THE CASE FOR ARMY XXI “MEDIUM WEIGHT”
AERO-MOTORIZED DIVISIONS:
A PATHWAY TO THE ARMY OF 2020
John Gordon IV
and
Peter A. Wilson
May 27, 1998
*****
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and
insights from our colleagues at RAND and the Army community while
writing this article. Naturally, we take full responsibility for the
opinions and accuracy of facts contained therein. Further, the content of
this article is not endorsed by RAND and represents the personal views
of the authors. John Gordon IV and Peter A. Wilson are members of the
senior professional staff at RAND.
*****
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This
report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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ii
FOREWORD
Since the end of the Cold War nearly a decade ago, there
have been repeated calls for the U.S. Army to make major
changes to accommodate to a transformed geo-strategic
environment. Specifically, advocates of major change
believe the Army should become strategically agile while
maintaining a high in-theater combat and mobility
capability. For example, much of the design work associated
with the Army After Next (AAN) exercise series has focused
on the development of a next generation of combat forces
which have very high strategic/theater mobility and
dramatically enhanced combat power. Unfortunately, some
of the concepts associated with the AAN are true
“leap-ahead” technologies that even in the most favorable
budgetary circumstances and development schedules will
not likely be available during the 2020 timeframe. At
present, the Army appears to have settled on the selective
modernization of its current force structure that is a
mixture of very light and ultra-heavy combat formations; a
“barbell posture.” This approach provides an inadequate
strategy for dealing with near-term political military
challenges and acting as a transition to a true next
generation Army.
The purpose of this monograph, therefore, is to stimulate
a debate within the Army as to whether there is a credible
transition strategy to modify a portion of its force structure
to gain some ANN-like attributes—enhanced strategic
responsiveness coupled with enhanced theater agility and
combat power. The authors believe there is a mix of extant
and near-term combat systems and technologies that will
allow the Army to create a number of “aero-motorized”
divisions within likely budgetary constraints by the end of
the next decade. These medium weight combat units would
exploit the large investment the Air Force is making to
modernize its strategic and theater airlift fleets during the
first decade of the 21st century. The authors believe that
forces equipped with light armored vehicles, next
generation combat aviation, and enhanced indirect fire
iii
support will provide the Army with a strategic “fist.”
Aero-motorized forces can be used either as part of a leading
edge of a large and inherently slower to deploy
expeditionary force or as a central combat component of
future lesser contingencies including operations other than
war. Finally, the aero-motorized concept will allow the
Army to develop thoroughly the doctrine and concept of land
forces operations that have the strategic agility of current
light forces and approach the combat power of current heavy
forces—major features of a desired next generation Army.
The Strategic Studies Institute strongly encourages
readers to participate in a continuing discussion on the
future of American land power and the challenges it holds
for the U.S. Army.
LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
OF THE AUTHORS
JOHN GORDON IV graduated from The Citadel in 1977 with a
bachelor’s degree in history. He also holds a masters in international
relations from St. Mary’s University in San Antonio, Texas, and a
masters in business administration from Marymount University in
Arlington, Virginia. Currently, he is a candidate in George Mason
University’s Public Policy Ph.D. program. Following graduation
from The Citadel, he entered the Army as a Field Artillery officer.
His assignments included the 82d Airborne and 2d Infantry
Divisions, the Field Artillery School, and Training and Doctrine
Command Headquarters. For the last 4 years of his Army career, he
served at Headquarters, Department of the Army where he was the
Chief of the Doctrine Team in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS). He was also the leader of the
Army’s Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) team. While in
DCSOPS, Mr. Gordon was a member of the Army’s Roles and
Missions Commission team and represented the Army at several
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) panels. He is the author of over
30 articles in various publications such as Army, Military Review,
Joint Force Quarterly, Naval Institute’s Proceedings, and
Georgetown University’s National Security Studies Quarterly. He
joined RAND in May 1997.
PETER A. WILSON graduated from Princeton University in 1966
with a B.A. in political science. He then attended the University of
Chicago where he earned an M.A. in political science in 1970. Mr.
Wilson is a member of the senior staff at RAND. During the last
several years, he has been working on a number of interrelated
projects including the co-authorship of the “The Day After” policy
exercise series which have explored the implications of major
challenges (counterproliferation, strategic information warfare, and
electronic commerce) to post-Cold War national security planning.
Mr. Wilson is co-teaching a course at Georgetown University’s
School for Foreign Service that will use the RAND exercise
experience to examine the implications of these new technologies to
a significant change of the early 21st century definition of national
security. Mr. Wilson’s written works have appeared in Parameters,
Naval Institute’s Proceedings, National Defense University Press,
the Progressive Policy Institute, Washington Quarterly, and include
the co-authorship of several major RAND studies.
v
THE CASE FOR ARMY XXI “MEDIUM WEIGHT”
AERO-MOTORIZED DIVISIONS:
A PATHWAY TO THE ARMY OF 2020
The ability to project lethal forces—in the air, on the sea, or on
the land—will be essential. Toward that end, our ability to
project combat power anywhere in the world will require new
technologies, operational concepts, and capabilities to meet new
challenges. First among these new challenges is the need for
much smaller force “footprint” characterized by fewer but more
capable attacking troops and platforms supported by an even
smaller logistics element. Priority challenges will also include
an enhanced military responsiveness distinguished by its
increased range of employment and resulting in reduced
exposure of our forces.
National Defense Panel Report
December 1997
Overview.
The authors contend that today’s Army is essentially a
“barbell” shaped organization: very light or very heavy
forces with little in the form of “middleweight” units. One of
the fundamental decisions that the Army must make in the
coming decade is whether it intends to continue this
organizational structure or modify it modestly or radically.
