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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
TAB C TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
OPERATIONS SECURITY
REFERENCE: Joint Pub 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, 24 January 1997.
1. Situation
a. Enemy Forces. Annex B, Intelligence.
(1) Current Enemy Intelligence Assessment. See current CFC, INTSUM. DPRK military
operations are threatening the Government of South Korea and the political stability of the region. The DPRK
has the political will to subvert normal political, military and economic processes and has demonstrated that it
will use it . They view the US and its South Korea allies and other UN nations as a threat to its long-term goal
of reunification of the peninsula and will do all that is necessary to reduce US influence in the country and
throughout the region. It is unknown if the DPRK has any information about the planned operation.
(2) Enemy Intelligence Capabilities. See Annex B, Intelligence, and Paragraph 2a(3)
(Adversary Intelligence Organizations) to Exhibit 2 (Intelligence) to Tab A (Military Deception) to Appendix 3
(Information Operations). The DPRK is one of the most secretative society in the world and can acquire
most internationally available military hardware and software.
b. Friendly Forces. See current operations summary (OPSUM) and Annex A, Task Organization.
(1) Friendly Operations. All forces involved in the operation are already predeployed, or will
marshal in CONUS and elsewhere; move to intermediate staging bases (ISB) in Japan; deploy to objective
areas in the South Korea Joint Operations Area; execute pre-emptive strikes, conduct non-combatant
evacuation (NEO) of US citizens and other eligible third-country nationals, and secure key installations; return
control to the South Korea military or an international force; and redeploy. Deny information on these
activities to the DPRK and its friends while at the same time disseminate information supportive of US
operations.
(2) Critical Information. See basic plan and Appendix 1 (Essential Elements of Information
(EEI)) to Annex B (Intelligence). All supporting commands, agencies and organizations report, IAW unit SOP
and Service policies and directives, the following data:
(a) Information that answers all priority intelligence requirements (PIR) or
intelligence requirements (IR).
(b) Suspected disclosure of designated PIR or IR to DPRK leadership, military
forces or other unauthorized persons.
(c) Violation of established security procedures.
(d) Friendly losses attributable to probable compromise.
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(e) Indications that enemy forces have prior knowledge of the operation.
(f) DPRK activity directed against otherwise well concealed friendly vulnerabilities.
(g) Situations or events that suggest the need to revise PIR or IR.
(h) Recommend additional PIR or IR.
2. Mission. When directed, CFC conducts operations security activities to support US national and theater
objectives and assist the government of South Korea in the defeat of the military forces of the DPRK.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations. Operational security (OPSEC) is the process used to deny to the DPRK,
its military forces and supporters critical information about friendly capabilities, intentions and current
operations. CFC and its subordinate and supporting forces must deny access to information that can be
used by the enemy to prevent or impede mission accomplishment.
(1) The OPSEC Process. OPSEC planning will use this process: Action 1, identify critical
information; Action 2, analyze the DPRK and its military forces threat; Action 3, analyze friendly
vulnerabilities; Action 4, assess risk of not addressing the threat; Action 5, apply appropriate OPSEC
measures.
(2) Scheme of OPSEC Programs and Actions
(a) OPSEC is both a unit and individual responsibility. The J/G/S3 at every level is
the point of contact for OPSEC activities. Critical information about CFC operations that can be observed,
collected against, and analyzed by DPRK intelligence systems must be protected. Indicators of friendly
actions, which can be interpreted and pieced together in a timely manner to derive critical information must
be identified and measures taken to reduce friendly vulnerabilities consistent with necessary situational
awareness.
(b) OPSEC planning is severely challenged by the new family of
telecommunications products – computers, cellular phones, laptops, global positioning systems – available to
the command. Measures must be taken to control the use of these non-secure communications means.
(c) The capability of international media to transmit real-time information worldwide
is a lucrative source of information to DPRK leadership and military forces. OPSEC planners must work with
Public Affairs (PA), CJG2, CJG6 and Civil Affairs (CA) to develop EEI to prevent the inadvertent public
disclosure of critical or sensitive information.
(3) Execution by Phase
(a) Phase I (Prehostilities: Alert and Staging, D-28 through D-24). Knowledge of
future operations must be tightly controlled. CFC forces will be especially vulnerable during this phase as
friendly forces without proper warning or training assemble, marshal and prepare for deployment.
Planners must ensure that only information necessary for extensive dissemination is released. Care must be
exercised to release deception operation information on schedule so that it does not stand out and be readily
recognized as “extraordinary” information. Forces at all levels must be given extensive training in OPSEC,
especially senior leaders who will be the object of intensive news media attention.
