R E L A T I O N

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RELATION
BETWEEN ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL AUTHORITY
A POSTATOMIC ATTACK SITUATION
IN
6 May 1954
j.687
CO NTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION--Colonel
L. R. Bartlett,
Member of the Faculty,
Jr., USAF,
ICAF .............
SPEAKER--Dr.
Charles Fairman,
Nagel Professor
of Constitutional Law, Washington University,
St. L o u i s ,
Missouri ......................................
GENERAL
DISCUSSION ....................................
26
NOTICE:
This is a copy of material presented to the resident
students at the Industrial College of the A r m e d Forces. It is furnished for official use only in connection with studies n o w being
p e r f o r m e d by the user. It is not for general publication. It m a y
not be released to other persons, quoted or extracted for publication
or otherwise copied or distributed without specific p e r m i s s i o n f r o m
the author and the C o m m a n d a n t , I C A F , in each case.
Publication
INDUSTRIAL
COLLEGE
N o . L 5 4 - 128
OF THE ARMED
Washington, D. C.
FORCES
Dr. Charles Fairman, Nagel Professor ofConstitutional Law,
Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, was born in Alton,
Illinois, 27 July 1897. H e received the following degrees: A.B.,
University of Illinois, 1918 and M. A., 1920; Ph.D., Harvard, 1926;
graduate work, University of Paris, 1925-26; L L . B . , University of
London, 1934; S. J. D., Harvard L a w School, 1938. H e has taught
at P o m o n a College, Harvard University, Williams College, Stanford
University, and since 1953 has been in his present position. Dr. F a i r m a n
served during W o r l d W a r s I and II and w a s active in the Reserve Corps
between the wars. In this service he rose f r o m the ranks through all
grades to Colonel. His World W a r II service was in the Judge Advocate
General's Office, 1943-44, and as Chief International L a w Division,
E T O , 1944-45. Other positions held by h i m are: consultant, C o m mission on Organization of Executive Branch of the Government, 1948,
consultant %o Provost Marshal General's Office, 1950; and chairman,
C o m m i t t e e on the L a w of Occupied Areas in the A m e r i c a n Bar Association's Section of International and Comparative Law. H e was
admitted to the bar in the District of Columbia and in Missouri, and
is a m e m b e r of the Board of Editors of the A m e r i c a n Journal of
International L a w and Social Science Research Council. H e is author
of "The L a w of Martial Rule, " 1930, 2d ed. 1943; "Mr. Justice Miller
and the S u p r e m e Court, 1862-1890, " 1939; " A m e r i c a n Constitutional
Decisions, " 1948, rev. ed. 1950; and m a n y articles on judicial biography
and on constitutional and international law including: " T h e S u p r e m e Court
on Military Jurisdiction: Martial Rule in Hawaii, and the Yamashita
Case, " 59 Harvard L a w Review 833-82, July 1946; " S o m e Observations
on Military Occupation, " 32 Minn. L a w Review 319-48, M a r c h 1948;
and " S o m e N e w P r o b l e m s of the Constitution Following the Flag,"
i Stanford L a w Review 587-645, June 1949, This is his first lecture
at the Industrial College.
1689
RELATION BETWEEN ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL AUTHORITY IN
A POSTATOMIC ATTACK SITUATION
6 M a y 1954
COLONEL• B A R T L E T T :
General Greeley, visitors, gentlemen:
W h e n t h e M o b i l i z a t i o n B r a n c h d e v i s e d t h e f i n a l p r o b l e m on w h i c h y o u
a r e w o r k i n g , we c o n s i d e r e d the p o s s i b i l i t y that one or m o r e c o m m i t t e e s w o u l d v i s u a l i z e a c o n d i t i o n of r i o t , p i l l a g e , a n d m a s s p a n i c a f t e r
t h e b o m b s f e l l . It s e e m e d p o s s i b l e t h a t w i t h o u t a n y g u i d a n c e y o u r
p r o p o s e d s o l u t i o n m i g h t b e to d e c l a r e m a r t i a l l a w a n d go o n to o t h e r
problems.
C o n s e q u e n t l y , w e s o u g h t a l e c t u r e r on t h i s t o p i c .
T h r o u g h t h e J u d g e A d v o c a t e G e n e r a l ( J A G ) of t h e A r m y a n d t h e
J A G S c h o o l a t C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e , V i r g i n i a , w e s e c u r e d t h e n a m e of
today's speaker.
As you have noted from his biography he is Nagel
P r o f e s s o r of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w a t W a s h i n g t o n U n i v e r s i t y i n St. L o u i s .
H o w e v e r , h e h a s b e e n e n g a g e d f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s o n a s t u d y of a l l
a s p e c t s of m a r t i a l l a w . " W h o ' s Wh o i n A m e r i c a " ' n e e d s 27 l i n e s to
recite all his accomplishments and we were delighted when he accepted
today' s assignment.
P r o f e s s o r F a i r m a n , it i s a p l e a s u r e to p r e s e n t y o u to t h e I n d u s t r i a l C o l l e g e of t h e A r m e d F o r c e s .
DR. F A I R M A N :
gentlemen:
Thank you, Colonel Bartlett.
General Greeley,
I h a v e w r i t t e n o u t w h a t I a m g o i n g to s a y to y o u i n 60 m i n u t e s
b e c a u s e t h i s i s a t h o r n y s u b j e c t . If o n e s p e a k s e x t e m p o r a n e o u s l y ,
there is considerable danger of misstating one's thought or inadverte n t l y g i v i n g u n d u e e m p h a s i s to o n e a s p e c t a n d o v e r l o o k i n g s o m e t h i n g
else.
I do n o t s u p p o s e %hat t h e o u t c o m e of a n y b a t t l e w i l l t u r n on t h e
m a t t e r I a m to d i s c u s s w i t h y o u t o d a y . I do a p p r e h e n d t h a t h o w w e
win and, indeed, whether we win, a war would be profoundly influenced
by our skill--or ineptitude--in civil-military relationships in the area
a f f e c t e d b y m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . I do b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s i s a m a t t e r
w h e r e w e a r e i n d e s p e r a t e n e e d of a s o u n d b a s i c p h i l o s o p h y , a n d of t h e
a s s u r a n c e t h a t c o m e s f r o m p r a c t i c e u n d e r a v a r i e t y of s i m u l a t e d s i t u a t i o n s . T h i s i s n o t a m a t t e r t h a t c a n s a f e l y b e l e f t to t h e i m p r o v i s a t i o n
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1690
of the moment.
A few days of bungling
would get us off to a Very bad start.
uncertainty,
after an attack,
We are a people inexperienced
in sustaining a war within the body
of the country.
"Hardly a man is now alive" who remembers
the four
years prior to Appomattox.
We have accumulated
experience
in the
forging of armed
forces at home while friends and eventual allies
engaged the enemy
far from our shores.
We have learned a good deal
about converting
our economy
to the ends of war.
We have recently
attained some proficiency in the conduct of civil affairs in foreign
places.
But how the Armed
Forces
and the agencies of civil government would get along together in the event that enemy
action struck
home--that
is a matter of great importance
on which we are woefully
unprepared.
Think~
for a moment,
of actual situations.
In the event of e n e m y action within domestic territory, disorganized civilians and organized evacuations would crowd the highways. The A r m e d Forces would be using the highways too. H o w
should these m o v e m e n t s be coordinated and controlled? It is no
s o l u t i o n s i m p l y to s a y , shove the c i v i l i a n s into the ditch and l e t the
t r o o p s go by. We m u s t w o r k out s o m e t h i n g m u c h b e t t e r t h a n that.
B l a c k o u t s and d i m o u t s would be i m p o s e d . T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s m u s t
be c o n t r o l l e d . Sabotage m u s t be w a t c h e d f o r and p r e v e n t e d . How would
a l l t h e s e l o c a l i n c i d e n t s of w a r be p o l i c e d - - b y s o l d i e r s , s c u r r y i n g a l l
o v e r the p l a c e ? - - o r by the civiliar, b l o c k w a r d e n s ? How s h o u l d an
a p p a r e n t o f f e n d e r be d e a l t w i t h - - b y p e t t y p r o v o s t c o u r t s s i t t i n g in
e v e r y t o w n ? - - b y an i n d i c t m e n t in one of the 80-odd F e d e r a l d i s t r i c t
c o u r t s ? How ? L o c a l s u p p l i e s m u s t be c o n s e r v e d and r a t i o n e d ;
f e e d i n g c e n t e r s and w e l f a r e s e r v i c e s m u s t be p r o v i d e d . G a s o l i n e is
the k e y to m o v e m e n t ; but who is to k e e p t h e k e y ?
Suppose the military authority orders the evacuation of an area.
W h o will see to it that the inhabitants get off ? W h o will supply the
transport ? W h o will conduct the m o v e m e n t , provide food and shelter,
administer the relocation? Evidently combat forces could not perform
all these functions--yet the functions m u s t be performed. There must
be working arrangements between the A r m e d Forces and the local
civil authorities. These working arrangements m u s t be flexible,
responsive to the situation as it presents itself--like the quick interaction of trained players on a basketball team.
169
Plant security, I need hardly r e m i n d the Industrial College,
would be a m a j o r concern in w a r production. It is a responsibility
definitely fixed upon m a n a g e m e n t .
But the civil authorities and the
military authorities are vitally concerned in seeing to it that that
responsibility is discharged.
A g a i n , t h e r e m a y b e p r e s e n t i n t h e c o u n t r y p e o p l e who a r e
r e a s o n a b l y s u s p e c t e d of a d i s p o s i t i o n to c o m m i t a c t s i n a i d of t h e
e n e m y . I s a y " r e a s o n a b l y s u s p e c t e d , " f o r I r a i s e t h e p r o b l e m of
" p r e v e n t i v e " m e a s u r e s , b e f o r e any "act" has b e e n c o m m i t t e d .
E n e m y a l i e n s p r o d u c e no " m a j o r " p r o b l e m ; c e r t a i n l y t h e y m a y b e
t a k e n into safe k e e p i n g , although they m u s t be given r e a s o n a b l e c a r e .
B u t t h e d e t e n t i o n of A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n s m e r e l y b e c a u s e t h e y a r e " r e a s o n a b l y s u s p e c t e d " of h o s t i l e p u r p o s e s - - t h a t b r i s t l e s w i t h d i f f i c u l t i e s
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law, of p o l i c y , of p r a c t i c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Such
a c t i o n i s , I s h a l l p o i n t out, n o t a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e A r m e d F o r c e s .
We m a y b e t h a n k f u l t h a t i t i s n o t , s i n c e i t i s a t o u c h y a n d u n w e l c o m e
b u s i n e s s f o r w h i c h m e n i n u n i f o r m a r e i l l - s u i t e d . B u t it i s a m a t t e r
in which the A r m e d F o r c e s have a p r o p e r i n t e r e s t . H e r e then is
a n o t h e r field w h e r e a sound r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n civil a u t h o r i t i e s and
t h e f i g h t i n g f o r c e s i s v i t a l to t h e n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e .
I m i g h t go on f i r i n g t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . T h e y a r e n o v e l , d i f f i c u l t ,
and in the h i g h e s t d e g r e e i m p o r t a n t . They would a r i s e the m o m e n t
o p e r a t i o n s b e g a n . T h e i r s o l u t i o n r e q u i r e s c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s of
d u t i e s a n d c a p a c i t i e s - - a s o u n d p h i l o s o p h y of f u n c t i o n s a n d w o r k i n g
relationships. Thinking should come before action--we should force
o u r s e l v e s to t h i n k t h i n g s out, a n d t h e n t e s t , a n d r e v i s e a n d t e s t a g a i n
and again, b e f o r e any e m e r g e n c y is upon us.
L e t us s t a r t with the l a r g e s t s t r a n d in this t a n g l e d m a s s - ~ C i v i l
D e f e n s e . D u r i n g W o r l d W a r II t h e r e w a s , you w i l l r e c a l l , a n O f f i c e
of C i v i l i a n D e f e n s e , w h i c h s p o n s o r e d a v a r i e t y of n a t i o n a l p r o g r a m s - air-raid drills, victory gardens, bond drives, and other extraneous
a c t i v i t i e s . I n 1948 t h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t C i v i l D e f e n s e B o a r d - - - o f w h i c h
I s h a l l s p e a k i n a m o m e n t - - e x p r e s s e d t h i s c o n c l u s i o n : "It i s a p p a r e n t ,
i n r e t r o s p e c t , t h a t t h e c i v i l d e f e n s e o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n s p i t e of t h e n o t e w o r t h y p a t r i o t i c r e s p o n s e of t h e c i v i l i a n v o l u n t e e r s , w a s i n a d e q u a t e
to c o p e w i t h a h e a v y a t t a c k . " 1 /
1/ A Study of C i v i l D e f e n s e .
R e p o r t of t h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t C i v i l
D e f e n s e B o a r d (the B u l l B o a r d ) , r e l e a s e d b y t h e O f f i c e of t h e S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e on 15 F e b 1948, p. 8.
