Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles carrying such weapons has
been regarded as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, there have been growing
fears that non-state actors, including terrorists, against whom traditional deterrence works less effectively, will
acquire and use weapons of mass destructions.
1. Nuclear Weapons
During the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 made
it clear that there was a risk of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)7 of 1968 prohibited countries other than those that had conducted
nuclear tests in or before 19668 from having nuclear weapons, and required nuclear-armed countries to control
and reduce nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations9.
Under the NPT, signed by 190 countries, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and
China are now permitted to have nuclear weapons. While some countries that had nuclear weapons abandoned
them and became signatories of this treaty10, some countries still refuse to sign this treaty11. Thus, in addition to
the five countries permitted to have nuclear weapons, there are other countries that have declared the
development and possession of nuclear weapons. For example, North Korea announced it had conducted a
nuclear test in October 2006.
2. Biological and Chemical Weapons
It is easy to manufacture biological and chemical weapons at a relatively low cost. Because most of the
materials, equipment and technology that are needed to manufacture them can be used for both military and
civilian purposes, disguising them is easy. This makes biological and chemical weapons attractive to states or
terrorists who seek asymmetric means of attack12.
Biological weapons have the following characteristics: 1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive, 2) there
is usually an incubation period of a few days from exposure to onset, 3) their use is hard to detect, 4) even the
threat of use can create great psychological pressures, and 5) heavy casualties can be caused depending on
circumstances and the type of weapon13.
As for chemical weapons, asphyxiants such as phosgene were known during World War I. In the Iran-Iraq
War, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas as an erosion agent and tabun and sarin as nerve agents14 against Iran. In
the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds15. Other chemical weapons include VX, a
highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds16.
North Korea (see Chapter 2, Section 2) is one country seeking such weapons. The Tokyo subway sarin
attack that took place in Japan in 1995, and mail in the United States containing anthrax bacillus in 2001 and
ricin in February 2004, respectively showed that the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by
terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage in cities if terrorists use them. Since
January 2007, Iraq has seen terrorist bomb attacks using chlorine gas, and containers of chlorine as well as
weapons caches have been uncovered by Iraqi security forces and multinational forces.
3. Ballistic Missiles
Ballistic missiles can carry heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of projecting
weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Once launched, a ballistic
missile makes a trajectory flight and falls at a steep angle at high speed. No states have completed full spectrum
deployment of an effective system of defense against ballistic missiles at this moment.
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If ballistic missiles are deployed in a region
where military confrontation is underway, the
conflict could intensify or expand. The deployment
of ballistic missiles could further exacerbate tension
in a region where armed antagonism exists, and
could destabilize that region. A country may use
ballistic missiles as a means of attacking or
threatening another country that is superior in terms
of conventional forces.
In addition to the threat of ballistic missiles,
attention is now increasingly being paid to the threat
of cruise missiles, because it is comparatively easy
for terrorists and other non-state entities to procure
them17. Although the speed of a cruise missile is slower than that of a ballistic missile, it is difficult to detect
once it is launched and in flight18. Because cruise missiles are smaller than ballistic missiles, a terrorist can hide
one in a ship and secretly approach a target. If a cruise missile carries a weapon of mass destruction, its threat
would be enormous.
4. Growing Concerns about Transfer or Proliferation of WMDs
Weapons that are purchased or developed by a country originally for its own defense purposes could be easily
exported or transferred if the country successfully manufactures these domestically. For example, certain states
that do not heed political risks are transferring weapons of mass destruction and related technologies to other
states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and intend to compensate for this with
weapons of mass destruction. These states that seek weapons of mass destruction do not hesitate to put their
land and people at risk. Because governance is poor in such countries, terrorist organizations are reported to be
active. Therefore, the chance of actual use of weapons of mass destruction may generally be high in these
cases.
In addition, since it is unlikely that such states can effectively manage the related technology and materials,
the high possibility that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states to
other countries is cause for concern. Even without this technology, there is the risk that a terrorist will use a
dirty bomb19 as a means of attack simply by acquiring a radioactive substance.
All countries have come to share concerns about the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by
terrorists and other non-state entities. Based on these concerns, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1540 in April 2004, declaring that all states should adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws
that prohibit non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring
or using weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery thereof, as well as refrain from assisting such
non-state actors. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was also
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in April 2005.