If major modification is appropriate, what are the options?
Fortunately, the Army has several years to consider such
issues.
Probably for at least a decade the United States and its
allies will not be confronted by a major military competitor
or a collection of medium-sized states that are capable of
successfully threatening our vital interests with “conventional” combined arms forces.1 That does not mean that
some regional adversary could not achieve a short-term
success by invading and seizing territory from its neighbor.
Furthermore, that “smash and grab” strategy could be
1
reinforced by the deft threat or actual use of nuclear,
biological, chemical (NBC) weapons—a feature described as
a plausible major theater war (MTW) scenario by both the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Defense
Panel (NDP). Additionally, future opponents are likely to
exploit long-range missile systems (both ballistic and
cruise) armed with advanced non-NBC munitions to
threaten the military viability of any future U.S.
expeditionary force. Such a victory could certainly be
reversed; for the foreseeable future the United States and
its friends can certainly turn back overt aggression if they
choose to do so. The critical strategic question is whether the
United States and its allies will be prepared to reverse this
act of aggression. Under the shadow of a NBC/missile
threat, the cost might be perceived as very high especially if
the United States has not adapted its forces to that
plausible contingency.2
One of the clear premiums of future U.S. combined arms
forces will be their ability to rapidly deploy into a menaced
theater and operate in the face of enhanced NBC and
long-range missile threats. The early deployment of a high
performance combat force will have a profound impact on
the probability, duration, and overall cost of a major
campaign.3
More probable than MTWs is the possibility that the
United States will be confronted by a whole series of lesser
crises or small-scale contingency (SSC) operations. Civil
wars that threaten to spill into other nations, relatively
limited armed struggles between religious and/or ethnic
groups, and breakdowns in civil order within “failed states”
are all examples of the kinds of operations where U.S. forces
could conceivably be deployed. Significantly, many areas
where such breakdowns in order could occur are where the
United States does not have forces permanently stationed
ashore. Finally, many of these future conflicts will take
place in an urban environment, which reflects the global
migration from the countryside to the cities. Should the
United States elect to intervene with ground force, deploy2
ments from distant locations would have to take place. This
changing reality has a significant impact on how the future
Army should be configured.4
The “Barbell” Army.
The Army has undergone at least four major organizational eras since the end of World War II. First was the
immediate post-World War II force. This was the Army that
fought the Korean War. Organizationally, doctrinally, and
in its equipment, this force was virtually identical to the
World War II Army. Second was the mid-1950s “Pentomic”
army that was a controversial attempt to organize the land
force for nuclear combat. The “Pentomic” era is generally
regarded as a failure.5 Third came the Vietnam-era force.
Organizationally, the Army of the 1960s owed much to the
World War II model and was a large conscript force whose
divisions were modeled on the armored division of World
War II and whose fundamental tactics were based on
massive application of firepower and armored shock tactics.
The most important innovation for “high intensity” ground
war was the creation of the mechanized infantry division
with each infantry battalion equipped with organic armored
carriers.6 In Vietnam, the Army focused on the exploitation
of helicopter technology to free it from the “tyranny of
terrain.” Following our geo-strategic defeat in Vietnam, the
Army slowly moved into the successful Army of Excellence
period, which is still in effect.
During the 1980s some experimentation included the
permanent assignment of an attack helicopter brigade to
the armored and mechanized divisions, the creation of the
9th “high technology light division” (motorized infantry
division) and the Light Infantry Division.7 The air combat
brigade concept became institutionalized while the
motorized concept died during the late 1980s due to a lack of
investment in a light armored vehicle family and hostility
from both the Armor and Infantry branches of the Army.
The light infantry division concept became the Army’s
3
model for air transportable units. Structurally, today’s
Army is quite similar to the force at the end of the Vietnam
period—a mix of very light and very heavy units. This is the
force that is on the verge of being transformed into Army
XXI with a focus on major upgrades in command, control,
communications, and computers (C 4 ) and improved
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
systems. Currently, this concept does not call for any major
change in organization or concept of operations for either
the light or heavy combat formations.8
With the brief “Pentomic” era and 9th Motorized
Infantry Division experiments being the exceptions, a
hallmark of the post-World War II Army is that it has had a
“barbell” characteristic. The Army has been generally
configured into either very heavy armored and mechanized
units armed with large numbers of heavy fully tracked
vehicles or very light infantry-type units that are primarily
foot mobile. One division, the 101st Air Assault remains as a
positive legacy of the Vietnam experience. Of course, both
types of forces include a wide variety of sub-units, artillery,
aviation, all kinds of support organizations. A glance at
today’s Army is illustrative.
T h e C u rren t A rm y
L igh t F orces
82nd A irborne
10th L igh t
25th L igh t
H eavy F orces
M ed iu m F orces
101st A irA ssault
1st A rm ored
1st C avalry
1st In f (M )
2n d Inf
3rd Inf (M )
4th In f (M )
The 10-division Army of 1998 has six “heavy” armored or
mechanized divisions on one end of the spectrum and three
air transportable or light divisions on the other end. The
single airmobile division lies somewhat in the middle. While
4
the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) division is not encumbered
with large numbers of armored vehicles, it is nevertheless
logistically equivalent to a heavy division and difficult to
move strategically due to the large numbers of current
generation helicopters that are difficult to self-deploy over
long distances.
The Need for Medium Forces.
What the Army has lacked since 1945 are “medium”
forces that combine a degree of mobility, firepower, and
protection greater than the generally foot-mobile light
forces, yet are less strategically and operationally
cumbersome than the heavy armored and mechanized
units. The latter require either prepositioning, relatively
slow sealift, or wide-scale rail/heavy equipment transporter
(HET) support in order to deploy into areas where forces are
not already stationed.