1692
The W a r D e p a r t m e n t C i v i l D e f e n s e B o a r d was s e t up by a
m e m o r a n d u m of 25 N o v e m b e r 1946, to f o r m u l a t e the D e p a r t m e n t ' s
v i e w s and p o l i c i e s a s to c i v i l d e f e n s e . Its p r e s i d e n t was G e n e r a l
H a r o l d R. B u l l - - l a t e r C o m m a n d a n t of the N a t i o n a l W a r C o l l e g e . The
r e p o r t was r e l e a s e d by Mr. F o r r e s t a l , S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e , on
15 F e b r u a r y 1948. I quote a few p a s s a g e s m a t e r i a l to o u r p r e s e n t in-.
quiry.
" T h e m a j o r c i v i l d e f e n s e p r o b l e m s a r e not a p p r o p r i a t e l y
m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Such p r o b l e m s a r e C i v i l i a n in n a t u r e
and s h o u l d be s o l v e d by c i v i l i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n . " (p. 20)
" T h e s t a t e g o v e r n m e n t m u s t a c c e p t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of
c i v i l d e f e n s e f o r i t s p e o p l e and c o m m u n i t i e s . . . .
Federal
c i v i l d e f e n s e a g e n c i e s a d v i s e , a s s i s t and s e c u r e n e c e s s a r y
u n i f o r m i t y , and m u s t h a v e the p o w e r to d i r e c t s t a t e a c t i o n when
t h e e m e r g e n c y is i n t e r s t a t e o r v i t a l l y a f f e c t s F e d e r a l i n t e r e s t s .
(p. 12)
T h e r e m u s t be " m a x i m u m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on c i v i l i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s
f r o m the F e d e r a l to l o c a l l e v e l s c o n s i s t e n t with n e c e s s a r y c o o r d i n a t i o n
with the a r m e d f o r c e s . !' The A r m e d F o r c e s m u s t be f r e e " f o r t h e i r
p r i m a r y m i s s i o n of o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the e n e m y . " (p..16)
S c a r c e l y a f o r t n i g h t t h e r e a f t e r , by d i r e c t i v e of 27 M a r c h 1948,
M r . F o r r e s t a l s e t up the Office o f C i v i l D e f e n s e P l a n n i n g - - a n o f f i c e
to p l a n a s y s t e m . It was a b l y d i r e c t e d by the late R u s s e l J. Hopley,
an e x e c u t i v e of the B e l l T e l e p h o n e s y s t e m . The e x e c u t i v e a s s i s t a n t
was C o l o n e l B a r n e t W. B e e r s , who had w o r k e d f o r the B u l l B o a r d ,
has ever since been involved in this business, and is today Assistaaut
for Civil Defense in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. F r o m the
elaborate report of i October 1948, I quote one remark:
"It would be m o s t d i s a s t r o u s and c o n f u s i n g d u r i n g a n e m e r g e n c y to find both the A r m y and the C i v i l D e f e n s e o r g a n i z a t i o n
d e p e n d i n g upon the s a m e r o u t e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , the s a m e
s u p p l y l i n e s o r the s a m e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s . T h i s t a c t i c a l
c o o r d i n a t i o n m u s t be c a r r i e d out in the f i e l d and with A r m y
H e a d q u a r t e r s . " (p. 177)
The H o p l e y R e p o r t a d v i s e d t h a t , on b a l a n c e , it s e e m e d b e t t e r t o
put the Office of C i v i l D e f e n s e u n d e r the S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e , on t h e
:i693
s a m e line with A r m y , Navy, and Air Force, rather than to m a k e it
a n independent agency. But, as will be seen in a m o m e n t , the
Executive and the Congress w e r e in accord in rejecting that suggestion.
M o v i n g r a p i d l y o v e r t h e g r o u n d , 2 / I d r a w y o u r a t t e n t i o n to
N S R B D o c u m e n t 128, " U n i t e d S t a t e s Cqvil D e f e n s e , " t r a n s m i t t e d to
t h e P r e s i d e n t b y M r . S y m i n g t o n , t h e n C h a i r m a n of t h e N a t i o n a l
S e c u r i t y R e s o u r c e s B o a r d , o n 8 S e p t e m b e r 1950. I t w a s , a n d r e m a i n s ,
the national plan for civil defense. The State and local organizations
have been brought into line with this document; the State Civil Defense
A c t s , i n t h e m a i n , f o l l o w t h e s u g g e s t e d M o d e l S t a t u t e on p a g e 135 of
the plan.
O n S e p t e m b e r 18 t h e P r e s i d e n t l a i d t h e p l a n b e f o r e C o n g r e s s .
B i l l s w e r e a t o n c e i n t r o d u c e d , h e a r i n g s w e r e h e l d , a n d on 12 J a n u a r y
1951 t h e F e d e r a l C i v i l D e f e n s e A c t b e c a m e law. Y o u s h o u l d a c q u a i n t
yourselves with that statute.
TheFCDA, as you know, was made an
i n d e p e n d e n t a g e n c y - - n o t p l a c e d u n d e r t h e r o o f of t h e D e p a r t m e n t of
D e f e n s e . On t h e m a k i n g of t h i s d e c i s i o n I q u o t e f r o m t h e h e a r i n g s
b e f o r e a s u b c o m m i t t e e of t h e S e n a t e A r m e d S e r v i c e s C o m m i t t e e :
"Mr. C h a m b e r s (Colonel C h a m b e r s of the C o m m i t t e e Staff):
Colonel Beers, was this matter--(that is, the question of putting
Civil Defense in the Department of Defense)--considered by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and did they advise on the final disposition ?
"Colonel Beers:
Quite thoroughly.
" M r . C h a m b e r s : A n d t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of Staff do a g r e e t h a t
t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c i v i l d e f e n s e s h o u l d n o t b e a p a r t of t h e
,military structure ?
"Colonel Beers:
Yes, sir.
Senato r Kefauver: W h y is it they don't want it a part of the.'
military structure, Colonel Beers ?
"
2/ A n enemeration of the major steps in the history of civil defense
is set out i n H o u s e Report No. 3209, of 19 Dec 1950, 81st Cong.,
2d sess.
5
•
1694
" C o l o n e l B e e r s : The f e e l i n g in m i l i t a r y c i z c l e s , the m i l i t a r y
t h i n k i n g , e v e n b e l o w t h e l e v e l of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c e of
t h e S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e , i s t h a t t h e y h a v e got e n o u g h to do a s
it i s
. .
"3/
Now c o n s i d e r t h e s t a t u t e , a n d g l a n c e at t h e D e c l a r a t i o n of
P o l i c y , s e c t i o n 2.
"It i s .
. t h e p o l i c y a n d i n t e n t of C o n g r e s s t h a t t h i s
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c i v i l d e f e n s e s h a l l be v e s t e d p r i m a r i l y i n t h e
s e v e r a l s t a t e s and t h e i r political subdivisions. The F e d e r a l
Government shall provide necessary coordination and guid,!
ance . . .
G l a n c e at t h e P o w e r s a n d D u t i e s of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t o r ,
t i o n 201:
,
in s e c -
To p r e p a r e n a t i o n a l p l a n s a n d p r o g r a m s .
2.
To s t u d y a n d d e v e l o p m e a s u r e s .
3.
To c o n d u c t o r a r r a n g e t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m s .
4.
To a s s i s t a n d e n c o u r a g e t h e S t a t e s to e n t e r i n t o m u t u a l
aid compacts.
5.
To a s s i s t a n d c o o r d i n a t e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e S t a t e s .
6.
To p r o c u r e a n d d i s t r i b u t e m a t e r i a l s a n d f a c i l i t i e s .
7.
To m a k e f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , a n d s o on.
T h e s e a r e n o t s t r o n g p o w e r s - - t h e y f a l l f a r s h o r t of a u t h o r i t y to
d i r e c t . P e r h a p s e x p e r i e n c e would s h o w t h a t they should be s t r e n g t h e n e d ;
that is my own belief.
We s t a r t , t h e n , w i t h a n a t i o n a l p o l i c y , e x p r e s s i n g t h e v i e w s of t h e
c i v i l i a n h e a d s a n d of t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p of t h e E x e c u t i v e , t h e v i e w s of C o n g r e s s , a n d t h e v i e w s of t h e S t a t e G o v e r n o r s .
3/
H e a r i n g s on S. 4217 a n d S. 4219, p. 80.
6
1695
T h e a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n of C i v i l D e f e n s e i s a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y v e s t e d
primarily in the States and their subdivisions. Each state has/its
plan. R e c e n t l y I have b e e n e x a m i n i n g t h e m . H e r e (showing the
d o c u m e n t ) is a t y p i c a l one, for O r e g o n - - a b a s i c plan, r e s t i n g upon
t h e S t a t e ' s C i v i l D e f e n s e A c t a n d N S R B D o c u m e n t 128. T h e r e i s a
f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e c e n t r a l o f f i c e , a n d l i n e s of c o m m a n d
r u n n i n g d o w n to t h e l o c a l l e v e l . T h e r e a r e a n n e x e s - - o n s e c u r i t y a n d
p o l i c e ; on f i r e s e r v i c e s ; on m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s - - r a d i o l o g i c a l
monitoring,
m e d i c a l e v a c u a t i o n , etc. ; on aid and w e l f a r e - - a s s e m b l y
areas,
- r e c e p t i o n c e n t e r s , c o n d u c t of e v a c u a t i o n s , r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e R e d C r o s s ;
on e n g i n e e r i n g a n d h e a v y r e s c u e ; o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , o n t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,
a n d .so f o r t h . T h e s e a r e
loose-leaf books, for you see they need constant revision.
Mutual aid, b a c k e d up by m o b i l e s u p p o r t , a r e b a s i c
c o n c e p t i o n s - - j u s t a s t h e y a r e i n t h e t a c t i c a l e m p l o y m e n t of a n i n f a n t r y
b a t t a l i o n . C i t y A h e l p s c i t y B if t h e l a t t e r i s h i t , a n d m o b i l e s u p p o r t
c o m e s u p f r o m t h e r e a r t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e it i s m o s t n e e d e d . T h e r e
i s n o w a p r e t t y h i g h l y d e v e l o p e d s y s t e m of i n t e r s t a t e c o m p a c t s , a n d
e v e n c o m p a c t s r u n n i n g o v e r the b o r d e r s .
Mutual support is, in some
c a s e s , a o n e - w a y u n d e r t a k i n g ; t h e r e m a y be little r e c i p r o c i t y .
For
example, Arizona's plan is concerned very largely with how ta handle
250, 000 t o u r i s t s c a u g h t in C a l i f o r n i a , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 m i g r a t o r y w o r k e r s , a n d
perhaps some panic- struck C alifornians--to route them along Arizona's
f e w h i g h w a y s , to a l l o c a t e g a s o l i n e , a n d to p r o v i d e f o o d in a s t a t e m o s t
of w h o s e g r o c e r i e s c o m e f r o m a f a r .
D o w n at t h e g r o u n d l e v e l a r e t h e b l o c k w a r d e n s - - t h e d o u g h b o y s of
Civil D e f e n s e - - s u p p o r t e d by s p e c i a l i s t s such as f i r s t - a i d t e a m s ,
police, rescue workers, and the like.
T h e F C D A i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r g u i d a n c e a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n of S t a t e
a n d l o c a l t r a i n i n g . To t h a t e n d i t h a s p r e p a r e d - - w i t h e l a b o r a t e c o n s u l t a t i o n - - - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e g u i d e s , s u c h a s t h a t on P r i n c i p l e s of C i v i l
D e f e n s e O p e r a t i o n s , a n d t h e o n e on E m e r g e n c y W e l f a r e S e r v i c e s - - a n d
T e c h n i c a l M a n u a l s , s u c h a s t h a t on U t i l i z a t i o n a n d C o n t r o l of S t r e e t s
a n d H i g h w a y s , a n d o n e on o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d O p e r a t i o n of C a s u a l t y
Services.
These are the drill and service regulations for the volunteer
a r m y of C i v i l D e f e n s e .
The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) maintains
e i g h t r e g i o n a l o f f i c e s . T h i n k of t h e m a s f a c i l i t a t i n g a g e n c i e s , f i e l d
o f f i c e s w h e r e b y t h e F C D A m o v e s c l o s e r to t h e S t a t e a n d l o c a l
authorities and thus makes its assistance and coordination more
1696
r e a d i l y e f f e c t i v e . R e g i o n a l o f f i c e s a r r a n g e f o r the e f f e c t i v e u s e of
F e d e r a l p e r s o n n e l and r e s o u r c e s i n a c i v i l d e f e n s e e m e r g e n c y . ~
W h i l e t h e r e g i o n a l o f f i c e t h u s a c t s a s a g o - b e t w e e n and f a c i l i t a t o r , i t i s not a r e q u i r e d c h a n n e l b e t w e e n t h e A r m e d F o r c e s a n d t h e
l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n the m a t t e r of t h a t i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of d a i l y c o n t a c t s t h a t w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y i n the c o u r s e of a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s .
