AY 97 COMPENDIUM
ARMY AFTER NEXT PROJECT
Yves J. Fontaine
Paul T. Hengst
Barbara A. Jezior
William T. Lasher
Gary J. Motsek
Arthur J. Sosa
Billy E. Wells, Jr.
Edited by
Douglas V. Johnson II
April 6, 1998
*****
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ii
CONTENTS
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1. The Future of Infantry: Maneuver in the 21st Century
Billy E. Wells, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. The Revolutionized Warfighter Circa 2025
Barbara A. Jezior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Promises and Potential
Arthur J. Sosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4. Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces
Yves J. Fontaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5. Logistic Support to the Army After Next Warfighters:
A Time for Fundamental Change
Gary J. Motsek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6. Managing the Intelligent Information Grid
for the Army After Next
Paul T. Hengst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7. Data Interoperability for Systems of Systems: Our
Acquisition Paradigm Must Change to Achieve It
William T. Lasher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
iii
TABLE AND FIGURES
Table 1. UAV Joint Program Office Payload Projects . 64
Figure 1. Proliferation of UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Figure 2. Illustration of a System of Systems . . . . . 137
Figure 3. Communicating Between Systems . . . . . 138
Figure 4. The Waterfall Life Cycle Model . . . . . . . 141
Figure 5. Military Standard 498 Software Development
Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Figure 6. The Functional Pie: Illustrative Slices . . . 143
Figure 7. Enterprise Data Architecture . . . . . . . . 148
Figure 8. Possible Layout for DoD Data Management
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
iv
FOREWORD
This compendium of student papers is the first in an
annual series generated by the U.S. Army War College
Special Program, the Army After Next Seminar. This
seminar is a continuing research effort involving students,
staff, and faculty that attempts to wrestle with the nature of
military power 30 years into the future. This is a difficult
task with no known “Right” or “Wrong” markers. Michael
Howard, in his seminal article, “Military Science in an Age
of Peace,” tells us that the task of the professional soldier in
time of peace is to try to figure out the future in such a
fashion that, when it arrives, he won’t be so far wrong as to
be unable to take corrective action quickly.
These student papers are largely focused on present
problems which must be solved before movement toward
the future can make much progress. If they are not
dramatically futuristic in approach, they are nevertheless
set against a future backdrop which is still in the process of
being defined. The broader Army After Next program, led by
the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Comand, is an
experiment, an examination of what could be. The Army
War College seeks to play its part through this contribution
and by educating those officers who will field, staff, and
command our future Army.
RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
v
PREFACE
This collection of essays reflects the state of future
thinking by selected students of the U.S. Army War College
Class of ‘97. Before summarizing the papers contained
herein, it is informative to recap student papers for the
entire class. There were a number of surprises. This year
saw a deep interest in Reserve Component (RC)
contributions to National Security, Information Operations
broadly defined, Logistics, and the full range of “Not-War”
situations. Of 300-odd papers, 20 were focused on Logistics,
26 on Information Operations, 17 on RC issues, and 15 on
“Not-War” issues. In addition, there were 14 focused on
aspects of the Future Army not specifically included within
these other categories. However, when we use the Future
Army as a primary category, the number of papers jumps
somewhat to around 50, depending upon how rigorously one
defines “Future Army.” This compendium reflects this focus
of interest.
It is essential that the reader understand the general
qualifications of our authors. Most of these authors are
Army officers with about 22 years of commissioned service.
They are practical men and women despite their broad
educational backgrounds. Most hold a master’s degree in
some discipline, but have had little opportunity to theorize
and mature their thinking about great political
issues—their job has always been to prevent problems or
solve them when things go awry. Consequently, this volume
contains no treatises on international relations nor
analyses of macro-trends in global relationships. Perhaps
that is a fault of the curriculum, but the nation does not pay
officers to think those thoughts; by a wonderful quirk of
logic, it chooses to elect others to do that.
The idea of a “Military After Next” seems first to have
surfaced in an article published in the Washington
Quarterly in 1993 by Paul Bracken. Within a year, U.S.
vii
A rmy C h ief of Staf f Gener al Denni s J. Rei mer
commissioned Headquarters, Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), to begin an exploratory program to
investigate the possible shape and behavior of the Army in
the 2025 time frame. Almost simultaneously, the Strategic
Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC) sought and obtained approval to put together a
Special Program (actually an extended Advanced Course)
entitled “The Army After Next,” as a parallel experiment
with full academic freedom to read, think, and debate the
breadth and depth of the plausible. Twelve students were
selected for the program from a group of 30 volunteers.
Some of their papers are included in this volume; but other
students worked similar issues on their own initiative, and
the lead paper in this compendium is one of those.
The structure of this compendium is as follows:
Lieutenant Colonel Wells’ paper is a wide-ranging,
impassioned presentation of the future of infantry. Branch
parochialism aside, it serves as a thought-provoking
baseline by which the other papers should be evaluated, for,
in the end, real war is about infantry. Wells’ presentation
leads logically to the Land Warrior program which Ms.
Barbara Jezior, as the second author, explains in depth,
treating the combat soldier as a whole system.
Ms. Jezior, who was invited to stay on at USAWC for a
year and teach, describes the course of developments in
soldier systems. Late in the academic year the Army After
Next (AAN) Seminar took up issues of operations and
tactics, using Ms. Jezior’s paper as a springboard. If the
Army chooses to pursue the Land Warrior system, it will
give the individual soldier significantly greater influence on
the battlefield. But in combination with other similarly
equipped soldiers and support measures, the Land Warrior
system promises a quantum leap in battle effectiveness.
After extended debate, the AAN Seminar more or less
agreed that the basic unit of Land Warriors ought to be a
“squad” of about seven persons, two teams of three and a
leader. Note how this contrasts with Wells’ argument for a
viii
somewhat larger group. The next level of aggregation,
however, was thought to be about four such “squads.”
Whether this unit would be a company or platoon was not
considered relevant; what was more important was the
amount of ground such a unit could control. When
augmented by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and
advanced antitank weapons, one “squad,” in the Seminar’s
estimation, could control the entire Gettysburg battlefield
(vice the 165,000 men who strove there in 1863), and that a
group of four of these squads could control the entire battle
area, about a 15-by-15-mile square. Next year the Seminar
will spend more time considering how the Land Warrior
system would work in urban combat, and what force levels
would be required there—more, we suspect.
Ms. Jezior describes the current state of Land Warrior
system development and outlines some of the more
visionary things being considered. In its current state of
development, Land Warrior allows its user to “see” and
engage around corners, to see and engage in most conditions
of visual obscurity, to maintain significant situational
awareness of the immediate operational area, and to
communicate laterally and vertically in a semi-automatic
mode. Not yet, but soon, his battledress will be chemical
agent resistant with automatic alarm and prophylactic
mechanisms, and, later, biological agent resistant.
Biomedical function monitoring is part of the suit, and
biomedical enhancements will be incorporated once
adequately tested. The list grows as time and money
increase, but therein lies one of the major limiters. Such
battle suits will not be cheap, and their cost may prove the
primary limiting factor.
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Sosa, an Army aviator with a
deep interest in UAVs, provides a good look at their
background and development. He does not address the overt
connections between these systems and the soldier, but the
reader will make those connections readily. The application
of UAVs to each level of war will prove a significant
capability enhancer. At the “squad” level, it is well within
ix
the plausible to think of the following scenario. One Land
Warrior is alerted by UAV reconnaissance to some
suspicious activity three miles to his west. Reaching into his
backpack quiver of micro UAVs, he programs one for
“Search-human/military material,” and launches it toward
the hot spot. The nearly silent, negligible cross-section
sensor darts out to scan the area, detects human movement,
reports the result of an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
inquiry and awaits further instructions. Those instructions
could include return to launch point, mark target, or
kamikaze. If the object is a hard target requiring an
Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOGM) or other
fire strike, the UAV may remain long enough to do
post-strike battle damage assessment (BDA). In short, the
UAV has the capacity to expand the soldiers’ control of the
battlefield in the same exponential fashion as the armed
helicopter. In fact, mainstream Army thinking, at least as
represented by USAWC students, reveals very limited
conceptions of what UAVs already have done, much less
how much they can do. The limitation of this technology
appears to be principally human. Humans must eat, sleep,
and have some social interaction, especially in stressful
situations.
Because the soldier will always find employment in a
wide range of circumstance, the next piece is by a
logistician, Lieutenant Colonel Yves J. Fontaine, who
addresses the persistent shortcomings in the soldier’s
support system in a variety of recent operations. He reviews
the logistics shortcomings of recent operations in order to
describe the challenge of creating a needed revolution in
logistics operations. His descriptions of the logistical
problems within these successful operations demonstrate
the potential for significant improvements, many of which
are possible in the near future. One can see in the
management concepts Fontaine describes pathways toward
implementation of the broader concepts in Colonel Gary
Motsek’s paper that follows. Fontaine’s hard-nosed analysis
concludes:
x
Nevertheless, the level of technology available today (and
probably in 2025) does not significantly change the way we do
business as logisticians. Current technology allows us to
improve . . . to process faster . . . [It] does not mean the U.S. Army
can decrease the logistics tail.
This may be Fontaine’s most important conclusion.
Unless radically new systems are developed that require
little logistics support, all improvements in logistics
systems will continue to be at the margin.
Colonel Gary J. Motsek also addresses logistics. In his
monograph titled, “Logistic Support to the Army After Next
Warfighters,” he argues that the time for change in logistics
operations is now. Leaning upon the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2010 as a starting point,
Colonel Motsek argues that major changes in logistics
management are already underway, but that further
change is essential. He points out that we do not know the
exact dimensions of the Army After Next force, but we do
know it will be a smaller, faster moving force, both
strategically and tactically. We may reasonably assume it
will be well-equipped with information technology that
significantly improves all facets of situational awareness.
His interest, of course, is focused on how that awareness will
translate into near-immediate response to logistics needs in
a very fluid environment. He goes on to caution that only so
much change is possible as long as the current weapons
system mix obtains. A 70-ton M1 tank has requirements
that cannot be met by anything less than large quantities of
fu el, ammu n ition, and heavywei ght c omp onent
transporters. Colonel Motsek carefully points out that the
Army After Next is likely to be responsible as executive
agent for many items of supply for the other services, as is
today’s Army. Part of his solution to is to reorganize the
logistics world to establish a national level logistics
provider. This concept capitalizes on the idea of centralized
management and decentralized execution. All logistics
stocks are centrally managed, as are Transportation
Command’s (TRANSCOM) assets, today. Commander-
xi
in-Chief TRANSCOM (CINCTRANS) “is the single
Department of Defense point of focus to contract and
leverage civilian transportation resources” as well as
military lift assets. He concludes that there will be funding
obstacles in modernizing the force that will likely
necessitate the ability to support several generations of
force structure; that the tactical transportation challenge
will likewise impose an expense in the development of the
force; and that the idea of a Commander-in-Chief Logistics
(CINCLOG) needs considerable development.
Whatever the strategic situation, whatever the combat
mode, the soldier will be utterly dependent upon
information technology. Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. Hengst
presents an overview of some of the technical aspects,
focusing on the Intelligent Information Grid (I2G) upon
which the AAN will be dependent. This I2G will form “a
single grid so powerful and intelligent that it will be able to
provide common situational awareness to friendly forces,
real-time intelligence on enemy forces and fire control.” In
order to establish this tool, which functions as the central
n erv ou s sy stem f or mi l i tar y f or c es , two major
improvements must occur:
•
•
Technology. Artificial intelligence must become a
reality for management functions within the grid,
multi-level security is a must, and database
technology management must become more
responsive.
Management. The I2G will operate off of commercial
systems with all that entails; the funding stream to
maintain competitive position within the commercial
structure must be maintained; and DoD must
establish a central management organization to focus
resources according to development priorities so as to
acquire the most effective systems when needed, and
to reduce training and interoperability problems.
xii
Finally, Lieutenant Colonel William T. Lasher discusses
information management systems and some of the existing
issues and proposed resolutions thereto. His basic point is
that, until we commit fully to developing a system of
systems in information, we will confront unnecessary
obstacles to the kind of information flow a really
revolutionized military requires.
There were 6-10 other papers that might have been
included, and segments of 12 or so others that addressed
future military matters, but space constrained selection.
What is reassuring is the high percentage of largely
future-focused studies, what is discouraging, although
understandable in the program’s first year, is the general
inability to push thinking out into the timeframe of our sons’
and daughters’ military careers. Nonetheless, this
compendium represents a good first effort to grapple with
the long range future in a program that we expect to see
mature over the next decade at least.
DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II
Army After Next Project Coordinator
Strategic Studies Institute
xiii
CHAPTER 1
THE FUTURE OF INFANTRY:
MANEUVER IN THE 21st CENTURY
Billy E. Wells, Jr.
[Editor’s Note: This paper ranges widely and
passionately over the entire realm of infantry, but it does so
in light of the most recent warfighting experiments and
advances in infantry related technologies. As noted in the
text, several of the following papers are directly related to
the author’s arguments. Where these arguments are
duplicative, I have opted to direct the reader to the broader
following articles. While not entirely focused upon Army
After Next, this paper lays the base case from which any
geopolitical situation requiring the use of military force
must begin. It is comprehensive in its address of technology,
training, education, and leader development. Other papers
address the required elements of command and control, and
sustainment. DVJ]
INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this paper is that highly mobile infantry
forces combined with increasingly lethal artillery and
aviation will be the dominant land combat force of the
future. This will occur as the geopolitical environment
evolves a new set of conditions requiring capabilities
traditionally associated with infantry. At the same time,
domestic requirements will continue to shape the direction
of national strategy and force structure, focusing on lighter,
more economical dual use technologies and forces. As
technological developments create the requirement and the
capability for a dispersed and expanded battlefield, mobility
requirements will expand the roles of aviation due to its
speed and of artillery due to its range. Infantry, by merging
1
dismounted mobility with aviation and providing targeting
information to artillery even in close terrain, will be the key
to full spectrum dominance. How the infantry force is
selected, organized, trained, employed, and supported will
require significant changes in order to meet the challenges
of future conflict.
THE ROLE OF INFANTRY
Throughout history the infantry has remained the most
flexible arm because it can fight in so many ways and places.
No other component of the ground force can perform the
wide range of infantry missions. Aviation cannot occupy and
hold terrain and cannot operate continuously. Armor is
partly deaf and blind, increasingly restricted by terrain,
difficult to conceal, vulnerable to an expanding variety of
weapons, impossible to deploy rapidly, and difficult to
sustain. Artillery, although increasing its capabilities, is
incapable of engaging small fleeting targets at close range
without endangering friendly personnel. Like armor,
artillery is of limited use in certain environments and of
little value in most military operations other than war.
The basic combat mission of the infantry is unlikely to
change in the long term. Infantry will continue to “close with
the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or
capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and
counterattack.” In order to accomplish this mission,
infantry performs six critical tasks: find, fix, finish, disrupt,
protect, and control. Although these tasks may be
accomplished alone, they are usually done in concert with
the other arms and services.
Infantry has always played an important role in gaining
contact with the enemy. Traditionally an aspect of battle
dominated by cavalry, this critical function is essentially an
infantry task in close terrain and at the low end of the
spectrum of conflict. Even in open terrain, infantry may be
the force of choice due to its low signature, if it can be placed
in proper position with good communications.
2
Despite the expanded capability of current and projected
sensors, close terrain (or poor visibility) still restricts their
use. While there are developmental programs targeted at
foliage penetration, they are not likely to solve the visibility
problem for urban terrain or to be able to distinguish
combatants from noncombatants.1
Once found, the enemy is usually fixed to facilitate his
destruction. The requirement to fix enemy forces is as old as
warfare. Fixing allows “time dominance” of the enemy.
When an enemy force is fixed, it loses flexibility and
initiative and leaves itself vulnerable to the massing of
destructive effects. Infantry is not the only force capable of
fixing; however, it is the most capable one, especially when
combined with other arms. The requirement to fix
diminishes in importance proportionally with real time
situational awareness and response capability. Even with
perfect situational awareness, however, fixing the enemy
facilitates the massing of effects.
Infantry forces are required to finish the battle however
it may be fought. Other forces are incapable of clearing the
terrain required to consolidate victory and have difficulty in
capturing enemy personnel. The implication that infantry
must always come to grips with the enemy to finish him is
misleading. While close combat is the essential infantry
task, weapons developments clearly indicate that in certain
conditions infantry will fight at extended ranges. The
meaning of closing with the enemy must be modified to
include long range engagements and “fire fights” along with
its traditional implication of bayonet and rifle butt.
Disruption is traditionally a light force function,
whether cavalry or infantry, and multiplies the effect of
combat power by creating vulnerabilities and destroying
enemy synchronization. In essence, disruption magnifies
the friction of war for the enemy. Infantry, by virtue of its
exceptional mobility and low signature, acts as an excellent
disrupter. Infantry has increasing potential to expand this
role with aviation support.
3
Protection of valuable resources remains a critical
infantry task across the spectrum of conflict. Fire support
and air defense commanders habitually request infantry
security forces to reduce their vulnerability to ground
attack. From fortress troops to fire bases in Vietnam to
aviation forward operating bases in Operation DESERT
STORM, infantry support has been critical to protecting
valuable assets. Even mobile armored forces require
infantry for security. Today’s crew-served systems do not
possess the personnel depth to maintain constant 24-hour
security and must have infantry for close-in protection and
early warning, especially in close terrain or bad weather.
This requirement is expanding as the battlefield becomes
more non-linear.
Control of populations and critical terrain is an infantry
intensive and essential function either in combat or in
increasingly prevalent operations other than war. The
closer the terrain and the larger the population, the greater
the requirement for infantry.
As requirements for infantry increase, solutions must be
found to meet the future challenges of full spectrum
dominance. In some cases, technology can actually expand
the individual soldier’s battlespace. In others, such as close
terrain and population control, technology can certainly
make the individual soldier more effective, but it cannot
reduce the personnel requirement for the foreseeable
future. A review of current and future infantry systems and
their capabilities will reveal some striking future
possibilities.
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Incredibly, the infantry appears to be gaining the most
from changes in technology and emerging global trends. An
examination of research and development efforts clearly
indicates it to be one of the most rapidly advancing forces in
terms of lethality, mobility, and information capability.
Technological innovations and mobility combinations with
4
other arms are revolutionizing the future infantry
battlefield.
Antitank Weapons.
Infantry antitank weapons represent some of the most
dramatic advances in capability across the force. The ability
of individual infantry soldiers and small crews to destroy
armor beyond tank gun range is dramatically changing the
combat power equation. Four air transportable systems,
Javelin, Follow on to TOW Missile (FOTT), Line of Sight
Antitank (LOSAT), and the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided
Missile (EFOGM), are dramatically changing the open field
advantage in favor of the easily concealed and increasingly
lethal infantryman.
The Javelin began fielding in 1996 as part the Force XXI
Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE). Representing a
tremendous leap ahead capability for the infantryman
compared to the M47 Dragon, the Javelin has an integrated
day-and-night sight. Passive infrared fire control with a
lock-on before launch provides a “fire and forget” capability.
Either top attack or direct fire modes may be selected for
defilade targets. With a 2000+ meter range and a soft
launch capability for firing from enclosures, Javelin
represents a powerful new antitank capability for the rifle
platoon.2
The TOW weapon system is receiving various missile
and target acquisition upgrades as well. The FOTT missile
is designed to reach about six kilometers with a lock-on
before launch and “fire and forget” capability similar to the
Javelin. Capable of defeating known and expected future
threat armor, it will also be capable of overcoming predicted
threat countermeasures as well. The improved target
acquisition system for TOW with second generation
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and laser range finder
enhance the crew’s capability to acquire targets and to
compensate for incorrect range determination.3
5
The most deadly direct fire antitank weapon system
under development is the LOSAT which takes advantage of
kinetic missile technology to fire a 170-pound, 112-inch-long
“telephone pole” at 5000 feet per second through an armored
vehicle. With a range beyond TOW and a capability to
engage multiple targets, this system represents a decided
advantage against any known or predicted future tank and
antitank missile countermeasure system. Originally
designed for mounting on the now defunct armored gun
system chassis, it can be mounted on the heavy version of
the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV), giving it an air assault/air mobile capability.
The EFOGM is designed to destroy tanks and rotary
wing aircraft defiladed by terrain out to 15 kilometers. This
system is HMMWV mounted as well. Like LOSAT, its
two-man crew and vehicle are air assault capable. Target
acquisition is FLIR with Global Positioning System (GPS)
inertial measurement for accurate target location, allowing
the system to serve as a reconnaissance asset while en route
to its own target. With six missiles carried ready to fire and
12 systems planned for a brigade sized maneuver force,
EFOGM will give small, agile light forces a decided
advantage over slower armored units. By using terrain
obstacles to impede movement and obstruct line of sight, the
lighter force completely deprives the heavy force of its
capability to locate and engage it.5
Directed Energy.
Directed energy weapons go beyond the current
capabilities of kinetic and chemical energy capabilities to
defeat armor. Directed energy uses lasers or high power
microwave systems to disrupt enemy electronics and fire
control optics in an asymmetrical attack. The weapon
strikes at the speed of light at ranges far beyond current or
projected tank main guns. Operating in a scan mode, an
invisible laser searches the battlefield for optics. In a
manner similar to the way radar reflects back to its source
and identifies a target location, the laser detects optics
6
ranging from binoculars to tank fire control equipment. In
the attack mode, it can disrupt these same systems by
transmitting a high energy beam which glazes optics and
destroys FLIR systems.
Because it requires only electrical energy to operate,
logistical requirements are essentially limited to
sustainment of the weapons platform. This could be
anything from an infantry fighting vehicle to the individual
soldier. While there are ethical issues associated with the
attack aspects of this system (it can cause blindness), its
target acquisition role is worthy on its own merits. It can
provide precise target locations for both direct fire and
indirect systems. When employed in the attack mode, it
eliminates the requirement for expensive precision guided
munitions altogether. In the detection mode during
Operation Other Than War (OOTW), directed energy can
identify surveillance efforts by insurgents and is effective in
locating snipers.6
Directed energy is not a drawing board item. Two
Bradley mounted Stingray directed energy systems were
built in 1991 and deployed to DESERT STORM (results, if
any, remain classified). Two other systems, the Outrider, a
HMMWV mounted version of Stingray for light forces, and
the Target Location and Observation System (TLOS) were
also planned by the Army; however, the Outrider project
was canceled.7
Scheduled for fielding in 1998 with three systems per
rifle platoon, the TLOS could revolutionize the battlefield.
TLOS is an M-16 mounted device that detects fire control
systems, both optical and FLIR, by using a laser scanner to
search the battlefield. Weighing 6.5 pounds, the system can
detect at ranges of 2500 meters during the day and 3000
meters at night. The final, lighter weight version will have
digital integration and GPS and will compute range to
target. This system can also destroy optics, though current
systems have had this capability removed.8
7
The impact of such a weapon in the hands of an
individual infantry soldier would be enormous. The fire
control system of any armored vehicle or aircraft within
sight could be destroyed. Constraints have been placed on
this capability by the Department of Defense, however. As
mentioned above, there are ethical issues surrounding the
use of such a weapon, as it can blind people. Since similar
ethically-driven restraints on the crossbow and gunpowder
were not successful, we can expect similar systems to
appear in other countries as an effective asymmetrical and
cheap counter to our technological advantage in the air and
on the ground.
Nonlethal Weapons.
Microwave sound weapons range from lethal to
nonlethal. In the nonlethal mode, these weapons create
imbalance and disorientation through effects on the inner
ear and can incapacitate individuals. But with sufficient
power, they can cause the internal organs to resonate,
producing death. They can cause sensitive materiel
subsystems such as electronics to overheat and melt.
Modern vehicle ignition systems, fire control electronics,
and communications networks are all vulnerable to this
type of attack. Ultralow frequency devices can be directional
and tunable, and can penetrate buildings and vehicles as
well, providing great potential for use in urban terrain.
Many of these weapons are already under development, and
the challenges of power requirements are rapidly being
surmounted. For example, the Russians have already
developed a 10 hertz sonic baseball-size device that can be
tuned for lethal or nonlethal effects9. The U.S. Army is
developing systems as well and has been working on a
tunable crew served acoustic weapon.10
Nonlethal weapons are a response to the changing
requirements and nature of conflict around the globe.
Peacekeeping missions and humanitarian assistance are
now frequent occurrences, and combat is more likely to
occur in an urban setting where the presence of innocent
8
civilians is likely to demand a reduction in collateral
damage. Insurgencies pose another demand for nonlethal
technology. The guerrilla’s traditional technique of inciting
the government to use overwhelming force, thereby
alienating the population, is now at risk. In the future
terrorists will find it much more difficult to hide behind
human shields, and radical or fanatic groups may be
deprived of their much sought after martyrdom, all because
of our use of nonlethal weapons.
Current nonlethal developments are targeted at
performing a wide range of tasks in a civilian intensive
environment where damage must be limited. In built-up
areas, buildings and rooms may be seized with minimal
damage through the employment of sedative agents or
electric, acoustic, or pyrotechnic stun weapons. Crowds may
be controlled through the use of blunt impact or malodorous
munitions. Individuals may be marked with invisible
marking rounds fired (along with many of the other
mentioned devices) from the Objective Individual Combat
Weapon (OICW) 20mm grenade launcher. Individuals may
be secured for apprehension by entanglements or sticky
foams and effective barriers created with nonlethal
acoustics. Various devices may be employed for seizing or
controlling vehicle access as well. Engine kill acoustical or
directed energy devices or aerosols as well as antitraction
materials can create barriers or assist in the apprehension
of those attempting to flee.11
First deployed to Somalia to assist in the withdrawal of
U.S. forces, where limited use was made of sticky foam,
nonlethals have since been deployed to Haiti and Bosnia,
and can be expected to remain on the scene for the
foreseeable future. For the first time, the ground
commander has the option of a graduated response across
the spectrum from lethal to nonlethal, depending on the
situation. This is not without some complicating factors; for
example, rules of engagement are likely to become more
complex. Finally, nonlethal technology could lower the
psychological threshold of war, making it a more palatable
9
instrument of policy. A palpable threat of death has utility.
Regardless of potential shortcomings and complications,
nonlethal weapons provide infantry a flexibility of response
previously missing from the inventory.12
Mortars.
A dispersed battlefield may in some cases limit field
artillery’s efficiency in attacking certain targets, which may
have a high priority for engaged units. While this represents
no change from current requirements, the infantry’s
traditional weapon to fill the gap, the mortar, is undergoing
a quiet revolution. With a range of 7,200 meters (vice the
5,700 meter range of the Russian equivalent), the 120 mm
mortar currently being fielded, along with future composite
mortars which can be fired from a HMMWV, will provide
the American infantryman a significant advantage.13
More important than the mortars are the associated fire
control capabilities and ammunition. Scheduled for fielding
in 2001, the XM95 Mortar Fire Control System (MFCS)
completely integrates the mortar platoon into the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). For the
first time, mortars will be digitally linked to the fire support
planning system. Essentially a conversion of the Multiple
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) positioning and guidance
system, MFCS reduces mortar setup times from eight
minutes to one. The crew does not have to dismount to lay in
the mortar due to imbedded Global Positioning System
(GPS), which also reduces the Circle Error Probable (CEP)
from 230 meters to 60 meters. Overall, the system provides
an autonomous single weapon system capability
functionally equivalent to Paladin.14
Enhanced fire control married with precision guided
mortar mu n itions ( PGM M) r ep r es ents a d ead l y
combination. Employing an infrared sensor, the PGMM
operates in a man-in-the-loop mode for laser target
designation or in an autonomous mode where it
automatically seeks the largest infrared source in a 500
10
square meter area (expandable to 1000 meters). With a
range of 15 kilometers, the round is capable of precision
engagement of armor, bunkers, or other high value
targets.15
Infantry Fighting Vehicles.
Infantry forces traditionally exploit any mobility
advantage they can obtain. This has remained true from
mounted archers to 18th century dragoons, and extends to
the present day armored infantry fighting vehicle. Today
the American infantryman has available to him the finest
infantry fighting vehicle in the world, the Bradley.
Scheduled for fielding in the year 2000, the next version of
the Bradley, the M2A3, will feature second generation FLIR
and squad vision displays; will be completely digitized; and
will be capable of internetting with the other members of the
combined arms team. With enhanced situational
awareness, battlefield combat identification capability, and
better armor, the M2A3 represents an extremely survivable
and effective vehicle.16
However, by 2010 the initial production Bradleys will be
almost 28 years old. Given the rapidly accelerating
technological advances, continued upgrading may not be
cost effective. A new vehicle designed to meet the 2010-2015
threat and capable of autonomous dispersed battlefield
operations is required. To meet this need, the United States
Army Infantry School has developed the requirements
document for the Future Infantry Vehicle (FIV).