During the Cold War, the primary and potentially most
challenging Army missions were the defense of Western
Europe and Korea. In both locations the Army had
relatively large forces in place. The deployment penalty
associated with armored units weighed heavily on military
planners and led to a great dependence upon prepositioned
equipment sets (POMCUS) and sealift. When the Gulf crisis
took place in August 1990, the United States was fortunate
to be confronted by an incompetent opponent who yielded
the strategic initiative once his initial objectives were
seized. This afforded the U.S.-led coalition the time (nearly
5 months) that was needed to deploy by sea the heavy forces
that would eventually lead the counteroffensive to retake
Kuwait. The operational immobility of heavy forces was
further revealed during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the
deployment of Army forces to Bosnia during the winter of
1995-96. The deployment of a reinforced brigade of only four
armored and mechanized infantry battalions from southern
Germany via rail and roads took nearly 2 months.9
5
The Gulf War exposed several features of the Army’s
light-heavy force structure. First, the Light Infantry
Divisions, a major Army initiative in “strategic power
projection,” were noteworthy by their absence. Their very
lightness to facilitate their transoceanic mobility lead to a
table of organization and equipment (TOE) which provided
no tactical or operational mobility and very modest
firepower for such a “high intensity” theater. While the 82d
Airborne Division did deploy, it quickly assumed the title of
“speed bump” in the face of an enemy with huge numbers of
armored vehicles. Ironically, the 9th Motorized Infantry
Division, specifically designed for early deployment, had
been disbanded the summer before Operation DESERT
SHIELD.10
If there is any doubt of the potential fate of foot-mobile
infantry such as the 82d Airborne when confronted by a
large enemy armored force in desert conditions, one has but
to look at many battles that took place in the desert in World
War II. The “bagging” of large numbers of foot-mobile
infantry units by more mobile armored and motorized forces
during the North African and Eastern Front campaigns
comes to mind.11
It took roughly a month before the Army had its first
division-sized heavy force ready for operations in Saudi
Arabia. Fortunately, the enemy was totally passive during
the strategic deployment of U.S. forces. Unquestionably all
potential future U.S. opponents took note of the fate that
befell the Iraqis due to ceding to the United States a lengthy,
undisturbed deployment period.
Since 1991 the Army has taken certain steps that have
enhanced the strategic deployability of its traditional heavy
forces. Prepositioning afloat and ashore has led to the
capability to deploy roughly a division-size heavy force in
about a week’s time. Anything more than a division,
however, will have to rely on medium-speed shipping to
move units from some combination of the U.S. and other
overseas locations. That will take several weeks. In any
6
area outside the Gulf, Korea, or Western Europe, the lack of
ashore prepositioning will also constrain the ability of the
Army to rapidly deploy heavy forces.
What is a “Medium” Aero-Motorized Force?
Before we elaborate on some options for moving the
Army away from the “barbell” model into more of a medium
force, it is necessary to add some definition to what such a
force might look like. Characteristics of a medium force
follow.
More rapidly deployable than a traditional heavy unit.
While it is physically possible to deploy main battle tanks
and tracked infantry combat vehicles on C-5 or C-17 aircraft, it is a very inefficient process. Either aircraft
mentioned above can lift only one main battle tank. To move
even a single battalion-sized heavy armor unit will require
virtually the entire C-5 fleet of 120 aircraft. A medium force
would be able to deploy platoons of (4-12) armored fighting
vehicles on a single C-5 or C-17, thereby allowing the
deployment of a brigade-sized task force with the use of
approximately 100 sorties of either wide-body airlifter.12
Greater firepower, survivability and mobility. New
technologies associated with the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA)—over the hill targeting sensors coupled with
stand-off firepower—can provide medium forces with
enhanced combat power. A medium force built around light
and medium weight armored fighting vehicles will provide
infantry and cavalry units with a wide range of protected
mobility.
Operate Under a Hostile Long-Range “Artillery Fan.”
Future regional opponents will be able to put U.S.
expeditionary forces under long-range ballistic and cruise
missile fires with and without the use of NBC. Light
armored vehicles, especially wheeled, will allow the
deployment of combined arms air and ground forces with a
smaller intra-theater logistics footprint with their lower
7
demand for POL than heavy armored forces. These lighter
forces can rely more heavily on the “just in time” delivery of
both long-range fires and logistics support. This will be
especially important where combined arms units have to
rapidly deploy over long intra-theater distances such as the
Saudi peninsula, Eastern Europe, or the Balkans.
The characteristics listed above argue for a medium
weight force that can deploy quickly to a potential trouble
spot via transoceanic range airlift, have a substantial
amount of mobility and firepower upon arrival, and be more
survivable than a foot mobile, dismounted unit. Such a force
could be the initial element of a global maneuver of land
power as part of a joint expeditionary force. In some
circumstances such as an SSC, the medium weight
aero-motorized force may be sufficient to deal with the
crisis. In other circumstances tending toward a MTW class
conflict, the aero-motorized forces will be the tip of the
Army’s spear, to be followed by heavier Army armored and
mechanized forces. The basic picture of what a medium
aero-motorized force would look like is as follows:
•
•
•
•
Brigade sized combined arms forces that are easily
deployable on C-5/C-17 type aircraft. Some brigades
would be optimized as motorized infantry while other
brigades would be organized as cavalry formations.
Ground combat elements that are built around
wheeled armored vehicles that provide transport, fire
support, command and control, and direct/indirect
fire capabilities. In the last case, artillery brigades
would be equipped with variants of the lightweight
155m howitzer and the wheeled High Mobility
Artillery Rocket (HIMAR) launchers.
