Understanding Society
Reader Expertmeeting
25 APRIL 2016
TILBURG LAW SCHOOL
AUBERGE DU BONHEUR
INT-AR
Databank Arbeidsmigratie
ISSN: 2468-2527
Department of Labour Law and Social Policy
Postbus 90153 • 5000 LE Tilburg • Bezoekadres • Prof. Cobbenhagenlaan 221 • Tilburg • Telefoon 013 466 81 31
IBAN NL74ABNA0602142539 • BIC ABNANL2A • BTW-nr NL002791250B01
www.tilburguniversity.edu
Inhoudsopgave reader
Deel A. De Europese pijler van sociale rechten
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Mededeling van de Europese Commissie over de Europese pijler
Bijlage bij de mededeling
Informatieblad Naar een Europese pijler van sociale rechten
Factsheet sociale rechten
De sociale acquis in de EU
De socio-economische achtergrond
Deel B. De herziening van de detacheringsrichtlijn
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Voorstel voor de herziening van Richtlijn 96/71
Informatieblad Herziening detacheringsrichtlijn - veel gestelde vragen
Detachering landencijfers Nederland
Detachering Europese feiten en gegevens
Impact assessment – samenvatting
Impact assessment – volledig rapport
Deel A. De Europese pijler van sociale rechten
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Mededeling van de Europese Commissie over de Europese pijler
Bijlage bij de mededeling
Informatieblad Naar een Europese pijler van sociale rechten
Factsheet sociale rechten
De sociale acquis in de EU
De socio-economische achtergrond
EUROPESE
COMMISSIE
Straatsburg, 8.3.2016
COM(2016) 127 final
MEDEDELING VAN DE COMMISSIE AAN HET EUROPEES PARLEMENT, DE
RAAD, HET EUROPEES ECONOMISCH EN SOCIAAL COMITÉ EN HET COMITÉ
VAN DE REGIO'S
Lancering van een raadpleging over een Europese pijler van sociale rechten
{SWD(2016) 50 final}
{SWD(2016) 51 final}
NL
NL
1. Inleiding
Voorzitter Juncker heeft de oprichting van een Europese pijler van sociale rechten
aangekondigd in zijn "State of the Union" voor het Europees Parlement op 9 september 2015.
Dit initiatief is onderdeel van de werkzaamheden van de Commissie voor een diepere en
billijkere economische en monetaire unie (EMU)1 en van het werkprogramma van de
Commissie voor 2016.
In zijn toespraak stelde voorzitter Juncker het volgende: "We moeten harder werken aan een
eerlijke en echte pan-Europese arbeidsmarkt. [...] Ik wil daartoe bijdragen met een Europese
pijler van sociale rechten, die rekening houdt met de veranderende realiteit van de Europese
samenlevingen en de arbeidsmarkt, en die kan dienen als kompas voor de hernieuwde
convergentie in de eurozone. Die Europese pijler van sociale rechten moet een aanvulling
vormen op wat we al samen hebben bereikt op het vlak van de bescherming van werknemers
in de EU. Ik verwacht van de sociale partners dat zij in dat proces een centrale rol opnemen.
Ik denk dat wij er goed aan doen om dit initiatief eerst in de eurozone te nemen en daarna
andere lidstaten te laten instappen als zij dat willen."
Deze mededeling stippelt de weg uit voor de Europese pijler van sociale rechten. Hierin wordt
de achterliggende redenering voor het initiatief geschetst, worden de rol, de omvang en de
aard ervan uiteengezet, en wordt een brede raadpleging opgezet met de bedoeling feedback te
verzamelen. In bijlage bij deze mededeling is een eerste voorlopige schets van de pijler
gevoegd om het debat te voeden. Deze mededeling gaat eveneens vergezeld van twee
werkdocumenten van de diensten van de Commissie: het eerste omvat een beschrijving van de
voornaamste tendensen op het vlak van economie, werk en maatschappij waarin de pijler zijn
oorsprong vindt en waarop deze mede een antwoord zou moeten bieden, en in het tweede
wordt het meest relevante wettelijk acquis op het niveau van de EU in herinnering gebracht2.
2. Waarom een Europese pijler van sociale rechten?
2.1. Een sociale markteconomie met een groot concurrentievermogen
Maatregelen op Europees niveau zijn een weerspiegeling van de fundamentele beginselen van
de Unie en zij zijn gestoeld op de overtuiging dat economische ontwikkeling grotere sociale
vooruitgang en samenhang met zich mee moet brengen; tegelijkertijd moet in passende
vangnetten overeenkomstig de Europese waarden worden voorzien en het sociale beleid ook
worden gevoerd als een productieve factor die toelaat ongelijkheid terug te dringen, zoveel
mogelijk werkgelegenheid te creëren en het Europese menselijke kapitaal optimaal te
ontplooien. Deze overtuiging wordt gestaafd aan de hand van feitenmateriaal over
werkgelegenheid en sociale prestaties. De lidstaten die de beste prestaties leveren op
economisch vlak hebben een ambitieuzer en doeltreffender sociaal beleid uitgewerkt dat niet
enkel het resultaat is van economische ontwikkeling maar een centraal onderdeel vormt van
hun groeimodel. Hierbij is de opzet van de socialezekerheidsstelsels en
arbeidsmarktinstellingen, die goed functioneren en banen helpen creëren, van wezenlijk
belang.
1
Politieke beleidslijnen voor de volgende Europese Commissie, 15 juli 2014, "Een nieuwe start voor Europa:
mijn agenda voor banen, groei, billijkheid en democratische verandering".
2
Werkdocumenten voor de diensten van de Commissie "Key economic, employment and social trends behind
the European Pillar of Social Rights", (SWD(2016) 51), en "The EU social acquis" (SWD(2016) 50) van 8 maart
2016.
2
Deze aanpak vormt ook de kern van de algemene economische agenda van deze Commissie,
zoals blijkt uit de jaarlijkse groeianalyse 2016. Waar de Commissie erop gericht is structurele
hervormingen, investeringen en een verantwoord begrotingsbeleid te stimuleren, ligt de
klemtoon duidelijk op sociale overwegingen en sociale billijkheid.
Overeenkomstig het subsidiariteitsbeginsel zijn in de eerste plaats de lidstaten bevoegd voor
hun sociaal en werkgelegenheidsbeleid. Dat omvat de arbeidsregelgeving en de organisatie
van de socialezekerheidsstelsels. Die bevoegdheid is vastgelegd in de EU-verdragen, waarin
sinds de oprichting van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap ook voor de EU in een rol is
voorzien, als aanvulling op het optreden van de lidstaten. Deze algemene doelstelling wordt
weerspiegeld in artikel 3 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie dat met name bepaalt
dat de Unie "zich inzet voor de duurzame ontwikkeling van Europa, op basis van een
evenwichtige economische groei en van prijsstabiliteit, een sociale markteconomie met een
groot concurrentievermogen die gericht is op volledige werkgelegenheid en sociale
vooruitgang, en van een hoog niveau van bescherming en verbetering van de kwaliteit van het
milieu."
Daarom zijn de oprichting en de verdieping van de Europese eengemaakte markt hand in hand
gegaan met de ontwikkeling van een wettelijk acquis op sociaal vlak op het niveau van de EU,
met de bedoeling voor een gelijk speelveld te zorgen, het risico van sociale dumping of
nivellering naar beneden te beperken en economische en sociale integratie te bevorderen.
Daarom ook zijn sociale en werkgelegenheidsoverwegingen sinds de jaren negentig bepalend
voor de coördinatie van het economisch beleid op Europees niveau, nu het Europees semester.
De achterliggende redenering voor de Europese pijler van sociale rechten volgt deze logica en
speelt in op twee behoeften: de crisis overwinnen en verder kijken, enerzijds, en naar een
diepere en billijkere EMU evolueren, anderzijds.
2.2. De crisis overwinnen en verder kijken
Europa herstelt van haar zwaarste crisis sinds decennia: alle lidstaten en de EU als geheel
kampen met de politieke, economische en sociale gevolgen van de crisis en proberen
tegelijkertijd te anticiperen op toekomstige ontwikkelingen. De crisis heeft ernstige en
zichtbare gevolgen gehad voor de Europese maatschappij en economie. De
socialezekerheidsstelsels hebben deze gevolgen gedeeltelijk opgevangen maar de
werkloosheid is toegenomen, een aanzienlijk deel van de bevolking dreigt in armoede terecht
te komen, de overheidsfinanciën zijn onder druk komen te staan en de verschillen tussen de
prestaties op nationaal niveau worden aanzienlijk groter. De werkloosheid in het bijzonder
heeft van zowel personen als de maatschappij gedurende vele jaren een zware tol geëist: nog
steeds zijn ongeveer 22 miljoen mensen inactief en werkzoekend (waarvan bijna 17 miljoen in
de eurozone); voor 10 miljoen onder hen was dit het geval gedurende meer dan een jaar.
Door de crisis zijn bovendien een aantal fundamentele langetermijntendensen op de
achtergrond geraakt en andere net beter zichtbaar geworden. Het gaat daarbij onder andere
over veranderende maatschappelijke structuren en familiale en werkpatronen, langere en
gevarieerdere beroepslevens, grotere diversiteit bij werknemers en de verspreiding van
nieuwe vormen van werk, de paradox tussen steeds hogere opleidingsniveaus en de
wijdverbreide discrepantie tussen gevraagde en aangeboden vaardigheden, toegenomen
ongelijkheden, nieuwe behoeften en kansen als gevolg van de toenemende levensverwachting
en vergrijzing, alsook technologische veranderingen en de digitalisering van de maatschappij
en de economie.
3
De omvang en de aard van de uitdagingen waarmee de arbeidsmarkt en de samenleving in het
algemeen worden geconfronteerd, zijn ingrijpend veranderd in vergelijking met de 20e eeuw,
en er dienen zich vele nieuwe of opkomende trends aan waaraan Europa zich zal moeten
aanpassen. De doelstellingen van het sociaal beleid en het vermogen ervan om deze
doelstellingen te halen, worden ernstig op de proef gesteld; de capaciteit van Europa om te
komen tot goed werkende en billijke arbeidsmarkten en socialezekerheidsstelsels is cruciaal
voor haar vermogen om de productiviteit te verhogen, op wereldniveau te concurreren, de
sociale samenhang te versterken en de levensstandaard van de EU-burgers verder te doen
stijgen.
Een dergelijke redenering wint zowel internationaal als binnen de lidstaten aan belang3.
Ondanks de onzekerheid over de toekomst zijn er meer en meer aanwijzingen en bestaat er
ook algemene consensus over de noodzaak om de band tussen economische, sociale en
milieu-ontwikkeling te versterken, over het feit dat ongelijkheden de economische
ontwikkeling afremmen en over de noodzaak een inclusiever groeimodel te ontwikkelen,
zoals blijkt uit de door de Verenigde Naties in september 2015 vastgestelde doelstellingen
inzake duurzame ontwikkeling en verschillende conclusies van de G20. Deze mondiale
agenda is in belangrijke mate gebaseerd op uitgebreid onderzoek door internationale
organisaties zoals de Organisatie voor Economische Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling, de
Wereldbank, de Internationale Arbeidsorganisatie en het Internationaal Monetair Fonds.
In deze publicaties wordt erop gewezen dat een belangrijk overdrachtsmechanisme tussen
groei op lange termijn, gelijkheid en sociale vooruitgang de investering is in menselijk
kapitaal. Verder wordt erin bevestigd dat inkomensongelijkheid de potentiële groei op lange
termijn negatief kan beïnvloeden aangezien zij de bestaande kansenongelijkheid in stand
houdt en versterkt, de ontwikkeling van vaardigheden afremt en sociale en beroepsmobiliteit
belemmert. In geavanceerde economieën, waar welvaart is gebaseerd op de toename van de
productiviteit en het eigen vermogen om te innoveren, zijn de sociale en economische
prestaties twee zijden van dezelfde medaille.
Een modern sociaal beleid zou moeten steunen op investeringen in menselijk kapitaal die
gebaseerd zijn op gelijke kansen, de preventie van en bescherming tegen sociale risico's, de
aanwezigheid van doeltreffende vangnetten en stimuleringsmaatregelen om toe te treden tot
de arbeidsmarkt, zodat mensen een waardig leven kunnen leiden, hun persoonlijke en
beroepssituatie in de loop van hun leven kunnen wijzigen en hun talenten ten volle kunnen
ontplooien.
2.3. Evolueren naar een diepere en billijkere economische en monetaire unie
De eurozone trekt lessen uit de crisis van de voorbije jaren en heeft een proces van verdere
integratie en consolidatie aangevat. Dit houdt noodzakelijkerwijs ook een sociale dimensie in.
In het verslag van de vijf voorzitters over de voltooiing van Europa's EMU4 wordt benadrukt
3
Zie bijvoorbeeld ILO (2015), "The future of work centenary initiative"; OESO (2016), "Policy forum on the
future of work"; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2015), "Redesigning European welfare states – Ways forward";
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2015), "Green Paper: Re-Imagining Work. Work 4.0"; Economisch
Wereldforum (2016), "The Future of Jobs: Employment, Skills and Workforce Strategy for the Fourth Industrial
Revolution"; OESO, IMF, Wereldbank en IAO (2015), "Income inequality and labour income share in G20
countries: Trends, Impacts and Causes".
4
"De voltooiing van de Europese economische en monetaire unie", verslag van Jean-Claude Juncker in
samenwerking met Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi en Martin Schulz, juni 2015. In hun
4
dat "het de ambitie van Europa moet zijn om het op sociaal gebied tot een 'triple A'-status te
brengen" en dat "de EMU pas succesvol kan zijn wanneer de arbeidsmarkten en
socialezekerheidsstelsels in alle lidstaten van de eurozone goed en rechtvaardig
functioneren". Hoewel er in het verslag aan wordt herinnerd dat er geen 'one-size-fits-all'aanpak is, wordt er ook opgemerkt dat de lidstaten vaak voor dezelfde uitdagingen staan.
Daarnaast wordt opgeroepen tot meer aandacht voor werkgelegenheid en sociale prestaties als
deel van een breder proces van opwaartse convergentie naar veerkrachtigere economische
structuren in de eurozone.
Dit is niet enkel een politieke of sociale maar ook een economische noodzaak: uit de ervaring
van de laatste 15 jaar is gebleken dat aanhoudende onevenwichtigheden in één of meerdere
lidstaten de stabiliteit van de eurozone als geheel kunnen bedreigen en dat het onvermogen
om deze te corrigeren tot nog meer verschillen met nog hogere kosten kan leiden. De crisis
van 2007-2008 heeft de homogeniteit van de eurozone aangetast aangezien bepaalde landen
bijzonder zwaar waren getroffen, en er is tijd nodig om deze heterogeniteit te verminderen.
Wanneer wij verder kijken is het duidelijk dat het toekomstige succes van de eurozone in niet
geringe mate afhangt van de effectiviteit van de nationale arbeidsmarkten en
socialezekerheidsstelsels, alsook van het vermogen van de economie om schokken op te
vangen en zich eraan aan te passen.
Goed presterende en inclusieve arbeidsmarkten moeten effectieve flexibiliteits- en
veiligheidsmechanismen inbouwen, die kunnen leiden tot meer werkgelegenheid en een beter
aanpassingsvermogen. Het concept van "flexizekerheid", dat daarmee verband houdt, is niet
nieuw maar in de nasleep van de crisis en tegen de achtergrond van veranderende
arbeidsmarkten is het tijd om opnieuw te bekijken op welke manier dit best in de praktijk kan
worden omgezet. Bedrijven zijn gebaat bij een voorspelbaar en rechtszeker bedrijfsklimaat
dat hen de mogelijkheid biedt opgeleide en productieve werknemers aan te trekken en zich
aan te passen aan de snel veranderende marktsituaties. Werknemers hebben er belang bij
werk- en inkomenszekerheid te verwerven en werk en privéleven te kunnen combineren, maar
ook om tijdens hun hele loopbaan nieuwe uitdagingen aan te gaan en zich aan te passen, en
steeds nieuwe vaardigheden aan te leren vanuit het oogpunt van een leven lang leren.
Werkzoekenden en niet-actieve personen zijn vaak op zoek naar manieren om de
arbeidsmarkt te betreden maar willen niet terechtkomen in slecht betaalde banen van lage
kwaliteit of waarbij hun wezenlijke sociale rechten niet worden gerespecteerd. De economie
en de maatschappij, in het bijzonder in de eurozone, hebben belang bij een betere
ontwikkeling en benutting van vaardigheden, meer flexibiliteit en veerkracht, sociale
samenhang en een billijke en effectieve verdeling van rechten, plichten en inkomens, ook
tussen de generaties.
Terzelfder tijd hebben hoge werkloosheidscijfers en de vergrijzing, in combinatie met
overheidsfinanciën die onder druk staan en de noodzaak om uit macro-economische
onevenwichtigheden voortvloeiende overloopeffecten tussen landen tot een minimum te
beperken, het probleem van de werking van de nationale socialezekerheidsstelsels op de
voorgrond gebracht, en dit vanuit verschillende oogpunten: ten eerste met betrekking tot de
geschiktheid en budgettaire houdbaarheid van deze stelsels in het licht van de evoluerende
gezamenlijke bijdrage aan het verslag hebben Frankrijk en Duitsland bijvoorbeeld bijzonder de nadruk gelegd op
de noodzaak om de samenwerking en gemeenschappelijke beleidslijnen op bepaalde gebieden te versterken,
zoals een actief arbeidsmarktbeleid en actieve socialezekerheidsstelsels. Zie ook Europees Centrum voor
politieke strategie (2015), "The Social Dimension of Economic and Monetary Union".
5
sociale behoeften, met inbegrip van de noodzaak armoede te bestrijden; ten tweede, met
betrekking tot de manier waarop zij het scheppen van banen beïnvloeden, vanuit het standpunt
van zowel werkgevers als werkzoekenden; daaronder wordt ook het vermogen van deze
stelsels verstaan om werk lonend te maken en de vaardigheden van personen en hun
bekwaamheid om ten volle aan het maatschappelijk leven deel te nemen, te versterken; en ten
derde, wat het vermogen van de stelsels betreft om macro-economische schokken op te
vangen en automatisch te stabiliseren, wat met name voor de eurozone erg belangrijk is. Een
hoge arbeidsparticipatie, lage werkloosheid en goed opgezette socialezekerheidsstelsels zijn
essentieel voor gezonde overheidsfinanciën, en te uitgesproken verschillen tussen de
prestaties van de arbeidsmarkten en sociale prestaties vormen een bedreiging voor de werking
van de eurozone. Als onderdeel van de stappen die zijn gezet om het begrotingstoezicht op
EU-niveau te verbeteren, heeft de reflectie over de kwaliteit van de overheidsfinanciën,
waarvan de socialezekerheidsstelsels een belangrijk onderdeel zijn, geleid tot meer aandacht
voor vraagstukken in verband met de billijkheid en efficiëntie van openbare inkomsten en
uitgaven.
2.4. Voortbouwen op een schat aan ervaring
De Europese pijler van sociale rechten kan voortbouwen op een schat aan ervaring en
praktijken: op vele gebieden levert Europa de beste prestaties en de oplossingen zijn
welbekend. Gezien de omvang van de huidige uitdagingen zijn zelfgenoegzaamheid en status
quo echter geen optie. En ook uit de snel veranderende realiteit in de wereld valt veel te leren.
Hoewel de situaties in de lidstaten sterk uiteenlopen, kan de pijler voorts voortbouwen op de
gedeelde gemeenschappelijke waarden en beginselen op nationaal, Europees en internationaal
niveau. Deze waarden en beginselen zijn prominent aanwezig in referentiedocumenten zoals
het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie (VEU), het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de
Europese Unie (VWEU), het Handvest van de grondrechten en de jurisprudentie van het Hof
van Justitie van de Europese Unie, alsook in internationale instrumenten zoals het Sociale
Handvest van de Raad van Europa en aanbevelingen van de Internationale Arbeidsorganisatie.
Dergelijke kaders bestrijken vaak een brede waaier van domeinen, waarvoor zij de algemene
beginselen en minimumnormen bepalen, die dan worden aangevuld op nationaal, regionaal of
lokaal niveau. Het voornaamste probleem in Europa houdt dus niet noodzakelijkerwijs
verband met de erkenning van rechten, maar eerder met de daadwerkelijke toepassing ervan,
gelet op de snelle veranderingen in de sociale, wettelijke en economische omgeving.
Door de jaren heen heeft de Commissie initiatieven genomen om de inspanningen op het vlak
van dwingende prioritaire thema's op te voeren en het EU-acquis bij te werken. Die
inspanningen volgen de logica van betere regelgeving: het gaat niet om minder regelgeving,
maar om een aanpak waarbij bij de regelgeving volledig rekening wordt gehouden met de
economische, sociale en milieueffecten in de praktijk, zodat elk initiatief op de best mogelijke
manier zijn doel bereikt. Tijdens deze ambtstermijn heeft de Commissie de Europese
structuur- en investeringsfondsen voor 2014-2020 vastgelegd, waarvan bijna 20 %
beschikbaar wordt gesteld via het Europees Sociaal Fonds. Zij is ook op diverse fronten actief
geweest, om maar een paar voorbeelden te noemen:

meer aandacht voor sociale overwegingen in het Europees semester voor coördinatie
van het economisch beleid, het gebruik van sociale indicatoren in de zogenaamde
procedure voor macro-economische onevenwichtigheden, de bevordering van "sociale
6
benchmarking" en een beoordeling van de gevolgen op sociaal vlak van het nieuwe
stabiliteitssteunprogramma voor Griekenland;

de integratie van sociale doelstellingen in de vlaggenschipinitiatieven zoals het
investeringsplan voor Europa, de energie-unie en de digitale eengemaakte markt;

de voorstelling van een strategisch engagement voor gendergelijkheid voor de
periode 2016-2019;

het vervroegd vrijmaken van de financiële steun aan de lidstaten voor de vaststelling
van een jongerengarantie, die ervoor moet zorgen dat alle jongeren tot de leeftijd van
25 jaar binnen vier maanden nadat zij het formele onderwijs hebben verlaten of
werkloos zijn geworden een deugdelijk en concreet aanbod krijgen;

de vaststelling van richtsnoeren voor de lidstaten in verband met de herintegratie van
langdurig werklozen op de arbeidsmarkt;

het voorstel voor een Europese toegankelijkheidswet teneinde de toegang tot essentiële
goederen en diensten voor mensen met een handicap in de eengemaakte markt te
vergemakkelijken;

het voorstel voor een herziening van de detacheringsrichtlijn ter bevordering van het
beginsel "gelijke beloning voor gelijke of gelijkwaardige arbeid" op dezelfde locatie.
In 2016 wordt ook werk gemaakt van verschillende aanvullende aspecten, dat gelijktijdig met
de raadpleging over de pijler zal worden voortgezet: een nieuwe impuls voor de bevordering
van het evenwicht tussen werk en privéleven voor werkende ouders; een Europese agenda
voor vaardigheden; en een grondige evaluatie van de 24 richtlijnen betreffende gezondheid en
veiligheid op het werk. Deze evaluatie zou moeten helpen de relevantie, doeltreffendheid en
coherentie van de richtlijnen te beoordelen om een hoog niveau van bescherming van de
gezondheid en veiligheid van werknemers te behouden in het licht van nieuwe risico’s, en
tegelijkertijd de geldende wetgeving te vereenvoudigen en te moderniseren zodat ook het mkb
deze makkelijker kan toepassen. Deze voorbeelden illustreren de ondersteunende,
begeleidende en omkaderende rol die de EU kan spelen op het vlak van sociale zaken, en
illustreren ook de verdere maatregelen die uit de totstandkoming van de pijler kunnen
voortvloeien.
Een topprioriteit voor deze Commissie is voorts de bevordering van de sociale dialoog op alle
niveaus. Naar aanleiding van een conferentie op hoog niveau in maart 2015 over een nieuwe
start voor de Europese sociale dialoog, zijn de bedrijfstakoverkoepelende sociale partners in
de EU het eens geworden over een diepgaande gezamenlijke analyse van de werkgelegenheid
en een gezamenlijk werkprogramma voor de periode 2015-2017. Er is gestart met
onderhandelingen over een autonome kaderovereenkomst over actief ouder worden; er
worden gezamenlijke conclusies opgesteld over het vraagstuk van het evenwicht tussen werk
en privéleven; en een werkgroep buigt zich over de uitvoering door de leden van hun vorige
autonome kaderovereenkomsten. De sectorale sociale partners in de EU, die in
43 verschillende sectoren aanwezig zijn en 75 % van de beroepsbevolking
vertegenwoordigen, hebben ook verder werk gemaakt van hun respectieve
gemeenschappelijke werkprogramma’s.
3. De Europese pijler van sociale rechten: rol, bereik en juridische aard
De pijler is erop gericht een aantal grondbeginselen te formuleren ter ondersteuning van goed
werkende en billijke arbeidsmarkten en socialezekerheidsstelsels. Zoals voorzitter Juncker
7
heeft aangegeven, zal aan de pijler in de eurozone vorm worden gegeven en kunnen andere
lidstaten daarna instappen als zij dat willen.
De pijler zal dus voortbouwen en een aanvulling vormen op het bestaande Europees sociaal
acquis, en de in de pijler vervatte beginselen zullen er specifiek op gericht zijn in te spelen op
de behoeften van en de uitdagingen voor de eurozone. Eens de pijler tot stand is gekomen,
zou deze het referentiekader moeten worden om de sociale prestaties van de deelnemende
lidstaten en hun prestaties op het vlak van werkgelegenheid te monitoren, hervormingen op
nationaal niveau te stimuleren en, meer in het bijzonder, als kompas te dienen voor
hernieuwde convergentie in de eurozone.
3.1. Omschrijving van beginselen op maat van de realiteit van vandaag en morgen
In de bijlage bij deze mededeling wordt een eerste voorlopige schets van de pijler ter discussie
voorgelegd. Bij de keuze van de beginselen was zowel hun economisch als hun sociaal belang
voor de prestaties van de deelnemende landen bepalend.
De pijler is opgebouwd rond drie hoofdthema's:

gelijke kansen en toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt, met inbegrip van de ontwikkeling van
vaardigheden, een leven lang leren en actieve ondersteuning van werkgelegenheid,
teneinde de kansen op arbeid te vergroten, de overstap tussen verschillende statussen
te vergemakkelijken en de inzetbaarheid van personen te verbeteren;

billijke arbeidsvoorwaarden teneinde een adequaat en betrouwbaar evenwicht tot stand
te brengen tussen rechten en plichten van zowel werknemers als werkgevers en tussen
flexibiliteit en zekerheid, teneinde het scheppen van banen, de deelname aan het
arbeidsproces en het aanpassingsvermogen van bedrijven te ondersteunen, en ter
bevordering van de sociale dialoog;

adequate en houdbare sociale bescherming en toegang tot essentiële diensten van hoge
kwaliteit, zoals kinderopvang, gezondheidszorg en langdurige zorg, teneinde te
waarborgen dat personen een waardig leven leiden, beschermd zijn tegen risico’s en
ten volle kunnen deelnemen aan het beroepsleven en, meer in het algemeen, aan de
maatschappij.
Er zijn een aantal beleidsterreinen in kaart gebracht waarvoor verschillende beginselen
gelden. Deze beginselen zijn gebaseerd op een aantal rechten die al in Europese en andere
relevante rechtsbronnen zijn opgenomen, en bevatten een meer gedetailleerde omschrijving
van mogelijke manieren om ze in de praktijk om te zetten. Voorts zijn deze formuleringen
geïnspireerd op bestaande richtsnoeren op EU-niveau, bijvoorbeeld in het kader van de
coördinatie van het economisch beleid, maar er wordt ook getracht rekening te houden met de
nieuwste trends.
Op het gebied van elk van deze beginselen bestaan er grote verschillen tussen de situaties in
Europa en er moeten vele grote en kleine praktische problemen worden verholpen. Daartoe
behoren met name de verschillen tussen de belangen van individuen, bedrijven en de
maatschappij; mogelijke compromissen tussen korte- en langetermijnoplossingen; het bestaan
van grijze zones, mede als gevolg van de vervaging van het begrip werk; en het probleem van
wie waarvoor betaalt, afhankelijk van de verwachting of particuliere of publieke financiering
een rol zal spelen. Een andere uitdaging bestaat erin nieuwe normen en praktijken op
8
zodanige wijze te ontwikkelen dat zij inspelen op de behoeften van een dynamische economie
ter ondersteuning van het proces van opwaartse convergentie tussen de regio’s en de lidstaten.
De logica achter deze pijler en achter het debat dat eraan vooraf gaat, is niet deze verschillen
en spanningen te verdoezelen, maar ze daarentegen bloot te leggen en in een nieuw licht te
plaatsen, daarbij rekening houdend met de veranderende realiteit van de arbeidsmarkt en de
uiteenlopende situaties in Europa. Op die manier moet de pijler bijdragen tot de
modernisering, uitbreiding en verdieping van de sociale rechten, op de werkplek en in de
maatschappij, door de werkelijke toepassing ervan te vergemakkelijken en praktijken te
bevorderen die gunstig kunnen zijn vanuit het oogpunt van zowel individuen als bedrijven en
de maatschappij.
3.2. Meer toegevoegde waarde voor de eurozone en de EU als geheel
De pijler is geen herhaling of parafrasering van het EU-acquis: hij biedt een meer
gedetailleerde omschrijving van de beginselen en verbintenissen die tot meer convergentie
binnen de eurozone kunnen leiden. En zoals de pijler het acquis niet vervangt, vervangen ook
de hier voorgestelde beginselen de bestaande rechten niet: zij kunnen een oplossing bieden
om de prestaties van het sociaal en werkgelegenheidsbeleid in de lidstaten te beoordelen en in
de toekomst beter op elkaar af te stemmen.
Maar het proces dat tot de totstandkoming van de pijler leidt, zou ook een gelegenheid moeten
zijn om opnieuw na te denken over het acquis. Het huidige acquis is stap voor stap tot stand
gekomen, op verschillende tijdstippen, waarbij sommige domeinen beter zijn bestreken dan
andere. De raadpleging over de pijler biedt een gelegenheid om het acquis op een holistische
manier te benaderen, de relevantie ervan te herzien in het licht van nieuwe trends en
mogelijke gebieden te identificeren voor toekomstige actie op het geschikte niveau.
Een dergelijke balans moet met name een antwoord bieden op de volgende vragen: heeft de
uitvoering van het acquis achterstand opgelopen? Zijn er fundamentele lacunes in de sociale
rechten die op EU-niveau zijn vastgesteld? Hoe kunnen een dergelijke achterstand en/of
dergelijke lacunes worden verklaard? Dit is ook de reden waarom het raadplegingsproces in
de aanloop naar de totstandkoming van de pijler zal openstaan voor alle lidstaten, en het zou
de lidstaten buiten de eurozone moeten helpen bij de keuze om al dan niet aan de pijler deel te
nemen.
De werkzaamheden voor de oprichting van de pijler zullen een aanvulling vormen op andere
inspanningen die momenteel geleverd worden ter verdieping van de EMU5 en zouden moeten
bijdragen aan de werkzaamheden voor het witboek over de toekomst van Europa’s EMU, dat
gepland is voor het voorjaar van 2017. In het verslag van de vijf voorzitters over de voltooiing
van Europa’s EMU werd met name de noodzaak benadrukt om door te gaan met het
convergentieproces naar veerkrachtigere economische structuren en dergelijke processen op
de middellange termijn een bindender karakter te geven. Om dit te bereiken zou
overeenstemming moeten worden bereikt over een reeks gemeenschappelijke normen van
hoog niveau, waarbij de klemtoon onder andere moet liggen op de arbeidsmarkten.
Ten slotte zal in de juridische aard van de pijler zelf rekening moeten worden gehouden met
het bereik en de juridische beperkingen die bestaan op EU-niveau en op het niveau van de
5
COM(2015) 600 van 21 oktober 2015 over stappen naar de voltooiing van de Economische en Monetaire Unie.
9
eurozone. Zo verleent bijvoorbeeld artikel 153 van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de
Europese Unie duidelijk geen bevoegdheid aan de EU om wetgeving vast te stellen inzake
"loon".
Hoewel er verschillende instrumenten, zoals een aanbeveling, kunnen worden overwogen om
de pijler op te richten, is het voor de Commissie van wezenlijk belang om het Europees
Parlement en de Raad, evenals de andere instellingen van de EU, bij dit proces te betrekken
en een breed draagvlak te verkrijgen voor de uitvoering ervan.
4. Doel van de raadpleging
De oprichting van de pijler is een gelegenheid om de reflectie over de bestaande sociale
rechten, de specifieke behoeften van de eurozone, de veranderende realiteit van de
arbeidsmarkten en de hervormingen die op alle niveaus nodig zijn, te sturen. Het
raadplegingsproces moet daarom zo uitgebreid mogelijk zijn.
4.1. Mogelijke resultaten
Het raadplegingsproces heeft drie hoofddoelstellingen:

een eerste doelstelling is om het huidige EU-acquis te beoordelen. De raadpleging
moet met name de mate helpen bepalen waarin bestaande rechten worden toegepast en
relevant blijven in het licht van de uitdagingen van vandaag en morgen en/of helpen
bepalen of nieuwe manieren moeten worden overwogen om deze rechten toe te
passen;

een tweede doelstelling is om na te denken over nieuwe werkpatronen en
maatschappelijke trends als gevolg van demografische tendensen, nieuwe
technologieën en andere factoren die van belang zijn voor het beroepsleven en de
sociale omstandigheden. Het inventariseren van beste praktijken en de lering uit
sociale innovatie moeten actief worden aangemoedigd;

de derde doelstelling is het verzamelen van inzichten en feedback over de hoofdlijnen
van de Europese pijler van sociale rechten zelf. De raadpleging moet dienen om het
bereik, de inhoud en de rol ervan als onderdeel van de sociale dimensie van de EMU
te bespreken, na te denken over de specifieke behoeften van de eurozone, in debat te
gaan over de specificiteit van de hier voorgelegde beginselen en de uitdagingen te
onderzoeken die ermee verband houden. Verder moet de raadpleging de lidstaten
buiten de eurozone helpen bij de keuze om al dan niet deel te nemen aan de pijler.
De raadplegingsprocedure zou vóór 31 december 2016 moeten worden afgesloten en de basis
vormen voor een definitief voorstel voor de pijler door de Commissie begin 2017.
4.2. Stimulering van het debat
In de komende maanden zal de Commissie actief samenwerken met andere EU-instellingen,
nationale overheden en parlementen, vakbonden en bedrijfsverenigingen, ngo’s, sociale
dienstverleners, deskundigen uit de academische wereld en het publiek. Op nationaal niveau
zal de Commissie het overleg stimuleren via haar vertegenwoordigingen in de lidstaten en de
Europese sociale partners zullen worden uitgenodigd een actieve rol te spelen bij de
vormgeving van de pijler. De Commissie zal ook het Europees Economisch en Sociaal
Comité en het Comité van de Regio’s verzoeken advies uit te brengen.
10
4.3. Gestructureerde feedback
Naast de openbare raadpleging zullen ook drie werkstromen worden georganiseerd om het
debat te voeden, met name één voor elk van de hierboven vermelde mogelijke resultaten.