Designed for greater mobility, the FIV will weigh no
more than 25 tons, be transportable by C-130 or airdropped
from the C-17 or C-5. Capable of high dash speeds and rapid
acceleration, the vehicle would employ advanced propulsion
systems (possibly an electric drive) and be fuel efficient
relative to current systems. The vehicle will be designed to
automatically provide digital fuel and ammunition status to
logisticians, thus eliminating voluminous reports,
enhancing anticipatory logistics, and increasing optempo.
11
Addressing a critical mobility shortfall in the current
Bradley, the FIV will be amphibious capable with 5 minutes
preparation. Some unique capabilities such as an autopilot
and formation capability are being examined, along with
robotic control by the dismounted squad.17
Although considerably lighter than the Bradley, the FIV
will be more survivable. Anticipated as a turretless design,
the system will employ composite armor, saving weight,
and, through low observable technology, provide a
significantly reduced visual, radar, acoustic, and infrared
signature. Current design criteria specify 30mm or better
frontal protection and defense against top attack munitions,
employing false target generation/jamming or conceivably
the Phalanx shotgun type close defense weapon. Stand off
mine detection and destruction technologies are to be
incorporated, providing the vehicle an in-stride breach
capability. For the first time an environmental control and
overpressure system designed to protect the infantry
soldiers from chemical attack will be incorporated as well.
For offensive employment the FIV will feature a new
on-board multispectral smoke system designed to defeat
thermal sights. Like the Bradley, add-on armor will be
available.18
The FIV concept represents a significant increase in
flexibility by employing both lethal and nonlethal weapons.
With acquisition and weapon ranges out to 8000 meters, the
system will probably employ a lethal gun (perhaps
electromagnetic), fire and forget missile, and laser mix. The
system must defeat troops in the open or in trenches
(implying microfuzed munitions), destroy threat tanks
beyond main gun range while the FIV is in total defilade or
moving, and be capable of defeating both rotary and fixed
wing aircraft. Advanced target acquisition will allow for
multiple simultaneous tracking and precision engagement
similar to that of LOSAT. Nonlethal systems are employed
for close in self defense, especially in OOTW situations.
Finally, the FIV capability to carry an entire Land Warrior
squad of 9-12 soldiers represents the greatest increase in
12
lethality over the Bradley, which severely restricts squad
size.19
Employing a wide variety of integrated electronic
sensors, the digitized system will identify threats beyond
maximum engagement range and provide warning of threat
optical, laser, and radar acquisition and thermal indication
of munitions launch, direction, and velocity. The FIV must
be capable of employing unmanned aerial and ground
sensors, NBC alarms, jammers, and perhaps weapons.
Built-in test and training systems, including the ability to
download digital mapping and imagery directly from space
based or aviation platforms, complete a wide range of digital
capabilities. Digitization, however, will not be limited to the
vehicle alone.20
The Digitized Soldier.
As a result of current research and development
programs, the lethality, survivability, and sensor potential
of the infantry soldier is increasing rapidly (see Chapter 2,
Ms. Jezior’s study).
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Force Structure.
The development of force structure to meet competing
requirements must exploit the inherent capabilities of
infantry to create a robust and flexible armed force capable
of executing its assigned mission at minimal cost.
The generally lightweight nature of much dual use
technology is applicable to the infantry soldier in particular.
This allows infantry to be rapidly and constantly
modernized at relatively low cost. Other systems are more
costly due to special production requirements. Large, low
density, high dollar systems with long production lead times
are even less cost effective. Light ground combat units offer
a greater return for the modernization investment. This is
13
not to say that other forces are unnecessary. They are
valuable, but they are less easily modernized and less
flexible across the spectrum of conflict.
Organizational Requirements.
Historically, revolutions in military affairs have
coincided with multiple transformations in mobility,
lethality, and information capability. These, combined with
timely adaptation of tactical or operational systems, result
in greatly enhanced capability to dominate time and space.
The most dramatic example of this is probably the
blitzkrieg, combining the mobility of the tank, the ability to
transmit information via vehicle mounted radio, and the
concept of close air support into an operational system
designed to disrupt rather than attack enemy defenses
directly. Achieving such a dramatic transformation today,
given the accelerated pace of technological change, poses a
great challenge. Strategic, operational, and tactical victory
will belong to the side that can develop organizations with a
superior combination of mobility, firepower, and
information capability at each level.
The Decentralization of Arms. Today we are witness to a
merging of the levels of war from tactical to strategic. Levels
of intensity are merging as well, and, as they do, many roles
and missions are changing and being consolidated. Aviation
is assuming the traditional role of cavalry based on its
mobility and information gathering capability. Artillery is
rapidly developing the ability to fix through precision
munitions and, along with aviation, is rapidly becoming the
biggest tank killer on the battlefield. Armor, no longer in
sole possession of a mobility advantage, now seems better
adapted for the role of a fixing force rather than
exploitation. The infantry has become one of the best
disrupters on the battlefield, a traditional artillery role. By
virtue of its unique capability to combine foot mobility with
that of the armored vehicle and aircraft, it remains the most
versatile of arms, capable of all its traditional roles as well.
14
These changes demand revisions to organizational
structure. Units capable of rapid concentration to attack
and speedy dispersal to avoid destruction are neither large
nor rigidly designed. The approach, then, is to combine
differential capabilities in the same unit at the lowest
possible echelon, as evident in the trend toward combined
arms and joint organization at lower echelons.
High optempo units will require organic mobility assets.
Units cannot wait for transportation on a dispersed
battlefield. Originally, armored personnel carriers were
fielded as a division or regimental asset, but later were
made organic to squads. It is conceivable that the assault
helicopter may one day follow this same path.
Dispersion, mobility, and vast improvements in
precision fire control and communications argue for a
decentralization of artillery as well. We have reached the
state where individual artillery vehicles can receive and
process a fire mission on the move, and execute it in 1
minute. This capability for dispersed yet responsive
artillery operations is unique to the U.S. Army and provides
the best possible defense against counterbattery fire.
In th e disper s i on of exp and ed battl es p ac e,
reconnaissance efforts are directly affected by a
g eometrically exp and i ng s ec ur i ty zone. Aer i al
reconnaissance is required at brigade level. Vehicular
mounted ground cavalry cannot cope with shifting
requirements of a nonlinear battlefield unless they are air
transportable. A combination of UAVs, rotary wing
aviation, and ground cavalry with vehicles which can be
slung under assault helicopters provides the most rational
response to this challenge.
The logic of dispersed operations argues for versatility
across the spectrum of conflict rather than the limited
specialization envisioned by some. Individuals may possess
a particular expertise, but units must be flexible, not
specialized. The balance of versatility and specialization
15
must be struck at the lowest possible echelon in order to
achieve flexibility.
Currently that level is the brigade as a fixed (though not
by Table of Organization and Equipment [TOE])
organization with multiple arms assigned in battalion
strength and supporting units attached for field operations.
Assigned combat arms units are subsequently task
organized at battalion task force and company team level.
The dispersed battlefield may force a lower level of
permanent assignment, retaining combat support and
combat service support units at brigade level and forming
more permanent task forces at lower echelons. This concept
has been promoted for some years by armor proponents
while the infantry community has steadfastly resisted it.
The time to reconsider may be here.
The Heavy Infantry Force. Heavy mechanized land
forces have lost the mobility differential they were created
to provide. The sheer bulk and weight of current combat
vehicles limits strategic, operational, and tactical mobility.
Light Infantry Forces. Designed for the low end of the
spectrum of conflict, today’s light forces are strategically
mobile and require minimum sustainment.
Current light forces will achieve substantial advances in
effectiveness through digitization. Situational awareness
has always been critical to light infantry. Lacking the
capability to extricate itself from danger through superior
mobility or to defend itself with massive firepower available
to heavier forces, light infantry commanders have excelled
at detailed planning and preparation for tactical operations.
The absolute requirement to get it right the first time or lose
a significant number of lives in the process has created a
culture of deliberate, methodical operations. Conversely,
this same cultural aspect has slowed the tempo of light force
operations to a crawl, even when merged with the powerful
mobility advantage of an air assault task force. Digitization
and greatly improved situational awareness should
increase the tempo of light operations considerably.
16
Lack of organic tactical, and to a lesser extent
operational, mobility will still restrict the scope of light force
operations. Maneuver by muscle quickly exhausts the light
infantry soldier. To overcome these shortfalls, tactical
mobility must be reintroduced to the light division structure
through the introduction of either ground or aviation lift
capability.
Air assault is the only organizational concept which
retains the full capability of light infantry while providing
the tactical and operational mobility required of the modern
battlefield. From Algeria and Vietnam to the Falklands and
DESERT STORM, the merger of infantry foot mobility and
the speed and obstacle crossing capability of the helicopter
have proven to be a potent combination. In close terrain the
attack helicopter served as a direct fire support weapon for
the infantry, while the infantry found enemy targets for
servicing by indirect fire support units. In open terrain the
infantry served to secure and support attack helicopter
operations.
Today’s aviation allocation to light divisions is
inadequate for the fast-paced operations of the future.
Battlefield agility must be enhanced if tomorrow’s force is to
truly achieve full spectrum dominance. Small highly mobile
organizations with exceptional long range nonjammable
communications and rapid cross country speed (both
operational and tactical) can dominate a wide variety of
tactical situations. Future force structures should provide
aviation at increasingly lower echelons, eventually
replacing the air assault concept with one of air maneuver.
The Infantry Squad. The squad will remain the building
block of infantry units. The traditional parameters that
have limited squad size are expanding. Previously,
dispersion of the squad was restricted by the range of voice
communications. Individual soldier radios and GPS along
with soldier computers, which can provide automatic
location updates, increase the command and control
capability of the squad leader, and the situation awareness
17
of his subordinates. Individual soldiers may find
themselves dispersed 50 to 150 meters or even more,
depending on terrain conditions.
With individual combat weapon ranges of 1000 meters,
squad level antiarmor capability with Javelin of 2000
meters, and the digitized ability to call and have precision
guided indirect fire on the way in 60 seconds out to a range of
7,200 meters, the squad can dominate the same terrain as
yesterday’s rifle platoon. Squad firepower is no longer
dependent simply on the number of riflemen.
These changes dictate the requirement for a new squad
study. The last study, the Infantry Rifle Unit Study (IRUS),
was conducted in 1969. Employing various combinations
from zero fire teams to three, and numbers of soldiers from
seven to sixteen, this study reached several important
conclusions. First, for ease of control two fire teams, each
with leaders, was the best organization for the infantry
squad. Second, each squad should have an organic machine
gun for additional firepower. Finally, squads of eleven and
thirteen men consistently outperformed smaller
organizations, especially in close terrain situations where
smaller organizations rapidly became ineffective due to
attrition and compartmentalization. These results
confirmed earlier testing in 1956 and 1961.21
The rationale for the current nine-man squad of the U.S.
Army leaves much to be desired. The 1946 Infantry
Conference at Fort Benning, Georgia, provides the only
semblance of justification for this organization. This
conference examined, among other issues, possible
revisions of the World War II 12-man rifle squad. Attendees
operated on two key assumptions. First, the squad should
consist of only as many soldiers as a single leader could
control; and, second, it would not engage in separate fire and
maneuver as mutually supporting teams, but operate as a
single unit within the context of platoon fire and
maneuver.22
18
Conference members determined that the number of
soldiers to execute this concept was about eight plus the
squad leader. Additionally, based on wartime experience, it
was concluded that the squad should be capable of
absorbing 25 percent casualties and still remain functional.
Subsequent studies of wartime operations have determined
that separate team employment in supporting fire and
maneuver is impossible once squad size drops to seven men.
Hence a nine-man organization has little hope of executing
current squad level fire and maneuver doctrine.23
The ultimate adoption of the current nine-man squad
has no basis in warfighting theory. When the Army decided
to adopt the Army of Excellence and create new light
divisions, it came up short in personnel strength. This
shortfall was made up in part by the reduction of
nonmechanized squads from eleven to nine men. Similarly,
the mechanized infantry squad was constrained based on
the carrying capacity of the Bradley vehicle, not infantry
combat requirements. Given peacetime manning and
wartime attrition, effective training and combat operations
appear to be at risk with this organization, especially when
the need for dispersion is considered.24
Intuitively, it seems that the infantry squad needs to
increase in size, given technological advances and the
nature of the future battlefield. However, such a decision
needs to be made on the basis of scientific analysis, not
opinion.
Leadership.
New organizations and tactics will require even better
leadership at lower echelons. Dispersed and independent
operations of small units will require the caliber of
leadership and reliability normally expected of the officer
corps. This will further enhance the already strong role and
prestige of the noncommisioned officer (NCO) in the
American Army. However, increased technical aspects of
military operations will make it more difficult than ever to
19
retain quality noncommisioned officers, especially in an era
of a strong economy. This will demand an increase of
benefits commensurate with enhanced responsibilities.
Soldiers are affected by leadership, machines are not.
Even today there exists a disparity between grade and pay
versus leadership requirements and responsibility. In a
military institution where all specialties are technical, a
more b a lan ced ap p r oac h between benef i ts and
responsibility is necessary. The current rifle squad costs the
government as much as a high performance aircraft over an
equivalent life cycle and requires much more skill to lead
under the turbulence of peacetime conditions, not to
mention the stress of close combat.
The tradition of an officer requirement as pilot for a
single aircraft as compared with a senior noncommisioned
officer to command a single combat vehicle must be
reexamined. An actual comparison of risk, responsibility,
and pay would be embarrassing to the officer, especially
considering that information technology and robotics are
rapidly eroding the requirement for manned aerial
platforms. Traditional approaches based on elitism are no
longer relevant.
Because of increased span of control, the future
noncommisioned officer corps could be smaller, allowing
more flexibility for better pay and enhanced privileges and
benefits. The gap in rewards between those who lead people
and those who only control machines must be closed,
especially if both must possess considerable technical
competence as well.
While the NCOs will become the specialists, the officer
corps will require more generalists capable of commanding
combined arms units. This represents a refutation of many
futuristic visions of increased specialization. With
increased skill expected in the employment of all arms at a
lower grade, merger of branches may be necessary at field
grade into a maneuver specialty rather than the current
combat arms system. Retention of skill identifiers would
20
assist in providing the proper mix of experience in combined
arms battalions by alternating specialties in the command
group. This simply represents tacit acknowledgment at a
lower echelon of what occurs today in heavy brigades, where
the second in command is from a different branch than that
of the brigade commander.
The increased span of control derived from better
situational awareness raises several associated issues.
With increased span of control at each echelon and fewer
echelons in the hierarchy, the leader-to-follower ratio is
obviously diminished. This creates a flatter pyramid for
upward mobility in both the officer and NCO corps,
introducing the associated issues of opportunity for
promotion and increased pay. This may require shorter
careers and a revision of the military retirement system.
At the same time, a short career must be made attractive
through enhanced pay and benefits such as education,
retraining, and separation options. Another option could be
an expansion of officer candidate opportunities in lieu of
other commissioning programs. One of the traditional
reasons for maintaining a separate officer and NCO
structure has been the time required to advance through the
ranks. With fewer echelons and an increasingly higher
standard for NCOs, a merger of the leadership structure is
conceivable, though highly controversial.
A final issue concerns the development of daring and
resourceful leaders. Dispersion and greater span of control
have the potential to result in reduced personal contact with
soldiers. It becomes more difficult and less necessary to
“troop the line” for an actual look at the situation. One of the
principal dangers of overreliance on information technology
is that it has the potential to distance the chain of command
from the fighting soldier, whose respect for leaders is based
not only on their competence, but their willingness to share
the hardship of the battlefield.
21
The Infantry Soldier.
The word “warrior” is the most frequently abused label
in the current military lexicon. Most, if not all, who wear a
uniform view themselves as warriors. In reality there are
very few who qualify.
A warrior is one who places himself at great risk to
engage in direct combat with the enemy. Generally
speaking, where the casualties may be found, there also will
the warriors be found. This criterion eliminates a
significant majority of the nation’s military structure and,
indeed, large parts of the Army. It is not difficult to argue
that, as a group, the infantryman represents the most
numerous warrior element in the armed forces. Always at
the greatest personal risk and with the least protection, he
offers battle to his enemies on an individual, personal, and
sustained basis.
Even within this group, the warrior ethic is not allinclusive. S. L. A. Marshall was one of the first American
military writers to recognize that relatively few
infantrymen actually fired their weapon in battle. By his
research, only 15-30 percent of World War II combat
infantry soldiers actually fired their weapon in an
engagement. This contention was verified in postwar
articles by infantry unit commanders who stated that in any
given engagement, you could count on certain soldiers to
aggressively engage the enemy. Others, who were willing to
share the danger, did not necessarily fight. Asked to repeat
his study in Korea, Marshall found the average up to 50
percent.25
Although Marshall’s findings have been hotly debated
for years, numerous other scientific studies of the Korean
War determined that there were certain characteristics of
fighters and nonfighters, which could be easily identified in
advance. Significant among the factors required of the
fighter were a higher order of intelligence, combined with
leadership ability, outdoor orientation, emotional stability,
and a sense of humor. All factors were clearly identifiable
22
through personality tests, which could be administered
prior to selection for a military specialty.26
This research has significant implications for the future
infantry force. The high-tech land warrior of the future
requires a greater degree of resilience than his
predecessors. Stress on highly mobile units is likely to be
increased due to their more frequent employment in
combat. With increased dispersion, the requirement for
self-imposed discipline becomes higher, and a greater
premium will be placed on self-reliance, initiative, and the
ability to operate for extended periods alone or in small
groups. All soldiers on the future battlefield must be
predisposed to fire their weapon.
This argues for psychologically and physically stronger
infantry soldiers possessing the best physical, mental, and
moral traits the nation can offer. Infantry soldiers cannot be
drawn from lower quality recruits. To achieve the goal of
“every man a fighter” requires psychological screening and
conditioning. This same method is applied today to the
selection of special operations personnel, who must
consistently operate in an environment similar to the future
dispersed battlefield.
Two other criteria must eventually be applied in
selecting the individual infantry soldier. First, there must
be age limits for enlistment into an infantry specialty.
Infantry is a young man’s game. With age comes loss of the
physical ability required to operate at platoon level. Second,
from the standpoint of maximizing military effectiveness,
the individual combat soldier should be single. There are a
host of reasons for this. The higher operational tempo of a
smaller force structure could be better managed with less
soldier stress and therefore better focus during extended
training or deployments. Psychological tests of fighters and
nonfighters from the Korean War show a direct correlation
b etween n on fig hter s and c ombat sol d i er s wi th
dependents.27 This is not a politically correct observation,
but it is true. Soldiers with conflicting loyalties between
23
commitment to the squad and responsibility for providing
for dependents are less likely to expose themselves.
In a small military, those who endure the harshest
service should be offered the most compensation. A gratis
educational scholarship program combined with thorough
screening would have the advantage of attracting more of
the desired candidates for infantry as well as providing
sufficient motivation to leave the service short of traditional
retirement. Interestingly enough, the best trained and
disciplined light infantry represented by the Ranger
Regiment already experience this as a natural process. Most
Ranger first termers leave the service for college, having
saved the required amount of matching funds to complete a
degree.
The only nonlinear wars that we have fought in the past
have been counterinsurgencies. These conflicts have always
been infantry intensive. The requirement for infantry on
the dispersed nonlinear battlefield of the future will be no
less. In fact, demands for infantry protection of combat
support and combat service support units during division
level warfighter exercises always exceed capability. The
increasing probability of urban operations magnifies this
requirement for more infantry.
If infantry is the most employed and most capable of
arms, it also the most frequently expended. Casualty
statistics for infantry have remained relatively constant.
While overall casualties have been reduced significantly,
those from the infantry have remained around 80 percent of
the total.28 While dispersion, new tactics, and better
individual body armor and stealth technology may reduce
these figures, we can still expect the infantry force to
sustain the bulk of casualties in future war. In fact, casualty
losses by branch provide a clear indication of the depth
required to sustain lengthy combat operations. By some
calculations, there is insufficient infantry strength today,
active and reserve, to repeat a successful defense of South
Korea.29
24
Infantry shortages in close terrain combat have
historically led to cannibalization of other units to provide
the required ground strength. This occurred in World Wars
I and II and in Korea. Operations in Somalia, Haiti, and
Bosnia have highlighted the substantial shortages of
infantry strength in heavy units deployed to these regions;
nondeploying units were stripped of infantry to fill positions
in participating organizations. This is not surprising as the
current mechanized infantry platoon has only two
nine-man squads, representing two-thirds of its light
component and only one-half of previous wartime
organizations. Similar shortfalls in forces of the former
Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Chechnya dramatically
highlight the risks of infantry-poor units in combat.
This problem will be magnified on the future battlefield.
Mobile units are more frequently engaged, resulting in
more casualties over time. Although their casualties per
engagement may be fewer based on their ability to choose
and strike the enemy’s weak spots, the cumulative effect
may be greater. At the same time, the human “machine”
requires time to recover from the stress of combat. A medical
analysis of infantry units in Korea under various combat
conditions from light to heavy provided a clear indication of
the time required to regain full human combat potential.
The more intense the combat, the longer the recovery time
required.30
This finding implies serious consequences for
attempting to do more with less in infantry close combat. No
other arm bears the psychological and physical burden of
the infantry soldier. Men are not machines, and they must
be sustained differently or they will eventually fail. Aside
from reduced combat effectiveness, the results of repeated
commitment to combat without recovery time include a
greater propensity to commit atrocities, a serious political
consideration given the global information environment of
future war.
25
Current Army infantry strength represents only 11.4
percent of the active component and 10.4 percent of the
reserves.31 This is an amazing situation, given the wartime
and OOTW requirements for infantry. In a long war or two
ma j or reg ion a l conti ngenc i es , es p ec i al l y wher e
reconstitution of units is mandated, this manning practice
will create significant problems. The increase in required
technological competence degrades the ability to mass
produce combat infantry soldiers. A larger infantry
component is required to meet the challenges of future
conflicts. This does not entail an increase in force structure.
Manpower savings in crew reductions due to automation
and a reduction in clerical and enlisted staff requirements
must be reinvested in infantry strength.
Training.
Training represents the single greatest challenge to the
future infantry force. The infantry soldier must be trained
to operate in small groups or as individuals for extended
periods. While initial quality selection will help, the new
recruit must be conditioned for the additional stress of new
forms of combat. This requires a more demanding basic and
advanced individual training program than is currently
employed. The internalization of soldier values must
become a goal of training as well. Only the crucible of a
combined selection and conditioning process can provide the
product required for decentralized operations.
Overall, essential technical training for the digitized
soldier will require a longer training program than that
currently employed. As a result of dispersion, the individual
soldier may be required to obtain additional skills such as
conducting indirect fire and performing selected engineer
tasks. Close combat skills cannot be neglected and must
remain the core of individual training. In addition, the
training base must turn out a fully as opposed to a partially
trained soldier. Units will have their hands full responding
to sustainment training for an increased number of tasks
and adapting training programs to rapid changes in
26
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. They will not
have the time to complete the soldier’s individual training.
Accelerated technological change will outdate many
techniques and procedures within a relatively short time.
Lack of a monolithic enemy with a set doctrine, as in the
Cold War, complicates matters as well. While doctrine and
tactics can be developed within 1-2 years to keep up with
these changes, internalization of new doctrine is much more
difficult. Incremental modernization of the force will create
its own challenges. Requirements for top-to-bottom
retraining of units in the field will demand innovative
solutions. Distance learning provides one alternative for
rapidly disseminating new doctrine. This will require
changes to institutional structure and some adaptations of
the battle focused training approach.
One way to increase quality and decrease training time
is to standardize squad and dismounted platoon doctrine
and standard operating procedures across the force and to
focus on basics. While infantry forces possess a common
mission with associated tasks required for successful
employment, they may be deployed strategically,
operationally, or tactically by a variety of means. Care must
be taken to distinguish between means of delivery, which
can vary, and means of employment, which can be
standardized.
A false theory of specialization by means of delivery
undermines the essential character of infantry, which is
defined by its role on the battlefield. The impact of this
myopic concept is a general dilution of emphasis on basic
infantry tasks and increased emphasis on tasks associated
with getting to the place of employment. In a training
resource constrained environment, this specialization
concept is dysfunctional, siphoning away time and
resources from the main effort, teaching infantry combat
doctrine.
Contemporary unit experiments have benefited from
Army level training and doctrine development resources
27
applied to individual units of brigade size or lower. While
these experiments shed little light on how to structure the
modernizing institutional army, they can provide some
valuable insights to the changing battlefield and the
expanding role of infantry.
Recent Experimentation Results.
Recent simulation results culminating in the Force XXI
Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at the National
Training Center confirm the potential of infantry as the
dominant future battle force. Lethality of the dismounted
infantryman has been demonstrated to be dramatically
increased through improvements in weaponry and night
vision equipment. For example, Dismounted Battlespace
Battle Lab (DBBL) experiments, including Warrior Focus
and Night Eagle, used various night vision enhancements
with impressive results. In one M16 qualification firing
experiment employing night vision goggles with laser
aiming lights, total hits were almost the same for night as
for daylight. Standing position hits were even better at
night.32 During the Warrior Focus exercise at the Joint
Readiness Training Center, experimental units equipped
with upgraded night vision equipment scored more hits on
nighttime live fire exercises than the previous ten rotational
units and suffered far fewer casualties.33
Recent Force XXI AWE results provide indications of a
similar lethality increase against armor. The Javelin
antiarmor missile, currently replacing the M-47 Dragon,
devastated any operating force (OPFOR) that dared come
within range. Unlike many of the other AWE initiatives,
light infantry employment of this weapon was considered by
all observers an absolute success. Innovative tactics such as
ferrying light antiarmor teams around the battlefield in
UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to block OPFOR movement
provide a clear indication of the future capabilities of
infantry married to aviation.34
28
This same combined infantry/aviation capability and its
enormous battlefield impact was employed in the Prairie
Warrior 96 AWE at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This
experiment provided for a “Mobile Strike Force” concept of
digitized units. Two brigades of the force were standard
mechanized and armored heavy units equipped with the
best computerized command and control systems under
development, along with direct feeds of intelligence
collection assets into the brigade tactical operation centers.
The third brigade was a light motorized infantry unit with
an armored gun system battalion and a variety of new
weapons, including 120mm mortar precision guided
munitions and HMMWV mounted EFOGM and LOSAT.
This light brigade was not resourced with the same level
of intelligence and communications support provided the
heavy brigades. Task organized with the aviation brigade
for additional mobility, this unit destroyed more enemy
than either of the other two organizations and suffered
considerably fewer casualties. Imaginative tactics
employed the aviation for operational and tactical mobility,
the HMMWV for tactical mobility and rapid closure to
targets from landing zones outside enemy low level air
defense coverage, and the infantry to find and fix the enemy
forces for precision attack.35
Similar division level experiments by the TRADOC
Analysis Center (TRAC) showed comparable results.
Regardless of division design employed, the greatest killers
in the open terrain fight were consistently attack aviation,
precision rocket artillery with brilliant antitank munitions,
and infantry. Tank engagements were minimal in their
contribution (less than 10 percent of enemy combat vehicle
kills) due to limited mobility compared to other assets.36
Aside from employment in combat, infantry proved its
utility as a security force in the seizure of terrain required to
facilitate helicopter and artillery mobility, and as an aid to
disrupting and targeting enemy forces.
29
The DBBL is currently focused on an advanced concepts
technology demonstration labeled the Rapid Force
Projection Initiative (RFPI). The RFPI hypothesis proposes
that hunters employing advanced sensor technology and
digitally linked to precision stand-off killers such as
EFOGM, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS), and automated howitzers firing Sense and
Destroy Armor (SADARM) munitions can tremendously
increase rapid deployment force survivability and lethality.