You k n o w , of c o u r s e , t h a t the s e v e r a l S t a t e s , w i t h v a r y i n g s u c c e s s ,
h a v e e n d e a v o r e d to r e c r u i t s k e l e t o n o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
T h e r e are a few
p e r m a n e n t e m p l o y e e s i n keY p o s i t i o n s ; r e t i r e d o f f i c e r s a r e p r o m i n e n t
i n t h e s e g r o u p s . A s to the s t r e n g t h of t h e C i v i l D e f e n s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,
I h a v e o n l y i m p r e s s i o n s , a s h a v e you. P e r h a p s t h e g r e a t e s t t r o u b l e
is that people, thus far, just don't get s c a r e d about a w a r and won't
play at being w a r d e n s and n u r s e s .
A y e a r ago, at San F r a n c i s c o ,
I w i t n e s s e d a d r i l l of A d m i r a l C o o k ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r t h a t c i t y , a n d
of the C a l i f o r n i a r e g i o n a l C i v i l D e f e n s e , a n d i t a l l l o o k e d v e r Y s u b s t a n t i a l and v e r y s e r i o u s .
T h e r e w a s a c a p t a i n t h e r e f r o m the
Presidio.
H e r e p r e s e n t e d , h o w e v e r , not S i x t h A r m y H e a d q u a r t e r s ,
b u t o n l y the P r e s i d i o ' a s a p a r t of San F r a n c i s c o .
The e x e r c i s e m a d e
no a t t e m p t to d e v e l o p the m a t t e r o n w h i c h I a m s p e a k i n g ~ - ~ t h e d a y - t o day w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the A r m e d F o r c e s and Civil Defense
a f t e r an attack.
S o m e m o n t h s ago, I a d d r e s s e d to t h e D i r e c t o r of C i v i l D e f e n s e i n
each S t a t e s o m e q u e s t i o n s about ! e g i s l a t i o n , plans, and p r a c t i c e s , and
then added this remark:
" A n y c o m m e n t s o r r e f l e c t i o n s on y o u r e x p e r i e n c e i n C i v i l
D e f e n s e e x e r c i s e s , i n t h e m a t t e r of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n
C i v i l D e f e n s e a c t i v i t i e s a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n s of the A r m e d F o r c e s ,
w i l l be m o s t g r a t e f u l l y r e c e i v e d . "
S o m e e v i d e n t l y did not r e a l i z e t h a t t h e r e w a s a n y p r o b l e m of w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s - - t h e y h a d not g o t t e n t h a t f a r . S o m e s a i d t h e y h a d
b e e n given everythSng they sought f r o m the A r m y . Some had at l e a s t
f a c e d up to t h e i r s i d e of the p r o b l e m . H e r e i s t h e e x p e r i e n c e of one
State director:
" I n 1952 we e n g a g e d i n a CPX a l e r t s u p e r v i s e d b y t h e J O C
at A r m y H e a d q u a r t e r s , w h i c h s h o w e d up a c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o b l e m
i n C i v i l D e f e n s e a n d M i l i t a r y c o o r d i n a t i o n . E a r l y i n 1953, we
i697.
-
d i r e c t o r s w e r e c a l l e d to A r m y H e a d q u a r t e r s f o r a b r i e f i n g on
a n o t h e r c o m b i n e d A l e r t to b e h e l d in t h e S p r i n g .
"At this time there had b e e n a change in personnel at
Headquarters, and it w a s obvious at this meeting that Civil
Defense w a s less than a 'step-child' in this Alert. So w e declined to participate, and set up our o w n Operation--the military
to observe. Actually, it w a s our feeling that Civil Defense w o u l d
have to operate on its own, anyway, so let's get s o m e practice.
" T h e Alert operated well within m o s t state areas, but f r o m
an inter-state standpoint w a s far f r o m satisfactory . .
. This
year w e will again attempt an inter-state approach, but this time
a blackboard drill. W e will again need military cooperation. "
H e r e is the experience of another director:
" M e m b e r s of the staff have participated in C o m m a n d
Post
Exercises with the (nearest) military District staff. While these
exercises have been of s o m e instructional value to Civil Defense
staff people, they have not b e e n too practical, mainly because of
the vast difference in staff training and experience b e t w e e n
Military and Civil Defense . . . .
W e have a great deal of w o r k
to do in this par'ticular field so that lines of responsibility and
actual operating procedur e s can be m o r e clearly defined in
advance. "
I a m not u r g i n g that the a r m e d s e r v i c e s be a big b r o t h e r to
C i v i l D e f e n s e j u s t out of k i n d n e s s to C i v i l D e f e n s e , a l t h o u g h to do s o
w o u l d g r e a t l y s t r e n g t h e n t h e c o u n t r y w e a r e a l l s w o r n to p r o t e c t a n d
defend. I am saying, rather, that an effective Civil Defense organizat i o n i s e s s e n t i a l to t h e s u c c e s s of t h e A r m e d F o r c e s .
Suppose this
atomic attack that has been given as our hypothesis: The Armed Forces
will n e e d c e r t a i n h i g h w a y s for t h e i r own o p e r a t i o n s .
Who will p r e v e n t
i n g r e s s a n d r e r o u t e t r a f f i c ? T h e A r m e d F o r c e s m a y h a v e to e v a c u a t e
certain areas.
Who w i l l c o n d u c t t h e m o v e m e n t , w i t h a l l i t s l o g i s t i c a l
s u p p o r t ? T h e A r m e d F o r c e s w i l l w a n t u n a u t h o r i z e d s i g n a l i n g to be
p r e v e n t e d , s a b o t a g e to be g u a r d e d a g a i n s t , s u s p i c i o u s c h a r a c t e r s to
be c h e c k e d . Who w i l l do a l l t h a t ? N o t G - l , G - 2 , G - 3 , G - 4 , t h e
Signal O f f i c e r , the Q u a r t e r m a s t e r ,
nor the Engineer.
A unit that
t u r n e d f r o m i t s c o m b a t m i s s i o n to do by i t s o w n m e a n s a l l t h e t h i n g s
it w o u l d r e q u i r e to be d o n e , w o u l d b e h o p e l e s s l y d i s s i p a t e d . I s u p p o s e
169S
t h e c o m m a n d i n g g e n e r a l w o u l d e m p l o y h i s G - 5 S e c t i o n to s e e to i t
t h a t the c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s did the t h i n g s e s s e n t i a l to a i d t h e m i l i t a r y
m i s s i o n , b u t i t w o u l d be t h e c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s , w h i c h m e a n s the l o c a l
C i v i l D e f e n s e o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h a t m u s t t h e m s e l v e s c o n t r i v e to dcv t h e i r
part in meeting the crisis.
T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p w o u l d not be one of c o m m a n d , b u t of c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e c o m m a n d i n g g e n e r a l d o e s not t a k e c o m m a n d
of the G o v e r n o r s o r t h e m a y o r s o r t h e d i r e c t o r s of C i v i l D e f e n s e i n t h i s
a r e a . If he a n d h i s s t a f f a r e s k i l l f u l i n h a n d l i n g c i v i l a f f a i r s , a h i g h
d e g r e e of m u t u a l s u p p o r t c a n be a t t a i n e d - - m o r e ,
c e r t a i n l y , c o u l d be
a t t a i n e d in t h i s m a n n e r t h a n b y a n y a t t e m p t to o r d e r t h e m a r o u n d .
M r . D a n i e l K. E d w a r d s , t h e n A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e ,
s p e a k i n g on b e h a l f of t h e D e f e n s e D e p a r t m e n t a t the N a t i o n a l C i v i l
D e f e n s e C o n f e r e n c e i n 1951, h a d t h i s to s a y :
" C i v i l d e f e n s e i s a p r o g r a m t h a t s h o u l d be c a r r i e d on b y
c i v i l i a n s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , it w i l l r e q u i r e t h e m a x i m u m e f f o r t
of o u r A r m e d F o r c e s to r e a d y t h e m s e l v e s a n d to c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n s i n d e f e n s e of o u r c o u n t r y . T h e y s h o u l d not be b u r d e n e d
w i t h a p r o g r a m t h a t c a n b e e f f e c t i v e l y c a r r i e d out b y the c i v i l i a n
population.
"But p e r h a p s even m o r e i m p o r t a n t than that, it is highly
d e s i r a b l e that the p r o g r a m d e r i v e its g r e a t v i t a l i t y f r o m e n e r g i e s
i n h e r e n t in local i n i t i a t i v e and in b r o a d popular support. " 4 /
He w a s s p e a k i n g , not o n l y of p r e p a r a t i o n b e f o r e w a r b r o k e out,
b u t a l s o of o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g h o s t i l i t i e s . F o r i t w o u l d be t h e h e i g h t
of f o l l y to p r e p a r e i n t i m e o f p e a c e on t h e t h e o r y t h a t C i v i l D e f e n s e
w a s a c i v i l a n d S t a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , a n d t h e n i n t h e h e a t of a c t i o n
s u d d e n l y s h i f t to a d i f f e r e n t t h e o r y . T h e A r m e d F o r c e s a n d c i v i l
g o v e r n m e n t , e s p e c i a l l y C i v i l D e f e n s e , m u s t l e a r n tO w o r k t o g e t h e r .
L e a r n i n g to w o r k t o g e t h e r i s a m a j o r e l e m e n t i n m o d e r n w a r f a r e .
T h e t h r e e s e r v i c e s a r e l e a r n i n g to w o r k t o g e t h e r . T h i s c o l l e g e i s a n
e x a m p l e of j o i n t a 6 t i o n . D e f e n s e m u s t w o r k w i t h the D e p a r t m e n t of
State, the T r e a s u r y , and other D e p a r t m e n t s .
That is recognized by
t h e p r e s e n c e i n t h i s c o l l e g e of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of o t h e r D e p a r t m e n t s .
The p o l i t i c a l a d v i s e r f r o m t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t i s now a f a m i l i a r
4]
C o n f e r e n c e R e p o r t of m e e t i n g i n W a s h i n g t o n , 7 - 8 M a y 1951, p. 15.
10
i699
f i g u r e at a t h e a t e r h e a d q u a r t e r s .
The United States and its allies
m u s t c o n c e r t a n d c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r a c t i o n . We h a v e p r o g r e s s e d f r o m
t h e C o m b i n e d C h i e f s of Staff of W o r l d W a r II to s u c h e l a b o r a t e a n d
d e l i c a t e a r r a n g e m e n t s as the NATO s y s t e m .
This has involved the
d e v e l o p m e n t of s t a f f p r a c t i c e s , to w h i c h t h i s c o l l e g e a n d t h e N a t i o n a l
War College make a major contribution. Defense today involves many
r e l a t i o n s o t h e r t h a n c o m m a n d . I v e n t u r e to s a y t h a t m e r e c o m m a n d
i s n o t a m a j o r e l e m e n t i n t h e o p e r a t i o n s of G e n e r a l G r u e n t h e r ' s
h e a d q u a r t e r s a t S H A P E . O n e m u s t u s e o t h e r m e a n s to g e t t h i n g s d o n e .
H e r e at t h e I n d u s t r i a l C o l l e g e , w i t h y o u r g r e a t c o n c e r n in t h e l o g i s t i c a l
s u p p o r t o f m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , it m u s t be e v i d e n t t h a t m e r e c o m m a n d
w i l l not a v a i l t o k e e p a l l t h e e l e m e n t s of p r o d u c t i o n l i n e d up. O n e m u s t
develop other techniques.
I u r g e t h a t t h e A r m e d F o r c e s m u s t l e a r n w a y s f o r g e t t i n g on w i t h
the civil authorities--must develop staff techniques and standard procedures for cooperating with Civil Defense. The Assistant Secretary,
i n t h e l a n g u a g e I j u s t q u o t e d , s p o k e of t h e " e n e r g i e s i n h e r e n t i n l o c a l
i n i t i a t i v e and in b r o a d p o p u l a r support. " In p l a n n i n g for an a t o m i c
attack, one should count upon that initiative and support.
The great
f e a r , it s e e m s to m e , i s t h a t a n a t o m i c a t t a c k w o u l d c a t c h C i v i l
D e f e n s e so u n p r e p a r e d to s u s t a i n a n d r i s e f r o m a b l o w , t h a t i t m i g h t
go to p i e c e s - - t h a t c r i e s w o u l d go u p , " N o b o d y k n o w s w h a t t h e s c o r e
i s " ; " n o b o d y k n o w s w h a t to d o " ; w i t h a h e e d l e s s d e m a n d t h a t " t h e
A r m y t a k e o v e r . " T h i s , I u r g e , s h o u l d be r e s i s t e d a n d w a r d e d o f f - both b e c a u s e the A r m y would be v e r y busy about its own p r o p e r
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , a n d b e c a u s e of o t h e r w e i g h t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d r a w n
f r o m e x p e r i e n c e , to w h i c h I s h a l l c o m e p r e s e n t l y .
So I venture to urge that these relationships be practiced and
strengthened
and war-gamed,
that staff practices be established and
confirmed
by trial, that hitches and kinks be spotted and corrected,
to the end that, come an attack, the Armed
Forces
and Civil Defense
could discharge
their respective
responsibilities
with mutual understanding and confidence.
