Historical roots of secularization in the Netherlands
Tymofii Brik, PhD student in Social Science at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Abstract: Secularization theory has received a lot of criticism in the recent decades. Although a visible
shift to the theory of religious economics has occurred in the literature, it was not taken without
considerable criticism as well. For instance, the Netherlands remained an empirical puzzle to scholars
since secularization in this country cannot be explained by religious competition. This paper refines the
issue of structural foundations of secularization. I demonstrate that social institutions rooted deep in
history affect individual likelihood to have a religious affiliation in the Netherlands. A clarification to the
theory of religious economics is added by looking into the subsample of people who do not belong to any
church and yet exhibit significant subjective religiosity. Those Dutch regions that demonstrated
historically high level of religious monopolization pushed non-believers in the path of resistance.
Keywords: Secularization, religious economics, path dependency
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Marco van Leeuwen who kindly provided the historical data about
religious affiliation, educational expansion and mass transport developments in the Netherlands.
1. Introduction
Secularization theory has been debated greatly over the past decades. A common wisdom in the
second half of the 20th century was that scientific progress and socio-economic modernization will
inevitable reduce the role of religion (Wilson, 1982; Lecher, 1991; Swatos & Christiano, 1999).
However, the world witnessed a very opposite trend (Chaves, 1994; Beckford, 2012). A question why do
people still attend churches around the Globe, and in the US particularly, motivated Stark and Innaccone
(1994) to introduce their theory of religious economics. In the nutshell, this theory focuses on the supply
side of the religious services stating that religious pluralism and limited state interventions stimulate
church competition for the congregation. Churches behave as active firms at the competitive market
attracting more people. This theory was well received by the international scientific community (not
without some substantial criticism, for example see the discussion of Gorski, 2000). Nevertheless, just
after the introduction of this theory it was question in case of the Netherlands by Lechner (1996). Lechner
(1996) argued that it is hard to find a systematic relationship between variation in church pluralism and
church attendance in the Netherlands throughout the second half of the 20th century. Moreover, he argues
that the very phrase “religious competition” does not fit the Dutch case. In his view the word “oligopoly”
is a better metaphor from the realm of economics to describe the Netherlands in terms of religious
developments. The country has been historically divided by a few major churches that did not compete
with each other for the congregation. This division is known in the literature as pillarization (Lijphart,
1968). Each church provided individuals with the full set of social institutions: education, work, leisure
activities. Depillarization that happened in the second half of the 20th century weakened churches and
1
made people to be individual consumers of religious services only in the course of time. Making these
observations, Lechner argues that the theory of religious economics lacks social structural components in
describing religious actors: “In the Netherlands, both suppliers and consumers were subjects to forces
beyond their control” (Lechner, 1996, p.261). He argues that it is necessary to study church competition
in a broad context of social institutions in order to better understand the case of the Netherlands, and
maybe other societies as well: “Once we know the stage, inferences about the behavior of rational actors
follow” (Lechner, 1996, p.261).
The aim of this article is to answer the call of Lechner after almost 20 years since his article was
published. The key question here is to what extend secularization in the Netherlands is a product of
pillarization and other important social institutions that are tracked down to the times of socio-economic
modernization?
My research contributes to the literature in a threefold way. First, lately a lot of Dutch religious
studies shifted to investigation of particular social groups, often minorities such as Muslims, Orthodox
Protestants, believers only (Achterberg et. al, 2009; Rujs et al., 2011; Rujs et al., 2012; Maliepaard et.al,
2012). The overall secularization in the society and its link to social institutions was not studied (with an
exception when the Netherlands were studied in the cross-national perspective, for example Hirschle,
2013). I shift scientific attention back to the “big picture” of secularization and its institutional
foundation. Second, I merge census and other historical data with survey data derived from European
Social Survey placing secularization of the Netherlands in a deeper historical context. Finally, my
theoretical contribution is a qualification to Stark and Innaccone’s theory. I will demonstrate that
competition of churches is indeed important for individual religiosity in the case of the Netherlands,
however, only for those people who do not belong to a particular church, since church monopolization
and competition affect the resistance of officially non-believers.
