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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
TAB D TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
REFERENCES: Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” 10 July 1996.
1. Situation. See basic plan.
a. Overview
(1) The United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) currently seek ways to convince the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that is should forego the manufacture of nuclear weapons,
initially by allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct full inspections of suspected
facilities. North Korea thus far has refused, although it did agree to an incomplete examination of declared
sites early in March 1994. This plan reviews military planning since there are constant threats of war from
Pyongyang.
(2) North Korean armed forces, with few exceptions, greatly exceed the size of ROK
counterparts: twice as many active uniformed personnel and main battle tanks, five times as many selfproprelled artillery pieces, air defense suites that dwarf South Korean analogues, plus many more
submarines, torpedo boats, and antiship missile craft. Neither Korea possesses a large air force. The U.S.
2d Infantry Division, deployed on a main invasion route, primarily symbolizes U.S. resolve, but U.S. air and
naval power (a small part which now is in place) provides capabilities that the DPRK cannot match. There is
little qualitative difference between North and South Korean military personnel. Both sides are well organize,
thoroughly professional, dedicated, tough,and highly motivated, although one may question how large a
share on North Korea’s rank and file would welcome orders to initiate large-scale offensive operations. Both
deploy he bulk of their best ground forces near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in well-prepared positions, but
technological superiority and synergistic U.S. relations with ROK allies confer unique advantages on our side.
(3) The PSYOP goal. Convince the people of South Korea to support CFC operations
because it will eventually result in stability on the Korean peninsula.
(4) The Chief, PSYOP Tasks
(a) Promote a favorable image of US forces to gain acceptance of US objectives.
(b) Build confidence in the South Korean military and among the population that
victory will be achieved on allies terms.
(c) Convince the military and UN that the US will stay the course until military
victory is achieved.
(d) Assist in stabilizing the political and military situation in South Korea and the
Korean peninsula.
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(e) Cause DPRK forces to feel isolated, inadequately supported by the people and
doubtful of eventual success.
b. US Perspective
(1) Intentions. The US strategic intention is to conduct international information activities to
influence foreign attitudes, perceptions and behavior to support US goals and objectives, especially in Asia,
and before the South Eastern Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the United Nations (UN). The
operational intention is to promote CFC’s objectives within South Korea, while at the tactical level reduce the
ability of the DPRK’s military forces to interfere with friendly military operations.
(2) Capabilities. With assistance from US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a
PSYOP assessment team (POAT) deploys to South Korea to assess the situation, develop detailed
objectives and recommend appropriate actions. It is anticipated that a Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF)
OPCON to CFC will be required to execute PSYOP tasks.
c. Neutral Perspective. The US National Command Authorities (NCA) will be subject to international
pressure to stop the operation.
(1) With the exception of Vietnam and China, the other nations in the Asia region can be
expected to support US operations in South Korea. The countries bordering South Korea will assist with
overflight rights and limited basing. China will support the populous political goals of the DPRK for
reunification with diplomatic discussions under the current four party talks. Outside the region, most nations
will support our objectives.
(2) International organizations such as the UN and SEATO will support CFC objectives.
However, rogue states may follow the lead of Iraqi and Iran ; stress goodness of the political goals of the
DPRK while ignoring their aggressive military operations. The SEATO will support the operations, although
some of the nations will oppose the military operations for internal political reasons. There will be cries of
“US-sponsored aggression” and “Yankee imperialism.”
d. Enemy Perspectives
(1) Decision-maker and Staff. DPRK senior leaders do expect direct military action by the
US against their activities in South Korea. DRPK leadership is vested in a small inner circle of DPRK
Principals who exerts total control of all facets of life in North Korea. The organizational structure is very flat
and facilitates quick decision-making.
(2) Intelligence Systems. The DPRK leadership has a series of highly sophisticated
telecommunications and intelligence centers that allow Army Commanders to coordinate their military
operations throughout the peninsula. They routinely use computer equipment and satellite phones to
communicate and monitor friendly activities. They possess complex intelligence networks with the best
equipment to gather information on South Korea and US military installations and units, including
photographs of senior ranking personnel, equipment and installations. DPRK infiltration of South Korean
infrastructure permits them to operate an extensive human intelligence (HUMINT) network composed of
both full time and part time operatives.