Attack helicopters that provide speed and long reach
to the force.
High reliance on indirect fire and air/missile active
defense support from the USAF and USN combat
8
aircraft, USN missile armed warships, and Army
ATACMs, MLRS and AD units.
•
•
•
Combat engineering units optimized for airlift that
can provide early deployers some field expedient
protected positions for key units such as air defense
and USAF aircraft.
Pallet Load System (PLS) trucks, lift helicopters,
STOL cargo aircraft, and Logistics Over the Shore
(LOTS) to provide for Just in Time (JIT) intra-theater
logistics.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) systems that are built around the Army XXI
initiatives, can reach back to other out of theater
bases for many of their needs, and are capable of
operating with coalition forces.
Armored Fighting Vehicle Options.
There are available in the world today a wide variety of
wheeled light and medium weight armored vehicles in the
5-25 ton weight class.13 There are two principal tactical
disadvantages to the wheeled armored vehicles. First, in
some types of very adverse terrain they have cross country
mobility that is inferior to tracked systems, and, second,
while they offer a degree of protection far better than a
dismounted soldier has, such vehicles are still far less
protected then a main battle tank (MBT).
Studies by the Army Corps of Engineers indicate that
the all terrain mobility “break-point” between wheeled and
tracked armored vehicles is around 20 tons. That is to say,
wheeled vehicles have similar cross-country mobility
attributes as track laying vehicles below the weight of
approximately 20 tons. Even heavier wheeled vehicles will
have superior mobility on road surfaces. Further, there
have been some interesting innovations in wheeled armored
9
vehicle designs, which suggest that the break point may
move upward.14
Contemporary wheeled vehicles rely upon a combination
of a diesel engine and a complex hydro-mechanical
transmission-suspension system. Within a decade, a next
generation of diesel electric powered vehicles is plausible.
This technology is likely to flow from the massive
investment (prompted by global environmental concerns)
that the global automotive companies will make in hybrid
vehicles—many of which will be a mix of internal
combustion engines, high density energy storage/
generation systems, and electric drive motors. If successful,
hybrid propulsion may provide the next generation of
armored vehicles with longer combat operating ranges with
important low observability features.15
On the issue of protection, lighter armored vehicles will
be inferior to super heavy fighting vehicles of the MBT class
without breakthroughs in either material technology and/or
active protection. One of the clear weaknesses of the 9th
Motorized Infantry Division was the fact that all of its
personnel and weapon carriers were modified unarmored
HMMWVs. These vehicles could be “swept away” by air
bursting artillery and mortar fire and proved very
vulnerable in contested urban terrain from Somali irregular
automatic weapon and rocket propelled grenade (RPG)
fire.16 More useful is to examine the issue of passive
protection from the full spectrum of killing threats.
As noted, wheeled armored personnel carriers (APCs)
will provide a measure of protection against a wide range of
infantry and indirect fire anti-personnel weapons.
Furthermore, the hull of wheeled armored vehicles can be
designed to be resistant to anti-vehicle mines. All of these
threats are likely to be a part of any future SSC operations.
Necessity and doctrine would use the APCs only as “battle
taxis” during intense combat operations. One advantage of
this infantry/vehicle configuration is that a motorized
battalion will have a higher density of useable infantry than
10
a comparable mechanized battalion—a likely advantage in
urban and broken terrain combat situations. Some units
might be organized as pure cavalry brigades. All direct fire
units would be complimented by vehicles armed with a
variety of stand-off weapons including fiber optic guided
missiles (FOGMs) and mortars armed with guided munitions.
Some passive protection against higher performance
direct fire weapons is possible especially with further
development of reactive and active armor arrays. Passive
protection against large caliber missiles or kinetic energy
weapons will likely remain very problematic. This will
require that light fighting vehicles in confrontations with
MBTs will either have to shoot first with a high performance
direct fire weapon or operate from a stand-off distance. For
example, a portion of the wheeled armored vehicles could be
armed with indirect fire weapons such as FOGMs or
mortars equipped guided munitions. This would allow the
vehicles to remain behind cover and engage heavier enemy
armor, thus avoiding exposing themselves to a direct fire
battle where their inferior armor would be a disadvantage.
Targeting could be provided by UAVs, helicopters, other
vehicles in hide positions, or dismounted elements.17
Lighter vehicles can be designed to have much lower
thermal, electromagnetic, magnetic, and acoustic
signatures than heavy tracked vehicles. There is a prospect
that the next generation of light armored vehicles can use
hybrid electric propulsion and ceramic type armor to reduce
their signature, especially to thermal imaging sensors. The
issue of low observability will loom larger in ground warfare
with the proliferation of a wide range of top attack
munitions, which can destroy the heaviest MBT. The latter
may prove very difficult to make “stealthy” from overhead
surveillance and top attack guided munitions.18
The direct fire battle will not be abandoned. There is a
wide range of options of powerful direct fire systems that
could be mounted on medium weight wheeled armored
11
vehicles including missiles, 105mm or 120mm low recoil
cannons, and automatic small caliber guns available to both
cavalry and motorized infantry brigades. Advances in top
attack munitions will allow 105mm and 120mm cannons
high killing power against upgraded versions of contemporary generation MBTs.19
A series of air defense, command and control, and
support vehicles would be needed. Many of the models of
wheeled armored vehicles in production already have
command and medical versions available.
Finally, light-medium armored vehicles can be designed
to be inherently amphibious, provide overpressure
protection from NBC contamination, and a measure of
flash, blast, and electromagnetic pulse protection from
nuclear detonations.20 If NBC weapons are employed in
future MTWs or SSCs, then the protected mobility of
medium weight forces will be of vital necessity to allow the
Army to operate in a “dirty” combat environment.