Het Europees sociaal acquis: een balans.

De toekomst van werk en van de socialezekerheidsstelsels: uitdagingen en kansen.

De rol van de Europese pijler van sociale rechten als onderdeel van een diepere en
billijkere EMU.
De Commissie zal tegen eind 2016 een Europese conferentie organiseren om feedback te
verzamelen.
4.4. Informatiebasis voor het debat
De
raadpleging
is
beschikbaar
op
een
specifieke
webpagina:
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/europeanpillar-social-rights
Hierop is de volgende informatie terug te vinden:

deze mededeling en de ondersteunende werkdocumenten van de diensten van de
Commissie;

een reeks factsheets, opgesteld door de diensten van de Commissie, met een
gedetailleerde uiteenzetting van de economische en juridische redenering achter de
domeinen die in de schets van de pijler zijn opgenomen, in bijlage bij deze
mededeling;

de activiteiten waarin in het kader van de hierboven vermelde werkstromen wordt
voorzien;

een lijst van bijeenkomsten en evenementen die op Europees en nationaal niveau in de
komende maanden zijn gepland.
5. Vragen van de raadpleging
De Commissie verzoekt alle belanghebbende partijen om uiterlijk op 31 december 2016 de in
deze mededeling gestelde vragen te beantwoorden en eventuele andere opmerkingen in te
dienen.
Dit kan door een online vragenlijst in te vullen die beschikbaar is op de hierboven vermelde
webpagina, of door de bijdrage per e-mail te sturen naar:
EMPL-EUROPEAN-PILLAR-OF-SOCIAL-RIGHTS@ec.europa.eu
of per post naar:
EUROPESE COMMISSIE
Directoraat-generaal Werkgelegenheid, Sociale Zaken en Inclusie
Joseph II-straat 27 – 00/120
11
1049 BRUSSEL6
De vragen waarop de Europese Commissie een antwoord wenst, zijn de volgende:
Over de sociale situatie en het Europees sociaal acquis
1. Wat zijn voor u de dwingendste prioriteiten op sociaal en werkgelegenheidsvlak?
2. Hoe kunnen we met de verschillende sociale en werkgelegenheidssituaties in Europa
rekening houden?
3. Is het EU-acquis actueel en ziet u ruimte voor verdere EU-actie?
Over de toekomst van werk en van de socialezekerheidsstelsels
4. Wat zijn volgens u de meest vernieuwende tendensen?
5. Wat zijn volgens u de belangrijkste risico’s en kansen die verband houden met deze
tendensen?
6. Zijn er bestaande of opkomende beleidsmaatregelen, instellingen of bedrijfspraktijken
die u als referentie zou aanbevelen?
Over de Europese pijler van sociale rechten
7. Bent u het eens met de hier beschreven aanpak voor de oprichting van een Europese
pijler van sociale rechten?
8. Bent u het eens met het bereik, de domeinen en de beginselen van de pijler, zoals ze
hier zijn voorgesteld? Zijn er aspecten die in dit stadium niet duidelijk zijn of
onvoldoende aan bod komen?
9. Welke domeinen en beginselen zouden volgens u het meeste belang hebben als
onderdeel van een hernieuwde convergentie in de eurozone?
10. Hoe zouden deze moeten worden geformuleerd en in de praktijk worden omgezet?
Gelooft u met name in de werkingssfeer en de meerwaarde van minimumnormen of
referentie-indicatoren op bepaalde gebieden, en zo ja, op welke gebieden?
U kunt ook over elk domein en beginsel van de voorgestelde pijler opmerkingen formuleren
via een meer specifieke online vragenlijst die beschikbaar is op de webpagina van de
raadpleging.
6
Alle ontvangen bijdragen zullen samen met de identiteit van de respondent op internet worden gepubliceerd,
tenzij de respondent bezwaar maakt tegen de bekendmaking van de persoonsgegevens omdat dit zijn of haar
legitieme belangen zou schaden. In dat geval kan de bijdrage anoniem worden gepubliceerd. Anders wordt de
bijdrage niet gepubliceerd en wordt met de inhoud ervan in principe geen rekening gehouden.
12
EUROPESE
COMMISSIE
Straatsburg, 8.3.2016
COM(2016) 127 final
ANNEX 1
BIJLAGE
Eerste voorlopige schets van een Europese pijler van sociale rechten
bij
MEDEDELING VAN DE COMMISSIE AAN HET EUROPEES PARLEMENT, DE
RAAD, HET EUROPEES ECONOMISCH EN SOCIAAL COMITE EN HET COMITE
VAN DE REGIO'S
Lancering van een raadpleging over een Europese pijler van sociale rechten
{SWD(2016) 50 final}
{SWD(2016) 51 final}
NL
NL
Inhoud
HOOFDSTUK I:
ARBEIDSMARKT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
GELIJKE
KANSEN
EN
TOEGANG
TOT
DE
Vaardigheden, onderwijs en een leven lang leren
Flexibele en zekere arbeidsovereenkomsten
Zekerheid bij het veranderen van loopbaan
Actieve ondersteuning van werkgelegenheid
Gendergelijkheid en evenwicht tussen werk en privéleven
Gelijke kansen
HOOFDSTUK II: BILLIJKE ARBEIDSOMSTANDIGHEDEN
7. Arbeidsvoorwaarden
8. Lonen
9. Gezondheid en veiligheid op het werk
10. Sociale dialoog en betrokkenheid van werknemers
HOOFDSTUK III: ADEQUATE EN HOUDBARE SOCIALE BESCHERMING
11. Geïntegreerde sociale uitkeringen en diensten
12. Gezondheidszorg en ziekte-uitkeringen
13. Pensioenen
14. Werkloosheidsuitkeringen
15. Minimuminkomen
16. Personen met een handicap
17. Langdurige zorg
18. Kinderopvang
19. Huisvesting
20. Toegang tot essentiële diensten
1
Toelichting
Deze bijlage omvat een eerste voorlopige schets van de Europese pijler van sociale
rechten met het oog op een raadpleging van het brede publiek. De pijler is ontworpen
om binnen de eurozone te worden opgericht maar ook andere lidstaten zouden op
vrijwillige basis kunnen deelnemen.
De pijler vertrekt vanuit de sociale doelstellingen en rechten die in het primair EUrecht zijn opgenomen, namelijk het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie (VEU), het
Verdrag betreffende de Werking van de Europese Unie (VWEU) en het Handvest van
de grondrechten, en vanuit de jurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie van de Europese
Unie. Om de raadpleging zo breed mogelijk te houden, behelst de pijler zowel
gebieden waarin de EU wetgevende bevoegdheid heeft als gebieden waarin in de
eerste plaats de lidstaten bevoegd zijn en de rol van de EU eerder ondersteunend en
aanvullend is. Er is ook gekeken naar praktijken op nationaal niveau en naar
internationale rechtsbronnen.
Het ontwerp van de pijler houdt geen herformulering of wijziging in van de bestaande
rechten; deze blijven van toepassing. De pijler heeft tot doel de bestaande rechten aan
te vullen aan de hand van een gedetailleerde uiteenzetting van een aantal essentiële
beginselen die de deelnemende lidstaten bij het voeren van hun sociaal en
werkgelegenheidsbeleid zouden moeten hanteren; daarbij wordt specifiek de klemtoon
gelegd op de behoeften van de eurozone en de uitdagingen waar deze voor staat. Eens
de pijler tot stand is gekomen, zou deze het referentiekader moeten worden om de
sociale prestaties van de deelnemende lidstaten en hun prestaties op het vlak van
werkgelegenheid te onderzoeken, hervormingen op nationaal niveau te stimuleren en,
meer in het bijzonder, als kompas te dienen voor hernieuwde convergentie in de
eurozone.
De beginselen die hier worden uiteengezet, zijn gegroepeerd volgens
20 beleidsdomeinen die van essentieel belang worden geacht voor goed werkende en
billijke arbeidsmarkten en socialezekerheidsstelsels. In deze schets is rekening
gehouden met economische en sociale overwegingen, de sterk uiteenlopende situaties
in Europa en de veranderende realiteit in de praktijk. Zij handelen over de
belangrijkste aandachtspunten om tot een diepere en eerlijkere economische en
monetaire unie te komen, zoals de noodzaak het concurrentievermogen te stimuleren,
de participatie op de arbeidsmarkt te verhogen, adequate minimale sociale
bescherming te ontwikkelen, het potentieel van mensen ten volle te benutten, de
houdbaarheid van de overheidsfinanciën te waarborgen en het aanpassingsvermogen
en de veerkracht van de economische structuren te vergroten.
De beginselen die hier worden uiteengezet, gelden voor EU-burgers en onderdanen
van derde landen die legaal in een lidstaat verblijven en al dan niet actief zijn,
overeenkomstig de formulering van elk beginsel. In het kader van de raadpleging
wordt onder de term "werknemer" voorlopig elke persoon verstaan die, gedurende
een bepaalde tijd, voor een ander prestaties verricht tegen beloning en daarbij onder
het gezag van die ander handelt met betrekking tot de bepaling van de tijd, de plaats
en de inhoud van zijn werk.
2
Onder "zelfstandige" wordt eenieder verstaan die voor eigen rekening een
winstgevende activiteit uitoefent. "Werkzame personen" verwijst naar zowel
werknemers als zelfstandigen. Het toepassingsgebied van deze termen moet tijdens
het raadplegingsproces mogelijk verder worden verfijnd.
De keuze en de formulering van de beginselen zijn onder andere gebaseerd op
bestaande richtsnoeren van het Europees semester voor coördinatie van het
economisch beleid, op afgeleide EU-wetgeving en, indien beschikbaar, op "soft law"richtsnoeren. Om elk beginsel beter in zijn context te kunnen plaatsen, wordt in de
schets een indicatie gegeven van de voornaamste bestaande uitdagingen, wordt de
mogelijke meerwaarde van elk beginsel verduidelijkt en worden, aan de hand van
kaders en indien van toepassing, de overeenkomstige rechten in het primair recht
aangehaald. Het is de bedoeling dat de beginselen het onderwerp uitmaken van een
breed debat en in het kader van het raadplegingsproces worden verfijnd met het oog
op een definitief voorstel voor de Europese pijler van sociale rechten in 2017.
3
HOOFDSTUK I: GELIJKE KANSEN EN
TOEGANG TOT DE ARBEIDSMARKT
1. Vaardigheden, onderwijs en een leven lang leren
De basisvaardigheden op het gebied van taal, lezen en schrijven, rekenen en
informatie- en communicatietechnologie (ICT), essentiële bouwstenen voor het
verdere leerproces, vormen voor een aanzienlijk deel van de bevolking, zowel
kinderen als volwassenen, nog steeds een uitdaging. Om de kwaliteit en de relevantie
van de onderwijsresultaten te verhogen, moeten de onderwijs- en opleidingsstelsels
doeltreffender en billijker worden en beter afgestemd zijn op de behoeften van de
arbeidsmarkt en de maatschappij. Gelijke toegang tot het verwerven van
basisvaardigheden en sleutelcompetenties tijdens de initiële opleiding, ongeacht de
economische middelen, moet worden aangevuld met een hoogwaardig aanbod aan
mogelijkheden voor volwassenen om gedurende hun hele leven basisvaardigheden en
sleutelcompetenties te verwerven. Door de vergrijzing van de bevolking, de
verlenging van het beroepsleven en de toegenomen immigratie van onderdanen uit
derde landen zijn aanvullende maatregelen nodig op het vlak van bijscholing en een
leven lang leren, zodat eenieder zich met succes kan aanpassen aan de technologische
veranderingen en snel evoluerende arbeidsmarkten.
a. Elke persoon moet gedurende zijn hele leven toegang hebben tot kwaliteitsvol
onderwijs en kwaliteitsvolle opleiding zodat hij een adequaat niveau van
basisvaardigheden en sleutelcompetenties kan verwerven die hem ertoe in staat
stellen actief aan het maatschappelijke en beroepsleven deel te nemen.
Laaggeschoolde jongeren en volwassenen in de werkende leeftijd moeten worden
aangemoedigd zich bij te scholen.
Artikel 14 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Eenieder heeft recht op onderwijs en op toegang tot
beroepsopleiding en bijscholing. Dit recht houdt de mogelijkheid in, verplicht onderwijs kosteloos te
volgen.
De artikelen 165 en 166 VWEU bepalen dat de Unie een beleid inzake beroepsopleiding ten uitvoer
legt en bijdraagt tot de ontwikkeling van onderwijs van hoog gehalte door samenwerking tussen de
lidstaten aan te moedigen en hun activiteiten te ondersteunen en aan te vullen.
2. Flexibele en zekere arbeidsovereenkomsten
Flexibele overeenkomsten kunnen de toetreding tot de arbeidsmarkt vergemakkelijken
en het veranderen van loopbaan bevorderen terwijl zij werkgevers in staat stellen in te
spelen op verschuivingen in de vraag. Digitale economieën wijzigen de werkpatronen
en leiden tot nieuwe vormen van werk zoals zelfstandig werk. Dit kan de toegang tot
de arbeidsmarkt diversifiëren en er mede voor zorgen dat mensen actief blijven. Er
4
bestaan echter nog steeds grote verschillen tussen de arbeidsvoorwaarden van de
verschillende arbeidsovereenkomsten.
Bovendien bestaan er grijze zones zoals economisch afhankelijke zelfstandige arbeid
en schijnzelfstandigheid die aanleiding geven tot onduidelijke juridische situaties en
de toegang tot sociale bescherming belemmeren. Dergelijke situaties kunnen leiden
tot onzekere arbeidsverhoudingen en/of een tweedeling en segmentering van de
arbeidsmarkten, die de productiviteit afremmen en personen dreigen uit te sluiten.
Arbeidsovereenkomsten voor bepaalde tijd kunnen het risico op onzekerheid nog
vergroten aangezien zij minder goed beschermen tegen ontslag en aanleiding geven
tot lagere lonen en beperktere toegang tot sociale bescherming en opleiding. Indien
men evolueert naar vormen van arbeidsovereenkomsten die vergelijkbaar zijn op het
vlak van garanties en kosten, kan tijdelijk werk een opstap worden naar stabiel en
zeker werk en tegelijk ook de veerkracht van arbeidsmarkten bij schokken vergroten.
a. Gelijke behandeling moet worden gewaarborgd, ongeacht de arbeidsovereenkomst,
behalve wanneer een verschil in behandeling op objectieve gronden
gerechtvaardigd is. Een verkeerd gebruik of misbruik van onzekere en tijdelijke
arbeidsrelaties moet worden voorkomen.
b. Flexibele arbeidsvoorwaarden kunnen de toetreding tot de arbeidsmarkt
vergemakkelijken en werkgevers blijvend in staat stellen snel op verschuivingen in
de vraag in te spelen; wel moet de overgang naar een overeenkomst voor
onbepaalde tijd worden gewaarborgd.
Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie minimumvoorschriften kan vaststellen, en het optreden van de
lidstaten op het gebied van de arbeidsvoorwaarden ondersteunt en aanvult.
3. Zekerheid bij het veranderen van loopbaan
Het beroepsleven wordt steeds diverser, met onder andere combinaties van
verschillende banen en vormen van werkgelegenheid, loopbaanonderbrekingen en
meer mobiliteit en veranderingen gedurende de loopbaan. Om optimaal in te spelen
op technologische veranderingen en snel evoluerende arbeidsmarkten moet er snellere
en betere ondersteuning komen om van baan of loopbaan te veranderen, alsook steun
voor regelmatige bijscholing gedurende het beroepsleven.
Bijscholing vereist investeringen door zowel individuele werknemers als bedrijven en
de maatschappij. Bepaalde rechten op sociale bescherming, zoals bedrijfspensioenen,
werkloosheidsuitkeringen, ziekteverzekeringen of rechten die op basis van
opleidingen zijn opgebouwd, kunnen niet altijd makkelijk worden overgedragen
wanneer iemand van werk verandert, noch kunnen zij worden benut of blijven zij
verworven wanneer iemand voor eigen rekening een activiteit opstart. Omgekeerd
mogen bepaalde rechten werkzoekenden of inactieven niet ontmoedigen om opnieuw
te gaan werken of een eigen activiteit op te starten.
5
a. Alle personen in de werkende leeftijd moeten toegang hebben tot
geïndividualiseerde hulp bij het zoeken naar een baan en zij moeten worden
aangemoedigd om opleidingen en bijscholing te volgen zodat zij hun
toekomstperspectieven op de arbeidsmarkt of als ondernemer kunnen verbeteren en
sneller van baan of loopbaan kunnen veranderen.
b. Het behoud en de overdraagbaarheid van sociale rechten en rechten op basis van
opleidingen die tijdens de loopbaan zijn opgebouwd, moeten worden gewaarborgd,
zodat mensen makkelijker van baan of loopbaan kunnen veranderen.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich de bevordering van de werkgelegenheid ten
doel stellen. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de lidstaten op het gebied van de
sociale zekerheid en de sociale bescherming van de werknemers, de bestrijding van sociale uitsluiting,
en de modernisering van de stelsels voor sociale bescherming ondersteunt en aanvult.
4. Actieve ondersteuning van werkgelegenheid
Om aanhoudende, herhaalde en langdurige werkloosheid, in het bijzonder bij jongeren
en mensen met weinig vaardigheden, te bestrijden, is adequate en gerichte
ondersteuning nodig om personen in staat te stellen (opnieuw) te gaan werken; ook
moeten maatregelen worden genomen voor de ontwikkeling van vaardigheden,
kwalificaties en werkervaring die het mogelijk maken nieuwe beroepsbezigheden uit
te voeren. Snelle en effectieve toegang tot dergelijke maatregelen kan sociale
uitsluiting en uitsluiting van de arbeidsmarkt voorkomen.
a. Alle jongeren tot de leeftijd van 25 jaar moeten binnen vier maanden nadat zij
werkloos zijn geworden of het formele onderwijs hebben verlaten, een deugdelijk
aanbod krijgen voor een baan, voortgezet onderwijs, een plaats in het leerlingstelsel
of een stage.
b. Ook moet worden gegarandeerd dat personen die al lange tijd als werkzoekende
geregistreerd zijn grondige individuele beoordelingen en richtsnoeren aangeboden
krijgen
alsook,
na
uiterlijk
18 maanden
werkloosheid,
een
re-integratieovereenkomst die een individueel aanbod van diensten en de
aanwijzing van één loket omvat.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich de bevordering van de werkgelegenheid ten
doel stellen. Artikel 153 bepaalt ook dat de Unie minimumvoorschriften kan vaststellen, en de
inspanningen van de lidstaten om de integratie van personen die van de arbeidsmarkt zijn uitgesloten,
te bevorderen, ondersteunt en aanvult.
6
5. Gendergelijkheid en evenwicht tussen werk en privéleven
Hoewel vrouwen mannen op het gebied van opleidingsniveau zijn voorbijgestreefd,
zijn zij nog steeds ondervertegenwoordigd op de arbeidsmarkt en
oververtegenwoordigd in deeltijdwerk en slechter betaalde sectoren, en verdienen zij
minder per uur. De ondersteuning van de participatie van vrouwen op de arbeidsmarkt
is van fundamenteel belang om te garanderen dat zij gelijke kansen krijgen, en wordt
een economische noodzaak in de context van een vergrijzend arbeidspotentieel.
Een gebrek aan adequate verlofregelingen en zorgregelingen voor kinderen en andere
gezinsleden ten laste kunnen mensen met zorgtaken, voornamelijk vrouwen,
ontmoedigen hun baan verder uit te oefenen of opnieuw aan het werk te gaan.
Factoren die de participatie van vrouwen op de arbeidsmarkt belemmeren, zijn onder
andere het gebrek aan beleidsmaatregelen om werk en privéleven beter te combineren,
negatieve fiscale prikkels voor tweede verdieners of de buitensporige belasting op
arbeid, en stereotypen op het vlak van studies en beroepsuitoefening.
De toegang tot betaald verlof om familiale redenen of verzekeringsstelsels voor
zelfstandigen of werknemers die niet voltijds en met arbeidsovereenkomsten voor
onbepaalde tijd werken, blijft variabel. Bovendien zijn de mogelijkheden voor
mannen om verlof te nemen ontoereikend en worden zij daartoe ook onvoldoende
aangemoedigd, wat de rol van vrouwen versterkt als degenen die daadwerkelijk
instaan voor het verlenen van zorg en een negatieve invloed heeft op hun participatie
op de arbeidsmarkt.
Digitale omgevingen en de combinatie van verschillende beroepsbezigheden in de
deeleconomie zorgen er mede voor dat er meer mogelijkheden bestaan om het werk
flexibel te organiseren. Flexibele arbeidsregelingen kunnen bijdragen tot een beter
evenwicht tussen werk en privéleven aangezien zij zowel werknemers als bedrijven
de mogelijkheid bieden de werkschema's en -patronen af te stemmen op hun
behoeften.
a. Gendergelijkheid op de arbeidsmarkt en in het onderwijs moeten worden
gestimuleerd, zodat een gelijke behandeling op alle vlakken, met inbegrip van loon,
wordt gegarandeerd, de obstakels die de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van vrouwen
belemmeren, worden weggewerkt, en segregatie van de arbeidsmarkt wordt
voorkomen.
b. Alle ouders en mensen met zorgtaken moeten toegang hebben tot adequate
verlofregelingen ten behoeve van de zorg voor kinderen en andere familieleden ten
laste en tot zorgdiensten1. Een gelijk gebruik van verlofregelingen door mannen en
vrouwen moet worden aangemoedigd aan de hand van maatregelen zoals betaalde
verlofregelingen voor ouders, zowel mannen als vrouwen.
c. Flexibele arbeidsregelingen, onder andere wat de arbeidstijd betreft, in
overeenstemming tussen werkgevers en werknemers, moeten mogelijk worden
1
In overeenstemming met de beginselen 17 en 18.
7
gemaakt en worden aangemoedigd; daarbij moet rekening worden gehouden met
de behoeften van zowel werknemers als werkgevers.
Artikel 33 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Teneinde beroeps- en gezinsleven te kunnen
combineren, heeft eenieder recht op bescherming tegen ontslag om een reden die verband houdt met
moederschap, alsmede recht op betaald moederschapsverlof en recht op ouderschapsverlof na de
geboorte of de adoptie van een kind.
Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie minimumvoorschriften kan vaststellen, en het optreden van de
lidstaten op het gebied van het arbeidsmilieu, de arbeidsvoorwaarden en de gelijkheid van mannen en
vrouwen wat hun kansen op de arbeidsmarkt en de behandeling op het werk betreft, ondersteunt en
aanvult.
Artikel 23 van het Handvest van de grondrechten bepaalt voorts het volgende: De gelijkheid van
vrouwen en mannen moet worden gewaarborgd op alle gebieden, met inbegrip van werkgelegenheid,
beroep en beloning. Het beginsel van gelijkheid belet niet dat maatregelen worden gehandhaafd of
genomen waarbij specifieke voordelen worden ingesteld ten gunste van het ondervertegenwoordigde
geslacht.
Artikel 3 VEU bepaalt dat de Unie sociale uitsluiting en discriminatie bestrijdt. Daarnaast bepaalt
artikel 8 VWEU dat de Unie ernaar streeft de ongelijkheden tussen mannen en vrouwen op te heffen en
de gelijkheid van mannen en vrouwen te bevorderen. Artikel 19 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie passende
maatregelen kan nemen om discriminatie op grond van geslacht, ras of etnische afstamming,
godsdienst of overtuiging, handicap, leeftijd of seksuele geaardheid te bestrijden. Artikel 153 VWEU
bepaalt dat de Unie minimumvoorschriften kan vaststellen, en het optreden van de lidstaten op het
gebied van de integratie van personen die van de arbeidsmarkt zijn uitgesloten en de bevordering van
de gelijkheid van mannen en vrouwen wat hun kansen op de arbeidsmarkt en de behandeling op het
werk betreft, ondersteunt en aanvult.
6. Gelijke kansen
Discriminatie op grond van geslacht, ras of etnische afstamming, godsdienst of
overtuiging, handicap, leeftijd of seksuele geaardheid is in de gehele Unie illegaal.
Toch ondervinden bepaalde groepen moeilijkheden om toe te treden tot de
arbeidsmarkt. Met name onderdanen van derde landen en etnische minderheden zijn
ondervertegenwoordigd op de arbeidsmarkt en lopen een groter risico op armoede en
sociale uitsluiting. Het is belangrijk de factoren aan te pakken die hun participatie
belemmeren; dit kunnen taalbarrières zijn of lacunes in de erkenning van
vaardigheden en kwalificaties. Wat de discriminatie op grond van nationaliteit of
etnische afstamming betreft, toont de ervaring in de praktijk aan dat werkgevers te
weinig kennis hebben van niet-discriminerende aanwervingspraktijken en dat
personen die het slachtoffer zijn van discriminatie, onvoldoende bewust zijn van hun
rechten.
De ondersteuning van de participatie van deze groepen op de arbeidsmarkt is van
fundamenteel belang om te garanderen dat zij gelijke kansen krijgen, en wordt een
economische noodzaak in de context van een vergrijzend arbeidspotentieel.
8
a. De participatie van ondervertegenwoordigde groepen op de arbeidsmarkt moet
worden verbeterd, met een gelijke behandeling op alle gebieden, onder andere door
bewustmaking en de bestrijding van discriminatie.
Artikel 21 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Iedere discriminatie, met name op grond van
geslacht, ras, kleur, etnische of sociale afkomst, genetische kenmerken, taal, godsdienst of overtuiging,
politieke of andere denkbeelden, het behoren tot een nationale minderheid, vermogen, geboorte, een
handicap, leeftijd of seksuele gerichtheid, is verboden.
Artikel 3 VEU bepaalt dat de Unie sociale uitsluiting en discriminatie bestrijdt. Daarnaast bepaalt
artikel 8 VWEU dat de Unie ernaar streeft de ongelijkheden tussen mannen en vrouwen op te heffen en
de gelijkheid van mannen en vrouwen te bevorderen. Artikel 19 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie passende
maatregelen kan nemen om discriminatie op grond van geslacht, ras of etnische afstamming,
godsdienst of overtuiging, handicap, leeftijd of seksuele geaardheid te bestrijden. Artikel 153 VWEU
bepaalt dat de Unie minimumvoorschriften kan vaststellen, en het optreden van de lidstaten op het
gebied van de integratie van personen die van de arbeidsmarkt zijn uitgesloten en de bevordering van
de gelijkheid van mannen en vrouwen wat hun kansen op de arbeidsmarkt en de behandeling op het
werk betreft, ondersteunt en aanvult.
9
HOOFDSTUK II: BILLIJKE ARBEIDSOMSTANDIGHEDEN
7. Arbeidsvoorwaarden
De nieuwe flexibele vormen van werk vereisen dat extra aandacht wordt besteed aan
de vaststelling van de aard, de omvang en de duur van het werk, de identificatie van
de werkgevers en het bijhorende niveau van sociale bescherming, en het vermijden
van misbruiken in de proeftijd. Gedecentraliseerde vormen van werk op basis van
zelforganisatie kunnen de autonomie van de werknemer doen toenemen en een
stimulans vormen voor de ontwikkeling van ondernemingen; zij kunnen er echter ook
toe leiden dat de geldende rechten minder bekend zijn en er onduidelijkheid bestaat
over de door de werkgevers te verstrekken informatie. Bestaande wettelijke EUbepalingen met betrekking tot informatie voor werknemers over de
arbeidsvoorwaarden gelden niet vanaf het begin van het dienstverband en kunnen
moeilijker worden toegepast in bedrijfsorganisatiemodellen die in toenemende mate
transnationaal, mobiel en digitaal zijn en hun activiteiten verplaatsen. De complexe,
dure en onduidelijke regelgeving die op de beëindiging van arbeidsovereenkomsten
voor onbepaalde tijd van toepassing is, doet bedrijven aarzelen om aan te werven en
brengt verschillen met zich mee in de handhaving van de bestaande regels.
a. Elke werknemer moet voor het begin van het dienstverband schriftelijk worden
geïnformeerd over de rechten en plichten die uit het dienstverband voortvloeien.
b. Een eventuele proeftijd moet van redelijke duur zijn en voor het begin ervan
moeten werknemers op de hoogte worden gebracht van de toepasselijke
voorwaarden.
c. Het ontslag van een werknemer moet gemotiveerd zijn en worden voorafgegaan
door een redelijke opzegtermijn; daarbij moet in een passende compensatie worden
voorzien en moet toegang mogelijk zijn tot snel en effectief beroep bij een
onpartijdig systeem van geschillenbeslechting.
Artikel 30 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Iedere werknemer heeft overeenkomstig het recht
van de Unie en de nationale wetgevingen en praktijken recht op bescherming tegen iedere vorm van
kennelijk onredelijk ontslag.
Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie door middel van richtlijnen minimumvoorschriften kan
vaststellen, en het optreden van de lidstaten op het gebied van de arbeidsvoorwaarden en de
bescherming van de werknemers bij beëindiging van de arbeidsovereenkomst, ondersteunt en aanvult.
10
8. Lonen
Adequate minimumlonen garanderen een waardige levensstandaard voor werknemers
en hun families en helpen armoede onder werkenden tegen te gaan. Indien dergelijke
minimumlonen op grote schaal worden toegepast, worden verstoringen die leiden tot
tweedeling op de arbeidsmarkt vermeden. Een voorspelbare ontwikkeling van de
lonen is belangrijk voor een stabiel bedrijfsklimaat. Minimumlonen moeten op een
niveau worden vastgesteld dat laaggeschoolden hun werkgelegenheidsvooruitzichten
behouden en dat werk lonend wordt voor werklozen en inactieven. Het is bewezen dat
het, in het bijzonder binnen de eurozone, cruciaal is voor het concurrentievermogen
om de ontwikkeling van de minimumlonen aan de productiviteit te koppelen.
a. Alle vormen van werkgelegenheid moeten billijk worden vergoed, zodat zij een
waardige levensstandaard mogelijk maken. Minimumlonen moeten aan de hand
van een transparant en voorspelbaar mechanisme op zodanige wijze worden
vastgesteld dat de toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt en de motivatie om te werken, intact
blijven. De ontwikkeling van de lonen moet de ontwikkeling van de productiviteit
volgen; dit moet gebeuren in overleg met de sociale partners en in
overeenstemming met nationale gebruiken.
9. Gezondheid en veiligheid op het werk
Minder stabiele arbeidsverhoudingen, nieuwe werkpatronen en een vergrijzend
arbeidspotentieel vormen nieuwe uitdagingen voor de gezondheid en veiligheid op het
werk. Bescherming bieden tegen arbeidsongevallen en beroepsziekten voor alle
werknemers, ongeacht de vorm van de arbeidsverhouding, en grijze zones aanpakken
zoals economisch afhankelijke zelfstandige arbeid en schijnzelfstandigheid die
aanleiding geven tot onduidelijke juridische situaties, zijn een belangrijke manier om
onzekerheid en maatschappelijke kosten te beperken en de productiviteit van
bedrijven te doen toenemen. Voor meer inspanningen op het vlak van re-integratie en
rehabilitatie moeten werkgevers meer worden betrokken bij omscholing en
aanpassingen van de werkplek. Voor kleine ondernemingen blijft de handhaving van
preventieve en corrigerende maatregelen belastend.
a. Een adequaat niveau van bescherming tegen alle risico's die zich op het werk
kunnen voordoen, en afdoende ondersteuning voor de uitvoering ervan, met name
in kleine en micro-ondernemingen, moeten worden gewaarborgd.
Artikel 31 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Iedere werknemer heeft recht op gezonde, veilige en
waardige arbeidsomstandigheden.
Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie door middel van richtlijnen minimumvoorschriften kan
vaststellen, en het optreden van de lidstaten op het gebied van de arbeidsvoorwaarden en de verbetering
van het arbeidsmilieu, om de veiligheid en de gezondheid van de werknemers te beschermen,
ondersteunt en aanvult.
11
10. Sociale dialoog en betrokkenheid van werknemers
Een goed werkende sociale dialoog vereist autonome en representatieve sociale partners die
in staat zijn collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten te sluiten. Aangezien de organisationele
densiteit en representativiteit afnemen, moeten de sociale partners hun capaciteiten verder
uitbouwen om bij een beter werkende en effectieve sociale dialoog betrokken te zijn. De
betrokkenheid van de sociale partners op nationaal en EU-niveau is van cruciaal belang om de
vormgeving en uitvoering van het economisch en sociaal beleid te doen slagen; dit houdt ook
hun betrokkenheid in bij de inspanningen om de werkgelegenheid in stand te houden in
perioden van economische neergang. Bovendien geven nieuwe vormen van
arbeidsorganisatie, zoals in de dienstensector en in de digitale economie, aanleiding tot
onevenwichtigheden in de betrokkenheid van werknemers en kunnen deze werknemers ook
moeilijker worden geïnformeerd en geraadpleegd.
a. De sociale partners moeten worden geraadpleegd bij de vormgeving en uitvoering
van het sociaal en werkgelegenheidsbeleid. Zij moeten worden aangemoedigd om
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten te sluiten op gebieden die voor hen relevant zijn,
met inachtneming van de nationale tradities, de eigen autonomie en het recht op
collectieve actie.
b. De tijdige informatie en raadpleging van alle werknemers, met inbegrip van zij die
digitaal werken en/of over de grenzen heen actief zijn, of van hun
vertegenwoordigers, moet worden gewaarborgd, in het bijzonder in gevallen van
collectief ontslag of van overdracht, herstructurering en fusie van ondernemingen.
De artikelen 12 en 27 van het Handvest van de grondrechten bepalen respectievelijk: Eenieder heeft op
alle niveaus, met name op politiek, vakverenigings- en maatschappelijk gebied, het recht op vrijheid
van vreedzame vergadering en op vrijheid van vereniging, hetgeen mede omvat eenieders recht, ter
bescherming van zijn belangen samen met anderen vakverenigingen op te richten of zich daarbij aan te
sluiten. Werknemers en hun vertegenwoordigers moeten in de gevallen en onder de voorwaarden
waarin het recht van de Unie en de nationale wetgevingen en praktijken voorzien, de zekerheid hebben,
dat zij op passende niveaus tijdig worden geïnformeerd en geraadpleegd.
Artikel 28 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Werkgevers en werknemers of hun respectieve
organisaties hebben overeenkomstig het recht van de Unie en de nationale wetgevingen en praktijken
het recht, op passende niveaus collectief te onderhandelen en collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten te
sluiten, alsmede, in geval van belangenconflicten, collectieve actie te ondernemen ter verdediging van
hun belangen, met inbegrip van staking.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich de bevordering van de sociale dialoog ten
doel stellen. Artikel 152 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie de rol van de sociale partners erkent en bevordert
en hun onderlinge dialoog bevordert. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie door middel van
richtlijnen minimumvoorschriften kan vaststellen, en dat zij het optreden van de lidstaten op het gebied
van de informatie en de raadpleging van de werknemers en de vertegenwoordiging en collectieve
verdediging van de belangen van werknemers en werkgevers, ondersteunt en aanvult. Bij de
artikelen 154 en 155 VWEU is voor de sociale partners een rol in het wetgevingsproces vastgesteld.
12
HOOFDSTUK III: ADEQUATE EN HOUDBARE SOCIALE BESCHERMING
11. Geïntegreerde sociale uitkeringen en diensten
Soms krijgen personen door de veelheid van uitkeringen en diensten, instanties en
aanvraagprocedures moeilijk toegang tot alle steun die zij nodig hebben. Een gebrek
aan geïntegreerde uitkeringen en diensten gaat ten koste van de doeltreffendheid
ervan in de strijd tegen armoede en de ondersteuning van sociale en arbeidsintegratie.
Het op elkaar afstemmen van sociale uitkeringen, actieve steun en sociale diensten is
essentieel voor de doeltreffendheid van de steun. Een dergelijke afstemming zou
betrekking moeten hebben op de voorwaarden voor het recht op en de mate waarin
steun wordt verleend, een gecoördineerd steunaanbod en het behoud van bepaalde
rechten wanneer iemand weer gaat werken of opnieuw een eigen activiteit opstart.
Een betere integratie van uitkeringen en diensten kan de kosteneffectiviteit van de
sociale bescherming verbeteren.
a. Uitkeringen en diensten voor sociale bescherming moeten voor zover mogelijk
worden geïntegreerd teneinde de samenhang en doeltreffendheid van deze
maatregelen te versterken en sociale en arbeidsintegratie te ondersteunen.
Artikel 34 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: De Unie erkent en eerbiedigt het recht op toegang
tot socialezekerheidsvoorzieningen en sociale diensten.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich een adequate sociale bescherming en de
bestrijding van uitsluiting ten doel stellen. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de
lidstaten op het gebied van de sociale zekerheid en de sociale bescherming van de werknemers, de
modernisering van de stelsels voor sociale bescherming en de integratie van personen op de
arbeidsmarkt ondersteunt en aanvult.
12. Gezondheidszorg en ziekte-uitkeringen
De vergrijzing van de bevolking en de hoge kosten voor behandelingen zetten de
financiële houdbaarheid van de gezondheidszorgstelsels en het vermogen om aan
iedereen degelijke gezondheidzorg te verstrekken, steeds meer onder druk. Hoge
inkomensgerelateerde kosten voor behandelingen of te lange wachtperioden zijn
bepalende factoren gebleken voor de ontoegankelijkheid van medische zorg. Om
universele toegang tot kwaliteitszorg te waarborgen en tegelijkertijd de financiële
houdbaarheid van de gezondheidszorgstelsels te garanderen, een kosteneffectieve
zorgverstrekking aan te moedigen en een gezonde levensstijl en ziektepreventie te
bevorderen, zijn grotere inspanningen nodig voor veerkrachtigere, efficiëntere en
effectievere gezondheidszorgstelsels; dit kan de gezondheidszorgstelsels beter in staat
stellen op de uitdagingen in te spelen. Door te zorgen voor universele toegang tot
13
gezondheidszorg en door ongelijkheden op het gebied van gezondheid aan te pakken,
wordt de sociale samenhang versterkt en worden de economische resultaten verbeterd.
Regelingen voor ziekte-uitkeringen en/of betaald ziekteverlof lopen sterk uiteen op
het vlak van carensdagen, duur, vervangingsniveaus en controlemechanismen. Het
blijft een hele uitdaging om een adequaat minimaal vervangingsniveau van de ziekteuitkeringen te garanderen en rehabilitatie en re-integratie aan te moedigen, maar
tegelijk ook de financiële houdbaarheid van dergelijke stelsels te behouden.
a. Eenieder moet tijdig toegang hebben tot hoogwaardige preventieve en curatieve
gezondheidszorg, en de behoefte aan gezondheidszorg mag niet leiden tot
armoede of financiële belasting.
b. Het beleid van gezondheidszorgstelsels moet kosteneffectieve zorgverstrekking
aanmoedigen, maar ook een gezonde levensstijl en ziektepreventie bevorderen,
zodat de stelsels veerkrachtiger en financieel houdbaarder worden.