2. Country context
Sociological studies demonstrate that the rates of personal religiosity in the Netherlands dropped
more than in almost all other countries in the World (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). The growth of GDP in
Holland during the last four decades correlates with the decline of church attendance. However, the
change in beliefs is “only minimally associated” with economic growth (Hirschle; 2013). Achterberg et.
al (2009) spotted a very important trend in secularization which is a divergence between those who do
believe and those who do not. They show that overall fewer people in the Netherlands are subjected to
faith; however faith becomes increasingly significant for those who do believe. Some case studies of the
Orthodox Protestants or Turkish and Moroccan Muslims illustrate this thesis showing a religious revival
for these small groups of believers (Rujs et al., 2012; Maliepaard et.al, 2012). These findings are
important departure points for the present research since they demonstrate that secularization is a complex
social process. It can be decomposed into different dimensions such as denomination membership,
frequency of church attendance or personal religiosity. It may be as well driven by different mechanisms
in case of believers and non-believers.
2
What are the historical developments in secularization in the Netherlands? The dynamic of
changes in religious affiliation and church attendance for the recent decades can be seeing in Figure 1 and
Figure 2 respectively. According to the Dutch Central bureau of statistics there were 44% of people with
no denomination, 27% of Roman Catholics, 6% of Protestant church of the Netherlands, 8% of the Dutch
reformed, and 3% of Calvinists in 2009. These figures are complemented with the fact that more than
70% of people hardly ever visited a church in the same year.
Figure 1. Individuals of a certain religious affiliation, %,
the Netherlands, 1997-2009
50
40
30
20
10
0
No denomination
Roman Catholic
Protestant Church of
The Netherlands
Dutch Reformed
Calvinist
Other
denominations
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, www.cbs.nl
Considering deeper historical trends, demographic data shows that in 1899 only 2% of population
was registered as being without any church affiliation, this increased to 18% in 1960 and 42% in 2008
(CBS, 2009).
Figure 2. Church attendance, %,
the Netherlands, 1997-2009
80
70
Once a week or more
60
50
40
Twice or three times a
month
Once a month
30
20
Less than once a month
10
0
Hardly ever
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, www.cbs.nl
3
3. Methodological strategy
In order to study social institutions that may affect secularization in the Netherlands I will
conduct an investigation in two steps: by looking into church affiliation and subjective religiosity.
Church affiliation is studied as having a denomination versus having no denomination. I use this
indicator because of a several reasons. First of all, it reflects an overall trend of a departure from a church
over time. Second, this indicator is present in different sources of data such as censuses, demographic
observations and sociological surveys. Using this reliable measure I can track down in history whether
secularization is framed by social institutions in a way expected by Lechner (1996).
There are reasons to focus on subjective religiosity as well. Recent studies demonstrate that
religion plays different role for believers and nonbelievers. Achterberg et. al ( 2009) studied a group of
believers in the Netherlands showing that for them the role of religion increased over time. However, the
studies of officially non-believers (those who do not belong to any particular denomination) are scarce. It
is not clear whether religious attitudes vary within this group and why. This question is of particular
interest to my study because it may put conflicting expectations of Stark and Innaccone (1994) and
Lechner (1996). According to the theory of religious economics, a church may recruit new members who
are not necessarily engaged in religious activities at the moment but possess a potential to become a
consumer of religious services in future. This potential can be measured in terms of subjective religiosity.
Considering, the logic of Lechner (1996), pillazrization created an “oligopoly” instead of “free religious
market”. The institutional power of a church may linger in the attitudes of non-believers. Individuals may
not belong to a denomination but still be religious due to the strong presence of religious institutions in
the context where they live.
4. Historical developments of secularization in the Netherlands
Historical data derived from the census conducted in 1909 allow measuring a proportion of
individuals who were members of a particular denomination and those who did not belong to any of them.
I use census of 1909 instead of earlier data because of a several reasons. First of all, at this time
pillarization has been greatly developed. Catholics and Protestants had their trade unions, educational
institutions, press, and political parties (Lijphart, 1968). Second, this is a time of considerable socioeconomic modernization and educational developments in the Netherlands (Wintle, 2000).
Stark and Innaccone (1994) propose to look at the church competition by means of Herfindahl
index. This index is used by economists to measure the level of monopolization in a given industry and is
often denoted as HHI as an acronym of the more common name Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. It is
defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of firms. Market shares in this case are fractions of
each firm within the industry. The final index is in a range from 0 to 1 where 0 means a significant
number of competing firms, whereas 1 means a presence of a single monopolistic firm.