The Aero Component.
The second major component of the force would be
transport and attack helicopters. Today an entire battalion
of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, with appropriate
support vehicles and a basic load of ammunition, can be
transported on 10 C-5 or 21 C-17 aircraft. When RAH-66
Comanche is fielded, its smaller size and reduced support
requirements will facilitate moving Comanche Scout/attack
units long distances in USAF transports. With greater
range (1200 nms.) than the Apache, Comanches may be able
to self deploy to many theaters and meet their ground
support elements, thus reducing the burden on the airlift
fleet.
Beyond 2010, it is possible to foresee the exploitation of
tilt-rotor technology derived from the development and
deployment of the MV-22 assault transport and the BB-609
executive aircraft. Variants of both could be seen as
12
follow-ons to the UH-60 Blackhawk and the ApacheLongbow. Additional aerial logistic support could be
provided the Army CH-47s and USAF C130Js. Given an
adequate commitment of resources, a heavy lift Joint
Transport Rotorcraft (JTR) or Advanced Theater Transport
(ATT) might be developed by the post-2010 time-frame.21
From the strategic deployment perspective, tilt-rotor
technology could provide Army medium forces great benefit
by facilitating the transoceanic deployment of airmobile
assets without relying as heavily on USAF strategic airlift
assets. On the other hand, the cost of developing and
procuring any new theater airlift aircraft after 2010 will
likely lead to a joint program operated primarily by the
USAF.
Recent studies by the Army and the Joint Staff have
clearly shown the power of the modern attack helicopter.22
Indeed, the attack helicopter may be the best anti-armor
platform among the many tank-killing systems currently
available to U.S. forces. A rapidly deploying U.S. force may
have to react to an enemy advance along many axes that are
widely separated. A dismounted infantry-heavy force has
little ability to rapidly shift to new locations to oppose
different enemy thrusts. The mobility of the attack
helicopter in conjunction with agile motorized infantry and
cavalry units is ideal under such circumstances.
A critical variable affecting rotary wing operations will
be the density and sophistication of the battlespace air
defense environment. An important synergistic role for the
motorized ground units is to direct fires against local air
defenses to facilitate air combat operations.23
Many of the potential crises that a medium Army force
could be deployed to include opponents who do not possess
large numbers of armored vehicles. The opponent could be
infantry heavy, relying on dispersion in difficult terrain.
The attack helicopter in support of dismounted motorized
infantry is probably a better platform than medium or high
13
altitude fixed-wing aircraft to seek out such dispersed
forces.
Attack helicopter units consume fuel at prodigious rates.
If a deployment was being conducted into an area where
there are no prepositioned supplies awaiting the U.S. force,
the number of attack helicopter units would have to be
carefully considered and based on the nature of the threat,
the amount of strategic transport aircraft available, and the
logistics challenges associated with that deployment.
Certainly, the concept of just in time POL logistics will have
to be fully developed including the employment of STOL
aircraft such as the C-130J as refuelers. Under appropriate
military circumstances, the use of C-17s should not be
excluded from these and other combat logistic missions. A
future JTR or ATT could play this role as well.
The Exploitation of Sealift.
Although the focus of the argument in favor of
aero-motorized forces is their capacity to be airlifted
rapidly, the very important role of sealift should not be
ignored in many contingencies. The Military Sealift
Command’s current modernization and expansion plan is
on the acquisition of very large (50,000-ton) medium speed
(25 knots) roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) cargo ships. Depending
upon the speed with which a future political military crisis
develops, it may be appropriate to use sealift to deploy some
aero-motorized units along with airlift. Wheeled fighting
units will be able to more rapidly embark and debark from
ro-ro ships then their heavier mechanized and armored
counterparts. Further, the motorized units will be able to
rapidly move over operational distances (more than 100
miles) without relying upon heavy equipment transporters
or railcars. By 2010, there may be a revolution in large cargo
ship design that will allow ro-ro ships to cruise at 40 knots in
adverse sea conditions. If realized, a fleet of fast sealift
might be used to deploy substantial aero-motorized forces to
a wide range of plausible military contingencies.24
14
Long-Range Fires and C4ISR.
To further facilitate the use of medium forces during an
anti-invasion or “halt phase” of an MTW, the aeromotorized units would rely heavily upon indirect fires
delivered by Army missile units, USAF and USN aviation,
and USN missile armed warships. Consistent with
philosophy of the use of aero-motorized combat, Army units
will be able to exploit the likely deployment of Short
Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variants of the
USAF’s Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in the post-2010
time-frame. To survive in an MTW shadowed by the
NBC/missile threat, USAF early deployers will have to
work closely with Army aero-motorized forces and be
prepared to operate from dispersed field sites.25
The command and control of such a force should be based
on information systems flowing from the Army XXI
initiatives. Technologies are already well advanced that
would permit the maximum use of “reach back/information
pull.” Thus the size of the headquarters elements actually
deployed could be minimized; data links to distant sensors
and information systems would be substituted in large part
for deployed capabilities. Nevertheless, such an aeromotorized task force would almost certainly need a suite of
tactical UAVs, battlefield radars, and other systems that
would contribute to situational awareness.
Since aero-motorized forces would be optimized for
deployments into areas where the United States does not
have a permanent presence, a premium could be placed on
ability to work with the forces of impromptu ad hoc
coalitions. One could envision that the headquarters of such
a unit would need personnel proficient in various
languages, for example.26
Medium Forces as a Transition to the Army of 2020.