Experimentation is far from complete; however, initial
computer simulations have shown a clear increase in
effectiveness. In one scenario, an airborne brigade using
conventional tactics and weapons was defeated by an
attacking motorized rifle regiment. When the same scenario
was run with the airborne brigade using the RFPI concept
and equipment, the threat regiment was defeated before it
ever came close to the airhead.37
Army After Next wargames have taken mobility and
strategic deployability requirements to a new level. Since
future combat units must be more deployable while still
maintaining lethality, this experiment employed several
lightweight brigade sized organizations with organic
strategic/self-deployment capability in a scenario involving
multiple major regional contingencies. The principal
success of this approach was the demonstrated ability to
rapidly execute deployment to multiple regional
contingencies in different theaters. Execution of the concept
was made feasible only by a dramatic reduction of present
day requirements for ammunition and fuel and through
close association of ground units with their strategic lift.38
When considered together with other results, AAN
experimentation clearly points to the future contribution of
infantry within the context of national military strategy,
operational art, and tactical doctrine.
The Future Contribution of Infantry.
The ground force mission is to take the struggle to the
heart of the conflict, where it directly affects the opponent’s
30
will. By seizing the critical points necessary to bring a
struggle to its conclusion, ground forces create a permanent
presence that cannot be ignored. Air power alone is
incapable of this decisive act except as a means of delivery
and support for airborne/mobile troops. Neither is naval
power able to execute decisive operations on its own, except
in a limited way and only then through the introduction of a
ground force such as naval infantry.
In operations across the spectrum of conflict, the close
combat soldier is the final arbiter of victory or defeat.
Technological advancements are rapidly increasing the
capabilities differential between the infantry soldier and
his potential opponents to the point of returning infantry
dominance to the battlefield.
The first phase of change has already begun. Fielding of
expanded night vision capability to every soldier is
scheduled to begin this year. This fielding includes thermal
sights for individual weapons that can see through smoke
and fog for the first time. This one change will dramatically
tilt the balance of infantry combat power in favor of the
American soldier. The second major change is occurring
relative to the infantryman and his open battlefield
nemesis, the tank. As the latest National Training Center
rotation clearly showed, infantry equipped with Javelin are
deadly to armored forces. These new capabilities will begin
the change to a tactical doctrine that provides for a wider
variety of infantry employment in a more expanded
battlespace.
The second phase of change will accompany the rise of
the Longbow equipped helicopter as the premier tank killer
of the future. Full fielding, beginning in 1998, will further
increase helicopter survivability, denying direct fire
counterengagement. The effect will be similar to the
artillery revolution brought on by combining ballistics with
the field telephone. Possessing superior mobility and
firepower, and with the capability of terrain protection en
lieu of armor, the attack helicopter will dominate open
31
terrain battle. At this point the artillery-infantry-aviation
combined arms team begins to emerge more clearly as the
heir to mobile warfare. This evolution will accelerate with
further artillery and infantry developments.
By the year 2000, automated artillery and mortar fire
control will be digitally linked to the individual soldier via
the Land Warrior system, initiating the third phase (see
Chapter 2). This coincides with the fielding of the rapidly
deployable and highly mobile HIMARS rocket system
capable of firing the Army Tactical Missle System
(ATACMS) with brilliant antitank submunitions out to a
300 kilometer range.39 To cover this geometrically expanded
battlefield with 24-hour all-weather surveillance will
require a dedicated infantry-aviation team employing
lightweight vehicles that can be lifted into position. By this
time, the requirements of an expanded battlespace will
relegate units still having large logistical requirements to
the status of third world armies.
The final phase of foreseeable change will coincide with
the obsolescence of the current family of systems beginning
about 2005. By this time, the Army has planned to begin
fielding of its first robotic systems,40 and Future Infantry
Vehicle development should be nearing completion,
providing enhanced mobility, lethality, and protection for
the infantry soldier. Infantry cross spectrum dominance in a
variety of environments will be improved by the
introduction of planned individual and crew served
weapons in 2006. The rapidly deploying ground soldier’s
ability to destroy armor will have reached a new level with
the introduction of LOSAT and EFOGM systems mounted
on light vehicles.
Artillery systems will complete the evolution required to
rapidly destroy massed armor with the fielding of the BAT
P3I brilliant antitank munition in 2005 along with fully
automated artillery represented by the Crusader. These
developments coincide with the fielding in 2006 of
Commanche, which, when combined with lightweight
32
infantry and artillery systems, will have transformed the
combined arms team into an agile, dynamic, and lethally
deployable force capable of true cross spectrum dominance.41
CONCLUSION
Smaller forces need not be less lethal. A carefully crafted
force incorporating new weapons capabilities and
information technologies can be more deployable, more
lethal, and more versatile than existing structures. This
will require innovation in design, and perhaps significant
changes in tactics and doctrine as well. Requirements for
dispersion on the open battlefield will demand increases in
mobility for all forces. At the same time, the more likely
close terrain fight will demand an increase in high quality
infantry offset by decreases in crew and clerical
requirements allowed by automation.
Traditional roles and relationships may be dramatically
altered as capabilities brought on by technological change
are incorporated into the force. Regardless of change, basic
principles of force design will drive us toward a balanced
combined arms team structure where the capabilities and
limitations of all arms, old and new, are mixed in a balanced
fashion to minimize weaknesses and maximize the threat to
our enemies. This union of capabilities, all strategically
mobile from the continental United States and rapidly
redeployable from one theater to another, meets the
requirements of Joint Vision 2010 and will set the stage for
transition to the Army After Next.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. Commandant, United States Army Infantry School briefing,
“State of the Infantry,” May 1996.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
33
4. Ibid.
5. Ronald V. Hite and Gilbert F. Decker, Weapon Systems, United
States Army 1997, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1997, p. 240.
6. Commandant, USAIS.
7. Ibid.
8. Directorate of Combat Developments, Infantry Programs and
Projects, Fort Benning, GA: United States Army Infantry Center, 1996,
p. D-1.
9. Joseph W. Cook, David P. Fiely, and Maura T. McGowen,
“Nonlethal Weapons: Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies,”
Air Chronicles, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1996, p. 9
(http://www.cdsar.af.mil/mcgowen.html, June 5, 1996).
10. Gerald J. Iafrate, Advanced Concepts and Technology II,
Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Office, 1995, p. 9.
11. Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab (DBBL), Army Nonlethal
Requirements Briefing, June 10, 1996.
12. Cook, et al., p. 11.
13. Directorate of Combat Developments, p. C-2.
14. Ibid., C-5.
15. Commandant, USAIS.
16. Directorate of Combat Developments, p. E-2.
17. Directorate of Combat Developments, Mission Need Statement
for Future Infantry Vehicle (FIV), November 30, 1995, p. 8.
18. Ibid., p. 2.
19. Ibid., p. 4-7.
20. Ibid., p. 8.
21. Stephen E. Hughes, “The Evolution of the U.S. Army Infantry
Squad: Where Do We Go From Here? Determining the Optimum
Infantry Squad Organization for the Future,” Thesis, Fort
34
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994, p. 18.
22. Ibid., p. 6.
23. Ibid., p. 14.
24. Ibid., p. 21.
25. Peter Watson, War on the Mind, The Military Uses and Abuses of
Psychology, New York: Basic Books, 1978, p. 45.
26. Robert L. Egbert, Victor B. Cline, and Tor Meeland, The
Characteristics of Fighters and Non-Fighters, Fort Ord, CA: Army Field
Forces Human Research Unit No. 2, 1954, p. 9.
27. Watson, p. 49.
28. Department of the Army, Staff Officer’s Field Manual
Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Planning Factors, Volume 2,
Field Manual 101-10-1/2, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the
Army, October 7, 1987, pp. 4-11.
29. Mike Jacobson, “Whither the Infantry, Does the US Army Have
the Soldiers to Fight a Second Korean War?” Draft manuscript, Fort
Benning, GA, undated, pp. 18-19.
30. S. W. Davis and J. G. Taylor, Stress in Infantry Combat, Chevy
Chase, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954, p. 3.
31. Office of Infantry Proponency, United States Army Infantry
School briefing, “Infantry Update,” May 1996.
32. Commandant, USAIS.
33. Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab briefing, “Warrior Focus
Advanced Warfighting Experiment,” November 1995.
34. Sean D. Naylor, “The Javelin Missile: A Lethal Ace Up the
Sleeve,” Army Times, April 28, 1997, p. 14.
35. Personal observations of author acting as an Infantry School
observer.
36. TRADOC Analysis Command briefing, “Force XXI Division
Design Analysis,” March 1996.
35
37. Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab briefing, “Rapid Force
Projection Initiative Concept,” April 1996.
38. Sean D. Naylor, “What the Future Holds . . .,” Army Times,
March 17, 1997, p. 20.
39. Hite and Decker, pp. 155, 161.
40. Directorate of Combat Developments, p. D-9.
41. Hite and Decker, pp. 109, 157.
36
CHAPTER 2
THE REVOLUTIONIZED WARFIGHTER
CIRCA 2025
Barbara A. Jezior
[Editor’s Note: Ms. Jezior’s study extends that of Colonel
Wells, speculating on advanced soldier technologies in a
systematic way which has not been done before. Ms. Jezior’s
future scenario provides a backdrop for these technologies,
several of which are on the very edge of thinking. This study
attempts to look beyond the systems Colonel Wells
addresses, most of which are in existence today, whether
fielded or not. DVJ]
INTRODUCTION
A Plausible Scenario.
At t h e en d of the 20th c e ntur y the mi l i ta r y
decisionmakers made some very astute choices. They
realized a land force would still be needed in 2025, but also
knew the politics and budget realities of the day meant a
small force was all they could realistically plan for. They
reasoned that, if it had to be small, it had to be elite.
Simultaneously, the technological advances in command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
of the time were forcing radical changes in warfighting
doctrine. This future force would be fighting a war of
maneuver, not attrition, and one of the critical elements in
dominating maneuver could be a revolutionized warfighter.
Since the warfighter would continue to be the common
denominator of the spectrum of conflict, they saw no risk in a
full-bore investment that would equip the warfighter with
every tool possible that could tip the battlefield balance in his
or her favor. That foresight 25 years ago resulted in today’s
37
revolutionized warfighter who is the sine qua non for
military success across the globe, and who has proven the
wisdom of the earlier investment many times over.
The 2025 warfighter bears little resemblance to that of
the late 20th century. He and his team members are
multi-skilled, smart, and more “in charge” than their
predecessors.1 Radically new technologies have also served
to make him and her the soul of stealth and prowess on the
battlefield.They have an arsenal of cutting edge technologies
to select from.
On e bat t lefiel d op ti on i s the e nc a p s ul a te d,
climate-controlled fighting suit with power enhancements,
sophisticated weapons and sensors, a communication and
guidance package, and active (chameleon-like) camouflage.
The power and strength component augment the
warfighter’s own body strength by supporting all body parts
associated with load carrying. The suit provides situational
awareness, operational information, and tactical guidance
along with small-unit medical, logistic, and intelligence
data.2
Another option is a lightweight battle dress uniform that
is flexible and body conforming. It improves performance by
concentrating vital body heat and blood flow within
muscular tissues. It, too, has the sensors and C4I capabilities
of the first suit described. The compression materials
incorporate biological and physical sensors that monitor
blood pressure, pulse, body temperature, penetration (from
projectiles), blood loss, and other vital signs. It provides
friend or foe identification. All the sensors are linked and
centralized as appropriate.3 The warfighter also has
cotton-weight ballistic protection and lightweight
chemical-biological (CB) gear comprised of a fabric that
breathes like regular clothing when no CB agents are
present.
He can also augment his human powers with skinpatch
pharmaceuticals tailored specifically for him as the need
38
arises. For example, he can control his fears, and
generate greater powers of concentration and physical
strength.
He has three-dimensional representation of the
battlefield on his arm- or head-mounted display. He can take
virtual trips to other parts of the battlefield to see the action
from other vantage points. He has extended sensory powers
that are continuing to evolve. Not only can he see everything
in human visual range, to include what is obscured by
terrain or structures, he will also be able to hear and see
beyond human range and see the enemy before the enemy sees
him. If by any chance the enemy should see and target him
first, he has the inner comfort of knowing that the sensors
embedded in his clothing would alert the medical world of
his exact whereabouts and the seriousness of his wounds.
He can connect to the entire information infrastructure
with a tiny system that has filtered incoming data to offset
information overload. He gets what he wants when he needs
it. His computer system is interactive and has both video and
voice functions. Best of all, it is so user friendly that no
training was required. It is completely integrated with his
other equipment.
The combination of his innate capabilities with radically
improved communications and situational awareness has
resulted in flattening the traditional military hierarchy. His
team is very small and flexible, its size and structure mission
dependent. Both his lateral and hierarchical relationships
are a source of support and strength.4 He has a level of
understanding that far surpasses his level of authority.
Every kind of information is his to receive, understand, and
assess.
His weapons are far more lethal and precise. These,
combined with the support of the precision indirect fires he
knows he can depend on, give him immediate target kill. The
indirect fires will be on time and on target; there is no more
mistaking friend for foe. Immediate target kill has terrific
39
psychological impacts—a positive one on him, and a
negative one on the enemy.
Back to 1997.
Whatever the future brings, many investigators believe
a small strategic land force will be a requirement. This force
must deploy swiftly, deter or halt aggression, and secure
any area vital to U.S. interests. Investigators also predict a
shift from large armies fighting attrition warfare to small
dispersed units fighting maneuver warfare.5
Technological advances in the C4 I arena and the
correlative changes in doctrine, training, and leadership
also point to that small, elite force comprised of
multi-functional soldiers or integrated combat arms
formations.6 Either case demands the multi-skilled, highly
mobile, and independent warfighter, linked to other
platforms, who may be fighting more often in cities and
suburbs than on open hills.7 This future warfighter will also
probably face the outlaw tactics of nonstate actors who have
no compunctions against using chemical/biological (CB)
weapons.
These future warfighters must achieve dominance in
maneuver to gain battlefield control and to increase their
probability of survival. Enjoying a technical revolution in
soldier capabilities, they will seek distributed and
cooperative engagement at the lowest levels.8 The small
elite force of the future simply must be as lethal and
high-powered as possible, down to the very last warfighter.
As the first Army After Next war game indicated, “The sine
qua non of ground forces in the future is smart, high-quality
soldiers who can operate at a very, very fast tempo and in a
very sophisticated way.”9
40
TECHNOLOGICAL STEPPING STONES
TO THE WARFIGHTER SYSTEM
What technologies are on the horizon that can meet the
materiel needs of such a revolutionized force? This paper
discusses a few of those technologies relevant to the
dismounted “Warfighter System,” those pertaining to any
item the dismounted warfighter wears, carries, and
consumes in a tactical environment. These technologies will
improve one or more of the warfighter’s lethality,
survivability, C4I, mobility, and sustainability.
Only recently has the Army decided to take a systems
approach to managing soldier programs, the same approach
it takes to managing major weapons systems. This means
the myriad of soldier programs now enjoy centralized
oversight as the “Warrior System,” rather than having each
commodity developed in a stovepiped, piecemeal fashion.
This allows for a fiscally balanced and prioritized soldier
“platform” that makes these programs more visible and
better able to compete for funding. It also means better and
better-integrated equipment.
Land Warrior Program.
A revolutionized warfighter will be the result of an
evolutionary process, since no one program will develop a
whole new set of technologies to replace all warfighter
components at once. The Land Warrior program managers
have taken a systems approach to developing technologies
that will result in dramatically new and improved
capabilities for the dismounted soldier. There is definitely
room for improvement, especially in those areas pertaining
to information technology.10
By the year 2000, we will begin to see Land Warrior
modular fighting systems designed for close combat
situations.11 The basic components are a helmet mounted
display, an improved image intensification (I2) modular
weapon, improved protective clothing to include improved
41
modular body armor, a computer and radio set-up, and
special software for battlefield communications.
The helmet-mounted computer display is linked directly
to the M16 or M4 weapon, which can incorporate other types
of weapons and sights. The weapon’s thermal sight allows
target engagement in daytime, nighttime, around corners,
or out of a foxhole without exposing its bearer. The
computer-based global positioning system (GPS) and radios
are mounted on the soldier’s back. Digital orders can be
transmitted down the chain of command, and, if a soldier
sees something worth reporting, he can also send a digital
report through his computer.
The thermal weapons sight, which can see through
obscurants like smoke, also makes it possible to transmit a
digital still video picture of a battlefield object. The system’s
modularity means the soldier can “mix and match” the
various components, depending on mission needs. This
ensemble is already in prototype and has been demonstrated.
The Land Warrior system will give battalion tactical
operations centers better control of the battlespace and the
pace of operations. Unit leaders will know where their
soldiers are and be able to meet their logistical needs very
quickly.
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT).
Urban warfare is predicted to be a large part of the
military future and is a tough challenge in many ways. It
usually involves high military and civilian casualties.
Today, the capabilities for conducting urban operations are
no different than they were in Vietnam, as fighting in the
Balkans is demonstrating. 12 Urban operations have
traditionally been characterized by difficult command and
control (C2), high military and civilian casualty rates, and
large numbers of soldiers.13
42
What urban fighting requires is light, mobile
combatants who are in tune with their immediate
environment (situational awareness), and who have links to
outside platforms, such as sensors and fires. They also need
flexible, responsive logistical support. While soldiers
fighting in the open have many similar requirements, urban
infrastructure and the constant risk of civilian involvement
impose unique conditions.14
There is a joint program underway which will meet
many of the requirements for urban fighting, constituting a
major intermediary step toward the revolutionized
warfighter(urban or otherwise). This MOUT Advanced
Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) will
demonstrate new concepts in 2000, and the resulting
materiel should go into full scale development and fielding
within 3-5 years thereafter. The individual projects that
make up this umbrella program are:15
Force XXI Land Warrior. Adds sophistication to the
Land Warrior system previously discussed, such as further
advanced individual communications, situational
awareness, location, and small arms body armor.
Small Unit Operations. Communications/geo-location,
sensors, and situational awareness technologies will be
integrated in other battle platforms allowing enhanced C4I,
and sensor to shooter linkages with precise indirect
weapons.
•
•
Objective Individual Combat Weapons. Precision
individual weapon, employing either point munitions
or airbursting munitions for attacking targets in
defilade. Fire control will be wirelessly linked to C4I
networks for indirect viewing of targets (on a helmet
mounted display) and precise handover of targets to
indirect fire weapons systems.
Combat Identification. Knowing friend from foe will
be accomplished by embedded soldier-to-soldier laser
43
interrogation and radio frequency response enabled
by sensors and C4I.
•
•
•
Counter-sniper. The ability to detect sources of direct
fire.
Non-lethal weapons. Non-lethal technologies are
being pursued that will incapacitate, distract, or seize
individuals, stop vehicles, control crowds, deny areas,
and disarm or neutralize equipment.
Multi-purpose Individual Munition. A shoulder-fired
weapon that can defeat light armor and targets in
masonry structures.
With the successful outcome to this ACTD, the
warfighter will be able to move information around the
battlefield as needed. Everything from firepower to supplies
can be delivered when and where needed. A warfighter’s
probability of survival is also greatly increased with the
cutting-edge laser, armor, reduced signature, and other
technologies. He will also obtain a real psychological edge,
especially from his much improved situational awareness.
The 2005-2025 Technologies.
The years following the MOUT ACTD will see
breakthrough technologies as well as improvements to
MOUT technologies that will ultimately comprise the
revolutionized Warfighter System.
This section describes some of those potentialities, but it
is by no means a complete list. Many of the future
technologies have widespread application; very few are
peculiar to the military. A few “blue sky” or “stretch”
technologies (not considered achievable by circa 2025) will
also be outlined here, along with a few that do not fall into
the Warfighter System definition. They are included
because of the enormous impact they could have on the
individual warfighter.
44
Some of the 2005-2025 potential technologies may not
hit their targeted time table for a number of reasons. It is
reasonable to assume those technologies coming to fruition
after 2005 may still offer the best to be had at 2025. The best
that can be done is to put forth possibilities with the caveat
that unexpected technological breakthroughs are sure to
occur, and the military will be watching for them and
responding to them.
The taxonomy for the promising Warfighter System
technologies is warfighter capabilities. The most
appropriate category for a given technology may be
arguable, but that illustrates the synergy that can be gained
by looking at the warrior as a system. For instance,
improving the warrior’s lethality is going to affect his
survivability, just as improving his mobility may also
improve his survivability.
Survivability. “Smart” materials will give new meaning
to the words “stealth and survivability” and will have
tremendous payoffs. One example is a chameleon-like
uniform material that renders the warfighter virtually
invisible. Another is a ballistic material based on spider
silk. This ballistic material will be, inch-for-inch, stronger
than steel, but lighter than cotton, and will offer comfort
and mobility along with survivability.
Chemical-biological protection from smart materials
technology is also emerging. One possible technology is
molecular imprinting. In this case, a polymer membrane
“traps” threatening molecules when they match the
imprints of noxious substances. The other is a gated
membrane technology. A material embedded with this
technology will breathe like regular clothing until a CB
agent is detected, and then the membrane will close off.
With either technology, the bulk of the current CB
protective suit bulk will be a thing of the past, much
improving the warfighter’s comfort and mobility.16
Sensor technology will also play a large role in
survivability. Embedded in clothing or other gear, sensors
45
not only will be able to detect CB agents, they could also
cancel the effects of body temperature, obscuring battlefield
signature. They will also be able to monitor the location of
the wearer and the enemy, and provide other battlefield
intelligence. The notion is to link all this information.
A key sensor for improving survival is a bioanalysis
system which will electronically relate real-time warrior
body status (e.g., vital signs, penetration from projectiles,
blood loss) to a central monitoring site.18
One form of medical CB protection could be a reactive
vaccine (administered after exposure) which would stop the
damage by attacking and neutralizing the agent or by
repairing the actual damage.19
Warfighters should be able to grow new organs from
their own tissue thanks to advances in human genome
mapping, and a stretch will be replacement limbs fabricated
of artificial tissues.20 While those two technologies fall
outside the Warrior System definition, they merit mention
because of their implications for the rear-area medical
support available to the warfighter.
S u st ain abilit y. Ther e wi l l be c onsi d er abl e
improvements in rations by 2025. For instance, food should
be more concentrated and lighter, and there could be a
transdermal (through-the-skin) nutritional system.21 This
system would be comprised of time-released nutriceutical
substances tailored to the individual’s needs, which would
go directly into his system through patches or lotions. The
transdermal system will not truly substitute for food, but it
will meet nutritional needs when food is not available.22
Bioprocessing will eventually revolutionize logistics and
lighten the warfighter’s load. He will be able to create food,
water, and ammunition components from substances
locally available. The warfighter will no longer have to carry
those items, or at least not as many of them. Bioprocessing
does not fall into the strict Soldier System definition, but
would alter the warfighter’s life on the battlefield.
46
The generation of sustainment items will probably not
become a reality in the 2025 timeframe, except for the
water. It is possible that by 2025 an individual water
purifier will be able to filter heavy metals, the only
substances it cannot filter today. The warfighter could then
carry a small purifier or packet of chemicals instead of
carrying water in those areas where water is available.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence (C4I). This area is rife with possibilities. A
single chip embedded in a warrior’s clothing may be a whole
miniature satellite communication system comprised of
micromechanical devices that could be controlled by voice,
gesture, or thought.23 Sensors will allow a warfighter to
“see” through any weather, foliage, and other obscurants, as
well as detect CB agents.24 One distinct possibility for a CB
sensor may come through micro-electro-mechanical-system
(MEMS) technology. MEMS could replace cumbersome
$17,000 laboratory spectrometers, which determine
chemical composition of substances, with a $20 device that
the warfighter could hand carry.25 Biosensors may someday
detect the presence, and maybe even the status, of enemy
soldiers by detecting smells and other signatures. This
capability is a stretch, but “breakthroughs by 2020 would be
possible if enough resources are applied.”26
Pharmaceutical enhancements could contribute to the
warfighter’s sense of control in battlefield situations. These
pharmaceuticals could target specific areas of the brain and
increase or extend cognitive, psychological, and
physiological functions. The warfighter’s memory could
improve along with his attention span. He could suffer less
fear and stress, and be more alert. He could be physically
stronger and sleep better. He could deal with information
overload and make better decisions. A stretch in
performance enhancers would be those that combat fatigue
and hunger. 27 Another stretch technology would be
man-machine interfaces allowing the warfighter to control
equipment from afar with his or her mind. While this
speculation might evoke a chuckle, it is not as blue sky as it
47
seems. Several automobile manufacturers are now trying to
develop headrests that pick up signals from the driver’s
mind to control automotive functions.28
Advances in the traditional computing technologies will
continue. Computer systems will become much more user
friendly, and will be smaller and lighter. Voice activation
will be commonplace. Information overload will also be
tackled with “smart agent” computer applications. However, a whole new computing technology, biocomputing, will
bring unprecedented changes. Biocomputing is predicated
on DNA-based storage and has widespread military
applications. A DNA chunk the size of a sugar cube could
hold 10 petabytes (10 million billion) of data. The individual
soldier could have a small computer with billions of bytes of
information, with everything from a complete language
dictionary, to topographically accurate maps, to guides to
the local flora and fauna if he is forced to live off the land.29
There are several other possible biotechnology
applications to future complex integrated C4I systems. For
example, sensors could be linked with biocomputers which
warfighters could instruct by consciously altering their
brain waves or by voice pattern signals, putting warfighters
in a position to communicate more effectively with their
machines.30
Lethality. While MOUT ACTD weapons technologies
will presumably offer lethal and non-lethal contributions to
the future warfighter, the development of precision indirect
fires is required because of the greater lethality they offer.
The indirect fire technologies do not fall into the definition of
Warfighter System, but they have a profound impact on the
battlefield. The warfighter would have less weaponry and
ammunition to carry, lightening his load and improving his
chances for single shot kills—a real psychological coup.
Anti-materiel weapons also have promise. They will
feature agents that react in such a way to destroy the
intended target, such as rubber-eating microbes, or
microbes that consume silicon, electronics, or Kevlar.
48
Genetically-designed weapons that are based on DNA of
a target, such as the genetic sequence of an enemy leader, or
those that are targeted on a bodily function such as sight or
motor ability, may eventually be pursued. While these are
ethically arguable and run counter to the Biological
Weapons Convention, research will be needed to counter
such weapons should enemy forces possess them.31
Mobility. New or improved airdrop technologies will
allow for high tempo insertion of small units at many
different locations, providing an edge in maneuver. There
will be no time delays associated with personnel and
equipment link-up. These technologies will also allow soft
landings and a concomitant reduction in damage and
injuries.32
CONCLUSIONS
The future warfighter will be part of an elite joint force
which represents an expensive investment not easily
replaced. The economics involved in the training and
sustainment of such a force dictate that these warriors have
the cutting-edge warfighting tools and technologies. The
Warfighter System will be a vital prerequisite to
dominating maneuver and will also allow the military to
meet urban warfare challenges. Since the dismounted
warfighter has been, and will continue to be, the common
denominator in the spectrum of conflict, it is an investment
choice that can be made with utmost confidence.
Like traditional major acquisition programs, the
Warrior System program must be steadily funded and
centrally managed. Programmatic oversight should reside
at the highest organizational levels. Unlike traditional
prog rams, th e War f i ghter Sys tem p os es uni que
considerations for doctrinal, psychological, personnel,
training, and technological spheres. As such, it needs
special organizational structures and procedures.
An overarching systems approach is required that can
fuse all the Warfighter System’s aspects—materiel and
49
otherwise. The system’s designers must carve out a
long-range program showing a balanced approach and
defined priorities. This will instill confidence in program
success at the highest military levels and in Congress, thus
enhancing prospects for adequate funding.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Tactics and Technology for
21st Century Military Superiority: Final Report, Vol 1, Washington:
Defense Science Board, October 1996, pp. 11-5 - 11-13; Douglas A.
MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the
21st Century, Westport, CT: Praeger Publications, 1997, pp. 1-19.
2. Philip Brandler, Acting Technical Director, Natick Research,
Development and Engineering Center, “The Army After Next (AAN),”
memorandum for Commander, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command,
ATTN: ATCG-S (Dr. Paul Berenson), Fort Monroe, VA, July 2, 1996,
para. 2d.
3. Ibid., para. 2c.
4. Tactics and Technology, p. V-12.
5. Ibid., pp. II-3—II-9.
6. MacGregor, pp. 59-93.
7. Tactics and Technology, pp. III-17—III-20.
8. A. Fenner Milton, “Soldier Systems: The Path to the Army After
Next,” Briefing of Major General Robert Scales, Washington: Office of
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, February
19, 1997, unnumbered page.
9. Sean D. Naylor, “What the Future Holds . . . ,” Army Times,
March 17, 1997, p. 22.
10. Tactics and Technology, p. II-9.
11. “Infantry System Turns Soldier Into High-Tech Urban
Warrior,” National Defense, Vol. LXXXI, April 1997, p. 24.