T h i s m a y b e v i e w e d a s a s p e c i a l a n d d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m of f e d e r a l i s m .
The r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y w i t h l o c a l a u t o n o m y d a i l y c a l l s
f o r d e l i c a t e a d j u s t m e n t s - - a s in t h e r e g u l a t i o n of i n t e r s t a t e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , o r i n F e d e r a l j u d i c i a l c o n t r o l of S t a t e c r i m i n a l
proceedings.
H e r e w e h a v e a p r o b l e m , h o w e v e r , of a d j u s t i n g F e d e r a l
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n w i t h t he a c t i o n of S t a t e c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s .
Civil-military
11
1700
relations are always s o m e w h a t delicate, and here w e have Federal
military and State civil authorities. M o r e o v e r , the two m u s t learn
to act together in m o m e n t s of emergency, w h e n there is little time
for deliberation. So I repeat, here is a need for patient, thoughtful,
resourceful staff work--a task for your very best endeavors.
Now a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of t h e p r e v e n t i v e d e t e n t i o n of s u s p e c t e d
c i v i l i a n s in t i m e of w a r . I w i l l n o t t a k e l o n g , f o r t h i s i s not a
m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . It i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t y o u know t h a t we h a v e
a s t a t u t o r y s c h e m e , a n d t h a t t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y h a s b e e n p l a c e d in
other hands.
I assume, for present purposes, that some preventive detention
would be r e a s o n a b l e and n e c e s s a r y .
The B r i t i s h - - c e r t a i n l y as
l i b e r t y - l o v i n g a n d d e m o c r a t i c a s w e - , r e s o r t e d to s u c h m e a s u r e s i n
b o t h W o r l d W a r s . 5 / I h a v e s t u d i e d t h a t h i s t o r y at s o m e l e n g t h . It
is significant, v e r ~ i n s t r u c t i v e , and I b e l i e v e p r o p h e t i c . We should,
and [ hope would, profit f r o m t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e .
T h e a c t of C o n g r e s s of 23 S e p t e m b e r 1950, P u b l i c L a w 831, i n
i t s T i t l e I I - - t h e E m e r g e n c y D e t e n t i o n A c t - - i n t h e e v e n t of w a r o r
c e r t a i n o t h e r e m e r g e n c i e s , a u t h o r i z e s t h e d e t e n t i o n of any " p e r s o n
a s to w h o m t h e r e i s r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d to b e l i e v e t h a t .such p e r s o n
p r o b a b l y w i l l e n g a g e i n . . . a c t s of e s p i o n a g e o r of s a b o t a g e . "
P o w e r to i n i t i a t e a c t i o n l i e s w i t h t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l . T h e r e m u s t
b e a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g - - w i t h d i s c l o s u r e of t h e g r o u n d s a n d t h e
r i g h t to c o u n s e l . If p r o b a b l e c a u s e i s f o u n d , t h e d e t a i n e e m a y a p p e a l
to t h e D e t e n t i o n R e v i e w B o a r d , w h e r e u p o n a h e a r i n g i s h e l d , w i t h a
c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n of w i t n e s s e s .
The B o a r d m a i n t a i n s o r t e r m i n a t e s
t h e d e t e n t i o n . If t h e B o a r d f i n d s t h a t the d e t e n t i o n w a s w i t h o u t r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s , it a w a r d s a n i n d e m n i t y . J u d i c i a l r e v i e w of t h e s e
actions is maintained. The Attorney General must render a report
to t h e P r e s i d e n t and t h e C o n g r e s s e v e r y two m o n t h s .
I see s o m e serious constitutional difficulties with the statute,
but I will not bother you with that, o r with the grave problems of
procedure. This has always been a very unhappy business in Great
Britain, and it would be so with us. There are tremendous possibilities
5/
Cornelius P. Cotter, "E m e r g e n c y Detention in Wartime; The
British Experience," 6 Stanford L a w Review 238-86, M a r 1954.
12
i701
of injustice, through mistake or excess of zeal. It would be a marvel
if it did not run beyond all reason.
I have mentioned this statutory
scheme because of its interest to the Armed Forces,
and because in
times past some commanders
have reached out to take this sort of
concern into their own hands.
T h i s w a s a s o u r c e of a n o t o r i o u s a n d
lamentable conflict between the commanding general and a Federal
judge in Hawaii in World War II. Now Congress has made its own
provision for detention on suspicion; it has established procedural
safeguards; and it has lodged the entire matter in the civil side of
the G o v e r n m e n t .
Now I have gotten thus far in my talk without once using the
expression "martial law,"6/
or more accurately,
"martial rule.
U n i n f o r m e d people, even people w h o should be informed, are
apt to suppose that, by saying "martial law, " the Executive can shift
gears, throwing out the n o r m a l legal s y s t e m of p o w e r s and restraints,
and throwing in an extraordinary s y s t e m with far m o r e p o w e r and far
less restraint. This, I assure you, is a gross misconception. Put
no m o r e trust in it than in the incantation "presto," or "abracadabra. "
By declaring "martial law" one gains no lawful p o w e r that one would not
have had without it. That last sentence m a y be subject to s o m e qualification in cases w h e r e a statute or a State constitution has m a d e s o m e
express reference to "martial law. " T h e r e is, for instance, such a
provision in the Organic Act of Hawaii. But for our present purposes-action by the F e d e r a l A r m e d F o r c e s within the body of the country-the proposition r e m a i n s true: declaring "martial law" does not m a k e
lawful one single thing that w o u l d otherwise have b e e n unlawful. T o
quote Chief Justice H u g h e s in a great opinion, a declaration of "martial
law" affords no "avenue of escape f r o m the p a r a m o u n t authority of the
Federal Constitution. "7 /
In the law of the American Constitution, the questions are, first,
Was the action taken--exclusion,
restriction,
seizure,
removal,
or
whatever it may be--directed
toward a legitimate end, an end that the
law commands,
for example, that the invader be repelled?
Second,
were the means used appropriate to that legitimate end?
There, in
a nutshell, is the entire law of the matter.
6/
7/
T h e expression "martial law" has at various times had various
meanings. I have discussed the historical b a c k g r o u n d in the law
of "Martial Rule," 2d ed., 1943. A s here used, it refers to the
a s s u m p t i o n by a military c o m m a n d e r of authority for s o m e or all
of the functions of civil government.
S t e r l i n g v. C o n s t a n t i n , 287 a n d 3 9 8 , 1 9 3 2 .
m
13
Going o v e r the g r o u n d once m o r e , f i r s t , the end. I t m u s t be an
end t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n and the law h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d ' - n o t m e r e l y
s o m e end t h a t s o m e c o m m a n d e r c o n c e i v e s tt w o u l d be good to p e r s u e .
The e n d s of w h i c h I s p e a k a r e a p p o i n t e d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n - - t h a t the
i n v a d e r be r e p e l l e d , t h a t i n s u r r e c t i o n be s u p p r e s s e d , t h a t the s y s t e m
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t be m a i n t a i n e d : The c o m m a n d e r h a s
n o t h i n g to do with n a m i n g t h o s e e n d s . T h e y a r e e s t a b l i s h e d by the
C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h he and we a r e in duty bound to p r e s e r v e , p r o t e c t ,
and defend. So m u c h f o r the end.
Now, " l e t the end be l e g i t i m a t e , l e t it be w i t h i n the s c o p e of t h e
Constitution, and all m e a n s which are appropriate, which are plainly
a d a p t e d %o t h a t end, w h i c h a r e not p r o h i b i t e d ° but c o n s i s t with the
l e t t e r a n d s p i r i t of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " 8 / I h a v e
a p p r o p r i a t e d the l a n g u a g e of John M a r s h a l l , the g r e a t e s t of a l l the
J u s t i c e s , i n M c C u l l o c h v. M a r y l a n d , j u s t 135 y e a r s ago. " W e m u s t
never forget," he said in that s a m e opinion, "that it is a constitution
w e are expounding . . . . a constitution, intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of h u m a n
affairs." Marshall had been a soldier in Washington's a r m y - - a
lieutenant at 19; later he had taken a major part in securing the ratification of the Constitution. H e was a m a n of faith, of confidence in the
A m e r i c a n system of government, wherein public power is m e a s u r e d
by a Constitution, adapted even to crises, and finally interpreted by
an independent judiciary.
C h i e f J u s t i c e H u g h e s - - o n e of M a r s h a l l ' s m o s t w o r t h y s u c c e s s o r s - once o b s e r v e d f r o m the C o u r t that, u n d e r the C o n s t i t u t i o n , " t h e p o w e r
to wage w a r i s a p o w e r to wage w a r s u c c e s s f u l l y , and t h u s i t p e r m i t s
the h a r n e s s i n g of the e n t i r e e n e r g i e s of the p e o p l e in a s u p r e m e c o o p e r a f i r e e f f o r t to p r e s e r v e the n a t i o n . " 9 / The p o w e r i s a d e q u a t e to a n y
emergency.
But t h e w a r p o w e r i s not e n t i r e l y E x e c u t i v e p o w e r ; t h e r e a r e
s o m e t h i n g s t h a t r e m a i n f o r C o n g r e s s . S t i l l l e s s i s the w a r p o w e r
e n t i r e l y confided %o m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d e r s ; it does not follow t h a t ,
b e c a u s e a c e r t a i n r e s u l t i s n e e d e d , the m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d e r m u s t himls e l f a s s u m e a u t h o r i t y to t a k e a c t i o n . M a y b e it b e l o n g s to s o m e b o d y e l s e
8/
9]
M c C u l l 0 c h v . M a r y l a n d , 4 Wheat~ 316 and 421, 1819.
H o m e B u i l d i n g and L o a n A s s n . v. B l a i s d e l l , 290 U. S., 398 and
426, 1934.
14
703
to j u d g e on t h a t , C h i e f J u s t i c e H u g h e s s p o k e , a d v i s e d l y , of " a
s u p r e m e c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t to p r e s e r v e t h e n a t i o n " ; a p r u d e n t c o m m a n d e r d o e s n o t c l a i m a m o n o p o l y on t h e b u s i n e s s of s a v i n g t h e
Nations; he will seek and promote a supreme cooperative effort.
I a m g o i n g to s p e a k of a n u m b e r of i n s t a n c e s of m i l i t a r y a c t i o n ,
to e x t r a c t ~ r o m e a c h i t s l e s s o n o n w h a t to d o - - o r , m o r e o f t e n , w h a t
n o t to do, 10 /
Ex parte Merryman,
Federal
C a s e No. 9487,
1861.
T h i s c a s e a r o s e i n B a l t i m o r e , i n M a y 1861. M i l i t i a b e i n g r u s h e d
to t h e d e f e n s e of W a s h i n g t o n h a d b e e n f a l l e n u p o n a n d b e a t e n u p by
h o s t i l e m o b s at B a l t i m o r e .
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s w e r e b e i n g c u t off.
Presently President Lincoln instructed the commanding general that,
if a t a n y p o i n t on t h e l i n e f r o m P h i l a d e l p h i a to W a s h i n g t o n h e f o u n d
r e s i s t a n c e w h i c h r e n d e r e d i t n e c e s s a r y t o s u s p e n d t h e w r i t of h a b e a s
corpus for the public safety, the commanding general was authorized
to t a k e t h a t a c t i o n .
M e r r y m a n , lieutenant in a secessionist militia c o m p a n y at
Baltimore, w a s arrested and held at Fort M c H e n r y . His lawyer
promptly obtained a writ of habeas corpus f r o m Chief Justice Taney,
returnable at the Federal Circuit Court r o o m in Baltimore. The
general in c o m m a n d replied that he w a s authorized by the President
to suspend the writ; he respectfully declined to produce the prisoner;
he requested time to receive instructions f r o m the President.
T h e w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s , I s h o u l d e x p l a i n , i s t h e g r e a t w r i t of
l i b e r t y ; i t i s t h e a c t i o n o n e b r i n g s to c a u s e t h e p e r s o n d e t a i n e d to be
b r o u g h t i n t o c o u r t , i n o r d e r t h a t t h e l e g a l i t y of h i s d e t e n t i o n m a y b e
determined.
If t h e r e s p o n d e n t d o e s n o t s h o w l a w f u l g r o u n d s , t h e
10
F o r t h e b e n e f i t of a n y o n e w h o m a y b e i n t e r e s t e d , I c i t e t h e
following where I have discussed more fully the instances mentioned
i n t h e l e c t u r e : M r . J u s t i c e M i l l e r a n d t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , 18621890, 1939, ch. IV, T h e C o u r t a n d t h e C i v i l W a r ; T h e L a w
M a r t i a l R u l e , 2d e d . , 1943; " T h e L a w of M a r t i a l R u l e a n d t h e
N a t i o n a l E m e r g e n c y ; ~~ 55 H a r v a r d L a w R e v i e w 1 2 5 3 - 1 3 0 2 , J u n e
1942; " T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t on M i l i t a r y J u r i s d i c t i o n : M a r t i a l R u l e
i n H a w a i i a n d t h e Y a m a s h i t a C a s e , " 59 H a r v a r d L a w R e v i e w
8 3 3 - 8 2 , J u n e 1946.