A powerful argument for moving to the aero-motorized
concept described above is that it is an organizationally
15
comprehensible, technologically feasible, and financially
plausible transition from the contemporary Army design to
an Army of 2020. Already, there have been several
large-scale strategic war games sponsored by the Army
After Next (AAN) program that explored the implications of
very high performance air-ground units which might be
procured and deployed by 2020. The current design concept
being explored by the AAN is based upon “air-mechanized”
units that assume the rapid development and procurement
of a post-2010 generation of technologies far in advance of
those required to create the medium weight aero-motorized
units described in this essay. To see some variant of the
AAN era force posture deployed within 25 years, the Army
will have to seriously consider the intermediate transition
process. That transition process points to an Army which
decisively moves away from its current ultra light/ultra
heavy force “barbell” posture by 2010.
At a minimum, the Army of 2010 might be a mix of light,
medium, and heavy units. The prospect is plausible that
most light units will have been converted to medium units.
More radical and controversial is the conversion of several
heavy units to medium weight forces by 2010.
Choices Available to the Army.
This essay has tried to make the case that the Army,
currently of a “barbell” configuration, should change at least
a portion of its structure into a lighter, yet still potent,
medium force by 2005 with extant or nearly developed
combat vehicles and systems. The essential elements of a
medium force were described as having strategic/
operational mobility superior to traditional heavy forces
and better firepower, operational/tactical mobility, and
survivability than present light forces.
Several questions must be answered. First is the issue of
whether this is a correct course of action for the Army. The
organization has been successful for the past 50 years in
roughly its present barbell configuration. Any change of this
16
type would require some existing forces, either heavy or
light, to be reconfigured.
The second major question concerns the speed and scale
of converting heavy and/or light divisions into medium
weight units. In those areas of the world where the Army
has some combination of in-place heavy units and/or
prepositioned equipment available, a traditional heavy unit
will play an important, if not central, role for the near
future. Looking out a decade, even prepositioning concepts
may become increasingly questionable once future
opponents have potent long-range missile capabilities.
Prepositioned equipment—ashore and afloat—could be
menaced by accurate missile and aircraft strikes even
without the use of NBC warheads. Additionally, in some
parts of the world, such as heavily forested, mountainous,
and some urban areas, specially trained (Ranger type) light
units that are centered on dismounted infantry are still very
appropriate.
Below is an outline of how the Army shift to
medium-weight forces might occur over the next 20 years.
Organizational Options
Light Forces
Heavy Forces
Medium Forces
82nd ABN
One Light Div
101st AirAssault
One “medium” Div
(One Light Div)
Light Forces
82nd ABN
One Light Div
(ACR)
Medium Forces
82nd Airborne
(Most structure
moves to middle)
Two Armored Divs
Three Mech Divs
(One Heavy Div
and ACR)
Medium Forces
Seven - Eight
Medium Divisions
“Limited” Option circa 2001
One light division and
3rd ACR convert to medium
structure and join the 101st
which retains its present air assault
configuration.
Heavy Forces
Three “medium” Divs
(One Light Div)
Light Forces
Two Armored Divs
Four Mech Divs
Heavy Forces
One-two Heavy Divs
(Most structure
moves to middle)
17
“Balanced” Option circa 2008.
One light and one heavy
divsion, plus the ACR, convert
to medium structure. 101st
also reconfigured with additional
wheeled armored vehicles.
“AAN Type” Option circa 2020.
One-two heavy divisions
and the 82nd ABN are retained
in their present structure. All
other divisions and the ACR move
to medium force configuration.
Third is the cost of these initiatives. The type of medium
force discussed in this essay will require recapitalization of
a portion of the Army division/brigade structure.27 While
the Army already has the best fleet of attack helicopters in
the world, it has virtually no wheeled armored vehicles.
Several thousand vehicles would have to be procured from
U.S. and/or overseas sources. Additional indirect fire
weapons would have to be bought, for example, adding a
vehicle with an FOGM-type capability. These are difficult
times for the Army budget, and without additional funding
during the next 10 years, some other less appropriate
systems such as the heavy Crusader self-propelled
gun/howitzer would have to be radically scaled back if not
eliminated in order to initiate a wheeled armored vehicle
program. Any option to move the Army in the direction of
becoming a more middle weight force, whether along the
lines described in this article or toward a more radical AAN
type force must take into account affordability and realistic
budget assumptions.
Whether the Army will move to a nearly pure medium
weight-type force by 2020 remains uncertain. Several key
technological and operational questions will have to be
answered. The fate of the ultra heavy units which rely upon
land “dreadnought” (50+ tons) armored fighting vehicles
will critically depend upon whether the investment in the
next generation of combat vehicle and weapons technology
will lead to an Army consisting of primarily medium weight
aero-motorized forces. Several major advances if not
breakthroughs will have to be made in active/passive
protection and propulsion efficiencies by 2010 to allow
medium weight ground forces to fight in all combat
environments. Second is the question about the risks and
benefits of low altitude combat and maneuver aviation. Low
altitude aerial fighting vehicles can be neutralized by
dispersed and effective battlefield air defenses. A key
question is whether the United States will be able to devise
effective suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD)
capabilities to facilitate low altitude air combat operations
18
without heavy attrition. Third is the question as to whether
reconnaissance strike combinations will dominate the
battlefield even down to the close engagement regime.
Fourth, there remains the question about the size,
configuration and role of future infantry forces and how
they interact with the next generation of combat vehicles
(with and without human operators) and long-range fire
systems.
Conclusion.
A decision to transform a portion of the Army into
aero-motorized divisions and brigades appears compelling.