12. Tactics and Technology, p. III-17.
13. Ibid.
50
14. Ibid., p. III-20.
15. Brandler, para. 2a.
16. Ibid., para. 2g.
17. Steven Kenney, et al., Biotechnology Workshop 2020, May 29-30,
1996: Summary Report, SAIC Document No. 96-6963 &SAC, McLean,
VA: Science Applications International Corporation, undated, p. 29
(hereafter SAIC).
18. Brandler, para. 2c.
19. SAIC, Tab H, p. 3.
20. Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., et. al., “Alternate Futures for 2025:
Security Planning to Avoid Surprise,” Research paper presented at Air
Force 2025, p. 153; Robert Langer and Joseph Vacanti, “Artificial
Organs,” Scientific American, September 1995, Vol. 273, No. 3, p. 131.
21. Kenny, et al., p. 22.
22. Brandler, para. 2j.
23. Engelbrecht, et al., p. 181.
24. Tactics and Technology, p. V-21.
25. John Markoff, “New Wave in High Tech: Tiny Motors and
Sensors,” New York Times, January 27, 1997, p. 1.
26. Kenny, et al., p. 28.
27. Ibid., p. 36.
28. Biotechnology Workshop 2020: Readings, Tab H, p. 12.
29. Ibid., Tab H, pp. 8-9.
30. Kenny, et al., p. 29.
31. Biotechnology Workshop 2020: Readings, Tab H, p. 3.
32. Brandler, para. 2b.
51
CHAPTER 3
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES:
PROMISES AND POTENTIAL
Arthur J. Sosa
All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to
endeavor to find out what you don’t know by what you do
know; that’s what I call guessing what was at the other side of
the hill.
Duke of Wellington1
INTRODUCTION
The concept of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) began
with the appearance of target drones in the 1940s. Shortly
thereafter, a veil of secrecy fell over UAV research, and their
operational capabilities were developed covertly. Nearly 50
years later, during Operation DESERT STORM, UAVs
came to the attention of the general public through
extensive war reporting, highlighted by reports of Iraqi
soldiers with arms held high, attempting to surrender to a
circling UAV. The Gulf War became the latest proving
ground to evaluate UAV capabilities in combat and their
potential role on the modern battlefield.
My experiences as an Army Attack Helicopter Company
Commander and Combat Aviation Battalion Commander
have taught me the value of aerial weapons platforms on the
battlefield as a combat multiplier. The success of Operation
DESERT STORM was made possible through the unique
synergy of men and machines in cohesive units. The
operation also underscored the vulnerabilities of the human
and the machine in that equation. Machines can fail, but
more often it is a human operator exceeding personal
limitations that becomes responsible for turning aircraft
53
into scrap metal. High stress mission conditions, fatigue,
poor weather, and reliance on night vision devices increase
pilot workload and risk. These factors create pilot errors
which are responsible for the majority of aircraft accidents.
It still takes less time to build a combat aircraft than to
recruit, train, and qualify the pilots who will fly it in combat.
Encounters with enemy air defense systems, enemy air
assets, and enemy small arms fire are predictable, potent
threats when U.S. forces deploy into a hostile theater of war.
What high risk roles can be performed by unmanned
aircraft? Which must be performed by manned aircraft
regardless of risk?
In this information age, emerging electronic and
aviation design technologies are melding in UAVs. These
factors in combination increase mission capability while
enhancing aircraft and human survivability. For purposes
of this paper, I shall restrict my remarks to unmanned
systems except in those circumstances where a comparison
to manned systems would be helpful for clarification.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNMANNED FLIGHT
Unmanned aircraft may appear as a novel concept to
some outside the military community. This is hardly
startling, considering that the early use of unmanned
aircraft was subject to security classification. A civilian
resident of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, working at the War
College overheard several of my colleagues discussing their
research papers. At a quiet moment he turned and asked
me, “What are you researching?” “Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles," I replied. This immediately drew a puzzled look,
and then my acquaintance said, “Oh yeah! My son has one of
those. He flies it at a big field outside of town.”
The potential of UAVs can be better understood through
the events that led to their development. The rapid progress
and growth of the UAV program open our imagination to
further possibilities for improving current capabilities and
exploring new military applications for the future defense.
54
The protection of American citizens is one of the stated
vital interests of the United States. An American hostage or
prisoner held by an enemy creates political leverage for that
enemy to exact concessions from the United States. This
was clearly demonstrated by the downing of a U-2 spy plane
and capture of pilot Francis Gary Powers by the Soviets in
1960. The incident occurred only a few years after President
Dwight D. Eisenhower had proposed mutual aerial
surveillance or “Open Skies” to ease tensions between the
Soviet Union and the United States. When overflight
privileges were denied by Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev, President Eisenhower covertly authorized
overflights of the Soviet Union to maintain surveillance of
the growing Russian military. Embarrassed by the incident,
President Eisenhower was compelled to make a public
statement announcing terminatation of U-2 flights over the
Soviet Union.
Two months after the Powers shootdown, a similar
incident occurred. The Soviets downed an American RB-47
aircraft over the Barents Sea between Norway and Russia,
50 miles from Soviet territory. Two of the crew members
survived and were taken prisoner. However, three
American lives were lost, and further embarrassment for
the United States ensued. These incidents forced the United
States to explore alternatives to its manned reconnaissance
program. Intelligence analysts believed the growth of Soviet
military power demanded a surveillance capability to
provide critical reaction time for U.S. forces if needed. Aerial
reconnaissance was the best means to satisfy this
requirement, but further risk of American pilots was not
acceptable. Initial feasibility studies of UAVs grew out of
this realization.
“Red Wagon” was the code name for the first flight
demonstration of target drone aircraft modified for
reconnaissance use. The highly classified project began in
July 1960, shortly after Powers’ U-2 was shot down. The
drone was developed by the Ryan Company, a manufacturer
of target drone aircraft. It was advertised as
55
a ground controlled target flying at near sonic speed and at
altitudes in excess of 60,000 ft. It was to be flying for more than
six hours while being engaged by surface to air missiles in an Air
Force Training program against high flying enemy aircraft.2
This cover story was intended to disguise the true purpose of
the tests.
Meanwhile, U.S. policy with respect to UAVs continued
to develop. A report from Dr. Harold Brown, Director of
Defense Research and Engineering in 1961, summarized
the issues and requirements of aerial reconnaissance
programs:
The suspension of overflights (by U.S. over Russia) and
peripheral operations by U-2 aircraft is political in nature and
has deprived the United States of its most effective aerial
intelligence collection capability.
The fact that Sino-Soviet Bloc capabilities, both offensive and
defensive, are dynamic and aggressive, dictates that an almost
constant surveillance be maintained to insure maximum US
combat effectiveness. This requires high resolution (1 foot)
photographic coverage of selected areas and of specific targets
within these areas.
Based on the preceding remarks, the following criteria are
proposed for use in the selection of any future vehicle that will be
used for overflights:
Unmanned. For political, diplomatic and public acceptability.
Operate independent of foreign and U.S. overseas bases. Not
dependent on a third country for support and/or policy. It could
be recovered over international waters.
Lead Time. Recommend that the study phase of a drone
program be undertaken immediately.3
Clearly, a need exists for accurate aerial-photo
intelligence data without the political liability of a dead or
captu red av iator . H owever , bud get battl es f or
modernization and research funding continued to impede
56
UAV progress. At this time, the Soviets were supplying
missiles to Cuba. In October 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson
was killed when his U-2 was hit by a surface-to-air missile
(SAM) over Cuba. At that time, only two UAVs were mission
capable. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 prompted
additional funding for reconnaissance.
The earliest combat use of UAVs occurred in Vietnam.
Twenty-eight different configurations of UAVs flew from
1962 through 1975, involving over 3,435 operational sorties.
The missions flown by the Vietnam War UAVs included
both day and night photo reconnaissance missions, photo
missions over the Hanoi Hilton prisoner of war camp, and
other battle damage assessment (BDA) photos of Hanoi
from 2,000-3,000 feet. 4 However, there were also
alternative special purpose UAV payloads used during the
Vietnam War. For example, several 147NA/NC UAVs were
maintained on standby for possible pre-strike electronic
countermeasures (ECM) chaff-dispensing missions. An
undetermined number of UAVs were used for electronic
intelligence or electronic countermeasures missions. Over
29 UAVs, called “bullshit bombers,” were launched to drop
leaflets. The appendix also offers several examples of
unmanned systems serving as decoy aircraft.5
In Vietnam, off-the-shelf-technology was successfully
adapted to enhance aerial reconnaissance capabilities. This
field experience is a proof of concept for UAVs, creatively
demonstrating a potential for expanding their missions.
The UAV project engineers evaluated many advanced
technology concepts, which included:
•
•
•
Prototype low observable (Stealth) designs to reduce
radar signature.6
Radar altimeter low altitude control system to hug
terrain.7
Integration of LORAN for position accuracy within
200 feet.8
57
•
•
•
Unmanned flight to 65,000 feet at nearly the speed of
sound.9
UAV suppression of enemy air defenses (air to surface
missile).10
UAV bomber (1964) with a 250-pound bomb.11
The second and third order effects of the UAV program
could have surfaced in the 1960s by spin-off research
developments, but the doctrine and the culture were slow to
adapt to the potential opportunities offered. In the Air
Force, advocacy for unmanned systems was seen as a vote
against manned aircraft, tantamount to career suicide for
senior aviators.
How did manned systems and unmanned systems
compare? It is reducing risk and the related cost in human
lives that is really at the center of the issue. William
Helmich, Ryan Company’s Program Manager for their
Air-to-Surface Missile Project, offered one prophetic
opinion:
The drone runs about one-tenth the cost of a (1970 vintage)
manned jet fighter, which carries one or two pilots each. And,
everyone wanted to cut down on the number of guests in the
Hanoi Hilton, and this (Ryan 234 armed UAV prototype) is one
way to do it.12
U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES TODAY
Unlike during the Vietnam era, the current UAV
Program is a joint service program with participation by all
services. The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
(DARO) manages the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Program (DARP) and is a focal point for all airborne
reconnaissance matters.13
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) sets
priorities for the Department of Defense (DoD) by allocating
funds to key projects. Tactical UAV (TUAV) is the number
58
one UAV program priority. TUAVs are represented by two
distinct systems called Pioneer and Outrider. The second
and third priority projects, respectively, are the Predator
and High Altitude Endurance UAVs.14 These separate and
unique UAV projects are the core of the DARP. Each UAV
system has the potential of being tasked to perform a
variety of missions with each individual service
component.15
The TUAV will eventually support Army battalions,
brigades, and light divisions as well as deployed Navy units.
The TUAV mission is to provide near real-time,
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RSTA) and BDA.16 Currently both the Pioneer and Hunter
UAV systems are filling this role. An Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) design called Outrider
is being evaluated as a replacement for Pioneer and Hunter.
Outrider’s operating range is over 200 kilometers, nearly
twice the range of the previous systems. It is more easily
deployable than the earlier systems, requiring only a single
C-130. Both Hunter and Pioneer would require multiple
C-130 or C-141 sorties. Each of these TUAV systems uses a
Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigation and cruises
at approximately 90 knots air speed (90 nautical
miles/hour).17
The Predator is the Medium Altitude Endurance or Tier
II UAV. This system was a ACTD and is now in production.
It has a mission range of over 500 nautical miles,
approximately five times that of the TUAVs. Predator has
20 hours fuel endurance, cruising at 70 knots. Satellite
communication (SATCOM) allows near real-time
transmission of reconnaissance and target acquisition data
from over the horizon, beyond electronic line of sight. This
system is the first to incorporate a de-icing capability,
essential for flight operations in cold weather. The Air
Force’s 11th Reconnaissance Squadron at Nellis Air Force
Base, Nevada, formed in August 1995 was the first UAV
unit equipped with Predator. The Predator system is called
59
Tier II because of features that surpass the capabilities of its
UAV predecessors.
The Global Hawk is a Tier II+ UAV. This is a
conventional high altitude endurance system currently in
testing and development, with a first flight planned for
March 1997.18 Its aft-mounted jet engine distinguishes it
from the other UAV propeller driven systems. The jet
engine allows Global Hawk to fly over 345 knots, almost four
times the airspeed of previous systems, and to attain a
range of 3,000 nautical miles. This Teledyne Ryan built
UA V resemb les a U- 2 i n si ze and s hap e. Its
transcontinental flight capability could replicate the
Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 flight easily, and, arguably, since
it is unmanned, do so without the same potential political
liabilities. The payload is similar to that of the other
systems which use electro-optical/infrared and synthetic
aperture radar. These sensor systems provide day-night
and all-weather imagery capability. Survivability is
achieved by its high altitude stand-off and its self-defense
measures. The phrase “global” is well suited to this UAV;
with its strategic range, Global Hawk is self-deployable
worldwide.
DarkStar is the Low Observable High Altitude
Endurance or Tier III(-) UAV. In this context, Low
Observable means stealth capable. The Darkstar is the only
U.S. produced UAV with true stealth design. Owing to its
stealth focus, DarkStar will not achieve the same overall
flight performance as the Global Hawk, but should attain
over 250 knots airspeed for more than 8 hours endurance,
reaching altitudes over 45,000 feet. The payload capacity,
although not fully described in the open literature, appears
to be less than Global Hawk as well. The DarkStar sensor
payload includes either an electro-optical or synthetic
aperture radar, not both systems like Global Hawk.19
DarkStar trades air vehicle performance and payload capacity
for survivability against highly defended air defenses by
minimized radar return. This UAV is still in the developmental
60
and test flight stage with production scheduled to begin in the
year 2000.20
Larry Lynn, Director of Defense Advanced Research
Projects, states that “DarkStar will demonstrate a
warfighting capability that the United States has not had
since the early days of the SR-71 Blackbird and the U-2
Spyplane.”21
Each modern UAV system possesses unique flight
characteristics and capabilities to support the Joint Task
Force Commander on the modern battlefield. Joint
command and control of these assets require rapid
facilitation of in-flight handoffs of mission aircraft and
seamless sharing of data. To accomplish this, DARO is
developing two types of UAV ground control systems. Two
distinct types of ground control links will support the
Tactical and the High Altitude Endurance UAVs,
respectively. The Tactical Control System (TCS) is designed
for TUAVs supporting the close battle without going beyond
the horizon. The Common Ground Segment for the
relatively autonomous high altitude endurance UAVs
provides high data exchange rates and multi-payload
functionality for significantly more complex missions
beyond the horizon.22
The nature of UAV missions is directly influenced by the
threat environment, distance to the area of interest, and the
payload components required. The fiscal year 1997 UAV
sy stems a n d payl oad s d emons tr ate si gni f i c ant
improvements over Vietnam era reconnaissance pilotless
vehicles (RPV). These improvements cut UAV size and
weight, upgraded electronics to smaller high efficiency
integrated circuits, and achieved real-time data sharing via
SATCOM data linkages. UAVs provide responsive coverage
of large geographic areas of responsibility, quicker than
possible by repositioning reconnaissance satellites. This
advantage in responsiveness is critical to many JTF
Commander intelligence requirements. In an effort to
expand the UAV flight mission, the DARO program
61
managers are looking to the most promising technologies for
new applications
THE POTENTIAL IN UAV MISSION PAYLOADS
Several new UAVs are in development and testing.
These systems represent significant product improvements
over the Ryan platforms used during Vietnam. Let us now
examine the potential that technology offers for alternative
payloads and expanded UAV roles and missions.
On January 16, 1996, Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,
identified primary enabling technologies and architectural
concepts that are vital to achieve battlefield dominance.
One or more of these technologies are relevant to all high
technology military systems. Several of the following
technologies will be applied to UAV system development:
•
Advanced processing;
•
Automatic target processing;
•
A common grid;
•
Distributed and open architectures;
•
Sequential application of off board collectors;
•
Data compression;
•
Very large, dynamic, object-oriented data bases;
•
Data storage;
•
Data dissemination; and,
•
Planning analysis tools.
Battlefield dominance thus relies heavily on automated
information processes or information dominance.
Predictably, information requirements of battlefield
62
commanders will vary in terms of quantity, quality, and
timeliness, according to their role in the close, deep, or
theater fight. UAV systems will require an advanced C4I
(Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and
Intelligence) infrastructure for collection, processing, and
dissemination to meet the unique needs of commanders at
all levels.
UAVs are critically dependent on computer data
processing, data compression, storage, and high speed data
transmission for navigation and flight profile. The UAV
mission equipment will also need a high speed data
dissemination capability to feed the C4I infrastructure and
serve its subscribers. Fortunately, the technology sectors
that engineer multimedia microchip capacity, computer
processing, and high speed data modems produce
significant improvements with regularity in the private
sector. Private sector automation technology directly
supports some UAV development programs, thus reducing
costs. New directions in UAV missions have been well
described by Rear Admiral Barton Strong, Program
Executive Officer, Cruise Missile and Joint Unmanned
Vehicles Office:
In developing effective and affordable UAVs and ground
control systems we need to prepare for both core and specific
UAV missions. The core missions include day or night
reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA);
combat assessment (CA); and battlespace management. As
new payloads become available, more specific UAV taskings
will evolve to include adjusting indirect fire; close air support;
deception operations; search and rescue (SAR) and mine
detection. Our list of potential “real time or near real time”
UAV missions is growing.23
A clear indication of the program managers’ intent to
explore the potential of UAVs for missions beyond the
historical aerial reconnaissance mission is reflected in the
fact that the DARO approved 16 proof-of-principle
demonstrations of UAV payloads, which are described in
Table 1.
63
Demonstration Payload
Potential Mission Application
Meteorological Sensor
Radiac Sensor
Light-weight Standoff Chemical
Detector
Light-Weight Communications
(COMINT) payload
Acoustic Wave Chemical Detector
Hyperspectral Sensor
Coastal Reconnaissance and
Analysis
Tactical Remote Sensor System
Communications Relay
Systemic atmospheric readings
Plot suspected NBC contamination
Detect and plot toxic agents
Electronic Intelligence Payload
Radar Jammer Payload
Light-weight COMINT Payload
Communications Jammer Payload
Tactical Meteorological System
Find/identify ground
communications emitters
Detect/plot low level chemical agents
Detect hidden/difficult targets
Detect mines (day/limited visibility)
BLOS* ground sensor data relay
BLOS communications relay for
ground forces
Locate/identify enemy ground forces
Jam enemy ground radars
Find/identify ground
communications emitters
Jam both radios and data links
Weather from remote/denied areas
*Beyond Line of Sight
Table 1.
24
UAV Joint Program Office Payload Projects.
The goal of each payload project as shown in Table 1 is to
provide battlefield commanders with additional means to
achieve battlefield dominance. As of this writing, results of
these proof-of-principle demonstrations are unavailable.
However, some initial information has been released, for
example, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
(DARPA) reported promising results on feasibility tests
using ultra-wide band radar (UWB) to detect buried mines.
However, according to the report, mine-detecting radar
operating from a UAV at altitude will require a significantly
higher power supply than used in ground tests.
Furthermore, precise location of small mines is difficult
with UAVs, even with dual GPSs.25 Additional testing is
planned.
64
A report in the Journal of Electronic Defense described
tests of four different payloads installed in a UAV for
electronic warfare potential. One payload performed
precision direction finding using high frequency (HF), very
high frequency (VHF), and ultra high frequency (UHF)
bands. A second payload autonomously recognized and
jammed “enemy” VHF and UHF transmission. A third
payload tested radar electronic warfare, and the fourth
payload was a tactical radar jammer to counter pulse,
pulse-doppler, and continuous-wave radar threats. All
payloads performed well in the initial concept tests. It is
now up to the services to analyze the data and then decide
whether they will develop programs for UAV electronic
warfare payloads.26
The concept of armed or lethal UAV systems is also being
tested. One defense publication reported that a UAV-flown
laser targeting system successfully guided anti-armor
missiles to four out of five targets.27 In another report,
General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, announced that the Marine Corps was assessing the
development of UAV bombers in recent tests conducted at
Aberdeen Proving Grounds.28 The concept of using UAVs for
a weapons delivery platform originated in 1953 and was
tested in 1964, using two 250-pound bombs from a Ryan
Firebee RPV.29 There is a variety of possible armed UAV
prototypes.
The first launch of an air-to-ground weapon—a
Maverick missile—from a UAV was made on December 14,
1971.30 The UAV, a Teledyne Ryan BGM-34, was recovered
after firing, confirming the proof-of-principle. This project
was originally designed to assist Israel in maintaining a
balance of power with Egypt by providing a low cost weapon
system to counter the Russian SAM and AAA batteries in
Egypt.31 Anti-radar “harassment drones and decoys have a
major role in efforts by the Israeli Air force to defeat hostile
air defenses.”32 ARMADA magazine reports that six nations
presently have attack UAVs.33 In addition to Israel, these
65
nations include Iran, Israel, Germany, France, South
Africa, and the United States.
As can be seen in Figure 1, many nations are coming to
realize that UAVs provide cruise missile capability at a
fraction of the cost. A hostile UAV carrying a lethal payload
could reach the United States from a number of locations.
Consider the domestic and international impact associated
with chemical or biological agents dispensed by UAV.
Suddenly, terrorists could have an accurate, long-range
delivery means for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Non-proliferation of UAV technology is clearly a national
security issue for the United States.
50
40
30
20
10
0
1986
1991
1996
Nations with UAVs
Figure 1.
34
Proliferation of UAVs.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a
voluntary agreement to prevent the proliferation of missiles
capable of nuclear delivery, which covers cruise missiles
and related technologies.35 The MTCR specifically prohibits
the “export of unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including
cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance
drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kilogram
payload to a range of 300 kilometers.”36 The MTCR was first
established in 1987 and now has 25 countries participating.
66
The United States is a charter member of the MTCR and
has taken a strong stand in support of weapons control
agreements including armed UAVs. The following
statement appeared in the 1995 UAV Annual Report:
We will continue to monitor advances in the arms control
arena and ensure treaty compliance. In addition, to preclude
any future misunderstanding about UAVs as weapon
platforms, the DARO has made it clear that it has no plans to
develop or test armed reconnaissance UAVs.
Clearly there has been a major reversal in U.S. policy in
the last 2 years; concept tests of armed UAVs are now
allowed. Oddly, there is no mention of this significant
change in policy in the 1996 UAV Annual Report.
The UAV program addresses the airworthiness of each
system and the opportunities this technology offers to
commanders at every level. Emerging technologies as
buttressed by over 40 years of experience with UAVs have
led to a family of uniquely capable air vehicles that allows
U.S. forces to dominate the battlefield without incurring
unnecessary risks to aircrew members. However, the
proliferation of UAV technology is tantamount to handing a
cruise missile to a hostile nation as a delivery means for
WMD. We have come far in those 40 years, but did we come
far enough? Let us consider what the future applications for
UAVs could and should be.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Three primary recommendations emerge from this
review of UAVs. First, we should increase the commitment
on the part of all services, especially the Air Force, to
maximize UAV capabilities. Second, we should research
UAV fighter aircraft. Third, the United States should
monitor international efforts for development and sale of
UAVs and related technology.
As to service commitment on behalf of UAVs, I do not
advocate a UAV program as a substitute for airpower. There
67
can be no replacement for tactical or strategic lift capability.
UAVs are ill suited for lift purposes. UAVs are better suited
for aerial reconnaissance, communications relay, electronic
warfare, and radar jamming missions. Nonetheless, UAV
systems should have achieved greater integration into the
military overall and into the Air Force in particular.
Considering this nation’s over 40 years experience with
UAVs, it is amazing that there is only one Air Force UAV
unit in existence. Furthermore, several of the payload
concept tests mentioned earlier merely repeat similar tests
conducted during the 1960s and early 1970s. Microchip and
miniaturized on-board computers are providing the UAV
with a virtual cockpit capability. This virtual cockpit and
alternative payloads will make new UAVs even more
functional as aviation assets than in the past. Richard T.
Wagaman, former President of the Association of
Unmanned Vehicle Systems, tells us that:
UAVs are being used for more functions every day. The military
UAV missions are obvious and have been addressed many
times. The non-military government and commercial
unmanned aircraft functions will yield a yearly market
exceeding one billion U.S. dollars by the turn of the century.
[and] will likely exceed $2 billion by 2005—just 10 short years
away.38
It would be a telling indictment if the private sector
realizes the enormous potential of UAVs before the military.
A spark is needed. It is time for a new generation of Hap
Arnold’s or Billy Mitchell’s to lead a cultural revolution to
further the unmanned revolution in military affairs.
The second recommendation deals with the U.S. need to
research a UAV fighter concept. This concept offers some
economy compared to manned systems—an alternative to
large numbers of high technology manned fighter aircraft. A
small number of UAV fighters could serve in the first wave
of a high risk theater campaign to whittle down enemy air
defenses. This would effectively preserve manned systems
for later lower-risk missions. The question of whether to
68
rely on threat-based or capability-based weapons systems to
support U.S. national security strategy becomes irrelevant
if UAVs can do both cost efficiently. Consider the potential
benefits of a UAV fighter in terms of cost avoidance (benefits
1-5) and operational capabilities (benefits 7-9; benefit 6
applies to both):
1. No ejection seat/no oxygen system (low cost/less
weight);
2. A virtual cockpit: no flight controls or pilot safety
systems;
3. No ergonomic studies of cockpit design (low cost);
4. Potentially less time & cost to replace a combat UAV
than replace a combat fighter and pilot;
5. If feasible, convert current aircraft to UAV for testing;
6. Reduce fratricide: real-time/gun camera slow-motion
and stop-action imagery, thus improving target identification;
7. Fly by wire (F-16 type) control system would connect
through on-board computer to ground control system;
8. Extremely high g-maneuvers (exceeding human
capacity); and,
9. Precise close air support: combine gun camera
targeting with laser guided munitions.
An ironic but significant justification for unmanned
fighters (in lieu of manned versions) is to increase the
aircraft’s capability by removing the human constraint.
Pilots generally cannot sustain more than 6-7 Gs. In a tight
turn, a fighter aircraft can easily develop G-forces that will
cause pilots to lose consciousness. UAVs are already capable
of exceeding 8 Gs, sufficient to outmaneuver manned
systems in aerial combat. In 1971, this air-to-air concept
was tested informally in mock dog fights, pitting an
unarmed UAV against veteran Navy pilots in two F-4s with
Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles. The UAV repeatedly
69
outmaneuvered the F-4s and was not hit.39 This capability
may be as significant as stealth in aircraft survivability,
providing the best countermeasure against enemy UAVs.
The final recommendation deals with monitoring
international development and sale of UAV technology.
This will become increasingly difficult if Mr. Wagaman’s
assessment for the growth potential of the nonmilitary
market for UAVs proves correct. He claims that the annual
nonmilitary UAV market will double to $2 billion. For
example, UAVs may be used for dusting crops, highway
traffic surveillance, counterdrug operations, border
surveillance, and nuclear power plant or chemical plant
discharge monitoring. In each of these examples, a common
operational theme emerges. Extended, monotonous, and
high-risk hazardous operations entail technologies that
make UAVs attractive to civilian as well as military
application. The UAV is clearly a dual use technology,
ultimately capable of crop dusting farms as well as
delivering biological toxins and nerve agents to the
battlefield. The United States must be prepared for a
two-fold challenge:
•
•
Prevent rogue nations from gaining a delivery means
for weapons of mass destruction, and
Devise countermeasures for highly maneuverable,
stealthy enemy UAV aircraft.
CONCLUSION
The United States DoD must maintain a balanced
military capability to protect national interests and project
power. This must be done without eroding the national
economy or vital domestic interests. UAV systems offer a
unique opportunity for a true revolution in military affairs
and a cost-effective alternative to a large manned aircraft
fleet.
70
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3
1. As quoted in Jay M. Shafritz, Words on War, New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1990, p. 208.
2. William Wagner, “Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance
Drones,” Fallbrook, CA: Armed Forces Journal and Aero Publishers,
1982, p. 17.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. Ibid., p. 202.
5. Ibid., p. 99.
6. Bill Sweetman,“The Invisible Men,” Air & Space Smithsonian,
April/May 1997, p. 19.
7. William Wagner, p. 175.
8. Ibid., p. 194.
9. Ibid., p. 166.
10. Ibid., p. 182.
11. Ibid., p. 174.
12. Ibid., p. 185.
13. Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, UAV Annual Report,
FY 1996, November 6, 1996, p. 1.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 31.