Stark and Innaccone (1994) use this index in their models associating it with church attendance
around the world. In the next part of the text the same index will be computed based on the Dutch
demographic data for 1909 and 2008 years on the level of provinces. I use provinces because of the idea
4
of pillarization, since the Netherlands were divided geographically between Protestants in the North and
Catholics in the South.
Figure 3. Herfindahl–Hirschman Index,
the Netherlands, 1909 and 2008
1
0.9
0.8
0.80
0.7
0.69
0.6
0.58
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.89
0.84
0.39
0.30
0.29
0.22
0.39
0.23
0.40
0.21
0.42
0.43
0.27
0.29
0.43
0.48
1909_HHI
2008_HHI
0.20
0.21
0.24
0.1
0
Sources: for 1909 I use census data, for 2008 I use aggregated data derived from the Tabel 5.3. Bevolking van 18
jaar en ouder naar kerkelijke gezindte en kerkbezoek naar provincie, 2008 (CBS, 2009).
As it can be seen from Figure 3, overall monopolization of churches slightly decreased during the
hundred years. Figure 3 reveals as well that the index of monopolization in 2008 is highly associated with
the same index in 1909. Interpretation of these figures must be careful given at least two important facts.
First, shares of fifteen different churches were utilized to construct index for 1909. In 2008 many of these
churches ceased to exist while, for example, the Islamic churches appeared. Only five churches were
utilized for the HHI calculations in 2008. Second, in 2008 only adults older 18 were analyzed, which was
not the case for 1909 where all population was taken into account. Nevertheless, given the serious
changes in composition of churches and some methodological differences in population selection, the
overall picture of church monopolization remained the same. The South remained to be monopolized by
Catholics (Limburg and North-Brabant), while the Northern Protestant Provinces remained to be less
monopolized by a single church. For instance, values of HHI for Limburg (most monopolized) and NorthHolland (least monopolized) are almost the same after 100 years.
But what can we say about secularization in 1909? How many people were registered as without
any denomination? In order to investigate it I provide numbers on the level of municipalities in Table 1.
Even though the mean number of people with no church affiliation was almost 2% in 1909, the
5
variation among municipalities is sometimes striking. Sometimes there were around 30% of people with
no church affiliation in a municipality which is a quite high figure even by up to day standards.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of secularization per municipality in 1909, the Netherlands
Being without any denomination
N
Mean
Median
SD
Min
Max
1142
1.81
0.43
3.65
0
34.84
Figure 4 demonstrates the map with distribution of secularization per municipalities. Each
municipality is marked with a red dot. A size of the dot represents a share of people with no church
affiliation. It is evident that the South of the country (Limburg and North-Brabant regions) did not
experience secularization (the map is almost blank in this regions); at the same time Protestant territories
in the North and mixed religious territories in the Center experienced a significant variation in
secularization in 1909.
Figure 4. Secularization by municipalities in 1909, the Netherlands
Source: 1909 census derived from the CBS software StatLine
Figure 4 provides an intuition that secularization began in the Netherlands quite early and with
different speed by regions. To what extend these developments may linger up to the present time? In
order to illustrate this relationship between the past and the present of religious developments and
6
secularization in the Netherlands I merge census data from 1909 and survey data from ESS (2002-2008).
The data will be discussed elaborately later in the text. I use the system of Dutch “COROPS” or NUTS-3
units in order to merge data. Overall, there are 40 NUTS-3 units. First, to illustrate the data I present the
HHI index again. This time on the level of NUTS-3 subregions instead of provinces.
Figure 5. Correlations between HHI in 1909 and 2000s
on the level of 40 NUTS-3 subregions, the Netherlands.
The correlation of monopolization index on the level of NUTS-3 units in 1909 and 2000th is very
strong (0.84).
The next graph (Figure 5) demonstrates stability in church departure trends over the course of 100
years on the level of NUTS-3 units. I calculate proportions of people with no denomination in a
respective subregion in 1909 and 2000s. The correlation of church departure is quite strong (0.56).