The geo-strategic environment will likely call for the rapid
deployment of high performance combined arms forces over
trans-oceanic distances. Even in Europe, NATO expansion
east to Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic highlights the
need for operationally agile ground forces since classic
prepositioning options may be precluded for geo-strategic
and cost reasons.
In many small-scale contingencies, aero-motorized units
appear more versatile than pure light infantry units,
especially if there is any expectation of intense local combat.
Additionally, there will be the need to have theater
forces that have high firepower, operational agility, and a
low logistics “footprint.” This provides them the capacity to
operate effectively in a military environment under the
“artillery fan” of long-range ballistic and cruise missiles and
possibly “dirtied” by the use of NBC weapons. Finally, a
move toward the medium weight aero-motorized concept
would put the Army firmly on the path toward a more
strategically and operationally agile force of 2020 without
calling for either technological or budgetary magic.
ENDNOTES
1. The possible exception to this “10-year” rule is the prospect that
the PRC will acquire a substantial air and naval capability to menace
Taiwan by circa 2005. To be credible the Chinese would have to
19
efficiently exploit a wide range of contemporary air and naval weapons,
largely acquired from the Russian Federation. The Chinese
military—not noted for high technology innovation—would have to
selectively master elements of the contemporary “revolution in military
affairs.” Even if a Chinese “regional strategic threat” rapidly matured
by 2005, it is likely that the geo-strategic focus of possible future
confrontations with the United States will have primarily aerospace
and naval features with U.S. ground forces playing a secondarysupporting role. The nuclear capability of China should not be forgotten.
2. U.S. forces in Korea face the immediate prospect that a second
Korean War would involve the substantial if not massive use of chemical
and biological weapons by the North Koreans. During 1997, a major
shift in attitude toward the DPRK’s CW and BW capability occurred
both within the region and the U.S. Joint Staff. By the winter of 1998,
there was wide concern about the need to enhance both the U.S. and
South Koreans’ joint capacity to operate in a theater “dirtied” by wide
scale CW and BW use.
3. In an important shift emphasis from the Bottom-Up Review
(BUR), the strategic analysis contained in the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) acknowledged that CW and BW use was likely in future
Major Theater Wars (MTWs). This shift in strategy was strongly
endorsed by the National Defense Panel.
4. See the Strategic Assessment 1997, Flashpoints and Force
Structure, Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University.
5. With hindsight, the “Pentomic” concept of five infantry battle
groups without organic armored mobility and protection made little
operational sense in the context of a battle fought primarily with
nuclear weapons. See A.J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, Washington,
DC: National Defense University Press, 1986.
6. By the early 1960s, the Infantry Branch had adopted the concept
of mechanized warfare if only to provide its forces with protected
mobility in a European Theater nuclear war. With the 1960s heavy
division concept, the distinction between an armored and mechanized
division became trivial. Both had a mix of armored and mechanized
battalions in three brigades. It was during this time the concept of the
armored self-propelled gun-howitzer fully matured as key supporting
arm to the armored and mechanized brigades with a heavy division.
7. The Light Infantry Division’s table of organization and
equipment (TO&E) was sized so that the entire division could be
20
airlifted by 500 C-141 sorties. This resulted in a very light division
structure will little organic mobility and modest anti-tank and artillery
assets.
8. See Major P. H. Herbert, “Deciding What Has to Be Done: General
W. E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM-100-5,” 1988; and Major R.A.
Doughty, “The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,”
Command and Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1979.
9. Both Operations DESERT STORM and Operations JOINT
ENDEAVOR revealed the very large intra-theater logistic support
needed to provision and move heavy armored and mechanized forces.
The now famous “left hook” of the 100-hour DESERT STORM ground
campaign required a massive shift of supplies to pre-dumped sites
through the use of thousands of heavy cargo trucks and heavy
equipment transporters (HETs). Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR
required the extensive use of rail and road support to move one
reinforced heavy Army brigade out of southern Germany to Bosnia over
a 90-day period. Aero-motorized units would have had far better
operational agility in a similar circumstance, especially in a military
environment with a substantial road net.
10. One brigade of the 9th Motorized was operational during the fall
of 1990 during Operation DESERT SHIELD. It was not deployed! The
82d was deployed without organic trucks. Unlike the HMMWV
equipped 9th ID, the 82d would have been either overrun and/or
bypassed if the Iraqi Army had moved south during the first six weeks of
the U.S. build-up. It is noteworthy that trucks were provided the 82d
when it participated with the 6th French Motorized Division as the
furthest element of the left hook into Iraq during the 100-hour ground
war.
11. The Italian, British, and American Armies had several
disastrous experiences during the North African campaign where foot
mobile infantry units were either overwhelmed or bypassed by opposing
armored and motorized units. Much of the German infantry and their
allied forces suffered similar military disasters along the Eastern Front
especially after the battle of Stalingrad in 1943. The Marines discovered
this reality during a number of NATO exercises in the 1980s when their
then foot-mobile infantry regiments were overrun or bypassed by West
German armored and mechanized units. This “lesson” prompted the
Marines to use their amphibious assault vehicles as armored personnel
carriers during the Marine offensive into Kuwait during Operation
DESERT STORM.
21
12. See various RAND studies by John Lund and others for analyses
of the role of wide-body aircraft to carry light armored fighting vehicles.
For an earlier discussion of these issues see Peter A. Wilson, “U.S.
Reinforcement Options” in European Security Policy After The
Revolution of 1989, Jeffrey Simon, ed., Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 1991.
13. See Jane’s Armor and Artillery, 1997, for a description of the
wide range of extant light and medium weight wheeled armored
fighting vehicles and new developments. Also see R. M. Ogorkiewicz,
“Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles: Finding the Right Capability Mix,”
International Defense Review Special Report, May 1995.