15
"1704 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
p r i s o n e r i s s e t f r e e . T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s : " T h e P r i v i l e g e of
t h e W r i t of H a b e a s c o r p u s s h a l l not be s u s p e n d e d , u n l e s s w h e n i n
C a s e s of R e b e l l i o n o r I n v a s i o n t h e p u b l i c S a f e t y m a y r e q u i r e i t . "
Who s h a l l d e c i d e , w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g of t h i s l a n g u a g e , w h e t h e r
t h e p u b l i c s a f e t y s o r e q u i r e s - - t h e P r e s i d e n t , o r the C o n g r e s s ?
C e r t a i n l y it is the l a t t e r - - t h e C o n g r e s s .
I w i l l not s t o p to g i v e t h e
r e a s o n s w h y t h i s i s so.
P r e s i d e n t L i n c o l n was, I think, i l l - a d v i s e d when he a u t h o r i z e d
t h e s u s p e n s i o n of the w r i t . T h i s a c t i o n s e e m e d to put h i m i n t h e
w r o n g . T h e C h i e f J u s t i c e p r o m p t l y w r o t e a f o r c e f u l o p i n i o n to t h e
e f f e c t t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t h a d u s u r p e d p o w e r t h a t b e l o n g e d to C o n g r e s s
alone.
On t h i s p o i n t , d o u b t l e s s h e w a s r i g h t . B u t m o r e b r o a d l y ,
s u r e l y u n d e r the c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t w a s l a w f u l to d e t a i n one who w a s
e n g a g i n g i n a c t s h o s t i l e to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . It w a s l a w f u l to h o l d
h i m t e m p o r a r i l y to k e e p h i m f r o m h u r t i n g the G o v e r n m e n t .
This
w o u l d b e t r u e w i t h o u t a n y f o r m a l s u s p e n d i n g of the w r i t .
President Lincoln's measures were often, I think, far better in
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w t h a n the r e a s o n s t h a t w e r e a s s i g n e d . I r e g r e t t h a t
he did n o t h a v e t h e b e n e f i t of b e t t e r l e g a l c o u n s e l ; at t i m e s he w a s put
in the w r o n g - - a s by T a n e y ' s opinion in M e r r y m a n ' s C a s e - - w h e n
b a s i c a l l y h e w a s on f i r m g r o u n d .
W h y do I t e l l y o u of t h i s c a s e ? C h i e f l y to m a k e t h i s p o i n t : It
i s o r d i n a r i l y u n n e c e s s a r y , a n d u n d e s i r a b l e , e v e n f o r C o n g r e s s to
s u s p e n d the w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s . S u s p e n s i o n of the w r i t m e r e l y
p u t s off the d a y of l e g a l r e c k o n i n g . I t t a k e s f r o m t h e p r i s o n e r h i s
n o r m a l r i g h t to h a v e the v a l i d i t y of h i s d e t e n t i o n d e t e r m i n e d , h e r e a n d
now. B u t if t h e r e i s good r e a s o n f o r h o l d i n g h i m , t h e G o v e r n m e n t w i l l
d o w e l l to s e e k a n e a r l y d e c i s i o n - - n o t to s t a l l f o r t i m e . T h e n we w i l l
k n o w w h e r e we a r e . F u r t h e r , I w o u l d t e l l y o u , a s o f f i c e r s of the
armed services, that your prospects for being upheld are far better
w h i l e t h e d a n g e r i s p r e s e n t , t h a n t h e y w i l l b e a f t e r t h e w a r i s won.
I s h a l l h a v e o t h e r o c c a s i o n s to m a k e t h a t point.
I f y o u m u s t h o l d a m a n to p r e v e n t h i m f r o m d o i n g a c t u a l d a m a g e
to the U n i t e d S t a t e s - - n o t to p r e v e n t b i g t a l k , but a c t u a l d a m a g e - - t h e n
g r a b h i m a n d h o l d h i m , a n d if h e s u e s f o r h a b e a s c o r p u s , go i n t o
c o u r t a n d t e l l the j u d g e e x a c t l y w h y i t w a s n e c e s s a r y to do w h a t y o u
did. If y o u h a v e a c t e d on r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s a n d h a v e done no m o r e
16
1705
than appeared necessary,
to s u s t a i n y o u r a c t i o n .
Ex parte Vallandigham,
1864.
you may count upon the Federal
Fed.
C a s e No. 1 6 , 8 1 6 ,
judiciary
1863; 1 W a l l a c e 243,
General Burnside had been relieved of the c o m m a n d of the A r m y
of the P o t o m a c and assigned %o the c o m m a n d of the D e p a r t m e n t of the
Ohio, with headquarters at Cincinnati. T h e area w a s infested with
disloyal persons. Burnside issued G. O. No. 38, in part as follows:
" T h e h a b i t of d e c l a r i n g s y m p a t h i e s f o r t h e e n e m y w i l l no
l o n g e r b e t o l e r a t e d in t h i s d e p a r t m e n t .
Persons committing
s u c h o f f e n s e s w i l l b e at o n c e a r r e s t e d w i t h a v i e w to b e i n g i
tried .
o r s e n t b e y o n d o u r l i n e s i n t o t h e l i n e s of t h e i r f r i e n d s .
T h e r e a f t e r B u r n s i d e r e a c h e d out and g r a b b e d C l e m e n t L.
V a l l a n d i g h a m , t h e m o s t n o t o r i o u s of t h e C o p p e r h e a d s .
Vallandigham
h a d u n t i l 1863 b e e n a M e m b e r of C o n g r e s s , a n d a v i g o r o u s o p p o n e n t
of t h e w a r . In a s p e e c h i n O h i o in 1863 h e h a d c a l l e d P r e s i d e n t L i n c o l n
a t y r a n t a n d s a i d t h a t " r e s i s t a n c e to t y r a n t s i s o b i d e n c e to G o d . "
V a l l a n d i g h a m w a s a r r e s t e d at Dayton and b r o u g h t b e f o r e a m i l i t a r y
c o m m i s s i o n at C i n c i n n a t i , c h a r g e d with h a v i n g p u b l i c l y u t t e r e d d i s loyal sentiments.
H e w a s c o n v i c t e d , a n d s e n t e n c e d to c o n f i n e m e n t
f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e w a r .
W h y did Burnside initiate all this controversy ? Did the A d m i n i s tration in Washington want h i m to silence and punish this noisy critic ?
W h y did he suppress the "Chicago T i m e s " and forbid the circulation
in his department of the " N e w Y o r k W o r l d , " as he did at this juncture ?
T h e r e w a s telegraphic c o m m u n i c a t i o n with the capital. W h y did
Burnside rush into this thicket of b r a m b l e s all on his o w n ? lit put the
President in a m o s t unhappy position. If he sustained his ill-advised
and impetuous subordinate, m a n y citizens, even perfectly loyal
citizens, would resent this needless attack upon civil liberties. If
he repudiated him, m a n y ardent loyalists would say the President
lacked nerve and--to b o r r o w a m o d e r n w o r d - - w a s an appeaser.
Burnside, a general w h o had failed in great things, might well have
sought at least to be prudent in the smaller things that w e r e his
responsibility at Cincinnati. But no, he rushed to take on the A d m i n istration's greatest critic, and to attack the press, by m e a s u r e s that
w e r e needless, in excess of the occasion, and unconstitutional.
17
170{;
L i n c o l n o v e r r u l e d h i m a s %o the n e w s p a p e r s . As to V a l l a n d i g h a m ,
the P r e s i d e n t o r d e r e d t h a t he be r e l e a s e d f r o m c o n f i n e m e n t and
s e n t o v e r to the C o n f e d e r a t e s he l o v e d so w e l l . T h a t w a s a r e s o u r c e f u l w a y out of the m e s s B u r n s i d e had c r e a t e d . V a l l a n d i g h a m
b e i n g no l o n g e r in c o n f i n e m e n t , t h a t ended the h a b e a s c o r p u s a c t i o n
he had b r o u g h t . T h e n V a l l a n d i g h a m ' s l a w y e r - - s e e k i n g to g a i n a
quick d e c i s i o n by the S u p r e m e C o u r t a d v e r s e %o the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n - a s k e d the C o u r t to r e v i e w the p r o c e e d i n g s of the m i l i t a r y c o m m i s s i o n .
The C o u r t h e l d , quite r i g h t l y , t h a t it i s not a p a r t of the c h a i n of
m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t y f o r the r e v i e w of r e c o r d s of t r i a l by a m i l i t a r y
tribunal.
I do not w i s h to discuss h e r e the p r e c i s e l e g a l p o i n t s i n v o l v e d .
V a l l a n d i g h a m ' s c a s e i s of i n t e r e s t f o r us h e r e t o d a y a s a n o t a b l e
i n s t a n c e of w h a t a g r e a t lot of t r o u b l e c a n be c a u s e d by one f i d g e t y
g e n e r a l who l e a v e s h i s path of duty, w h i c h i s w i n n i n g the w a r , to
e n g a g e in w r o n g - h e a d e d a t t a c k s upon the l i b e r t i e s of the c i t i z e n s .
Here, as in so m a n y instances during the Civil War, President
Lincoln could have cried, Save m e f r o m m y friends!
E x p a r t e M i l l i g a n , 4 W a l l a c e 2, 1 8 6 6
L a m d i n P . M i l l i g a n of I n d i a n a w a s a m a j o r g e n e r a l in the O r d e r
of t h e Sons of L i b e r t y , a C o p p e r h e a d o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t h a d e n r o l l e d
m a n y m e m b e r s in Ohio, I n d i a n a , and I l l i n o i s . The're w a s a plot,
f i n a n c e d by C o n f e d e r a t e m o n e y s e n t in f r o m C a n a d a , to o v e r p o w e r
the g u a r d s at P O W c a m p s at C h i c a g o , S p r i n g f i e l d , Rock I s l a n d ,
I n d i a n a p o l i s , and C i n c i n n a t i , to a r m t h e s e C o n f e d e r a t e s and to 6 v e t t h r o w the State G o v e r n m e n t s . 11 /
T h i s w a s in the s u m m e r of 1 8 6 4 - when the e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n w a d g e t t i n g u n d e r way. The G o v e r n m e n t
w a s a w a r e of the plan, and took m e a s u r e s t h a t c o m p l e t e l y d i s h e a r t e n e d
the c o n s p i r a t o r s . On 8 O c t o b e r the Judge A d v o c a t e G e n e r a l m a d e a
r e p o r t to the S e c r e t a r y of W a r , d i s c l o s i n g the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of the
p l o t A l l t h i s w a s i n j e c t e d into the e l e c t i o n c a n v a s s .
What m e a s u r e s should be t a k e n a g a i n s t M i l l i g a n and the o t h e r s
i m p l i c a t e d ? It s e e m s t h a t G e n e r a l H e n r y B. C a r r i n g t o n , who h a d
11/ T h i s plot i s the t h e m e of an i n t e r e s t i n g new book, J a m e s D.
H o r a n ' s , C o n f e d e r a t e A g e n t , 1954.
18
1707
c o l l e c t e d the e v i d e n c e , wanted to have the t r i a l in a F e d e r a l c o u r t ;
but G o v e r n o r M o r t o n of I n d i a n a and the S e c r e t a r y of W a r , Stanton,
thought t h a t a t r i a l by m i l i t a r y c o m m i s s i o n would have a m o r e s a l u t a r y
e f f e c t in d i s c o u r a g i n g f u r t h e r p l o t s . 12/ On o r d e r s f r o m W a s h i n g t o n ,
the C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l of the D i s t r i c t of Indiana c o n v e n e d a m i l i t a r y
c o m m i s s i o n at I n d i a n a p o l i s and b r o u g h t M i l l i g a n and o t h e r s to t r i a l
f o r giving aid to the r e b e l s , and on o t h e r c h a r g e s . He was c o n v i c t e d
and s e n t e n c e d to be hanged. I n d i a n a was t h e n r e m o t e f r o m h o s t i l i t i e s .
M o r g a n ' s r a i d in J u l y 1863 had b e e n the l a s t t i m e it was s e r i o u s l y
t h r e a t e n e d . The F e d e r a l C o u r t was s i t t i n g r e g u l a r l y at I n d i a n a p o l i s .
A t r i a l t h e r e would p r e s u m a b l y have r e s u l t e d in the c o n v i c t i o n of a l l
w h o s e t r e a s o n could be p r o v e d .
This trial by military c o m m i s s i o n w a s needless, unconstitutional,
and politically erroneous. Justice David Davis, Lincoln's close friend
and a judge of the utmost fideliiy to the Union, advised the President
"that the various IT1ilitary trials in the Northern and B o r d e r States
w h e r e the courts w e r e free and untrammelled, w e r e unconstitutional
and wrong. " Lincoln put off acting upon the record of conviction,
hoping that the w a r would soon be w o n and then, as he said, " W e
shall none of us want any m o r e killing done. " But w h e n ~he record
finally c a m e to the White House, Lincoln had been assassinated,
and President Johnson approved the sentence--later it w a s c o m m u t e d
to life imprisonment.
