Discussion paper
The Costly
Game
A study of the arms trade and development
“I can understand the principles of expediency and ‘balance’ in arms
sales, but I get a bit confused when morality is invoked. I think it is better
to steer clear of this last concept now that we are so far into the arms
supply game (sic)” (Sir Stephen Egerton, Foreign Office civil servant,
evidence to the Scott enquiry.)
Bryan R Evans
Tearfund, 100 Church Road, Teddington, Middlesex TW11 8QE, UK
Tel. 0181 977 9144
Fax 0181 943 3594
Tearfund discussion papers are short exploratory research papers aimed at provoking wider
discussion of development-related issues among Tearfund staff and the organisations and
individuals with which Tearfund works. They do not necessarily constitute Tearfund policy.
Comments from readers are welcomed.
Bryan Evans is a researcher in Tearfund's Public Policy Team and may be contacted by email at: bre@tearfund.dircon.co.uk
Contents
Executive summary:
Page
1
Introduction
2
The arms trade and the poor
High military spending
Armed conflict
Trends in conflict and military expenditure
3
4
6
Key issues and relevant policy processes
The ineffectiveness of general international agreements on the arms
trade
The UK as arms exporter
The EU as arms exporter
Western defence budgets ... for what?
The arms brokers and others
Channels for the arms trade
Mercenary companies
Landmines
Light weapons in Africa
Child soldiers
7
7
10
12
13
13
14
15
16
19
Conclusions and recommendations
Roots
Matters to raise with UK policy-makers
The example of the Ottawa Process
19
20
21
APPENDICES
1) ‘Just war ... just arms trade’
2) Statistics
23
24
ABBREVIATIONS
27
SOURCES
28
Executive Summary
Poverty is a factor in conflict and the buying of arms. In turn conflict is a root cause of
poverty, important in itself and intertwined with other causes. High military spending means
over-consumption of resources. It results in degradation of the environment and distortions
in the economy. It is intimately related with the problems of debt, illegal drugs, and the
denial of democracy and human rights. It may lead to armed conflict, bringing loss of civilian
life, displacement, destruction of the environment and infrastructure, and severe disruption of
the economy.
All but one of the 25 conflicts noted in 1997 were intra-state in nature, and all but one took
place in the Third World. Six countries (the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council, plus Germany) supplied 84 per cent of arms exports. All the new conflicts noted
occurred in Africa, which was characterised by weak states, clusters of unstable states, and
low technology wars. East Asia is troubled by conflicting maritime claims, but the financial
crisis of 1997 damped down the arms race. Military expenditure seems set to increase in
Latin America as a result of economic growth and the lifting of the US embargo on the sale
of advanced weapons.
The world-wide trade in arms flourishes because the North’s desire to sell arms meets the
readiness of some in the South to pursue conflict through violence, and each aggravates and
feeds the other. This cycle may continue until, in some cases, warfare becomes the engine
driving an utterly perverted economy. General international agreements have so far failed
because of the over-riding importance (in the North) of the protection of the arms industry,
and related foreign policy aims.
The European Union will be central in any attempts to bring the world-wide trade in arms
(licit and illicit) under control. For the UK, France and Germany (all in the top six among
the weapons suppliers) the health of the arms industry is regarded as a fundamental national
interest, and the requirements of the arms exporters compete with development issues when
foreign policy decisions are made. Yet it may be argued that control of the arms trade is in
the best interests of exporting countries. The EU Code of Conduct agreed in 1998 is a
significant first step, but falls well short of setting “high common standards”. Nor can the
Code work in isolation from the USA. Ill-defined dangers (from ‘rogue states’ and general
instability), domestic politics, and the prospect of new markets among new members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), are driving up the US defence budget. New
purchases push older weapons on to the second-hand market, and stimulate calls for
increases at other Western defence ministries.
Regulation of the licit trade in arms will never be enough in itself. Rebel groups such as
UNITA in Angola, and the Lord’s Resistance Army operating in northern Uganda, obtain
arms deliveries through brokers, and through the re-cycling of weapons from one conflict to
the next. Particular countries regularly feature as channels for the weapons.
Mercenary/mining companies are another strand in this web of unofficial (if not outright
illegal) transfer of weapons and instability.
1
Landmines, light weapons, and the enlistment of child soldiers are major threats to long-term
development. No effective measures are in place in the West to address the matter of light
weapons from the supply side, but a group of non-government organisations (NGOs) has
taken inspiration from the successful landmines campaign, and is setting up a coalition to
press for effective controls. Another NGO coalition is campaigning for a ban on the
enlistment of child soldiers.
Conclusions and recommendations:
Guidelines and treaties are not enough. Poverty, as a root cause of conflict, and
international debt as a root cause of poverty, must be seriously addressed. In the North, a
vigorous programme of conversion is called for in order to reduce over-dependence on jobs
in the arms industry. New cultures must be fostered, of non-possession (of weapons) in the
South, and a presumption to deny (export licences) in the North.
There are a number of matters which UK NGOs should urgently raise with their own
government. These include: the illusion that an arms industry upholds status and credibility;
the illusion that national security depends on heavy defence expenditure; the argument “if we
do not supply arms, others will” amounts to idolatry of the market, while subsidising arms
exports is an offence against the market; heavy involvement in the arms trade has a negative
effect on our national life; the impossibility of controlling the final use/misuse of weapons; the
dangers of delegating foreign policy objectives to mercenary companies; the UK’s
responsibility to end the irregular, and much-abused, status of off-shore havens.
The example of the Ottawa Process teaches, first, that a network makes a powerful voice
and, secondly, the intervention of a few key governments can make a crucial difference.
Introduction
The arms trade is not a private matter between the makers and the buyers of weapons. It is
a major development issue because it entails the diversion of human and material resources
from productive to non-productive use. It distorts whole economies and, in the event of
actual conflict, results in degradation and destruction of resources, with severe disruption of
social and economic life. The arms trade is also inextricably linked with other major factors
in poverty, such as unpayable debt, illegal drugs, and the maintenance of unjust structures.
This paper begins by outlining the aggravating effects of poverty on conflict and conflict on
poverty. It reviews the distinctive character of conflict in the 1990s, and goes on to note the
very limited success of general agreements on arms control.
It then looks at the key role of the UK as a major arms exporter and a, supposedly,
responsible permanent member of the UN Security Council. It examines the costs to Britain
of undue dependence on the arms trade. The central role of the European Union, the role of
certain countries and off-shore havens as channels for the arms trade, and the disturbing
trend to privatising foreign policy through mercenary companies are noted. Attention is
drawn to the causes and consequences of US defence expenditure.
2
Three related issues - landmines, light weapons, and child soldiers - are then looked at.
Finally, some conclusions and recommendations are offered for consideration.
The arms trade and the poor
Irrespective of whether armed conflict is in progress high military spending will have
serious consequences for the poor, and for the natural environment.
Firstly it entails over-consumption of resources. An active arms industry creates a high
demand for metals and other resources. Military vehicles, ships, and aircraft all use large
amounts of fuel, even when limited to training exercises. Military bases, and their access
roads, take up land resources.
Secondly, military activity can bring about degradation of the environment. The US naval
facility at Subic Bay in the Philippines left a legacy of environmental contamination. “The
residue of chemicals used in fire-fighting flowed directly into the bay. Heavy metals from the
shipyard operation also drained into the bay or were buried in landfills. Chemicals were
released into the air by the powerplant. And gasoline and oil leaked into the soil from
underground tanks” (Human Development Report 1994.) Although the town has attracted
considerable new investment since the base closed in 1992, the unknown levels of
contamination still hinder development.