Activities related to weapons of mass destruction were secretly pursued in some countries. Such activities
have come to light since 2002, revealing the fact that nuclear weapon technologies have been proliferated and
transferred. On the other hand, the international community’s uncompromising and decisive stance against the
transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has put enormous pressure on countries involved with
such weapons, leading some of them to accept inspection by international institutions or to abandon further
programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.
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Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan
During (then) U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kerry’s visit to North Korea in October 2002, the
United States announced that North Korea had admitted to the existence of a project to enrich uranium for use
in nuclear weapons, pointing out the possibility that North Korea was pursuing the development not only of
plutonium-based weapons but also uranium-based nuclear weapons.
It has become clear that Iran, too, has been engaged in uranium enrichment-related activities since 2002,
and efforts by the international community to resolve this issue continue.
As a result of behind-the-scenes discussions with the United States and the United Kingdom from March
2003, Libya announced in December 2003 that it would abandon all of its weapons of mass destruction
programs and accept immediate inspections by international organizations. Subsequently in August 2006, the
country ratified the additional IAEA protocol.
Pakistan seems to have launched its nuclear development program in the 1970s, and suspicious technology
transfers concerning uranium enrichment from Pakistan to Iran and Libya were revealed in 2003. In February
2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, have been
transferred to North Korea, Iran and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists for personal gain. These
transfers have been shown to have been secretly conducted using global networks involving Europe, Africa, the
Middle East and Southeast Asia20. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohammad
El Baradei has reportedly stated that this network spans more than 30 countries21.
Further, ballistic missiles have significantly proliferated or been transferred. The former Soviet Union
exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea and Afghanistan. China and
North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of
countries now possess them. Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North
Korea’s No-Dong missile22. Libya, which agreed to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs,
reportedly disclosed production lines for Scud-Cs and other facilities built with the technological assistance of
North Korea23. It has been reported that Ukraine illegally exported cruise missiles capable of being fitted with
nuclear warheads to Iran and China around 200124.
5. Iran’s Nuclear Issue
Since the 1970s Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from
abroad, claiming that this plant was to be used for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002,
however, it was announced by a group of dissidents that Iran was secretly constructing a large-scale uranium
enrichment facility, and subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran had engaged in the enrichment of
uranium and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons without notifying the
IAEA, in violation of the IAEA’s safeguards agreement. Since this revelation regarding Iran’s nuclear
program, Iran has insisted that it has no intent of developing nuclear weapons and that all of its nuclear
activities are for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the international community has expressed strong concerns
about obtaining assurances of Iran’s claims, and has demanded that Iran suspend all of its enrichment and
reprocessing activities until it can confirm that Iran’s nuclear development activities are solely for peaceful
purposes.
Exercising initiative to resolve the issue, the EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) held
discussions with Iran in hopes of resolving this issue; an accord (Paris Accord) was reached in November 2004
on halting uranium enrichment and all other nuclear-related activities, and Iran accordingly ceased its nuclearrelated activities. However, Iran rejected as unsatisfactory the proposal25 for a Long-Term Agreement presented
by the EU-3 in August 2005 and announced the start of preparations for the recommencement of uranium
enrichment in January 2006 (Iran recommenced uranium enrichment in February). The IAEA then convened an
emergency Board of Governors meeting in February 2006 that by a majority vote adopted a resolution to report
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the issue to the U.N. Security Council. In March
2006, the U.N. Security Council approved a
Presidential Statement calling on Iran to halt its
uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, but
in April Iran announced that it had successfully
achieved low-grade (3.5%) uranium enrichment26 and
stuck to its policy to continue uranium enrichmentrelated activities. In June 2006, a comprehensive
proposal was presented to Iran under an agreement of
the 5 permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council and Germany. The proposal included
cooperation in the event that Iran suspended all its
nuclear activities, including uranium enrichmentrelated activities; Iran nevertheless continued its nuclear activities. In view of Iran’s response, the U.N.
Security Council in July adopted Resolution 1696 demanding Iran to suspend all of its uranium enrichment and
reprocessing activities and warning that appropriate measures would be taken under Chapter 7, Article 41 of
the U.N. Charter if Iran were not to comply with this resolution by the end of August 2006.
Because Iran continued its uranium enrichment-related activities, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 173727 on December 23, 2006, and then Resolution 174728 on March 24, 2007, to impose stricter
sanctions in accordance with Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. Despite these efforts by the
international community, Iran in April 2007 declared that its nuclear fuel production was in industrial scale.