T h e r e u p o n h a b e a s c o r p u s p r o c e e d i n g s w e r e b r o u g h t , and the c a s e
c a m e up to the S u p r e m e C o u r t , which on 3 A p r i l 1 8 6 6 - - a y e a r a f t e r
A p p o m a t t o x - - h e l d t h a t the t r i a l by m i l i t a r y c o m m i s s i o n had b e e n
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . M i l l i g a n went f r e e ; if he had had a p r o p e r c i v i l
t r i a l p r e s u m a b l y he would have b e e n c o n v i c t e d and p u n i s h e d .
Mr. J u s t i c e Davis spoke f o r the Court:
"If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the court s are actually
closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theater of actual military operations,
where w a r really prevails, . .
(the military power) is allowed
to govern by martial rule until ;he laws can have their free course.
12/
W. D. F o u l k e , .Life of O l i v e r -~P..M
. . o. .r.t o n , I, 419.
19
vos,
As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration .
. .
Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and
in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their
jurisdiction.
V'
It is also limited to the locality of actual war.
The language m a y have been s o m e w h a t too strict, but the decision remains above question.
So the Civil W a r ended on a note of constitutional restraint. The
military authority had been placed, undeservedly, in a very unfavorable
light as an e n e m y of civil liberty.
In the decades that followed, down to World W a r If, the Court had
no occasion to m a k e any further pronouncement about martial rule.
But in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and down to the
1930's, governors in a n u m b e r of States b e c a m e m o r e and m o r e prone
to declare "martial law" on slight provocation--on the occasion of
s o m e labor dispute, or even for the most trivial incidents. The
national guard would be called out and employed--usually, though not
always, on the side of m a n a g e m e n t and against organized labor--and a
good m a n y high-handed and rather outrageous things were done.
Usually the matter was of brief duration, and only once did a case reach
the S u p r e m e Court until Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, in 1932.
Sterling v. Constantin w a s a part of the struggle over limiting
production in the oil fields of Texas. Earlier prorationing statutes
had been held invalid. Then the Governor declared "martial law" and
instructed the adjutant general to do that which the courts had held unconstitutional. It was an attempt to bypass the Constitution by saying
the w o r d s "martial law." Chief Justice Hughes, for a unanimous
Court, held "No." That w a s the opinion where he said there was no
"avenue of escape f r o m the paramount authority of the Federal
Constitution. " The military authority, in the face of an actual
emergency, has "a permitted range of honest judgment as to the
m e a s u r e s to be taken in meeting force with force . . . .
Such
measures, conceived in _g_9odfaith, in the face of the e m e r e n ~
ed to the q_uell_!!!
~ of disorder or the prevention of
and ~
t
its continuance, a-rew-~-h~ the r a ~ e o-fp ~ i - ~ i ~
discretion.
But "what are-the allowable limits of miiitar___~ydiscretion, and whether
or not they have been overstepped in a _particular case, and judicial
q'~e'-~ions Yt-w~'~a "gr--~
lnxon
op"
"
and ever
:---"
today.
20
word of it rings true
Y
"
"
1709:
Now I c o m e to W o r l d W a r II. F i r s t , the e x c l u s i o n of U n i t e d
S t a t e s c i t i z e n s of J a p a n e s e p a r e n t a g e f r o m the P a c i f i c C o a s t w a s
s u s t a i n e d i n K o r e m a t s u v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 323 U. S. 214, d e c i d e d i n
D e c e m b e r 1944. J u s t i c e s R o b e r t s , M u r p h y , a n d J a c k s o n d i s s e n t e d .
So f a r a s a l i e n J a p a n e s e w e r e c o n c e r n e d , t h e r e c o u l d be no s e r i o u s
q u e s t i o n of the p o w e r to i n t e r n e n e m i e s . B u t to e x c l u d e A m e r i c a n
c i t i z e n s on a c c o u n t of t h e i r a n c e s t r y - - t h a t w e n t v e r y f a r . I t i s f a i r
to s a y t h a t the c o u n t r y h a s h a d a b a d c o n s c i e n c e a b o u t t h e w h o l e
m a t t e r ; the m e a s u r e s t h a t we.re i n v o l v e d i n t h e K o r e m a t s u c a s e - b a s e d u p o n a r a c i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n - - a r e not to be r e g a r d e d a s h a v i n g
solid judicial support today.
I c o m e to t h e s e c o n d g r e a t e p i s o d e of W o r l d W a r H , t h e m i l i t a r y
g o v e r n m e n t of H a w a i i . In D u n c a n v. K a h a n a m o k u , 327 U.. S. 304,
d e c i d e d i n F e b r u a r y 1946, w h e n the f i g h t i n g w a s o v e r , the C o u r t h e l d
that the m i l i t a r y r e g i m e that had been m a i n t a i n e d in Hawaii was
beyond anything that the law could s u s t a i n . T h i s is a c a s e that t e a c h e s
u s w h a t n o t to do.
Go b a c k to the a u t u m n of 1941, b e f o r e P e a r l H a r b o r .
The
H a w a i i a n L e g i s l a t u r e was in s e s s i o n , c o n s i d e r i n g the s o - c a l l e d M - d a y
b i l l , w h i c h b e c a m e the H a w a i i D e f e n s e A c t . 13 / T h i s s t a t u t e g a v e t h e
G o v e r n o r p e r h a p s the m o s t s w e e p i n g a u t h o r i ~ e v e r c o n f e r r e d upon
a n A m e r i c a n g o v e r n o r . In the e v e n t of w a r , h e w a s c l o t h e d w i t h p o w e r
to m a k e r e g u l a t i o n s u p o n v i r t u a l l y e v e r y m a t e r i a l c o n c e r n , to r e q u i s i t i o n l a b o r a n d s e r v i c e s , to c o n t r o l the e c o n o m y , to r e q u i r e i n h a b i t a n t s
to t a k e m e a s u r e s of d e f e n s e e t c . H e c o u l d e v e n s u s p e n d t h e o p e r a t i o n
of s t a t u t e s . A n y v i o l a t i o n of one of t h e G o v e r n o r ' s r e g u l a t i o n s w a s a
m i s d e m e a n o r p u n i s h a b l e in t h e c o u r t s .
G e n e r a l S h o r t a p p e a r e d b e f o r e the t e r r i t o r i a l
S e p t e m b e r 18 ¢o s p e a k i n f a v o r of t h e M - d a y b i l l .
S e n a t e on
He c o n c l u d e d :
"I b e l i e v e i t i s a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l i n a n y b i l l p a s s e d b y
the l e g i s l a t u r e to g i v e t h e g o v e r n o r the b r o a d e s t p o s s i b l e p o w e r s
a n d d e p e n d on h i s d i s c r e t i o n n o t to u s e s u c h p o w e r s u n l e s s a
real emergency arises.
T h i s i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y w i l l do a w a y w i t h
the n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of m a r t i a l law. T h i s i s m o s t
essential.
1_33/ Ch. 324, R e v i s e d L a w s of H a w a i i ,
a s L. SP. 1941, ch. 24.
21
1945; the s t a t u t e w a s e n a c t e d
17iO
"I would very m u c h rather see the necessary action taken
by the civilian population in the present emergency and have
t h e m handle the e m e r g e n c y • • •
14/
You k n o w , of c o u r s e , t h a t i s n o t w h a t h a p p e n e d . O n t h e a f t e r n o o n of 7 D e c e m b e r 1941, t h e G o v e r n o r w a s i n d u c e d to d e c l a r e
" m a r t i a l l a w " a n d to c a l l u p o n the C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l " t o e x e r c i s e
a l l the p o w e r s n o r m a l l y e x e r c i s e d b y m e a s G o v e r n o r , " a n d to e x e r c i s e
t h e p o w e r s n o r m a l l y e x e r c i s e d b y j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s a n d e m p l o y e e s of
and such other and f u r t h e r p o w e r s as the e m e r g e n c y
this territory •
m a y require." All this was done suddenly, on the Island. The
President knew nothing of it until s o m e w h a t later. The A r m y authorities established what was styled a "Military Government." The
courts of law were closed. Military commissions and provost courts
were created, tO try "any case involving an offense committed against
the laws of the United States, the laws of the Territory of Hawaii, or
the rules, regulations, orders or policies of the military authorities."~/
Late in January 1942, the courts were permitted, "as agents of
the Military Governor," to r e s u m e their normal functions, subject to
considerable exceptions. 16/ Of course the Federal and Territorial
courts created by Congres-~ could never be "agents" of a "Military
Governor." The phrase s
had supreme
entire regime was conauc~e ,
power, supreme over the courts and the law. This was wrong; it must
always be wrong so long as the A m e r i c a n constitution endures; and w h e n
the validity of this regime c a m e before the S u p r e m e Court in 1946, the
whole thing was struck down. Duncan v. K a h a n a m o k u was the case of
a drunken civilian a~ the N a v y Y a r d w h o had punched a Marine sentry.
The companion case of White v. steer concerned a stockbroker
charged with embezzling the stock of his client. Both were tried
before military tribunals. W h y w a s it necessary two years after
Pearl Harbor in one case and eight months after in the other to bring
these civilians before a military tribunal rather than the civil court
appointed by law ?
The counsel for one of the petitioners put that question to the
C o m m a n d i n g General, in habeas corpus proceedings. Here is a
part of the testimony:
'~'
1 4 / M { n u t e s of t h e C o m m i t t e e of t h e W h o l e .
1-5] G. O. No. 4, 9 D e c 1941.
"1"6] G. O. No. 57, 27 J a n 1942.
22
•
17ii
Q. W h a t I a m t r y i n g to g e t f r o m y o u i s , why do y o u t h i n k we
h a v e got to h a v e t h e p r o v o s t c o u r t s ? Y o u f i r s t s a i d t h a t o n a c c o u n t
of the d e l a y s of t h e c i v i l c o u r t s . I s t h a t o n e of y o u r r e a s o n s ?
A.
That is one r e a s o n , yes.
Q. You k n o w t h a t to b e a f a c t , t h a t t h e r e a r e d e l a y s i n t h e
c i v i l c o u r t s of t h i s T e r r i t o r y ?
A. I w o u l d not s a y in t h e c i v i l c o u r t s of t h i s T e r r i t o r y b e c a u s e
I am not familiar with them.
Q,
A.
Q.
courts ?
W e l l , t h a t i s w h a t w e a r e t a l k i n g about.
But I say this:
I d r a w on m y g e n e r a l e x p e r i e n c e .
W e l l , i s t h e r e a n y t h i n g e l s e b e s i d e s t h e d e l a y s of t h e c i v i l
A. Oh, y e s , t h e r e a r e m a n y r e a s o n s w h y we s h o u l d h a v e c o n t r o l
u n d e r the p r o v o s t court s y s t e m . I thought I outlined that v e r y elabor a t e l y in m y d i r e c t t e s t i m o n y .
Q. One of t h e t h i n g s y o u s a i d w a s t h a t y o u h a d to h a v e s o m e
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y to e n f o r c e y o u r o r d e r s ?
A.
Yes, which are not offenses against the Territorial
or the Federal Courts.
Q.
Courts
You a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y c o u l d b e m a d e s u c h ?
A. B u t , a s I s a i d , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y w e r e m a d e o f f e n s e s , I w o u l d
s t i l l h a v e to go b e f o r e t h e c o u r t s , t h e c i v i l c o u r t s , w h i c h i s o b j e c t i o n a b l e w h e n t h e o f f e n s e s a r e of t h i s c h a r a c t e r t h a t r e s t upon s e c u r i t y .
A n d y o u p l a c e t h e C o m m a n d e r , t h e n , of t h e a r e a u n d e r the c o n t r o l of
o t h e r a g e n t s f o r e n f o r c e m e n t of h i s r e g u l a t i o n s w h e n h e h a s t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of s e c u r i t y . A r e y o u g o i n g to t a k e t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e s e i s l a n d s ? Is t h e C o u r t g o i n g to t a k e t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e f l e e t ? I s G o v e r n o r S t a i n b a c k
g o i n g to t a k e t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e f l e e t ? No.
I h a v e it. And, n o r m y c o n s c i e n c e a n d n o r m y duty w i l l e v e r m a k e
m e s a y t h a t I d o n ' t n e e d t h e a u t h o r i t y t h a t g o e s h a n d i n h a n d with m y
a u t h o r i t y (sic}. 17 /
17 /
Transcript
of Record
in Duncan
23
v. Kahanamoku,
p. 1051 ff.
The Supreme Court was unimpressed.