Thirdly, high military expenditure produces distortions in the economy. Resources may be
diverted from health, education, agriculture and civilian industry. The 1994 Human
Development Report published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
cites the following examples of misplaced priorities, taken from 1992:
China bought 26 combat aircraft from Russia at a cost which could have provided safe
water for one year to 140 million of the 200 million people without safe water.
India bought 20 MiG-29 fighters from Russia at a cost that would have provided basic
education to all the 15 million girls out of school.
Nigeria bought 80 battle tanks from the UK at a cost that could have immunised all of the
two million unimmunised children and provided family planning services to nearly 17 million
couples.
A study of sub-Saharan Africa (Dager and Sen, Arms and the child, 1991), carried out by
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for UNICEF linked high
military spending and rising child mortality.
The distortions may be insidious as the secrecy cloaking the arms trade is fertile ground for
corruption among both buyers and sellers. Again, distortions may be long-term in nature as
investment is diverted towards military rather than civilian priorities, e.g. roads built to serve
military bases rather than civilian needs. Human resources may be misused. Military
equipment requires personnel to operate and maintain it, thus diverting scarce technical
skills. Social distortion of another kind may occur in the vicinity of military bases. For
example, the small town of Olungapo, near Subic Bay, provided services ranging from
dozens of bars to thousands of prostitutes. All these factors restrain healthy economic
growth and further undermine the government’s capacity for social provision.
3
Fourthly, a distortion of a very particular kind is the unpayable debt crippling many Third
World countries. During the Cold War the superpowers often supplied client states with
weapons on credit. The World Development Movement (WDM), citing the World Bank,
says that as much as one third of all debt servicing is accounted for by arms purchases. And
once debt is in the system further distortions in the socio-economic context may occur. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF), in an internal study (cited in Biting the bullet, p.15)
noted that, when the Fund called for fiscal tightening, military spending proved more resilient
than social spending. Yet such inverted priorities threaten social cohesion, possibly leading
to violent conflict and further expenditure on arms.
Another very particular kind of distortion is the growing of illegal drugs. In Bolivia,
Colombia and Peru, where poverty is closely related to conflict, arms-related debt, and
falling commodity prices, peasant communities have resorted to growing coca. The situation
has then further deteriorated through the pervasive lawlessness, with drugs traffickers
battling the security forces. Such conflict further feeds the arms trade. (Funding for crop
substitution programmes is dwarfed by the expenditure on fighting drugs with weapons,
Biting the bullet, p.18) There are also serious environmental implications: deforestation,
soil erosion, air pollution through burning, widespread use of pesticides and herbicides.
Excessive defence expenditure inevitably strengthens the influence of the armed forces,
leading to the further diversion of resources to them. This is often to the detriment of
democracy and human rights. The danger is particularly acute when the defence in question
is defence of the privileges of an elite. Arms purchases may enable a small minority
(sometimes ethnically distinct) to retain control of most of the country’s wealth. Others may
then exploit the imbalance to enlist the poor in their own armed struggle to control resources.
Armed conflict
A very obvious consequence of actual conflict is the loss of human life. “During the first half
of the 1990s, at least 3.2 million people died of war-related causes (either due to fighting or
to hunger and disease caused by the fighting)” (Vital Signs 1998-1999, p.116). This was
one of the highest death tolls of any five-year period since the end of the Second World
War. Since 1946 at least 25 million people have been killed (Vital Signs p.116, citing RL
Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1996). Warfare in the 1990s has been
intra-state in nature. In 1997, for example, all but one of the 25 major armed conflicts were
within country. (Of the 25 conflicts listed in the SIPRI Yearbook for 1998 one was in
Europe, four in the Middle East, and the remainder in the developing countries of Africa,
Asia and Latin America). A matter of particular concern is that civilians accounted for 90
per cent of the casualties in the wars of the 1990s. (In the First World War the figure was
14 per cent, and in the Second World War 67 per cent).
Another consequence of conflict is the disruption of human life. Civil wars tend to hit food
production particularly badly. In Cambodia in the 1970s production fell by more than 50
per cent (Biting the bullet, p.14) Food imports may also be cut back, to pay for arms
imports. Civilian jobs may be cut. Family bread-winners may go away to fight, and some
4
will be killed or injured, leaving an ongoing problem of care of widows, orphans and the
disabled. Transport (to market, for example) may be disrupted or rendered too dangerous.
Exports may be hindered, especially if there is an external trade embargo.
A severe form of disruption is the displacement of people, either internally or across
borders. Displaced people put serious strain on the resources of the area to which they flee.
They cease to be self-sufficient for they cannot plant crops for themselves, and so become
dependent on relief supplies. In recent years there have been conflict-related famines in
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Chad, Sudan, Liberia and Somalia. During the long civil war
between the Frelimo government in Mozambique and the South African-backed Renamo
1.7 million people became refugees in neighbouring countries, and another 4-5 million were
internally displaced. (This was on top of one million deaths through the conflict and related
famine, and through drought.)
Another very obvious consequence of war is the destruction that results. Agricultural land,
vegetation, water sources, seas may be destroyed or polluted. Even if not destroyed,
access may be denied by unexploded ordnance, or by the laying of mines - and these may
remain a threat for years, if not generations, to come. Vital infrastructure may well be
deliberately targeted by the warring parties. In the Mozambican civil war about 68 per cent
of the primary school network, and one third of all rural health units were destroyed or
closed down. Road, rail, and oil-pipeline links that are vital to the economic independence
of southern Africa from South Africa were persistently disrupted.
Severe distortion of the economy may take place in a war situation. Inflation, currency
devaluation, panic buying, hoarding and racketeering may become problems. The
government may find it hard to collect tax revenue, putting further pressure on social
spending.
In sum, arms imports will cost a country dear. Ironically they may deny the importer the
security they were supposed to buy. UNDP comment: “It is sobering to reflect that
countries spending very little on defence and much more on human development [Botswana
and Costa Rica, for example] have been more successful at defending their national
sovereignty than those spending heavily on arms” (Human Development Report 1994,
p.51)
Trends in conflict and military expenditure
As already noted most of the conflicts of the 1990s have been intra-state in nature, with high
civilian casualties, and they have been largely confined to the developing world.
Furthermore, UN peace-keeping seems to be in decline, with the major powers now
preferring to act through ad hoc coalitions or not at all. For example, in 1997 the NATO
operation in Bosnia was bigger than all the UN peacekeeping missions combined.
World military expenditure continues to fall, but the rate of decline is slowing down. Six
countries - the USA, Russia, UK, France, China and Germany - accounted for nearly 84
per cent of all arms exports in 1997.
5
The global trend (since 1990) towards a decline in the number of conflicts does not apply to
sub-Saharan Africa. All the new conflicts in 1997 were located there. SIPRI note three
trends:
the opportunity for warlords and criminal elements to fill the power vacuum in weak states
state involvement (more or less open) in disputes in neighbouring countries, creating
‘clusters’ of unstable states in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, and West Africa
wars fought on a technological level little different from that of the 1960s and 1970s. It is
sobering to realise that so much devastation and misery can be brought about for
comparatively little money. (The region accounted for only 0.5 per cent of the world’s arms
imports in 1997.)
Asia is troubled by conflicting maritime claims, which have re-surfaced as the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea is ratified. The South China Sea carries about $1,000
billion worth of trade every year, and it is also thought to be rich in oil, gas, minerals and fish.