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(b) Phase II (Establish Intermediate Staging Bases, D-23 through D-1). Train and
enforce OPSEC measures at all levels as forces deploy forward, conduct reception, staging, onward
movement and integration (RSOI) activities, and establish the ISBs. Once established at the ISBs, protection
of information about the timing, strength, location and disposition of forces is paramount. Training for
upcoming operations must be conducted with strict information controls. This must appear as a routine,
regularly scheduled deployment exercise. Public media must be monitored and the force educated so as not
to release critical information, especially on public telephones.
(c) Phase III (Decisive Combat, D-Day through D+79). Actions in support of
deception operations, continue RSOI, rehearsal, and preparation for movement to forward support bases
must be tightly controlled. Once in combat on D-Day with DPRK military forces, CFC forces must exercise
care to control information security (INFOSEC), transmission security (TRANSEC), communications security
(COMSEC) and signal security (SIGSEC) to reduce opportunities for interception and exploitation. The
DPRK will have equal access to international news media.
(d) Phase IV (Lodgment and Follow-Through, D+79 through D+100). After
successful NEO, protecting key US installations in South Korea, and establishing defensible forward support
bases in the object area, OPSEC will remain important to deny the enemy information about US intentions
and further objectives. As tactical objectives are secured and the deployed force begins transition
operations to a responsible South Korean military force or a force from an international organization, such as
the South Eastern Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the United Nations, CFC forces in the JOA will
remain vulnerable to enemy collection efforts. Aggressive OPSEC will reduce friendly vulnerabilities.
(e) Phase V (Posthostilities and Redeployment, D+100 through D+180). TBP.
b. Tasks. Command guidance and directives, coordinated throughout all level of command will
direct CFC OPSEC. Throughout all phases of the operation, units and organizations will implement OPSEC
measures to deny the DPRK and its military forces the information they are seeking. Other intelligence
efforts will concentrate on reconnaissance and surveillance efforts to determine if OPSEC efforts are
successful. Minimum protective measures include:
(1) Special access requirements with limited compartmentalized access and entry on a
need-to-know basis.
(2) Use of special code words.
(3) Use of standard cryptological systems and devices. Cellular phones and e-mail are not
secure devices.
(4) Use of normal administration and physical security procedures.
(5) Monitoring of hostile surveillance and reconnaissance activities, visual platforms and
other collection means and report to higher level of command before destruction.
c. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Manage OPSEC programs down to the individual level.
(2) Develop essential elements of information (EEI) and associated indicators.
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(3) Establish OPSEC policy and procedures, prepare OPSEC estimates, plans and
annexes; review all plans and orders to ensure adherence to OPSEC policies and procedures; assist in
developing friendly force profiles; evaluate operational risks; select countermeasures; and direct OPSEC
estimates.
(4) Perform counter intelligence functions and coordinate the collection and processing of
intelligence to support the OPSEC program.
(5) Recommend EEI to CFC, CJG3 and evaluate hostile intelligence, sabotage and
subversion capabilities.
(6) Support CJG2 and CJG3 risk analysis, recommend OPSEC countermeasures and
evaluation requirements.
(7) Coordinate OPSEC measures with Public Affairs and Civil Affairs at all levels of
command to support deception and public information campaigns.
(8) CJG3 is the termination authority for specific command-wide OPSEC measures, as well
as declassification and public release of OPSEC-related information.
4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D, Logistics.
5. Command and Control
a. Feedback. IAW USPACOM periodic reporting requirements in Situation Report (SITREP) or
Spot Intelligence Report (SPIREP) format.
b. OPSEC Surveys
(1) Both command and formal OPSEC surveys will be conducted to identify operational
indicators that signal friendly intentions, capabilities and limitations that will permit the Cartel to counter
friendly operations. The surveys will be used to evaluate operations and systems designed to protect friendly
information.
(2) The formal team built around personnel from the Joint Command and Control Warfare
Center (JC2WC) will survey OPSEC systems at the start of each phase of the operation and report its
findings to Commander, CFC. The command team composed of members from throughout the command
will concentrate on events in Phases I, II, and III to support deception operations and determine the
command’s readiness to effectively execute information operations. Its report will go to the staff principals in
a timely manner to permit corrective action before the start of each phase.
(3) Both teams will evaluate intelligence collection, operations, logistics, communications,
administration and support.
c. After-Action Reports. All elements include input on OPSEC with after action comments to be
submitted to the Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS).
d. Signal. Annex K, Command, Control and Communications Systems.
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