16. Ibid., p. 14.
17. Ibid., p. 31.
18. Ibid., p. 20.
19. UAV Annual Report, FY 1996, p. 31.
20. Ibid., p. 22.
71
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 24.
23. Rear Admiral Barton Strong, Statement before Subcommittee
on Airland Force of the Senate Armed forces Services Committee,
March 29, 1996.
24. UAV Annual Report, FY 1996, p. 39.
25. Bruce D. Nordwall, “Ultra-Wideband Radar Detects Buried
Mines,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 31, 1997, p. 63.
26. Z. Lum, “Demo Done, UAV EW Payload Players Await Report,”
Journal of Electronic Defense, Vol. 20, January 1997, p. 27.
27. Pat Cooper, “New Battlefield Tasks Eyed for UAVs,” Army
Times, October 28, 1996, p. 12.
28. Ibid.
29. Wagner, p. 174.
30. Ibid., p. 181.
31. Ibid., p. 180.
32. W. Seth Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s,
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Praeger Publishers, 1992, p. 86.
33. Doug Richardson, ARMADA International, October/November
1996, p. 20.
34. UAV Annual Report, FY 1996, p. 6.
35. Most international weapon agreements do not include UAVs,
the Missile Technology Control Regime being a noteworthy exception.
36. Carus, p. 89.
37. Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, UAV 1995 Annual
Report, FY 1995, August 1995, p. 8.
38. Richard T. Wagamon, Address before UV-95 Conference, Paris,
June 1995.
72
39. Wagner, p. 186.
73
CHAPTER 4
STRATEGIC LOGISTICS
FOR INTERVENTION FORCES
Yves J. Fontaine
[Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Fontaine presents
evidence of a slow learning curve when it comes to solving
logistics management problems. He points to potential near
term solutions for many existing problems, but makes clear
that many greater changes will be required throughout the
force before any revolution in military logistics can be
expected to become a reality. DVJ]
INTRODUCTION
In every overseas deployment since the SpanishAmerican War, the responsiveness of the logistics system
was degraded by lack of information concerning personnel,
equipment, and requisitions status. Moreover, an enormous
amount of materiel was shipped to the theater, but was not
readily available because of this poor information, which in
turn reduced the combat forces’ ability to accomplish their
mission. This paper analyzes the strategic logistics systems
of recent force projection operations covering the entire
spectrum of war, to include Operations DESERT
SHIELD/DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE, SUPPORT
HOPE, and JOINT ENDEAVOR. It identifies problems
with tracking the status of supplies, building the
Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), attaining
Automated Data Processing (ADP) compatibility, and
securing unity of command and control over the various
log istica l in pu ts. The p ap er c onc l ud es wi th
recommendations for logistics concepts which should
support the Army through the opening decades of the next
century.
75
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and seized
control of the country.1 In response, the U.S. military began
deploying personnel, equipment, and supplies to seaports
and airports in Saudi Arabia.2 The brevity of the warning
time, the massive size of the coalition force, the lack of
prepositioned equipment, and the distances between the
United States and Saudi Arabia required U.S. logisticians
to mass enormous lift assets in a short period of time.3
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was responsible
for theater logistics management. It developed policy and
monitored and coordinated transportation and distribution
operations. CENTCOM tasked the Army component
(ARCENT) with management of seaport and airport
operations. ARCENT also managed theater surface
transportation and distributed common items such as food,
clothing, lubricants, and munitions to all services.4
ARCENT operated the theater Communication Zone,
coordinating joint, combined, and coalition operations to
include Host Nation Support (HNS).
Because of the immediate threat from Iraq, CENTCOM
decided to deploy mobile combat units first, bringing in
logistics units later. This decision to deploy service support
units later in the deployment sequence seriously degraded
ARCENT’s ability to provide support. Initially ARCENT
had to rely heavily on HNS for the operation because U.S.
forces had limited in-country capability to move, store, and
retrieve equipment and supplies. This CENTCOM decision
also triggered instant allocation of the most available and
fastest strategic lift assets to combat units. This ultimately
resulted in an unsynchronized buildup of a theater
infrastructure. The inserted force was dangerously
unsustainable for the initial period of Operation DESERT
SHIELD because of a significant shortage of Army surface
transportation assets, including heavy equipment
76
transporters, tractor trailers, and materiel handling
equipment.5 This meant that the Army could not fulfill its
mission of providing support, thus leaving the Air Force and
Marines no choice but to establish their own transportation
systems, which further complicated matters.6
An automated data system was supposed to regulate the
massive flow of cargo and people into the theater of war, but
CENTCOM had not finalized its Saudi Arabian plan. Thus,
deployment data were not automated. Most of the
movement was managed manually, and planners
improvised the force deployment list as they executed it.
This lack of automation and midstream revisions prevented
airlift and sealift from operating at full capacity. Deploying
units often did not know where and when to meet aircraft, or
how to marry equipment with departing ships, thus causing
planes to fly empty or with low priority cargo and forcing
units’ equipment to be piecemealed on several ships.7 Such a
large operation needed a well-planned, automated guidance
system for orderly deployment.
Logisticians admitted that they were unable to track
equipment and supplies arriving in theater. They knew
when a ship was scheduled to arrive, but they had only a
general idea of the cargo. Ships had incomplete manifests
and mislabeled containers. During the initial phase of the
operation, logisticians at the ports had to empty containers
in order to determine where to ship the contents.8 Because
of the constant changes in the deployment sequence, some
equipment arrived before its unit did. Logisticians at the
ports did not have knowledge of the units’ arrival, nor did
they know their location in-country after the units had
deployed. Supplies piled up at the port, overwhelming the
supply personnel, and the proverbial iron mountain started
to rise.
Container management was nonexistent, so throughput
became impossible. The Army had no viable tracking
systems, used sloppy documentation procedures, and
lacked sufficient materiel handling equipment to move the
77
containerized cargo to appropriate distribution centers. To
assure maximum use of ship capacity, shippers filled the
containers full regardless of destination. Containers were
filled with supplies addressed to several consignees, or were
loaded with unidentifiable loads with minimum
documentation. Because the personnel needed to document
the receipt of the materiel were not deployed early, stacks of
containers piled up unprocessed in the ports. Lack of
documentation further degraded the tracking of supplies,
and 50 percent of the arriving containers had to be opened to
identify their contents. The lack of materiel-handling
equipment and transportation assets worsened the backlog.
Units lost confidence in the system and reordered “missing”
items, thereby compounding the problem.9 Finally, even
logisticians bypassed the supply system and established
direct logistics links with their home bases to obtain critical
items.
The airlift system was overloaded and could not keep up
with demands. By December 1990, 7,000 tons of cargo were
lying on the ground at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware,
awaiting shipment to Saudi Arabia. This supply remnant
exceeded the total airlift capacity sixfold.10 Units saturated
the airlift system with high priority demands because they
had lost confidence in the standard logistics system.
Because cargo and supplies were not properly prioritized,
first in/first out became the rule, and high priority items
were delayed in reaching deployed units. To partially
correct th e probl em, Tr ans p or tati on Command
(TRANSCOM) established the Desert Express and the
Desert European Express Systems to deliver critical repair
parts overnight from the United States and Europe.
Although successful, the system bypassed the established
procedures—at enormous extra cost. 11 Ingenuity, not
consistently applied logistical practices, saved the day!
Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia.
In April 1992, the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council approved Resolution 751, establishing the U.N.
78
operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Its mission was to
provide humanitarian aid and facilitate the end of
hostilities. 12 During the next 6 months, U.N. forces
delivered supplies to Somalia. However, by December 1992,
the security situation worsened, forcing the United Nations
to initiate Operation RESTORE HOPE. The United Nations
assigned the United States to lead and to provide military
forces to a multinational coalition; to secure air and naval
ports; to secure key installations and food distribution
points; and to provide security for convoys and relief. This
operation, which involved more than 38,000 troops from 21
nations, finally succeeded in providing security and food
throughout the country.13 In May 1993, the United Nations
assumed the mission to provide humanitarian support
under Operation UNOSOM II. U.S. participation was then
reduced to providing logistical support and a quick reaction
force.14
Upon initial notification, CENTCOM deployed a
humanitarian assistance survey team to assess the
situation, then activated a Joint Task Force (JTF) to
conduct emergency airlift of food and supplies into Somalia.
In December 1992, CENTCOM ordered the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force to become the nucleus of the 20-nation
combined task force. Concurrently, CENTCOM alerted the
10th Mountain Division to prepare to serve as the
headquarters for all Army forces in Somalia and to conduct
military operations to provide security for the relief effort.15
The deployment of forces and equipment to Somalia
encountered problems similar to those in operation
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. During the planning
phase, the 10th Mountain Division had to contact four
different headquarters to determine deployed force
strengths. Strategic planners had developed plans for the
operation but sought little input from the tactical units.
This caused significant problems since the strategic
planners did not anticipate the large number of logistics
personnel required to support a bare base logistics
operation.16 Transportation problem solvers did not deploy
79
early enough to detect on a timely basis the terminal and
port problems stemming from absence of a host country
infrastructure. Without this on-site expertise, major
problems were inevitable.
The 10th Mountain Division deployed to Somalia
expecting to provide self-contained logistics, but it was
ill-equipped to overcome the logistical nightmare it
encountered. The unit was not prepared to handle
problems associated with downloading prepositioned ships
and operating sea and air ports of debarkation. The rapid
arrival of Army combat units soon overwhelmed the initial
support capability provided by the Marine Corps Force
Service Support Group; 10th Mountain Division logistics
units had to be consolidated to perform wholesale logistics
functions.17
There was no preexisting plan for Somalia, and the
deliberate planning process failed as the TPFDD
continuously changed. 18 The CENTCOM-developed
TPFDD was valid for only a few days at a time as
subordinate units made changes on the ground without
coordination. Loaded cargo never left the port of
debarkation or had to be unloaded at another port because it
was no longer needed. Likewise, airlift was sent to carry
cargo that never appeared.19
The lack of automation interface caused significant
problems in tracking. Unforecasted cargo, inaccurate data,
and differences between codes used by deploying units were
as prevalent as in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
The lack of interface between Joint Operations Planning
and Execution Systems (JOPES) and the military standard
transportation and movement procedures resulted in a loss
of materiel tracking, tracing, and status awareness. So once
again, items could be found only after physical checks were
made. 20 At one time the Army was sending excess
equipment back to the United States while the Marines
were requesting augmentation of the same equipment.21
80
Six separate supply support systems were used in the
Somali theater. Units used the standard Unit Level
Logistics System to request supplies; requisitions were
transferred through the Direct Support Unit to the Defense
Automated Addressing System for routing into the National
Inventory Control Point (NICP); units also used direct
requests such as E-mail and phone to home station; in
desperation, units called directly to depots and NICPs to
shorten order and shipping time. The wholesale level
honored the system, but tracking was difficult. At times,
units used the U.N. system to obtain common use items, but
the system was slow, quality was uncertain, and delivery
was erratic. Action officers and general officers also made
direct requests, triggering movements of supplies without
the knowledge of logistics personnel in the theater. Finally,
Army Materiel Command established a back-up system
using logistics representatives to obtain supplies. These
systems got the job done, but the logistics ADP
infrastructure did not work.22 The lack of a theater level
supply command to discipline the supply system led to
waste, and the iron mountains started to appear on the
horizon again.
Operation SUPPORT HOPE, Rwanda.
On July 4, 1994, Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, fell to the
Tutsi dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front. Thousands of
Hutus, fearful of genocide, fled to Zaire or French safe zones
in south Rwanda and Burundi. Most fled to Goma, Zaire,
which exploded into a refugee camp of one million refugees.
Soon humanitarian organizations were overwhelmed by the
need for food, medical assistance, and clean water.23 By July
24th, U.S. military personnel deployed to Kigali, Goma, and
Entebbe, Uganda, to establish the infrastructure for
humanitarian support. Civilian Military Operation Centers
were established immediately in Goma and Kigali to
synchronize support requirements with the NonGovernment Organizations (NGO). U.S. policy at this time
was to assist the humanitarian effort, take no casualties,
81
and leave. The United States subordinated its logistics
effort to U.N. control.24 The primary U.S. mission was to
provide clean water and then to collect and distribute food
and other necessities.
Upon notification of the crisis, the U.S. European
Command (USEUCOM) JTF deployed a survey team to
provide on-the-scene assessment of the situation.25 This
early assessment was vital in determining the composition
and flow of follow-on forces to accomplish the mission.
However, the JTF commander found it very hard to
influence the deployment of forces once requirements
became more clear. The deployment was managed by phone,
which resulted in inefficient use of airlift. The JTF
commander lacked the ability to enter the JOPES system in
order to build his force. Present procedures call for the
TPFDD to be built by unified commands, but in
nonstandard contingency operations, each of which
presents its own unique problems, the commander should
have the authority to reach deep into unit structures and
call upon the capabilities required to accomplish the
mission following his assessment of the situation.26 That is
to say, he should be able to tailor his forces to fit the unique
circumstances of his mission. This requires the Army to
review how it structures forces and builds TPFDDs.
As in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
and RESTORE HOPE, several commands and agencies
were involved in TPFDD input, creating problems in
synchronization. As the JTF Forward was trying to pull
units it needed for the mission, the JTF Rear and supporting
commands were pushing units to the theater based on the
previously established TPFDD. Additionally, and peculiar
to this operation, international relief and NGO
requirements were added on top of an already confusing
TPFDD without consideration of timing or flow. This
resulted in a backlog at ports of embarkation, unnecessary
movement delays, and a loss in status awareness. Finally,
the JTF gained control of the movement and circumvented
82
the broken system by resorting to teleconferences and daily
airlift messages.27
T h e Materia l M anagement Center and the
Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group were bumped by
higher priority units and did not arrive in theater until
C+21. Prior to their arrival, no structure was in place to
maintain accurate status information on supplies and
equipment.28 Personnel did not use the proper cargo
documentation and manifesting procedures, which resulted
in the loss of transit status information once again. These
problems forced the JTF commander to allocate personnel
to the aerial port of debarkation to meet each aircraft,
identify the cargo, break it out, and get it to the proper
place.29
The JTF also encountered problems in ADP. It had no
capability to track individual loads precisely or forecast
arrivals because of an interface problem between the Global
Decision Support System (GDSS) and JOPES. The interface
works only when the GDSS data is loaded into the JOPES in
a timely and correct manner. Headquarters Air Mobility
Command was responsible to load GDSS into JOPES, but
poor quality input caused problems. The Army needs a link
to interconnect strategic airlift, the JTF, and the
customers.30 During Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the
Standard Army Automated Requisition System was
introduced early, but proved unable to transmit
requisitions for several days because of delays in
establishing communications.31
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Bosnia.
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR offers yet another
example of flawed logistics planning. The Dayton
agreement (December 1995) led to a general accord for
peace among warring parties in Bosnia. The mission to
implement the peace agreement fell to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States committed
the 1st Armored Division to NATO’s Allied Ready Reaction
83
Corps (ARRC) for the operation. The United States also
provided augmentation to the ARRC headquarters and a
National Support Element in Hungary and Croatia.32
Strategic ambiguity plagued the operation from the
start. It was not clear until the actual signing of the peace
agreement what type of force package was needed to
accomplish the mission. At the conclusion of the planning
phase, the TF commander’s plan called for a deliberate,
balanced deployment so he could tailor his forces in-country.
The force package would augment the V Corps National
Support Element in establishing the intermediate staging
base in Hungary. The TF would then insert engineers and
combat forces to establish lines of communication into
Bosnia. The JOINT ENDEAVOR organization anticipated
a single U.S. division organized with multiple brigades,
numerous corps level support units directly under division
control, and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) forward as the
National Support Element. However, the final peace
agreement called for the immediate entry of a sizable
combat force into Bosnia. This altered the deployment
packages and delayed deployment of combat service support
assets, desynchronizing the deployment plan. 33
Once again, the decision to deploy combat forces at the
cost of logistics forces affected the sustainment of these
same forces in country. USEUCOM enlisted the Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), so civilian
contractors would build the forward logistics bases as forces
arrived in the area. LOGCAP’s requirements for movement
of supplies conflicted with requirements to move the combat
forces. Lift for the combat forces was accorded a higher
priority, causing a shortage in logistics support. Once again
we had inserted an unsustainable force. Unit deployments
had to be delayed or diverted until bases were established.
The Task Force arrived without its main support and repair
parts stocks. Had the TF been required to undertake combat
operations, it would have found its combat power severely
constrained.33
84
Several deployment management systems designed to
assist in deploying the force were either overlooked or
inefficiently used. The failure to use the Transportation
C oordin ator A u tomated Command and Contr ol
Information System, which automates the input of unit
movement data and generates deployment equipment lists
for loading in the JOPES system via the computerized
movement planning and status system, prevented JOPES
from automating construction of the TPFDD and
contributed to the inability to maintain accessible
information on the composition of the projected force.35
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR benefited from ADP
technological improvements identified as necessary in past
contingency operations. In this operation, logisticians
sought to achieve Total Asset Visibility by tracking the
location, condition, and consignee of supplies and
equipment from the factory to the foxhole. Logisticians
planned to use radio frequency tags, detection devices, and
computer systems to track the movement of items through
the entire distribution system. 36 Even though Radio
Frequency (RF) tags were used to maintain visibility over
equipment throughout the deployment, these tags did not
sustain visibility as planned. Only one station was set up to
load the RF tags with the data needed for tracking of
containers and supplies, and it could not handle the large
quantity of containers being tagged. Next, “interrogator”
hardware was not established at all major intersections
along the Lines of Communication, thus preventing
logisticians from tracking RF tagged items. Third, the
Automated Manifest System (AMS), used by the direct
support units to improve accuracy and expedite processing,
did not arrive in country until late in the deployment;
therefore, containers received prior to their unit’s arrival
were not processed correctly. Once operational, the AMS
was able to track and distribute supplies.37
In summary, the U.S. Army encountered the same
problems in deploying and maintaining visibility of
85
personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of four recent
contingency operations.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
We have unquestionably identified the problems, now
can we fix them? If we are going to provide the 2025 force
adequate logistical support, we need to make critical
changes in four areas: force structure, ADP improvement,
C3, and technology.
It is a given that, regardless of the type of operation,
combat forces will always deploy first at the expense of
combat services support (CSS) forces. The TPFDD will
always change, and human errors will always play havoc
with deployment documentation and manifests. We must
anticipate these realities and change the way we look at the
CSS force structure. We need a CSS force based on a
modular system. We must build logistics modules tailored
to perform specific functions. We should develop such
modules to serve as receiving units at aerial ports of
debarkation or as seaport unloading units, armed with the
technology to perform these functions. The unit should be
able to talk directly to the national provider and to the JTF
commander to obtain follow-on support and to keep the
commander aware of the support situation. These modules
must deploy as part of the combat forces. This approach
to force structure is not new. USEUCOM attempted to use
this approach during the initial deployment for operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR. The CSS community must refine its
structure and build units in accordance with the functions
they must accomplish, while keeping them small but
technologically updated.
The modular system allows for flexiblility and the
capability to move modules within the TPFDD once on the
ground. The system must allow the TPFDD to evolve from
the present system to a more agile system ready to respond
to changes in the fast-paced situation.
86
The commander’s ability to manipulate the TPFDD is
directly linked to the level of ADP support he will receive. By
2025, ADP improvements must enable commanders to
obtain and maintain visibility of all assets at all times. This
will provide commanders the ability to influence not only
the movement and deployment of initial entry forces, but
also to influence logistics flow throughout the operation.
The Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV) program, built in
response to the growing importance of TAV to a
restructured Defense Logistics System, has developed an
implementation plan that integrates TAV throughout the
Department of Defense. The objective of JTAV is to develop
a responsive, user-friendly system, easily understood by all
and capable of rapid deployment to contingency areas.
CINCs and JTF commanders will use the system to enhance
the planning, deployment, and movement of forces and to
respond to changing strategic guidance. The system will
enable logisticians to track orders, shipping activities, and
port operations throughout the supply system; it will give
strategic level materiel managers visibility of all assets
throughout all systems.38
The JTAV implementation plan synchronizes four
national systems to accomplish TAV. The Logistics
Information Processing System (LIPS) will serve as DOD’s
central repository for requisitions status. The Inventory
Control Point Automated Information System will be the
permanent data repository for information on all
ICP-managed assets from retail to wholesale levels. The
Global Transportation Network (GTN), developed by
TRANSCOM, will provide visibility of unit and nonunit
shipment data (personnel, equipment, and supplies) to
include information on medical patients. Finally, the JTAV
will develop the Joint Theater Logistics Automated
Information System to provide visibility of the location and
status of in-theater logistics assets.39 JTAV plans to use a
client server architecture consisting of a server/database
manager, a network manager, and a communications
manager. It will develop a deployable JTAV package in
87
conjunction with the CINCs to support activities equivalent
to an Army Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, Navy Fleet
Headquarters, or numbered Air Force. Deployed units will
be able to access JTAV with existing military applications.40
The JTF staff will be able to access supplies in transit and in
storage. It will process information from CONUS through
the links with LIPS and GTN and merge this information
with the information received from in-theater logistics
modules, thereby giving the JTF commander the status on
all his assets and the capability to manipulate logistics to
meet mission requirements.
The JTAV modernization system not only allows
logisticians to obtain and maintain visibility of all
personnel, equipment, and supplies in the system but also
to modify the logistics request system significantly. Since
managers will have visibility of supplies at all times and
have the ability to change the flow of supplies at a moment’s
notice, there will be no need for the existing priority system
and the large stockpiles of supplies. The new ADP system
gives the logisticians the opportunity to streamline logistics
into a more flexible and responsive system.
The ability to control agile CSS modules on the
battlefield and to harness the power of the revolution in
information technology brings to light the need for a
centralized logistics command and control system.
Command structures, such as a JTF, should contain a
logistics commander with the necessary ADP and trained
personnel to monitor all logistics assets in the theater of
operations. The logistics commander should deploy early to
assess the situation and take immediate strategic level
action concerning movement of personnel and equipment
(both military and civilian) to respond to mission changes.
The JTAV ADP system, previously discussed, would give
the JTF logistics commander the ability to modify the
TPFDD as soon as he is on the ground, plus the ability to
maintain visibility of personnel, equipment, and supplies
shipped to the area of operations. However, although
technology will give logisticians the ability to know where
88
the assets are at all times, it likewise demands stronger
restrictions on the manipulation of the system. Given the
new JTAV capability, a JTF logistics commander must
establish strict guidelines on who can input changes to the
deployment of forces and who monitors the arrival and
transfer of logistics assets. Such real-time, on-site control
and authority over logistics is revolutionary but absolutely
essential. In the past, the logistics tail could unfortunately
wag the JTF dog. Now that big dog will wag his tail any time,
any way he sees fit!
Finally, ADP improvements are a subset of the
revolution in information technology. They allow
logisticians to improve logistics systems during contingency
operations. Nevertheless, the level of technology available
today (and probably in 2025) does not significantly change
the way we do business as logisticians. Current technology
allows improvement of logistics systems by giving total
visibility of all assets and by enabling faster processing of
information, but it does not yet alleviate the need for the
extensive quantity of logistics to support U.S. deployments
throughout the spectrum of war.
ONE OBSTACLE REMAINS
Careful analysis of the primary logistics requirements in
a conflict reveal, as always, the critical need for fuel,
ammunition, and food as the most significant logistics
requirements for any force deployment. Consequently, the
revolution in information technology does not mean a
massive decrease in the U.S. Army logistics tail. Prior to a
significant change in logistics or implementation of a
genuine logistics revolution, the U.S. Army must undergo a
deeper technological revolution and develop radically new
systems, such as tanks that do not use conventional fuels
and ammunition. In other words, the U.S. Army must
develop systems that require very little or no logistics tail.
The U.S. services need to increase budget share allocated to
Research and Development (R&D) on behalf of such
systems, even at the cost of force structure. Once these
89
systems are identified, all services must join in procuring
and using common versions to the maximum extent
feasible, rather than each service designing, developing,
and deploying its unique version. The result will be a simple
logistics system, a small logistics tail, and a lethal but
smaller and supportable contingency force.
CONCLUSION
This study has identified key logistics problems that
occurred during recent contingency operations. Problems in
materiel visibility, building and managing the TPFDD,
ADP compatibility, and command and control hampered
logistical support to varying degrees in each operation.
Logisticians are aware of these issues and have taken steps
to resolve them by developing and implementing the JTAV
plan. On a more fundamental level, we need to build a
centralized and permanent command and control system
that includes a logistics commander and a logistics force
composed of tailored logistics modules. This new capability
would enable logisticians to take full advantage of the JTAV
plan. These steps capitalize on the revolution in information
technology; they will certainly improve today’s logistics
systems.
What these improvements will not do is create the
revolution in military logistics that is needed by 2025. The
real revolution in military logistics will occur only after our
research community provides us with revolutionized
combat equipment that minimizes the logistics tail needed
to support it. The Army leadership must realize the need for
new equipment and allocate the necessary resources to
develop it.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force, Desert Storm and Beyond,
McNair Paper No. 32, Washington: National Defense University Press,
December 1994, p. 13.
90
2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Desert
Storm Transportation and Distribution of Equipment and Supplies in
Southwest Asia, General Accounting Office Report, 1991, p. 1.
3. Scott, p. 3.
4. General Accounting Office, p. 1.
5. Scott, p. 28.
6. General Accounting Office, p. 4.
7. Scott, p. 25.
8. General Accounting Office, p. 7.
9. Scott, p. 36.
10. Ibid., p. 26.
11. U.S. Congress, Senate, Desert Shield/Storm Air Mobility
Command’s Achievement and Lessons for the Future, General
Accounting Office Report, 1993, p. 27.
12. Kenneth C. Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned,
Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995, p. 14.
13. Ibid., p. 16.
14. Ibid., p. 18.
15. Ibid., p. 3.
16. David T. Stahl and S. L. Arnold, “A Power Projection Army in
Operations Other Than War,” Parameters, Vol. XXIII, No.4, Winter
1993-1994, p. 11.
17. Jeanette K. Edmunds, “Organizing Logistics for Peace and War:
The Necessity of a Trained Joint Logistics Support Command
Headquarters,” in Essays On Strategy, Vol. XIII, Washington: National
Defense University Press, 1996, p. 235.
18. David B. Kassing, Transporting the Army for Operation
RESTORE HOPE, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994, p. xii.
19. Ibid., p. 13.
91
20. Allard, p. 46.
21. Ibid., p. 47.
22. Department of the Army, UNOSOM II Lessons Learned, Fort
Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1996, p. II-10-21.
23. Edmunds, p. 139.
24. Ibid., p. 140.
25. Headquarters U.S. European Command, Operation SUPPORT
HOPE, 1994 After Action Review, 1995, p. 2.
26. Ibid., p. 34.
27. Ibid., p. 14-4.
28. Ibid., p. 8-4.
29. Ibid., p. 8-5.
30. Ibid., p. 14-9.
31. Ibid., p. 8-2.
32. Department of the Army, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR Task
Force Eagle Initial Operations, Fort Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned,
May 1996, p. ix.
33. Ibid., p. 9.
34. Ibid., p. 5.
35. Ibid., p. 13.
36. Ibid., p. 163.
37. Ibid., p. 164.
38. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Total Asset Visibility
Implementation Plan, Washington, November 1995, p. 1-5.
39. Ibid., p. 2-3.
40. Ibid., p. 6-4.
92
CHAPTER 5
LOGISTIC SUPPORT
TO THE ARMY AFTER NEXT WARFIGHTERS:
A TIME FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
Gary J. Motsek
PROLOGUE
Captain Mike Thomas did a quick check of his info
screens. He had just ordered his battle team to disengage
from contact with the foe. With dominant battlefield
awareness, he knew the Joint Task Force J-3 could keep
“eyes” on the enemy and redirect other teams to swarm in and
engage them according to the plan. His group of seven mobile
assault vehicles (each with a two-man crew operating
ground and air defense weapon systems) was in pretty good
shape. Nobody killed or injured, the bio-monitors on his
people showed him that. Fuel and ammunition, according to
the readouts, were low, and two vehicles had significant
damage. Imbedded onboard diagnostics were performing
the required emergency repairs, and both could still move
under their own power. If either failed completely, the
support scavenger team would retrieve the vehicle and crew.