Law Chief Justice Stone:
"I f i n d n o t h i n g i n t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d w h i c h w o u l d f a i r l y
s u g g e s t t h a t t h e c i v i l c o u r t s w e r e u n a b l e to f u n c t i o n w i t h t h e i r
u s u a l e f f i c i e n c y at t h e t i m e t h e s e p e t i t i o n e r s w e r e t r i e d , o r
that t h e i r t r i a l by j u r y i n a c i v i l c o u r t would have e n d a n g e r e d
good o r d e r o r public s a f e t y . . . .
the military authorities
t h e m s e l v e s t e s t i f i e d a n d a d v a n c e d no r e a s o n w h i c h h a s a n y
b e a r i n g on p u b l i c s a f e t y o r good o r d e r f o r c l o s i n g t h e c i v i l
courts . . . I can only conclude that the trials and convictions . . . were . . . without lawful authority."
Mr. J u s t i c e B l a c k , in his opinion for the C o u r t , said the m i l i t a r y
a u t h o r i t i e s w e r e a u t h o r i z e d " t o a c t v i g o r o u s l y f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of
a n o r d e r l y c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t a n d f o r t h e d e f e n s e of t h e I s l a n d s a g a i n s t
a c t u a l o r t h r e a t e n e d r e b e l l i o n o r i n v a s i o n " - - b u t t h e r e w a s no n e e d a n d
t h e y w e r e n o t a u t h o r i z e d to s u p p l a n t t h e c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t .
I n p r e p a r i n g t h i s l e c t u r e I w e n t b a c k to m y o l d f i l e on m a r t i a l r u l e
i n H a w a i i , a n d I c a m e u p o n t h i s o f f i c e m e m o r a n d u m d a t e d 17 A u g u s t
1942--a m o m e n t w h e n the Hawaiian situation was at a critical state in
Washington. The m e m o r a n d u m closes with this sentiment, to which
I still subscribe:
"If no c o m m a n d e r imposes any control over the civil population which cannot be justified in court, the judiciary will acquire
s o m e confidence in the sobriety and self-restraint of military
c o m m a n d e r s . It would be a splendid thing if at the close of the
present W a r it could be said that the A r m y had imposed no
control . . • that had not survived the test 'of judicial scrutiny."
N o w , i n c o n c l u s i o n , to p u l l a l l t h i s t o g e t h e r .
1.
W e l i v e u n d e r a n d a r e b o u n d to s u p p o r t a C o n s t i t u t i o n
t h a t i s a d e q u a t e to t h e v a r i o u s c r i s e s of t h e N a t i o n . T h e p o w e r t o
w a g e w a r i s a p o w e r to w a g e w a r s u c c e s s f u l l y . I t i s n e e d l e s s , it i s
f o l l y , it i s a b l u n d e r , f o r a n y o f f i c e r to go on t h e t h e o r y t h a t h e h a s
to b r e a c h t h e l a w of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i n o r d e r to s a v e t h e c o u n t r y .
D o n ' t c r o s s t h e R u b i c o n - - d o n ' t a s s u m e a r b i t r a r y a u t h o r i t y on t h e
theory that only so can you save the Nation.
2.
T h e w a r p o w e r c o n t e m p l a t e s " t h e h a r n e s s i n g of t h e
e n t i r e e n e r g i e s of t h e p e o p l e i n a s u p r e m e c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t to
24
171"
p r e s e r v e t h e n a t i o n . " S e e k to m a x i m i z e t h a t c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t .
C u l t i v a t e g o o d r e l a t i o n s , m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W e w i l l edl b e s e e k i n g to w i n t h e w a r ; we c a n do it b e s t by w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r .
3.
W h a t e v e r a p p e a r s r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y to t h a t e n d , l e t
i t b e d o n e . Done by w h o m ? If i t i s t h e s o r t of a c t i o n t h a t p e r t a i n s to
t h e A r m e d F o r c e s , l e t t h e m do it. If it i s t h e s o r t o f a c t i o n t h a t p e r t a i n s to the c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t , l o o k to t h e c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t to do it.
L e t the civil a u t h o r i t i e s close the saloons and e n f o r c e the c u r f e w s .
If t h e c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t w i l l n o t o r c a n n o t at t h e m o m e n t p e r f o r m i t s
p r o p e r functions, and action then and t h e r e is r e a l l y n e c e s s a r y , then
t a k e it. B u t s e e k to a n t i c i p a t e a n d a v e r t a n y s u c h s i t u a t i o n . A s t h e
Supreme Court said in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the military authority
should "act v i ~
for the maintenance of an o r d e r ~ o v e r n ment."
4.
A d e c l a r a t i o n of " m a r t i a l l a w " d o e s n o t m a k e l a w f u l a n y t h i n g t h a t w o u l d n o t b e l a w f u l w i t h o u t it.
5.
T h e A r m e d F o r c e s s h o u l d n o t a s s u m e t h e f u n c t i o n s of t h e
S t a t e a n d F e d e r a l c o u r t s . T h a t w a s t h e p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e of t h e r e g i m e
in Hawaii that the S u p r e m e C o u r t found u t t e r l y n e e d l e s s and unlawful.
V i o l a t i o n s of C i v i l D e f e n s e r e g u l a t i o n s , of t r a f f i c c o n t r o l s , a n d t h e l i k e ,
w i l l be p u n i s h a b l e in t h e S t a t e c o u r t s . T h e a c t of C o n g r e s s of 21 M a r c h
1 9 4 2 - - n o w 18 U. S . C . s e c . 1383, 1 9 4 8 - - m a k e s it a F e d e r a l o f f e n s e - an o f f e n s e p u n i s h a b l e i n t h e F e d e r a l c o u r t s - - t o v i o l a t e r e g u l a t i o n s
i m p o s e d i n m i l i t a r y a r e a s a n d z o n e s . I do not d o u b t t h a t i n t h e e v e n t of
e n e m y a c t i o n w i t h i n tl~e b o d y of t h e c o u n t r y , t h a t s t a t u t e w o u l d n e e d t o
b e e x p a n d e d . P e r h a p s r e l a t i v e l y p e t t y v i o l a t i o n s of l o c a l m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l s w o u l d be m a d e p u n i s h a b l e b e f o r e a U n i t e d S t a t e s C o m m i s s i o n e r ,
as is now p r o v i d e d for petty o f f e n s e s in p l a c e s u n d e r e x c l u s i v e F e d e r a l
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 1_88/ B u t I u r g e u p o n y o u , t h e A r m e d F o r c e s s h o u l d not
r u s h i n t o t h e b u s i n e s s of t r y i n g c i v i l i a n s by m i l i t a r y c o m m i s s i o n o r
p r o v o s t c o u r t f o r o f f e n s e s t h a t a r e c o g n i z a b l e in c i v i l c o u r t s . F o r
a c t u a l o f f e n s e s a g a i n s t t h e l a w s of w a r - - a s i n t h e c a s e of t h e G e r m a n
s a b o t e u r s who c a m e i n t o t h e c o u n t r y in 1 9 4 2 - - o f c o u r s e t h e m i l i t a r y
c o m m i s s i o n is the a p p r o p r i a t e tribunal.
6.
Establish channels for mutual consultation and for
supporting action. This means continuous, intelligent, understanding
staff practices.
T h e s e a r r a n g e m e n t s s h o u l d b e t e s t e d in j o i n t
exercises, in war games, until they become smooth and habitual.
Treat the civil authorities with respect.
Don't tell the Federal judge
18"] 18 U . S . C .
secs.
3401 a n d 3402, 1948.
25
i?i
or the State governor that you are making h i m your "agent." That
is wrong in principle, and only gets us to fighting a m o n g ourselves.
7. Don't evade a challenge in the Federal courts to the
m e a s u r e s you are taking. If you have done only what was necessary,
you are on firm ground. Experience shows that it is safer for the
c o m m a n d e r to have that settled during the w a r than to wait until the
t
is past.
danger
To work out wise patterns for civil-military relations in the
event of an attack upon this country is a tremendous
challenge to you,
the future commanders
and senior staff of the Armed
Forces.
I urge
you to give it your best thought.
QUESTION:
I have two questions:
The first one is about the
Civil Defense Act of 1950. Isn't that divided into two parts, the one
delegating the planning, guidance, and coordinating activities to the
Administrator
prior to the attack and then subsequent
to the attack,
doesnlt he have much broader
powers as an operator which he uses
through the regional director ?
DR. FAIRMAN:
doesn't have power
The Administrator
to command.
Here
has more power
are the emergency
but he still
powers:
"to sell, lease, lend, transfer, or deliver materials or
perform
services for civil defense purposes
. . . reimburse
any State, including any political subdivisions thereof, for the
compensation
paid to and the transportation,
subsistence,
and
maintenance
expenses
. • • provide financial assistance for the
temporary
relief .
. employ temporarily
additional personnel ....
Those
"
are things he needs--but
they do not give the power
QUESTION:
Why don't they grant him those same
to attack as he has subsequent
to the attack ? It would
a more
to direct.
powers prior
seem to me
actual situation.
DR. FAIRMAN:
That is for the FCDA
to worry about. If it
feels the need of a little more" elbow room now, I should think it
would seek an amendment
of statute.
These are largely matters of
procurement
and spending, which are tied down by procedures.
Congress is unwilling to turn the Administrator
loose before an emergency.
26
17i5
QUESTION: I can see that in an emergency the Armed Forces
would n e c e s s a r i l y h a v e to c o o p e r a t e w i t h the c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s a n d
I c a n s e e t h a t i t would be u n d e r the a u t h o r i t y of t h e c i v i l i a n s . I d o n ' t
s e e how we r e c o n c i l e t h e d o c t r i n e of " p o s s e c o m i t a t u s " w i t h t h i s u s e
of t r o o p s .
DR. F A I R M A N : I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e y a r e o p e r a t i n g u n d e r c i v i l i a n s .
I t i s n o t a m a t t e r of the A r m e d F o r c e s b e i n g u n d e r S t a t e o r l o c a l
c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t y o r the c i v i l a u t h o r i t y b e i n g u n d e r the A r m e d F o r c e s .
Y o u do y o u r job a n d y o u t r y to g e t t h e m a y o r to do h i s job. You
c e r t a i n l y d o n ' t go o v e r a n d r e p o r t to t h e m a y o r a n d s a y , w h o m do y o u
want shot.
DR. F A I R M A N : P o s s e C o m i t a t u s g o e s b a c k to R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,
l i k e so m u c h e l s e . 1 9 / T h i s w a s a s t a t u t e to t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e A r m e d
F o r c e s s h o u l d n o t e'~xcept a s e x p r e s s l y a u t h o r i z e d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o r
b y a c t of C o n g r e s s , be u s e d a s a p o s s e c o m i t a t u s . It g o e s b a c k to
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n w h e n t h e F e d e r a l f o r c e s w e r e s t a t i o n e d down t h e r e a n d
w e r e c a l l e d o u t to a r r e s t a m a g i s t r a t e in the e x e c u t i o n of t h e law.
T h e r e i s a n u n f o r t u n a t e c a s e w ~ c h o c c u r r e d i n I d a h o i n 1899.
T h e N a t i o n a l G u a r d w a s s t i l l out, h a ~ n g gone ~o the S p a n i s h W a r , a n d
t h e G o v e r n o r h a d a l a b o r d i s p u t e i n t h e C o e u r d' A l e n e m i n e s on h i s
h a n d s . F e d e r a l t r o o p s w e r e s e n t t h e r e a n d t h e y got t h e m s e l v e s o r
w e r e a l l o w e d to get t h e m s e l v e s i n t o a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e G e n e r a l M e r r i a m
l e a d i n g the f o r c e o f the F e d e r a l t r o o p s to m a k e e f f e c t i v e ~ e t h i n g s the
G o v e r n o r w a n t e d to d o - - a n d s o m e of t h e m w e r e , I t h i n k , r a t h e r u n w i s e
t h i n g s . T h a t h a s s t o o d out e v e r s i n c e a s a n e x a m p l e of w h a t y o u s h o u l d
n o t d o - - s e n d F e d e r a l t r o o p s i n a n d t e l l t h e m to r e p o r t to t h e G o v e r n o r
a n d do w h a t e v e r l~e a s k s . W h e n E l i h u R o o t b e c a m e S e c r e t a r y of W a r ,
that whole thing was stopped.
QUESTION: The thing I visualized, doctor, is such great conf u s i o n i n a n a t o m i c a t t a c k t h a t s o m e b o d y i s g o i n g to h a v e to s t a n d up
t h e r e a n d s a y , " Y o u a r e g o i n g to do i t t h i s w a y . " I s i t g o i n g to be the
g o v e r n o r or the m i l i t a r y ?
DR. FAIRIVIAN: V~hat i s " t h i s ? " I s i t t a k i n g b o d i e s out of t h e
d e b r i s ? I think that is the g o v e r n o r ' s b u s i n e s s .
Is it shooting a r t i l l e r y ? That is y o u r b u s i n e s s . I know t h e r e is a f e e l i ng that t h e r e h a s
to be one f e l l o w o v e r e v e r y o t h e r f e l l o w . T h e B r i t i s h h a d a good d e a l
19/
Sec.
15 of t h e A c t of C o n g . , 18~June 1878, 20 Star.
27
152.
of e x p e r i e n c e with b l i t z e s , but the generals have n e v e r taken o v e r .
