A Quagmire in Afghanistan
Michael J Napolitano 1
For more than nine years now, the United States Military, in coordination with NATO
forces, has been engaging in combat operations in Afghanistan. While supporters of the war state
that controlling and stabilizing Afghanistan is vital to the security of the United States and its
allies, opponents of the war state that the persistent presence of US military forces is actually
causing a destabilization of the country. Additionally, US intervention is being scrutinized for
the negative effects it is having on the social constructs in Afghanistan. This, on top of an
unstable Afghani government, poses a great logistical and tactical predicament to military and
political operations in the country.
Afghanistan is an interesting political anomaly. As a modern state, Afghanistan is not
defined as a nation state because there is not a single dominating ethnic group that defines the
country. Unlike other Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan where the
prominent ethnic groups are Tajiks and Uzbeks respectively, Afghanistan is compromised of
various different groups including Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras (Maley). Because of
these diverse groups who carry varied customs and dialects, finding a common cultural thread
amongst Afghanis is nearly impossible. This assessment helps shed light on the tumultuous
political atmosphere in Afghanistan.
Although Afghanis are more likely to associate themselves with individuals who share
similar ethnic, tribal, and sectarian characteristics, an overwhelming majority of Afghanis are
Muslim (Maley). Many Afghanis who become disgruntled with the political situation in the
country are much more prone to associate themselves with an Islamist organization such as the
Taliban or the Mujahedeen. This trend is seen, ―even among disaffected Afghans most likely to
support the Taliban,‖ that, ―there was no evidence that ethnicity was a major worry‖ (Jones 12).
It is clear that the Taliban, as a regional organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is more
concerned with expelling those that they see as intruders on their territory, seen in their fighting
against the Soviets in the 1980s and the Americans for the past eight years.
As the Taliban is such a rooted enemy, especially near the Pakistani border, the US
military is having difficulty dealing with the insurgents. Mao Zedong once said that, ―guerrillas
are like fish which swim in the sea,‖ and that, ―the sea is the civilian population, which provides
the guerrillas with the support they need to survive‖ (Robinson 4). The difficulty then for those
fighting militants is that, ―counterinsurgency theory demands that the state catch the fish from
A Quagmire in Afghanistan
Michael J Napolitano 2
the sea… to separate the insurgents from the population,‖ which is usually done, unfortunately,
in brutal ways (Robinson 4).
Undoubtedly, the tactics used to pin-point and extricate suspected insurgents needs to be
reconsidered. Currently, it seems that the course of action being taken by the US military is
causing Pashtun villagers in Afghanistan to begin to, ―lose faith in the American project‖ (Gopal
12). The trend in many villages in Afghanistan is that the villagers become victims of target
bombings – where the US Military is attempting to ‗fish out‘ suspected insurgents by bombing
specific locations – and become supporters of the Taliban, their most convenient alternative to
turn to. Instead of the use of violent means to try and ‗fish out‘ suspected insurgents, many are
saying that the, ―best way to keep Americans safe from terrorism is through effective
intelligence, expert police work and judicious homeland defense,‖ and that, ―these practical
measures cost far less than war and occupation in Muslim lands, which arouse hatred of the
United States—and give strength to Islamist extremists‖ (Vanden Heuvel 3).
The difficulty of winning the ‗hearts and minds‘ of Afghanis is an interesting problem for
the US government. On the one hand, ―the paradox of military engagement in such a conflict is
that the more you fight the more you lose‖ (Schell 18), where as, ―the paradox of political
engagement is that the more you rule the weaker the native component of the government
becomes, and the more likely it is to collapse when you leave‖ (Schell 18). With this analogy, the
costs of the war on the US efforts are clearer. While prolonged military engagement may result
in relative stability and security, it also causes more casualties, more collateral damage to
infrastructure, and more discontent among the citizens of both in the United States and
Afghanistan. Furthermore, the longer the US remains in Afghanistan, the weaker the Afghani
government will become as it will begin to rely more heavily on US support and intervention
that, eventually, it will cease to function and collapse.
It is imperative for the United States government to reconsider their course of action in
Afghanistan. Because President Obama has recently recommitted to US military operations,
alternative theories must be present to, at the very least, combat the persistent use of violent
military force. Some scholars believe that the best course of action is to involve Afghanistan‘s
neighbors by investing in a security initiative in the region. This can take the form of, ―a major
United Nations diplomatic initiative designed to get Afghanistan‘s regional neighbors to join in
setting a disengagement timetable and to share responsibility for preventing a Taliban return to
A Quagmire in Afghanistan
Michael J Napolitano 3
power in Kabul‖ (Harrison 6). This type of solution cannot be attempted unless the US
government seeks a major diplomatic initiative in Central Asia.
Afghanistan, however, cannot partake in multilateral talks with its neighbors if its own
government is unstable. According to some scholars, ―the collapse of governance in Afghanistan
was a precondition for the onset of the insurgency‖ (Jones 19). This collapse of governance is
rooted in the poor political management of Hamid Karzai, the Afghani president. The key to
regain governance in Afghanistan is to reestablish the legitimacy of the government amongst the
citizenry. It is difficult, however, for the US and Afghani governments to build relationships with
Afghanis when the government isn‘t functioning properly and botched military strikes are
harming the civilian population. Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff, wrote in Joint Forces Quarterly that, ―For all the time we spend thinking about how we
communicate our actions, we are failing to actually build relationships and convince the majority
Afghans not to hate us. The Taliban, on the other hand, are doing pretty well‖ (Xinhua News
Agency). This highlights the issue quite clearly: the Taliban is taking advantage of situations
created by the US and allied forces which is hurting the political and military stability of the
country.
There have been efforts by the US government to set up programs and initiatives to
provide social and economic support to Afghanistan. These programs, however, have been
mostly unsuccessful because of mismanagement by the Afghani government. Often, projects are
planned by the US government and then given to the Afghani government to appropriate funds
or find a local firm to handle the project (Roston 13). The issue, however, is that President
Karzai often gives projects to unqualified or corrupt individuals (ibid). In one instance, Karzai
gave a $360 million security and transportation contract to his cousins who have, ―no known
trucking experience, and little security experience to speak of,‖ and who have been charged with
smuggling heroin into the US during the 1990s (Roston 16). It is unfortunate that the US
government does not look further into the ethical and legal shortcomings of the Karzai
administration but, until they do, US funded programs are not going to function properly and the
Afghani people are going to continue to suffer.
The Afghani government has so many issues to solve that it is difficult to determine
where to begin. As Afghanistan is in a state of war, resolution of certain issues will take
significant political, diplomatic, and social will. Additionally, the Afghani government is at a
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Michael J Napolitano 4
crucial juncture as it is nearing the point where it will be unable to govern because it has become
too heavily reliant on US support. Beyond that, the United States has to reevaluate their
commitment to Afghanistan to try and decide how long is too long to invest resources, money,
and human life in the country. The US government must realize, ―that the American public will
not support war without end, which means [the US military will have] to leave one day‖ (Schell
18). The reality is that the current strategy in Afghanistan is not working and it is failing at a
massive human cost. The tactics the military is using either needs to be completely reconsidered
or the US needs to withdraw from Afghanistan and let Afghanis resolve their own political
differences.
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