China claims sovereignty over virtually the entire Sea, and it is in dispute with Japan over the
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea. In the long term China is seeking naval
equivalence with the USA (a disturbing development if one recalls the outcome of
Germany’s attempt to gain naval equivalence with Britain, 1898-1914).
Military expenditure in the member countries of the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) increased by 52 per cent in real terms 1988-96 and, unlike Africa, major
conventional weapons are involved here. Thailand, for example, took delivery of an aircraft
carrier in 1997, and Indonesia and Singapore bought submarines. Military expenditure has
absorbed much of the region’s economic growth and, indeed, payment for arms imports
contributed significantly to the outflow of foreign currency, and therefore to the financial
crisis which surfaced in the second half of 1997. Depreciation of the local currencies has
now made arms imports roughly twice as expensive as before, and has resulted in budget
cuts and postponement of new procurements.
A US market research firm estimates that Latin America will spend $262 billion on
defence (including $78.7 billion on procurement) over the next 10 years. This is four times
as much as the expenditure in the years 1985-95. Two factors are behind this trend: the
improved economic situation, and the end of the US ban (imposed by President Carter
against right-wing dictators) on the sale of advanced weapons. It had become clear that
some countries were planning to buy from non-US producers and the Clinton administration
accordingly bowed to pressure from industry, the Defence Department, and certain
members of Congress.
Key issues and relevant policy processes
Any attempt to reduce the impact of the arms trade on development will require grappling
with a number of key issues. This section examines those issues and the relevant policy
processes.
6
The ineffectiveness of general international agreements on the arms trade
There are a number of international agreements on the arms trade. Two agreements in
particular may be noted: the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), which aims
to identify and prevent destabilising weapons accumulations, and the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.
A total of 93 countries have supplied information to the UN Register yet, overall, it is failing
in its purpose.
Only eight African states have supplied information, even though that continent has been so
seriously affected by weapons proliferation.
The register does not cover local production and procurement.
The protection of the arms industry, and related foreign policy aims, is often seen as more
important than any call for transparency.
There is no consistency in what is included in the category ‘arms’.
Discrepancies between the information supplied by exporters and importers make the data
very difficult to interpret.
The Conference on Disarmament is the only multilateral negotiating body dealing with the full
range of disarmament issues. It operates by consensus, and is split at present between nonaligned nations wanting to focus on nuclear issues, and Western states wanting to
concentrate on stopping transfers of fissile material and on landmine negotiations. The CD
failed on all issues under discussion in 1997 and it would appear to be in deep crisis.
The UK as arms exporter
The health of the UK arms industry is regarded as a fundamental national interest, and
because the trade in arms contributes to the health of the industry it is actively promoted.
(The UK is the world’s third largest supplier.) Yet the trade has a detrimental effect on UK
development policy, and it can be argued that it harms the UK’s best interests as well.
Arms exports are promoted through an alliance between government, banks and the arms
industry itself. The government promotes sales through the Defence Export Services
Organisation (DESO, part of the Ministry of Defence), and the Export Credit Guarantees
Department (ECGD, part of the Department of Trade and Industry). DESO links potential
buyers with British arms companies, and runs arms fairs and exhibitions. ECGD underwrites
exports, and offers interest rate subsidies.
Why is so much effort put into promoting the arms trade? It is said that it gives the UK
influence in the world and helps to maintain its seat in the UN Security Council. It subsidises
national procurement (by about £300 million a year) through recouping overheads, and it is
claimed that it strengthens non-military trade and investment links. Crucially it provides jobs
- 140,000 directly and a total of 415,000 (10 per cent of the UK manufacturing work
force) when support industries are counted (figures quoted by David Faber MP in a House
of Commons debate on the international arms trade, Hansard p.1447, 2/4/98).
However, the prominence of the arms trade has serious implications for the UK’s
development policy. ECGD resources that might have been used to promote productive
7
exports have been diverted to weapons. Foreign policy decisions are liable to be influenced
by the consideration ‘what will promote the arms trade?’ as much as by the question ‘what
will promote development?’ The aid budget may even be called upon to back-up an arms
deal. This happened in the case of Malaysia (the notorious Pergau dam affair). The World
Development Movement (WDM) have drawn attention to a correlation between aid
agreements and arms deals in trade with Indonesia and Oman. Although it is claimed that
other trade and investment links are fostered, it is obvious that a country that is buying arms
has less money to spend on civilian exports, from the UK or anywhere else. One lesson
drawn from the Asian financial crash of 1997 was that arms imports had absorbed much of
the economic growth achieved in the 1980s and 1990s. (Nor was this unforeseen. A 1995
report from the Office of Science and Technology noted that rising prosperity and growing
tension in the Asia Pacific region presented an opportunity for arms exports.) Finally, and of
critical importance, the perception of the UK government that fostering a strong arms
industry is a crucial national interest, cannot but make the UK a reluctant participant in
discussions on arms export controls.
Britain’s involvement in the arms trade is clearly detrimental to the best interests of the
developing world, but a good case can be made for saying that the trade seriously harms the
UK as well. Firstly, the dependence of so many jobs on arms exports degrades foreign
policy. “The more successful ministers are as salesmen, the less independence they have as
statesmen” (Alan Howarth MP). For example, how can the UK criticise the lack of
religious, political and gender freedom in Saudi Arabia, when that country buys so much UK
weaponry? Not only may considerations of justice be marginalised, but policy may become
irresponsible. The perception that tensions in Asia were an opportunity for arms exports has
already been noted. A high proportion of UK weapons exports go to the Middle East
(Saudi Arabia alone takes 60 per cent of the UK total), and this is one of the most volatile
regions in the world.
Secondly, the undue importance given to arms sales corrupts standards in public life. The
close links between government, banks and the arms industry are fostered through the
regular exchange of personnel, thus creating an unhealthy network of insider relationships.
At times the UK government has shown itself devious in hiding the true destination of
exports. Sir Stephen Egerton, a Foreign Office civil servant who gave evidence to the Scott
enquiry, seemed to acknowledge that expediency had come before morality. He said “I
can understand the principles of expediency and ‘balance’ in arms sales, but I get a bit
confused when morality is invoked. I think it is better to steer clear of this last concept now
that we are so far into the arms supply game.”
The arms trade is inherently secretive. Justification is found in the need to deny valuable
information to competitors, to respect requests for secrecy on the part of buyers, and to
avoid inhibiting the ‘frankness’ of internal discussions when export licence applications are
discussed. Is it not more important to prevent secrecy becoming a cloak for wrong-doing
and abuse of power? Secrecy undermines democracy.
Fourthly, the UK's civil exporters lose out when over-spending on arms causes Third World
countries to cut back on other imports. It is worth noting here that the UK government has
8
consistently denied to civilian industry the sort of help it gives to arms exporters. Yet, in the
judgement of WDM (Beyond Scott, p.4) the former has much greater potential for boosting
jobs, exports and research. “While military cuts would hit jobs in the arms industry, they
also allow government to spend in other sectors of the economy which create more jobs per
pound” (Biting the bullet, p.20, drawing on research by three Cambridge and London
economists writing in the Journal of Peace Research, vol.28, no.4, 1991)
Lastly, when an arms importer defaults the UK tax-payer foots the bill. (However,
government ministers have consistently refused to make public the level of ECGD losses in
the defence sector.)