c. Alle werknemers, ongeacht het type overeenkomst, moeten tijdens perioden
van ziekte recht hebben op behoorlijk betaald ziekteverlof en zelfstandigen
moeten worden aangemoedigd in te stappen in verzekeringsregelingen.
Effectieve re-integratie en rehabilitatie om snel terug aan het werk te kunnen
gaan, moeten worden aangemoedigd.
Artikel 35 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Eenieder heeft recht op toegang tot preventieve
gezondheidszorg en op medische verzorging onder de door de nationale wetgevingen en praktijken
gestelde voorwaarden. Bij de bepaling en de uitvoering van het beleid en het optreden van de Unie
wordt een hoog niveau van bescherming van de menselijke gezondheid verzekerd. Artikel 34 van het
Handvest van de grondrechten: De Unie erkent en eerbiedigt het recht op toegang tot de sociale
zekerheid [...] in omstandigheden zoals ziekte.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich een adequate sociale bescherming ten doel
stellen. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de lidstaten op het gebied van de
sociale zekerheid en de sociale bescherming van de werknemers en de modernisering van de stelsels
voor sociale bescherming ondersteunt en aanvult.
Artikel 168 VWEU bepaalt dat bij de bepaling en de uitvoering van elk beleid en elk optreden van de
Unie een hoog niveau van bescherming van de menselijke gezondheid wordt verzekerd.
13. Pensioenen
Door de stijgende levensduur en de krimpende bevolking in de werkende leeftijd
ontstaan twee uitdagingen: de financiële houdbaarheid van de pensioenen waarborgen
en in staat zijn toereikende pensioeninkomens te verstrekken. Om de houdbaarheid
van de overheidsfinanciën op lange termijn te combineren met een rechtvaardige
lastenverdeling tussen de generaties is het belangrijk de wettelijke pensioenleeftijd te
koppelen aan de levensverwachting en de kloof tussen de werkelijke en de wettelijke
14
pensioenleeftijd te verkleinen
beroepsbevolking tegen te gaan.
door
vroegtijdige
pensionering
van
de
In verschillende lidstaten vormt de ontoereikendheid van de pensioenen een extra
uitdaging. In de meeste landen bestaat bovendien een grote genderkloof op het gebied
van pensioenen, aangezien de lagere inkomsten en de frequentere
loopbaanonderbrekingen van vrouwen tot gevolg hebben dat hun pensioenbijdragen,
en bijgevolg ook hun pensioenrechten, lager liggen.
Ook zelfstandigen en werknemers in flexibele arbeid lopen meer risico op een
ontoereikend pensioen en kunnen minder aanspraak maken op bedrijfspensioenen.
a. Pensioenen moeten eenieder een waardige levensstandaard garanderen eens de
pensioenleeftijd is bereikt. Er moeten maatregelen worden genomen om de
genderkloof op het gebied van pensioenen aan te pakken, bijvoorbeeld door
zorgperiodes adequaat in rekening te brengen. Zelfstandigen moeten worden
aangemoedigd in te stappen in verzekeringsregelingen.
b. Pensioenregelingen moeten ernaar streven de houdbaarheid en toekomstige
toereikendheid van de pensioenen te waarborgen, door ervoor te zorgen dat de
bijdragen door een brede basis worden gedragen, de wettelijke pensioenleeftijd
wordt gekoppeld aan de levensverwachting en de kloof tussen de werkelijke en
wettelijke pensioenleeftijd wordt gedicht door vroegtijdige pensionering van de
beroepsbevolking tegen te gaan.
Artikel 34 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: De Unie erkent en eerbiedigt het recht op toegang
tot de sociale zekerheid [...] in omstandigheden zoals ouderdom [...] [en] [...] het recht op sociale
bijstand voor eenieder die niet over voldoende middelen beschikt.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich een adequate sociale bescherming en de
bestrijding van uitsluiting ten doel stellen. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de
lidstaten op het gebied van de sociale zekerheid en de sociale bescherming van de werknemers, de
bestrijding van sociale uitsluiting, en de modernisering van de stelsels voor sociale bescherming
ondersteunt en aanvult.
14. Werkloosheidsuitkeringen
Effectieve werkloosheidsuitkeringen zijn een succesvolle manier om werkzoekenden
de mogelijkheid te bieden een job te zoeken en hun vaardigheden beter af te stemmen
op de arbeidsmarkt, economische zekerheid te bieden tijdens perioden van
werkloosheid en armoede te voorkomen; ook zorgen zij voor automatische stabilisatie
bij economische neergang. In sommige gevallen ontvangt slechts een zeer klein deel
van de werklozen een werkloosheidsuitkering door de strenge voorwaarden om ervoor
in aanmerking te komen. De duur van de uitkeringen en de handhaving van de
voorwaarden voor het vinden van een baan en voor deelname aan actieve
steunmaatregelen zijn in sommige lidstaten een punt van zorg.
15
a. Acties om werklozen te ondersteunen moeten de verplichting inhouden actief op
zoek te gaan naar een baan en deel te nemen aan actieve steunmaatregelen, in
combinatie met adequate werkloosheidsuitkeringen. De duur van de uitkeringen
moet lang genoeg zijn om naar een baan te kunnen zoeken maar mag een snelle
terugkeer naar de arbeidsmarkt niet minder aantrekkelijk maken2.
Artikel 34 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: De Unie erkent en eerbiedigt het recht op toegang
tot sociale zekerheidsvoorzieningen [...] bij verlies van arbeid [...].
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich een adequate sociale bescherming en de
bestrijding van uitsluiting ten doel stellen. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de
lidstaten op het gebied van de sociale zekerheid en de sociale bescherming van de werknemers, de
bestrijding van sociale uitsluiting, en de modernisering van de stelsels voor sociale bescherming
ondersteunt en aanvult.
15. Minimuminkomen
In de meeste, maar niet alle, lidstaten wordt in een minimuminkomen voorzien voor personen
die in armoede leven of het risico daarop lopen en die geen andere middelen van bestaan
hebben. Toch bestaan er momenteel uitdagingen op dit vlak zoals ontoereikende uitkeringen
die niet volstaan om aan de armoede te ontsnappen, een lage dekkingsgraad, en gevallen
waarin de steun onder de vorm van een minimuminkomen niet wordt benut wegens de
complexiteit om toegang te krijgen tot deze regelingen. Voor personen in de werkende leeftijd
kunnen een zwakke band met actieve steunmaatregelen en sociale diensten, en uitkeringen die
bij het opnieuw toetreden tot de arbeidsmarkt niet geleidelijk maar meteen volledig
wegvallen, leiden tot uitkeringsvallen en negatieve prikkels om te werken. Door gebrekkige
coördinatie tussen de uitkeringen voor werkloosheid enerzijds en de voorzieningen voor een
minimuminkomen anderzijds is er onvoldoende inkomenszekerheid voor personen voor wie
het recht op werkloosheidsuitkeringen is uitgeput. Wat ouderen betreft, voldoen de
voorzieningen voor het minimuminkomen in de meeste lidstaten niet om personen die geen
andere inkomsten hebben uit de armoede te halen.
a. Adequate voorzieningen voor een minimuminkomen moeten worden gewaarborgd
voor personen die over onvoldoende middelen beschikken om volgens een waardige
levensstandaard te leven. Voor personen in de werkende leeftijd moeten deze
uitkeringen de verplichting inhouden deel te nemen aan actieve steunmaatregelen
ter bevordering van hun (re-)integratie op de arbeidsmarkt.
Artikel 34 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Om sociale uitsluiting en armoede te bestrijden,
erkent en eerbiedigt de Unie het recht op sociale bijstand en op bijstand voor huisvesting, teneinde
eenieder die niet over voldoende middelen beschikt, een waardig bestaan te verzekeren.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich de bestrijding van uitsluiting ten doel
stellen.
2
Zoals beschreven in beginsel 3.
16
Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de lidstaten op het gebied van de bestrijding
van sociale uitsluiting en de integratie van personen op de arbeidsmarkt ondersteunt en aanvult.
16. Personen met een handicap
Personen met een handicap lopen een veel groter risico dan de rest van de bevolking
om het slachtoffer te worden van armoede en sociale uitsluiting. Zij krijgen te maken
met inadequate toegankelijkheid van de werkplek, discriminatie en negatieve
belastingprikkels. De manier waarop de toekenning van invaliditeitsuitkeringen is
georganiseerd, kan leiden tot uitkeringsvallen, bijvoorbeeld in gevallen waar de
uitkeringen volledig worden opgeschort wanneer de persoon (opnieuw) aan het werk
gaat. De beschikbaarheid van ondersteunende diensten kan ook een invloed hebben op
het vermogen om deel te nemen aan het maatschappelijke en beroepsleven.
a. Personen met een handicap moeten toegang hebben tot ondersteunende diensten
en een minimale inkomenszekerheid waardoor zij waardig kunnen leven. De
voorwaarden om recht te hebben op een uitkering mogen geen obstakel vormen
voor arbeidsparticipatie.
Artikel 26 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: De Unie erkent en eerbiedigt het recht van personen
met een handicap op maatregelen die beogen hun zelfstandigheid, hun maatschappelijke en
beroepsintegratie en hun deelname aan het gemeenschapsleven te bewerkstelligen.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich een adequate sociale bescherming en de
bestrijding van uitsluiting ten doel stellen. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de
lidstaten op het gebied van de sociale zekerheid en de sociale bescherming van de werknemers, de
bestrijding van sociale uitsluiting, en de modernisering van de stelsels voor sociale bescherming
ondersteunt en aanvult.
17. Langdurige zorg
De vergrijzing van de bevolking, veranderende familiestructuren en de grotere
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen dragen er stuk voor stuk toe bij dat de vraag naar
diensten voor langdurige zorg toeneemt. Personen met familiale zorgtaken, meestal
vrouwen, vullen vaak de lacune in die ontstaat door de ontoereikendheid of de kosten
van de institutionele zorgverlening. Hoewel vele begunstigden en hun familieleden
een voorkeur hebben voor formele thuiszorg, is deze nog steeds onderontwikkeld
zodat mantelzorg voor vele families vaak de enige optie is, wat een grote financiële
last betekent voor wie ermee te maken krijgt. Om de toegang tot adequate diensten
voor langdurige zorg te garanderen en tegelijk de financiële houdbaarheid van de
stelsels voor langdurige zorg te waarborgen, zijn extra inspanningen nodig ter
verbetering van het aanbod en de financiering van langdurige zorg.
17
a. De toegang tot hoogwaardige en betaalbare diensten voor langdurige zorg, met
inbegrip van thuiszorg, die door voldoende gekwalificeerd personeel wordt
verstrekt, moet worden gegarandeerd.
b. Het aanbod en de financiering van diensten voor langdurige zorg moeten worden
versterkt en verbeterd zodat de toegang tot adequate en financieel houdbare zorg
wordt gegarandeerd.
Artikel 34 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: De Unie erkent en eerbiedigt het recht op toegang
tot socialezekerheidsvoorzieningen en sociale diensten die bescherming bieden in omstandigheden
zoals [...] afhankelijkheid.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich een adequate sociale bescherming ten doel
stellen. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de lidstaten op het gebied van de
sociale zekerheid en de sociale bescherming van de werknemers en de modernisering van de stelsels
voor sociale bescherming ondersteunt en aanvult.
18. Kinderopvang
Kinderopvang verbetert de cognitieve en sociale ontwikkeling van kinderen, in het
bijzonder van kinderen die opgroeien in minderbedeelde gezinnen, en verbeteren hun
perspectieven in het onderwijs en op de arbeidsmarkt in het latere leven. Formele
kinderopvang is een essentieel instrument in het evenwicht tussen werk en privéleven
dat de arbeidsparticipatie van ouders, in het bijzonder vrouwen, positief beïnvloedt.
De beperkte beschikbaarheid, toegang, betaalbaarheid en kwaliteit ervan blijven
echter de grootste obstakels en belemmeren de ontwikkeling van kinderen. Ook de
toegang van kinderen uit kansarme milieus tot deze diensten vormt nog steeds een
uitdaging.
a. De toegang tot hoogwaardige en betaalbare kinderopvang die door voldoende
gekwalificeerd personeel wordt verstrekt, moet voor alle kinderen worden
gegarandeerd.
b. Er moeten in een vroeg stadium maatregelen worden genomen en preventief
worden opgetreden tegen kinderarmoede; dit omvat specifieke maatregelen die
gebruikmaking van kinderopvang door kinderen uit kansarme milieus
aanmoedigen.
18
Artikel 24 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Kinderen hebben recht op de bescherming en de
zorg die nodig zijn voor hun welzijn.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich een adequate sociale bescherming ten doel
stellen. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de lidstaten op het gebied van de
sociale zekerheid en de sociale bescherming van de werknemers, de bestrijding van sociale uitsluiting,
en de modernisering van de stelsels voor sociale bescherming ondersteunt en aanvult.
19. Huisvesting
Het tekort aan passende woningen en de onzekerheid omtrent huisvesting blijven in
de hele EU een punt van zorg; zij leiden tot situaties waarin steeds grotere financiële
risico's worden genomen, tot uitzettingen, achterstallige betalingen van huur en
aflossingen van hypotheekleningen en, in sommige extreme gevallen, dakloosheid.
Beperkingen op het aanbod in de woningsector en huurmarktverstoringen dragen bij
tot dat tekort. Verder belemmert een tekort aan passende woningen nog steeds de
arbeidsmobiliteit, de deelname van jongeren aan de arbeidsmarkt en de realisatie van
levensplannen en een zelfstandig leven.
a. Er moet worden gezorgd voor toegang tot sociale huisvesting of bijstand bij
huisvesting voor behoevende personen. Kwetsbare personen moeten worden
beschermd tegen uitzetting, en gezinnen met lage en middelhoge inkomens moeten
worden gesteund om een eigen woning te kunnen bezitten.
b. Er moet onderdak worden verstrekt aan daklozen; dit moet worden gekoppeld aan
andere sociale diensten ter bevordering van hun sociale integratie.
Artikel 34 van het Handvest van de grondrechten: Om sociale uitsluiting en armoede te bestrijden,
erkent en eerbiedigt de Unie het recht op bijstand voor huisvesting, teneinde eenieder die niet over
voldoende middelen beschikt, een waardig bestaan te verzekeren.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich de bestrijding van uitsluiting ten doel
stellen. Artikel 153 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie het optreden van de lidstaten op het gebied van de
bestrijding van sociale uitsluiting ondersteunt en aanvult.
20. Toegang tot essentiële diensten
Essentiële diensten, zoals elektronische communicatie, vervoer, energie (zoals
elektriciteit en verwarming) en financiële diensten (zoals bankrekeningen) die ervoor
zorgen dat mensen volledig sociaal geïntegreerd zijn in de maatschappij en gelijke
kansen hebben bij het vinden van een baan, zijn niet altijd beschikbaar of toegankelijk
voor wie deze nodig heeft. Tot de obstakels voor de toegang tot deze diensten behoren
de betaalbaarheid, gebrekkige infrastructuur of de niet-naleving van de
toegankelijkheidsvereisten voor mensen met een handicap.
19
a. Eenieder moet betaalbare toegang hebben tot essentiële diensten waaronder
elektronische communicatie, energie, vervoer en financiële diensten. Er moeten
maatregelen worden genomen om deze diensten toegankelijk te maken voor
behoevende personen.
Artikel 151 VWEU bepaalt dat de Unie en de lidstaten zich een adequate sociale bescherming en de
bestrijding van uitsluiting ten doel stellen.
20
Europese Commissie - Informatieblad
Naar een Europese pijler van sociale rechten – Vragen en antwoorden
Straatsburg, 8 maart 2016
Vandaag heeft de Commissie een openbare raadpleging over de Europese pijler van sociale
rechten gestart.
Vanwaar dit initiatief?
Voorzitter Juncker heeft de Europese pijler van sociale rechten aangekondigd in zijn "State of the
Union" voor het Europees Parlement op 9 september 2015. In zijn toespraak verklaarde voorzitter
Juncker het volgende: "We moeten harder werken aan een eerlijke en echte pan-Europese
arbeidsmarkt. [...] Ik wil daartoe bijdragen met een Europese pijler van sociale rechten, die rekening
houdt met de veranderende realiteit van de Europese samenlevingen en de arbeidsmarkt, en die kan
dienen als kompas voor de hernieuwde convergentie in de eurozone. Die Europese pijler van sociale
rechten moet een aanvulling vormen op wat we samen al hebben bereikt op het vlak van de
bescherming van werknemers in de EU. Ik verwacht van de sociale partners dat zij in dat proces een
centrale rol opnemen. Ik denk dat wij er goed aan doen om dit initiatief eerst in de eurozone te nemen
en daarna andere lidstaten te laten instappen als zij dat willen."
Wat is de Europese pijler van sociale rechten?
Op 8 maart 2016 heeft de Europese Commissie een brede raadpleging gestart en een eerste voorlopige
omschrijving gepresenteerd van wat de Europese pijler van sociale rechten moet worden. Dit initiatief
maakt deel uit van de werkzaamheden van de Commissie voor een diepere en billijkere economische
en monetaire unie (EMU). Zoals voorzitter Juncker heeft aangegeven, is het initiatief gericht op de
eurozone, maar kunnen andere lidstaten instappen als zij dat willen.
De Europese pijler van sociale rechten moet het Europees sociaal acquis aanvullen en erop
voortbouwen om richting te geven aan beleidslijnen op een aantal gebieden die essentieel zijn voor
goed werkende en billijke arbeidsmarkten en socialezekerheidsstelsels binnen de deelnemende
lidstaten.
De voorgestelde beginselen komen niet in de plaats van bestaande rechten, maar kunnen een
oplossing aanreiken om de prestaties van het sociaal en werkgelegenheidsbeleid in de lidstaten te
beoordelen en deze in de toekomst beter op elkaar af te stemmen en aldus te verbeteren.
De Commissie zal gedurende heel 2016 overleg plegen met andere EU-instellingen, nationale
autoriteiten en parlementen, de sociale partners, het maatschappelijk middenveld, deskundigen uit de
academische wereld en burgers. Het is de bedoeling dat de resultaten van dit overleg worden
meegenomen in de oprichting van de Europese pijler van sociale rechten begin 2017.
Eens de pijler tot stand zal zijn gekomen, zou deze het referentiekader moeten worden om de
prestaties op het vlak van werkgelegenheid en de sociale prestaties van de deelnemende lidstaten te
monitoren, hervormingen op nationaal niveau te stimuleren en, meer in het bijzonder, als kompas te
dienen voor hernieuwde convergentie in de eurozone.
Waarom een Europese pijler van sociale rechten?
De economische crisis van de laatste jaren had verregaande sociale gevolgen, die de kansen voor de
toekomstige groei en de economische prestaties in heel Europa kunnen beperken.
Tegelijkertijd blijven de arbeidsvoorwaarden veranderingen ondergaan door de demografische trends
enerzijds en de snelheid waarmee en de mate waarin de arbeidsmarkt verandert anderzijds.
Wanneer wij met name kijken naar de lidstaten die de gemeenschappelijke munt delen, is het duidelijk
dat het toekomstige succes van de eurozone in niet geringe mate afhangt van de effectiviteit van de
nationale arbeidsmarkten en socialezekerheidsstelsels en van het vermogen van de economie om
schokken op te vangen en zich eraan aan te passen.
Wat is de rol van de EU op dit gebied?
Overeenkomstig het subsidiariteitsbeginsel zijn in de eerste plaats de lidstaten bevoegd voor hun
sociaal en werkgelegenheidsbeleid. Dat omvat de arbeidswetgeving en de organisatie van de
socialezekerheidsstelsels. Die bevoegdheid is vastgelegd in de EUverdragen, waarin sinds de oprichting
van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap ook voor de EU in een rol is voorzien, namelijk de
ondersteuning van en de aanvulling op het optreden van de lidstaten.
Maatregelen op Europees niveau zijn een weerspiegeling van de fundamentele beginselen van de Unie
en zijn gestoeld op de overtuiging dat economische ontwikkeling grotere sociale vooruitgang en
samenhang met zich mee moet brengen; tegelijkertijd moet het sociale beleid ook worden gevoerd als
een productieve factor die toelaat ongelijkheid terug te dringen, zoveel mogelijk werkgelegenheid te
creëren en het Europese menselijke kapitaal optimaal te ontplooien.
Deze overtuiging wordt gestaafd aan de hand van feitenmateriaal over werkgelegenheid en sociale
prestaties en werd door de crisis van de voorbije jaren nog versterkt. De lidstaten die de beste
economische prestaties leveren hebben een ambitieuzer en doeltreffender sociaal beleid uitgewerkt dat
niet enkel het resultaat is van economische ontwikkeling maar een centraal onderdeel vormt van hun
groeimodel.
Welke belangrijke veranderingen doen zich momenteel voor in de Europese samenleving en
op de Europese arbeidsmarkt?
De omvang en de aard van de uitdagingen waarmee de arbeidsmarkt en de samenleving in het
algemeen worden geconfronteerd, zijn veranderd. Een aantal trends is nieuw, terwijl andere zich al
langer aftekenen maar extra maatregelen vergen. Het gaat daarbij onder andere over veranderende
maatschappelijke structuren en familiale en werkpatronen, langere en gevarieerdere beroepslevens,
grotere diversiteit bij werknemers en nieuwe vormen van werk die ingang vinden, de paradox tussen
steeds hogere opleidingsniveaus en de wijdverbreide discrepantie tussen gevraagde en aangeboden
vaardigheden, nieuwe behoeften en kansen als gevolg van de toenemende levensverwachting en
vergrijzing, alsook technologische veranderingen en de digitalisering van de maatschappij en de
economie.
Wat wordt verstaan onder het Europees sociaal acquis?
Het begrip sociaal acquis verwijst naar het huidige corpus van sociale regels in de Europese rechtsorde.
Het bestaat in de eerste plaats uit doelstellingen en bevoegdheden op sociaal gebied die zijn
opgenomen in het primair EU recht, namelijk het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie (VEU), het
Verdrag betreffende de Werking van de Europese Unie (VWEU) en het Handvest van de grondrechten
van de Europese Unie, zoals uitgelegd door het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie. Deze zijn
vervolgens door middel van afgeleide EUwetgeving, met name richtlijnen, geïmplementeerd.
Om maar een paar voorbeelden te geven: er bestaan Europese voorschriften inzake de bescherming
van de gezondheid en de veiligheid van werknemers, inzake arbeidsvoorwaarden, inzake de rechten
van jonge werknemers, inzake uitzendwerk, deeltijdwerk en arbeid voor bepaalde tijd, inzake de
bescherming van werknemers in geval van insolventie van de werkgever en inzake arbeidstijden. Met
het oog op de bestrijding van discriminatie op grond van geslacht, ras of etnische afstamming,
godsdienst of overtuiging, handicap, leeftijd of seksuele geaardheid (artikel 19 VWEU) werden
richtlijnen vastgesteld betreffende non-discriminatie in arbeid en beroep en betreffende gelijke
behandeling ongeacht ras of etnische afstamming.
Over welke bevoegdheden beschikt de EU op het gebied van sociale rechten?
De EU implementeert haar sociale taak en doelstellingen op grond van artikel 153 VWEU over de
sociale politiek. De Unie is bevoegd om het optreden van de lidstaten op een aantal gebieden voor
mensen op en buiten de arbeidsmarkt te ondersteunen en aan te vullen: werknemers, werkzoekenden
en werklozen. Het is de bedoeling de arbeidsvoorwaarden, de sociale zekerheid en de sociale
bescherming, de gezondheid en de veiligheid van de werknemers, de voorlichting en raadpleging van
werknemers en de integratie van uitgesloten personen op de arbeidsmarkt te verbeteren. Aangezien de
deelnemende lidstaten ertoe zullen worden aangemoedigd maatregelen te nemen op gebieden waar in
de eerste plaats zijzelf bevoegd zijn, betreft de pijler ook gebieden waar de EU niet bevoegd en ook
niet voornemens is om wetgevend op te treden, maar waar richtsnoeren en de uitwisseling van beste
praktijkvoorbeelden wenselijk zouden zijn.
Wat onderneemt de Commissie voorts op sociaal gebied?
De Commissie heeft reeds een aantal initiatieven genomen om de inspanningen op het vlak van
dwingende prioritaire thema's op te voeren en het EU-acquis bij te werken om nieuwe uitdagingen het
hoofd te bieden in de geest van de beginselen die deel zullen uitmaken van de pijler. Zo heeft de
Commissie tijdens haar ambtstermijn bij de coördinatie van het economisch beleid in het kader van het
Europees semester en haar werkzaamheden op het gebied van betere regelgeving meer belang
gehecht aan sociale overwegingen; zij heeft het werkgelegenheidsinitiatief voor jongeren (YEI)
versneld uitgevoerd om de jeugdwerkloosheid beter te bestrijden; zij heeft een aanbeveling gedaan
over de herintegratie van langdurig werklozen op de arbeidsmarkt om de lidstaten beste
praktijkvoorbeelden aan te reiken; en zij heeft een Europese toegankelijkheidswet voorgesteld om de
toegang tot essentiële goederen en diensten voor mensen met een handicap in de eengemaakte markt
te vergemakkelijken.
Het Europees sociaal acquis wordt ook aangevuld door de Europese structuur- en investeringsfondsen
(ESIF), in het bijzonder door het Europees Sociaal Fonds (ESF). Het ESF bestrijdt sociale uitsluiting en
armoede, bevordert de doeltreffendheid van overheidsdiensten en helpt jaarlijks 15 miljoen mensen
hun vaardigheden te verbeteren en zich op te arbeidsmarkt te integreren.
Met bedragen voor de periode 2014-2020 van 86,4 miljard euro uit het ESF, 3,2 miljard euro van het
YEI en nog eens 38,5 miljard euro aan medefinanciering uit nationale fondsen vervult het ESF een
cruciale rol bij het ondersteunen van de investeringen van de lidstaten in menselijk kapitaal en aldus
bij het versterken van het concurrentievermogen van de Europese economie, die zich momenteel van
de crisis herstelt.
Wat is het doel van de raadpleging?
Het raadplegingsproces heeft drie doelstellingen:
- het huidige Europees sociaal acquis beoordelen door de mate te bepalen waarin bestaande rechten
worden toegepast en relevant blijven voor de uitdagingen van vandaag en morgen, en/of bepalen
of nieuwe manieren moeten worden overwogen om deze rechten toe te passen;
- nadenken over nieuwe werkpatronen en maatschappelijke trends als gevolg van nieuwe
technologieën, demografische tendensen of andere factoren die van belang zijn voor het
beroepsleven en de sociale omstandigheden;
- inzichten en feedback verzamelen over de rol van de Europese pijler van sociale rechten zelf. De
raadpleging moet dienen om het toepassingsgebied, de inhoud en de rol van de pijler te bespreken
als onderdeel van de sociale dimensie van de EMU, en om na te denken over de specifieke
behoeften van de eurozone. Tot slot zal deze denkoefening ook de lidstaten die geen deel
uitmaken van de eurozone helpen bij hun beslissing of zij al dan niet aan de pijler willen
deelnemen.
Iedereen kan aan de openbare raadpleging deelnemen door hier te klikken.
Wie wordt bij het raadplegingsproces over de pijler betrokken?
In de komende maanden zal de Commissie actief samenwerken met andere EUinstellingen, de
nationale overheden en parlementen van alle lidstaten, vakbonden en bedrijfsverenigingen, ngo's,
sociale dienstverleners, deskundigen uit de academische wereld en de burgers. Op nationaal niveau zal
de Commissie het overleg stimuleren via haar vertegenwoordigingen in de lidstaten. De Commissie zal
ook het Europees Economisch en Sociaal Comité en het Comité van de Regio's verzoeken advies uit te
brengen.
Hier vindt u een lijst van eerdere en toekomstige evenementen ter bevordering van de dialoog.
Welke rol zullen de sociale partners vervullen bij de totstandbrenging van de pijler?
Zowel de Europese als de nationale sociale partners zullen worden uitgenodigd om een actieve rol te
spelen bij de vormgeving van de pijler.
Deze eerste voorlopige omschrijving van de pijler zal op 16 maart 2016 op de eerstkomende tripartiete
sociale top worden gepresenteerd. Daarnaast zullen de sociale partners gedurende heel 2016 bij
diverse gelegenheden worden geraadpleegd. Hier vindt u een lijst van eerdere en toekomstige
evenementen ter bevordering van de dialoog.
Hoe zullen de resultaten van de raadpleging worden gestructureerd?
Naast de algemene raadpleging voor het publiek zullen ter ondersteuning van de raadpleging een
aantal gerichte activiteiten plaatsvinden om rond drie hoofdthema's feedback te verzamelen:
- Een balans van het Europees sociaal acquis: is het nog relevant en actueel?
- De toekomst van werk en van de socialezekerheidsstelsels: wat zijn de uitdagingen en kansen voor
de toekomst?
- De rol van de Europese pijler van sociale rechten als onderdeel van een diepere en billijkere
economische en monetaire unie: wat zijn de essentiële voorwaarden voor een goed werkende
eurozone?
Welke sociale rechten zullen in de ontwerp-pijler aan bod komen?
De beleidsgebieden zijn in de volgende drie hoofdthema's gegroepeerd:
- Gelijke kansen en toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt, met inbegrip van de ontwikkeling van
vaardigheden, een leven lang leren en actieve ondersteuning van werkgelegenheid, teneinde de
kansen op arbeid te vergroten, de overstap tussen verschillende statussen te vergemakkelijken en
de inzetbaarheid van personen te verbeteren.
- Billijke arbeidsvoorwaarden, waarbij een adequaat en betrouwbaar evenwicht tot stand wordt
gebracht tussen de rechten en plichten van zowel werkgevers als werknemers, en tussen
flexibiliteit en zekerheid, teneinde het scheppen van banen, de deelname aan het arbeidsproces en
het aanpassingsvermogen van bedrijven te ondersteunen, en waarbij de sociale dialoog wordt
bevorderd.
- Adequate en duurzame sociale bescherming en toegang tot essentiële diensten van hoge kwaliteit,
zoals kinderopvang, gezondheidszorg en langdurige zorg, teneinde te waarborgen dat personen
een waardig leven leiden, beschermd zijn tegen risico's en ten volle kunnen deelnemen aan het
beroepsleven en, meer in het algemeen, aan de maatschappij.
Binnen deze drie hoofdthema's zijn 20 beleidsterreinen in kaart gebracht en voor elk daarvan gelden
verschillende beginselen. Deze beginselen zijn gebaseerd op een aantal rechten die al zijn opgenomen
in Europese en andere relevante rechtsbronnen en bevatten een meer gedetailleerde omschrijving van
mogelijke manieren om deze in de praktijk om te zetten. Door hier te klikken, kunt u meer lezen over
elk van deze uiteenlopende thema's en er uw opmerkingen over formuleren.
Waarom legt de pijler de nadruk op de lidstaten van de eurozone?
De situaties verschillen nog steeds heel sterk tussen de lidstaten van de eurozone onderling, en uit de
ervaring van de laatste 20 jaar is gebleken dat aanhoudende economische en sociale
onevenwichtigheden in één of meerdere lidstaten de prestaties van de eurozone als geheel kunnen
bedreigen en dat het onvermogen om deze te corrigeren tot nog meer verschillen met nog hogere
kosten kan leiden.
De eurozone trekt lessen uit de crisis van de voorbije jaren en heeft een proces van verdere integratie
en consolidatie aangevat. Dit houdt noodzakelijkerwijs ook een sociale dimensie in. In het verslag van
de vijf voorzitters over de voltooiing van Europa’s economische en monetaire unie wordt benadrukt dat
het de ambitie van Europa moet zijn om het op sociaal gebied tot een "triple A"-status te brengen en
dat de EMU pas succesvol kan zijn wanneer de arbeidsmarkten en socialezekerheidsstelsels in alle
lidstaten van de eurozone goed en rechtvaardig functioneren.
Hoewel er in het verslag aan wordt herinnerd dat er geen "one-size-fits-all"-aanpak is, wordt er ook
opgemerkt dat de lidstaten vaak voor dezelfde uitdagingen staan. Daarnaast wordt opgeroepen tot
meer aandacht voor werkgelegenheid en sociale prestaties als deel van een breder proces van
opwaartse convergentie naar veerkrachtigere economische structuren in de eurozone.
Met de pijler wordt de eurozone beoogd, maar hij blijft openstaan voor alle lidstaten die willen
instappen.
Welke rechtsvorm krijgt de pijler?
Bij de juridische aard van de Europese pijler van sociale rechten zelf zal rekening moeten worden
gehouden met het rechtskader op EU-niveau en met het feit dat de eurozone hier centraal staat.
Hoewel er verschillende instrumenten kunnen worden overwogen om de pijler op te richten, acht de
Commissie de betrokkenheid van het Europees Parlement, de Raad en de andere EUi nstellingen van
wezenlijk belang om voor de uitvoering van de pijler over een breed draagvlak te kunnen beschikken.
Wat zijn de volgende stappen?
Tijdens de volgende maanden zal de Commissie via de openbare raadpleging actief met
belanghebbenden overleggen. De raadplegingsprocedure zou vóór 31 december 2016 moeten worden
afgesloten en de basis vormen voor een definitief voorstel voor de pijler door de Commissie
begin 2017.
De feedback zal ook worden meegenomen in het voor het voorjaar van 2017 geplande Witboek over de
toekomst van de Europese economische en monetaire unie.
MEMO/16/545
Contactpersoon voor de pers:
Christian WIGAND (+32 2 296 22 53)
Sara SOUMILLION (+32 2 296 70 94)
Voor het publiek: Europe Direct per telefoon 00 800 67 89 10 11 of e-mail
Towards a
European Pillar
of Social Rights
#SocialRights
European Pillar of Social Rights: Key economic,
employment and social trends
The European Pillar of Social Rights will set out a number of essential principles to support wellfunctioning and fair labour markets and welfare systems within the euro area. Some trends are new,
others are long-standing but require further action to address them. This factsheet illustrates some
of these key trends.
PERSISTENT DIVERGENCES IN UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE EURO AREA
Unemployment rates, 2000-2015 (%)
The impact of the crisis on employment in
the euro area has been profound and uneven. Convergence has restarted, but not
fast enough to make up for lost ground.
The unemployment gap between least
and most affected countries increased
from 8 percentage points during the crisis
to 20 percentage points in 2015.
20
18
EA
EA Centre, North
EA South, East
EU 28
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2000 2001
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Source: Eurostat. Note: 2015 based on three first quarters
HIGHER PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AND OLDER WORKERS
A positive trend of recent years has been
the steady and converging growth in labour market participation of women and
of older workers, which has at least partially offset the decline in workforce in
many countries. Female workforce participation has consistently gone up (from
56.1% in 2005 to 59.6% in 2014).
80
Employment rates of men, women (age group 15-64),
and older adults (age group 55-65), EU28, 2003-2014 (%)
70
60
50
40
Older adults
Males
Females
30
20
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Source: Eurostat
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE LEADING TO SHIFTS IN OCCUPATIONS
Technology and digitally powered
automation are producing long-term
shifts in occupations, with half of EU
jobs at risk of automatisation. The
share of jobs involving routine tasks
is decreasing, while that of jobs requiring digital and high-level problem skills is increasing. By 2025, less
than 15% of job openings would be
for the low qualified.
Share of jobs at risk of automatisation (%)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
SE
UK
IE
NL
DK
FR
LU
BE
LV
DE
FI
MT
LT
SI
CZ
EE
AT
SK
ES
HU
IT
PL
EL
BG
HR
PT
RO
Source: Bruegel calculations based on Frey & Osborne (2013), ILO, EU Labour Force Survey
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Structural changes in employment
have been reflected in the increase
in temporary types of employment
contracts across Member States.
Only 22% of temporary workers
manage to access permanent employment. Labour market segmentation decreases, but remains high
across the euro area.
Share of temporary contracts and transitions from temporary to permanent
(%)
(%)
Temporary workers 2014
Transition to permanent 2013
30
70
60
25
50
20
40
15
30
10
20
5
0
10
RO LT
EE
LV
BG UK MT LU
SK DK
BE IE
AT
CZ
HU
EL DE
IT EU28 FI
FR
SI
SE
HR CY NL
PT ES
PL
0
Source: Eurostat, LFS and SILC.
PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES
In almost half of the countries, income inequalities among European
households increased in twelve EU
countries between 2008 and 2012.
Unemployment, in particular, has
been a key driver of rising inequality
during the crisis. Growing polarisation between well paid and low paid
jobs is also contributing to this.
Disposable household income, level of inequality, 2005-2014 (Gini coefficient)
34
33
32
31
30
29
28
EA
EA Centre, North
EA South, East
EU 28
27
26
25
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Source: Eurostat
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND ADJUSTMENTS IN SOCIAL PROTECTION
Change in population structure, 2000-2060
600
500
5%
400
300
200
2% 1%
3% 2%
Old age and survivors
Sickness/Health care
Family/Children
Disability
Unemployment
7%
65+
20-65
0-20
44%
8%
100
0
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
2022
2025
2028
2031
2034
2037
2040
2043
2046
2049
2052
2055
2058
The EU would move from having
