
that the Air Force conduct a readiness evaluation. These actions include
conducting a 1994 logistics demonstration project to improve and
streamline the C-5 management structure and policies for handling spare
parts and repairing components, as well as incorporating lessons learned
from the B-1B operational readiness assessment to better manage the C-5
program. Although these actions are good first steps, DOD must ensure that
they are fully implemented. In particular, DOD needs to use the DRIVE
model, which was successfully demonstrated during the B-1B assessment,
to allocate C-5 spare parts and prioritize their repair.
DOD
agreed with our recommendation that the Air Force assess the impact
of proposed aircraft modifications on mission capability and reprioritize
the modifications accordingly. DOD noted that the San Antonio Air
Logistics Center was developing a computer model that will be able to
quantify the effects of proposed aircraft reliability improvements on
mission capability. DOD expects this model, scheduled for completion in
July 1996, to help improve the method for prioritizing C-5 modifications.
DOD
did not agree with our recommendation that the Transportation
Command’s strategic mobility planning include the potential increase in
C-5 cargo capability resulting from a higher mission capable rate. DOD
stated that the potential cargo capability increase would not translate
directly into increases in cargo delivered to a theater of conflict because of
the limited airfield infrastructure (including ramp space, refueling
facilities, and material handling equipment).
DOD
Although potential increases in cargo capability identified in our report
may not translate directly into cargo delivered to the theater under some
scenarios, the potential capability still exists under more unconstrained
scenarios with many available airfields or fields with areas large enough to
accommodate substantial numbers of C-5 aircraft. To maximize potential
C-5 cargo deliveries, DOD should consider using C-5 aircraft in the more
unconstrained scenarios. DOD bases many of its conclusions about a more
capable C-5 aircraft on studies of buying additional quantities of a new
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C-5D aircraft, which has not yet been developed. These conclusions could
be substantially different if DOD looked at current quantities of more
capable existing C-5A and C-5B aircraft. Therefore, we continue to believe
DOD should consider the implications of more capable existing C-5 aircraft
in its modeling efforts and decisions on the mix of future aircraft.
Scope and
Methodology
We conducted our review at AMC, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; 436th
Airlift Wing, Dover Air Force Base, Delaware; C-5 System Program
Director’s Office, San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base,
Texas; Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company, Marietta, Georgia; and
Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C. We interviewed various officials
at these locations and reviewed pertinent regulations, guidance, and
reports pertaining to the subject areas. We also interviewed officials
regarding the B-1B readiness assessment and DRIVE model at the Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, New
Mexico; Air Combat Command Headquarters, Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia; and Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio.
To calculate potential aircraft availability and mission capability increases,
we relied on Air Force and C-5 manufacturer estimates of increases in
mission capable hours attributable to the proposed changes. We added the
mission capable hours attributable to those improvements to the 1994 total
fleet mission capable hours and calculated a revised mission capable rate.
We used the revised mission capable rate to calculate a new aircraft
utilization rate, which we used to recalculate a C-5 million ton mile per day
cargo contribution. We divided increases in the C-5 cargo contribution by
the currently estimated AMC million ton mile per day contribution of a C-17
to determine the equivalent number of C-17s.
We conducted our review from August 1994 to August 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member of
your Subcommittee and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of
the Senate Committee on Armed Services, House Committee on National
Security, and Senate and House Committees on Appropriations; the
Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy; the
Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Commander in Chief,
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U.S. Transportation Command; and the Director, Office of Management
and Budget.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5140. The major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix II.
Sincerely yours,
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
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Contents
Letter
1
Appendixes
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report
Tables
Table 1.1: Mission Capable Rates for AMC Aircraft From July
1994 to June 1995
Table 1.2: Impact of Top 10 Proposed Modifications to the C-5
Aircraft
3
Figure 1.1: Percent of C-5 Not Mission Capable Rates Attributable
to a Lack of Spare Parts From October 1992 to June 1995
Figure 1.2: AMC C-5 TNMCS Rates From October 1991 to
June 1995
Figure 1.3: Cannibalizations per AMC C-5 Aircraft From October
1992 to June 1995
4
Figures
16
28
9
5
6
Abbreviations
AFOTEC
AMC
DOD
DRIVE
TNMCS
Page 14
Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center
Air Mobility Command
Department of Defense
Distribution and Repair in Variable Environments
total not mission capable supply
GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
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Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
Note: GAO’s comment
supplementing those in the
report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
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Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
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Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
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Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
Now on pp. 2-6.
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Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
Now on pp. 2, 7-8.
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Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
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Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
Now on pp. 3, 9-10.
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GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
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Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
See comment 1.
Now on p. 10.
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GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
Now on p. 11.
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GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
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GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense
The following is our comment on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter
dated October 23, 1995.
GAO Comment
1. DOD stated that it could not substantiate the additional 1.3 million ton
miles per day of capability that we reported the C-5 aircraft could provide.
Our calculation was based on the 40-percent improvement in total not
mission capable supply (TNMCS) rate projected by the C-5 manufacturer.
We discussed how we calculated utilization rates and million ton mile
contributions in the Scope and Methodology section. We used standard Air
Mobility Command (AMC) formulas in those calculations. In addition, as
noted in the report, if AMC met its own 7-percent goal for TNMCS, it could
achieve the 40-percent TNMCS reduction projected by the C-5 manufacturer.
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Appendix II
Major Contributors to This Report
National Security and
International Affairs
Division, Washington,
D.C.
Robert Eurich
James Murphy
Kansas City Field
Office
Gregory Symons
Claudia Saul
Norman Trowbridge
(703080)
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