Before looking at proposals for the regulation of the UK arms trade it is worth noting the
question of church investments in arms firms. According to the Church Times of 11/9/98
the Church of England has £25m invested in GEC, the UK's second largest arms
manufacturer. It justifies the holding on the ground that only a small part of GEC's
manufacturing output is military, that it is sold to NATO allies, and the holding enables the
Church Commissioners to raise ethical concerns with the company. It is also said that the
primary responsibility of the Commissioners is to their pensioners, and to the maintenance of
churches. However, Lord Prior, the current chairman, acknowledges that 41 per cent of
business is now defence-related. NATO still takes about 90 per cent of exports, but other
customers include Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and China. The Church Times (11/9/98)
comments “the case for disinvesting church funds becomes stronger, simply to protect the
Church's integrity, not, sadly, because this will alter company policy ... If the Church acts as
a light, the biblical promise is not that it will illumine the whole world, merely that it will not
be extinguished.”
Regulation of the UK arms trade
Three measures have been under discussion in the past year: the announcement of an ethical
foreign policy, a white paper on strategic export controls, and the agreement of an EU Code
of Conduct for the arms trade (see under ‘Regulation of the EU arms trade’).
The “foreign policy with an ethical content” announced by Robin Cook in May 1997 was to
include tightening the criteria for arms sales. However, the defence industry was assured
that the new policy would not result in large numbers of licences being blocked, and these
assurances seem to have been well founded. A Saferworld report of August 1998 said that
2,181 licences had been granted in the previous twelve months and only 24 refused. It is
reported (Observer, 11/10/98) that Robin Cook’s plans to publish details of all applications
for arms export licences, including those turned down, have been thwarted by the MOD and
the DTI.
The July 1998 white paper ‘UK Strategic Export Controls’ is a response to the Scott
Report, but it proposes few changes.
Prior parliamentary scrutiny of export licence applications is opposed on the grounds that
this would slow decisions, harm the competitiveness of exporters and deter overseas buyers.
9
The government favours a ‘negative procedure’ allowing it to grant licences speedily, subject
to annulment by parliament within 40 days.
The government proposes that the purposes of the export controls covered by the EU Code
of conduct should be set out in secondary legislation only, allowing it “flexibility.” Licences
for controversial arms exports could then be awarded, subject to receiving parliamentary
approval within a set time-scale.
Controls on arms brokering would also be laid down in secondary legislation.
The government does not favour licensing by default (where the licence is deemed to be
granted if not refused within a certain period) as this could lead to licences being granted
contrary to the UK's international obligations, or to government policy. However, they do
favour the setting up of an appeals committee made up of senior officials from the DTI,
MOD, FCO, and DFID. Third parties would not have the right to appeal against the
granting of licences.
The government does not accept the suggestion that a standing interdepartmental (DTI,
FCO, MOD, DFID) committee should be responsible for licence decisions. This means
that the conflict of interests within the DTI - it is responsible both for promoting trade in
general and applying controls to the arms trade - continues. It fails to recognise that the
arms trade is qualitatively very different from other trade.
The European Union as arms exporter
The European Union will be central in any attempts to bring the world-wide trade in arms
(licit and illicit) under control. Three members of the EU - France, the UK and Germany are among the top six suppliers of major conventional weapons. Arms brokers make use of
havens in the EU. In France and Germany, as in the UK, the requirements of the arms
exporters conflict with development issues when foreign policy decisions are made. Clearly
three leading arms producers are not well-placed to promote restraints in the trade. The
Code of Conduct agreed in 1998 is a significant first step, but falls well short of setting “high
common standards”.
Regulation of the EU arms trade
The EU programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms
(June 1997) calls for the registering and tagging of arms. (Technologies now exist to do this
cheaply, and in a way that is hard to remove or tamper with.) This should make it possible
to trace the source of arms found in proscribed destinations. However, the system needs to
be complemented by a database to facilitate the exchange of information between national
authorities.
In May 1998 EU members adopted a Code of conduct on arms exports, and it has since
been endorsed by the 13 central and eastern European countries associated with the EU.
The code was drawn up by the UK and France, based on current UK guidelines, and the
criteria set out by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Before issuing arms export licences EU members will now take into account such factors as
10
the following: the international commitments of EU member states; the status of human rights
in the recipient country; regional security, and the impact of arms purchases on sustainable
development. When one member state denies an export licence it will notify the others. If
another member is then approached by the intending importer, the former must consult with
the member which denied the licence. If it finally decides to grant the licence it must notify
the first member state, and set out its reasons. Each member state is also committed to
providing an annual report on its defence exports. However, all these transactions are to be
"in confidence", and are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Room for improvement
The EU Code is a significant first step towards a common, responsible approach to arms
exports, but there are a number of shortcomings which will have to be put right in the near
future if the goal of “high common standards” in the arms trade is to be achieved.
There is no explicit obligation to prohibit arms sales to regimes likely to use them in a way
that would seriously violate international humanitarian law.
The list of equipment that is to be subject to control needs to be comprehensive, covering
small arms, police and paramilitary equipment, training and services, and dual-purpose
technologies, as well as major conventional arms.
The failures to address arms brokering, licensed production, and the monitoring of end use,
are major loopholes.
It is essential that the annual consolidated report on the arms trade is made public, and that it
contains a meaningful level of detail. A truly accountable system would be one which
required member states to allow national parliaments (or committees thereof) to scrutinise
proposed arms exports before licences are granted.
The key to the Code's initial success will be what happens when a denial is issued. If
member states do not act in concert, confidence in the Code will be damaged. At the time
of writing a serious test is in the offing. The South African government has recently
undertaken a $5 billion defence procurement programme, including fighter aircraft,
helicopters, submarines and corvettes. Tenders have been submitted by Germany, France,
Canada, with a joint bid from Sweden and the UK. Yet the deal may stimulate a regional
arms race (breaching criterion 4 of the EU code), and it will divert much needed resources
from education and health (criterion 8).
Longer term the Code is unlikely to succeed unless European politicians foster a new culture
of a “presumption to deny” an export licence, except when there are very good reasons
otherwise. They will also need to work with other major arms suppliers, particularly the
USA.
Western defence budgets ... for what?
The end of the Cold War has disorientated strategic thinking in the West. Who is now the
enemy? and how are they to be guarded against? A list of current threats might include:
drugs wars; fundamentalist regimes; pressures of mass migration (caused by famine, wars
and natural disasters); anti-western ‘rogue states’ (such as Iraq, Libya and North Korea)
with the ability, and the willingness, to use weapons of mass destruction; inequitable
11
distribution of wealth between North and South; the threat of terrorism to redress
grievances.
These threats may be real enough, and may justify the role of ‘global policeman’. Yet it is
not clear that they sufficiently explain the recent 5 per cent increase in the US defence
budget. In an election year US domestic politics surely played a part. The increase will
delay the closure of obsolete US military bases, and subsidise employment in the armed
forces and the arms industry. Yet, feeding the Cold War habit of high defence spending,
thus preserving jobs artificially, is no way to formulate a defence policy.
The prospect of NATO expansion is another factor in the equation, because any new
members will have to buy western weapons. This has serious implications for development
because upgrading weapons systems will bring second-hand equipment onto the world
market.
In the end everyone will be affected by the increase in US defence spending. Given that the
US military budget is 38% of the world total, their 5 per cent increase means a rise of 2 per
cent in global military costs. Moreover increased expenditure in the USA gives leverage to
defence ministries everywhere. How can Third World countries be expected to show
restraint in military expenditure when the West sets such a poor example? How can the
World Bank talk of penalising funding proposals from Third World countries on the grounds
that they spend too much on defence?
A strong campaign is underway in the USA to get a Code of Conduct comparable to the
EU Code. However, it is pitted against a powerful arms lobby which contributes generously
to Congressional candidates and backs the US Committee to Expand NATO.