four working-age people for every
person aged over 65 years to about
two working-age persons by 2060.
Health and pension expenditure increased more than social expenditure towards working age adults
since 2000. This raises a big challenge for the adequacy and sustainability of social protection.
28%
Administration costs
Housing
Social exclusion
Other expenditure
Source: Eurostat
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Strasbourg, 8.3.2016
SWD(2016) 50 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
The EU social acquis
Accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
Launching a consultation on an European Pillar of Social Rights
{COM(2016) 127 final}
{SWD(2016) 51 final}
EN
EN
Table of Contents
1.
A brief history of the social acquis .............................................................................. 3
2.
The framework of the EU social acquis as laid down in primary law ......................... 4
2.1.
The Treaties.................................................................................................................. 4
2.2.
The EU Charter ............................................................................................................ 5
3.
Social rights and principles in EU secondary law ........................................................ 6
3.1.
Work environment and access to work ........................................................................ 6
3.1.1.
Equal treatment in the workplace ................................................................................. 7
3.1.2.
Reconciling family and professional life ..................................................................... 7
3.1.3.
Awareness of conditions of employment ..................................................................... 7
3.1.4.
Equal treatment regardless of type of contract ............................................................. 8
3.1.5.
Limitation of working time .......................................................................................... 8
3.1.6.
Protection of health and safety ..................................................................................... 9
3.1.7.
Posted workers ............................................................................................................. 9
3.1.8.
Third country nationals ................................................................................................ 9
3.1.9.
Protection in the event of termination of employment............................................... 10
3.1.10. Organisation, information and consultation of workers ............................................. 10
3.1.11. The prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work .................. 11
3.2.
Social protection......................................................................................................... 11
3.2.1.
Social security coordination ....................................................................................... 12
3.2.2.
Equal treatment in social security and social integration ........................................... 12
4.
Soft law ...................................................................................................................... 12
4.1.
Policy coordination .................................................................................................... 12
4.2.
EU funding ................................................................................................................. 14
4.3.
Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 14
4.3.1.
Work environment and access to work ...................................................................... 14
4.3.2.
Social protection......................................................................................................... 15
4.3.3.
Education and training ............................................................................................... 16
5.
Social rights and principles as laid down in international law ................................... 17
2
1.
A brief history of the social acquis
EU primary law, consisting of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter), bestows a social
mission and mandate on the EU. This social mandate is the result of a long and gradual development.
Social policy in the broad sense began as a means of securing market integration, and has developed
into a method to deliver social policies. This paper focuses on this "acquis", in a legal sense.
Already starting with the Treaty of Rome (1957), the European Economic Community provided the
creation of a European Social Fund (ESF) in order to improve employment opportunities for workers
and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living (Chapter II). It included a right to free
movement of workers and the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of
the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and
employment (Article 48). As illustrated in Article 119, it also focused on gender equality with respect
to equal pay for equal work. In the field of the protection of health and safety in the workplace the
Commission could issue opinions on problems at national and international level (Articles 117 and
118).1 Moreover, due to the Treaty's obligation for the Council to act in the area of the coordination of
social security (Article 51), EU secondary legislation in this field has existed since 1958.2 Finally,
concrete action was taken on vocational training already in 1963.3 Relatively early the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) took social considerations on board, in particular in cases involving
individuals. The result was that individuals, often migrant workers and their families were held to be
entitled to various types of social benefits.4
The EU social acquis initially evolved in order to complete the single European market.5 The social
policy further developed with the inclusion by the Single European Act in 1986 of the possibility to
adopt minimum requirements on the health and safety of workers (Article 118a). The areas for EU
action were expanded in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty’s Social Protocol. The Protocol’s provisions were
subsequently integrated into the general Treaty framework by the 1998 Amsterdam Treaty rendering
them applicable to all Member States, forming the basis for the current Title X of the TFEU. From the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had for the first time in the history of integration
included the concept of achieving a highly competitive social market economy.6
As for fundamental social rights, the initial point of reference in the EU legal order was the
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted in 1989 by all Member
States except the UK. Not legally binding, the 1989 Community Charter was a political instrument and
a point of reference for the CJEU.7 Many of the 1989 Community Charter’s rights are now featured in
the EU Charter. Proclaimed in Nice in 2000 and given status equal to primary law by the Lisbon
Treaty in 2009, the EU Charter contains a great number of social and welfare rights that need to be
respected by the EU Institutions, as well as the Member States when they are implementing EU law.
1
Minimum occupational health and safety requirements were needed in order to complete the single European
market. This led to the adoption, for example, of Directive 82/605/EEC on protection against the risks
associated with metallic lead, Directive 83/477/EEC on asbestos, and Directive 86/188/EEC on noise..
2
Regulations No 3 and 4 of 1958.
3
63/266/EEC: Council Decision of 2 April 1963 laying down general principles for implementing a common
vocational training policy.
4
Cf. Case 249/83, Hoeckx; case 94/84, Deak; and C-237/94, O’Flynn.
5
Many early EU labour law measures were based on the general harmonisation competence for the
establishment and functioning of the internal market. See e.g. Directive 80/987/EEC on employer insolvency,
Directive 75/125 on collective redundancies, and Directive 77/187/EEC on transfer of undertakings.
6
Article 2(3) TEU.
7
For example case C-173/99, BECTU; C-397/01, Pfeiffer and C-151/02, Jaeger.
3
2.
The framework of the EU social acquis as laid down in primary law
2.1.
The Treaties
The social mission and objectives of the EU are to promote the well-being of its peoples (Article 3
TEU), to work for the sustainable development based on a highly competitive social market economy,
aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection. The EU shall combat
social exclusion and discrimination, promote social justice and protection, equality between women
and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall also promote
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.
The EU shall pursue these social objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences
which are conferred upon it in the Treaties (Article 5(2) TEU). The use of these competences shall
comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5(3) and 5(4) TEU).
The social mission of the EU is further enhanced by Article 9 TFEU that prescribes a social
‘mainstreaming’ obligation, stating that in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the
EU shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the
guarantee of adequate social protection and the fight against social exclusion.
The EU has implemented its social mission and objectives inter alia on the basis of Article 153 TFEU
of the Social Policy Title X. The central provision in this Title is Article 153(1). It has a wide personal
and material scope, providing the legal basis for the EU “to support and complement the activities of
the Member States” in a number of fields for people both inside and outside the labour market:
workers, jobseekers and unemployed. The objective is to improve working conditions, social security
and social protection, workers' health and safety, information and consultation of workers, and the
integration of persons excluded from the labour market.
For all those fields the EU is granted a law-making competence to adopt directives (except the
combating of social exclusion and the modernization of social protection systems), but this power is
limited in two ways: the EU operates under “shared competence” (Article 4 TFEU), and can only
establish minimum requirements.
For directives concerning social security and social protection of workers, the protection of workers
where their employment contract is terminated, the representation and collective defence of workers
and employers and conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in EU's
territory, unanimous Council voting with consultation of the European Parliament is required.8 The
specific bridging clause, which authorises the Council to decide unanimously to apply the ordinary
legislative procedure9 can be applied in those cases, except on measures concerning social security and
social protection of workers.
The final paragraph of Article 153 TFEU declares that "the provisions of this Article shall not apply to
pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs", limiting the EU’s
power under this social competence.10
8
Second subparagraph of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU.
Third subparagraph of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU.
10
However, some measures based on Article 153 TFEU, such as the fixed-term, part-time and temporary agency
work directives include pay among the “employment conditions” for which they lay down a right to equal
treatment. Aspects of pay are also indirectly regulated by Article 7 of the Working Time Directive, which lays
down the right to minimum paid annual leave. In none of these cases are the levels of pay determined by EU
law and this remains a matter of national competence. The CJEU has explicitly held that “as [Article 153(5)
9
4
Article 5(3) TFEU provides that the EU may take initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States'
social policies. The scope of and arrangement for exercising the Union’s competence in this regard is
set out in Article 156 TFEU, laying down the necessary infrastructure for a social ‘open method of
coordination’.
The TFEU features a unique additional way for the EU to adopt social policy legislation, namely by
the implementation of agreements concluded between the social partners, i.e. representatives of
management and labour, at EU level. Articles 152, 154 and 155 TFEU provide the legal framework
for this European-level social dialogue. In the areas covered by Article 153 TFEU, such agreements
shall be implemented “at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a Council decision”.11
Article 21(3) TFEU provides competence for the EU to adopt measures concerning social security or
social protection. Similarly, for cross-border situations in the internal market Article 45–48 TFEU
provide competence to secure the free movement of workers in the EU.
Finally, Articles 145, 148, 162, 165 and 168 TFEU on employment guidelines, the ESF, education and
health can be mentioned in the present context.
2.2.
The EU Charter
A wide range of social rights and principles are laid down in the EU Charter. 12 The EU Charter is
binding on the EU institutions, which means that they have to respect and observe it whenever they act
in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the Treaties. In addition, the Charter is binding
on the Member States when they are implementing EU law, for instance when transposing directives
into their national law. Many of the social rights and principles laid down in the Charter have been
concretised by means of secondary law. These measures are fully binding on the Member States and
are interpreted by the CJEU in the light of the Charter.13
TFEU] derogates from paragraphs 1 to 4 of that article, the matters reserved by that paragraph must be
interpreted strictly so as not to unduly affect the scope of paragraphs 1 to 4, nor to call into question the aims
pursued by Article [151 TFEU]”. See inter alia Case C-268/06, Impact, and C-307/05, Yolanda Del Cerro
Alonso v Osakidetza-Servicio Vasco de Salud.
11
The social partners have to date adopted ten such agreements: Four cross industry and six at sector level.
12
Such as the prohibition of forced labour (Article 5), respect for private and family life (Article 7), freedom of
association (Article 12), the freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work in any Member State
(Article 15), the right not to be discriminated on only ground (Article 21), the equality between men and
women in all areas, including employment, work and pay (Article 23), the right to information and consultation
within the undertaking (Article 27), the right of collective bargaining and action (Article 28), the right to a free
placement service (Article 29), the right to protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30), the right
to fair and just working conditions, to maximum working hours, breaks and holiday (Article 31), the
prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 32), and the entitlement to social
security and assistance (Article 34).
13
Already before the entry into force of the EU Charter, the CJEU attached considerable importance to it when
interpreting EU law. See Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council, paragraphs 38 and 58; Case C-432/05, Unibet,
paragraph 37; Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union,
paragraphs 90 and 91; Case C-275/06, Promusicae, paragraphs 61 to 65; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and
C-415/05, P Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, paragraph 335; Kücükdeveci
and Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, paragraph 45 et seq. See also
Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré v Commission.
5
However, the EU Charter must be read in conjunction with the Treaties. The Charter does not establish
any new power or task for the Union. Moreover, Article 52(2) requires that rights of the Charter for
which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits
defined by the Treaties and the general principles of EU law. The freedom to choose an occupation
and right to engage in work in any Member State (Article 15 of the Charter) is therefore to be
exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by article 45 TFEU as interpreted by the
CJEU. Most importantly, in many areas where social rights feature in the EU Charter (e.g., housing,
child well-being, social protection), there is little to no EU competence to enact secondary legislation.
3.
Social rights and principles in EU secondary law
The largest part of the EU social aquis consists of secondary legislation, mostly in the form of
directives. Many of these give a more concrete expression or implementation of social rights as
derived from the Treaties and in the EU Charter. Moreover, EU secondary law in other areas also
includes social clauses.
3.1.
Work environment and access to work
The protection of workers at the EU level is currently ensured through a set of individual and
collective rights. The EU has adopted directives on the basis of Article 153 TFEU on social policy. 14
In those directives, the definition of worker is not uniform15 and most refer to national definitions.16
For a few, where there is no definition or reference to national definitions, the one used under Article
45 TFEU applies.17 This leaves a margin of appreciation to Member States and to their courts.18
14
For example on worker's health and safety (Framework Directive 89/391/EEC and the 23 specific Directives,
see Part 3.1, Protection of health and safety, and footnote 36), and working conditions: Directive 91/533/EEC
(Written Statement); Directive 94/33/EC (Young People at Work); Directive 2008/104/EC (Temporary Agency
Work); Directive 2008/94/EC (protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer);
Directive 1997/81/EC (Part-time work); Directive 1999/70/EC (Fixed-term work); 2002/14/EC (Information
and Consultation Directive); Directive 2003/88/EC (Working Time) and Directives 2000/78/EC (nondiscrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation) and 2000/43/EC (racial
equality).
15
See for example Directive 90/270/EEC (work with display screen equipment); Directive 92/85/EEC (Pregnant
workers); Directive 2010/32/EU (sharp injuries); Directive 92/29/EEC (medical treatment on board vessels)
and the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC.
16
All working conditions directives referred to in footnote 3 except Directive 98/59 (collective redundancies)
and Directive 2003/88/EC (working time).
17
Directive 2000/78/EC (case C-432/14, "O"); Directive 2003/88 (case C-428/09, Isère); Directive 98/59 (case
C-229/14, Ender Balkaya).
18
The CJEU has brought some limitation to this discretion in order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law See for
example Case C-393/10, O’Brien.
6
3.1.1.
Equal treatment in the workplace
Several Directives aim to implement the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of
racial or ethnic origin19 and of men and women.20 They require Member States to set up National
Equality Bodies to promote equal treatment and to assist victims of discrimination. The Employment
Equality Directive21 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation,
religious belief, age and disability, and the Racial Equality Directive 22 prohibit discrimination on the
basis of race and ethnicity in employment, in education, and in access to social security and goods and
services. In 2006, the Gender Recast Directive consolidated into a single directive earlier EU
legislation relating to equal opportunities and equal treatment for men and women in employment and
occupation.23
In addition to the antidiscrimination directives, EU law in areas of transport, telecommunication,
consumer protection, state aid or public procurement include provisions to ensure accessibility for
persons with disabilities.
3.1.2.
Reconciling family and professional life
The Pregnant Workers (Maternity Leave) Directive provides for paid maternity leave, at least at the
level of sick pay for fourteen weeks.24 In addition, the Directive on self-employed workers and
assisting spouses also grants a maternity allowance that is sufficient to enable an interruption of
occupational activities for at least fourteen weeks for female self-employer workers or female spouses
of self-employed workers.25 The revised Parental Leave Directive26 entitles men and women workers
to a minimum of four months' leave after the birth or adoption of a child. Member States, or where
implemented through collective agreements, social partners are granted discretion to decide whether or
not this leave is paid, and whether or not this leave can be taken in a piecemeal way or part-time.
Parents who return from parental leave have the right to request but are not entitled to changes to their
working hours and/or patterns for a certain period of time. It also provides that workers may request
limited time off work for urgent family reasons (force majeure).
3.1.3.
Awareness of conditions of employment
The worker is entitled to receive essential information relating to the employment relationship in
writing, not later than two months after the commencement of employment on the basis of the Written
Statement Directive.27 These elements cover the description of the work, the date of its
commencement, its duration, the amount of paid leave and the working time with additional
information for expatriate employees. The Commission is currently undertaking an evaluation of the
Directive.
19
Directive 2000/43/EC.
Directive 2006/54/EC (recast) on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation; Directive 2004/113/EC implementing
the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services;
Directive 97/7/EC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in
matters of social security.
21
Directive 2000/78.
22
Directive 2000/43.
23
The recast Directive 2006/54/EC.
24
Directive 92/85/EEC.
25
Directive 2010/41/EU.
26
Directive 2010/18/EU implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave.
27
Directive 91/533/EEC.
20
7
Awareness of rights is also ensured through the Directives adopted in view of a more effective
enforcement of existing EU rules in the fields of posting of workers28 or of free movement of
workers.29 They include obligations to ensure effective access to information on rights as established
in the EU law and transposed into national law, via the use or setting up of dedicated tools or specific
bodies through the availability of effective mechanisms for dispute resolution, or similar judicial or
administrative proceedings.
3.1.4.
Equal treatment regardless of type of contract
Three separate EU labour law Directives, concerning fixed-term work, part-time work and temporary
agency work are aiming to provide equal treatment and prevent abuse of ‘atypical’ contracts. 30 Where
a worker is employed under such an atypical contract, he or she should generally not be treated in a
less favorable manner than comparable permanent and/or fulltime staff concerning employment
conditions unless there are objective reasons for different treatment. Under the Temporary Agency
Work Directive for instance, from the first day of their assignment, temporary agency workers have to
have the basic working and employment conditions that would apply if they were recruited directly by
the user firm to occupy the same job. These conditions cover pay, as well as the duration of working
time, overtime, breaks, rest periods, night work, holidays and public holidays. To allow flexibility for
workers and employers, they allow deviations from this principle in specific circumstances. The
Fixed-Term Work Directive also includes an 'anti-abuse' clause to impede unjustified successions of
such contracts. An additional directive extends the EU rules on occupational health and safety to
temporary workers, generally more exposed to the risk of accidents at work and occupational
diseases.31
3.1.5.
Limitation of working time
The Working Time Directive32 provides a limit to weekly working time, which must not exceed 48
hours on average, including overtime. There can be an individual opt-out of this maximum on the
basis of a written agreement between the worker and the employer, if the Member State has allowed
the use of this derogation. This opt-out does not apply to the minimum rest provisions of the Directive,
which prescribe a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours, a rest break during working
hours if the worker is on duty for longer than 6 hours, and a minimum weekly rest period of 24
uninterrupted hours for each 7-day period. The Directive also lays down the right to minimum paid
annual leave of 4 weeks. The Working Time Directive allows flexibility to accommodate differences
between national rules or the requirements of specific activities. There is substantial scope for flexible
working arrangements through collective bargaining (e.g. yearly accounting of working time) and
derogations are also available to address circumstances where continuity of service is crucial (e.g.
hospitals). In addition to the Working Time Directive, specific directives apply to a number of
transport sectors.33
28
Directive 2014/67/EU.
Directive 2014/54/EU.
30
Fixed-Term Work Directive 1999/70/EC; Part-time Work Directive 97/81/EC; Temporary Agency Work
Directive 2008/104/EC.
31
Directive 91/383/EEC.
32
Directive 2003/88/EC.
33
Minimum standards for working time in the civil aviation sector are laid down in Directive 2000/79/EC.
Directive 2005/47/EC implements the Social Partners agreement on certain aspects of the working conditions
of mobile workers engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector. Directive 2002/15/EC
in turn sets the framework for the organisation of working time for mobile workers in road transport activities
and self-employed drivers. Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 provides for minimum requirements on the daily and
weekly driving times, minimum breaks and daily and weekly rest periods for drivers engaged in the carriage of
goods and passengers by road. These provisions reinforce the existing rules on the organisation of the working
29
8
3.1.6.
Protection of health and safety
EU rules in the social policy area guarantee workers’ right to occupational health and safety (OSH). A
Framework Directive and 23 individual directives provide rules on the prevention of occupational
risks, the protection of safety and health, the elimination of risk and accident factors. 34 The Framework
Directive establishes general principles for managing safety and health, such as responsibility of the
employer, rights/duties of workers, using risk assessments to continuously improve company
processes, and workplace health and safety representation. All individual directives follow these
common principles, tailoring the principles of the Framework Directive to specific tasks, specific
hazards at work, specific workplaces and sectors, and specific groups of workers. The individual
directives define how to assess these risks and, in some instances, set limit exposure values for certain
substances or agents.
3.1.7.
Posted workers
To ensure fair and just working conditions also in the context of the temporary provision of services
across borders, the Posting of Workers Directive35 provides that a host State is required to apply to
workers posted to its territory certain basic standards of its own labour law system (e.g. minimum
wage, working time, holidays) as laid down in national legislation or universally applicable collective
agreement. The Enforcement Directive allows host States more effective methods of enforcing labour
standards in these situations.36
3.1.8.
Third country nationals
Legal migration of third-country nationals to the EU is partly regulated by EU Directives which set out
the conditions of entry and residence and also minimum of rights that third-country nationals should
enjoy, in particular equal treatment with nationals. The Long-term Residence Directive created a
single status for non-EU long-term residents. A Directive on family reunification establishes the rules
and conditions under which non-EU nationals who are residing lawfully on EU territory may exercise
the right to family reunification. The EU also harmonised national legislation concerning the entry of
students and non-remunerated trainees and researchers.To attract talent and high skills workers, the
European Union adopted the EU Blue Card Directive in 2009. A Directive on seasonal work sets
important labour standards for third country nationals engaging in seasonal work in the EU.37 The
Directive provides the principle of equal treatment between third country nationals and Union
nationals, particularly as regards the freedom of association and the right to strike, concerning terms of
employment, working conditions and social security benefits.
time and are strictly monitored by means of recording equipment. The working time of seafarers is regulated
by Directive 1999/63/EC.
34
Framework Directive 89/391/EEC and Directive 89/654/EEC on minimum safety and health requirements for
the workplace; 92/57/EEC on temporary or mobile construction sites; 92/91/EEC on the mineral-extracting
industries through drilling; 92/104/EEC on workers in surface and underground mineral extracting industries;
93/103/EC on fishing vessels; 92/29/EEC on improved medical treatment on board vessels; 89/656/EEC on
personal protective equipment; 90/269/EEC on the manual handling of loads; 90/270/EEC on work with
display screen equipment; 92/58EEC on safety and/or health signs at work; 2009/104/EC on work equipment;
92/85/EEC on pregnant workers; 2013/35/EU on electromagnetic fields; 1999/92/EC on explosive
atmospheres; 2002/44/EC on mechanical vibration; 2003/10/EC on noise; 2006/25/EC on artificial optical
radiation; 2000/54/EC on biological agents at work; 2010/32/EU on sharp injuries in the hospital and
healthcare sector; 98/24/EC on chemical agents; 2004/37/EC on carcinogens or mutagens; 2009/148/EC on
asbestos.
38
Directive 96/71/EC.
39
Directive 2014/67/EU.
37
Directive 2014/36.
9
The Single Permit Directive establishes a single application procedure for a single permit to work in
the EU and a common set of rights for third country workers legally residing in a Member State. 38 A
common set of rights for intra-corporate transferees when working in the EU, facilitating their entry
and mobility between Member States is provided by Directive on the conditions of entry and residence
of third country nationals in the framework of intra-corporate transfers.39
3.1.9.
Protection in the event of termination of employment
Article 153 TFEU provides for the possibility for the EU to support Member States in ensuring the
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, notably through the adoption by
unanimity voting of directives laying down minimum standards. There is no secondary EU law to
implement this right. Similarly, there are no EU rules regarding the length of probation periods.
Three different directives are concerned with the potential termination of the employment contract in
the event of structural changes in companies. They embody the basic right to protection against
unjustified dismissal, but only in ‘collective’ circumstances. The Insolvency Directive ensures
payment of employees' outstanding claims in the event of the employer's insolvency.40 The Collective
Redundancies Directive regulates the situation of workers affected by decisions of employers to lay
off a group of employees.41 The Transfer of Undertakings Directive42 protects employees’ rights in the
event that an undertaking, business, or part of an undertaking or business is transferred from one
employer to another, stipulating inter alia that such a transfer does not in itself constitute valid
grounds for dismissal. The Directives on transfer of undertakings and collective redundancies provide
for information and consultation rights. The Maternity Leave Directive 43 prohibits women's dismissal
from work because of maternity for the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end of the
period of maternity leave, save exceptional circumstances, for which the employer needs to give
justification in writing. The Recast Directive44 furthermore sets out that workers taking paternity or
adoption leave should be protected against dismissal due to exercising those rights.
The Directive establishing a framework for equal treatment in employment 45 protects workers against
dismissal where there is discrimination on a prohibited ground, including victimisation. 46
3.1.10. Organisation, information and consultation of workers
The promotion of social dialogue is enshrined as a common objective of the EU and the Member
States in Art 151 TFEU. The rights of association, collective bargaining, to strike or to impose lockouts are excluded from the application of this article. The role of the social partners is recognised at
EU level, taking into account the diversity of national systems and their autonomy (Art 152 TFEU).
Eight social partner agreements have been implemented either by EU law or by the social partners.47
38
Directive 2011/98/EU.
Directive 2014/66/EU.
40
Directive 2008/94/EC.
41
Directive 98/59/EC.
42
Directive 2001/23/EC.
43
Directive 92/85/EEC.
44
Directive 2006/54/EC.
45
Directive 2000/78/EC.
46
Other EU anti-discrimination directives (such as Directive 2006/54/EC or Directive 2000/43/EC) also provide
specific protection against unfair dismissal.
47
Articles 153 and 154 TFEU. Examples of such cross-industry agreements are: Parental leave (revised) (2009),
Fixed-term contracts (1999); Part-time work (1997); Parental leave (1996). Autonomous Framework
agreements implemented by social partners: Inclusive labour markets (2010); Harassment and violence at work
(2007); Work-related stress (2004); Telework (2002).
39
10
The General Information and Consultation Directive48 establishes a framework for informing and
consulting employees at enterprise level. Information and consultation are required on the
development of the activities, economic situation and employment, and particularly anticipatory
measures where there is a threat of restructuring, and likely changes in work organisation or in
contractual relations.
The European Works Council Directive49 provides for the creation of a Works Council (a body
representing the employees of a transnational company, to inform and consult them on the progress of
the business and any decisions significant for their working conditions) at the request of 100
employees of at least two undertakings or establishments in at least two Member States, or on the
initiative of the employer. The involvement of employees, including at board level, is also provided by
company law directives.50 Finally, the Cross-Border Mergers Directive51 provides for detailed rules of
employee participation in the event of mergers of limited liability companies.
3.1.11. The prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work
The Young People at Work Directive52 requires Member States to take the necessary measures to
prohibit work by children, particularly that the minimum working age is not lower than the minimum
age at which compulsory full-time schooling ends, or 15 years in any event. Exceptions can be
adopted by Member States for occasional work or short-term work, involving domestic service in a
private household or work regarded as not being harmful, damaging or dangerous to young people in a
family undertaking, for cultural, artistic, sporting or advertising activities, subject to prior
authorisation by the competent authority in each specific case, for children of at least 14 years of age
working under a combined work/training scheme, and for children of at least 14 years of age
performing light work. The Directive provides specific limits to maximum weekly working time, night
work and minimum rest periods for children and adolescents when they engage in employment. 53
3.2.
Social protection
The EU acquis in the area of social protection is rather limited. Though the EU may adopt legislation
in the area of 'security and social protection of workers' (Article 153(1)(c)), it does not have the
competence to adopt legislation for 'the combatting of social exclusion' (Article 153(j)) or for 'the
modernisation of social protection systems' (Article 153 (k)).
48
Directive 2002/14/EC.
Directive 2009/38/EC.
50
Firstly, Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the
involvement of employees provides that the establishment of a European company will not mean the
disappearance or watering down of existing employee involvement arrangements, calling for agreement
between the employer and the representatives of employees and providing subsidiary rules applicable in the
absence of agreement. Secondly, Directive 2003/72/EC on the information, consultation and participation
