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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX B TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT
REFERENCES:
a. DOD Directive S-3325.1, “Foreign Materiel Program,” 18 September 1986.
b. DIA Manual 58-13, Volume III, “HUMINT Intelligence Collection Management,” 20 March 1988.
c. Army Regulation 381-26, “Army Foreign Materiel Program,” 27 May 1991.
d. FM 34-54, “Battlefield Technical Intelligence,” April 1990.
f. CRDEC-SP-87023, “Management Procedures for Chemical and Biological (CB) Sampling,
Transport, and Evaluation,” August 1987.
g. CFC Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
1. SITUATION
a. Enemy. See Annex B.
b. Friendly. Real-time evaluation of captured equipment to identify modification, determine
weapons effectiveness, exploit documents or identify country of origin can have significant impact on the
development of new tactics. INSCOM’s Foreign Materiel Intelligence Battalion (FMIB) of the 800th MI
Brigade is the second active element in DOD providing battlefield technical intelligence support. This
unit can be deployed to form the core of the Joint Captured Materiel Center (JCMEC), providing
collection management, dissemination and handling of material purposefully not turned over to the
South Korean Government for shipment to CONUS for further exploitation.
c. ASSUMPTIONS
(1) Recovery of enemy equipment during military operations is a national as well as
theater requirement. The JTF Korea J2 will plan for the establishment of a JCMEC to manage recovery,
exploitation, and disposal of Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE).
(2) The COMJTF Korea and subordinate commands will provide JCMEC and EOD
personnel with access to captured materiel collection points and CEE.
(3) Subordinate commanders will develop procedural instructions to ensure that acquired
foreign materiel is properly protected and fully exploited by qualified personnel.
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(4) COMJTF Korea will establish procedures to turn over captured weapons, munitions,
documents, and equipment that are not required for further exploitation to the South Korean
Government.
2. MISSION. Establish the procedures and tasks governing intelligence exploitation, assessment and
disposition of captured enemy equipment, documents, and material.
3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operations
(1) CEE will be evacuated to theater /component collection points for technical
intelligence screening and evaluation for further use.
(2) Enemy material captured by US military personnel becomes the property of the
United States Government and must be protected from theft or recapture. Destruction and/or
abandonment of CEE will not be unilaterally taken without concurrence and direction of the JTF Korea J2
unless dictated by combat conditions.
(3) The JCMEC will deploy with GENSER JDISS.
(4) CEE excess to US needs will be evacuated through logistic channels to the theater
Defense Reutilization Marketing Office (DRMO). This office will determine excess to be turned over to the
Government of South Korea. Procedures established for turn-in of US equipment to DRMO will be used
for the disposal of excess CEE. DRMO will dispose of excess items in accordance with the DOD Manual
4160.21-M, March 1990, “Defense Reutilization and Marketing Manual,” and DOD Manual 4160.21-M-1,
October 1991, “Defense Demilitarization Manual.
b. Tasks
(1) CFC
(a)
Validate technical intelligence augmentee requests and coordinate
satisfaction of validated requests with JCS.
(b) Provide consolidated theater and national CEE priorities to JTF KOREA.
(2) JIC. Submit CEE priorities to USPACOM J2 for consolidated priorities being
forwarded to the JTF KOREA.
(3) JTF Korea
(a) Submit technical intelligence support request to USSOUTHCOM. Requests
for a JCMEC should include the intent and anticipated scope of JCMEC’s operations to
ensure appropriate resources are allocated at the earliest opportunity.
(b) Incorporate national and theater requirements to establish priorities for the
on-scene exploitation, reporting, recovery, and movement of CEE to theater collection points and
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shipment to CONUS. These priorities will be promulgated as weekly “Items Wanted List” to guide force
collection and recovery efforts. Priorities will be based on intelligence recommendations of the JTF
KOREA J2, in coordination with JTF Korea J3 for recovery operations.
(c) Exercise operational control of the JCMEC and staff responsibility over matters
pertaining to CEE. EOD support for saving captured materiel will be coordinated with JTF Korea J3. Most
EOD services will be provided by Joint EOD cell deployed with the JCMEC.
(d) Coordinate with Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) to ensure compliance with the
Geneva Conventions regarding exploitation of captured material.
(4) JTF Korea AND SERVICE COMPONENTS
(a) Designate, establish, operate, and maintain collection points to receive, store,
issue, and dispose of CEE.
(b) Initial reports of captured materials will be made through component G2, N2, or
IN to the JTF Korea J2. Reports should contain location, description, and condition of the item secured.
(5) JCMEC
(a) Perform in-theater exploitation of captured enemy material and produce tactical
intelligence reports.
(b)
augmentation request.
Provide liaison teams to components in accordance with COMJTF Korea
(c) Coordinating Instruction. Movement of high priority CEE within and out of the
theater will be coordinated with the JTF Korea J2 and CJG4.
4. Administration and Logistics
a. Logistics. Annex D.
b. Administration. All CED and CEE will be handled as confidential and will not be folded, stapled,
or marked in any manner. Pertinent comments will be placed on separate accompanying documents.
Category A documents will be translated, retained, and stored at the JDEC. Category A equipment will be
evaluated, retained, and stored at the JCMEC.
5. Command and Signal. The DIRNSA/CHSSC must approve any operation wherein the acquisition of
Foreign Cryptologic material is a planned objective. (Annexes J/K)
Tab
A - Special Prioritized Intelligence Collection Requirement
(N/A)
B - Equipment Releasable for Operational Purposes
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