Those same systems had already transmitted back to the
loggies which locally replaceable units had failed and
ordered the replacements needed to bring the vehicles to full
capability. Thomas verbally instructed his display to show
his next refit/rearm location. As expected, nothing was there
yet. Large logistic points were just too tempting a target for
the enemy. Nonetheless, Mike saw on his screen the icons of
the support elements rapidly converging to the point
designated for his team and the several other points for his
counterpart teams. Clearly, they would be up and running by
the time he gave the command to sortie his folks to the
location. The team would receive its critical materiel and
93
repairs, and then, just as quickly, the logistic elements
would disperse. Both combat and support forces constantly
worked to stay “demassed” until absolutely necessary.
Momentarily, his thoughts wandered to the historical study
he had read of the revolutionary way warfare changed in the
20 years between the 20th century world wars. The 25 years
following Operation DESERT STORM brought their own
changes as well, especially in support. Heck, the sergeant
major still talks about the old “sneaker net Army” and
transporting floppy disks of supply data around the
battlefield to get a repair part or a round of ammunition.
You’ve got to wonder how they ever won a war.
INTRODUCTION
How will logisticians support the battles of the future?
Do the techniques and procedures of today have to be
fundamentally altered? Why?
It is generally accepted that we are in a period of
profound change for the U.S. military. The degree of this
tran sforma tion is unc er tai n, and ther e i s wi d e
disagreement whether the change will be evolutionary and
incremental or truly revolutionary and radical. The fact is
that the technology of the world, and information
technology in particular, is advancing at a profound rate
which virtually assures change for the military. Joint Vision
2010, issued in order to shape and focus the near future,
acknowledges the emerging importance of information
superiority.1 The Army, through Force XXI initiatives and
Army Vision 2010, has articulated a similar picture of
leveraging technology to gain information dominance and
superiority directed to the same ends.2 In fact, the Army is
already extending the institutional long range vision
beyond the year 2010 horizon to the 2025 timeframe under
the aegis of the Army After Next (AAN) effort. The AAN
guidance issued by the Army Chief of Staff is clear—narrow
the gap between heavy and light forces, improve mobility,
enhance firepower, and, finally, revolutionize logistical
concepts.3 As the Army Deputy Chief of Staff puts it bluntly,
94
“Without an RML [Revolution in Military Logistics], there
will be no RMA [revolution in military affairs] or AAN.”4
New technologies must provide agility, support force
projection, reduce excess demand and waste, and be
tailorable to requirements. Only with profound, indeed
revolutionary, changes can we lessen the logistics tail.
Without advances in logistics, an RMA for U.S. forces, and
for the Army in particular, is not possible.5
Why is the commitment to RMA in logistics critical
today? Why is the close of the 1990s an important decision
point? To put it simply,
as we move beyond 2010, most of the major weapon systems
supporting Force XXI will be approaching the end of their life
cycle. The Army will be faced with the decision to either
continue investing in incremental improvements in existing
platforms which could extend their usefulness to about 2025,
or taking the steps required to replace these aging weapon
systems with totally new systems designed to take advantage
of the technological advances which have occurred over the
years.
Force XXI, an incremental step along the way, is not the
RMA. It was initially envisioned to be a rapidly tailorable,
rapidly expandable, and strategically deployable force
capable of supporting the two major regional conflict (MRC)
construct. A key goal was to make these forces lighter
without sacrificing lethality and survivability, but it is
extraordinarily difficult to change the nature of warfighting
radically while retaining existing equipment.7 The 70 ton,
M-1 series tank, with all its strengths and limitations, will
remain through the early 21st century without regard to
informational technology appliques. Force XXI divisions
will see little organizational change since the major existing
systems will still be in place. Important possible exceptions
are the Commanche helicopter and perhaps the Crusader.
New technology may raise the cost to the point at which the
nation can afford only a small high-tech force which will
have difficulty with asymmetric responses.8
95
The Army must be able to perform successfully in a force
projection role deploying primarily from the continental
United States (CONUS). This drives considerations for
major weapon and support systems.
Technology is changing at an exponential rate. The Force XXI
systems may not be the world’s leading warfighting systems if
we do not improve them over time. Technology growth will
require organization changes in both the assets and business
practices used. This march of technology will result in the need
for spending more time and money to keep ourselves and
products current.
If we retain the existing systems, only marginal
improvements are possible. The Division XXI Tables of
Organization and Equipment show no important changes in
th e Div ision Su pp or t Command other than the
consolidation of maintenance resources from the maneuver
brigades. The primary weapon systems remain the same,
the logistical burden remains essentially constant. As the
Air Force demonstrated with the C-17, one must specifically
design the new platform with reduced support, but
streamlined C-17 support procedures cannot be applied
backward to the existing C-5 fleet. Likewise, unless the
probability of hit and kill per round from a given weapon
system markedly improves, logisticians still need to provide
the warfighter with essentially the same number of rounds
as today. Improving probability of kill from 77 to 80 percent
has only a marginal effect on the support structure, which
measures resupply in terms of truckloads.
If the way the land force maneuvers, moves, and fights
changes because of profound improvements in the
capabilities of their platforms, the logistical tail can and
must be changed as well. A logistician that cannot keep up
or see the friendly forces, cannot adequately support. If the
combat platforms dramatically increase in speed and
maneuver, support vehicles must have a commensurate
improvement. The two systems are inextricably linked.
96
THE NEAR FUTURE PICTURE
In the broadest terms, Joint Vision 2010 considers
focused logistics as one of the four key operational concepts.
Army Vision 2010 complements this with a pattern of
operation entitled “Sustain the Force,” one of five key
patterns listed in the document. The Force XXI effort
establishes the framework and environment for the Army
Strategic Logistics Plan which in turn provides focus to
synchronize Army logistics support for this near future
force.10 The Army Strategic Logistics Plan postulates
profound re-engineering and redesign of the logistics
community and possibly profound cultural changes as well.
This radical approach is not reflected within existing Force
XXI force documents, which is based rather upon a level of
iterative change and leveraging of some technology
enablers along the way to a more radical future.
When Joint Vision 2010 is largely realized, the battlefield of the past will be largely replaced by a nonlinear
battlespace. 11 U.S. forces, through information and
technological innovations, will have achieved dominant
maneuver, increased ability for precision engagement, more
control of the battlespace through full dimensional
protection, and some measure of focused logistics.
What happens to logistics with this near future force?
The vision documents perceive:
the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation
technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift
assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics
packages and sustainment directly at the strategic,
operational, and tactical level of operations.12
Yet, additional technological enhancement is the key to
achieving logistical improvements in this timeframe, since
the force will still be utilizing today’s support systems
(wheeled trucks, palletized loading system, rotary and fixed
wing aircraft). Clearly, reducing the size of theater stocks,
the iron mountains of the past, will make the logistical tail
97
of the fighting force smaller and more agile. Logistics are
more predictive, responsive, and visible to the operators and
those supported; large, brute-force push packages have
been largely supplanted by smaller, rapidly moving pull
packages; the past practice of physically stockpiling 30 days
or more of supplies in theater for everything the warfighter
believed he needed are gone. On-ground stockpiles of
critical items are measured in terms of 2, 3, or 5 days of
supply. The goal is affordable and responsive support that is
modular and thus tailorable to mission requirements.
The 2010 logisticians should enjoy a mature capability of
total asset visibility (TAV) for materiel and personnel.
Through the interconnection of new and legacy information
and management systems, a worldwide asset picture should
be available. However, some of those same legacy systems
will inevitably inhibit complete real-time access and
operation. The Global Combat Support System (GCSS), the
logistical component of the Global Command and Control
System (GCCS), has established the common information/
communication technology environment. Until all
subsystems are compliant and interactive, logisticians will
be constrained by some aged information. Despite these
limitations, the supported warfighter should see a
dramatically improved snapshot of all resources allocated to
him. The resources no longer need to be physically in the
theater. Admittedly, this is the military equivalent of
commercial “just in time” delivery, a profound cultural
change for a warfighter. It can result in a controlled supply
rate, established by the warfighter, for all classes of supply
wherein resources are allocated strictly for the mission at
hand—with confidence that the follow-on mission will be
preceded by follow-on supplies. In other words, you get only
what you need, not what you want.
Velocity Management should be the accepted doctrine of
the time. It posits a responsive transportation system to
further reduce in-place stockpile requirements. The
capability of a “FEDEX style” package delivery is available
98
for rapid delivery of low density, high value, and critical
items wherever needed.
“Stovepipe” logistics have been significantly reduced
with increased reliance and compliance of the GCSS
environment. The captains trained in the late 1990s at a
common logistics advanced course will now be the colonels
in command of multi-functional units which are modular
and capable of reconfiguration based upon mission
requirements. These colonels’ most important function is to
serve as Battle Command Logisticians who command the
logistics elements and provide all of the tactical warfighting
support. Logistical command layers have been reduced, and
nonvalue-added accounting and management steps largely
eliminated. The multi-functional elements have direct
access to national logistical information, can fix by
replacement or evacuation, and handle all resupply
coordination.13
Although the United States should enjoy dominant
battlefield awareness, there is a recognition that centers of
gravity and critical points need to be reduced. For
logisticians, this will provide additional incentive to avoid
large static piles of materiel within the battlespace. Tactical
and operational logisticians will “reach back” as far as
necessary, even to the CONUS base, to fulfill requirements
while keeping the battlespace logistical footprint small.
Although not consolidated, there will be increased
cooperation among the logistical components of the services,
the Defense Logistics Agency, and private industry.
Common application of electronic management and
information systems will create linkages from factory to
foxhole, with the civil sector assuming more responsibility
for warehousing, maintenance, and materiel management
at one end of the pipeline and the Logistic Civil
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) at the other.14 The
Army will still have both Table of Organization and
Equipment (TO&E) and Table of Distribution and
Allowances (TDA) units within the logistics structure,
99
although they will be composed of smaller modular units
that, at the appropriate level, are capable of task
organization.
Finally, it should be recognized that there are at least
two tiers of forces within the Army. Clearly, the Army
cannot equip the full force with the digital technology
presently being evaluated by the experimental force
(EXFOR) of the 4th Infantry Division. A corps, perhaps two
at the maximum, will be equipped with the necessary
appliques and provided the additional resources, such as
improved communications, to meet the desired capabilities
of Force XXI and Army Vision 2010. Logisticians will likely
be expected to support two tiers of active combat forces and
additional tiers in the reserve structure.
In summary, logistics in 2025 will have changed. Instead
of forward deployed resources, the bulk of stocks will be
CONUS based. The focus is no longer the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) environment of Europe, but
one of rapid response to a variety of locations and multiple
missions. Massive in-place stockpiles are largely
supplanted by a responsive, high velocity transportation
system. Asset visibility has been markedly improved.15
Finally, although joint operations are the norm, the
individual services’ Title 10 responsibilities, which include
sustainment of the force, remain fundamentally unchanged
a lth ou g h in creas i ngl y c hal l enged by other DoD
organizations, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the
Department of Defense Information Systems Agency, which
push inexorably towards consolidation.
THE FUTURE OF ARMY AFTER NEXT (AAN)
Given that Force XXI and Army Vision 2010 provide the
template for the interim force that is largely composed of
existing platforms, some predictions can be made of the
AAN future, where those same platforms finally have been
replaced. The specific year of the future, 2020, 2025, or
whatever, is not as critical as acceptance of the assumption
100
that new systems will continue to build upon and further
develop the trends of the interim force. For example, one can
reasonably assume that information and communication
technologies will continue to develop to improve our ability
to see the battlefield in real time and that larger and larger
volumes of data will be handled as a matter of course.
Similarly, if we intend to further develop the enablers of
Army Vision 2010, the M-1 tank replacement will likely be
lighter (to enhance strategic mobility and power projection),
multi-capable (possessing ground and air attack
capability?), and equipped with integral and embedded
technologies that could only be crudely replicated by the
appliques of the past. One need only consider the embedded
computer and diagnostic capability of a 1997 commercial
automobile as compared with a car of 25 years ago to
visualize the possible technology jump. On-board systems
will monitor performance and consumption rates, predict
and diagnose potential and real failures (at 99+ percent
accuracy), and digitally link to the supporting logisticians.
Decreased consumption rates for the two largest classes of
supply, III (fuel), and V (ammunition) should further
diminish the logistical footprint. Vehicle energy costs could
be reduced by as much as 50 percent. Through the use of
new materials ammunition packaging could have 30
percent less weight and volume.16 Line unit replacement of
failed components can be performed on many sub-systems
by the operator crew without technician intervention.
What appears to be generally consistent among the AAN
fighting concepts is that the battle force will have radically
increased mobility, and will have all combat operating
systems organic to it.17 Some combat organizations will
strategically deploy directly from CONUS. This suggests an
ability to transition directly from the strategic movement to
combat without pause. Forces will be increasingly joint in
character and composition, single service operations being
an exception to the rule. The command and control
structure will become even flatter, cellular rather than
hierarchical, with fewer levels of intermediate command.18
101
Operational orders and schemes of maneuver will be
transmitted immediately to all subordinate commanders
from the primary planner.
Technology will continue to improve battlefield
awareness. Although the United States is likely to maintain
dominance, the technologies associated with this awareness
are increasingly available on the commercial market for use
by potential enemies. Even rogue nations and their warriors
will have access to cheap satellite imaging and pinpoint
navigation systems.19 This further increases the need for
friendly forces to avoid presenting centers of gravity or
critical points. To stay massed invites attack. Therefore,
forces will have developed a swarming scheme of maneuver.
Combat forces remain demassed in numerous small
elements and, when directed, mass to concentrate
overwhelming power for short periods of time. Upon order,
they again demass. This cycle of sorties continues until the
enemy is defeated. Because of dominant battlefield
awareness, contact does not have to be maintained to fix the
enemy. It provides the ground force commanders their
picture of the battlespace much the same way the present
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) provides
the Air Force a full picture of its operational space. Because
of this knowledge of the enemies’ location, friendly forces
may sortie in and out of the immediate battlespace. The
concepts of dominant maneuver and precision engagement
become complementary.20 Ground forces of tomorrow could
maneuver to position advantage the same way a combat
aircraft is directed towards the target area by AWACS
controllers today, then strike from that location with
precision and immediately leave the area.
This constant massing and demassing of forces is
possible only with the maturation of the operational
concepts of Joint Vision 2010 and the necessary technology.
It suggests that the bulk of critical logistical support (fix,
fuel, arm) are provided during those times when the battle
force is demassed. It suggests that logistical support forces
will have many of the characteristics of the battle forces.
102
Just as the combat forces mass only when required, the
logistical elements will do likewise and form support
locations only as required, quickly diffusing when the
immediate support mission is accomplished. The joint task
force J-3 and J-4 will have to work current operations in
close coordination and harmonization. Logisticians within
the battlespace will have to become experts in maneuver.
The movements and massing/demassing of the combat and
logistical forces must be carefully synchronized to assure
success.
Within the battlespace, the logistician’s main protection
is the same battlefield awareness enjoyed by his combat
compatriot. The combat team leaders and their supporting
logisticians must see and work with a common battlefield
picture, common planning tools, and common predictive
models. A key capability of the vehicles supporting the
battle force must be equality in range and speed. The
envisioned battlespace is not linear, meaning that
logisticians must quickly maneuver to meet the combat
forces in temporary relatively safe spaces scattered around
the area of operation.
Fixed and slow-moving targets will fare poorly on tomorrow’s
battlefield. Any object with a fixed latitude and longitude can
be targeted (with low-cost, highly accurate aiming systems)
and struck. These weapons will use a combination of improved
gyroscopes and accelerometers, navigational devices, global
position system (GPS) satellites, and local positioning signals
from pre-positioned emitters.21
Additionally, speed provides protection in itself and
offsets the lack of other forms of protection by limiting
exposure in dangerous areas. To provide the logistic
vehicles with heavy protection approximating the fighting
force would necessarily limit their load capacity. Every
pound of armor is one less pound of support materiel. This
tradeoff, again, is not unlike the support arms of the sister
services, which do not heavily armor tankers (air or sea) or
supply ships. The support ships (or aircraft) rapidly move in
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and then move out, their speed and short time exposure
being their primary protection.
Outside the immediate battle area in relatively safer
zones, logisticians may operate mobile bases that provide
more extensive support. This could include prepositioned
afloat intermediate support bases consisting of ships
designed for a support function, which is a logical extension
of the present Marine Corps concept of ship-based logistics.
Combat forces could move to these safe areas and obtain
resupplies fabricated from raw materials, as well as
availing themselves of creature comfort supply and
services. Combat systems would have major battle damage
repaired and components with a predicted failure replaced.
The battlespace logisticians reach back to these bases for
their resupply.
“Procurement agility” becomes a strategic matter, and
national resources, because there is total visibility of assets
and capability, can be leveraged to support the battle
directly.22 Requirements may be placed directly on the
industrial base with a “just in time” delivery directly to the
battlespace. In fact, this principle is implemented today
with Class VIII medical materiel requirements sent directly
from the commercial supplier to the user. We will need a
cultural shift from unit ownership of resources to national
ownership, though the unit will require the discipline of
management responsibility. Although located in a specific
location, unit resources are part of the national “virtual
warehouse” under consolidated materiel management.
Thus with an integrated distribution system (with mature
Velocity Management), an item in unit stockage, such as an
Army standard load (ASL) or basic load (or their AAN
equivalents), will be available for a contingency across the
world if not specifically authorized retention due to an
authorized higher priority.
Who controls logistic support and these priorities of
materiel in behalf of the warfighter? As envisioned, only
those supporters operating directly in the battlespace are
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under the direct command and control of the geographical
commander-in-chief (CINC) or joint task force (JTF)
commander. Unlike the present environment where
support is fragmented among the service commodity
commands and DoD agencies, the rest of the logistic
structure “tail” is envisioned to be under the control of a
single commander. This change is akin to the previous
consolidation of service strategic transportation resources
and their control and management under the United States
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Like that
consolidation of service resources under a single supporting
CINC, there is tremendous opposition to this concept and
organization. It directly challenges the services and would
be a direct attack on their U.S. Code Title 10 responsibilities
to “equip the force.” Yet, these responsibilities have already
been eroded in other areas as well, such as with the
establishment of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in
1962. Today DLA:
manages and purchases items used by all military services
and some civilian agencies, including fuel, food, clothing,
medical supplies, construction material, and the hardware
and electronic items used in the maintenance and repair of
military equipment.
Additionally, the Army itself serves as the DoD
executive agent for most conventional Class V ammunition
and munitions for all the services. The contracted LOGCAP
support, initially envisioned to support Army soldiers, has
now routinely expanded to support all forces within the joint
task force. These three cases demonstrate that Congress or
the Secretary of Defense will modify the means of support,
Title 10 notwithstanding. Consolidation of responsibilities
and functions should improve the effectiveness and the
efficiency of the armed forces.
The next reasonable consolidation of functions to
support the AAN is the establishment of a national level
logistics provider. As in the Division XXI design where
support was removed from the maneuver brigades and
105
consolidated in the Division Support Command (DISCOM),
the same general logic applies at the higher echelons. As
envisioned by the Logistics Integration Agency:
The Army National Provider contains the national level
capability to manage, resource, and control the materiel
management, maintenance, procurement, distribution, and
deployment functions for the Army or other joint and combined
customers. The Army National Provider brings the full power of
the National Logistics Base (DoD Civilian resources as well as
our U.S. Industrial Base), to satisfy the logistics needs of the
supported CINC over a seamless pipeline of support that
extends directly to the warfighting element.24
The National Provider is responsible for filling the
common pipeline to the warfighting CINCs and owns all
resources above that which is traditionally accepted as
direct support. This system fundamentally changes the
concept of ownership of stocks, whatever the class. A unit
may maintain a stock and store it, but it remains under the
ownership of the National Provider who may direct usage
elsewhere. Lest we think this is too revolutionary, we
should recall that overseas Army Class V stocks are treated
in this way today, with only a fraction of the in-theater
stocks actually “owned” by the geographical CINC. The
remainder may be swung to whomever the national
priorities dictate. Likewise, prepositioned afloat resources
may be directed wherever needed.
The National Provider would also control DoD industrial
operations and maintain the contractual relationships with
the civilian industrial base. Again, comparison with
TRANSCOM cannot be avoided. CINCTRANS is the single
DoD point of focus to contract and leverage civilian
transportation resources to support the requirements of
plans and ongoing operations. TRANSCOM performs the
transportation feasibility analysis and determines whether
national transportation resources can adequately support
strategic operation plans. Likewise, the National Logistics
Provider (CINCLOG) would do the same. There would be a
single command to define the requirements, contract with
106
the industrial base, keep warm key operations, maintain
key stocks, and ensure a seamless plug-in to the battle area
logisticians. This command would determine the logistical
feasibility of the plans of warfighting CINCs. There would
be one voice for strategic and operational logistic support.
Because of the existing responsibilities already
incumbent on the Army to support other forces and
establish common lines of communication, maintain the
LOGCAP contract, and control most wholesale Class V, it is
a logical candidate to serve as the National Provider. Just as
the commander of the Air Force Air Mobility Command is
dual hatted as CINCTRANS, the commander of the Army
Materiel Command could also serve concurrently as
CINCLOG.
PITFALLS AND CONCLUSIONS
The envisioned logistical organization for the forces of
the Army After Next clearly brings with it an additional set
of risks which must be carefully considered. First, it is
unlikely that the Army will have the resources to fully
modernize the entire force. There will be, inevitably, tiered
forces. Some, perhaps only the “tip of the spear,” will be a
fully modernized battle force. The remainder of the Army
will remain more traditional, probably similar to the forces
of today. The logistical structure in place must be flexible
enough to accommodate multi-tiered forces.
Secondly, the logisticians within the battlespace must
have high-speed mobility comparable to that of the force
being supported. The nonlinear nature of the battle and the
fact that the logisticians are maneuvering constantly to
support the battle swarms require this capability. Organic
transport capability to provide such high-speed mobility
must be provided.
Finally, without a CINCLOG, it is unclear how the
resources of the nation could be effectively focused to
provide the necessary support in light of the inevitable
reductions of stocks available to DoD. The “iron mountains”
107
are to be eliminated, and their replacement, the “virtual
mountains” located throughout the world, must be managed
and allocated according to national priorities.
These steps represent fundamental cultural changes in
the way logisticians support and how the warfighters
measure it. The new system gives up proven but excessively
expensive ways of doing the support business in exchange
for major technological innovation. It requires unparalleled
trust, coordination, and synchronization between the
G/J-3s and G/J-4s of the future. It is indeed a revolution in
logistical affairs which, if successful, will help provide the
funds, through substantial savings in stocks, to modernize
the force. The choice for the Army is actually quite simple:
stay with the existing logistical organization, structure, and
functions and have, at best, an evolutionary change in force
capability; or take the visionary approach, leverage the
information age and other technologies, and revolutionize
logistics.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5
1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010,
Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996, p. 16.
2. Army Chief of Staff, Army Vision 2010, Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of the Army, 1996, p. 10.
3. Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, briefing, “The Army After Next Project. Current
Thoughts on the Army After Next,” 1996.
4. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Revolution in Military
Logistics, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1997, p. 18.
5. Scientific Applications International Corporation, Contract
#MDA-903-93-D-0020, Proceedings of Workshop III on Dominating
Maneuver and the RMA, 1995, p. 10.
6. Department of the Army, ODCSLOG, Revolution in Military
Logistics (Draft 1 Release), Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the
Army, September 11, 1996, p. 17.
108
7. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC PAM
525-5, Force XXI Operations, Fort Monroe, VA, August 1, 1994), p. 3-1.
8. Steven Metz, et al., The Future of American Landpower:
Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War
College, 1996, p. 13.
9. Department of the Army, ODCSLOG, p. 17.
10. Logistics Integration Agency, The Army Strategic Logistics Plan
Battlespace Logistics—The Vision, Alexandria, VA, undated, p. 4.
11. Charles Link, “21st Century Armed Forces-Joint Vision 2010,”
Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1995, pp. 69-73.
12. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 24.
13. Logistics Integration Agency, pp. 6-7.
14. U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, pp. 3-14, 3-15.
15. Department of the Army, Functional Area Assessment of the
Army Title 10 Functions “Equip/Supply/Maintain” (Draft Interim
Report), Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 20,
1995, p. III-5.
16. U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, CSS Technology
Vision for Army After Next, Information Papers, August 27, 1996.
17. Scientific Applications International Corporation, Contract
#DASW-01-95-D-0060, Dominating Maneuver Workshop IV Summary
Report, 1996, tab c.
18. Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, Briefing, The Army After Next Project. Emerging
Impressions. 1996.
19. Jake Tapper, “A Nation’s Future Foretold,” George, February
1997, pp. 68-77.
20. Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, Briefing, The Army After Next Project. Current
Thoughts on the Army After Next.
21. National Defense University Institute for National Strategic
Studies, Project 2025, Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 1991, p. 37.
109
22. Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, Briefing, The Army After Next Project. Emerging
Impressions.
23. George T. Babbitt, “Meeting Today’s Logistics Challenges,”
Issue 1, Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997, p.
7.
24. Logistics Integration Agency, p. 9
110
CHAPTER 6
MANAGING THE INTELLIGENT
INFORMATION GRID
FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT
Paul T. Hengst
[Editor’s Note: Virtually everything associated with
future thinking about warfare depends upon a fully
functioning intelligence system. Entire sensor suites are
supposed to be able to locate every friendly element and
most enemy elements, too. Distributed communications are
supposed to enable many-to-many communications so that
individual action within the commander’s intent will
produce an overwhelming effect upon the enemy.
Lieutenant Colonel Hengst describes what this system
must look like and then asks whether we are, in fact, headed
in the right direction. DVJ]
THE INTELLIGENT INFORMATION GRID
Information superiority will be key to the Army After
Next (AAN).1 To achieve this superiority, the AAN will rely
on information networks. These networks will be combined
to form “a single grid so powerful and intelligent that it will
be able to provide common situational awareness to friendly
forces, real-time intelligence on enemy forces and fire
control.”2 This intelligent information grid (I2G) will be
capable of connecting the multitude of sensors and
information systems together into a seamless information
environment.
Decreases in Department of Defense (DoD) funding and
manpower are driving planners to develop a grid that will
operate in a “management-by-exception mode without
human interface.”3 It will represent an enormous departure
from current network management techniques where
111
thousands of people perform day-to-day network
management functions. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the I2G.
WHAT THE I2G MAY LOOK LIKE
The best analogy to what the I2G should look like is the
human nervous system. That system is a remarkable
information-sensor network of hundreds of miles of nerves
running through the body connecting all the major sensory
centers. The sensors and nerve network work in harmony to
provide the individual total awareness of his surroundings.
Within this network, the brain acts as a central computer,
while the spinal cord is the backbone. Connected to the
spinal cord are the various major nerve bundles that
provide the path for sensory inputs to travel to the brain.
This complex network foresees problems and responds to
threats. Should a major attack on a component of the
network occur, like an injury, the brain automatically
responds so as to limit the damage. The network of nerves
can also be self-healing when minor damage occurs. This
nervous system analogy is so accurate that some AAN
planners have described the I2G as a “living internet.”4
The future challenge is developing control mechanisms
in the I2G that are similar to our nervous system. But,
unlike the homogenous, single, connected network of the
human body, the AAN will still be operating under a
system-of-systems concept in which multiple systems will
exist and be connected together.5 The number of individual
sy stems can b e d i vi d ed i nto two major ar eas,
communications systems and information systems. For
clarity, each area will be discussed as a separate entity.
Communications Systems.
The human nervous system can be broken down into the
brain, spinal cord, and nerves. Similarly, the I2G can be
broken into three key components. First is the backbone
system, analogous to the spinal cord and major nerve
112
bundles, capable of carrying a high capacity of information.
The second area is the local systems that extend from the
backbone to the individual nerves, or users. The final area is
the switching or transfer of signals between local and
backbone systems.6
Backbone Systems. The backbone network will be
comprised of the major communications systems we use
today: satellites, microwave, and cable. No major
technological leap is predicted for backbone systems.
However, developing technology will drive these systems to
ever increasing bandwidths necessary to handle the volume
of expected traffic.
Satellites will become increasingly important for two
major reasons. First is the flexibility needed to move fairly
quickly to extend the backbone to areas without terrestrial
systems; and second is the need to cover large geographic
regions with a single platform. Evolving compression
techniques will increase bandwidth; however, transmission
delays due to distance will still be a limiting factor for
satellites.
The bulk of the terrestrial backbone will continue to be
microwave and cable systems. As in the case of satellites,
technology will continue to push terrestrial systems to
handle larger bandwidths. The current trend to replace
copper-based cable with fiber optic cable will increase
available bandwidth.7
As with our current force, the AAN will contract with
commercial vendors to provide the bulk of the backbone
systems, primarily for economic reasons.8 Expected future
budgets preclude installation, operation, and maintenance
of DoD-unique global communications networks;
technology upgrades necessary to remain state-of-the-art
will require manpower to operate and maintain backbone
systems. In addition, an infrastructure based on
commercial standards will help ensure interoperability.