Somehow l o c a l c i v i l d e f e n s e people get out the s u r v i v o r s and b u r y the
dead. T h e y h a v e , I t h i n k - - I h a v e s e r v e d with t h e m as m a n y of you
h a v e - - a b e t t e r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e s e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a n we h a v e ,
p a r t l y b e c a u s e h e r e t h e r e a r e F e d e r a l , m i l i t a r y , and State o f f i c e r s ,
which a l w a y s m a k e i t h a r d e r t h a n as it is in E n g l a n d , w h e r e it i s the
W a r Office and the H o m e Office, w o r k i n g u n d e r the s a m e g o v e r n m e n t .
T h a t ' m a y not be a s c l e a r as you would l i k e it to be. I t h i n k if we
h a d w a r - g a m e d t h i s thing, did i t o v e r and o v e r a g a i n , the s i t u a t i o n s
would tend to c l a r i f y t h e m s e l v e s a lot m o r e t h a n by j u s t s i t t i n g h e r e
in c h a i r s and s p e c u l a t i n g .
QUESTION: I l e a r n e d quite a while ago t h a t you c a n ' t c o m m a n d
by c o o p e r a t i o n , and, s i n c e doing two t e r m s in W a s h i n g t o n , I h a v e b e e n
v e r y m u c h c o n f u s e d by the w o r d " c o o r d i n a t i o n . " It s e e m s to end up
i n s o m e d i r e c t i v e w h e r e i n if y o u r e s t a b l i s h e d a g e n c y of G o v e r n m e n t
d e c i d e s to u n d e r t a k e a p r o j e c t it a t t e m p t s to spend the funds of a n o t h e r
agency.
We in the m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s b u m p e d up a g a i n s t t h i s p r o b l e m when
we unified. We e s t a b l i s h e d p l a n s f o r j o i n t action; t h e y a r e quite
l e n g t h y . We have s w e a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l y o v e r t h e m , but we h a v e t h e m .
You can m o v e y o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n . You can p r e s e r v e y o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n
i n t e g r i t y while f u n c t i o n i n g u n d e r a d i r e c t - c o m m a n d - a p p o i n t e d o f f i c e r
w h e t h e r A r m y , Navy, C o a s t G u a r d , o r a f o r e i g n e r . What we n e e d is
s o m e s o r t of p l a n s f o r j o i n t a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g m i l i t a r y and duly a u t h o r i z e d
c i v i l i a n a g e n c i e s . The p a t t e r n of g r o u n d w o r k i s t h e r e . I w o n d e r
w h e t h e r you have c o n s i d e r e d t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y ?
DR.
FIARMAN:
QUESTION:
Is it that in the end there
Command
is what
will be one fellow ?
you are after.
DR. FAIRMAN:
I think the answer
then is the man in the White
House.
He is the only man far enough back to tell everyone
what to doo
QUESTION:
No, I disagree,
sir. You must have your authority
delegated to the scene of action.
If you are going to undertake
tactical
operations,
you must have command
on the spot.
DR. FAIRMAN:
Let us take five paces forward.
Should I be at
Denver
or what about somewhere
further toward the coast?
All right;
28
17
7
I a m at S a c r a m e n t o . And y o u w a n t e i t h e r the G o v e r n o r of C a l i f o r n i a
o r the C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l Sixth A r m y to h a v e o p e r a t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n
of e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s done. I think y o u r t h e o r y C a p t a i n , i s t h a t it h a s
to be one o r the o t h e r of t h o s e two g e n t l e m e n . It c e r t a i n l y i s n ' t going
to be the G o v e r n o r t h a t a s s u m e s c o m m a n d of the A r m e d F o r c e s . So
in y o u r t h e o r y the A r m y c o m m a n d e r m u s t have u l t i m a t e d i r e c t i o n of
e v e r y t h i n g in C a l i f o r n i a .
A s soon as you have done that, every complaint--and they m a y
be, not unreasonable and ill-mannered, but constructive and patriotic
criticism--about h o w the General is exercising this total authority
can be carried back only to the General's boss, w h o is the Secretary
of the A r m y .
This would d a m up all local civilian energy and dissatisfaction, too, because you put the civilian inhabitants and the m a y o r s
and even the G o v e r n o r in the position of a private in the A r m y , w h o
can m a k e his representation only through channels. I don't think that
this_ is a practicable w a y of winning a w a r in this country. I think the
experience in Hawaii shows that.
I s a w that episode, not quite as a participant, but f r o m a ringside
seat at one phase, here in Washington.
The A r m y c a m e back to
Mr. M c C l o y , the Assistant Secretary of W a r , and the civil authorities
c a m e back to Mr. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior. There w e r e protracted conferences, in the office of the Solicitor of the Interior, over
w h o w a s going to do this and w h o w a s going to do that. I believe that
it should have been possible, on the ground, out there in Hawaii, to
effect c o m m o n action--rather than to have to bring these local matters
w a y back to Washington. A n d that w a s a relatively simple situation,
because it w a s all Federal authority anyway. All parties w e r e subject
to the President's direction. H o w m u c h m o r e theory it would be if it
w e r e a Federal military c o m m a n d e r and a State governor.
I don't think you can hand over to A r m y c o m m a n d e r s , with good
prospects for successful action, c o m m a n d over State and local civil
authorities. Don't misunderstand me. W h a t is it you want to have
done ? If it is something really necessary to the national defense,
get it done. I thought I m a d e that clear. But if the governor will do
it, you are willing that he should do it, aren't you ?
QUESTION:
I want to m a k e it clear that I have no intention of
disturbing the organizational integrity of the State and rnunieipal
forces, but there m u s t be overall c o m m a n d .
29
DR. FAIR_MAN: W h a t i s t h a t o v e r a l l c o m m a n d ?
QUESTION:
T h e w h a t m u s t be d o n e , not t h e how but t h e w h a t .
DR. F A I R M A N : P e r h a p s I a m w i t h y o u , i n t h e u l t i m a t e . B e f o r e
t h i s t h i n g b e g a n , y o u s h o u l d h a v e y o u r w a r g a m e s . You w o u l d n ' t t a k e
doughboys, and for that m a t t e r the Air F o r c e and Navy, who h a d n ' t
w o r k e d t o g e t h e r , you would n e v e r s e n d t h e m out t h e r e with a book about
w h a t t h e y h a d to do a n d l e t t h e m l e a r n h o w to do it. T h e k e y i s i n
w o r k i n g t h e m out. I n t h e w o r k i n g out, y o u w i l l f i n d out how. N o n e of
u s k n o w a l l a b o u t t h a t . If t h e g o v e r n o r w i l l s e e to it t h a t t h e y do get
t h e b o d i e s out, a n d so on, y o u a r e c o n t e n t , a r e n ' t y o u ? If i t i s d o n e ?
QUESTION:
Yes.
MR. F A I R M A N : T h a t i s h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . As l o n g as h e i s
d o i n g h i s job, a n d you a r e s t i c k i n g to y o u r s , I d o n ' t t h i n k y o u n e e d to
say, " L o o k h e r e , G o v e r n o r , you a r e w o r k i n g for me. I a m y o u r b o s s . "
I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t i s g o i n g to m a k e h i m w o r k m o r e e a g e r l y .
QUESTION:
I still d o n ' t think we a r e o r g a n i z e d right; h o w e v e r ,
I c a n ' t put m y f i n g e r on it.
DR. F A I R M A N : I d o n ' t t h i n k w e a r e e i t h e r .
I t h i n k w e h a v e to
l e a r n to do it.
QUESTION:
I merely suggested the pattern is there.
DR. F A I R M A N : I a m w i t h y o u t h a t w e n e e d a c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s .
If i n t h e e n d t h e g o v e r n o r s a y s , " L o o k , I a m n o t g o i n g to do i t , " a n d
y o u s a y , " I t i s r e a l l y n e c e s s a r y , i t h a s to b e d o n e , " a n d s t i l l h e s a y s ,
"I w o n ' t do i t " - - d o u b t l e s s t h e n y o u w o u l d s e e to i t t h a t t h e n e c e s s a r y
t h i n g w a s d o n e . B u t I t h i n k it w o u l d b e s i l l y to d i v e r t y o u r t r o o p s to
do t h o s e t h i n g s u n l e s s t h e r e w a s no o t h e r m e a n s of d o i n g w h a t w a s
necessary.
QUESTION:
That is the point,
We c a n ' t .
DR. FAIRMAN: Since you can't divert your troops, and these
t h i n g s , if t h e y a r e d o n e , m u s t be d o n e by t h e g o v e r n o r ' s p e o p l e , t h e
n e x t q u e s t i o n i s , A r e t h e y g o i n g to b e d o n e m o r e w i l l i n g l y by t e l l i n g
h i m h e i s y o u r a g e n t o r by t e l l i n g h i m , "I k n o w y o u h a v e a h a r d t i m e
30
running your State but this must be done. " I think Civil Defense is
pretty fopply.
I don't think the conclusion is for the Army
to rush in
and fake over.
The conclusion is, endeavor,
very diligently, to get
on together, and see how it works.
Q U E S T I O N : Y ou h a v e l e d m e i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n I d i d n ' t i n t e n d to
g e t i n t o . I w o u l d n ' t i n s i s t t h a t t h e c o m m a n d e r of t h e o v e r a l l s t r u c z u r e
b e m i l i t a r y n e c e s s a r i l y , if, in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h i s p a t t e r n , y o u e n d
u p w i t h a c i v i l i a n , w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i v e to t h a t d i r e c t i v e . S o m e b o d y h a s to c o m m a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n . T h a t is w h a t I a m t r y i n g to s a y i n
a n u t s h e l l , a n d n o w t h e y d o n ' t s e e m to h a v e it. It i s c o o p e r a t i o n a n d
c o o r d i n a t i o n a nd it d o e s n ' t m e a n a d - - t h i n g .
DR. F A I R M A N : T h e s e p r o b l e m s of c i v i l - m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s
a r e t o o d i f f i c u l t a n d e l u s i v e , I t h i n k , to y i e l d to a s i m p l e f o r m u l a .
U n i f i e d o p e r a t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n i s a s p l e n d i d c o n c e p t i o n a s it a p p l i e s to
A r m y , N a v y , a n d A i r F o r c e c o m m a n d e r s , a l l of w h o m a r e s u b j e c t to
a s i n g l e a l t e r n a t e a u t h o r i t y , t h e P r e s i d e n t t h r o u g h t h e S e c r e t a r y of
D e f e n s e to t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of Staff. B u t t h e c o m m a n d i n g g e n e r a l a n d
t h e S t a t e g o v e r n o r do not w o r k f o r a s i n g l e u l t i m a t e c h i e f ; o n e w o r k s
f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e o t h e r h i m s e l f i s t h e h i g h e s t m a g i s t r a t e of
o n e of t h e S t a t e s . The P r e s i d e n t d o e s n o t h a v e c o m m a n d o v e r
g o v e r n o r s - - m u c h l e s s d o e s t h e c o m m a n d i n g g e n e r a l . I do n o t d o u b t
t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t m a y , i n a l l t h a t i s r e q u i s i t e to
e f f e c t i v e n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e , e s t a b l i s h s u c h a s y s t e m of n a t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n
of S t a t e a c t i v i t i e s , s u c h a s c i v i l d e f e n s e , a s m a y a p p e a r n e c e s s a r y a n d
appropriate.
It w a s a g o o d p h r a s e w h e n y o u s p o k e of a n e f f e c t i v e o v e r all s t r u c t u r e .
But however that may be, I believe that our greatest
n e e d a t p r e s e n t i s f o r c o m m a n d e r s a n d s t a f f o f f i c e r s of t h e A r m e d
F o r c e s on t h e o n e h a n d a n d g o v e r n o r s , m a y o r s , a n d o t h e r a g e n t s of
c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t on t h e o t h e r to l e a r n to c a r r y on t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e
functions with mutual understanding.
T h e y w o u l d s t i l l h a v e to do t h a t ,
i n d a y - t o - d a y a c t i v i t i e s , e v e n if C o n g r e s s s h o u l d e s t a b l i s h s o m e
u l t i m a t e o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n . P r a c t i v e a t d o i n g t h e i r b e s t is t h e b e s t
w a y to d e v e l o p w h a t m o r e m a y be n e e d e d .
COLONEL BARTLETT:
Professor, there are many hands that
h a v e n ' t b e e n r e c o g n i z e d , but w e h a v e a p o l i c y t h a t t h e l u n c h h o u r
c o m e s a l o n g a b o u t n o w . You w i l l r e c a l l w h e n I t e l e p h o n e d , p r o f e s s o r ,
I a s k e d y o u to t a l k to u s on M a r t i a l L a w . I k n o w t h e t o p i c y o u c h o s e i s
m u c h m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d m u c h m o r e b e n e f i c i a l to u s i n o u r f i n a l
problem.
So on b e h a l f of t he C o m m a n d a n t a n d t h e s t u d e n t s , m a y I
e x p r e s s to y o u o u r d e e p a p p r e c i a t i o n .
(7 June 1954--350)S/en
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