rights of employees in a European Cooperative Society provides that information, consultation and in some
cases, participation procedures at transnational level are to be used whenever a European Cooperative is
created.
51
Directive 2005/56/EC.
52
Directive 94/33/EC.
53
See also Commission Recommendation of 31 January 1967 to the Member States on the protection of young
workers and the Commission Recommendation of 15 September 2000 on the ratification of International
Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No 182 of 17 June 1999 concerning the prohibition and immediate
action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour.
49
11
3.2.1.
Social security coordination
The rules on social security coordination apply to national legislation on sickness, maternity and
equivalent paternity benefits, old-age pensions, pre-retirement and invalidity benefits, survivors’
benefits and death grants, unemployment benefits, family benefits, benefits in respect of accidents at
work and occupational diseases.54 The Directive on patients' rights in cross-border healthcare clarifies
citizens' rights to receive healthcare services in another EU Member State; guarantees the safety,
quality and efficiency of care that they will receive there; and promotes cooperation between Member
States on healthcare matters.55
3.2.2.
Equal treatment in social security and social integration
The equal treatment for women and men in matters of social security is ensured by the Directive on
the protection against discrimination in the scope, contributions and benefits of social security
schemes.56 The Gender Recast Directive moreover ensures respect for the principle of equal treatment
for men and women in occupational social security schemes. The Racial Equality Directive gives
protection against discrimination based on race or ethnic origin in social protection (including social
security and healthcare) as well as access to goods and services, including housing.57
Finally, some legislation exists in order to promote access to necessary goods and services for
ensuring adequate livelihoods. The Directive on Payment Accounts seeks to improve access to low
income individuals for basic bank accounts.58 The European Commission's recent proposal for a
European Accessibility Act,59 currently under discussion between co-legislators, also seeks to ensure
that people with disabilities can access products, transportation, information and communications
technologies, and other facilities/services that are necessary for their full inclusion in society.
4.
Soft law
In addition to the legally binding instruments, the EU has adopted ‘soft law’ measures. As they are
‘soft law’, they do not confer social rights in the strict sense. Nevertheless, they provide a policy
framework for such rights.
4.1.
Policy coordination
The EU has competences to coordinate the employment policies of the Member States.
This coordination was formalised in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy and is implemented
annually through the European Semester.To meet the Europe 2020 objectives, five headline targets
have been agreed for the whole EU to achieve by the end of 2020. These include achieving an overall
employment rate of 75% for 20-64 year-old women and men as well as reducing by at least 20 million
the number of people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion.
54
See most notably Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, which was
adopted on the basis of Article 42 EC (now Article 48 TFEU) and Article 308 EC (now Article 352 TFEU)
and its implementing Regulation (EC) 987/2009.
55
Directive 2011/24/EU.
56
Directive 79/7/EC.
57
Directive 2000/43/EC.
58
Directive 2014/92/EU on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching
and access to payment accounts with basic features.
59
Proposal for a Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the
Member States as regards the accessibility requirements for products and services (COM(2015) 615 final).
12
On education, a twofold headline target is set on reducing the rates of early school leaving below 10%
and ensuring at least 40% of tertiary graduates. To measure progress, each EU headline target is
declined into national targets.
The Employment Guidelines include common priorities and targets for employment and social
policies. The current guidelines reflect the new approach to economic policy-making built on
investment, structural reform and fiscal responsibility.60 They aim to boost demand for labour,
covering job creation, labour taxation and wage-setting and to enhance labour and skills supply, by
reinforcing education and training systems, and by tackling youth and long-term unemployment. To
improve the functioning of labour markets, they call for reducing labour market segmentation and the
development of active measures and mobility. They also aim to increase fairness, combating poverty
and promoting equal opportunities.
The European Semester includes a stronger emphasis on employment and social performance, under
more focused Country-Specific Recommendations.61 In recent years, the European Semester has been
taking better account of employment and social objectives by upgrading the employment indicators in
the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure and by seeking to strengthen the involvement of social
partners at both EU and national level in the process.
The European Semester also aims to better integrate national and euro area dimensions.
A recommendation for the economic policy of the euro area was issued for the first time in 2015
together with the Annual Growth Survey 2016 in order to better coordinate Member States' reforms,
individually and collectively, to address imbalances and promote upwards convergence.62
In the area of social policies, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) supports the definition,
implementation and evaluation of social policies based on common objectives and indicators. The
method supplements the legislative and financial instruments of social policy. It applies to the
eradication of poverty and social exclusion; to adequate and sustainable pension systems; and to the
provision of accessible, high-quality and sustainable health care and long-term care.63
The Education and Training 2020 strategic framework for European cooperation in education and
training covers the following four objectives: making lifelong learning and mobility a reality;
improving the quality and efficiency of education and training; promoting equity, social cohesion and
active citizenship; enhancing creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of
education and training.64 Cooperation between Member States is supported through a set of
benchmarks and through mutual learning processes.
60
Council Decision (EU) 2015/1848 of 5 October 2015 on guidelines for the employment policies of the
Member States for 2015.
61
Communication on steps towards completing Economic and Monetary Union COM (2015) 600 final.
62
Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area, COM(2015) 692
final.
63
A renewed commitment to social Europe: Reinforcing the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protection
and Social Inclusion COM(2008) 418 final.
64
2015 Joint Report of the Council and the Commission on the implementation of the strategic framework for
European cooperation in education and training (ET 2020) New priorities for European cooperation in
education and training.
13
4.2.
EU funding
Article 174 TFEU provides inter alia that, in order to strengthen its economic, social and territorial
cohesion, the Union is to aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various
regions. On that basis, European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) are the main source of
investment at EU level to help Member States to restore and increase growth and ensure a job rich
recovery while ensuring sustainable development, in line with the Europe 2020 objectives. 65 In this
context, the European Social Fund (ESF) helps people get the right skills for the right job, by
improving the quality of and access to education and training from early childhood to later life. The
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) provides support to both infrastructure and direct
creation of job-rich activities, by supporting housing, childcare infrastructure, healthcare facilities,
education and training infrastructure, employment creation and entrepreneurship measures and urban
regeneration. The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) supports training and
advice for farmers and other rural SMEs wishing to grow their businesses. The European Maritime
and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) promotes social cohesion and job creation in fisheries-dependent
communities, through diversification into other maritime sectors and training in fishing communities,
including fishers, fish farmers and their relatives.
4.3.
Recommendations
EU soft law on social matters may also take the form of policy coordination, exchanges of good
practice, benchmarking, frameworks of action and codes of conduct, aimed at shaping consensus and
creating incentives for national or company-level action.
In accordance with Article 288 TFEU, recommendations do not have binding force. In addition,
Council recommendations in the field of social policy are also limited in scope by Article 153 TFEU.
Nevertheless, they can be important tools for agenda setting, can be used by the CJEU in its
interpretation of EU law,66 and can be used in the context of cooperative mechanisms.
4.3.1.
Work environment and access to work
Under the Youth Guarantee, Member States should ensure that, within four months of leaving school
or losing a job, young people under 25 can either find a good-quality job suited to their education,
skills and experience; or acquire the education, skills and experience required to find a job in the
future through an apprenticeship, traineeship or continued education.67 The Youth Guarantee requires
early intervention and activation, as well as reforms of training, job-search and education systems to
improve the transition from school to work and the employability of young people.
The Quality Framework for Traineeships proposes guidelines enabling trainees to acquire high-quality
work experience based on a written traineeship agreement, with learning and training objectives, under
safe and fair conditions, thus increasing their chances of finding a good quality job.68
65
See the Common Provisions Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013; European Regional Development Fund
Regulation (EU) 1301/2013; European Social Fund Regulation (EU) No 1304/2013; Cohesion Fund
Regulation (EU) 1300/2013; Regulation on the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EU)
1305/2013; Regulation on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EU) 508/2014.
66
Case C-322/88, Grimaldi.
67
Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee.
68
Council recommendation of 10 March 2014 on a Quality Framework for Traineeships.
14
The Council Recommendation on the integration of the long-term unemployed in the labour market
offers guidance on encouraging the registration of long-term unemployed, on enhancing and
simplifying support by an individual in-depth assessments and offering a job integration agreement
identifying a single point of contact to all registered long-term unemployed at the very latest at 18
months.69
The Council Recommendation on the promotion of employee ownership and participation promoted
the use of financial participation schemes, with the direct involvement of the social partners.70
In 2008, the Commission issued a recommendation on the active inclusion of people excluded from
the labour market. The recommendation covers policy guidance on providing adequate income support
together with help to get a job, on inclusive labour markets and on access to quality services helping
people participate actively in society, including getting back to work.71
The Commission has issued recommendations or opinions on topics such as the protection of young
workers (1967),72 an equitable wage (1993)73 and the ratification of ILO Conventions on home work
(1998),74 seafarers’ working hours (1999)75 and child labour (2000).76
4.3.2.
Social protection
The 1992 Council Recommendation on common criteria concerning sufficient resources and social
assistance in social protection systems77 sets out that persons residing in the EU should have access to
sufficient resources and assistance to live in a manner compatible with human dignity. The
Recommendation defines the common principles for implementing this principle in all the Member
States in order to progressively cover all instances of exclusion.
The 1992 Council Recommendation on the convergence of social protection objectives and policies78
recommends guaranteeing a level of resources in keeping with human dignity, access to all legal
residents to protection of human health and support for social integration and integration into the
labour market. It also calls for a wide coverage of a replacement or benefits and for strengthening
appropriate social protection for self-employed persons.
69
Council Recommendation of 15 February 2016 on the integration of the long-term unemployed in the labour
market.
70
Council Recommendation 92/443/EEC of 27 July 1992 concerning the promotion of employee participation in
profits and enterprise results, including equity participation.
71
Commission Recommendation 2008/867/EC of 3 October 2008 on the active inclusion of people excluded
from the labour market.
72
67/125/EEC: Commission Recommendation of 31 January 1967 to the Member States on the protection of
young workers.
73
Commission opinion on an equitable wage COM (93) 388 final.
74
98/370/EC: Commission Recommendation of 27 May 1998 on the ratification of ILO Convention No 177 on
home work of 20 June 1996.
75
1999/130/EC: Commission Recommendation of 18 November 1998 on ratification of International Labour
Organisation (ILO) Convention 180 concerning seafarers' hours of work and the manning of ships, and
ratification of the 1996 Protocol to the 1976 Merchant Shipping (minimum standards) Convention.
76
2000/581/EC: Commission Recommendation of 15 September 2000 on the ratification of International Labour
Organisation (ILO) Convention No 182 of 17 June 1999 concerning the prohibition and immediate action for
the elimination of the worst forms of child labour.
77
92/441/EEC Council Recommendation of 24 June 1992 on common criteria concerning sufficient resources
and social assistance in social protection systems.
78
92/442/EEC: Council Recommendation of 27 July 1992 on the convergence of social protection objectives and
policies.
15
Work-life balance measures were promoted through the 1992 Council Recommendation on child care
focusing on childcare for parents who are working or who are following education/training; special
leave for parents and improving the environment, structure and organization of work for working
parents with children.79 The 2013 Commission Recommendation on investing in children also
provided a set of recommendations to improve child outcomes and reduce the intergenerational
transmission of disadvantage, including by stepping up affordable, quality early childhood education
and care services.80 The Council Recommendation on effective Roma integration measures promotes
effective policy measures in the areas of access to education, employment, healthcare and housing.81
4.3.3.
Education and training
The Recommendation on key competences for lifelong learning aims to equip young people with key
competences for further learning and working throughout their lives. 82 In 2011 Member States were
asked to implement comprehensive policies to tackle early school leaving, encompassing prevention,
intervention and compensation measures.83
The European Qualifications Framework relates national qualifications systems through common
European reference levels for knowledge, skills and competences.84The European Quality Assurance
Reference Framework for Vocational Education and Training provides common European references
to develop, improve, guide and assess the quality of vocational education and training. 85 The European
Credit System for Vocational Education and Training (ECVET) allows validation and recognition of
work-related skills and knowledge acquired in different systems and countries.86 The proposal for a
Council Recommendation on the validation of non-formal and informal learning aims to establish
arrangements for the identification, documentation, assessment and certification of learning
outcomes.87
4.1.4. Health
The Council Recommendation on smoke free environment88 recommends Member States to provide
effective protection from exposure to tobacco smoke in indoor workplaces, indoor public places,
public transport and other public places.
The Council Recommendation on prevention of injury and the promotion of safety 89 promotes better
use of existing data and the development, where appropriate, of representative injury surveillance and
reporting instruments to obtain comparable information, monitor the evolution of injury risks and the
effects of prevention measures over time.
79
92/241/EEC: Council Recommendation of 31 March 1992 on child care.
Commission Recommendation Investing in children: breaking the cycle of disadvantage, C(2013) 778.
81
Council recommendation of 9 December 2013 on effective Roma integration measures in the Member States.
82
Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on key competences
for lifelong learning (2006/962/EC).
83
Council Recommendation on policies to reduce early school leaving (2011/C191/01).
84
Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on the establishment of the
European Qualifications Framework for lifelong-learning.
85
Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on the establishment of a
European Quality Assurance Reference Framework for Vocational Education and Training.
86
Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on the establishment of a
European Credit System for Vocational Education and Training (ECVET).
87
COM/2012/0485 final.
88
Council Recommendation on smoke free environment, 2009/C 296/02.
89
Council recommendation on prevention of injury and the promotion of safety, 2007/C 164/01.
80
16
5.
Social rights and principles as laid down in international law
The EU Charter, the European Social Charter and the European Code of Social Security of the Council
of Europe, as well as those defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), can be a source of
inspiration for both the EU legislator and the CJEU.
The EU is not party to most of the international conventions that requires membership of the
organisations where they are enacted. However there are exceptions and new developments. The UN
Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was ratified by the EU in December
2010. The CRPD is an integral part of EU law and takes precedence over secondary EU legislation.
A number of ILO conventions are ratified by all 28 EU Member States (core labour standards, labour
inspection) or by the large majority of them (social security conventions, human resources
development). All EU Member States have ratified the eight fundamental ILO conventions and most
of the priority conventions covering labour market governance (employment policy, tripartite
consultations, labour inspection). These instruments cover all possible enterprises, institutions and
activities (formal and informal economy) with very limited exceptions and cover all workers without
distinction. For other conventions on for example skills, working conditions, employment protection
legislation, minimum wages fixing, social security and OSH, the ratifications vary according to
subject.
The second important international source of social rights and principles is the Council of Europe,
with in particular its EU Charter of 1961 and the Revised Social Charter of 1996. All Member States
have ratified either the 1961 or the 1996 Social Charters.90 The importance of the Social Charters is
acknowledged in the EU legal order in Article 151 TFEU, which provides that the EU and Member
States should have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working
conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation, proper social protection, dialogue between
management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment
and the combating of exclusion, “having in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out in the
European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961”. It reflects the common views and
traditions of the Member States and can be considered a declaration of the fundamental principles held
dear by the EU and its Member States.91
The ratification by EU Member States of ILO conventions, classified as up to date by ILO, and the
acceptance of the different articles of the (Revised) European Social Charter, in particular on working
conditions, income and employment relationships, is uneven. Many EU Member States have used the
possibility to opt out to some of the provisions such as on minimum wages, working time or social
inclusion and protection.
EU law is enforceable and more detailed than international standards, and can be made effective
through a strong legal framework ensuring fair remedies for both citizens and businesses. 92
International standards remain an important reference, as they can express common views on
minimum labour and social protection.
90
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp.
See Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C‑282/10, Maribel Dominguez, paragraph 104.
92
ILO standards and the European Social Charter cover a wider range of aspects, including minimum wages, the
right to skills and human resources development, protection against individual dismissals, minimum standards
for social security and unemployment benefits, as well as governance aspects such as labour inspection,
collective bargaining and tripartite consultations.
91
17
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Strasbourg, 8.3.2016
SWD(2016) 51 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Key economic, employment and social trends behind a European Pillar of Social Rights
Accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
Launching a consultation on a European Pillar of Social Rights
{COM(2016) 127 final}
{SWD(2016) 50 final}
EN
EN
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3
2. WELFARE IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW ........................................................................... 5
2.1. Diverse welfare models and levels of social expenditure ........................................................................ 5
2.2. A redistributive and cushioning role...................................................................................................... 7
2.3. The role of social partners ..................................................................................................................... 9
3. LONG-TERM TRENDS, SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND CHANGING
NEEDS ............................................................................................................................................... 10
3.1. An ageing continent ............................................................................................................................. 11
3.2. More female workers and changing family structures ......................................................................... 13
3.3. A more diverse population and workforce ........................................................................................... 14
3.4. Rising levels of education ..................................................................................................................... 15
4.
THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS: A HALT TO CONVERGENCE ........................... 20
4.1. Divergences in employment ................................................................................................................. 20
4.2. Recent trends in income inequalities.................................................................................................... 23
4.3. Poverty and social exclusion ................................................................................................................ 25
4.4. Sustainability of public finances, financing public services and the turn to social innovation ............. 27
5. THE NEW WORLD OF WORK, JOBS AND SKILLS .................................................... 27
5.1. Technological change and sectoral shifts ............................................................................................. 27
5.2. Changing work conditions ................................................................................................................... 28
5.3. Skills for changing occupations ........................................................................................................... 32
6. SPECIFIC CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE EURO AREA .......... 35
2
1. Introduction
This Staff Working Document presents a selection of key economic, employment and social trends of
relevance to the discussion on the establishment of a European Pillar of Social Rights. 1 The Pillar is
targeted at the euro area, but other Member States would be allowed to join in if they wanted to.
The discussion on the Pillar is an opportunity to review trends in the world of work and in society,
to take stock of the impact of the worst economic and social crisis in decades, and also to look ahead
and consider long-term trends that are very much relevant beyond the crisis. Such stocktaking should
take account of the wide diversity of situations and challenges across European countries,
of the particular needs of the euro area and also of the commonalities of European approaches from a
global perspective.
An important aspect of the consultation being launched today is to make sure that the principles to be
eventually outlined in the Pillar should be applicable not only for today's but also for tomorrow's
realities. This is why, in addition to the analysis presented here, a dedicated work stream for the
consultation is foreseen to discuss the future of work and welfare systems.2
This Staff Working Document highlights four trends in particular.
First, the crisis has had far-reaching social consequences, which may hamper opportunities for future
growth and economic performance across Europe. The recovery is slowly firming up in both the EU
and the euro area, but productivity growth remains low, affecting competitiveness and living standards
in many countries. Unemployment is decreasing steadily, but long-term unemployment as well as
the share of of young people not in education, employment or training (NEET) remain high.
Moreover, even though Europe has one of the most comprehensive welfare systems, around a quarter
of the population in the EU – 122 million people – are at risk of poverty or social exclusion,
with children being among the most vulnerable.3
The crisis has aggravated well-known challenges in a number of Member States. These include the
segmentation of labour markets between categories of workers, as well as between jobseekers and
those in work, and the persistence of job vacancies in certain sectors and regions in spite of high
unemployment, as a result of large skills mismatches.
Second, the current pace and extent of change in the world of work are further transforming
employment conditions. Global production patterns and the organisation of work across borders were
already affecting the European economy and its labour markets long before the financial crisis.
New ways of working, together with technological change and the digitisation of the economy, offer
new opportunities, increase possibilities for self-employment and new types of activities, and
make career patterns more diverse,4 yet also create new risks of "grey zones" in terms of labour rights
and access to welfare.
1
COM(2016) 127 of 8 March 2016 launching a consultation on a European Pillar of Social Rights.
See webpage of the consultation at: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetaryunion/european-pillar-social-rights
3
Eurostat (2015), “The risk of poverty or social exclusion affected 1 in 4 persons in the EU in 2014”; European
Commission (2015), Draft Joint Employment Report from the Commission and the Council, accompanying
the Communication from the Commission on the Annual Growth Survey 2016.
4
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2015), Reimagining Work, Green Paper Work 4.0.
2
3
These trends are being magnified by what is now referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution, 5
a paradigm shift in how economic value is created, and working lives are structured. The opportunities
perceived in terms of job creation go hand in hand with revived concerns about the substitution effect
and 'hollowing out' of a growing number of occupations caused by automation. Skills and access
to life-long learning matter more than ever in light of the changing work realities.
Third, demographic trends suggest that Europe's capacity to grow will increasingly rely on its ability
to boost productivity, which means moving towards high-end sectors, and on making the most of
Europe's human capital, by mobilising Europe's workforce. This includes women, whose employment
rate is catching up but remains below that of men in most countries, and also Europe's youth and older
workers.6 This also involves addressing obstacles to the participation of people underrepresented in the
labour market, such as third country nationals.
Demographic trends also put pressures on the financial sustainability of welfare systems and question
their ability to adjust to new family structures and societal trends, such as the tendency of people to
live more individual lives. Over the years, welfare systems have extended their role towards providing
services, incentivising labour market participation and generally investing in people's employability.
Social services have also been geared towards child development and the needs of dual-earner families
and have facilitated the labour force participation of women. Yet, the capacity of social protection
systems to provide adequate financial assistance and prevent poverty while supporting the labour
market integration of beneficiaries remains a challenge in several countries.
Fourth, divergence in employment and social performances may weigh heavily on the performance of
the euro area. During the crisis, the adjustment capacity of several Member States of the euro area
showed severe limitations. This has increased employment and social disparities, and tested
the resilience and stability of the euro area as a whole. In recent years, euro area Member States have
agreed on stricter coordination of economic and fiscal policies, but such deeper integration within the
Economic and Monetary Union also necessarily includes a social dimension.
As highlighted in the Five Presidents' Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary
Union,7 in a single currency area, there is a need to build up the shock absorption capacity and labour
market adjustment mechanisms of Member States. Enhancing convergence towards robust labour
market institutions and social infrastructure can facilitate resilience, social cohesion and macroeconomic adjustment within the euro area and beyond.
Looking ahead, the challenges are significant. Peoples' working lives are expected to be longer and
less linear: they will likely be marked by numerous transitions in jobs and professions, as well as by
changing needs, with life-cycle and work-cycle pressures requiring career interruptions or breaks for
caring responsibilities, or for seeking access to re-skilling opportunities. The notion of work is
becoming increasingly fluid and blurred, with ongoing, rapid technology-driven transformations
presenting both challenges and opportunities. The capacity of welfare systems to ensure equity and
enable upwards mobility is being tested, and a lot of efforts is still required to invest in Europe's skills
and human capital.
Although the benefits of policy interventions in all these fields may take time to materialise, the costs
associated with a lack of concerted action will no doubt be felt even more acutely.
5
World Economic Forum (2016), “The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond”.
European Commission (2015), “2015 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 28
EU Member States (2013–2060)”, Directorate- General Economic and Financial Affairs.
7
"Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union", Report by Jean-Claude Juncker, in cooperation with
Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and Martin Schulz, June 2015.
6
4
2. Welfare in Europe: an overview
European welfare States fulfil the key objectives of protecting against life's risks, poverty
alleviation, intra- and inter-generational redistribution, as well as macroeconomic
stabilisation. There is a very wide diversity of welfare and labour market institutions across
Europe, including in the organisation of social dialogue, which remains a building block of
the European social model and of a well-functioning social market economy. In recent years,
social protection systems played their role in cushioning the impact of the economic and
financial crisis, but their efficiency and financial sustainability have been put to a test.
2.1. Diverse welfare models and levels of social expenditure
European welfare states developed primarily in the second half of the 20th century during a period of
solid economic growth, to reconcile the often competing dynamics of solidarity and competitiveness,
labour and capital, equity and efficiency. Their key objectives have been pursued mainly through
regulation, fiscal redistribution, the provision of public goods and collective insurance against
individual and socio-economic risks.8
Instruments have been developed to insure against life-course and labour market risks; to reduce
poverty and income inequality; to encourage children and family protection; to promote labour force
participation; and to improve population health and skills.9 The weight attributed to the different
functions varies substantially across countries, as do their coverage and generosity 10 and their
performance in terms of efficiency and equity.11
The differences between Europe’s social and welfare models have led to a number of categorisations, 12
taking into account the level of income support for those outside the labour market, the effects of
welfare policies on social mobility, and the differences in welfare providers (i.e. public or private).
Beyond such classifications, models have tended to converge in this century to reflect evolving
societal needs. However, for illustrative purposes, it is possible to categorise national welfare systems
across clusters, mostly following Europe’s geographical regions:13
8
Lindert, P.H. (2004), “Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century”,
Cambridge University Press; Begg, I., Draxler, J. and Mortensen, J. (2008), “Is Social Europe Fit for
Globalisation? A study of the social impact of globalization in the European Union”. Brussels: European
Commission, Centre for European Policy Studies.
9
Boeri, T. (2002) “Let Social Policy Models Compete and Europe Will Win”, paper presented at a Conference
hosted by the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 11-12 April.
10
Sapir A. (2005), “Globalisation and the Reform of European Social Models”, Bruegel Policy Contribution;
Begg I. et al. (2008), op.cit.; Ferrera M. (1996) “The Southern Model of Welfare in Social Europe” in Journal of
European Social Policy, 6:1, 1996, pp.17-37; Esping-Andersen G.(1990), “The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism”, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
11
European Commission, (2016), “Employment and Social Developments in Europe” (ESDE) 2015.
12
European Commission (2016), “Employment and Social Developments in Europe” (ESDE) 2015, op.cit.,
(Chap2-3_Table-1); Ebbinghaus, B. (2012), “Comparing Welfare State Regimes: Are Typologies an Ideal or
Realistic Strategy?”, ESPAnet Conference, Edinburgh, UK, September 6‐8, 2012; Sapir A. (2005),
“Globalisation and the Reform of European Social Models”, Bruegel Policy Contribution; Begg I. et al. (2008),
op.cit.; Ferrera M. (1996) “The Southern Model of Welfare in Social Europe” in Journal of European Social
Policy, 6:1, pp.17-37; Esping-Andersen G. (1990), “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
13
It should still be acknowledged that a great degree of variation in terms of inputs and outcomes of welfare
policies can be found within these regimes.
5





The "Nordic" cluster features the highest levels of social protection expenditures, universal
welfare provision and trade union density. Intervention in labour markets is characterised by
a mix of active labour market policies to promote integration in gainful employment. Social
partners play a leading role in wage setting and working conditions. Social insurances include
a combination of general provisions, income-related benefits and in-kind benefits.
The "Continental Western European" cluster relies extensively on insurance-based
unemployment benefits and old-age pensions, traditionally aimed at managing income
fluctuation across the life cycle. In spite of declining membership, trade unions remain strong
as regulations extend the coverage of collective bargaining to non-unionised workers.
The "Anglo-Saxon" cluster features relatively large social assistance of the last resort,
with limited transfers oriented at people of working age. Activation measures are important as
are schemes conditioning access to benefits to regular employment. This model is
characterised by relatively weak trade unions and decentralised wage bargaining.
The "Mediterranean" cluster is highly state-centred. Social spending may tend to be biased
towards old-age pensions and often allows for a high segmentation of entitlements and status.
The cluster is characterised by a relatively homogeneous wage structure obtained through
collective bargaining.
The "Baltic, Central and South Eastern European" cluster is characterised by more limited
welfare provisions14 based on state-centred welfare spending, but also on family for providing
support, with relatively fragmented bargaining systems.
Over the past decades, the role of welfare states has been extended by more actively providing
services, incentivising labour market participation and generally investing in people's employability.
Family-friendly social services geared towards the needs of dual-earner families have facilitated
labour force participation of women and child development. Childcare and long-term care for elderly
citizens have grown in importance, as has the need for good quality preventive and curative healthcare.
Early retirement policies have been phased out and replaced by initiatives aimed at promoting longer
and healthier working lives. Emphasis has also been increasingly put on the inclusion of residents with
a migrant background, which is even more necessary in the light of recent flows of migrants and
refugees.
As a result of these differences, levels of social expenditure vary significantly across Europe.
Countries such as Denmark, France, Finland and Greece spend more than 30% of GDP (not including
education) on social expenditure whereas Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania spend less than 15%
(Figure 1).15
14
According to the World Bank (2015), “EU Regular Economic Report, Fall 2015”, a distinction should be
made between (a) Cyprus, Croatia and Hungary being on a path to a fully balanced welfare state, (b) Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia having implemented small balanced welfare states; and (c) Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic and Estonia still having rather limited welfare States.
15
European Commission (2015), “Social protection systems in the EU: financing arrangements and the
effectiveness and efficiency of resource allocation”.
6
Figure 1: Spending on social protection, EU-28, % of GDP, 2013
Note: data for Greece and Poland, and the EA18 and EU 28 are from 2012
Source: Eurostat
Old age and survivors pensions enjoy the largest share (44%) of total social expenditure, followed by
public expenditure on health care and sickness benefits (28%) (Figure 2). Expenditures related to
unemployment displayed the largest variation over the last decade: they fell between 2005 and 2007,
and increased steeply as a result of the crisis between 2008 and 2009, to contract slightly afterwards,
including during the second dip of the recession (2012-13).
Figure 2: Structure of social protection expenditure, EU-28, % of total expenditure, 2012
Source: Eurostat, Expenditure: main results
2.2. A redistributive and cushioning role
The 2008 economic and financial crisis confirmed the role played by social expenditure –
unemployment benefits in particular – as an automatic stabiliser, contributing to the resilience of the
economy and society. In order to ensure effective macroeconomic stabilisation, effective social
spending and support to the active age population are essential.
7
Overall, while social spending had played a significant role in the first phase of the crisis, by
sustaining incomes of households affected by unemployment or wage reductions in most countries in
2008/2009, this contribution lessened from 2010 onwards. This is partly the result of an increasing
share of long-term unemployed having lost access to insurance-based benefits.
In particular, a number of Southern European countries and Baltic States, where the crisis hit hardest
and initial conditions were more fragile than in other parts of Europe, had to tighten eligibility
conditions for cash benefits, freeze indexation and limit in-kind benefits/social services.16
Beyond the level of spending, the distributional and stabilisation effects of social expenditure is
heavily influenced by its composition,17 notably the design of benefits and related indexation
mechanisms. 18
Figure 3: Overall social protection expenditure, real growth trends in the EU, 2001-2012
Source: European Commission (2016), Employment and Social Developments Report 2015
In some cases, the lack of integrated benefits and services reduces their effectiveness in addressing
poverty and supporting labour market integration. Access to essential services such as transport,
energy and financial services is also an issue in several EU countries, while the lack of adequate
housing and housing insecurity is a large concern across the EU.
The consequences of Europe's ageing societies, the need for more effective lifelong activation and
protection policies, and the growing pressures on the sustainability of public finances all call for better
performing welfare systems. In addition to their social protection function, efficient welfare systems
with appropriate levels and mixes of social expenditure contribute to economic growth in a two-fold
and mutually reinforcing manner.19
16
Hemerijck A. (2012) “When Changing Welfare States and the Eurocrisis meet”, Essays in Sociologica,
1/2012; Matsaganis M., and Leventi C. (2014), "The distributional impact of austerity and the recession in
Southern Europe" in South European Society and Politics 19 (3) 393-412.
17
Stiglitz, J.E., Sen, A., Fitoussi, J.-P. (2009), “Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic
Performance and Social Progress”.
18
Social Protection Committee and the European Commission Services (2015), “Joint Report on: Social
protection systems in the EU: financing arrangements and the effectiveness and efficiency of resource
allocation.” pp. 34-39; European Commission (2014); European Commission (2014), Employment and Social
Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2014.
19
Gill, I. S. and Raiser, M. (2012), “Main Report: Golden Growth: Restoring the Lustre of the European
Economic Model”, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
8
First, better integrated employment and social services and active labour market policies can ease
access to the labour market, provide adequate incentives to work, support skills and employability, and
provide support for professional transitions. In practice, the capacity of unemployment, minimum
income and disability benefits to provide adequate financial assistance and prevent poverty while
supporting the labour market integration of beneficiaries remains a challenge in several countries.
Second, investment in human capital and enabling services, such as childcare, lifelong learning and
retraining, allow more people to be part of the labour force and to develop their skills base throughout
their life, to move society up the value and innovation chain, and thereby contribute to economic
growth.20 This includes good quality primary and secondary education, apprenticeships for young
adults, smooth transitions from education to work, as well as training and lifelong learning
programmes for adults and older workers to update their skills. This, in turn, allows for better
employment opportunities, longer working lives and consequently better pension prospects.
Enabling services also include universal and good quality early childhood education that promotes
cognitive development and social integration, preventing the inter-generational transfer of poverty,
as well as robust safety nets that support life and work-related transitions.
An adequate balance between a social protection function and a social investment function of welfare
systems is essential to build resilient economies. Investment in education, health and childcare
facilities may have an important role in supporting higher levels of male and female labour market
participation over the life-cycle, higher productivity and earnings.21 Examples show that
well-functioning welfare states open to reforms and adjustments can create an environment for growth
and investment.22
2.3. The role of social partners
Social dialogue is a building block of the European social model and of a well-functioning social
market economy. It contributes to devising arrangements that better serve the employment and skills
needs of both employees and companies, and to building shared understanding and mutual trust,
which are essential for addressing social challenges and modernising economies.23
20
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2015), “In It Together: Why Less Inequality
Benefits Us All”, Paris: OECD Publishing; Hemerijck, A. (2014), "Social Investment in 'Stocks', 'Flows' and
“Buffers", in Politiche Sociali, 1 (1): 9-26; Hemerijck, A. and Vydra, S. (2016), "Navigating Social Investment
Policy Analysis".
21
See, for instance: Kenworthy L. (2008), “Jobs with equality”. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kenworthy L.
(2011), “Progress for the poor”. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Pontusson, J. (2005), “Inequality and
Prosperity: Social Europe versus Liberal America”. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Esping-Andersen G.
(2009), “The Incomplete Revolution: Adapting to Women’s New Roles”. Cambridge: Polity Press; Bernard, P.,
and Boucher, G. (2007) “Institutional competitiveness, social investment, and welfare regimes.” In “Regulation
and Governance” 1: 213-229; Begg, I., Draxler, J. and Mortensen, J. (2008), “Is Social Europe Fit for
Globalisation? A study of the social impact of globalization in the European Union”. Brussels: European
Commission, Centre for European Policy Studies; Eichhorst, W., and Hemerijck, A. (2010), “Welfare and
employment: A European dilemma?” Pp. 201-236 in “United In diversity? Comparing Social Models in Europe
and America”, edited by J. Alber and N. Gilbert. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22
Leoni, Th. (2015), “Welfare state adjustment to new social risks in the post-crisis scenario. A review with
focus on the social investment perspective”. Vienna: WIFO; Kenworthy, L.(2004), “Egalitarian Capitalism: Jobs,
Incomes and Growth in Affluent Countries”. New York: Russell Sage. Boeri, T. and Garibaldi, P. (2009),
“Beyond Eurosclerosis”, in Economic Policy, Jul 2009, 24 (59) 409-461; Bertola et al. (2001), “Welfare and
Employment in a United Europe”, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
23
Business Europe (2014), “Future of Social Europe. Challenges and the Way Ahead”; Lapeyre, J. (2015),
“European Social Dialogue: 30 Years of Experience and Progress but what does the Future hold?” in Notre
Europe.
9
Industrial relations cover a wide range of domains but typically include issues related to remuneration.
Collective bargaining varies significantly between Member States and can take place at national,
sectorial, regional or company level.24 Further differences are related to the degree of employee
coverage25 and whether social partners are involved in the administration of unemployment benefits,
social security or public healthcare (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Typology of welfare States and industrial relations
Broad
geographic
region
Northern
Europe
Main
characteristics
Organised
corporatism
Employee
representation
at
company
level
Main level of
bargaining
Bargaining
style
Role of state in
IR
Role of Social
Partners
in
public policy
Continental
Western
Europe
UK, Ireland
Southern
Europe
Corporatism,
Social
partnership
Union based, Dual system,
high coverage high coverage
Liberal pluralism State centred
(Anglo-Saxon)
Sector
Sector
Company
Integrating
Integrating
Conflict oriented
Limited
(mediator)
Institutionalise
d
Shadow of
hierarchy
Institutionalise
d
Central and
South Eastern
Europe, CY,
MT
Fragmented /
state-centred
Union
based, Union based, Union based
limited coverage high
limited
coverage
coverage
Sector
Conflict
oriented
Non-intervention Frequent
intervention
Rare,
event Not on a
driven
regular basis
Company
Acquiescent
Organiser of
transition
Not
on
a
regular basis
Source: Adapted from European Commission (2016), Employment and Social Developments Report 2015, and
European Commission (2008)
3. Long-term trends, societal transformations and changing needs
Profound long-term changes are taking place in the world of work and society. In particular,
demographic ageing, as well as the need for adequate activation and protection policies along the life
cycle, call for a renewed attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of European welfare states.
At the same time, the labour market participation of women is progressing and family structures are
changing, while the workforce is getting more diverse. Moreover, levels of education are increasing,
but challenges remain, and inequalities remain persistent.
24
European Commission (2016), “Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE)” 2015, Chapters
2-3 for an in-depth account.
25
Coverage: share of employees covered by collective (wage) bargaining agreements (excluding sectors or
occupations that do not have the right to bargain).
10
3.1. An ageing continent
In the future, Europe’s population will be slightly larger but significantly older. The size of the age
group 65+ is expected to increase from 96 million (2015) to 148 million (2060) while the population
of working age (20-65) is projected to decrease from 306 million to 269 million.26 The share of those
aged 20-65 will become substantially smaller by 2060, declining from 60% to 51% of the population,
while the share of 65+ will become much larger, rising from 18% to 28%. The group over 80 years old
will be as numerous as children under 15 years of age (Figures 5 and 6).
This demographic shift is the result of a lower number of births, increasing life expectancy and the
larger birth cohorts of the 1960s (the so-called baby-boom generation) entering retirement age.
The so-called demographic "old-age dependency ratio" of people aged 65 or above relative to those
aged 15-64 is projected to increase from 27.8% (in 2013) to 50.1% in the EU as a whole by 2060.
Figure 5: Absolute change in population age
structure, EU28, actual (2000-2014), medium
scenario (2015 -2060) in millions
Figure 6: Age structure, EU28,
2013 – 2060
Source: Eurostat
Source: Eurostat, Europop 2013
This implies that the EU would move from having four working-age people for every person aged
over 65 years to about two working-age persons. This will pose substantial challenges to labour
markets, the financial sustainability of welfare systems, health and elderly care and pension systems.
This risk needs to be addressed now. Under alternative scenario assumptions, total labour supply could
almost stabilise between 2013 and 2023. Yet, it is expected to decline by 19 million people
(-8.2%) in the EU between 2023 and 2060 as larger cohorts retire and are replaced by smaller ones of
younger workers and labour migrants from third countries.27 Increases in the employment rate as well
as increases in productivity would compensate the reduction in working age population.
But for this to happen, it is essential to invest in people's skills and support their employability.
Older workers have been remaining in the workforce or entering the workplace in increasing numbers,
although the current employment rate of 52% among those aged 55-65 remains much lower than
the overall employment rate (Figure 8 below).28 Evidence suggests that it is also this age group that is
most at risk of having obsolete skills and least likely to receive training (Figure 7).
26
European Commission (2015), “The 2015 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 28 EU
Member States” (2013 – 2060), Economic and Financial Affairs.
27
European Commission (2015), “The 2015 Ageing Report” op. cit.
28
European Commission (2016), “Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2015, op. cit.
11
In recent decades, Member States have taken a variety of reforms to manage pension expenditure and
safeguard the financial sustainability and adequacy of pension systems.29 Considering the future
outlook, pension adequacy will depend, to a much higher degree than before, on the amount and
length of pension contributions resulting from the career average wage level and the length of the
working career. Low earnings, long career breaks and early retirement can therefore be identified as
key risk factors for pension adequacy in the future. Expenditure projections based on the legislation
adopted by end of 2014 assume higher effective retirement ages and employment rates for older
workers and show that, even under such assumptions, several Member States could still experience a
significant increase in their spending.
Due to high levels of long-term unemployment and atypical career paths, poverty among future
pensioners, particularly women, is at risk of increasing. In general, older people (aged 65 and more)
are not currently more at risk of poverty than other age groups. In most EU countries, older people
seem so far to have been better protected against the social impact of the recession and public finance
crisis than other age groups. The share of older people with incomes below the at-risk-of-poverty
threshold has actually declined from 2009 to 2012. However, for older people, the risk of severe
material deprivation has increased slightly over this period. Pension systems, and in particular public
pension schemes, have continued to ensure that oldest people in the majority of EU countries are
protected against the risk of poverty and deprivation. While pensions are the main income source of
older Europeans, living standards in old age also depend on other factors, such as private assets,
notably home ownership, access to other benefits and services, and employment opportunities.
Figure 7: Participation rate in training and education by age in EU, %, 2002-2014
Source: Eurostat
At the same time, European health systems are facing growing common challenges: intensifying
health and long-term care demands linked to demographic ageing and the resulting rise of chronic
diseases and multi-morbidity; shortages and uneven distribution of health professionals;
health inequalities and inequities in access to healthcare.
Ageing and medical innovation have increased health expenditure in the EU during most of the second
half of the 20th century, and estimates expect public spending on health and long-term care to rise by
2060.30 There is a pressing need for more efficiently managed healthcare31 to transform resources into
29
European Commission (2015), "The 2015 Pension Adequacy Report:
current and future income adequacy in
old age in the EU”, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, and Social Protection
Committee.
30
European Commission (2015), “The 2015 Ageing Report” op. cit.
31
Medeiros J. and Schwierz, Ch. (2015), “Efficiency estimates of health care systems”, European Economy.
Economic Papers 549. June 2015
12
health outcomes (i.e. longer and healthier life expectancy, amenable mortality rates, etc.).
Equally important is to ensure a balance between preventive and curative care, improving health
security, reducing inequalities in access to quality care, and addressing growing needs for long-term
care services and mitigating dependencies.
3.2. More female workers and changing family structures
Labour market participation of women has been steadily growing, which, together with growing
participation of older workers, has at least partially offset the decline in workforce in many countries.
Female workforce participation has consistently gone up, from 56.1% in 2005 to 59.6% in 2014.
Cross-country variation in the EU, however, is still considerable and women have on average an
employment rate of 11.5 percentage points lower than men. The employment gap is much bigger when
full-time equivalent is considered.
Figure 8: Employment rates of women and men (age group 15-64), and older adults (age group 55-65),
EU28, %, 2003-2014
Source: Eurostat
Data suggests that, although employment tends to increase with parental age, young mothers and
particularly single mothers are more likely to engage in part-time work. As a result, not only are they
more likely to face diminished employment opportunities over their life-time, they are also more likely
to rely on a lower income, with further implications for long-term inequality and human capital for
themselves and their offspring.32 Due to discontinued employment patterns and fewer hours worked,
the gender earnings gap during active years has reached 41% and leads to a very wide gender gap in
pensions. Older women are much more at risk of poverty and social exclusion than older men, and no
mitigating trends have been observed in recent years.
Moreover, while women are more likely than men to have a higher education degree, they remain
underrepresented in the science, technology, mathematics and engineering sectors (STEM) and overrepresented in fields of study that are linked to traditional gender roles. Women also represent the
biggest untapped source of entrepreneurial potential, as only 29 % of today's entrepreneurs are women.
The increase in female labour market participation, the fact that it remains well below that of men,
particularly for mothers, as well as the growing numbers of single-parent families over past decades,
has triggered a review of entitlements and work-life balance policies.33
32
European Commission, (2014), “Single parents and employment in Europe”.
European Commission (2016), “Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015”; European
Commission (2013) “Evidence on demographic and social trends: Social policies' contribution to inclusion,
employment and the economy”.
33
13
Yet, gender inequalities in the labour market continue to be exacerbated by a lack of adequate worklife balance arrangements - such as leaves, flexible working patterns and access to formal care
services34. Moreover, lack of paid leave arrangements for fathers relative to mothers, or insufficient
incentives to make use of them, can further reinforce gender differences between work and care.
3.3. A more diverse population and workforce
At the beginning of 2014, there were 34.1 million foreign citizens residing in the EU Member States.
Of these, 14.3 million citizens were nationals from another EU Member State and 19.8 million were
non-EU citizens. (Figure 9). 7% of the total population of the EU is thus from foreign origin,
of which 40% are citizens of another EU Member State.35
Figure 9: Breakdown of EU28 population
Source: Eurostat, LFS
The growing diversity of immigration flows on origin and type has challenged the capacity of host
countries to respond effectively to the different integration needs of the various migrant groups.
The EU's diverse workforce is characterised by limited integration in terms of educational attainment
and participation in the labour force. In 2014, on average, some 10% of Europe's labour force was
unemployed, while the rate was significantly higher among third-country nationals (17.0%).
Employment rates of third country nationals (56%) are indeed below EU average (69.2%).
Recent intakes of asylum seekers and refugees reinforce these existing integration challenges in
the short and medium term.
At EU level, the employment rate of people with disabilities is 47.9% compared to 71.5% of persons
without disabilities. While part of this difference is due to the fact that people with disabilities might
be unable to enter employment, part of it also has to do with the lack of adequate support measures to
enable people with disabilities to enter the labour market.
34
35
See for instance OECD (2012) “Closing the Gender Gap”
Eurostat (2015), “News release: Foreign citizens living in the EU Member States”.
14
3.4. Rising levels of education
Skills and human capital are widely considered the backbone of economic prosperity and social
well-being in the 21st century. Over the years, Europe has achieved high levels of education.
Participation rates in early childhood education have been rising, while numbers of early leavers from
education and training have been decreasing over the past decades (Figures 10 and 11).
Figure 10: Participation in early childhood education,
(from 4 years to compulsory school age),
EU-28, 2002-2012
Source: Eurostat
Figure 11: Early leavers from education
and training EU-28, 2002-2015
Source: Eurostat
Nonetheless, significant challenges persist. Formal childcare has positive consequences for children,
in particular those from disadvantaged backgrounds, whereas lack of or limited formal childcare
options can have negative consequences for female career development. As most parents combine
various reconciliation instruments between family and work lives, childcare arrangements are related
to parents’ preferences and norms, the children age, and labour market opportunities for parents.
Despite steadily decreasing trends, there are still more than 4.4 million early school leavers across
Europe36, and about 60% of these are either inactive or unemployed. Underachievement in
mathematics, reading and science, in particular among pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds,
underlines persisting vulnerabilities in European societies. Early school leaving represents a loss of
potential that has effects on both social and economic scale such as reduced social cohesion and lower
financial incomes. In the long run, early school leaving has negative effects on social development and
economic growth, which is very much based on qualified labour force. The reduction of the rate of
early school leaving on European scale would supply the European economy with a substantial
number of young people with qualifications who have better employment prospects.
36
European Commission's 2015 Education and Training Monitor.
15
The share of the population aged 30-34 that have completed tertiary or equivalent education stands at
37.9% (2015), but the transition from school to work remains difficult, as shown by the employability
rate of graduates, which is stagnant across the EU and still below its 2008 peak.37 Education
attainment rates vary considerably across Member States; yet most countries face similar challenges in
terms of broadening access to higher education. Specific challenges concern the inclusion of students
from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds or geographical locations, from ethnic groups and
people with a disability. Additional priorities include reducing drop-out rates and the time it takes to
complete a degree; and improving the quality of higher education and making it more relevant to
labour market transformations.
3.5. Persistent inequalities
The distribution of outcomes and opportunities is closely intertwined. Unequal opportunities affect
individual capacities to earn income; wealth inequalities affect individuals' educational and labour
market choices and performance.
The overall income distribution in the EU is generally more equal than in other major economies,
such as the USA or Japan. There is a broad trend toward rising inequality and declining labour income
share over recent decades in Europe, as well as in most other industrialised countries, but the
developments vary across countries, and inequalities increased to a lesser extent in Europe than in the
USA (figure 12).38 In many advanced economies, there is increasing concentration of income at the
very top of the distribution.39
Figure 12: Long term trends in income inequalities (mid-1980s to 2013 or latest available) (Gini Index)
Source : OECD (2015). Note: inequality of household disposable income. "Little change" in inequality refers to
changes of less than 1.5 percentage points. Data year for 2013 or latest year (2013 for FI, HU, NL and the
United States, 2009 for Japan, and 2012 for the other countries).
37
Europe 2020 target: Tertiary Education Attainment; Eurostat; 2015 Joint Report of the Council and the
Commission on the implementation of the strategic framework for European cooperation in education and
training (ET 2020) New priorities for European cooperation in education and training, (2015/C 417/04).
38
See OECD (2015).
39
OECD (2014); Sommeiller and Price (2015).
16
Since 2000, in Europe, inequalities have generally increased less in countries with higher levels of
inequalities and more in countries with lower levels of inequalities. This trend was relatively smoothed
during the crisis: overall inequality in the EU has been nearly constant, though some of the countries
most affected by the crisis such as Cyprus, Italy and Spain have registered increases in inequalities
(Figure13).
Figure 13: Trends in income inequalities (2000-2007 and 2008-2013) (Gini Index)
Source: Eurostat
Available evidence points to a number of key causal factors that may potentially explain these trends.
These factors include: increasing technological change; changes in labour market institutions such as
declining bargaining power of workers; globalisation of financial and trade flows; polarisation on the
labour market; the changing nature of employment relationships; financial deepening; privatisation of
state-owned enterprises; changes in the size and structure of families.40 On the contrary, higher levels
of education have been contributing to curb the increase in income inequalities.41 Tax and benefit
systems also generally play a central role in reducing income inequalities.42 Minimum wages can also
help prevent growing in-work poverty and are an important factor in ensuring decent job quality, while
they should also preserve the incentives to seek work and not discourage hiring for those at the bottom
end of the wage distribution.
The labour income share has typically fallen alongside an increase in market income inequality.43
Intergenerational income mobility also appears to be lower in countries with higher income inequality.
In addition, inequality of opportunities such as unequal access to education, health care and finance
can be pervasive and exacerbate income inequality.
Over the last decades, access to education and educational attainment have improved for the vast
majority of the population, thereby improving opportunities for all (see section 3.4), but socioeconomic status remains one of the main determinants for the development of basic skills (figure 14).
In most EU Member States, foreign-born students are under-performing their native peers.
Early school leaving is double among young people born outside of the EU compared to native born.
Educational inequalities are also due to stereotypes.
40
See for instance OECD, IMF, World Bank and the ILO (2015), “Income inequality and labour income share in
G20 countries: Trends, Impacts and Causes”.
41
See OECD (2011, 2015)
42
Add reference to ESDE reports, DG EMPL webnote on inequalities.
43
See for instance OECD, IMF, World Bank and the ILO (2015), “Income inequality and labour income share in
G20 countries: Trends, Impacts and Causes”.
17
Figure 14: Gap in achievement in mathematics by socio-economic status, PISA 2012
Source: OECD (PISA 2012)
Inequalities do not only worsen individual chances, they are also detrimental to growth.44
A main transmission mechanism between inequality and growth is human-capital investment,
as people in disadvantaged households have lower access to quality education. Analysis by the OECD
shows that widening income inequality can lead to larger gaps in educational outcomes and weaker
social mobility45.
At an early stage in life, unequal access to childcare, education and health46 are the main barriers to
equal opportunities. They are later reflected in terms of labour market participation and productivity
and are often reinforced by gaps in access to life long-learning.47
Early intervention has the potential to mitigate the impact of socio-economic background on the future
skills of children and their future academic and labour market outcomes. Children who attend
pre-primary education are more likely to be successful at school when they get to 15 and in the years
beyond.48 While in Europe pre-primary education programmes are expanding (with more than 80% of
the 4 years old are enrolled), significant differences remain as regards participation in early education
and care according to family incomes.49 Furthermore, catching up later in life can be impaired by gaps
in access to life-long learning. Participation in adult education and training is four times lower among
low qualified people compared to people with tertiary education.
In addition, sizeable gaps in health status exist within and between Member States (see Chart 15).
Throughout the EU, people with lower education, a lower socio economic status or lower income tend
to have shorter life expectancy and suffer from a higher incidence of most types of health problems.
Inequalities in health status are related and compounded by inequalities in access to health care,
by income level, as well as by regional disparities.
44
See for instance OECD (2015) and Dabla and al (2015).
OECD (2012) – PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through equity.
46
Which are to a large extent determined by family background such as parents' education and occupation, and
region of birth. See, for instance, Lentz and Laband (1989) and Gevreky, D. and Gevrek, E. (2008).
47
See, for instance, Eurofound (2007).
48
Idem.
49
See for instance Maquet and al (2015).
45
18
Figure 15: Development of life expectancy at 65 by socio-economic status in France and the United
Kingdom
Source: European Commission (2016), ESDE 2015
Territorial disparities affect the capacity of individuals to access essential public goods, such as
education and health care, as well as business and employment opportunities. People living in larger
cities generally have a lower risk of poverty or social exclusion, but there are exceptions and
significant differences across countries. Regional disparities in GDP per head (in purchasing power
standards) have shrunk substantially between 2000 and 2009, but the crisis put a halt to this
convergence process. In addition, regional disparities in unemployment and employment rates have
increased significantly since 2008, while there is also wide regional variation in educational outcomes
across the EU (Figure 16). On the contrary, there are also parallel trends towards increase in tertiary
attainment and a decline in early school leaving in the vast majority of regions, thus narrowing
regional dispersion. Such trends should contribute to reducing inequalities in the longer term.
Figure 16: Regional dispersion of GDP per head, employment, and unemployment (2000-2014) and in
early school leaving and tertiary education (2007-2014)
Source: European Commission (2016)
19
4.
The impact of the crisis: a halt to convergence
The economic and financial crisis has accentuated pre-existing imbalances, leading to very high
unemployment, especially long-term and youth unemployment, and increased poverty and inequality
in many parts of Europe. Despite some renewed convergence in employment and unemployment since
2013, large differences persist. Long-term unemployment and very long-term unemployment now
make up a very large share of the unemployed. The deterioration of unemployment has exacerbated
the conditions of Europeans at risk of poverty or social exclusion, which now count for almost
a quarter of EU citizens. Reduction in inequality has also stopped with the crisis.
4.1. Divergences in employment
A key feature of EU membership has been the long-term increase in wealth and welfare levels of its
poorer Member States. The economic and financial crisis, however, has generally decelerated such a
convergence process and even put some Member States on a divergent track. 50 The impact of the crisis
on employment in the euro area (EA) Southern and Eastern Member States, as well as on Ireland, has
been significant.51 The gap in employment rates between the Central and Northern euro area Member
States and the Southern and Eastern ones has doubled from 5 pp in 2007 to 11 pp in 2015.52
Figure 17: Employment rates, EU28 and groups of countries, 2000-2015, % of age group 15-64
Source: Eurostat.
Note: 2015 based on three first quarters.
50
For an overview of social convergence and divergence in the EU and EMU, see European Commission (2015)
“Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2014”.
51
To illustrate divergences, the following country groups within the euro are used: EA "Centre & North"
(Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Finland) and EA "South & East"
(Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia)
52
In recent years, short-time working arrangements (reducing monthly working hours instead of workers), partial
unemployment benefits, increased investment in childcare, withdrawal of early retirement schemes, an increased
participation in lifelong learning, and reduced strictness of employment protection have contributed to
recovering employment levels.
20
Europe is currently faced with the challenge of high unemployment, particularly long-term
unemployment, while having still over 1.8 unfilled job vacancies.53 Indeed, unemployment in Europe
has been for a long time structurally higher than that of other developed economies, such as Japan and
the United States.
While the three decades preceding the crisis saw overall convergence in the EU, the crisis produced a
dramatic rise in unemployment. Unemployment in 2014 remained above pre-crisis levels in all EU
Member States except Germany, where it is much lower, and in Poland and Malta, where it is now
close to 2008 levels.
Since 2008, the heterogeneity of unemployment rates has increased significantly between EU Member
States. This is especially true in Southern and Eastern European Member States of the euro area and in
Ireland, where it more than doubled from 2008 to2014 (Figure 18). In contrast, in Northern and
Central Member States of the euro area, unemployment rates remained largely stable, leading to a
difference of more than 10 pp. in 2014 compared to the other group. This represents a substantial
increase compared to 2007, when the difference was 0.5 pp. Germany is the euro area Member State
with the lowest unemployment rate, currently at 5.0%, while rates in Greece stand at 26.5% (2015).
The difference between the weakest and strongest performer within the euro area increased threefold
during the crisis.
Figure 18: Total unemployment, annual average, %, 2000-2015
Source: Eurostat.
Note: 2015 based on three first quarters.
The strong rise in youth unemployment began in 2007, rising from 15.9% in 2007 to 22.2% in 2014.
In the euro area, it rose from 15.6% to 23.7% (Figure 19). Deteriorating conditions are not limited to
unemployment: the proportion of people not in employment, education or training (NEET) reached
16.6% in 2014, against 14.2% in 2008.
53
EURES and according to Eurostat (2015), “EU Employment and Social Situation” – Quarterly Review, the
vacancy rate, stood at 1.7% in Q3 2015. Looking forward, up to up to 825,000 unfilled vacancies are estimated
for ICT (Information and Communications technology) professionals alone by 2020 (European Commission
(2014) – “Mapping and Analysing Bottleneck Vacancies in EU Labour Markets”.
21
The annual cost of the NEETs in terms of loss of human capital has been estimated at about 1.2%
of EU GDP (EUR 153 billion).54 Recent data show modest but encouraging developments, with youth
unemployment decreasing, employment increasing slightly, NEET rates decreasing and participation
in education increasing. Yet, youth unemployment remains very high and there are still very
considerable differences across Member States. The youth unemployment rate ranges from less than
10% in countries little affected by unemployment (e.g. Austria and Germany), to more than half of the
active population aged 15-24 in Greece and Spain, where it has almost tripled since 2008.
Figure 19: Youth unemployment, in %, 2015
Source: Eurostat.
Austria, Estonia, United Kingdom, Italy and Greece data are from 2014
Levels of long-term unemployment reached record highs during and in the aftermath of the crisis:
in 2008, 2.6% of active people were affected but the number almost doubled in the subsequent years,
as shown in Figure 20 (5.1% the labour force and about 50% of total unemployment in 2014). For the
very long-term unemployed, the rate rose from 1.5% in 2008 to 3.1% in 2014. Only recently, during
2015, have numbers started to decline. One in five long-term unemployed has never worked, and three
quarters of them are below 35 years of age. Third country nationals and low-skilled workers are
among the most affected by long-term unemployment.
The crisis revealed very wide differences in the capacity of labour markets to absorb shocks. On the
one hand, Sweden and Luxembourg preserved their traditionally low levels of long-term
unemployment since the crisis – respectively, 1.5% and 1.7% in 2014 – and Germany even reduced it
(2.2% in 2014). On the other hand, long-term unemployment substantially worsened in Greece (19.5%
in 2014), Spain (12.9% in 2014) and Croatia (10.1% in 2014). In the euro area, long-term
unemployment rose from 3.3% in 2008 to 8.2% in 2014, with alarmingly high rates among the youth.
This creates a vicious cycle, as being unemployed for a long time leads to low employment
opportunities, skills erosion and lower earning potential, increasing the lifetime risk of poverty and
social exclusion.
54
Eurofound (2012), “NEETS Young people not in employment, education or training: Characteristics, costs and
policy responses in Europe”.
22
Figure 20: Long-term unemployment and youth long-term unemployment, %, 2000-2014
Source: Eurostat
4.2. Recent trends in income inequalities
Market income inequalities55 among European households increased in twelve EU countries between
2008 and 2012, as a result of both increased unemployment and increased earnings polarisation for
those in employment. Unemployment, in particular, has shown to be a key driver of rising inequality
in overall incomes during the crisis.56
Following the worsening of unemployment from 2008 onwards, the share of households with no
income from work increased, especially in Ireland, Spain, Lithuania and Greece. The increased
polarisation of household market incomes can also be explained in part by the respective shares of jobrich and job-poor households. Before the recession, the share of adults living in very high work
intensity households was increasing with growing labour market participation of women as second
earners. During the crisis, this trend reversed, with an increase in lower job intensity households and
reductions in the number of high work intensity households due to unemployment and part-time
work.57
55
In this section Gini coefficients are used. It measures the degree of inequality of the income distribution by
taking all income distribution into account. It varies from 0 to 100, with 0 corresponding to perfect equality
(everyone has the same income) and 100 to extreme inequality (one person has all the income). Regarding
market income, we refer here to gross earnings from work and capital before taxes and transfers.
56
Recent analysis of the drivers of income inequality shows that the Great Recession has had only a limited
effect on the distribution of earnings among those who remained employed, and it is non-employment that drives
earnings inequality upwards. See: Hellebrandt, T. “Income Inequality Developments in the Great Recession”,
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 1 4-3, January 2014, and Duiella, M. and A. Turrini,
“Poverty developments in the EU after the crisis: a look at main drivers” European Commission, DirectorateGeneral Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Brief n. 31, May 2014.
57
European Commission (2015) “Employment and Social Development in Europe (ESDE) 2014”; Op. Cit. pp
56-59.
23
With regard to inequalities in disposable income after social transfers, European divergences have
widened.58 While disposable income inequality has increased in 10 Member States between 2008 and
2012, notably in Spain, Hungary and Denmark, inequality has fallen in seven others, notably in Latvia,
Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands.
The impact of social policy on inequality can be illustrated by comparing market income inequalities
with inequalities of disposable income after transfers. The comparison shows the role of tax and transfer systems in reducing market income inequality. The result clearly is a decrease of inequality after
redistribution (Figure 21) and may be considered as a way of assessing the effectiveness of welfare
systems. It also shows the importance of redistribution contributing to resilience during times of crisis.
Figure 21: Market income versus disposable household income, level of inequality, selected EU Member
States, 2012 (Gini index)
Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2015), ESDE 2014.
Note: Income data are not available for all EU Member States
A longer-term view suggests that in the euro area South and Ireland, where initial conditions in terms
of income distribution were more unequal, disposable household inequalities fell between 2005 and
2008, and they have consistently intensified since 2011. In the euro area East, inequality was slightly
reduced until 2012, but has since started to rise again. In the euro area North, inequalities grew until
2008, but have remained more or less stable since.
Figure 22: Disposable household income, level of inequality, 2005-2014 (Gini coefficient)
Source: Eurostat
58
Net earnings from work, capital and social transfers after taxes.
24
4.3. Poverty and social exclusion
The deterioration of unemployment has exacerbated the conditions of Europeans at risk of poverty or
social exclusion, i.e. people with an income below 60% of the national median income, and of those
suffering from severe material deprivation, or living in households with low work intensity.
This affects almost a quarter of EU citizens, in particular in Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, and
Hungary (see Figure 23). Child poverty is higher than the average, especially among young children
(less than 6 years old) in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain and the United Kingdom.
This perpetuates structural impediments to equitable access to opportunities and well-being, and
suggests ineffectiveness of social expenditure targeting the most vulnerable groups of the population.
Figure 23: People at risk of poverty by country, disaggregated by gender and age, 2014, % of population
Source: Eurostat
Older people are, at present, better protected against poverty. However, there remain clear differences
between men and women across much of the EU. Women above age 65 face a substantially higher risk
of poverty or social exclusion than their male counterparts. For the EU as a whole, gender differences
in the incidence of poverty amount to more than four percentage points for women between age 65 and
74, and increases to over six percentage points above age 75 (Figure 24).
Figure 24: Differences between women and men (pp) in at-risk of poverty and/or social exclusion
(AROPE) rate, 2014
Source: Eurostat. Calculated as AROPE rate for women – AROPE rate for men (pps)
25
Older women are more vulnerable to poverty because of lower average pension income across
Member States (60% of the average pension of men in 2012), as well as lower likelihood to be
covered by pensions.59 Women's lower pay, greater concentration in part-time work, lower statutory
retirement age, and gaps in their careers, often due to caring responsibilities, lead to lower pension
contributions and, ultimately, lower pension entitlements. Moreover, family-friendly policies
mitigating gender inequalities in pension entitlements, by allowing workers to continue to build up
pension contributions during caring periods, are present to varying extent across Member States. 60
In 2014, 70% of the EU population lived in owner-occupied dwellings, 19% were renting
accommodation at market price and 11% were tenants in reduced-rent or free accommodation
(Eurostat data). Limited access to affordable housing can be an obstacle to labour market adjustment
and job uptake. Faced with growing demand, particularly cities have a limited capacity to supply
additional affordable and quality housing. New investments, particularly in new construction, slowed
down during the crisis due to the adjustment in house prices from elevated pre-crisis levels and
existing zoning regulations. Mortgages lending activity also decreased considerably. Growing
financial difficulties for people on low and middle incomes have resulted in more frequent arrears in
rental and mortgage payments and a rise in evictions and foreclosures. Restricting access to housing
assistance and creating barriers to access to affordable social housing by the most vulnerable people
increases the risk for homelessness. Housing assistance also performs an automatic stabilisation
function, as it grows or remains constant while market incomes decline.
There is wide outcome heterogeneity among Members States in the effectiveness of social spending.
Evidence suggests that, on average, only half or less of the poor are lifted out of poverty by social
transfers. Overall spending may be relatively large, for instance as in the case of the welfare states of
Southern Europe, but social assistance coverage of the poor is relatively low. In contrast, welfare
states in other countries that spend less on social protection seem to achieve a better coverage of the
poorest 20 percent of the population.61
Figure 25: Social protection expenditure and reduction of inequality and poverty in EU Member States
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS and EU-SILC, DG EMPL calculations.
59
European Commission and Social Protection Committee (2015), “Pension Adequacy Report: current and
future income adequacy in old age in the EU”.
60
DG EMPL (2015) “Review of recent social policy reform - Report of the Social Protection Committee”
61
Please see “Social protection systems in the EU: financing arrangements and the effectiveness and efficiency
of resource allocation” (10/03/2015). See also “Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2014”,
Chapter 6, 'Efficiency and effectiveness of social expenditure in the crisis'.
26
4.4. Sustainability of public finances, financing public services and the turn to social innovation
The onset of the crisis considerably worsened the fiscal position of Member States, especially within
the euro area. However, since 2010, significant efforts have improved the fiscal outlook with deficit
reduction and stabilisation of debt levels. From 2007 to 2009, fiscal deficits in the EU increased from
0.9% of GDP to 6.7%, and started then a downward trend reaching 3% in 2014. There has been an
increase of EU's public debt by about 30 percentage points of GDP between 2007 and 2014 that
peaked at almost 89% of GDP, but a slightly downward trend is visible since 2015.
Over the years, Member States have been pursuing redistribution and anti-poverty policies,
to preserve social inclusion and counter the impact of the crisis, especially at its onset,62 leading to a
large increase in expenditure on social support measures. Social protection benefits (pensions, health
and disability, unemployment, family, social exclusion and housing) were the main contributing
factors to the stabilisation of household incomes. As a consequence of rising unemployment, in the
Southern Member States of the euro area and Ireland, expenditure on social support measures
increased much more significantly than in the EU as a whole or in Northern countries of the euro area,
putting additional pressure on public finances which were already much affected by the crisis.
In the context of mounting fiscal constraints for the financing of essential welfare and public services,
novel models to supply social services in a targeted and cost-effective way have emerged, under the
umbrella of "social innovation",63 mobilising innovation not only for generating economic benefits,
but also for meeting social challenges, and, importantly, anticipating problems. Meeting social
challenges calls for innovative solutions at all levels. Private corporations, entrepreneurs and civil
society have, for instance, combined resources into new and hybrid ventures where service providers
and beneficiaries work together. Public authorities have engaged more thoroughly in the policy
evaluation and experimentation, building on best practices elsewhere.
5. The new world of work, jobs and skills
5.1. Technological change and sectoral shifts
EU labour markets have been undergoing structural transformations in recent decades and more
particularly since the mid-1990s. This trend accelerated during the crisis. Growing innovation, trade,
and global value chains, propelled by digital technologies, have put a premium on service-related jobs
and thus on high, non-routine and interpersonal skills. Such effects of technology on employment are
likely to affect as much as 42% of existing occupations in the US by 2035. 64 In other words, almost
half of existing professions may be partly if not entirely computerised and automated in the medium
term. Similar estimates seem to plausible in the European case, as illustrated in Figure 32.65
62
See “Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2014”, pp. 66 for the differences in social
protection usage during the first phase of the crisis and after 2010.
63
Study on social innovation, Social Innovation eXchange (SIX) and The Young Foundation for the Bureau of
European Policy Advisors, (2010); Growing Social Innovation: A guide for Policy Makers, TEPSIE (2015);
Powering European Public Sector Innovation: Towards a New Architecture, DG RTD (2013) ; Social
Innovation: A decade of changes, Bureau of European Policy Advisors (2014)
64
Frey, C. B., Osborne, M. A. (2013), “The future of employment: how susceptible are jobs to computerisation",
Study for the Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology
65
Bowles, J. (2014), “The Computerisation of European Jobs”, Bruegel online.
27
Figure 32: Share of jobs at risk of automatisation (%)
Source: Bruegel calculations based on Frey & Osborne (2013), ILO, EU Labour Force Survey
* Data not available for Cyprus
Such developments are related to the ability to accurately translate a task into a series of codified steps
that can be automated which explains the higher job vulnerability of routine tasks. These
transformations will thus particularly affect production lines in the manufacturing sector, a particularly
relevant point for Europe's industrial core, but they may also affect specific high-skilled occupations.
For instance, "hollowing out" effects are already tangible in higher-skill professions such as
journalism, accounting, tax and management consultancy, legal and other advisory, eventually even
education (Figure 26). At the same time, new activities and sources of jobs are likely to emerge.
Figure 26: "Winners" and "losers" among professions. Cumulative growth rate of distribution of
population by occupation
Source: Eurostat
28
These changes have provided opportunities for increased productivity in knowledge-intensive sectors,
leading to additional labour re-allocation and employment growth in certain sectors. Manual work –
in particular in manufacturing and agriculture – has in part been losing ground in recent years, which
is more than the effect of the crisis and certainly also reflects the process of automation (Figure 27).66
But skills mismatches and limits to up-skilling remain significant barriers to a smooth re-allocation of
labour across and within sectors.67
Figure 27: Change in total employment by sector in EU28, 2010-14, absolute numbers
Source: OECD, 2015
By 2020,68 more job losses are predicted in administration, manufacturing, management, agriculture,
than additional jobs gains in science, engineering, transportation, and logistics (Figure 28).
The welfare gains and losses of such industrial and labour market developments are still unclear,
depending on how smooth the re-allocation of labour across sectors may be.69
Figure 28: Expected impact of technology (thousands of jobs gained/lost) by 2020, France, Germany, Italy
and the UK
Source: World Economic Forum (2016), Future of Work Report. Based on Survey of CHROs of largest
employers by industry. Focus countries: France, Germany, Italy, UK.
66
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2015), “OECD Science, Technology and Industry
Scoreboard 2015: Innovation for growth and society”, Paris: OECD Publishing
67
United Nations Development Programme (2015), “Human Development Report 2015. Work for Human
Development; World Economic Forum (2016)”, “The Future of Jobs, Employment, Skills and Workforce
Strategy for the Fourth Industrial Revolution”; International Labour Organisation, (2015), “The future of work
centenary initiative”.
68
World Economic Forum (2016), “The Future of Jobs: Employment, Skills and Workforce Strategy for the
Fourth Industrial Revolution”.
69
Eden, M., Gaggl, P. (2015), “On the Welfare Implications of Automation”, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
29
5.2. Changing work conditions
Structural changes in employment have been reflected in the increase in temporary types of
employment contracts across Member States. At the same time, transitions from unemployment to
self-employment have decreased and the share of self-employed has slightly receded during the last
decade.70
Decentralised, self-organised forms of work can increase workers' autonomy and boost business
development, but it may also blur the notion of work and limit awareness of or access to rights, such
as unclear information requirements for employers, new challenges for health and safety at work and
in the organisation of social dialogue. New forms of flexible employment thus put the question of the
nature, volume or duration of work, the capacity to identify the employers as well as the associated
level of social protection, notably in terms sickness, unemployment and pension benefits.
There is still a sizeable employment protection "gap",71 i.e. a large difference in protection levels
between types of contracts, in many countries, which has led to some form of labour market duality.
A wide gap is hindering the conversion of temporary into permanent contracts, perpetuating the
segmentation of labour markets (Figures 29 and 30). However, several recent crisis-induced reforms
have sought to address this,72 and such reforms may take time to produce their effect.
Figure 29: Change in permanent, temporary employment and self-employment, EU 28
Source: Eurostat
70
France Stratégie (2015), “Le compte personnel d’activité, de l’utopie au concret”, Report, Commission
Compte personnel d’activité présidée par Selma Mahfouz.
71
Dolado, J., Lalé, E. and Siassi, N. (2016), “Replacing dual employment protection with a single labour
contract”, Vox, 30 January 2016.
72
This is a indicate conclusion, as the OECD indexes for temporary and permanent protection are not strictly
comparable.
30
Figure 30: Share of temporary contracts and transitions from temporary to permanent
Source: Eurostat. Data on transitions for BG, EL, PT, HR refer to 2012, for AT to 2014. Data on transitions are
not available for IE and SE.
Existing regulations do not always fit well with new business models and the new realities of the
workplace. The current labour law acquis unevenly covers changing employment patterns, resulting in
precarious working conditions, risks of circumvention or abuses, and potentially hindering innovation
as well as skilling opportunities. Flexibility in conditions of employment may offer more opportunities
for workers, including in part-time work, self-employment and entrepreneurship, but it may also
expose them to greater insecurity and vulnerability. For instance, independent and temporary workers
are generally unable to access the same level of benefits enjoyed by company workers when it comes
to unemployment benefits, health insurance, pensions, maternity leave, to mention some, or would
access them only at very high costs.
Figure 31: Part-time workers in % of total employment
Source: Eurostat.
31
The tension between emerging types of occupation and business models and existing contractual
arrangements poses questions on the definition of workers, statistically, economically and legally.
For instance, the distinction between "worker" and "self-employed", and between "self-employed" and
"entrepreneur" is sometimes blurred. The case of the collaborative economy is particularly illustrative
as it is based on a business model which allows individuals to capitalise on their own assets such as
cars or houses, while these companies provide tasks rather than fully-fledged services, making it hard
to account for work and workers under current standards. In addition, it is still unclear how to account
for the value generated by work – and employment – produced by car- or house-sharing, to mention a
few, which raises the question of who is eligible to social benefits and under which conditions.
This situation shows the need to reconsider the identity and responsibilities of the employer in
triangular relationships with the employee and the customer, and raises the question of the definitions
of contracts and relationships, and their impact on undeclared labour. At the same time, collaborative
economy platforms create jobs and new opportunities for (self-)employment by lowering entry barriers
to service provision and to new forms of employment or activities as an alternative to traditional
employment, including for those at the margins of society.73 They may also offer opportunities for
on-the-side earning which supplements family income. Online platforms can also facilitate the keeping
of records for administrative and tax purposes.
The fundamentals on which the concept of 'flexicurity' is based, namely flexible and reliable
contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, active labour market policies
and modern social security systems, are particularly pertinent in view of the aforementioned trends,
but would need to rediscovered in a new light. The presence of dual labour markets in several Member
States has aggravated the position of young generations. Tackling this duality by reviewing contractual
arrangements is a priority for many countries, as well as investment in skills. This offers workers the
human capital they need to be secure and to be able to manage the adaptation challenges that will be
increasingly required in the future world of work; and it offers employers the security that they will be
able to find and retain the skills they need for growth and innovation.
5.3. Skills for changing occupations
Prioritising skills acquisition and retention is essential to building more resilient economic structures
and to boosting job creation in the knowledge economy. Gains from improving educational standards
have been shown to lead to average increases in GDP.74 To be effective, however, education and
training need to provide quality outputs and respond to the fast-changing needs of the economy and
society. Research shows that the skills most in demand in advanced economies are “non-routine and
interpersonal”75 while most Europeans are still trained in more traditional “routine and manual” skills.
The employment share of non-routine jobs, such as design-related occupations, grew from 28% to
38% between 1995 and 2010, whereas traditional routine jobs fell from 53% to 41%. A targeted
investment in human capital, which addresses the skills shortage while anticipating future
developments in the job market, is particularly relevant for low-skilled workers who have been most
strongly affected by the crisis, and typically would need some retraining to take up work again.
This challenge is compounded by the fact that some contract types do not encourage investment in
lifelong learning. In effect, access to in-work training remains highly dependent on the type of
contract: almost one in two employees on permanent contracts received training compared to 32% of
employees with fixed-term contracts and 19% of self-employed.
73
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015.
Hanushek, E. A. and Woessmann, L., (2012), “The Economic Benefit of Educational Reform in the European
Union”, CESifo Economic Studies, vol. 58, 1
75
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, (2013), OECD Skills Outlook 2013
74
32
For people out of work, only 9.5% of the unemployed participate in education and training,
even though these opportunities provide the best chances of return to employment, particularly from
situations of long-term unemployment. Individuals doing undeclared work are most vulnerable from
this perspective.76
A significant explanation for the polarisation and mismatches in employment are gaps and divergence
in skills levels, particularly ICT-related skills.77 There seems to be a generally positive relationship
between employment and the ICT intensity of industries, with the notable exception of jobs in highroutine occupations, where ICT seemingly displaces workers. It is not coincidental, therefore, that
from the mid-1990s to 2010, the demand for ICT-related skills vis-à-vis routine skills has become
polarised in the EU: the former increased by 20%, while the latter decreased by 20%.78
At present, just half of the EU labour force considers that their level of computer and/or internet skills
is sufficient if they were to look for a job or change job within a year. On average 14% of Europeans
have low level computer skills, 25% have medium level skills and 27% have high level skills. At the
same time, 30% of Europeans have low level internet skills, 32% have medium level skills and 11%
have high level skills.79 Low digital and internet skills constitute significant challenges to be addressed
given that up to 90% of jobs, across all sectors, increasingly require ICT literacy.80
Figure 33: Evolution of employment in occupational groups defined by problem-solving skills
Source: OECD Skills Outlook
If skill levels largely determine access to opportunities, they also explain a sizeable part of the
employment-wage gap. Permanent employment – associated with high skill levels – remains the best
paid, the most secure and the fastest growing in Europe. During and immediately after the economic
and financial crisis, employment only grew in jobs accounting for the lowest and highest job-wage
quintile (Figure 34).
76
Data from the Special Eurobarometer Survey (2014: 402) on Undeclared Work in the EU suggests that one in
nine Europeans declare to have purchased goods or services involving undeclared work.
77
Marcolin, L., Miroudot S. and Squicciarini, M. (2016), “Routine jobs, employment and technological
innovation in global value chains”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, No. 2016/01,
Paris: OECD Publishing.
78
Skill gaps and needs for upskilling of workers need to be addressed for a successful transition towards a green
and resource and energy efficient economy, as highlighted in the circular economy package, which has great
potential for job creation. For example, improving waste prevention and management in the EU could create
more than 400,000 new jobs. See: European Commission Communication COM(2014)446 final “Green
Employment Initiative: Tapping into the job creation potential of the green economy”.
79
European Commission (2011), "Chapter 4: Digital Competences in the Digital Agenda".
80
European Commission (2015), "Skills and Jobs" Article online, published on 02/03/2015.
33
Figure 34: Net Employment Change (in thousands) by job-wage quintile, EU27, 1998-2014
Source: European Commission (2016), Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2015
Avoiding lower employment and job polarisation hinges on the provision of skills that fit the demands
of evolving labour markets, and this puts a premium on “non-routine and interpersonal” abilities and
problem-solving in technology-rich environments. at present, many Europeans tend to be
"overqualified but under-skilled".81 The provision of effective training throughout one's educational
and professional development from job entry level to retirement, are unevenly distributed – both
within and among Member States. In only a third of Member States, more than 10% of all working,
unemployed and inactive adults participate in adult education and training annually (Figure 35).
Figure 35: Participation in adult education and training by labour status, %, 2014
Source: Eurostat
81
Institute for the Future for University of Phoenix Research Institute (2011), “Future Work Skills 2020”.
34
6. Specific challenges and requirements of the euro area
Economic performance depends in sizeable measure on the effectiveness of employment and social
systems and on the functioning of labour markets. This is particularly true for a currency union,
where there is one monetary policy and fiscal stabilisation instruments are constrained.
Given the strong interdependence and possibilities of spill-overs between economies, the lack of
convergence in socio-economic performances to support more resilient economic structures may
hamper the functioning and stability of the euro area. While the crisis and its aftermath triggered large
differences in socio-economic situations across the euro area,82 in the Member States most affected by
the crisis, the convergence process had already stalled ahead of the sovereign debt crisis, together with
the building-up of imbalances.83 The crisis revealed and accentuated a number of pre-existing
weaknesses, which had not been tackled.84
In particular, before 2008, in several countries, domestic demand booms and foreign capital inflows
led to the expansion of non-tradable (less productive) sectors of the economy, rather than to the
financing of sustainable growth enhancing investments. The global financial crisis brought a
reassessment of credit risks in line with the potential growth prospects of individual countries, the lack
of growth enhancing structural reforms, and the uncertainties of an incomplete EMU. The sudden stop
of foreign capital inflows was accompanied by a drop of domestic credit, income and consumption.
This reversal in the direction of these flows was a major driver of the recessions in some Member
States in the East and South of the euro area. The decline in consumption (imports) occurred initially
through an increase of unemployment rather than through an adjustment of real wages (lower
incomes). Thus, the divergences in unemployment rates accumulated during the crisis derive from
current account imbalances built up before 2008 (Figure 36).85
Figure 36: Current account balances crisis hit countries vs. surplus countries, 2000-2015
Source: Eurostat. Estimates for 2015
82
With the return to growth in 2014, a limited resumption of convergence was also observed, both in 2014 and
2015, but it is unclear if this reflects a mere temporary recovery or a resumption of the previous long-term trend.
83
See for instance ESDE 2014, chapter 4 for a review.
84
With the return to growth in 2014, a limited resumption of convergence was also observed, both in 2014 and
2015, but it is unclear if this reflects a mere temporary recovery or a resumption of the previous long-term trend.
85
Surplus countries are those which posted a current account surplus over the 2000s'. A current account surplus
indicates that a nation is a net lender to the rest of the world, in contrast to a current account deficit, which
indicates that it is a net borrower. The current account is the sum of the trade balance (exports less imports), net
income from abroad and net current transfers; as the trade balance is generally the largest of these components, a
current account surplus usually implies that the nation is a large exporter and has a positive trade balance. See
also EPSC Strategic Note no.3, (2015) “The Euro Plus Pact: How Integration into the EU Framework can Give
New Momentum for Structural Reforms in the Euro Area”.
35
In several countries, rigidities have contributed to wage increases above productivity levels in the
years preceding the crisis (while in other Member States unit labour costs developed significantly
below the euro average) and it took some time for wages to start to adjust once the crisis had hit. In the
meantime, the current accounts reversals (i.e. the reversal of capital inflows) had exerted their
disruptive effects on unemployment (Figure 37).
Figure 37: Nominal unit labour cost, EA north vs. EA south+Ireland, 2000 to 2013
Source: Eurostat. Note: Estimates for 2015.
As is shown in the literature, the labour market response to shocks may occur through "price"
adjustment, i.e. through changes in wages/labour costs, and "quantity" adjustment, i.e. through
changes in the total number of hours worked (i.e. either the number of people employed or in the
average hours worked), and/or ensuing geographical and occupational labour mobility. This is all the
more relevant in a currency union.
As underlined in the Five Presidents' Report and the Communication on steps towards completing the
Economic and Monetary Union,86 more resilient labour markets and well-functioning welfare systems
are essential to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union,87 and thus strengthen the positive
effects expected from a deeper economic integration. For instance, it is estimated that in the US,
not only greater labour mobility,88 but also fiscal transfers and more integrated private capital markets
with diversified investment portfolios, are key to cushion economic shocks, and these factors play a
much larger role than in the euro area.89
86
COM(2015) 600 final.
EPSC Strategic Note No. 5, (2015) “The Social Dimension of Economic and Monetary Union: Towards
Convergence and Resilience”.
88
Evidence suggests that labour mobility has been of similar magnitude in Europe and the USA in the crisis
(see for instance ESDE 2014).
89
See for instance Allard and al. (2013), IMF SDN/13/09.
87
36
Enhancing convergence between national employment and social performances within the euro area,
including along the principles of flexicurity,90 should go hand-in-hand with a greater capacity to adjust
in case of adverse shocks.91 Significant reforms to allow smoother transitions on the labour market
have already taken place across the euro area, notably in those countries long characterised by rigid
job protection legislation and a significant regulatory gap between open-ended and the so-called
atypical contracts.92 While time may be needed for the effects of those reforms to materialise, changes
in policy fields such as unemployment benefits, employment services and active labour market
policies, as well as access to skills and vocation training, can also strengthen resilience and
convergence towards the best performing labour markets in euro area.93 Since 2008 in particular,
reforms to reduce stringent employment protection legislation for permanent contracts and/or increase
protection for temporary workers have attempted to reduce labour market segmentation, especially in
the Southern euro area Member States. The 'employment protection gap' between open-ended and
temporary labour contracts, however, remains significant in many countries.
Greater labour mobility can also be an important instrument to cushion the impact of economic
shocks, help address unemployment disparities between the Member States, contribute to a more
efficient allocation of human resources, assist the reduction of skills mismatches and also lessen
budgetary pressures. As underlined by optimum currency areas theory, labour mobility can also
contribute to support the function of stabilisation. At the same time, national concerns about a possible
drain of productive labour and the reinforcement of labour market segmentation should not be
discarded.94
More responsive labour markets increase the sensitivity of employment to the economic cycle, since
more jobs can be created in an upswing, and, symmetrically, more lost in a contraction. This also
increases the importance of both re-training for new types of jobs as well as adequate social protection
during labour transitions. It also emphasises the importance of the portability of social rights and
benefits so that workers are able to seamlessly carry all their pension, health care and other rights from
one employer to another, regardless of the geographical location of this employer. 95
Social protection systems provide for the major component of automatic stabilisation of the economy
in bad economic times, since expenditure generally increases (partly compensating for the decline in
market incomes) and tax revenues decline. This stabilisation function is mainly fulfilled by
unemployment benefits, means-tested benefits (such as social exclusion or housing benefits), as well
as for pension or health care expenditure, since those generally continue to grow or remain constant
while market incomes decline.96
90
Including striking the right balance between flexible and secure labour contracts; avoiding the divide between
‘insiders’ with high protection and wages and ‘outsiders’; shifting taxes away from labour; delivering tailored
support for the unemployed to re-enter the labour market, improving education and lifelong learning.
91
See also European Commission (2015, 2016), Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE), 2014
and 2015, chapter 4 Op.Cit
92
ECB, (2014), “The Impact of the Economic Crisis in Euro Area Labour Markets”, Monthly Bulletin, October
2014, pp 49-68.
93
An exception is provided by the so-called 'tax wedge', or the difference between the salary costs of a “average
worker” to their employer and the amount of the “take-home-pay” that the worker receives: while this is very
high in the euro area, on average 43% of the salary (compared with a OECD average of 38%), it is considerably
lower in the Southern euro area members, averaging 40% (compared to a 46% Northern euro area average).
94
For a discussion on the role of labour mobility as an adjustment channel see: European Commission (2015),
“Labour mobility and labour market adjustment in the EU”, Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe
2015 Report, Chapter II.1.
95
France Stratégie (2015), op cit.
96
See for instance Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2012 and 2013, and Bontout and
Lokajickova (2013).
37
Deel B. De herziening van de detacheringsrichtlijn
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Voorstel voor de herziening van Richtlijn 96/71
Informatieblad Herziening detacheringsrichtlijn - veel gestelde vragen
Detachering landencijfers Nederland
Detachering Europese feiten en gegevens
Impact assessment – samenvatting
Impact assessment – volledig rapport
EUROPESE
COMMISSIE
Straatsburg, 8.3.2016
COM(2016) 128 final
2016/0070 (COD)
Voorstel voor een
RICHTLIJN VAN HET EUROPEES PARLEMENT EN DE RAAD
tot wijziging van Richtlijn 96/71/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van
16 december 1996 betreffende de terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers met het oog op
het verrichten van diensten
(Voor de EER relevante tekst)
{SWD(2016) 52 final}
{SWD(2016) 53 final}
NL
NL
TOELICHTING
1.
ACHTERGROND VAN HET VOORSTEL
1.1.
Motivering en doel van het voorstel
De Commissie heeft in haar politieke beleidslijnen een doelgerichte herziening van
de terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn aangekondigd en deze bevestigd in haar
werkprogramma voor 2016. Het doel van de herziening is oneerlijke praktijken aan
te pakken en het beginsel ingang te doen vinden dat hetzelfde werk op dezelfde
plaats op dezelfde manier moet worden bezoldigd.
Terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers vervult een belangrijke rol op de interne
markt, met name bij het grensoverschrijdend verrichten van diensten.
Richtlijn 96/71/EG1 ("de richtlijn") regelt drie varianten van terbeschikkingstelling:
de rechtstreekse verrichting van diensten door een onderneming in het kader van een
overeenkomst, terbeschikkingstelling van een vestiging of een tot hetzelfde concern
behorende
onderneming
("intragroepterbeschikkingstelling")
en
terbeschikkingstelling via een uitzendbedrijf in een andere lidstaat.
De EU heeft een interne markt tot stand gebracht op basis van een sociale
markteconomie met een groot concurrentievermogen die gericht is op volledige
werkgelegenheid en sociale vooruitgang (artikel 3, lid 3, VEU).
In het Verdrag is het recht vastgesteld voor ondernemingen om diensten te verrichten
in andere lidstaten. In het Verdrag is bepaald: "In het kader van de volgende
bepalingen zijn de beperkingen op het vrij verrichten van diensten binnen de Unie
verboden ten aanzien van de onderdanen der lidstaten die in een andere lidstaat zijn
gevestigd dan die, waarin degene is gevestigd te wiens behoeve de dienst wordt
verricht." (artikel 56 VWEU). Het vrij verrichten van diensten kan slechts worden
beperkt door regelingen die hun rechtvaardiging vinden in dwingende redenen van
algemeen belang, op voorwaarde dat deze gerechtvaardigd en evenredig zijn en op
niet-discriminerende wijze worden toegepast.
In 2014 (meest recente gegevens) waren er in totaal meer dan 1,9 miljoen
terbeschikkingstellingen in de EU (dat is 0,7 % van de totale EU-beroepsbevolking),
een stijging met 10,3 % vergeleken bij 2013 en met 44,4 % in vergelijking met 2010.
De opwaartse trend werd gevolgd door enige stagnatie in 2009 en 2010.
De richtlijn van 1996 vormt het EU-regelgevingskader waarbinnen een evenwicht
kan worden gevonden tussen drie doelstellingen: het grensoverschrijdend verrichten
van diensten bevorderen en vergemakkelijken, bescherming bieden aan ter
beschikking gestelde werknemers en gelijke mededingingsvoorwaarden waarborgen
voor buitenlandse en lokale concurrenten. In de richtlijn is een "basispakket" van
arbeidsvoorwaarden en -omstandigheden vastgesteld voor de gastlidstaat die
verplicht moeten worden toegepast door buitenlandse dienstverrichters. Deze
omvatten (artikel 3, lid 1, van de richtlijn): maximale werk- en minimale
rustperioden; minimumlonen, inclusief vergoedingen voor overwerk; minimumaantal
betaalde vakantiedagen; voorwaarden voor het ter beschikking stellen van
werknemers; gezondheid, veiligheid en hygiëne op het werk; beschermende