The arms brokers and others
Regulation of the licit trade in arms will never be enough in itself. Much devastation, and
instability leading to the abandonment of development work, can be laid at the door of
groups such as UNITA in Angola, the Lord’s Resistance Army operating in northern
Uganda, and the notorious ‘Interahamwe’ militias who carried out the genocide in Rwanda.
Arms brokers organise supplies for them, and particular countries regularly feature as
channels for the weapons. Mercenary/mining companies are another strand in this web of
unofficial (if not outright illegal) transfer of weapons.
Ostende airport in Belgium is a hub of the illicit arms trade, but brokers make use of other
havens in the EU (off-shore or across borders). They operate in networks, and some also
deal in drugs, diamonds and gold. Their cunning has so far outmatched inadequate countermeasures by the authorities. One Belgian entrepreneur of Burundian origin avoids
prosecution because he conducts his weapons-related business in France, not Belgium. A
British company called Mil-Tec used the offshore havens of the Isle of Man and Sark in the
Channel Islands from which to broker arms deals for the Rwandan armed forces (FAR) and
the Hutu militias (Independent, 22/11/96 and 23/11/96). If such legal loopholes are not
enough then the brokers are ready to use false documentation, clandestine night flights, and
12
false flight plans. The countries most seriously at fault in failing to control the illicit trade are
Belgium, France and, to a lesser extent, the UK.
Channels for the arms trade
A number of countries seem to have achieved notoriety in the arms trade. The role of
Belgium, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands in arms brokering has just been noted.
Eastern Europe in general is a problem area in the arms trade. Saferworld quote a recent
case of surplus Polish arms being supposedly sold to the Baltic republics, then diverted to
regions of conflict such as Somalia, Croatia and Sudan. The case illustrates the poor enduse controls in operation and, even more, the limited enforcement capabilities. Saferworld
also note that the Polish arms firms implicated in the incident (Cenrex and Steo) are reported
by one Polish newspaper to have links to Polish intelligence. Bulgaria is another key player.
During the cold war it supplied the Warsaw Pact, and other Moscow clients such as Libya,
various African governments and guerrilla groups, and both sides in the Iran-Iraq war.
Post-cold war the country is struggling to survive economically and is so desperate for
customers that it will provide false shipping documents to disguise both the buyer and the
destination. According to Raymond Bonner (writing in the International Herald Tribune
4/8/98), “Bulgaria has become the arms bazaar for rebels and terrorist organisations of
every political, ethnic and religious persuasion.” The Bulgarian attitude to the small arms
trade has been described as: “We know we shouldn't, but we can't afford not to.” Sudan is
said to operate as a general “warehouse” for small arms, holding weapons from the Islamic
world and distributing them to Muslims in Uganda, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia
and elsewhere. Egypt is another channel for arms transfers. It has been suggested, for
example, that France and Egypt have assisted with shipments from South Africa and Eastern
Europe to Rwanda and other destinations in sub-Saharan Africa. Guerrilla movements in
southern Sudan are said to have acquired British and French produced arms with financial
help from Egypt and through intermediaries in Kenya and Uganda. An investigation into
South African arms exports found that Armscor, the South African arms procurement
agency, repeatedly broke UN sanctions by using some 130 front companies, numerous
agents and middlemen, and fake end-user certificates. The company was described as
having a “systematic disregard for where its arms ended up” (Cameron commission report).
Jordan and North Cyprus are also recognised channels for shipments to blacklisted
countries.
Mercenary companies
There seems to be a trend towards increasing involvement of mercenary companies in
African conflicts, and their acceptance into near respectability. Sandline International (UK),
for example, assisted in the March 1998 overthrow of the military junta in Sierra Leone, in
concert with the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and with the full backing of
President Kabbah. Sandline were also in touch with certain sections of the UK Foreign
Office and intelligence service. (It was this that persuaded Customs and Excise not to
prosecute Sandline for their breaching of the UN arms embargo on Sierra Leone.) Among
the reasons for this development are the inadequacy of UN intervention forces in Africa, the
reluctance of the West to step in with their own soldiers, and the usefulness of Sandline and
13
associated companies to the British and South African security establishments, and some
sections of the US security establishment.
The trend has some disturbing features. Firstly, apart from their contacts with Western
intelligence, the mercenary companies are linked with some dubious mining interests, some
of which are close to centres of power without being subject to any democratic
accountability. The money for Sandline’s Sierra Leone operation was put up by Rakesh
Saxena, an exiled Indian banker wanted by the Thai authorities in connection with
embezzlement investigations. Saxena was to be recompensed with mining concessions in
Sierra Leone. Executive Outcomes of South Africa have established a joint-venture security
consulting company with Raymond Moi, son of President Moi of Kenya. Saracen Uganda
(an EO subsidiary) was established in co-operation with Major General Salim Saleh, halfbrother of President Museveni. Saleh also owns 25 per cent of the local gold-mining
operations of a mining concern called Branch Energy. In mid-1998 Branch began to
acquire some under-developed mining sites in Sudan, and Sandline are said to be providing
the security.
Secondly, the presence of mercenary companies is potentially destabilising. Mercenaries
who have helped one side may then be ‘bought’ by the other. “Some sources claim that
such is the commercial rivalry between diamond mining companies that some businessmen
are hiring mercenaries to work with RUF/Liberian militias [in Sierra Leone] to sabotage their
rivals’ operations” (Africa Confidential, 23/10/98).
Thirdly, Africa Confidential (29/5/98) notes, as a central question in the ‘Arms to Sierra
Leone’ affair, the “privatisation of British foreign policy”, that is, entrusting policy-making
and implementation to these private military companies. How are they to be brought under
effective regulation when western foreign ministries and secret services make such use of
them?
Two measures aimed at overcoming the problem of mercenaries are: the UN International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Finance and Training of Mercenaries (1989), and
the OAU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa (1997). The fact that
mercenaries are still a serious problem in Africa, and seem on the way to semirespectability, indicates that these conventions are having only limited effect.
Landmines
Landmines are a major threat to development, and they long outlive the conflict which saw
them laid. They kill and maim active members of the community, putting strain on medical
services, and on the families which have to support crippled members. They render
agricultural land unusable and make travel to market hazardous. They make the work of
development agencies more complicated, by limiting the areas in which workers can safely
travel. The costs of clearance are usually well beyond the capacity of Third World
governments, especially when their economies have been devastated by conflict. According
to UN estimates, more than 110 million landmines are deployed in some 70 countries, with
Africa the most mine-infested continent. They have been used to demoralise not just the
14
opposing army but also the civilian population. 2,000 people (80 per cent of them civilians)
are killed or maimed by
landmines every month. Despite these
Tearfund partner, the United Evangelical
statistics a number of countries have been
Church of Angola (UIEA), drew up
very unwilling to discuss a comprehensive
plans for a community development
ban on landmines.
programme at Masseka, 70 miles east of
Menengue in Kuando Kubango
Notable ‘foot-draggers’ are:
province. This is an area where use of
Russia and China, with their long borders
agricultural land is restricted by
countries in areas of continuing or potential
landmines, and educational and health
conflict and/or unable to afford more costly
facilities are starved of resources. The
weapons (e.g. Azerbaijan, Cuba, Ecuador,
insecurity created by UNITA as it
North and South Korea, Sri Lanka)
attempts to retake land given up under
The USA, concerned for its 37,000 troops
the Lusaka Protocol has forced UIEA to
in the Korean Peninsula, and reluctant to
put the proposal on hold. At present the
give up high-technology mines
only option appears to be a pilot project
Finland, concerned for its border with
in a secure area much closer to
Russia.
Menengue.
Yet the usefulness of landmines on the battlefield has been increasingly queried, even by
elements within the military.
The campaign to ban landmines
The UK Working Group on Landmines (a coalition of NGOs) has campaigned for the
elimination of landmines as a weapon, and the Mines Advisory Group is involved in mine
clearance.
In 1996/97 there were moves towards a ban on the manufacture, export and deployment of
anti-personnel mines (APMs) in two very different fora. Negotiations in the Conference on
Disarmament followed a lengthy, step-by-step approach, working for a ban only as a longterm goal. The dissatisfaction with progress felt by some countries, and their fear that CD
members opposed to swift progress would hamstring negotiations, combined with a
vigorous and innovative campaign by NGOs, produced the 'Ottawa Process'. This
culminated in a treaty signed in Ottawa by 121 countries in December 1997.
The USA withdrew from the Ottawa Process after failing to secure a nine year exemption
for the Korean Peninsula, the right to withdraw from the treaty during a conflict, and an
exemption for anti-handling devices used in conjunction with anti-tank mines. (The stance of
the majority was ‘no exceptions, no reservations and no loopholes.’)
The Ottawa treaty differs significantly from other disarmament and arms control agreements
in that its concern is not so much with the military utility of the weapon, but with its residual
threat long after a conflict is over. The main provisions are:
small numbers of APMs may be retained for purposes of developing clearance techniques
and for training in clearance
15
all other APMs are to be destroyed within four years of the treaty coming into force (six
months after the 40th ratification - achieved in September 1998)
signatories to clear minefields in their own territory within 10 years
states in a position to do so will give aid for the care and rehabilitation of mine victims, mine
awareness programmes, and clearance programmes.
Three unresolved questions are: the lack of strong enforcement provisions (the emphasis is
on the goodwill and co-operation of the participating states); the need to ensure that mines
are not used by non-state actors (terrorists, guerrillas); the status of US mines stored on the
territory of allies who have signed the convention. The CD could still have a role in
strengthening the enforcement provisions, and bringing reluctant participants on board.
Light weapons in Africa
Light weapons hamper development by encouraging the resort to violence as a means of
resolving differences, and by prolonging conflicts already under way. Weapons retained
after conflict has died down foster banditry, and the resulting insecurity deters or prevents
the implementation of development projects. In terms of the world-wide trade in arms the
money involved is very small, but in the Third World context it is significant, diverting scarce
resources from human development to arms purchases. When/if the fighting ends, the
community faces the cost of post-war reconstruction, resettlement of displaced people,
disarmament, and debts for weapons supplied on credit. (It is no exaggeration to insert ‘if’.
In some parts of Africa - Liberia, Somalia, Angola, for example - warfare has now become
the main driving force of the local economy, What women do in wartime, p.159.) No
effective measures are in place in the West to address the matter of small arms from the
supply side, but a group of NGOs has taken inspiration from the landmines campaign, and is
setting up a coalition to press for effective controls. The term ‘light weapons’ includes
automatic rifles, grenades, mortars and shoulder-fired missiles. These weapons, and the
ammunition for them, are relatively easy to use, easy to maintain, cheap and, except in large
quantities, easily transferable. In terms of the world trade in arms they are ‘small change’,
but their impact in Africa, especially on non-combatants, has been devastating. They have
been widely used by government armies, secessionist groups, and rival ethnic groups.
Furthermore, they may continue in use in a post-war situation, because the central political
authority is too weak to guarantee security. For civilians and demobilised soldiers arms may
then represent their only access to food and income, as well as security. A culture of
violence and gun ownership then develops and may continue for years. Somalia is a classic
example. Where do the weapons come from? Case studies indicate that supplies come
from outside the region (the favoured sources being the former Soviet bloc and war zones
gone quiet), and there is also an important intra-regional trade, from African governments to
rebel groups in neighbouring countries.
It must be one of the great ironies of the human condition that, in the making of arms, such
high qualities of workmanship and durability are achieved. Weapons are sold onward from
one war to the next, almost taking on a life of their own. Sudanese bandits apparently still
use weapons left behind by the Italians in Ethiopia during the
16
In June 1998 factional fighting forced
Tearfund partner, ACROSS, to withdraw
from Leer and Koch Districts in Western
Upper Nile province of Southern Sudan.
Only three months before this Tearfund
had agreed a grant to support a
Community-Based Animal Health
Programme in the area. Medecins sans
Frontiers (MSF) reported that 751
children had been left without vital food,
while TB and mobile clinic programmes
had been halted and, in the town of Leer,
agency compounds had been looted. It is
also feared that girls in the education
programme may have been targeted to be
taken away as wives.
Second World War. The Kalashnikov
assault rifle is an obvious modern
example. It will probably be in
circulation for decades, such is the
simplicity of design and maintenance.
Weapons left over from wars in the
former Yugoslavia and Cambodia have
found their way to Africa. Arms
supplied by the Soviet Union to the
former Communist government in
Afghanistan, and by the USA to the
Mujahadeen resistance, now find their
way down the east coast of Africa (the
so-called ‘Afghan pipeline’) and are sold
to various groups in the region.
It is difficult to monitor this flow of arms.
Some of the former Soviet bloc
countries have plenty of weapons to sell,
they are short of cash, officials are
poorly paid, and law enforcement is
weak. In Africa borders are long and
porous, and customs authorities are
often corrupt and/or ill-equipped. In this
context even a disarmament programme
may become a curse, with the weapons
collected ‘leaking’ back into civilian
society to fuel another conflict.
The fighting which led to the with-drawal
was another twist in the chaos of Southern
Sudan. A local commander, disgruntled at
not being made governor as he had
expected, resorted to force against Dr
Riak Machir, deputy president for
Southern Sudan. Riak is himself a former
rebel turned government protégé, yet
government forces in the area remained
aloof.
Military facilities also have an on-going life. For example, airstrips in Angola that were
partly built by the USA to facilitate the transport of logistical support to UNITA, were
subsequently used in the illicit movement of weapons to Rwanda during the genocide.
Essentials of an effective disarmament programme
NGOs, particularly Saferworld and Novib, have been working to define the conditions
under which a disarmament programme is likely to work. Essential conditions have been
identified as:
a reasonable level of internal security
a stable central government with resources and infrastructure in place
seizing the time of opportunity: successful disarmament often takes place in the immediate
post-conflict situation, while combatants are still grouped together in barracks, and military
command structures are still in place
immediate destruction of weapons before they can ‘leak’ back into society
adequate funding, forthcoming when it is needed: too many programmes have been
hamstrung by a shortage of funding brought about by donors rejecting funding proposals or
spending excessive periods of time studying them
17
continuity: it is essential that any disarmament programme is seen through to the end,
otherwise it may penalise those who co-operate and hand in their weapons, only to fall
victims to armed gangs that do not comply.
Moves against light weapons
A number of meetings took place in 1998, organised by NGOs and a few concerned
governments.
In July the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, with the UN Development
Programme, convened a meeting in Oslo to discuss a proposed moratorium on the export,
import, and manufacture of light weapons. Major arms producers such as Israel, Russia and
China did not attend the conference. The USA, anxious not to fall foul of its influential gunlobby, wants to proceed slowly. However, the conference did produce some proposals for
strengthening controls on the legal trade, preventing illicit transfers, and enhancing
transparency. Switzerland has proposed an international conference on the subject, to take
place in 2000 or 2001.
In October ministers and representatives from 98 governments attended a conference in
Brussels on ‘Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development’. The conference
recognised the need to tackle the illicit trade. It showed less awareness of the significance of
the legal trade where illegal weapons often have their origins.
This conference was immediately followed by a consultation of over 100 NGOs from the
developed and the developing worlds. This was hosted by an EU coalition (Amnesty
International, BASIC, Oxfam, GRIP, International Alert, Pax Christi and Saferworld), and
sponsored by the Swedish and Dutch foreign ministries, and the development ministries of
the UK and Belgium. The meeting discussed setting up an International Action Network on
Small Arms (IANSA). It is hoped that the text of a ‘founding document’ will be agreed in
the New Year, and IANSA formally launched in May 1999.
Other measures include:
the Mali Moratorium on small arms, so-called because it was proposed by Mali at the
annual summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A three
year freeze on the import, export and manufacture of small arms has been secured and the
UN and the OAU have been asked to press for the adoption of similar measures throughout
Africa,
the UN Small Arms Panel,
the OAS Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of, and Trafficking in, Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials.
Child soldiers
Modern technology has made weapons lighter and easier to use, contributing to a rapid rise
in the number of child soldiers. According to Vital Signs 1998-1999, an estimated
18
250,000 children are serving as soldiers. “Taking a snapshot of 1995, Project Ploughshares
in Canada studied the wars of the year 1995 and found that children took part in fighting in
more than 80 per cent of the countries in conflict. Child soldiers are likely to be deeply
traumatised by witnessing armed conflict and taking part in it. They are exposed to the
danger of death or injury. They miss out on family life and education.
A coalition of NGOs (including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Save the
Children Fund, and the Jesuit Refugee Service) is campaigning for a ban on the employment
of child soldiers. The campaign is complementary to the moves to regulate the trade in light
weapons. As part of this campaign they are working with key UN agencies for an optional
protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child banning the recruitment of children
under 18.
Conclusions and Recommendations:
Roots
The arms trade will never be brought under control simply by improving information
systems, and by the drawing up of guidelines and treaties. These may help, but only if the
parties are serious about implementation and monitoring. More important still, the causes of
conflict, and the strong roots of the arms industry, must be tackled.
Of first importance is the gulf between rich and poor in Third World countries, that is,
between the elites who control political power and national resources, and the many living
below the poverty line. Poverty and conflict are closely related, even though the one may
not be the direct, or sole, cause of the other. The suggestion is that development assistance,
targeted against poverty, inequity and marginalisation, will reduce the risk of violent conflict
(see Benson, p.56).
Secondly, poverty has been greatly exacerbated when countries have been burdened with
unpayable debt (some of it the result of arms purchases). In some cases frustration over the
debt burden has helped provoke armed conflict. The G8, World Bank and the IMF must
summon the resolve to deal decisively with the debt problem. Nor, incidentally, should the
West be using over-spending by Third World governments as an excuse for withholding
help. Arms sales have been vigorously promoted by the West. The West sets a very bad
example in high defence expenditure. Africa’s wars are ‘low-tech’ and result in great
devastation for really very little money.
Thirdly, excess production in the North must be tackled, for this is responsible for much of
the pressure for arms exports; but any campaign against the arms trade will have to
recognise that the livelihoods of many ordinary people in the North depend on the trade.
Defence cuts since the end of the Cold War have already devastated communities in some
industrial cities. The question of the conversion of industrial capacity from military to civilian
usage must be addressed.
19
Fourthly, deep-seated outlooks must change. Arms-producing countries will not turn from
their vigorous pursuit of export markets unless they encourage a quite different culture. This
will be one where there is a presumption to deny export licences unless there are strong
reasons otherwise. Arms-importing communities will have to foster a culture where nonpossession of weapons is the norm. They will need help in strengthening their political, legal
and security institutions.
Matters to raise with UK policy-makers
The UK’s own defence expenditure, at 3 per cent of GDP, is much higher than that of most
Third World countries - whose expenditure we presume to criticise. It seems that this
expenditure is, in part, the price of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council - an illusion
of status, dating from the immediate post-War years when the UK was arguably Europe’s
strongest power. It may also have roots in nostalgia for an imperial past, and a desire to
impress the US. This unwarranted status should now be given up. Moreover, policymakers need to be reminded of the illusion of security. No amount of military hardware can
provide absolute security.
Secondly, while the standard argument “if we do not supply arms, others will” appears to
hold a superficial logic it is not always borne out in practice. Defenders of the slave trade
used the same argument, and tried to alarm the public with prophecies of economic decline.
Their warnings were founded more on self-interest than on sound reasoning. Moreover the
point has been made (The Arms Trade, p.15) that this argument leads to the idolatry of the
market. It means that the market is no longer the means for efficiently allocating resources.
It becomes an end in itself. As in the campaign against the slave trade, the UK should be
prepared to go it alone if need be, and not allow progress in arms restraint to be governed
by the slowest.
It may be further pointed out that in using so much ECGD credit to foster arms deals the
government offends against market principles, discriminating as it does against civilian
industry.
Fourthly, the negative effect which a heavy involvement in the arms trade has on our national
life should be stressed. The trade distorts UK foreign policy, corrupts standards in public
life, and undermines democracy. The misuse of language needs to be faced. Too often the
arms trade - selling the means to kill human beings - is discussed in common business terms
(as if we were selling training shoes or motor cars) or even as if the whole thing was just a
game.
Fifthly, long-term self-interest should give us pause. Weapons are very durable, and no one
can ever know their final end. Once weapons have been told the supplier country loses
control over them. (End-user certificates provide no absolute guarantee.) Who, for
example, could have confidently predicted that: British arms sold to the democratically
elected government of Chile, in the early 1970s, would be used in the overthrow of that
government? arms supplied to the Shah of Iran, as a bulwark on the southern flank of the
Soviet Union, would be inherited by a fundamentalist Islamic regime? arms supplies to
20
bolster Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, would help Iraq to menace world peace? The West
should be concerned about the second-hand market, too. If former Eastern bloc countries
joining NATO have to buy new weapons systems then they will need financial and technical
help so that obsolete stock is destroyed rather than off-loaded on to the second-hand
market. Arms supplies may not of themselves inevitably provoke war, but they will likely
prolong it once started and will certainly increase the devastation.
Sixth, the delegation of foreign policy objectives to mercenary companies is a dangerous
trend. It could harm Britain’s name and best interests.
Lastly, the UK has an obligation to end the irregular, and much-abused, status of off-shore
havens such as the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. Association with the arms trade
should be a stigma.
The example of the Ottawa Process
A number of valuable lessons can be learned from the vigorous and innovative campaign
against landmines (as well as from the campaign against the slave trade noted above).
First, each NGO is, by itself, weak, but a network makes a powerful voice. This paper
notes the pervasiveness of networks in the arms trade, involving government export credit
departments, intelligence services, mercenary companies, mining interests, and arms
brokers. We need strong ‘counter-networks’ which should include all those concerned with
development and environment issues.
Second, the intervention of certain governments - those of Canada and Norway in particular
- was of crucial importance. Perhaps these, or others, can be enlisted again. (There are
also some MPs who take a keen interest in the arms question).
21
22
APPENDICES
1) ‘Just war ... just arms trade’ (Tearfund briefing on the arms trade)
The criteria for a "just war" can serve as a bottom line for all Christians.
War should only be fought for a just cause, such as in response to violent aggression (which
may include aggression against a third party)
The intention should be to restore a just peace
War should only be a last resort
The decision to go to war should only be made by a legitimate authority
There should a reasonable hope of success
The conduct of war: non-combatants should never be directly or deliberately attacked (the
principle of discrimination). The human, financial and environmental costs of military action
should not outweigh the likely gains (the principle of proportion).
Extrapolating these principles to the arms trade, we can say that:
arms should not be sold to those engaged in aggression or human rights abuse
arms should not be sold where they will create tension, and make war more likely
arms should only be sold to countries already at war if they have exhausted all other
possibilities, are intent on creating a just peace, and have a reasonable hope of success
arms should only be sold to legitimate authorities (this might include rebel forces with
widespread popular support)
arms should not be sold where there is a possibility of their being deliberately used against
civilians, or where the weapons are indiscriminate (e.g. landmines)
a just arms trade will take account of the other needs (health, education, development, and
so on) of a country.
Beware:
the idolatry of the market. The argument “If we do not supply arms, others will” means that
the market is no longer the means for efficiently allocating resources. It becomes an end in
itself, and begins to take on the features of an idol
the cloaking of truth in euphemism, e.g. collateral damage, and (applied to weapons)
accuracy, reliability, versatility
the illusion of security. No amount of military hardware can provide absolute security.
23
2) Statistics of military expenditure and the arms trade
A) Leading suppliers of major conventional weapons , 1993-97. Figures are trendindicator values expressed in US$ million at constant 1990 prices.
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1993-97
USA
12,504 10,434
9,823
9,528 10,840 53,129
Russia
3,541
1,117
3,218
3,904
3,466 15,246
UK
1,585
1,506
1,726
1,975
2,631
9,423
France
898
704
811
2,004
3,343
7,760
Germany
1,562
2,392
1,255
1,399
569
7,177
China
1,108
687
887
679
170
3,531
Netherlands
351
502
381
440
504
2,178
Italy
353
289
338
393
408
1,781
B) Leading importers of major conventional weapons , 1993-97.
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
Saudi Arabia
2,799
1,460
1,259
1,946
2,370
Taiwan
907
614
1,138
1,530
4,049
Turkey
1,983
1,373
1,253
1,127
1,276
Egypt
1,267
1,941
1,680
937
867
South Korea
482
642
1,553
1,591
1,077
China
1,097
341
697
1,102
1,816
Japan
1,580
703
1,021
666
584
India
582
468
1,062
1,231
1,085
Greece
991
1,048
947
248
715
Kuwait
650
45
962
1,323
411
UAE
751
636
475
684
808
Thailand
135
835
688
522
1,031
Malaysia
17
448
1,143
199
1,346
Pakistan
825
719
225
644
572
The top importers in Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
81
96
1
South Africa
7
19
38
Eritrea
18
1
Nigeria
35
72
24
7
51
38
8
53
1993-97
9,834
8,238
7,012
6,692
5,345
5,053
4,554
4,428
3,949
3,391
3,354
3,211
3,153
2,985
185
123
110
107
C) Military expenditure 1995-97, in US$ million, at constant 1995 prices and exchange
rates
i) The G8
1995
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Russia
UK
USA
1996
1997
9,077
8,262
7,595
47,768 46,596 47,061
41,160 40,343 39,106
19,376 21,369 21,582
50,117 51,095 51,355
24,600 23,300 24,100
33,896 34,096 32,837
278,856 263,727 258,963
ii) Selected countries in Asia
China
7,576
7,823
India
8,018
8,153
Indonesia
2,630
2,859
Malaysia
2,444
2,349
Pakistan
3,427
3,522
South Korea
14,410 15,488
Thailand
3,571
3,563
7,920
9,015
2,900
2,295
3,410
16,615
3,445
% of GDP
1995
1996
1.6
3.1
1.7
1.8
0.1
3.7
3.0
3.8
1.4
3.0
1.7
1.9
0.1
3.7
3.0
3.6
1.1
2.5
1.3
2.8
5.4
3.2
2.1
1.1
2.5
1.3
2.4
5.6
3.2
1.9
ii) Selected countries in Africa
Angola
417
385
7.9
DR Congo
17
0.3
Mozambique
69
54
56
4.6
3.4
Nigeria
428
548
520
0.6
0.7
Rwanda
56
4.5
Sierra Leone
25
18
9
2.6
1.8
South Africa
2,949
2,854
2,440
2.2
2.1
Sudan
153
204
1.2
1.6
Uganda
200
240
3.3
3.8
Zambia
56
37
1.7
1.1
Notes:
(1) The figures for Russia are problematic. Published information is inadequate, and the
situation is further complicated by rapid inflation and the inadequacy of the official exchange
rate as a measure for international comparisons.
(2) The figures for China are based on official data, and they are known to be an
underestimate.
25
D) UK arms manufacturers listed in ‘The 100 largest arms-producing companies, 1996’
(Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1998)
Company
British Aerospace
Rank
3
GEC
Rolls Royce
GKN
Hunting
7
21
26
52
Racal Electronics
Vickers
62
66
Babcock Rosyth
Defence
Smiths Industries
Vosper Thorneycroft
Lucas Industries
Sema Group
84
88
98
99
100
Manufactures
Arms
sales
US$m
8,340
Artillery , aircraft,
electronics, missiles,
small arms/ ordnance
Electronics, ships
4,460
Engines
2,010
Aircraft, military vehicles 1,500
Components for
640
electronics and missiles
Electronics
550
Engines, military vehicles,
540
small arms/ ordnance
Ships
370
Electronics
Ships
Components for aircraft
Other defence equipment
26
360
300
290
290
% of
total
sales
72
Workforce
26
30
29
32
79,850
42,900
30,000
12,740
30
29
14,320
10,190
37
9,030
23
80
6
20
12,800
2,950
47,000
13,110
ABBREVIATIONS
APC
APM
ASEAN
CD
COARM
DESO
DFID
DTI
ECGD
ECOMOG
ECOWAS
EGCO
FAR
FCO
IANSA
MOD
NATO
NGO
OAS
OAU
OSCE
RUF
SIPRI
SPLA
UNDP
WDM
Armoured Personnel Carrier
Anti-Personnel Mine
Association of South-East Asian Nations
Conference on Disarmament
The EU Council of Ministers Working Group on arms exports
Defence Export Services Organisation
Department for International Development
Department of Trade and Industry
Export Credit Guarantees Department
ECOWAS Monitoring Group
Economic Community of West African States
Export of Goods Control Order
Forces Armées Rwandaises (the army of the former Hutu
government in Rwanda)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
International Action Network on Small Arms
Ministry of Defence
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Non-government organisation
Organisation of American States
Organisation of African Unity
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Revolutionary United Front
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Sudan People's Liberation Army
United Nations Development Programme
World Development Movement
27
SOURCES
Benson, W. Undermining development. London: Saferworld/Novib, 1998
DTI. Strategic Export controls. London: DTI, 1998
Earthscan. Vital Signs 1998-1999. London: Earthscan, 1998
General Synod. Responsibility in arms transfer policy. London: General Synod of the
Church of England, 1994
Saferworld. Arms trade bulletins, nos 1-9. London: Saferworld, 1998
SIPRI. SIPRI Yearbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998
Tearfund. The Arms Trade. Teddington: Tearfund, 1996
Turshen/Twagiramariya. What women do in wartime. London: Zed Books, 1998
UNDP. Human development Report. New York: UNDP, 1994
WDM. Beyond Scott. London: WDM, 1996
WDM. Biting the bullet. London: WDM, 1993
WDM. From High Street to Battlefield. London: WDM, 1996
Articles and news reports in: The Church Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Economist, The
Financial Times, Foreign Report, The Guardian, The Independent, The International Herald
Tribune, The Observer.
28