113
Local Systems. Local systems connect users through
voice and data networks to the backbone. Like the
backbone, DoD will continue to use today’s line-of-sight
radio, cable, single channel satellites, and cellular systems.
Increases in bandwidth are also expected. At this level,
military-unique systems will fill niche requirements
unavailable from commercial vendors.
The local communication system in the AAN will fill two
major requirements. First is portability. 9 Using a
combination of terrestrial and projected space-based
cellular systems, such as IRIDIUM, cellular technology
offers the flexibility necessary to communicate in fluid and
widely dispersed operations.10 Second is that cellular
technology offers a cheap alternative to installing a
permanent cable-based infrastructure.11 This is especially
critical for contingency operations in lesser developed areas.
Local and space based cellular systems will also reduce the
“rolling stock” infrastructure equipment and manpower
currently delivered during deployments.
Switching. Unlike backbone and local systems, which
will see a gradual technological evolution to better, higher
bandwidth systems, switching will undergo two major
technological leaps, the combining of analog and digital
switching and the arrival of the communications unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV).
The development of a single device to quickly switch both
voice and data will greatly reduce the infrastructure
burden. Currently, parallel switched networks are
required: analog for voice and digital for data. The cost of
such parallel networks will be unaffordable in the AAN.
Additionally, parallel networks complicate the information
sharing necessary to create common situational awareness.
Technological improvements in optical switches will also
increase switching speed, preventing the switch from
becoming a bottleneck.12
The second technological leap in switching is the
communications UAV. Used in a quasi-satellite role, UAVs
114
will be used as relay/switching stations between networks.
Future enhancements, like in-flight refueling, will increase
loiter time, making UAVs candidates to supplement or
replace existing military communications satellites.
Additionally, these UAVs could provide the switching link
from terrestrial cellular systems to the space backbone,
particularly for deployments outside the normal
commercial satellite footprint.
In summary, the communications systems of the AAN
can be characterized as a commercial based system
augmented by military assets to create a system-of-systems
grid. The predominant communications architecture at the
local level will be a cellular system based on commercial
standards and protocols. Maximum use will be made of
space based communications platforms. New technological
developments will be integrated into an increasingly fiber
optic based infrastructure.
Information Systems.
The five senses—smell, touch, taste, sight, and
hearing—comprise the sensors of our human system. Input
from the sensors combine with the brain’s stored knowledge
to help us make decisions. In the AAN, information systems
will include the full range of sensors, automated decision
support tools, and databases working in a common
operating environment to aid commanders in decision
making. The processes used by our brain to make these
decisions are analogous to application programs.
C ommon Oper a ti ng Envi r onme nt ( COE) . The
development of the COE will be critical to prevent some of
the information systems problems we currently experience.
A COE provides a common look, touch, sound, and feel to the
user, and COE ensures the interfaces from platform to
platform are consistent.13 The COE attempts to create a
homogenous environment, much like our nervous system,
where data is defined and shared easily between systems. In
order to obtain a common picture of the battlespace and take
115
advantage of the vast amounts of data being collected,
systems must be totally interoperable and capable of
sharing collected data. To ensure this interoperability, the
COE will establish standards for a wide range of items,
including operating systems, communications protocols,
and individual data elements.
Applications. The types of applications working in this
COE will range from military-unique command and control
to administrative. Commercial software industry will
provide the necessary applications; however, some
applications will require development of military-unique
interfaces.
The bulk of the applications developed will be systems
that collect information from a variety of databases. These
databases will be built from the vast number of sensors
expected to be in the AAN information environment. They
will be linked via the I2G to ensure information availability.
These interconnected databases will give an increasing
amount of battlespace information to the commander, and
research is underway to solve information overload
problems.14 Two intertwined concepts, data-mining and
digital agents, will come to fruition in the AAN to assist
commanders in grappling with information overload.
Additionally, by permitting the commander to test multiple
courses of action prior to making final decisions,
simulations will help in managing information overload.
Data-mining is the ability to take advantage of the vast
amounts of data being collected and stored in various, often
unrelated databases. Military applications are just
scratching the surface of this area. In the commercial sector,
data-mining determines individual buying patterns. A
grocer may determine that most customers who purchase a
particular snack food usually buy the same type of soda, and
that they purchase the items late in the week. By placing
the two items close together on the shelf or combining them
in a package, the grocer may increase his sales. The grocer
also establishes delivery dates for both items late in the
116
week to reduce the amount of time he has to warehouse the
items. All the data revealing such purchase patterns are
gathered when the items are scanned at the point of
purchase. Using data-mining concepts, logistics units can
use similar techniques to determine key item delivery
dates. Operational units can use data-mining to correlate
data from multiple sensors to establish possible tactical and
operational patterns, both ours and the enemy’s.
Digital agents are “computer surrogates that possess a
body of knowledge both about something (a process, a field
of interest, a way of doing) and about you in relation to that
someth in g (y ou r tas te, your i nc l i nati on, your
acquaintances).”15 With the perceived glut of information
available to the commander, the use of digital agents will
assist him in profiling critical information requirements
necessary for decisionmaking and could also reduce the
human staffs that now collect and store this critical data.
Simulation is the final piece assisting the commander
with information overload. The nonlinear battlefield has too
many variables for most commanders to assimilate.16
Simulation will allow commanders to pull information into
the simulator, test assumptions, and help determine the
factors critical to success prior to conducting an operation.
Simulations will take into account the multitude of factors
in a nonlinear problem that linear database searches,
employing data-mining or digital agents, cannot.
Additionally, the visual nature of simulations assists the
commander in retaining information in his mind.
The I 2 G, then, will consist of commercial-based
communications systems at the backbone and local level.
The communications systems will link the various
components, sensors, databases, and application programs
into a system-of-systems. Intelligent applications connected
by the I2G will greatly assist the commander in decisionmaking.
117
WHAT TO MANAGE
With the I2G now described, it is necessary to determine
what functions within the grid need to be managed. As
mentioned, the goal is a grid that requires minimum human
intervention. This implies that a certain amount of
intelligence must be built into the systems that make up the
I2G. With 25 years of unfulfilled promises of artificial
intelligence (AI) in the past, it is unlikely that AI will
progress in the next 25 years to the point where no human
intervention is required. Therefore, the I2G will use a
combination of artificial and human intelligence to manage
the major functions of configuration control, security, and
repair.
Configuration Control.
There are three major configuration control areas:
architecture, device addressing, and bandwidth.
Architecture. While not a real-time management
feature, many current problems in network management
are born of a lack of architectural control. Once again, it is
possible to look at the nervous system as an analogy. One of
the beauties of the human body is that underneath the skin
we are pretty much alike. This is not true for our current
information and communications systems. Not having a
standard system architecture, we often rely on one or two
gurus who understand how our systems work. If a problem
occurs and the gurus are gone, nothing happens until they
return. To overcome this problem, a standard architecture
must be adopted. The Army has recently published the
Army Technical Architecture (ATA) to help standardize the
way we put networks together.17 The ATA is also being used
as the baseline for the development of a Joint Technical
Architecture.18 This will help ensure interoperability in the
joint information environment.
Device Addressing. The second issue of configuration
control is knowing what devices are in the network, such as
118
satellites, switches, routers, computers, weapons platforms,
and sensors. The expected fluid nature of warfare in the
AAN requires devices that are self-addressing. Current
manpower intensive addressing schemes, such as call signs
on a radio net, a phone number, or an Internet Protocol
address, will be unacceptable in an era of reduced
manpower. Maximum use will have to be made of intelligent
devices capable of registering themselves in the I2G.
Bandwidth. The final aspect of configuration control is
bandwidth. By controlling the configuration of the
connected devices, the grid should be able to self-configure
to ensure that necessary bandwidth is available to all users.
As noted in the communications system description,
available bandwidth is expected to increase in the AAN;
however, it will still be possible that multiple devices could
overwhelm a particular link, which would decrease
performance for all who use that link. Although irritating
today, it could become life threatening when soldiers and
weapons platforms are waiting for critical intelligence or
“shooting” data. Therefore, certain platforms and sensors
will have to receive priority for the available bandwidth,
with administrative traffic riding in the holes between
priority traffic.
In summary, configuration control will be provided by a
common grid architecture, the addressing scheme of the
device, and, finally, the allocation of bandwidth across the
grid. Critical to the success of configuration control is a
certain degree of intelligence built into the network to
achieve the objective of minimum human intervention.
Security.
The second major function to manage is security, which
must likewise require minimum manpower. The three
major security items that require management are access
security, information assurance, and infrastructure
protection.
119
Access Security. Unlike our current security protection
architecture where we build separate systems of different
security classifications, in the AAN we will have one grid
with access security being provided at the “point-of-entry.”
This is not a new concept and is used in our current voice
networks. For example, the STU-III telephone connected to
a commercial line off-post is just as secure as when it is
connected to a government-owned line on an installation.
Point-of-entry security is now being developed for a variety
of devices, including cellular telephones19 and computers.20
Point-of-entry security implies that we will have achieved a
certain degree of multilevel security, which allows a single
computer to operate at different security levels. The
planned battlefield combat identification system for the
identification of friendly vehicles can be used as a model for
access security. Under this scheme, a device would enter the
grid, be queried for its address and routing information, be
identified as an authorized device, and then be connected to
the I2G.21
Information Assurance. The second area of security is
information assurance. We must retain the ability to protect
the information we are using. Information assurance has
four elements: availability, integrity, confidentiality, and
nonrepudiation. 2 2 Availability assures access to
information by authorized users, integrity protects the
in forma tion from unauthor i zed c hange, whi l e
confidentiality protects the information from unauthorized
disclosure. Finally, nonrepudiation is the undeniable proof
that users are who they say they are. Loss of information
assurance will make all data suspect. Such loss would be
catastrophic to an Army that relies on information to
maintain battlefield dominance.
Infrastructure Protection. The final security area is
infrastructure protection, currently addressed as command
and control warfare in Army Information Operations
terms,23 or as Defensive Information Operations in joint
terms.24 Infrastructure protection is the ability to protect
the grid from attack and takeover. The importance of this
120
issue is well-known, being the driving force behind the
recent President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection.25 The commission examined the “cyber” threats
to the national telecommunications infrastructure. If used
properly, the output of this commission will result in shared
responsibility between government and the commercial
sector to provide adequate infrastructure protection. This
shared responsibility will be critical to a military dependent
on commercial communications systems.
Repair.
The final function to manage is repair. Repair of the I2G
resembles the healing process of our body; some repair is
self-healing, and some requires external intervention.
Similar to the case of configuration control and security,
manpower to perform repair functions must be kept to a
minimum. The loss of manpower combined with the
increasing complexity of network repair will pose a critical
challenge to AAN.26
The complexity of repair will reduce most local
maintenance to no more than item/board replacement.
Diagnostic work will be accomplished through the grid by a
centralized maintenance facility with the intelligent tools
capable of analyzing the full range of possible alternatives.
Individual platforms will have some limited self-diagnostic
capability, but it is unlikely that crew members on
informational weapons platforms like Crusader or
Commanche will be able to do more than board level
replacement.
Like other management functions, the diagnostic repair
tools will require some degree of artificial intelligence. The
greatest technological leap in this area will be in the tools
that not only find the problem, but correct it without human
intervention. These maintenance tools would automatically
create a log of their actions. The log would be reviewed by
maintenance personnel in conjunction with other
intelligent tools as a basis for further action. For example,
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the grid diagnostic tool would notice that a network laser at
a remote unmanned communication node was pulsing too
fast. Automated maintenance tools would take the laser out
of service and activate the backup laser. The action would be
recorded in the log, and the automated maintenance
supervisor tool would prompt the repair person to physically
replace the bad laser with a new one. For catastrophic
problems, the automated maintenance supervisor would
call or page the on-call repair person to immediately
perform the necessary repair.
While we may never fully get away from some manpower
requirements such as hardware replacement, most of the
maintenance functions of the I2G must be self-repairing.
Intelligent programs, able to identify errors and take
corrective measures to repair the damage, are critical in this
area.
WHO MANAGES THE I2G
After identifying what we will manage—the grid and
individual functions—it is necessary to determine who will
do the managing. When asked who controls your body, most
of us would state, “I do.” But what makes up the “I” in the
grid will not be replicated by a single entity as our brain does
for our body. Like today, the I2G will be managed from a
variety of sources, some managing global functions, others
managing local functions.
There will be two factors driving the “who”—jointness
and manpower. Almost all operations will be joint;
therefore, all service elements will require interoperable
systems that are managed by a joint force, although it will
probably not be the Joint Information Corps proposed by
some authors.27
The reduction of manpower will manifest itself in some
type of consortium of commercial vendors and military
units. These two factions will be combined in a virtual
operations cell to manage the function of the grid. Given the
current state of deregulation, there may be a number of
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service providers in the operations cell. The consortium will
conduct a variety of tasks, from day-to-day operations to
standards setting. Military personnel will monitor the
commercial networks and establish priorities between
them. Both the Gulf War and the Force XXI demonstrations
have shown the utility in using contractors to supplement
military communications management.28
The development of a consortium to mange the I2G will
be an evolutionary process. Reliance on commercial vendors
to perform tasks such as logistics, maintenance, and
communications will make this concept more acceptable.
Additionally, joint military and commercial efforts will help
develop relationships necessary to support the transition to
the consortium concept.
WHERE TO MANAGE THE I2G
Thus far, we have examined what to manage in the grid
and who will do the management. It is also necessary to
examine where we will manage the grid. Unlike the human
nervous system, there will not be a single centralized
management center. More likely, the widely dispersed
system-of-systems will be managed at different locations,
with each location being visible to all the other systems.
The majority of these centers will almost certainly be
located in the continental United States (CONUS).
However, recent efforts to complete “a global pact that
would phase out monopolies and restriction on competition”
across the world-wide telecommunications industry may
result in some centers residing in other countries.29
Military management centers will also be in CONUS.
These centers can be collocated with commercial vendors,
but more likely will reside on existing installations with
communications links to the commercial centers. Based on
the amount and type of service being contracted, liaison
officers may be collocated with the commercial vendor.
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A capability will exist to establish deployable forward
mini-centers to give commanders on the ground the ability
to reallocate scarce resources and exercise limited control
over portions of the grid, especially if the grid is established
in a remote area. Additionally, local grid managers will
have the capability of keeping the system running if cut off
from CONUS based management centers. However,
primary management responsibility will remain with the
CONUS centers. This reality argues for deploying the
smallest force and being able to mass quickly, complete the
mission, and disperse the force.
In an age of information warfare, where borders no
longer matter and asynchronous attacks against our
systems are expected, the lack of one central control location
will be an advantage. This de-massification of network
ma n ag emen t wil l enhanc e the r ed und anc y and
survivability of the grid. Therefore, the majority of network
management functions for the I2G will be controlled from
CONUS centers in a tightly coupled military-commercial
management structure. The military will continue to
maintain some type of deployable centers with limited
ability to manage local assets.
IMPLEMENTATION CONCERNS—
ARE WE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?
Some of the changes predicted above are built on
evolutionary change, i.e., use of commercial vendors, while
other changes may be more revolutionary, i.e., UAVs. The
concerns about the success of these concepts can be broken
down into two broad areas, technology and management.
Technology.
Improvements in three technological areas are needed if
the I2G described above is to work. First, there have not
been significant advances in producing artificial
intelligence in almost 40 years.30 Some progress has been
made around the edges, with fuzzy logic and pattern
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recognition, but true intelligence replicating human
analytical reasoning has not occurred. The I2G described
above requires significant artificial intelligence,
particularly self-repair and access control.
Second, like artificial intelligence, much has been
promised in the area of multilevel security, with very
little result. Some products, like the multilevel security
personal computer card, FORTEZZA, may lead to a
breakthrough in this area. Without multilevel security, the
necessary security at the point-of-entry may be more
difficult.
Third is database technology, particularly those
areas that support data-mining and warehousing. It will be
critical to wrap all the sensor information into a framework
understood by the decisionmaker. Without improvement in
the database area, data will be collected and stored, but
commanders will be unable to use it. While the use of digital
agents may assist in this area, there is also a downside to
their use. As we collect information about one topic, we often
incidentally discover information about something else that
adds to our knowledge. By limiting the amount and type of
information to just the few items a digital agent gathers, it
is possible for the commander to miss other information
that could impact on his decision.31
Management.
There are three major concerns with the management of
the I2G: reliance on commercial systems, funding, and
necessary future decisions.
Commercial Systems. The I2G will rely predominantly
on commercial systems. While this is not a great leap from
where we are today, changes in the nature of the
telecommunications business, such as global business
groups and deregulation, will greatly change the way we
interact with the vendors. The critical point is how the
business world responds to what the military perceives as a
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crisis situation. As we rediscovered in the Gulf War, we
cannot always adequately predict what assets we will
need.32 If limited assets are available, service providers may
have to choose between military units and commercial
customers to increase profits or support a crisis. This
becomes particularly challenging as telecommunications
companies take on a more multi-national role, and appeals
to patriotism cease to resonate. This may require changes in
contracting mechanisms to support military requirements
in times of crisis. A communications program similar in
principle to the Air Force Civil Reserve Air Fleet program is
another possible option.
Funding. We rely on commercial systems for funding
because we cannot afford to replicate the global networks
commercial vendors have built. This will not change in the
future and defines us as simply another customer in the
open market. Vendors will continue to find new and unique
ways of billing, which could increase our overall information
costs. This is particularly true for funding contingency
operations, where contractual agreements may not exist.
Sufficient funding will be necessary to take advantage of
technological gains and, in some military-unique cases,
push research. Trying to balance manpower, technology,
and systems fielding will be difficult with limited funding.
However, the recent decision by the Army’s Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations to skip a generation of equipment and
concentrate on information technology should assist in
focusing available funding.33 Finally, funding must be made
available to upgrade our installation infrastructure,
especially replacing copper and lead cable unable to handle
the expected bandwidth requirements of future information
systems.
Necessary Future Decisions. The final management area
concerns future decisions. These decisions encompass
dev elopmen t resp onsi bi l i ty, ac qui s i ti on, r i sk,
interoperability, and training.
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The overall requirement to develop an I2G must be
assigned to one organization. Currently the services and
separate DoD agencies are working on unique systems,
often without coordination. The Defense Information
System Agency or Assistant Secretary of Defense C3I may
be in the best position to pull the individual efforts together,
including continuation of the current move toward a Joint
Technical Architecture.
T h e I 2 G will not c ome to f r ui ti on unti l the
acquisition/procurement problem is fixed. Given a 12-18
months life span of most computer related equipment, the
time now required to obtain state-of-the-art information
technology is unacceptable. Strides have been made with
the procurement of commercial-off-the-shelf products, but,
if we continue with current methods, information
technology will continue to outpace our ability to put the
latest technology in the hands of the soldiers. Additionally,
leaders and managers must accept some individual
responsibility for funding upgrades instead of waiting for
everything to be pushed down from higher levels.
The Army will have to accept the risk of using
commercial systems or it will have to fund a separate
communications infrastructure which it cannot afford. The
crux of the problem is weighing the potential information
warfare (IW) threat against the billions of dollars it may
take to build an alternative global system. Building
separate systems will be expensive in both equipment and
manpower, but it significantly lowers IW risk. Complicating
the decision is determining whether an IW attack
constitutes an attack on the homeland and whether it
necessitates a military response.
To improve interoperability, tactical communication
systems, like Mobile Subscriber Equipment, must work
smoothly with commercial systems. This requires some
equipment/technological changes as well as policy changes.
Multi-level security equipment expected to be fielded in the
next 5-10 years should help to resolve the policy issue of
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classified networks being connected to unclassified
networks. Seamless communications from deployed
locations to CONUS installations cannot truly be
accomplished until the link between tactical and
commercial systems is fixed.
The final issue that must be addressed is training. One
author has called for the immediate training in
knowledge-based warfare for “soldiers, sailors, marines,
and airmen at all levels of professional military
education.”34 This is necessary if we are to understand not
only how to operate and maintain the I2G, but also take
advantage of the opportunity it offers in the way of
information operations.
CONCLUSIONS
The AAN will require an I2G capable of supporting the
commander’s information needs. The human nervous
systems provides the architects of the I2G the best example
of what the grid should be. It should be a self-controlling and
self-healing grid that users can plug into anywhere in the
world. Technology will not fully take care of all grid
management requirements. Therefore, human intervention
will be necessary, but must be kept to a minimum in light of
dwindling manpower resources.
The critical functions the I2G must manage include
architecture, device addressing, and bandwidth. Of these,
architecture may be solved in the not too distant future
when all services will be using a common joint architecture
developed from the Army Technical Architecture model.
Device addressing will be critical to quickly linking the full
array of sensors, information systems, and communications
devices to the grid. Progress will have to be made in
database technology to fully solve the device addressing
issue. Finally, bandwidth may no longer be a problem as
new techniques and mediums increase the amount of
bandwidth available. However, in crisis or outages,
128
bandwidth will still have to be managed and allocated to
high priority users.
Security will continue to be a major concern in the AAN,
particularly as we become completely reliant on
information technology. The threat of an asymmetrical
attack against our information systems will continue to
drive security technology. Of particular concern is the
access security necessary to validate each device in the
network and the assurance that the information is secure.
Finally, we must protect the infrastructure from attack.
The I2G will be managed by a consortium of business and
military personnel from locations primarily in CONUS. We
will continue to rely on commercial communications
systems to provide the bulk of our communications
requirements. The rapid changes in the telecommunications industry will drive us to establish new ways of doing
business. For example, new statutory and contractual
instruments that provide for the reallocation of critical
communications infrastructure in times of crisis will be
required.
The proposed management of the I2G is cause for
concern. Technological issues in database technology,
multi-level security, and artificial intelligence may delay
the development of the I 2 G. Additionally, without
establishing working relationships with commercial
vendors and assurance of funding, the I2G can not be
realized.
The creation of an I2G has already started, with the
linking of current communications and information
systems. However, at best it could be described as a
conglomeration of often non-interoperable, manpowerintensive systems unable to share information. This
conglomeration must be turned into a seamless information
grid capable of providing commanders with the necessary
information tools to aid in decisionmaking. All of this must
be accomplished with a minimum of human intervention.
129
Without an I2G, the information dominance necessary to
achieve success in the AAN will not be obtainable.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6
1. “Information superiority is the ability to collect, process, and
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.” John M. Shalikashvili,
Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1996, p. 16.
2. TRADOC Annual Report to the Chief of Staff of the Army on Army
After Next Project, Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command
Army After Next Staff, June 1996, p. 13.
3. Ibid.
4. The term “living internet” or internetted “living” system of
systems is from the Training and Doctrine Command Army After Next
briefing to the U.S. Army War College Army After Next Advanced
Course on October 23, 1996.
5. William A. Owens, “The Emerging System of Systems,” US
Naval Proceedings Vol. 121/5/1,107, May 1995, p. 37; and Thomas G.
Mahnken, “War in the Information Age,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 16,
Winter 1995-96, p. 40.
6. Switching in this context takes in the entire range of switches,
routers, and other devices used to switch signals between systems.
7. Vincent W. S. Chan, “All-Optical Networks,” Scientific
American, Vol. 273, No. 3, September 1995, p. 73; and David L. Osborne,
Domestic Trends to the Year 2015, Forecasts for the United States,
Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 1991, p. 190.
8. Robert K. Ackerman, “Digital Formats Complicate Information
Security Tasks,” Signal, Vol. 51, No. 6, February 1997, p. 22.
9. George I. Zysman, “Wireless Networks,” Scientific American,
Vol. 273, No. 3, September 1995, p. 71.
10. When it becomes operational in 1998, the IRIDIUM system will
provide portable, universal service through a constellation of 66
satellites in low earth orbit. Subscribers will use pocket-size, hand-held
IRIDIUM telephones transmitting through digital facilities to
communicate with any other telephone in the world. The IRIDIUM
system is being financed by an international investor consortium to
130
telecommunications and industrial companies. “IRIDIUM” available
from http://www.computerreview.com /iridium.htm; Internet, access
March 15, 1997; and “Totally Global, Global Mobile Personal
Communications by Satellite Offers New Vision,” Iridium on line
magazine, Fall 1996, available from http://www.iridium.com/public/
fall/pubcov.html; Internet, access February 20, 1997.
11. Zysman, p. 70; and Sheldon Teitelbaum, “Cellular Obsession,”
Wired, Ed. 5.01, January 1997, p. 147.
12. During a visit to Lucent Technology Center in Homdel, NJ, the
author was briefed on an all-fiber switch that was being developed; and
Chan, p. 73.
13. Shawn Butler, David Diskin, Norman Howes, and Kathleen
Jordan, “Architectural Design of the Common Operating Environment
for the Global Command and Control System,” IEEE Software, Internet,
http://www.computer.org/pubs/software/extras/butler/butler.htm,
accessed March 15, 1997, p 8.
14. Andrew C. Braunberg, “Brain’s Affinity for Imagery Eases
Information Overload,” Signal, Vol. 51, No 4, December 1996, p. 49. Also
see Lawrence E. Casper, Irving L. Halter, Earl W. Powers, Paul J. Selva,
Thomas W. Steffens, and T. Lamar Willis, “Knowledge-Based Warfare:
A Security Strategy for the Next Century,” Joint Force Quarterly, No.
13, Autumn 1996, p. 84.
15. Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital, New York: Vintage Books,
1995, p. 151.
16. Thomas J. Czerwinski, “Command and Control at the
Crossroads,” Parameters, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Autumn 1996, p. 126. Also
see Glenn M. Harned, The Complexity of War: The Application of
Non-linear Science to Military Science, Paper Submitted At the Marine
Corps War College, Quantico, VA: The Marine Corps War College, June
5, 1995.
17. The Army Technical Architecture, Version 4.0, Executive
Summary, Washington, DC: The Army Staff, January 30, 1996, p. 1.
18. Address by LTG Otto Guenther, DISC4, The Army Staff, to the
USAWC Class of 1997 on January 29, 1997. The Joint Technical
Architecture being developed by the Joint Staff will use the Army
Technical Architecture as the base model.
19. Sean Patrick Burgess, “Art of the Small Supplies Secure
Cellular Voice, Data,” Signal, Vol. 51, No. 1, September 1996, p. 60.
131
20. “What is DMS,” available from the DMS Program Manger at
internet, http://www.monmouth.army.mil/dms/whatis.htm; and
National Security Agency Multilevel Information Systems Security
Initiative (MISSI) Program explained by Defense Information System
Agency (DISA) at internet, http://www.disa.expoqa3.html.
21. Scott R. Gourley, “The Battlefield Combat Identification
System,” Army, Vol. 47, No. 1, January 1997, p. 52.
22. The Joint Staff currently uses 5 elements: availability, integrity,
identification and authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.
In the I2G, identification and authentication is accomplished by access
security. The Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,
First Draft, JCS Pub 3-13, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January
21, 1997, p. III-2.
23. Department of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual
100-6, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 27, 1996,
pp. 3-5.
24. JCS Pub 3-13, p. III-6.
25. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 13010, Critical
Infrastructure Protection, July 15, 1996. Taken from the Federal
Register: July 17, 1996, Vol. 61, No. 138, 37345, Federal Register Online,
internet, wais.access.gpo.gov.
26. Solving individual network problems has become increasingly
complex. With computers now being connected to networks or, in some
cases, multiple networks, an individual problem could have one of four
possible outcomes. The problem could be hardware, software, network,
or some combination of the three.
27. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and The Net: Speculations on
Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 1994, p. 52.
28. Dennis Steele, “Countdown to the Next Century,” Army, Vol. 46,
No. 11, November 1996, p. 21.
29. “US Keeps World Waiting on Communications Deal,” Carlisle
Sentinel, February 15, 1997, p. A3.
30. Douglas B. Lenat, “Artificial Intelligence,” Scientific American,
Vol. 273, No. 3, September 1995, p. 80; and H. M. Collins, Artificial
Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 1990, p. 3.
132
31. Cliff Stoll in his book, Silicone Snake Oil, discusses at several
points the topic of searching for information leading to other
information. In particular, see Chapter 11, “Wherein the Author
Considers the Future of the Library, the Myth of Free Information, and
a Novel Way to Heat Bathwater,” Silicone Snake Oil, New York:
Doubleday, 1995, pp. 173-214. Also see Jaron Lanier, “My Problem with
Agents,” Wired, Ed. 4.11, November 1996, p. 157.