Figures 3 to 5 are simple correlations on the cross-sectional level. Nevertheless, they point out
that the theory of religious economics by Stark and Innaconne (1994) cannot be applied directly in its
simplest form to the Netherlands. Catholic regions that experienced monopolization had higher rates of
church affiliation. At the same time Protestant North that had more church competition lost a considerable
piece of its congregation. Stark and Innaccone’s theory predicts otherwise stating that monopolization
should have increased church departures. Hence, I provide some historical credibility to the critical
comments of Lechner (1996).
7
Figure 6. Correlations between proportions of people
who do not belong to any denomination in 1909 and 2000s
on the level of 40 NUTS-3 subregions, the Netherlands.
Historical data reveal a case of path dependency in church monopolization in the Netherlands.
Some regions maintained their level of HHI over the course of time despite the two world wars, economic
fluctuations and changes in churches composition. Moreover, regions with higher rates of church
departure in 1909 demonstrate higher departure figures in 2000th. This path dependency has to be taken
into account when analyzing secularization in the present days.
The data also pose more questions. For example, what were the reasons for people to depart from
churches so actively in 1909? Since the logic of competition provided by Stark and Innaccone cannot be
applied, what were the institutions that overtook the power of church in the North of the country?
To address these issues and study secularization in the present day Netherlands as a product of
historical path dependencies I will move from correlations to statistical inferences by means of regression
modeling.
My first set of hypotheses puts a contradiction between Star and Innaccone (1994) and Lechner
(1996) to the test. Religious economics theory predicts that a person who lives in a competitive religious
market is more likely to be religious. At the same time a logic proposed by Lechner (and a historical
verification of this logic provided in the previous part of the text) states that a historical power of a church
as institution increases a likelihood of a person to be a member of this church. Stark and Innacone’s logic
of religious economics motivates the H1.1 hypothesis, and Lechner’s logic motivates the H1.2 hypothesis.
8
H1.1. a person who lives in a region with historically higher rates of church monopolization is
more likely to belong to a particular church themselves.
H1.2. a person who lives in a region with historically higher rates of secularization is less likely
to belong to a particular church themselves.
My second set of hypotheses, as it was mentioned in the part of methodological strategy, is
concerned with subjective religiosity among those individuals who do not belong to any denomination.
Just like in the first set of hypotheses, the conflicting propositions of Stark and Innacone and Lechner are
placed against each other.
H2.1. People with no denomination are going to be more religious in those regions that were
more religiously monopolized
H2.2. People with no denomination are going to be more religious in regions with historically
lower secularization
5. Data, methods and variables.
Data
For this study a few datasets are merged. Historical data come from a various sources all kindly
provided by Marco van Leeuwen and Ineke Maas from Utrecht University. Church affiliations per
municipality in 1909 are derived from the StatLine software of the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek
(CBS). Variables of socio-economic modernization are retrieved from HISCI_NL dataset (Historical
International Standardized Community Indicators, the Netherlands). All these historical data were
collected as a part of HISMA project that investigates consequences of socio-economic modernization in
the Netherlands in terms of social stratification and mobility1. Survey data is derived from European
Social Survey (2002-2008). Four rounds of ESS survey in the Netherlands were selected because of their
sampling design. In 2002-2008 years Dutch sample was based on so-called “COROPS” that correspond to
NUTS-3 units. According to the ESS manual, Dutch ESS sample is representative on the level of
COROPS. The overall number of these subregions is 40 which allow detailed spatial comparisons.
Data merging is an important part of the current research. All historical data originally are on the
level of municipalities. Historical data were merged on the level of NUTS-3 units first and then merged
with the ESS data on the level of respective units. In the beginning of the 20th century there were more
than 1000 municipalities in the Netherlands. This number was around 400 in the 21th century. While
many European countries increased the number of their municipalities during the course of the previous
centuries by conquering new territories and shifting from rural to urban zones, the Netherlands took
another way. A lot of Dutch municipalities disappeared over time by means of various administrative
reforms. In order to fit historical municipalities to the present day NUTS-3 units the code-book
“Repertorium van Nederlandse gemeenten 1812-2006” (Van der Meer & Boonstra, 2006) was used. This
1
http://hisma.org/
9
codebook lists all historical names of the Dutch municipalities and all historical changes of their borders.
For instance, such changes are listed as “merging with another municipality” or “emergence from another
municipality”. Very rarely some municipalities shifted to another states (Belgium and Germany) and had
to be excluded from the analysis. In some cases web-pages of the Dutch provinces and Wikipedia pages
of municipalities were used in order to track all changes in borders of some municipalities. An important
issue is how to treat those Dutch territories that emerged very recently? The twelfth Dutch province
Flevoland was established in 1986. Although the vast majority of the municipalities in this province were
established in the same year, there are a few municipalities that can be tracked down to the smallest
municipalities that existed on the borders and subordinated to other provinces (for instance, such
municipalities as Warffum or Urk). These municipalities were merged separately and labeled as
Flevoland rather artificially. It is clear that the direct link between a few municipalities in 1909 and a very
new and modern region of Flevolend in 2000th is more than questionable. Nevertheless, I believe it is
wrong to merge these municipalities to the bordering provinces since their administrative history is very
different.
Method
To test the first round of hypotheses binominal multilevel regression is used. Multilevel
regression model is used to test the second set of hypotheses. OLS models utilize the whole data creating
spurious significance (Hox, 2010) while multilevel models take into account regional allocation of
observations. The variation between NUTS-3 regions is modeled. Random effects Level 2 variance was
calculated with the Latent Variables method in the case of binominal multilevel regression.
Variables
I have two dependent variables for the two set of hypotheses. The first one is whether a person
has no denomination; the second one is the subjective religiosity. The list of independent variables is the
same for the both tests.
Dependent variables
1. A dummy variable from ESS with 0 when a person has a denomination and 1 when a person
does not have a denomination.
2. Subjective religiosity is measured by the ESS item “How religious are you” on the 0-10 scale.
Only people whose subjective religiosity is larger than 0 are included to the analysis.
Independent variables
Nonbelievers are the share of people with no denomination in 1909 on the level of NUTS-3.
The Herfindahl index (HHI) is a measure of monopolization by a certain church (ranges from 0 to
1) in 1909 on the level of NUTS-3. Overall, 15 churches are in the index.
10
Education and mass transport. Correlations of shares of nonbelievers and HHI in the first part of
the paper revealed that religious monopolization was not linked to the departures from churches. Since
the logic of Stark and Innacone’s theory cannot be applied to explain secularization in the past it is
necessary to test an alternative reason of secularization in the Dutch history. Numerous researchers
pointed out that economic development and education may have influenced secularization (Hirschle,
2013). The link between religiosity, economic development and education is discussed elaborately by
Becker & Woessmann (2009). However, it is little known whether historical developments in educational
and economic systems still have shadow on the present day secularization. To study this educational
expansion and train station shares are included to the analysis. Educational expansion is measured as is
the number of enrolled pupils per 100 in a region in 1909. A share or municipalities that have a train
station in a NUTS-3 region in 1909 is utilized to study whether secularization is linked to economic
developments in the past.
Muslims, migration and GDP. Present day secularization is often considered as a product of only
present day developments in a society. It is important to control for these types of variables in terms to
prove that historical variables are actually at work. GDP per capita in 2000 on the NUTS-3 unit levels is
used to control for the economic development of subregions. Net migration in 2000 on the NUTS-3 level
is used for two reasons: 1) it is an alternative control for the economic development; 2) it is a way to
control for socialization effects when a large part of the population was grown in one religious context but
contribute to the aggregated numbers of secularization in another context. Muslim shares in each ESS
round on the level of NUTS-3 are used in the model to account for changes in church compositions since
Islamic religious were not present on such large scale in 1909. Values of GDP and net migration are
centered in the models.
Controls on the individual level. Such controls as age, gender (being a man), ISEI, and whether a
respondent was born in the Netherlands are used in the models. In this way it is expected to control for
various sources of secularization pointed out in the literature: generational replacement, gender
socialization, national based socialization, social status socialization.
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. It worth
mentioning that descriptive statistics show that the minimum number of pupils enrolled in 1909 per
NUTS unit was 0. Zuidwest-Friesland was the only one region with no pupils. Most likely, children from
this region had to attend schools in neighboring regions. However, the neighboring regions were
subordinated to the same Protestant pillar, hence this case is not considered to be problematic.
11
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
N
Mean
Median
SD
Min
Max
Being without any denomination
7912
0.57
-
-
0
1
Subjective religiosity (all sample)
7912
4,98
6
2,99
0
10
Subjective religiosity
3298
4,76
5
2,35
1
10
Nonbelievers in 1909 (proportion) per NUTS unit
40
4.2
3.3
3.9
0.15
21.2
HHI in 1909 per NUTS unit
40
0.51
0.42
0.20
0.27
0.96
Share of municipalities with trains in 1909 per NUTS unit
40
0.30
0.26
0.17
0.08
1
Educational expansion in 1909
40
0.83
0.72
0.43
0
2.6
GDP in a region in 2000
40
25,780
23,800
5420.437
16,200
39,260
Net migration in 2000
40
1911
1452
2091.407
-1693
8339
Muslim share (from ESS)
40
2.32
2.15
1.94
0.00
6.83
Age
7912
48.9
48
17.48
15
95
Male
7912
0.46
-
-
0
1
ISEI
7912
47
49
16.46
16
90
Born in the country
7912
0.92
-
-
0
1
(nonbelievers whose religiosity is higher than zero)
6. Results.
Table 3 includes three models testing the first set of hypothesis. Dependent variable in this case is
the odds ratio of an individual to be without any denomination. Model 1 includes only historical variables
of religiosity and individual controls. Model 2 includes the same variables and historical variables for
socio-economic modernization and controls. Model 3 includes all previous variables as well adding
controls for modern socio-economic developments.
Model 1 shows that church monopolization in the past does not affect the odds rations of an
individual to belong to a church today. Hence, an expectation of Stark and Innacone is not confirmed
from the historical perspective. On the other hand, higher rates of people with no denomination in 1909
indeed positively affect odds ratios of an individual to be without a denomination in 2000 th (although the
size of effect is quite small). Model 2 includes more historical variables: share of municipalities with train
stations (economic development) and amount of pupils enrolled per 100 (social modernization). This
model reveals that economic developments do not affect church belonging over time. However, education
is very important in shaping secularization. Individuals have higher odds to have no denomination in
those regions where education was more developed historically.
12
Table 3. Binominal multilevel regression. Individual departure from church
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
0.52 (0.25)*
0.28 (0.30)
0.28 (0.30)
0.05 (0.01)***
0.05 (0.01)***
0.05 (0.01) ***
-0.38 (0.33)
-0.17 (0.32)
-0.16 (0.33)
Share of trains in 1909
-0.30 (0.29)
-0.24 (0.32)
Educational expansion in 1909
0.26 (0.11)*
0.24 (0.12)*
Intercept
Nonbelievers in 1909 (proportion)
HHI in 1909
GDP in a region in 2000
0.04 (0.06)
Net migration in 2000
0.02 (0.06)
Muslim share (from ESS)
0.0004 (0.03)
Age
-0.025 (0.001)***
-0.02 (0.001 )***
-0.03 (0.001)***
Male
0.23 (0.05)***
0.23 (0.05)***
0.23 (0.05)***
ISEI
0.003 (0.001)*
0.003 (0.001) *
0.003 (0.001)*
Born in the country
0.79 (0.09)***
0.80 (0.09 )***
0.80 (0.09 )***
0.08(0.04)
0.07 (0.04)
0.06 (0.04)
9575.1
9574.3
9579.8
7419
7419
7419
Variance of intercept
AIC
N
Model 3 includes variables that control for modern developments. The model shows that
historical variables are more important than the variables of the present day situation in explaining
secularization.
In models 2 and 3 intercepts are not significant. This implies that the event probability (have no
denomination) is 0.5 given all other predictors as 0. If the predictors are taken into consideration, the
event probability will change. For example in Model 3 the probability of being with no denomination is:
exp⁡(0.28 + ⁡0.05 + ⁡0.238 − ⁡0.0246 + ⁡0.229 + ⁡0.0032 + ⁡0.799)
= 0.83
1 + exp(0.28 + ⁡0.05 + ⁡0.238 − ⁡0.0246 + ⁡0.229 + ⁡0.0032 + ⁡0.799)
13
Table 4. Multilevel regression. Subjective religiosity among officially nonbelievers.
MODEL 1
MODEL 2
MODEL 3
(Intercept)
7.05 (0.29)***
6.82 (0.32)***
6.96 (0.35)***
Nonbelievers in 1909 (proportion)
-0.04 (0.01) **
-0.04 (0.01)**
-0.04 (0.01)**
HHI in 1909
-0.88 (0.28) **
-0.77 (0.29)**
-0.88 (0.31)**
Share of trains in 1909
0.19 (0.28)
0.13 (0.31)
Educational expansion in 1909
0.14 (0.11)
0.19 (0.12)
GDP in a region (2008)
0.08 (0.06)
Net migration (2008)
-0.04 (0.05)
Muslim share (from ESS)
-0.04 (0.03)
Age
0.02 (0.003)***
0.02 (0.003)***
0.02 (0.003) ***
Male
-0.62 (0.08 )***
-0.61 (0.08)***
-0.62 (0.08) ***
ISEI
-0.006 (0.002)*
-0.006 (0.002)*
-0.007 (0.003)*
-0.96 (0.158) ***
-0.96 (0.16)***
-0.96 (0.16) ***
Variance of intercept
0.009 (0.02)
0.009 (0.02)
0.012 (0.002)
Variance of residual
5.28 (0.83)
5.28 (0.83)
5.27 (0.83)
14284.23
14289.31
14305.07
3161
3161
3161
Born in the country
AIC
N
Table 4 includes three models testing the second set of hypotheses. The dependent variable is
subjective religiosity among officially nonbelievers on the ten point scale. Only individuals with
religiosity larger than zero were selected for the analysis. Models 1, 2, and 3 reveal a significant
importance of church monopolization and secularization in the past on subjective religiosity among
officially non-believers in the present. A historical role of education in shaping subjective religiosity of
people without church affiliation is not significant. Table 2 demonstrates that Stark and Innaccone’s logic
can be used to explain subjective religiosity in a historical context. Officially non believers that live in
regions with historically higher church monopolization are less religious. This can be explained as a
counter reaction of secular individuals to the power of church. The more power a church had in history
the higher resistance it faces from those who do not believe.
14
7. Conclusions and discussion
Average number of individuals who did not have any church affiliation at the beginning of the
th
20 century in the Netherlands was almost 2%. Such a low number combined with the notion of
pillarization made scholars to believe that secularization in the Netherlands began much later in history,
around the sixties in the 20th century. However, as this research demonstrates when the same numbers are
considered on the level of municipalities and provinces it is evident that secularization was quite spread in
Holland at the onset of the 20th century. One of the main drivers of secularization was educational
expansion in the Protestant North.
The fact that Holland was historically divided between a few major churches made scholars to
question whether the theory of religious economics can be applied to this society. Theoretical criticism
points out the need to study social structural components behind rational actions of religious actors on the
supply and consumer sides (Lechner, 1996). At the same time empirical findings point out that the
Netherlands actually fit the traditional secularization theory documenting a link between modernization
and the weakening of faith with time (Achtenberg, 2009; Hirshe, 2013). The present research tackles
these issues by looking deeper in history of pillarization and secularization in the Netherlands.
First, my research demonstrates that the higher rates of nonbelievers and better education
development in the past affect nonbelievers today. I do not find a significant influence of religious
monopolies in 1909 on the church belonging in 2000s. Hence, the idea of Stark and Innaccone can be
questioned. Societies that were pluralized in the past are not necessary more or less religious today in
terms of religious affiliations. However, the church belonging in 1909 and educational expansion in 1909
influences significantly the church belonging in 2000s. Path dependency in social structures is more
important than competition of churches with respect to the religious affiliations. Second, my analysis
reveals that people who do not belong to a church are less religious when the religious pluralism was
absent in history. In this respect the theory of Stark and Innaccone (1994) is correct. My interpretation of
this fact is that nonbelievers have higher resistance to monopolistic churches that try to impose their
power on people. At the same time religious competition contributes to the religious pluralism in a society
making nonbelievers less rigid and strong in their opinion towards other side.
One of the possible implications of these findings is that governmental actions of church
regulation cannot be based on the present figures solely. They must be based on the knowledge of
relevant social channels that are at work in maintaining religiosity via generations (such as social
networks, keen influence, and regional segregation).
15
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