(3) Target Audiences. There are three target audiences of US PSYOP efforts: the North
Korean military and student radicals, the South Korean people, and the DPRK senior leadership. Efforts aim
to reassure the military and National Police leadership and rank-and-file, and the rural population that they
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can depend on US support. And at the same time undermining the confidence of adversary leadership and
lowering the morale and combat efficiency of DPRK military forces. Secondarily, PSYOP efforts must
encourage the international community that the application of military force will hinder DPRK efforts to seize
the Korean peninsula by military force.
(4) Command Systems. The highly sophisticated telecommunications and intelligence
systems are used primarily for military communications, but they also use them to command and control the
North Korean military forces when they are engaged in tactical operations against the Republic of Korea
government’s military forces. Activities to degrade the communications systems and reduce confidence in
them will contribute to mission success.
2. Mission. When directed, CFC conducts psychological operations in support of US national and theater
objectives to assist the government of South Korea in the defeat of the DPRK aggressive military attacks
across the DMZ.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
(1) Overview
(a) Intent. PSYOP efforts must contribute directly to our gaining and maintaining
information dominance in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The US will not ignore this transition of South
Korea into a communist state. We must convince military and police forces that the United States is willing to
accept the international political risk of direct action in South Korea because our nation is in this for the long
haul. CFC will stay in South Korea with overwhelming force until the job is done. When we achieve this task,
others, such as building a favorable image of US forces and the isolation of the DPRK, will follow. At the
same time we must be recognize Japanese sensitivity to US use of the Kadena and other Air Bases. Remain
good neighbors at the ISB. I see the end state as the defeat of DPRK military forces in the field and a
strengthened South Korea and UN ability to combat the DPRK military aggressive actions.
(b) Prehostilities Strategic PSYOP. US governmental agencies conduct an
international information campaign to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions and behaviors in support of US
goals and objectives in South Korea and the region. While these actions occur outside the military sphere,
they will use selected Department of Defense assets, including strategic assets from USSOCOM. This is
ongoing and will continue until the beginning of Phase I at D-28.
(c) Strategic and Theater PSYOP. PSYOP must be closely coordinated with
tactical operations, public affairs (PA) and civil affairs (CA) activities. In instances where national policy and
military operations conflict, national policy objectives take precedence. The PSYOP campaign will be
designed to strengthen US and South Korean military and police operations in theater and facilitate mission
accomplishment, especially in Phase II (Establish ISBs, D+40 through D+60) and the beginning of Phase III
(Decisive Combat, D+60 through D+100).
(d) Joint Tactical PSYOP. Joint Tactical PSYOP will provide an effective
information program directed at enhancing support for the tactical mission with the goal of manipulating the
attitudes and behavior of DPRK leadership and high-ranking field commanders. They will believe that
overwhelming US military power is being brought to bear, and that direct confrontation is hopeless, and that
SOF terrorist tactics will also prove useless. As applied in Phases III and IV (Lodgment and FollowThrough, D+75 through D+120), PSYOP activities will facilitate reorganization and control of liberated areas
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in conjunction with civil-military operations, while continuing to obtain cooperation of the South Koreans in the
ISB and the ROK military and police forces.
(2) Guidance
(a) Themes to be Stressed
1. DPRK Forces
a. The isolation and ultimate annihilation of DPRK military forces
when in combat with US units is certain.
b. Great social and economic disparity exists between the DPRK
leadership and the average North Korean soldier and civilian.
2. DPRK Sympathizers. Instill doubt and fear relating to support of the
DPRK and their chances of success.
3. South Korean Military and National Police. The US cares about South
Korean and wants to work with its Government for the defeat of the DPRK military forces.
4. Okinawans. While extensive, the US presence at Kadena Air Base will
be temporary until peace is restored on the Korean peninsula.
5. South Korean Population
a. The futility of hostile action against South Korea and the US.
b. The DPRK and its military forces are aggressors who have
brought misery to millions of people on the Korean peninsula through their aggressive military action.
c. Reducing the military threat and reunification will bring about
political, economic, and social activity in a one Korea that will benefit the entire population.
d. Improved relations with the US will result in increased social
and economic benefits for the people of a one Korea. That situation can best be achieved by eliminating the
totalitarian, isolated, xenophobic, belligerent, and backward, and tactically unpredictable DPRK leadership.
e. The only US interest is to ensure the sovereignty of South
Korea and the stability of the region .
(b) Themes to be Avoided
1. South Korea Government. Many in the government are corrupt and
take money from businesses.
2. South Korea Military and National Police. Military forces do not support
civilian leadership .
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3. South Korea Population. The South Korean culture will be slow to
change and that social, political and economic transformations will not necessarily happen as a result of the
US military effort.
(3) Planned PSYOP Operations
(a) Military Operations that will contribute to the success of US Forces.
1. Destruction of major DRPK base and LOC’s.
2. Destruction of critical DPRK telecommunications and intelligence
centers.
3. Destruction of missile production and transshipment facilities.
(b) Behavior that will inspire emotions, attitudes, and behavior contrary to the
objectives of a successful operation.
1. Making derogatory comments to local civilians concerning national
heritage or religion.
2. Occupation of places of sanctity and worship.
3. Harassing the civilian population by causing unnecessary interruptions in
their daily lives.
4. Heavy drinking and lewd, boisterous behavior.
(4) PSYOP Objectives Matrix
Phase
I -Prehostilities
(D-28 to D-24)
II – Establish ISB (D+40 to
D+60)
III – Decisive Combat
(D+60 to D+100
PSYOP Objectives
1. Promote favorable image of US military
operations in South Korea.
2. Build confidence in South Korea military and
National Police.
1. US deployments to Japan and South Korea
are training exercise related.
2. Promote favorable image of US military
operations in South Korea.
3. Build confidence in South Korea military and
National Police.
4. Cause DPRK not to feel threatened by US
presence in Japan and South Korea.
1. Promote favorable image of US military
operations in South Korea.
2. Build confidence in South Korea military and
National Police.
3. Assist in stabilizing the military situation in
South Korea.
4. Encourage civilian compliance with
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Support
1. Deception
2. CFC readiness
3. Liaison w/ South
Korea military
1. Deception
2. CFC deployment
3. Establish ISB
4. Train for force
entry
1. Deception
2. Execute NEO
3. JTF KOREA
tactical operations
4. Secure US
installations
5. Establish forward
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IV – Lodgment & Followthrough (D+100 to D+180)
V – Posthostilities &
Redeployment (D+180 to
D+240)
government to isolate the DPRK leadership.
5. Isolate DPRK senior leadership from field
military commanders.
1. Promote favorable image of continued US
military operations in South Korea.
2. Build confidence in South Korea military and
National Police to defeat DPRK military forces.
3. Assist in stabilizing the improving military
situation in SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA.
4. Encourage continued civilian compliance with
government to isolate the DPRK.
5. Further isolate DPRK senior leadership from
field military commanders.
6. Inform the international audience of the
success of US/South Korean operations against
the DPRK.
TBP
support bases
1. JTF Korea
2. Tactical
operations
3. Civil-military
operations in areas
liberated from DPRK
forces
TBP
b. Situation Monitoring. The CFC CJG3 is responsible for monitoring the success of PSYOP efforts
in all phases of the operation, assisted by USSOCOM and DoD and interagency feedback. Subordinate
commands report IAW SOP.
c. Control. Assisted by USSOCOM, the PSYOP campaign is a CFC’s responsibility. If established,
the JPOTF will remain OPCON to CINCKorea while is supports JTF Korea. The CJG3 is responsible for
coordinating and monitoring PSYOP efforts. Commander, JTF Korea has the responsibility to coordinate all
JTF PSYOP efforts with appropriate headquarters, maintain up-to-date PSYOP estimates, and monitor and
review component PSYOP plans and operations.
d. Tasks
(1) All subordinate commands incorporate PSYOP into operations plans.
(2) Prepare to conduct counter propaganda campaigns.
(3) Support deception operations.
(4) Coordinate with USSOCOM and the JPOTF for support such as leaflet dissemination,
loudspeaker broadcasts, audiovisual products, television broadcasts, computer home pages, and face-toface communications.
(5) Evaluate and report reactions of target groups and recommend themes to be stressed or
avoided.
(6) Direct liaison authorized between with cells coordinating deception, operations security,
intelligence, public affairs, and civil affairs to support PSYOP operations.
4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D, Logistics.
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5. Command and Control
a. Command. See Annex J, Command Relationships.
b. Signal. See Annex K. Command, Control and Communications Systems.
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