32. Alan D. Campen, “Gulf War’s Silent Warriors Bind U.S. Units
Via Space,” Signal, Vol. 45, No. 12, August 1991, p. 81.
33. “Modernizing to Achieve a Capabilities-Based Force,” Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations briefing to the Army Research
Laboratory (ARL) on February 18, 1997, and further discussed with
U.S. Army War College Army After Next students on a visit to ARL on
March 3, 1997.
34. Casper, et al., p. 89.
133
CHAPTER 7
DATA INTEROPERABILITY
FOR SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS:
OUR ACQUISITION PARADIGM MUST
CHANGE TO ACHIEVE IT
William T. Lasher
[Editor’s Note: While Lieutenant Colonel Hengst’s paper
addresses the necessity for an Intelligent Information Grid,
this paper illuminates some of the problems that must be
overcome to arrive at a point where systems of systems can
become an operating reality. Together, these two papers lay
one of the the foundation stones for the Army After Next.
DVJ]
INTRODUCTION
Success of the Army After Next (AAN) will be heavily
dependent on our ability to manage information adeptly.
Army Vision 2010 calls for us to “gain information
dominance . . . to create a disparity between what we know
about our battlespace . . . and what the enemy knows about
his.”1 Joint Vision 2010 foresees:
increased access to information and improvements in the
speed and accuracy of prioritizing and transferring data
brought about by advances in technology of old. We must have
information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying our adversary’s ability to do the same.2
It calls for us to develop “a new conceptual framework for
operations. The basis for this framework is found in the
improved command, control, and intelligence which can be
assured by information superiority.”3
135
To attain this information superiority, we will have to do
much more than buy new hardware and develop advanced
software. We will need to build new systems which can
freely interoperate. We will need to build systems of
systems. DoD’s current acquisition paradigm, however,
does not enforce development of interoperable systems.
This paper discusses the types of interoperability
necessary to create a system of systems, shows why the
current acquisition system severely inhibits achieving data
interoperability necessary for the realization of this goal,
and, finally, discusses alternatives to the current
acquisition strategy that could provide the type of
interoperability that facilitates development of joint
systems of systems.
THE NEED FOR SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS
In his visionary article, “The Emerging System of
Systems,” Admiral William Owens describes a future battle
en v iron men t wh er e “systems of systems ” wi l l
synergistically improve the strategic leader’s abilities to
command and control joint forces. They promise to keep
commanders at all levels fully informed, assist them in
better and timelier decisionmaking, and, in some cases,
automatically detect and respond to events, a feat largely
beyond our grasp today.
So what is a system of systems? In essence, it is an
executive level automated system that pulls data from
functional level information systems (IS). As shown in
Figure 2, the executive information system could poll
subordinate information systems for either raw (base level)
data, or some form of aggregate or abstract data derived
from the subordinate system’s base level data. Subordinate
information systems could be programmed to pass critical
data to the executive system periodically or as triggered by
key events. The executive level system could then present
this information to senior commanders to assist in
decisionmaking.
136
Abstract or
Aggregate Data
Base Level Data
Top Level System of
Systems
Abstract or
Aggregate Data
Abstract or
Aggregate Data
Base Level Data
Base Level Data
Low Level System of
Systems (e.g. C2 System)
Low Level System of
Systems
Abstract or
Aggregate Data
Abstract or
Aggregate Data
Abstract or
Aggregate Data
Base Level Data
Base Level Data
Base Level Data
Functional (Stovepipe)
Information System
Functional (Stovepipe)
Information System
Functional (Stovepipe)
Information System
Figure 2.
Illustration of a System of Systems.
In some predetermined cases, executive level systems
could instruct subordinate information systems to take
action based on an automated analysis of the available
information, for example, detection of a missile launch.
Actually, military systems of systems have existed for
centuries. A standard command and staff structure is
essentially a system of systems. Subordinate commanders
and staffs freely communicate laterally. They provide
information and recommendations to the commander;
based on his interpretation of the information, the
commander returns guidance. While we have automated
functional information systems which assist staff officers
and commanders, the interface between these systems is
still a human one. In a true system of systems, as Admiral
Owens envisions it, data would be freely passed between
functional and executive level information systems without
requiring human interpretation or intervention. It is this
total interoperability between systems that will ultimately
137
allow us to improve battlefield awareness and dramatically
shorten our decision cycles.
CONSIDERATIONS IN BUILDING
INTEROPERABLE SYSTEMS
Three primary challenges must be overcome to allow any
two systems to “talk” to each other directly (see Figure 3).
First, the systems must be technically compatible; that is,
System A must have a communications interface
electronically compatible with that of System B. Second, a
communications link must be established between the
systems. Third, System A must correctly interpret the
information it gets from System B.
Communications Link
COMM Interface
COMM Interface
System Data
SSN
000-24-7890
123-45-6789
098-76-5432
System Data
Last Name First Name
DOE
BURPEE
JONES
SSN
000-24-7890
123-45-6789
098-76-5432
JOHN
FRED
JAMES
Last Name First Name MI
DOE
BURPEE
JONES
JOHN
FRED
JAMES
J
G
R
System B
System A
Figure 3.
Communicating Between Systems.
The Technical Challenges.
The first two “technical” challenges can be solved, given
the right hardware, software, and technical expertise (i.e.,
enough money). Modern network technology and maturing
industry standards (such as those used for the internet) are
making the technical problems far less formidable than
they once were.
138
The Data Challenge.
The third and most difficult challenge in allowing
systems to talk to each other is getting them to exchange
data. This is actually a design problem. It can be difficult, or
impossible, to properly exchange data between systems
which have different data designs.
The Growing Need for Sharable Data.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has long recognized
the need for building systems with sharable data. In the
stovepipe era, however, information systems were built
primarily to perform one and only one function (e.g., the
Joint Uniformed Military Pay System). These were large,
self-contained systems with massive databases run on
mainframe computers from a central location.
This method of system development tended to ensure
that data design was consistent (thus data were sharable)
within that large system. The need for sharing data across
these large “legacy” systems, however, while important,
was not critical since each generally performed a different
and completely independent function.
As computer technology has advanced, we are moving
away from the centralized mainframe environment to one
that is highly distributed. Advancing technology is
effectively removing a discipline previously imposed by the
size and expense of mainframe computers.
We are seeing the appearance of multiple systems built
at different echelons that perform similar functions and
track similar (sometimes even the same) data. But, again,
the focus of each is usually exclusive to the one function it is
to perform, at the expense of interoperability. In this new
distributed environment, it is becoming absolutely critical
to design information systems that can share data.
The 1993 Army Enterprise Strategy specifically
mandates that “all information systems will use Army
139
standard data elements. This will increase the accuracy and
timeliness of the data, increasing interoperability during all
operations.”4
The Director of the Defense Information Systems
Agency has stated, “There is no greater imperative than to
deliver to warfighters fully integrated systems that provide
[a] fused, real-time, ground truth picture of the
battlespace.”5 The goal is clear and relatively simple.
Developing a method to achieve it is another matter.
THE FLAW IN OUR CURRENT ACQUISITION
PARADIGM
Why is building information systems that share data so
hard? A great deal of the problem has to do with the way we
acquire data. DoD and service information systems are built
using the standard DoD acquisition model. Each major
system is, for the most part, developed independently by a
program manager (PM) who is provided reasonable
autonomy and held responsible for progress in system
development and fielding. The PM’s primary motivation is
delivery of a system on time and within budget. While the
PM undoubtedly desires interoperability with other
systems, there is little hope of coordinating the system
design with every other system that may someday require
interface.
DoD fu n din g mec hani sms f oc us nar r owl y on
independent systems. As Admiral Owens points out, “We
have cultivated a planning, programming, and budgeting
system [PPBS] that tends to handle programs as discrete
entities. The PPBS cycle forces us into a compartmentalized
perspective.”6
Thus, DoD’s acquisition system is really designed to
optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of individual
systems at the expense of developing (or even allowing the
development of) systems of systems with their promised
synergistic performance.
140
The Method: How We Build “Watches” Now.
To illustrate why we are where we are (having spent
billions of dollars constructing sophisticated information
systems which, for the most part, do not interoperate), we
need to review how we design and build information
systems. Figure 4 shows the typical “waterfall”
development model used to build software during the
mainframe era.7 Figure 5 shows the newest software
development lifecycle model approved as part of DoD’s
Military Standard 498. Both are process- or functioncentered models. If one envisions a pie representing all
functions performed across the services, these models take a
slice of that pie and automate the functions within (possibly
a very small part of) that slice (see Figure 6). A portion of the
development effort involves designing the system
database—or building a system data architecture.
Take the Standard Installation/Division Personnel
System, for example, or substitute your favorite system
Operational
Requirements
System
Requirements
Software
Rqts Analysis
Preliminary
Design
Detailed Design
Coding
and Unit Testing
Software
Integration
System Integration
System Testing
Figure 4.
The Waterfall Life Cycle Model.
141
142
Operational
Concept
Description
Description
SoftwareTest
Report
CSCI
Quality
Testing
System
Quality
CSCI/HWCI Test
Integration & SoftwareTest
Description
Test
and Report
Basic Software Development Model Depicted in Mil Standard 498
Hardware Configuration (HWCI) Development
(not covered by Mil Std 498)
Software, Interface,
& Database Design
Descriptions
Software
Design
Software &
Interface
Requirements Specs
Software
Requirements
Analysis
Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI) #2
Unit
Software
Integration/
Implement- Testing
ation/Testing SoftwareTest
Software
Test Report
CSCI
Quality
Testing
Executable Software
Source Files
Software Version
Descriptions
Software Product
Specifications
Update System/
Subsystem Design
Descriptions
Support Manuals
Prepare for
Software
Transition
Executable Software
Software Version
Descriptions
User/Operator
Manuals
Prepare for
Software
Use
Software Installation Plan/Software Transition Plan
Figure 5. Military Standard 498 Software Development Cycle.
Software
Design
Description
System/
Subsystem
Specs
Interface
Requiements
Specs
System
Requirements
Analysis
System
Design
Software &
& Database Design
Interface
Descriptions
Requirements Specs
Software
Software
Requirements Design
Analysis
Software Interface,
Unit
Software
Integration/
Implement- Testing
ation/Testing
Software Test
Description
SoftwareTest Plan
Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI) #1
Software Development Plan
Project Planning and Oversight
Air & Space
Defense
Intelligence
Finance
Force
Protection
Personnel
Maneuver
Logistics
Fires
C2
Figure 6.
The Functional Pie: Illustrative Slices.
here. Under these models we would conduct a thorough
analysis of all the processes involved in managing personnel
at divisions and installations. Based on that analysis, we
would develop a set of requirements to automate these
processes, a data architecture for the system, and
ultimately a detailed design to automate these processes.
The Problem With the Single System Focus.
From its genesis, the entire system is narrowly oriented
on the slice of pie involving one particular function (in this
case, personnel management), inherently driving the
system developer into a stovepipe. Once the system
developer is given his charter (“Go forth and automate
function xyz.”), our system development models effectively
call for him to concentrate within that narrow lane. There is
no construct in the formal models that causes the PM to look
143
outside his lane and integrate his system with others. There
are no provisions in these models that compel a system
developer to design interoperability into the system. In fact
Military Standard 498, which is just over two years old, does
not even mention interoperability of data. Thus,
interoperability is typically handled as an adjunct to
building the basic system.
If the PM strictly followed the formal system
development models, he or she might well have fully
developed the system’s data architecture before even
considering interoperability.
OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING AN INTEROPERABLE
DATA ENVIRONMENT
There are at least three general courses of action DoD
could pursue in developing systems which could freely
exchange data. It could centralize all systems development
efforts under one organization within DoD. It could
continue to allow decentralized development while insisting
developers adhere to strict interoperability standards. Or it
could change the acquisition method by making system
development a joint effort between the system developer
and an organization responsible for development of an
enterprise data architecture. Each of these options is
discussed in more detail below.
Centralize: Develop Systems only at the DoD/Joint
Level.
Under this “massive centralization” course of action,
system development efforts and expertise reside in a central
department under DoD. This agency would be responsible
for development of all new information systems within DoD.
It would implement rules and procedures to ensure that
systems interoperability was developed.
144
Standardize: Remain Decentralized but Build and
Enforce Standards.
DoD has commonly called this the “data standardization
program.” It is the course of action both DoD and the Army
have been pursuing in some form for at least the last 30
y ea rs. 8 T h e persi s tent and wi d es p r ead l ac k of
interoperability within DoD systems today would seem to
indicate that this course of action is just not working.9
Th e C on cept . Data stand ar d i zati on c al l s f or
development and implementation of technical and data
interoperability standards to which system development
efforts would be held. Data standards are centered around
an enterprise data architecture (data model) and uniformly
defined pieces of data called “standard data elements.”
These are kept in a repository, or dictionary, which would be
universally available to system developers.
In theory, system designers could go to the dictionary
and pull out the “standard” definition for any DoD data and
use that in their design. Under the current guidance, if the
developer does not find a suitable standard to use, he or she
is then responsible for developing a proposed standard and
submitting it to the DoD Data Administrator for approval.10
In this manner, the DoD enterprise data architecture is
supposed to be developed over time as new systems are
built.
The Fallacy of Standard Data. The word “standard”
evokes an image of a set of rules, protocols, or specifications
which rarely change over time and need little periodic
maintenance. Unfortunately, construction of an enterprise
data architecture is a massive project requiring significant
development effort and considerable upkeep.
Database design is a major portion of the development
effort on behalf of any information system. Developing an
enterprise data architecture is, in essence, the construction
of a high level data design for every functional area in the
enterprise. It is more an engineering effort than one of
145
developing a standard, and, while a system’s data
architecture is relatively fixed compared to other system
components, it can change over time. Thus calling it a
standard can be deceiving.
The implication behind the data standardization
program is that at some point the data architecture will be
“finished.” However, experience during the Army’s data
modeling efforts in the early 1990s showed that as new
functional areas were modeled, inconsistencies, oversights,
and errors were consistently revealed in the existing data
architecture.
The current DoD Data Model, which is relatively young,
has 3,453 entities, with another 5,000 under development.
The DoD Data Dictionary System, which is used to store
DoD standard data elements, has 23,658 elements
approved, proposed, or under development to date. 11
Obviously, as future information systems are developed, the
data model and the number of required standard data
elements will grow.
As with most engineering products, the utility of any
data architecture is highly dependent on its quality. If it
fails to accurately represent the entities and business
practices of an enterprise, it will not support construction of
useful information systems. Unfortunately, once a data
architecture is defined and systems are built to its
specification, it becomes an expensive proposition to change
the architecture upon discovery of an error. Thus,
development of an accurate, high-quality data architecture
from the start is crucial.
Determining the correct entities, relationships, and
business rules for a large data architecture is an
exceptionally difficult mental drill. Managers who
participate in data modeling sessions often find themselves
rigorously defining their business practices and realizing
they have never really done so before.
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A PM, whose primary motivation is delivery of a system,
is unlikely to take the care desired in developing his portion
of the enterprise data architecture. With this method, the
potential for developing a high-quality enterprise
architecture is quite poor.
COMBINE CENTRALIZATION
AND STANDARDIZATION
The third possible course of action is to modify the DoD
acquisition paradigm by effectively incorporating the
essentials of the two previous options, but with a major
difference in focus. This course of action splits development
strategy for information systems into two parts.
Development of the data architecture would be done
centrally, while allowing the remainder of system
development to stay decentralized.
The Concept.
Under this approach, the enterprise data architecture
would be viewed as a major engineering project, not a set of
standards. DoD would fund, build, and maintain a data
architecture as a major system development effort. Unlike
most development projects, however, the product would not
be a system designed for end users. It would instead be a
system built exclusively to support other information
system development efforts. In essence, this approach
advocates construction of DoD’s enterprise data
architecture as a large infrastructure project that provides
a foundation upon which end user information systems are
built (see Figure 7).
A necessary step in this process would be development of
a comprehensive information system designed to support
construction of the data architecture. This system would be
a type of Computer-Aided Software Engineering (CASE)
tool designed to assist users in navigating and modifying
the data architecture. It would also assist system
147
Air & Space
Defense
Intelligence
Finance
Force
Protection
Enterprise
Data
Architecture
Personnel
Maneuver
Logistics
Fires
C2
Data Architecture at the Core of Systems Development
Figure 7.
Enterprise Data Architecture.
developers in incorporating the architecture into new
information system design.
This approach would also recognize the inevitable need
to maintain the data architecture over the long term. An
organization’s data needs and business practices will
change (usually slowly) over time. If the data architecture
doesn’t change with the organization, it becomes obsolete
and ultimately useless.
To retain its utility, the architecture would have to be
modified periodically. This modification must be closely
controlled to ensure components of the architecture
(models, data elements, etc.) remain consistent.
Mechanisms must also be built which eventually cascade
changes in the enterprise data architecture down to existing
information systems.
148
The Organization.
Under this approach, we would charter a high level office
at Office of the Secretary of Defense or Joint Staff level to
ensure that DoD’s data architecture would be centrally
developed and maintained by an organization charged with
assisting information system developers in using the
enterprise data architecture to design and build new
systems. A proposed organization appears at Figure 8.
DoD
Data Manager
Data Dictionary/
Respository/
CASE Tool
Maintenance Division
Design
Assistance
Division
Architecture
Management
Division
Model and Metadata
Branch
Functional Expert
Teams
PM A
Information
System
Design Team A
PM B
Functional Expert
Teams
Information
System
Design Team B
Figure 8.
Possible Layout for DoD Data Management
Organization.
The Dictionary/Repository division would be responsible
for maintaining the information system (CASE tool) in
which the architecture is kept. The Architecture
Management Division would continually update and
maintain the architecture to ensure its currency, quality,
and consistency. Teams of functional experts would be
149
responsible for portions of the architecture that fall into
their particular functional area.
The Design Assistance Division would be composed of
several design-build teams. Each design-build team would
work with an individual information system (IS) developer
during system development on a dedicated basis. The team
would assist the IS design-build team in database
specification, design, and development, and would monitor
and assist the PM as needed on all database redesign issues
through the entire life cycle of the program.
Building the Architecture.
As noted earlier, construction of the architecture would
clearly be a massive job in itself; however, it could be done
incrementally given the right organization and a consistent
funding stream. As design teams developed additions or
corrections to the architecture, the Architecture
Management Division could integrate them into the
enterprise architecture, ensuring they remained consistent
with existing portions.
While this approach to building an enterprise
architecture is similar to the approach DoD is currently
pursuing under the data standardization program, it differs
in that only the DoD Data Manager is responsible for the
architecture. The DoD Data Manager’s focus is primarily on
development of a high-quality, consistent enterprise
architecture. The PM, on the other hand, can focus on
building a system without having to devote his or her
resources toward building the enterprise architecture.
Advantages and Disadvantages.
This approach could have several advantages over our
current standardization approach. It removes the burden of
developing an architecture from the PM and places it on an
organization designed and staffed to do that job.
Design-build teams would be fully familiar with the
150
enterprise architecture, and new projects could
immediately take advantage of existing protocols and apply
them to new development efforts. It also means they could
quickly identify omissions, inconsistencies, or errors in the
enterprise architecture and work to get them corrected.
Finally, quality, consistency, and integrity should be
considerably better than one developed by multiple
organizations.
However, there are clearly some tough issues that must
be addressed with this “team” approach to information
systems development. The fundamental change from the
PM’s point of view is that he or she would no longer have
exclusive control over the database design team. Database
design would instead be a joint effort between the PM’s
office and a DoD design-build team.
Design-build teams would initially require time to
become familiar with the specific project. There is no reason
to believe they would require significantly more time than
any normal development team starting a project, however.
Despite these challenges, this approach offers
considerable promise. It explicitly recognizes the need to
undertake a major infrastructure-type project to build and
maintain a high-quality enterprise data architecture. It
provides for an organization to do so. It provides tools and
personnel to assist the system developer in building new
information systems. And it promises true DoD-wide data
interoperability and potential long-term cost savings.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF AN INTEROPERABLE
DATA ENVIRONMENT
DoD-wide data interoperability, in turn, would provide a
common shared data environment across DoD. The
potential benefits of such a common data environment are
extraordinary.
Systems compatible with the DoD enterprise data
architecture could, in theory, freely pass data between
151
themselves without translation and with assurance that
definitions behind the data are common. This “complete
interoperability” would make it possible to build systems of
systems without having to modify the underlying functional
information systems and without having to build
translators.
A fully developed DoD data architecture also promises to
eliminate significant portions of individual system
development efforts, since much of the database definition
within any functional area would already exist. In fact,
given new CASE tools, one could envision database design
being done by merely selecting the desired entities,
relationships, and attributes from an already-constructed
DoD data model.
This shared data environment would also facilitate
development of truly reusable software. Both the Army and
DoD have long pursued a goal of establishing a repository to
maintain reusable software modules. This goal has eluded
them largely because software operates on data, and, if two
systems design their data definitions differently, they
generally cannot use the same software. Interoperable data
promises to make reusable software a viable possibility.
The ultimate goal for an enterprise data architecture
could be the development of an integrated system of
functional on-line databases. Given the near universal
accessibility that internet technology provides, developing
an information system in the future could be no more
complicated than forming a series of queries against these
already existing databases.
CONCLUSION
The potential advantages that integrated systems of
systems offer truly are synergistic. Unfortunately, our
current acquisition model inhibits the development of
systems which can freely share data and interoperate. If
DoD is to develop interoperable systems, we should fund
and undertake a major development effort to build an
152
enterprise data architecture. We must staff an organization
of experts responsible for the maintenance of this
architecture. Further, we should alter our acquisition model
such that database design and development occur jointly
between the PM’s office and the organization responsible for
the DoD enterprise architecture.
In the words of the Honorable Emmett Paige, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C3I):
Information that is part of a shared integrated information
database, accessible by a wide user base that can collaborate,
has tremendous value. The rapid pace of technological
advance, coupled with an unpredictable world situation,
demands that we pursue this goal with all deliberate speed.12
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7
1. Army Chief of Staff, Army Vision 2010, Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of the Army, 1996, p. 17.
2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010,
Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996, p. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. Department of the Army, “Army Enterprise Strategy, The
Vision,” Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the
Secretary of the Army, DISC4, July 20, 1993, p. 22.
5. Defense Information Systems Agency Memorandum for
Program Managers and Developers, “Implementing DoD Standard
Data Elements,” April 1996, p. 1.
6. William A. Owens, “Emerging Systems of Systems,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 121, No. 5, May 1995, p. 36.
7. The model shown in Figure 3 is taken from Major Paul D. Condit,
USAF, Principles of Information Resource Management: A Foundation
for the Future, research report, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air
University Press, 1992, p. 40.
8. U.S. Department of Defense, Data Elements and Data Codes
Standardization Program, DoD Directive 5000.11, dated December 7,
153
1964 (since rescinded). DoD Directive 8320.1, DoD Data
Administration, September 26, 1991, replaced this document.
9. John G. Roos, “Ending the C4I Tunnel of Babel,” Armed Forces
Journal, Vol. 132, No. 3, October 1994, P. 19. Mr. Roos states that
“decades of independent technical and procurement decisions have left
the services with a hodgepodge of command, control, computer, and
intelligence, C4I systems, making it difficult—in some cases
impossible—to communicate across service lines. The problem has been
obvious for years.” See also Peter Rackham, “Uniting the Tower of
Babel,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 16, October 22, 1994, p. 26.
Mr. Rackham states that “the U.S. Department of Defense operates the
world’s most diverse array of information systems with a vast collection
of computer architectures, operating systems, hardware, programming
languages, software applications, database languages, and protocols.
While each information system was designed to do a particular task,
many perform similar functions and yet few can interoperate or share
data.”
10. DISA Memorandum.
11. Pam Baylon, Information on number of entities in the DoD Data
Model and number of data elements in the DDDS provided by electronic
mail message <baylonp@ncr.disa .mil>, subject: “DoD Data Model,” to
Lieutenant Colonel W. Lasher <lasherw@carlisle-emh2.army.mil>,
March 19, 1997.
12. Emmett Paige, Jr., “Achieving the Integrated Systems
Concept,” Keynote address at the Armed Forces Communications and
Electronics Association International Technet 1996 Convention,
Washington, DC, June 4, 1996, as published in Defense Issues, Vol. 11,
No. 51, June 1996, p. 5.
154
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
BILLY WELLS graduated and was commissioned in the
Infantry from Mississippi State University in 1975.
Lieutenant Colonel Wells has served at almost every level of
Infantry assignment including command of the 3rd
Battalion, 15th Infantry. He served successively as Chief,
Doctrine Division, and as Chief, FORCE XXI Office, U.S.
Army Infantry School, prior to attending the U.S. Army War
College.
BARBARA JEZIOR graduated from the University of
Rhode Island with a B.A. degree in German in 1976. Ms.
Jezior subsequently took a masters degree in psychology
from Fitchburg University in 1983. Beginning her
government career as an Instructor at the U.S. Army
Intelligence School, she served as a Research Psychologist
and Project Officer at Natick Research, Development and
Engineering Center; then as a Systems Integrator in the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. She
returned to Natick as Chief, Consumer Resource Branch,
then went back to the Pentagon as a Program Analyst in the
Office of the Secretary of the Army for Research,
Development and Acquisition. Prior to her assignment to
the U.S. Army War College, she was Director, Plans and
Operations Division, Soldier Systems Command, Natick.
ARTHUR SOSA graduated from the University of West
Plattville in 1971 with a B.S. degree in science and biology.
Lieutenant Colonel Sosa returned to that university and
took a masters degree in counseling in 1977. An Army
National Guard officer, he was commissioned in Aviation
and has served in a variety of aviation assignments
including command of the 1st Battalion, 147th Aviation,
Wisconsin National Guard, just prior to attending the U.S.
Army War College.
155
GARY J. MOTSEK, an Ordnance officer, currently
commands Pine Bluff Arsenal. He graduated from Syracuse
University in 1974 with a B.S. in engineering. Colonel
Motsek took a masters degree in management from Troy
State University in 1982, and attended the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in 1984. He has served
in Field Artillery, Ordnance, and Maintenance units,
commanding successively the NATO Support Activity,
Brussels, Belgium, and the 15th Ordnance Battalion,
Muenster, Germany. Prior to attending the U.S. Army War
College, he was a Joint Staff Officer, J-4, the Joint Staff.
YVES FONTAINE is an Ordnance Corps officer currently
assigned as G-4, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). He
graduated from La Salle College with a B.S. degree in
business in 1975. Lieutenant Colonel Fontaine took a
masters degree from Webster University in business in
1989. Following attendance at the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College and the School of Advanced
military Studies, he was awarded a master of military arts
and science degree in 1990. He has served in Maintenance
and Ordnance units in the United States, Germany, and
Belgium and commanded the 82nd Forward Support
Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, immediately prior to
attending the U.S. Army War College.
PAUL T. HENGST graduated and was commissioned in the
Signal Corps from the United States Military Academy in
1977. Lieutenant Colonel Hengst took a masters degree in
information systems from the Naval Postgraduate School in
1987 and attended the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College in 1990. He has served in a variety of Signal
Corps assignments including command of the 112th Signal
Battalion prior to his attendance at the U. S Army War
College.
WILLIAM T. LASHER graduated from the United States
Military Academy with a B.S. degree in engineering in 1977.
Lieutenant Colonel Lasher went on to take a masters degree
in computer science from the University of Texas in 1988,
156
following which he attended the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College. He has served in a variety of Signal
Corps assignments including duty in Somalia and Haiti.
Just prior to attending the U.S. Army War College, he
commanded the 125th Signal Battalion, 25th Infantry
Division.
DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II graduated from the United
States Military Academy in 1963, took his masters degree
from University of Michigan in 1973 and his doctorate from
Temple University in 1992, both in history. He attended the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1974, to
which he returned in 1981 where he became co-founder of
the School of Advanced Military Studies. Retiring in 1992
after 30 years service as an artilleryman, Dr. Johnson is
currently an Associate Research Professor, National
Security Affairs, and directs the USAWC Army After Next
Seminar.
157
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon
Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Authors
Lieutenant Colonel Yves J. Fontaine
Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. Hengst
Ms. Barbara A. Jezior
Lieutenant Colonel William T. Lasher
Colonel Gary J. Motsek
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Sosa
Lieutenant Colonel Billy E. Wells, Jr.
Editor
Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II
Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Mary Jane Semple
Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler