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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX B TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO C2W
REFERENCES:
a. DOD Directive S-3600.1, “Information Operations.”
b. Joint Pub 3-13, “Draft Joint Information Operations.”
c. Joint Pub 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Operations.”
d. FM 100-6, “Information Operations.”
d. JCS MOP 30, “Command and Control Warfare.”
e. MCM 60-91, “Joint Procedures or Intelligence Support to Electronic Warfare (EW)
Reprogramming.”
f. DIA Pub DDB-1730-72-91, “Joint Procedures for Intelligence Support to EW Reprogramming.”
1. General. Intelligence Support to Command and Control Warfare (C 2W) is critical to the success of this
OPLAN. Intelligence activities must assess the threat, provide critical node analysis, and assist in
developing strategies.
a. Purpose. This Appendix identifies roles and responsibilities for intelligence support to C 2W
objectives of this OPLAN and describes processes and procedures for this support.
b. Relationships. Intelligence support to C2W is coordinated by CJG2 Plans Division.
Intelligence support planning and operations extends to all levels of effort (national, theater, and tactical)
and includes all collection disciplines, analysis centers, defense agencies, and scientific and technical
intelligence production centers. JTF Korea intelligence elements will develop procedures to support their
units C2W activities.
(1) JTF Korea J2 is responsible for coordinating the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence data in support of Information Operations (IO).
(2) JTF Korea J3 IO cell is responsible for identifying intelligence requirements and
conducting analysis in support of IW JTF operations.
2. Mission, Threat, and Requirements. To ensure timely, accurate intelligence support to JTF Korea
planning and operations. Intelligence support includes, but is not limited to:
a. Mission
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(1) Developing and maintaining data bases.
(2) Identifying critical paramilitary and North Korea EW/C3 nodes, links, and sensors,
with vulnerability times, communications/sensor operating modes, organizational structure, and
deployment.
(3) Assessing vulnerabilities of C2W targets.
(4) Estimating payoff from targeting C3 vice conducting C3 protection actions.
b. Threat Estimate. Both the North Korean combat forces and SOF pose problems for C 2W
planners. Presently little is known about their capabilities. Generally their communications security
(COMSEC) is good, some individual units appear to be able to control and quickly move units without
detection. Cover and camouflage are used extensively which will complicate the targeting process.
c. Operational Requirements. Commanders and operations personnel will identify C 2W
information requirements and incorporate these into supporting plans.
(1) EEI. See Appendix 1 to Annex B.
(2) COMJTF Korea will ensure rapid dissemination of information to tactical forces.
3. Collection. See Annex B
a. Collection Management
(1) Commanders will integrate C2W information into collection plans and forward
requirements in accordance with Annex B.
(2) COMJTF Korea will establish collection priorities.
b. Supporting Systems. All possible sources and methods will be used to obtain information
required to support C2W. SIGINT provides initial tip-off of enemy electronic activities/threats and IMINT
(to include electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar) confirms and details on-site configuration. SIGINT
collection is required along each of the areas of interest to maintain the electronic order of battle (EOB).
c. Capabilities Analysis. Theater collection requirements will exceed capabilities. Shortfalls
include responsiveness of national theater collection systems to meet projected requirements.
4. Processing, Production, Application, and Dissemination
a. Communication With Collection Management. See Annex K.
b. CJG2, J3, J6, and JTF Korea will coordinate with USPACOM J3 IO Cell.
c. Correlation or Fusion. The CFC Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), as the theater all source
processing center, provides time sensitive updates on the threat. The CFC IO Cell will coordinate IO
activities associated with operations against North Korea C3. Deconfliction and/or coordination of JTF
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Korea level IO efforts will be done by this cell to ensure theater objectives are met. The Joint Command
and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC) and the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) will provide
tailored IO expertise and perform critical C3 nodal analysis and C3 attack analysis in the area of critical
target nominations.
d. Foreign Capability or Activity Assessment. EW and C3 intelligence will be reported through
normal intelligence channels through INTREPS, TACREPS, INTSUMS, etc. An intelligence shortfall
concerning Insurgent and North Korea nodal analysis has been identified by CJG2 and is being worked by
theater and national-level intelligence organizations.
e. Targeting. Intelligence should prioritize and nominate potential C2W targets IAW CFC SOP.
SIGINT authorities will assist the commander in determining whether the advantages of electronic attack
(EA) against a target outweigh the loss of SIGINT. Critical IO targets include C 4I for IADS, maneuver, and
logistics assets, and Cartel EW assets if applicable.
f. Data Base Management. Responsive intelligence data base support is crucial for effective
C2W planning. Shortfalls in military forces and North Korea nodal analysis will be worked on a high priority
basis. The CJGC2WC will augment the JTF Korea IO cell and serve as the focal point for defining,
coordinating, and overseeing the integration of those databases necessary to establish a common joint
information base for conducting IO operations.
g. C3 Network Analysis. All intelligence organizations will perform varying levels of C3 network
analysis. CJG2 will coordinate with other theater and national intelligence organizations for C 3 target
systems analysis to identify nodes for theater targeting. The Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) cell
will perform C4I network analysis and will coordinate with the CJGC2WC or the National Intelligence
Support Team (NIST) at the JTF as required.
h. Capabilities Analysis. Current theater capabilities are limited by ability to responsively correlate
and disseminate intelligence on relocatable targets important to operational planners.
5. Sustaining Functions
a. Automated Data Processing. JTF Korea J2 responsible for indicating both hardware and
software needed to provide intelligence support.
b. Communications. See Annex K.
c. Capabilities Analysis. During execution theater and national assets will be used to collect
intelligence data needed to support the IO effort. CJG2 is the proponent for scheduling and coordinating
use of these assets.
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