Although the Iran’s nuclear issue remains unresolved, the U.N. Security Council and the rest of the
international community are continuing to pursue political and diplomatic solutions through negotiations.
[COLUMN]
COMMENTARY
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Issues Surrounding North Korea and Iran
Nuclear power is useful when used for peaceful purposes under the strict safeguards mechanism of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, since nuclear power can also be used to produce
nuclear weapons, the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues are currently posing a serious threat to the
international society. This column explains the two key terms of the issues—nuclear weapons and
reactors.
(1) Energy sources of nuclear weapons1: uranium and plutonium
Nuclear weapons utilize gigantic energy released at the time of nuclear fission activated by neutron
absorption. Therefore the production of nuclear weapons requires, first and foremost, materials made up
of atoms that are easy to split (fissile materials). The two most typical fissile materials are uranium and
plutonium.
Natural uranium consists mainly of uranium-235, which is fissionable, and uranium-238, which is not.
Since uranium-235 makes up only 0.7% of natural uranium, the enrichment process is required to separate
uranium-235 from natural uranium before using it as a material of nuclear weapons. Uranium enrichment
generally necessitates a large-scale facility with several thousands of centrifuges linked with each other.
The concentration of uranium-235 can be increased to a weapons grade (90% or more) at such an
enrichment facility.
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Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Plutonium, on the other hand, seldom exists naturally, and is created artificially in reactors. Most of
the existing nuclear weapons are the plutonium type. In reactors, when uranium fuel is irradiated with
neutrons to cause nuclear fission of uranium-235 to generate energy, uranium-238 is also exposed to
neutrons and produce plutonium as a by-product. The spent fuel therefore contains uranium-235, uranium238 and plutonium in a mixed state, and has to be chemically processed at reprocessing plants to separate
plutonium from the other remnants. However, plutonium extracted from fuel used for power generation in
nuclear power reactors—often called “reactor grade plutonium”—has a high plutonium 2402 content, and
is generally considered unsuitable for nuclear weapons.
(2) Types of reactors, and nuclear suspicion about Iran and North Korea
Reactors are divided into graphite moderated reactors (GMRs), heavy water reactors (HWRs) and light
water reactors (LWRs). GMRs and HWRs can use natural uranium as fuel, and are believed to be more
suitable for producing plutonium than LWRs. LWRs, on the other hand, use uranium-235 enriched to 3 to
5% (low-enriched uranium (LEU)). LEU can be produced domestically or imported from abroad, and in
the case of the former, it is important for other countries to determine whether the enrichment facility is
for peaceful or military use. Since LWRs need to be deactivated when their fuel is replaced, they are
believed to be easier than GMRs and HWRs to monitor the disposal of spent fuel containing plutonium.
Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to demolish its GMR on condition that,
among others, an LWR would be provided to the country in place of the GMR. The framework seemed to
put an end to the suspicion about North Korea developing plutonium-type nuclear weapons. However,
North Korea allegedly tried to import materials to produce centrifuges although the country was expected
to import LEU for the LWR. This has led other countries to suspect that North Korea may be developing,
this time, uranium-type nuclear weapons. (See Chapter 1, Section 2 (p.36))
Iran is trying to establish its own uranium enrichment technology, which the country claims is to be
used to produce LEU necessary for an LWR currently being constructed. However, since Iran had been
conducting various activities including uranium enrichment without reporting to the IAEA until 2002, the
country’s claim that its nuclear development is intended solely for peaceful purposes is regarded by the
international community as unconvincing, and is suspected to be developing nuclear weapons. Iran has
been continuing with uranium enrichment, defying Security Council resolutions several times, and the
IAEA reported in May this year that about 1,300 centrifuges are currently in operation in the country. In
addition, Iran has begun to construct a research HWR. Since it is not clear why an HWR is needed in
addition to the LWR, and HWRs are more suitable for producing plutonium than LWRs, it is also
suspected that the country may be developing plutonium-type nuclear weapons, causing concern to the
international community. (See Section 2 (p.14))
1) There are in fact two types of nuclear weapons: nuclear fission weapons and nuclear fusion weapons. But this column focuses only on the former.
2) Unlike plutonium 239, plutonium 240 is likely to fission spontaneously. Therefore, plutonium with a high plutonium 240 content is considered unable to
effectively produce nuclear explosions.
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