14. See Dennis W. Moore, The Influence of Soil Surface Conditions
On The Traction of Wheeled and Tracked Military Vehicles, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Report GL-89-6, 1989. During the 1980s, major
advances in off-road wheel technology occurred with the deployment of
radial/run flat tires and central tire inflation systems.
15. See Victor Wouk, “Hybrid Electric Vehicles” and Harold A.
Rosen and Deborah R. Castleman, “Flywheels in Hybrid Vehicles” in
Scientific American, October 1997, for a discussion of innovations in
land vehicle propulsion systems. Fuel cell technology appears to be on
the verge of major advance, which should further facilitate the mass
deployment of low emissions/high fuel efficient hybrid power plant
combinations for automobiles and utility vehicles by 2010. Variants of
these hybrids are likely to present the next generation of armored
fighting vehicle designers with some economically and technologically
attractive propulsion options. See Joe Feese, “Race on for Clean Cars,”
ABCNEW.com, October 24, 1997. In the future, it is possible to imagine
that each wheel of a fighting vehicle will be powered by an electric
motor. This will allow dynamic braking (using the motor as a generator)
which will increase overall fuel efficiency. If damaged in combat, these
powered wheels might be jettisoned to insure survival mobility for the
battle-damaged vehicle.
16. Proponents and participants of the 9th Motorized Division
experiment freely acknowledged the vulnerability of the force to
artillery fire while being equipped only with soft skinned vehicles, the
HMMWV. Attempts by the Army to develop and deploy an air
transportable Armored Gun System (AGS) have failed twice—once with
the Marines during the 1980s and most recently with the 1997
cancellation of the XM-8.
17. For a more detailed analysis of Rapid Force Protection
Technologies see R. Steeb, J. Matsumura, et al., Exploring New
22
Technology Concepts for Light Forces, DB-168-A/OSD, RAND 1997; and
R. Steeb, J. Matsumura, et al., Rapid Force Projection Technologies:
Quick Look Analysis of Advanced Light Indirect Fire Systems,
DB-169-A/OSD, RAND 1997. Unlike the aero-motorized concept, this
RAND concept calls for the deployment of very few combat troops and
primarily relies on air deployed weapon “pods” which have no tactical
mobility.
18. Radically lowering the signature of the next generation of
armored fighting vehicles to detection by overhead surveillance and top
attack systems will likely be a major design requirement. 70-ton class
MBTs may become just “too big and too hot” to hide from top attack
threats. See George Seffers, “DoD Wants Stealthy Hybrid Electric
Vehicles,” Defense News, December 1-7, 1997, p. 4.
19. See R. Steeb, J. Matsumura.
20. As the United States relies upon silicon-based weapons, sensors,
computers, and communications to affect a revolution in military
affairs, technologically competent military opponents may rely more
heavily upon weapons which generate high-powered electromagnetic
effects. These include both nuclear and non-nuclear driven
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and high-powered microwave (HPM)
weapons. Future Army wheeled fighting vehicles should be designed to
minimize these weapons effects especially if the next generation of
fighting vehicles relies upon hybrid electric propulsion systems. See F.
Gassman and EMC Baden, “High Power Microwave: The Silent Threat”
in Armada International, August/September 1997, p. 70.
21. See “JTR to be ‘Chinook’ for US Army of 2025” in Jane’s Defense
Weekly, September 10, 1997. An interesting alternative to various
tilt-rotor and large helicopter JTR concepts is the Boeing Super STOL
(SSTOL) concept for the Advanced Theater Transport (ATT) which
would replace the C-130 family. See Bill Sweetman, “A rising
imperative: more demands on airlift” in Jane’s International Defense
Review, 2/98, pp. 28-29.
22. Recent computer driven wargames such a TACWAR used during
the QDR highlighted the killing power of helicopter gunships during the
Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS).
23. The threat of manportable surface to air missiles to low altitude
fixed and rotary wing aircraft is very serious and will likely continue to
mature. A major objective of the RAH-66 Comanche gunship is to
produce a low observable combat helicopter. A major joint activity of all
four services will be to conduct suppression of enemy air defenses
23
(SEAD) operations. Well-armed motorized units can play an important
role in this regard. In those circumstances where there is a severe air
defense threat, motorized units will have to rely more heavily upon
long-range stand-off missile fire support from platforms operating
outside of the effective envelope of the local air defenses.
24. For a description of the next generation 40-knot cargo ship, see
David L. Giles, “Faster Ships for the Future,” Scientific American,
October 1997.
25. Current USAF plans for the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF)
which calls for the rapid deployment of short-range F-16 class
fighter-bombers to bare (unprotected) bases may be viewed as a bit
operationally naïve. Future long-range missile threats will likely
require that USAF units equipped with the STOVL version of the JSF
will operate out of dispersed and hidden sites. Both the Royal Air Force
while operating the GR-5/7 Harriers and the USAF while operating the
Gryphon Ground Launched Cruise Missile discovered that dispersed
logistics to support air units in the field was a major chore. Even the
USMC tends to operate its Harrier fleet from a fixed airfield or from a
large amphibious ship to minimize the logistics burden.
26. See R. Steeb, J. Matsumura.
27. Implicit in the proposals made in this article is the question as to
whether the Army should move to an all brigade structure, which
eliminates the division as an echelon. The authors are somewhat
agnostic and do not believe the argument in favor of the Army moving to
medium-weight combat formations stands on the outcome of this
debate. For a call to change the Army to a brigade structure with forces
having features described in this article, see Douglas A. Macgregor,
Breaking the Phalanix: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st
Century, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.
24
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Commandant
*****
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