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Richtlijn 96/71/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 16 december 1996 betreffende de
terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers met het oog op het verrichten van diensten (PB L 18 van
21.1.1997, blz. 1).
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maatregelen voor zwangere of pas bevallen vrouwen, kinderen en jongeren; gelijke
behandeling van mannen en vrouwen; en andere bepalingen inzake nietdiscriminatie.
De handhavingsrichtlijn van 20142 heeft voorzien in nieuwe en sterkere instrumenten
om omzeilingen, fraude en misbruik te bestrijden en te bestraffen. Door de richtlijn
kunnen de door zogenaamde "brievenbusondernemingen" veroorzaakte problemen
worden aangepakt. De lidstaten krijgen ook meer mogelijkheden om toezicht te
houden op de arbeidsvoorwaarden en om de toepasselijke regels te handhaven. In de
richtlijn worden onder meer kwalitatieve criteria opgesomd voor het bestaan van een
daadwerkelijk verband tussen de werkgever en de lidstaat van vestiging die ook
kunnen worden gebruikt om na te gaan of een persoon onder de definitie van een ter
beschikking gestelde werknemer valt. In de handhavingsrichtlijn zijn tevens
bepalingen vastgesteld om de administratieve samenwerking te verbeteren tussen de
nationale autoriteiten die met terbeschikkingstelling zijn belast. De richtlijn voorziet
bijvoorbeeld in een verplichting om gehoor te geven aan een verzoek om bijstand
van een bevoegde instantie in een andere lidstaat, binnen twee werkdagen voor een
dringend verzoek om informatie en binnen 25 werkdagen voor een niet-dringend
verzoek. Daarenboven is in de richtlijn een lijst vastgesteld van nationale
controlemaatregelen die de lidstaten kunnen toepassen bij het toezicht op de naleving
van de arbeidsvoorwaarden voor ter beschikking gestelde werknemers. Verder wordt
vereist dat passende en doeltreffende controles en controlemechanismen voorhanden
zijn en dat nationale autoriteiten op hun grondgebied doeltreffende en passende
inspecties uitvoeren om toe te zien op de naleving van de bepalingen en
voorschriften van Richtlijn 96/71/EG. Het volledige effect van de richtlijn zou
tastbaar moeten worden vanaf medio 2016 aangezien de lidstaten tot en met 18 juni
2016 hebben om de richtlijn om te zetten.
Met dit initiatief wordt geen enkel onderwerp aangepakt dat door de
handhavingsrichtlijn wordt behandeld. Het concentreert zich eerder op onderwerpen
die niet aan bod kwamen in de handhavingsrichtlijn en deel uitmaken van het
regelgevingskader van de oorspronkelijke richtlijn van 1996. De herziene
terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn en de handhavingsrichtlijn vullen elkaar dus aan en
versterken elkaar.
1.2.
Verenigbaarheid met bestaande bepalingen op het beleidsterrein
Als één van de belangrijkste prioriteiten voor haar ambtstermijn heeft de Commissie
zich ten doel gesteld naar een diepere en eerlijkere interne markt toe te werken. In het
voorstel
om
doelgerichte
wijzigingen
aan
te
brengen
in
de
terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn zijn de bepalingen van de handhavingsrichtlijn, die
uiterlijk op 18 juni 2016 moet zijn omgezet, opgenomen en worden deze aangevuld.
Tijdens de door de Commissie georganiseerde voorbereidende raadplegingen van
ongeveer 300 belanghebbenden, voornamelijk kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen
(kmo's), heeft 30 % van de ondernemingen die grensoverschrijdend diensten
verrichten problemen aangevoerd met de bestaande regels inzake de
terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers, zoals de belastende administratieve
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Richtlijn 2014/67/EU van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 15 mei 2014 inzake de handhaving
van Richtlijn 96/71/EG betreffende de terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers met het oog op het
verrichten van diensten en tot wijziging van Verordening (EU) nr. 1024/2012 betreffende de
administratieve samenwerking via het Informatiesysteem interne markt ("de IMI-verordening"),
PB L 159 van 28.5.2014, blz. 11.
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formaliteiten, papierwerk, heffingen en registratieverplichtingen. Het feit dat de
arbeidsmarktvoorschriften in het land van bestemming niet voldoende duidelijk zijn,
wordt ook beschouwd als een belemmering voor het grensoverschrijdend verrichten
van diensten, vooral bij kmo's.
Tegelijkertijd ondersteunt de terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn de initiatieven voor de
wegvervoersector die de Commissie heeft aangekondigd in haar werkprogramma
voor 2016. Deze maatregelen zijn voornamelijk gericht op het verbeteren van de
sociale en arbeidsomstandigheden van werknemers in het wegvervoer en
tegelijkertijd op het stimuleren van een doeltreffende en eerlijke verrichting van
wegvervoerdiensten. De twee miljoen werknemers in internationaal wegvervoer
werken regelmatig korte perioden op het grondgebied van verschillende lidstaten. In
dat kader moeten de komende initiatieven voor de wegvervoersector bijdragen aan
meer duidelijkheid en een betere handhaving van de voorschriften die van toepassing
zijn op arbeidsovereenkomsten in de vervoersector. Zij kunnen ook de specifieke
uitdagingen aanpakken die de toepassing van de bepalingen van de
terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn in deze sector met zich meebrengt.
Een moderner wetgevingskader voor de terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers zal
transparante en eerlijke voorwaarden creëren voor de toepassing van het
investeringsplan voor Europa. Het investeringsplan zal een aanvullende stimulans
vormen voor het grensoverschrijdend verrichten van diensten en zal zo leiden tot een
grotere vraag naar geschoolde arbeidskrachten. Aangezien over de hele Unie
strategische infrastructuurprojecten worden gerealiseerd, zullen ondernemingen op
zoek gaan naar de juiste vaardigheden voor dat werk en moeten passende
voorwaarden worden vastgesteld zodat aan die vraag kan worden voldaan met het
juiste aanbod over de grenzen heen. Een modernere terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn
zal bijdragen tot een investeringsklimaat van onvervalste mededinging waarbij de
rechten van de werknemers worden geëerbiedigd.
Het EU-platform tegen zwartwerk kan een positieve invloed hebben met het oog op
het aanpakken van frauduleuze aspecten van de terbeschikkingstelling van
werknemers. Bij terbeschikkingstelling is het risico op vormen van zwartwerk groter,
zoals "lonen onder couvert" of contante betaling waarbij slechts een gedeelte van het
loon officieel wordt betaald terwijl de rest zwart betaald wordt, schijnzelfstandigheid
en omzeiling van nationale en EU-wetgeving. De EU heeft de acties ter bestrijding
van zwartwerk opgevoerd en blijft optreden tegen brievenbusondernemingen. In
april 2014 heeft de Commissie voorgesteld een platform op te richten om zwartwerk
te voorkomen en tegen te gaan. Het platform brengt de handhavingsautoriteiten van
alle lidstaten samen. Het zal de uitwisseling van beste praktijken vergemakkelijken,
expertise en analyse ontwikkelen en de grensoverschrijdende samenwerking van de
lidstaten in de strijd tegen zwartwerk doelmatiger en doeltreffender ondersteunen.
2.
RECHTSGRONDSLAG, SUBSIDIARITEIT EN EVENREDIGHEID
2.1.
Rechtsgrondslag
Dit voorstel dient tot wijziging van Richtlijn 96/71/EG en heeft daarom dezelfde
rechtsgrondslag, namelijk artikel 53, lid 1, en artikel 62 VWEU.
2.2.
Subsidiariteit (bij niet-exclusieve bevoegdheid)
Een wijziging van een bestaande richtlijn kan enkel worden verkregen door een
nieuwe richtlijn vast te stellen.
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2.3.
Evenredigheid
Volgens de vaste rechtspraak mag het vrij verrichten van diensten slechts worden
beperkt wanneer dat gerechtvaardigd is door dwingende redenen van algemeen
belang, meer bepaald in verband met de bescherming van de werknemers, en
wanneer die beperking evenredig en noodzakelijk is.
Dit voorstel voldoet aan dat vereiste aangezien het de loonkosten in Europa niet
harmoniseert en beperkt is tot wat noodzakelijk is om voorwaarden te garanderen die
aangepast zijn aan de levensduurte en -standaard van de gastlidstaat voor de duur van
de opdracht van de ter beschikking gestelde werknemers.
In een concurrerende interne markt, is mededinging gebaseerd op kwaliteit van de
dienstverlening, productiviteit, kosten (waarvan loonkosten slechts één deel
uitmaken) en innovatie. Dit voorstel gaat daarom niet verder dan nodig is om het
doel ervan te verwezenlijken.
3.
RESULTATEN VAN EX-POSTEVALUATIES, RAADPLEGINGEN VAN
BELANGHEBBENDEN EN EFFECTBEOORDELINGEN
3.1.
Raadpleging van belanghebbenden
Bij gezamenlijke brief hebben België, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Luxemburg, Nederland,
Oostenrijk en Zweden steun gevraagd voor een modernisering van de
terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn met invoering van het beginsel van "gelijke beloning
voor gelijk werk op dezelfde plaats". Deze lidstaten hebben voorgesteld de
bepalingen in verband met sociale en arbeidsvoorwaarden, en dan met name in
verband met bezoldiging, die van toepassing zijn op ter beschikking gestelde
werknemers te wijzigen en te verruimen; er moet worden overwogen een maximale
looptijd voor terbeschikkingstellingen vast te stellen, in het bijzonder om de
bepalingen te laten aansluiten op de verordening betreffende de coördinatie van de
socialezekerheidsstelsels; de voorwaarden die van toepassing zijn op de
wegvervoersector moeten worden verduidelijkt; de basisinformatie die is vervat in de
meeneembare A1-documenten moet betrouwbaarder worden gemaakt; de
samenwerking tussen inspectiediensten over de grenzen heen moet worden
verbeterd; en de omvang en het effect van schijnzelfstandigheid in het kader van
terbeschikkingstelling moeten worden onderzocht.
Bulgarije, Estland, Hongarije, Letland, Litouwen, Polen, Roemenië, Slowakije en
Tsjechië hebben bij gezamenlijke brief aangevoerd dat het nog te vroeg is voor een
herziening van de richtlijn van 1996 en dat deze moet worden uitgesteld tot na de
uiterste datum voor de omzetting van de handhavingsrichtlijn, wanneer de gevolgen
ervan zorgvuldig kunnen worden beoordeeld en geëvalueerd. Die lidstaten hebben de
bezorgdheid uitgedrukt dat het beginsel van gelijke beloning voor gelijk werk op
dezelfde plaats mogelijk onverenigbaar is met de interne markt aangezien
loonverschillen een rechtmatig element vormen van concurrentievoordeel voor
dienstverleners. Daarenboven zijn zij van mening dat ter beschikking gestelde
werknemers voor de sociale zekerheid moeten blijven vallen onder de wetgeving van
de ter beschikking stellende lidstaat en dat dus geen maatregelen moeten worden
genomen om de koppeling van de terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers aan de
coördinatie van de sociale zekerheid te herzien. Ten slotte hebben zij de Commissie
verzocht enkel actie te overwegen voor zover het bewijsmateriaal grondig is
geanalyseerd in verband met de uitdagingen en specifieke kenmerken van het
grensoverschrijdend verrichten van diensten.
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5
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Het EVV (Europees Verbond van Vakverenigingen) heeft zijn steun uitgesproken
voor een herziening om het beginsel van gelijke behandeling te waarborgen. In dat
kader heeft het EVV de Commissie echter verzocht het beginsel van de autonomie
van de sociale partners om over lonen te onderhandelen en de veelheid aan nationale
systemen voor arbeidsverhoudingen te respecteren door bepalingen vast te stellen
voor de componenten van de bezoldiging die ertoe zouden leiden dat de voorkeur
wordt gegeven aan collectieve overeenkomsten op ondernemingsniveau boven
overeenkomsten op sectoraal niveau. Het EVV heeft op zijn beurt de Commissie
aangeraden maatregelen voor te stellen in verband met het vereiste al eerder in het
land van herkomst te hebben gewerkt dat vooral moet worden toegepast op ter
beschikking gestelde uitzendkrachten, alsmede in verband met nieuwe voorschriften
ter bestrijding van schijnzelfstandigheid en betere handhavingsmaatregelen, in het
bijzonder inspecties en betrouwbaardere socialezekerheidsformulieren.
De European Builders Confederation (EBC), die kmo's in de bouwsector
vertegenwoordigt, heeft haar steun uitgesproken voor een wijziging van de richtlijn
van 1996 overeenkomstig het beginsel "gelijke beloning voor gelijk werk op dezelfde
plaats". Ook de EU Trade Union of Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW), de
Nederlandse vakbondsfederatie (FNV), de Estse vakbondfederatie en de Raad van
Scandinavische vakbonden zijn voor herziening. De sociale partners in de
bouwsector in de EU (FIEC en EFBWW) hebben ook een gezamenlijk standpunt
ingenomen en de Commissie gevraagd een aantal problemen in verband met
terbeschikkingstelling te evalueren.
BUSINESSEUROPE beschouwt een correcte omzetting van de handhavingsrichtlijn
prioritair want de organisatie gaat ervan uit dat de meeste problemen in verband met
de terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers verband houden met zwakke handhaving
en gebrek aan controles in de lidstaten. BUSINESSEUROPE heeft ook geopperd dat
heroverweging van de richtlijn het aantal terbeschikkingstellingen zou verminderen
door de onzekerheid die de onderhandeling bij bedrijven zou creëren.
BUSINESSEUROPE is voorstander van maatregelen om de betrouwbaarheid en
transparantie van meeneembare documenten te vergroten, maar is van mening dat het
beginsel "gelijke beloning voor gelijk werk" een ongepaste inmenging van de EU
zou zijn in het vrij bepalen van de loonniveaus door de sociale partners. De
organisatie herinnert eraan dat gelijke mededingingsvoorwaarden worden gecreëerd
door een grote hoeveelheid EU-wetgeving met betrekking tot verscheidene aspecten
van het arbeidsrecht. Ook de werkgeversvertegenwoordigers van de sectoren metaal,
techniek en technologie (CEEMET) en de Confederation of European Managers
(CEC) delen deze argumenten. Het werkgeversverbond van Tsjechië en de
brancheorganisaties van Denemarken, Finland, Zweden, IJsland en Noorwegen
hebben ook in een gezamenlijke brief hun bezorgdheid uitgedrukt over het beginsel
van gelijke beloning voor gelijk werk in de terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn.
Daarnaast is het standpunt van UAPME dat de terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn niet
mag worden gewijzigd alvorens de omzetting van de handhavingsrichtlijn is
afgerond en de gevolgen ervan zijn beoordeeld.
Eurociett, dat de uitzendsector vertegenwoordigt, is van mening dat het algemeen
genomen niet noodzakelijk is de richtlijn van 1996 te heroverwegen. Eurociett heeft
nochtans zijn steun verleend aan het beginsel van gelijke beloning voor gelijk werk
voor ter beschikking gestelde werknemers en aan de toepassing van het volledige
pakket voorschriften van de richtlijn uitzendarbeid op ter beschikking gestelde
werknemers.
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4.
BIJEENBRENGEN EN BENUTTEN VAN DESKUNDIGHEID
Verscheidene onderzoeken, rapporten en artikelen zijn bij de voorbereiding van dit
initiatief gebruikt. De verwijzingen zijn te vinden in de effectbeoordeling bij dit
voorstel.
5.
EFFECTBEOORDELING
Dit voorstel gaat vergezeld van een effectbeoordeling die het verschijnsel
terbeschikkingstelling analyseert, het probleem met het huidige wetgevingskader
beschrijft, verscheidene beleidsopties om het aan te pakken overweegt en tot slot de
sociale en economische gevolgen van de beleidsopties beoordeelt.
6.
GRONDRECHTEN
Deze richtlijn eerbiedigt de grondrechten en neemt de beginselen in acht die in het
Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie worden erkend. De richtlijn
heeft met name tot doel de volledige naleving te waarborgen van artikel 31 van het
Handvest, dat bepaalt dat iedere werknemer recht heeft op gezonde, veilige en
waardige arbeidsomstandigheden, op een beperking van de maximumarbeidsduur en
op dagelijkse en wekelijkse rusttijden, alsmede op een jaarlijkse vakantie met behoud
van loon.
7.
TOELICHTING BIJ DE SPECIFIEKE BEPALINGEN VAN HET VOORSTEL
Bij artikel 1 van het voorstel worden meerdere wijzigingen van Richtlijn 96/71/EG
ingevoerd.
7.1.
Lid 1
In lid 1 wordt een nieuw artikel 2 bis aan de richtlijn toegevoegd. Dat artikel handelt
over het arbeidsrecht dat moet worden toegepast op ter beschikking gestelde
werknemers wanneer de verwachte of de effectieve duur van de
terbeschikkingstelling langer is dan 24 maanden. Dit doet geen afbreuk aan de
mogelijke duur van een tijdelijke dienstverrichting. Volgens de vaste rechtspraak van
het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie moet het onderscheid tussen de vrijheid
van vestiging en het vrij verrichten van diensten op tijdelijke basis per geval worden
gemaakt, rekening houdend met de duur maar ook met de regelmaat, de frequentie en
de continuïteit van de dienstverrichting.
Lid 1 van het nieuwe artikel 2 bis is van toepassing wanneer wordt verwacht dat de
terbeschikkingstelling langer dan 24 maanden zal duren of wanneer de effectieve
duur van de terbeschikkingstelling langer dan 24 maanden bedraagt. In beide
gevallen wordt de gastlidstaat geacht het land te zijn waar het werk gewoonlijk wordt
uitgevoerd. Volgens de bepalingen van de Rome I-verordening3 is daarom het
arbeidsrecht van de gastlidstaat van toepassing op de arbeidsovereenkomst van die
ter beschikking gestelde werknemers indien de partijen geen andere rechtskeuze
hebben gemaakt. Indien een andere keuze is gemaakt, mag dat echter niet tot gevolg
hebben dat de werknemer de bescherming wordt ontnomen die hem wordt geboden
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Verordening (EG) nr. 593/2008 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 17 juni 2008 inzake het
recht dat van toepassing is op verbintenissen uit overeenkomst (Rome I) (PB L 177 van 4.7.2008,
blz. 6).
7
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door bepalingen waarvan volgens de wet van de gastlidstaat niet bij overeenkomst
kan worden afgeweken.
Om omzeiling van de bepaling van lid 1 te voorkomen, wordt in lid 2 verklaard dat
wanneer een werknemer een andere werknemer vervangt voor dezelfde taak, bij de
berekening van de duur van de terbeschikkingstelling rekening moet worden
gehouden met de totale duur van de terbeschikkingstelling van de betrokken
werknemers. De bepaling van lid 1 is van toepassing wanneer de totale duur van de
terbeschikkingstelling langer is dan 24 maanden maar, omwille van het
evenredigheidsbeginsel, enkel op werknemers die ten minste 6 maanden ter
beschikking gesteld zijn.
7.2.
Lid 2
In lid 2 worden verscheidene wijzigingen van artikel 3 van de richtlijn ingevoerd.
Punt a)
Artikel 3, lid 1, van de richtlijn wordt vervangen door punt a).
In de nieuwe tekst worden drie belangrijke wijzigingen ingevoerd:
–
de verwijzing naar de "in de bijlage genoemde activiteiten" in het tweede
streepje wordt weggelaten;
–
de verwijzing naar "minimumlonen" wordt vervangen door een verwijzing naar
"bezoldiging"4;
–
er wordt een nieuwe alinea toegevoegd met de verplichting voor de lidstaten
om informatie bekend te maken over de componenten van de bezoldiging.
Door de eerste wijziging worden de collectieve overeenkomsten die algemeen
verbindend zijn in de zin van artikel 3, lid 8, van toepassing op ter beschikking
gestelde werknemers in alle sectoren van de economie, ongeacht of de activiteiten
worden vermeld in de bijlage bij de richtlijn (wat momenteel enkel het geval is voor
de bouwsector).
Het is de bevoegdheid van de lidstaten overeenkomstig hun wetgeving en praktijk
bezoldigingsvoorschriften vast te stellen. De tweede wijziging houdt in dat de
bepalingen over bezoldiging die van toepassing zijn op lokale werknemers en die
voortvloeien uit de wet of uit collectieve overeenkomsten die algemeen verbindend
zijn in de zin van artikel 3, lid 8, ook worden toegepast op ter beschikking gestelde
werknemers.
Ten slotte volgt in de nieuwe alinea de verplichting voor de lidstaten de
componenten van de bezoldiging van ter beschikking gestelde werknemers op de in
artikel 5 van Richtlijn 2014/67/EU vermelde website bekend te maken.
punt b)
Er wordt een nieuw lid toegevoegd in verband met de situatie van
onderaannemingsketens. Deze nieuwe bepaling geeft de lidstaten de mogelijkheid
ondernemingen te verplichten enkel ondernemingen te contracteren die aan
werknemers bepaalde bezoldigingsvoorwaarden toekennen die ook de contractant
moet toekennen, met inbegrip van voorwaarden die het resultaat zijn van niet
algemeen verbindende collectieve overeenkomsten. Dat is enkel mogelijk op
4
NL
Op grond van rechtspraak van het Hof in zaak C-396/13.
8
NL
evenredige en niet-discriminerende basis en dezelfde verplichtingen zouden dus aan
alle binnenlandse contractanten moeten worden opgelegd.
punt c)
Er wordt een nieuw lid toegevoegd met de voorwaarden die van toepassing zijn op
de werknemers als bedoeld in artikel 1, lid 3, onder c) van de richtlijn, namelijk
werknemers die zijn ter beschikking gesteld door een uitzendbedrijf dat gevestigd is
in een andere lidstaat dan de lidstaat waar de inlenende onderneming is gevestigd.
Dit nieuwe lid komt overeen met artikel 3, lid 9, van de richtlijn. Hierin wordt
vastgesteld dat op uitzendbedrijven die grensoverschrijdend actief zijn dezelfde
voorwaarden van artikel 5 van Richtlijn 2008/104/EG moeten worden toegepast die
ook gelden voor binnenlandse uitzendbedrijven. In tegenstelling tot artikel 3, lid 9,
van de richtlijn is dit nu een wettelijke verplichting van de lidstaten.
7.3.
Lid 3
Bij lid 3 wordt de bijlage bij de richtlijn gewijzigd overeenkomstig de wijzigingen
van artikel 3, lid 1.
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2016/0070 (COD)
Voorstel voor een
RICHTLIJN VAN HET EUROPEES PARLEMENT EN DE RAAD
tot wijziging van Richtlijn 96/71/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van
16 december 1996 betreffende de terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers met het oog op
het verrichten van diensten
(Voor de EER relevante tekst)
HET EUROPEES PARLEMENT EN DE RAAD VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE,
Gezien het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie, en met name artikel 53,
lid 1, en artikel 62,
Gezien het voorstel van de Europese Commissie,
Na toezending van het ontwerp van wetgevingshandeling aan de nationale parlementen,
Gezien het advies van het Europees Economisch en Sociaal Comité5,
Handelend volgens de gewone wetgevingsprocedure,
Overwegende hetgeen volgt:
NL
(1)
Vrij verkeer van werknemers, vrijheid van vestiging en het vrij verrichten van diensten
zijn grondbeginselen van de interne markt in de Unie die zijn verankerd in het Verdrag
betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie (VWEU). Die beginselen worden verder
ten uitvoer gelegd door wetgeving van de Unie die garandeert dat de
mededingingsvoorwaarden voor alle ondernemingen gelijk zijn en dat de rechten van
de werknemers worden geëerbiedigd.
(2)
Het vrij verrichten van diensten houdt onder meer in dat ondernemingen het recht
hebben om diensten te verrichten in een andere lidstaat, op het grondgebied waarvan
zij hun eigen werknemers tijdelijk ter beschikking mogen stellen om die diensten daar
te verrichten.
(3)
Volgens artikel 3 VEU bevordert de Unie sociale rechtvaardigheid en bescherming. In
artikel 9 VWEU wordt de Unie de taak toebedeeld een hoog niveau van
werkgelegenheid te bevorderen, adequate sociale bescherming te waarborgen en
sociale uitsluiting te bestrijden.
(4)
Bijna twintig jaar na de vaststelling ervan is het noodzakelijk na te gaan of de
terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn nog steeds het juiste evenwicht houdt tussen de
noodzaak het vrij verrichten van diensten te bevorderen en de noodzaak de rechten van
ter beschikking gestelde werknemers te beschermen.
(5)
Het beginsel van gelijke behandeling en het verbod op discriminatie op basis van
nationaliteit zijn sinds de oprichtingsverdragen in de EU-wetgeving verankerd. Het
beginsel van gelijke beloning is via secundair recht ingevoerd, niet enkel voor mannen
en vrouwen, maar ook voor werknemers met een contract voor bepaalde tijd en
5
PB C van , blz. .
10
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vergelijkbare werknemers in vaste dienst, voor deeltijdse en voltijdse werknemers of
voor uitzendkrachten en vergelijkbare werknemers van de inlenende onderneming.
NL
(6)
Volgens de Rome I-verordening mogen werkgevers en werknemers in het algemeen
kiezen welk recht van toepassing is op de arbeidsovereenkomst. De bescherming die
de werknemer echter geniet op grond van de dwingende bepalingen van het recht van
het land waar of, bij ontstentenis, vanwaaruit hij gewoonlijk zijn arbeid verricht, mag
hierdoor niet worden aangetast. Bij gebreke van een rechtskeuze geldt voor de
overeenkomst het recht van het land waar of, bij ontstentenis, vanwaaruit de
werknemer gewoonlijk de arbeid ter uitvoering van de overeenkomst verricht.
(7)
In de Rome I-verordening is bepaald dat het land waar de arbeid gewoonlijk wordt
verricht niet geacht wordt te zijn gewijzigd wanneer de werknemer zijn arbeid tijdelijk
in een ander land verricht.
(8)
Met het oog op de lange looptijd van bepaalde terbeschikkingstellingen is het
noodzakelijk vast te stellen dat wanneer de terbeschikkingstelling langer duurt dan
24 maanden, de gastlidstaat wordt geacht het land te zijn waar het werk wordt
uitgevoerd. Volgens het beginsel van de Rome I-verordening is daarom het recht van
de gastlidstaat van toepassing op de arbeidsovereenkomst van die ter beschikking
gestelde werknemers indien de partijen geen andere rechtskeuze hebben gemaakt.
Indien een andere keuze is gemaakt, mag dat echter niet tot gevolg hebben dat de
werknemer de bescherming wordt ontnomen die hem wordt geboden door bepalingen
waarvan volgens de wet van de gastlidstaat niet bij overeenkomst kan worden
afgeweken. Dit moet van toepassing zijn vanaf het begin van de terbeschikkingstelling
wanneer die voor meer dan 24 maanden is gepland en vanaf de eerste dag na de
24 maanden wanneer de terbeschikkingstelling daadwerkelijk langer duurt. Dit
voorschrift doet geen afbreuk aan het recht van ondernemingen die werknemers op het
grondgebied van een andere lidstaat ter beschikking stellen om ook vrijheid van
dienstverrichting in te roepen in omstandigheden waarbij de terbeschikkingstelling
langer dan 24 maanden duurt. Het doel is louter rechtszekerheid te creëren bij de
toepassing van de Rome I-verordening in een specifieke situatie zonder die
verordening op een of andere manier te wijzigen. De werknemer zal met name de
bescherming en de voordelen van de Rome I-verordening genieten.
(9)
Volgens de vaste rechtspraak mag het vrij verrichten van diensten slechts worden
beperkt wanneer dat gerechtvaardigd is door dwingende redenen van algemeen belang
en wanneer die beperking evenredig en noodzakelijk is.
(10)
Gezien de zeer mobiele aard van de arbeid in internationaal wegvervoer doet de
uitvoering van de terbeschikkingstellingsrichtlijn bijzondere juridische vragen en
moeilijkheden rijzen (vooral waar het verband met de betrokken lidstaat onvoldoende
is). Die uitdagingen zouden het best worden aangepakt door middel van
sectorspecifieke wetgeving samen met andere EU-initiatieven die gericht zijn op het
verbeteren van de interne wegvervoermarkt.
(11)
In een concurrerende interne markt concurreren dienstverrichters niet enkel op basis
van loonkosten maar ook op basis van factoren als productiviteit en efficiëntie of de
kwaliteit en innovatie van goederen en diensten.
(12)
Het is de bevoegdheid van de lidstaten overeenkomstig hun wetgeving en praktijk
bezoldigingsvoorschriften vast te stellen. Het toepassen van nationale
bezoldigingsvoorschriften op ter beschikking gestelde werknemers moet echter
11
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gerechtvaardigd zijn door de noodzaak hen te beschermen en
grensoverschrijdende dienstverrichting niet op onevenredige wijze beperken.
mag
(13)
De componenten van bezoldiging die voortvloeien uit de nationale wetgeving of
algemeen verbindende collectieve overeenkomsten moeten duidelijk en transparant
zijn voor alle dienstverrichters. Daarom is het gerechtvaardigd de lidstaten te
verplichten de componenten van de bezoldiging bekend te maken op de enige website
waarin in artikel 5 van de handhavingsrichtlijn is voorzien.
(14)
Door wettelijke en bestuursrechtelijke bepalingen of collectieve overeenkomsten die
van toepassing zijn in de lidstaten kan ervoor worden gezorgd dat ondernemingen bij
het contracteren van onderaannemers niet de mogelijkheid krijgen de regels te
omzeilen die bepaalde arbeidsvoorwaarden en -omstandigheden moeten garanderen in
verband met bezoldiging. Wanneer dergelijke bezoldigingsvoorschriften op nationaal
niveau bestaan, mag de lidstaat deze op niet-discriminerende wijze toepassen op
ondernemingen die werknemers ter beschikking stellen op zijn grondgebied op
voorwaarde dat zij de grensoverschrijdende dienstverrichting niet op onevenredige
wijze beperken.
(15)
In Richtlijn 2008/104/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende
uitzendarbeid wordt het beginsel uitgedrukt dat de essentiële arbeidsvoorwaarden die
voor uitzendkrachten gelden, ten minste dezelfde moeten zijn als die welke voor deze
werknemers zouden gelden als zij door de inlenende onderneming voor dezelfde
functie in dienst zouden worden genomen. Dat beginsel moet ook gelden voor
uitzendkrachten die op het grondgebied van een andere lidstaat ter beschikking worden
gesteld.
(16)
Overeenkomstig de gezamenlijke politieke verklaring van de lidstaten en de
Commissie van 28 september 2011 over toelichtende stukken6 hebben de lidstaten zich
ertoe verbonden om, in verantwoorde gevallen, de kennisgeving van hun
omzettingsmaatregelen vergezeld te doen gaan van een of meer stukken waarin het
verband tussen de onderdelen van een richtlijn en de overeenkomstige delen van de
nationale omzettingsinstrumenten wordt toegelicht. Met betrekking tot deze richtlijn
acht de wetgever de toezending van dergelijke stukken gerechtvaardigd,
HEBBEN DE VOLGENDE RICHTLIJN VASTGESTELD:
Artikel 1
Wijzigingen van Richtlijn 96/71/EG
Richtlijn 96/71/EG wordt als volgt gewijzigd:
1.
Het volgende artikel 2 bis wordt toegevoegd:
"Artikel 2 bis
Terbeschikkingstelling van meer dan 24 maanden
1. Wanneer de verwachte of daadwerkelijke duur van de terbeschikkingstelling meer
dan 24 maanden bedraagt, wordt de lidstaat op het grondgebied waarvan een
werknemer ter beschikking is gesteld geacht het land te zijn waarin hij of zij het werk
gewoonlijk uitvoert.
2. Voor de toepassing van lid 1 moet, wanneer ter beschikking gestelde werknemers
op dezelfde plaats en voor hetzelfde werk worden vervangen, rekening worden
6
NL
PB C 369 van 17.12.2011, blz. 14.
12
NL
gehouden met de totale duur van de terbeschikkingstelling van de betrokken
werknemers voor zover het werknemers betreft die daadwerkelijk ten minste voor
zes maanden ter beschikking worden gesteld."
2.
Artikel 3 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:
a)
"1.
lid 1 wordt vervangen door:
De lidstaten zien erop toe dat de in artikel 1, lid 1, bedoelde ondernemingen ongeacht het recht dat van toepassing is op het dienstverband - voor de op hun
grondgebied ter beschikking gestelde werknemers wat de hierna genoemde
aangelegenheden betreft, de arbeidsvoorwaarden en -omstandigheden garanderen die
in de lidstaat waar het werk wordt uitgevoerd, zijn vastgelegd:
–
in wettelijke en bestuursrechtelijke bepalingen en/of
–
in collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten of scheidsrechterlijke uitspraken
die algemeen verbindend zijn verklaard in de zin van lid 8:
a)
maximale werk- en minimale rustperioden;
b)
minimumaantal betaalde vakantiedagen
c)
bezoldiging, inclusief vergoedingen voor overwerk; dit punt is niet van
toepassing op de aanvullende bedrijfspensioenregelingen;
d)
voorwaarden voor het ter beschikking stellen van werknemers,
inzonderheid door uitzendbedrijven;
e)
gezondheid, veiligheid en hygiëne op het werk;
f)
beschermende maatregelen met betrekking tot de arbeidsvoorwaarden en
-omstandigheden van zwangere of pas bevallen vrouwen, kinderen en
jongeren;
g)
gelijke behandeling van mannen en vrouwen, alsmede andere bepalingen
inzake niet-discriminatie.
Voor de toepassing van deze richtlijn wordt onder bezoldiging verstaan alle
bezoldigingselementen die verplicht zijn bij nationale wettelijke of
bestuursrechtelijke
bepalingen,
collectieve
overeenkomsten
of
scheidsrechterlijke uitspraken die algemeen verbindend zijn verklaard en/of bij
ontstentenis van een stelsel voor het algemeen verbindend verklaren van
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten of scheidsrechterlijke uitspraken als
bedoeld in lid 8, tweede streepje, in de lidstaat op het grondgebied waarvan de
werknemer ter beschikking wordt gesteld.
De lidstaten maken de componenten van de bezoldiging overeenkomstig punt
c) bekend op de enige nationale website zoals bedoeld in artikel 5 van
Richtlijn 2014/67/EU."
b)
Het volgende lid wordt toegevoegd:
1 bis. Als ondernemingen die zijn gevestigd op het grondgebied van een
lidstaat bij wettelijke en bestuursrechtelijke bepaling of collectieve
overeenkomst verplicht zijn in het kader van hun contractuele verplichtingen
enkel onderaannemers te contracteren die bepaalde arbeidsvoorwaarden en omstandigheden inzake bezoldiging waarborgen, mag de lidstaat op nietdiscriminerende en evenredige basis bepalen dat voor dergelijke
ondernemingen dezelfde verplichting geldt voor het contracteren van in artikel
NL
13
NL
1, lid 1, bedoelde ondernemingen die werknemers op zijn grondgebied ter
beschikking stellen.
c)
Het volgende lid wordt toegevoegd:
"1 ter. De lidstaten bepalen dat de in artikel 1, lid 3, onder c), bedoelde
ondernemingen de arbeidsvoorwaarden en -omstandigheden die krachtens
artikel 5 van Richtlijn 2008/104/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad
van 19 november 2008 betreffende uitzendarbeid gelden voor uitzendkrachten
die worden uitgezonden door uitzendbedrijven die zijn gevestigd in de lidstaat
waar het werk wordt uitgevoerd ook garanderen voor ter beschikking gestelde
werknemers."
3.
d)
Lid 9 wordt geschrapt.
e)
Lid 10, tweede streepje, wordt geschrapt.
De eerste alinea van de bijlage wordt als volgt gewijzigd:
De in artikel 3 bedoelde activiteiten omvatten alle activiteiten in de bouwsector die
betrekking hebben op het oprichten, het herstellen, het onderhouden, het verbouwen
of het slopen van bouwwerken, en met name de volgende activiteiten:
Artikel 2
1.
De lidstaten doen de nodige wettelijke en bestuursrechtelijke bepalingen in werking
treden om uiterlijk op [two years after adoption] aan deze richtlijn te voldoen. Zij
delen de Commissie de tekst van die bepalingen onverwijld mede.
Wanneer de lidstaten die bepalingen aannemen, wordt in de bepalingen zelf of bij de
officiële bekendmaking ervan naar deze richtlijn verwezen. De regels voor deze
verwijzing worden vastgesteld door de lidstaten.
2.
De lidstaten delen de Commissie de tekst van de belangrijkste bepalingen van intern
recht mede die zij op het onder deze richtlijn vallende gebied vaststellen.
Artikel 3
Deze richtlijn treedt in werking op de [twintigste] dag na die de bekendmaking ervan in het
Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie.
Artikel 4
Deze richtlijn is gericht tot de lidstaten.
Gedaan te Straatsburg,
Voor het Europees Parlement
De voorzitter
NL
Voor de Raad
De voorzitter
14
NL
Europese Commissie - Informatieblad
Herziening detacheringsrichtlijn — veelgestelde vragen
Straatsburg, 8 maart 2016
Wat is detachering van werknemers?
Een gedetacheerde werknemer wordt door zijn werkgever tijdelijk naar een andere lidstaat gestuurd
om een dienst te verrichten.
Gedetacheerde werknemers zijn niet hetzelfde als mobiele werknemers in de EU. Mobiele werknemers
in de EU verhuizen naar een andere lidstaat om zich voor lange termijn of permanent te integreren in
de arbeidsmarkt. De aanwezigheid van gedetacheerde werknemers in een andere lidstaat hangt
daarentegen nauw samen met het verrichten van de dienst. Gedetacheerde werknemers blijven in
dienst van de detacherende onderneming en hun verblijf is tijdelijk.
Mobiele werknemers in de EU die voor lange termijn of permanent naar een ander land verhuizen,
blijven vallen onder het socialezekerheidsstelsel van het gastland, terwijl gedetacheerde werknemers
(voor een detachering van minder dan twee jaar) onder het socialezekerheidsstelsel van het
thuisland blijven vallen.
Waarom is detachering nodig?
De vrijheid diensten te verrichten in alle EU-lidstaten is één van de hoekstenen van de eengemaakte
markt. "Vrij verkeer van diensten" betekent concreet dat bedrijven een dienst kunnen verrichten in een
andere lidstaat zonder zich in dat land te moeten vestigen. Om dat te doen, moeten zij hun
werknemers naar een andere lidstaat kunnen sturen om daar de nodige taken uit te voeren. Daarom is
het voor een vlotte werking van de eengemaakte markt nodig de arbeidsvoorwaarden voor die
werknemers te regelen.
Hoeveel gedetacheerde werknemers zijn er in de Europese Unie? Waar werken zij?
Volgens EU-cijfers is het aantal gedetacheerde werknemers in de EU tussen 2010 en 2014 met bijna
45 % toegenomen. In 2014 waren er 1,9 miljoen detacheringen in de EU, in vergelijking met
1,3 miljoen in 2010 en 1,7 miljoen in 2013. Gemiddeld duurt een detachering vier maanden.
Gedetacheerde werknemers vertegenwoordigen slechts 0,7 % van het totale aantal werknemers in de
EU. Ze zijn echter sterk geconcentreerd in bepaalde sectoren en lidstaten.
De bouwsector alleen neemt 43,7 % van alle detacheringen voor zijn rekening maar detachering is ook
belangrijk in de verwerkende industrie (21,8 %), onderwijs, gezondheidszorg en maatschappelijke
diensten (13,5 %) en in zakelijke diensten (10,3 %).
Duitsland, Frankrijk en België trekken het meest gedetacheerde werknemers aan. Samen ontvangen
deze drie lidstaten ongeveer 50 % van alle gedetacheerde werknemers. Polen, Duitsland en Frankrijk
zijn dan weer de drie grootste detacherende landen.
Waarin voorziet de huidige detacheringsrichtlijn (van 1996)?
Momenteel bevat de EU-wetgeving een reeks verplichte voorschriften in verband met de
arbeidsvoorwaarden en -omstandigheden voor gedetacheerde werknemers. Deze voorschriften zijn
vastgesteld in Richtlijn 96/71/EG, die werd goedgekeurd in 1996.
In deze richtlijn wordt bepaald dat hoewel werknemers die naar een andere lidstaat zijn gedetacheerd
nog steeds in dienst van de detacherende onderneming werken en bijgevolg het recht van die lidstaat
op hen van toepassing is, zij bij wet recht hebben op een aantal basisrechten die van kracht zijn in de
gastlidstaat waarin het werk wordt uitgevoerd. In het geval van de bouwsector — en van andere
sectoren indien de lidstaten daarvoor kiezen — gelden eveneens de regels van algemeen verbindende
collectieve overeenkomsten van de sociale partners. Het gaat om de volgende rechten:
- minimumlonen;
-
maximale werk- en minimale rustperioden;
-
minimumaantal betaalde vakantiedagen;
-
voorwaarden voor het ter beschikking stellen van werknemers door uitzendkantoren;
-
gezondheid, veiligheid en hygiëne op het werk;
- gelijke behandeling van mannen en vrouwen.
Dit zijn de minimumvoorwaarden waarop gedetacheerde werknemers recht hebben. Werkgevers
kunnen ervoor kiezen gunstigere arbeidsvoorwaarden toe te passen.
De detacheringsrichtlijn heeft geen betrekking op aspecten van de sociale zekerheid. Die zijn
vastgesteld bij Verordening (EG) nr. 883/2004 betreffende de coördinatie van de
socialezekerheidsstelsels.
Wat is de rol van de handhavingsrichtlijn van 2014?
In 2014 werd Richtlijn 2014/67/EU (de zogenaamde "handhavingsrichtlijn") vastgesteld. Deze richtlijn
heeft tot doel de praktische toepassing van de voorschriften voor de detachering van werknemers te
versterken door problemen in verband met fraude, omzeiling van de regels en uitwisseling van
informatie tussen de lidstaten aan te pakken.
De handhavingsrichtlijn:
- vergroot de kennis van gedetacheerde werknemers en ondernemingen over hun rechten en
verplichtingen;
- verbetert de samenwerking tussen de voor detachering bevoegde nationale autoriteiten;
- pakt het fenomeen "brievenbusondernemingen" die detachering gebruiken om de wet te omzeilen
aan;
- preciseert de verantwoordelijkheden van de lidstaten betreffende het toezicht op de naleving van
de voorschriften in verband met de detachering van werknemers;
- verplicht detacherende ondernemingen ertoe informatie en inspecties transparanter te maken;
- biedt vakbonden en andere belanghebbenden de mogelijkheid klacht in te dienen en/of
bestuursrechtelijke maatregelen te nemen tegen de werkgevers van gedetacheerde werknemers
indien hun rechten niet worden geëerbiedigd;
- zorgt ervoor dat administratieve boeten in alle lidstaten daadwerkelijk worden toegepast en geïnd
indien de voorschriften van de EU-wetgeving in verband met detachering niet worden
geëerbiedigd.
De handhavingsrichtlijn voorziet de nationale autoriteiten van doeltreffende instrumenten om echte
detachering te onderscheiden van misbruik en omzeiling. De autoriteiten van een ontvangende lidstaat
kunnen bijvoorbeeld de autoriteiten van de detacherende lidstaat verzoeken na te gaan of de
detacherende onderneming in dat land daadwerkelijk substantiële activiteiten verricht, andere dan
uitsluitend administratieve activiteiten. Een belangrijk criterium waarmee rekening moet worden
gehouden, is het feit of de gedetacheerde werknemers in dat land worden aangeworven.
De handhavingsrichtlijn moet uiterlijk op 18 juni 2016 door de lidstaten in nationale wetgeving zijn
omgezet.
Waarom stelt de Europese Commissie voor de richtlijn van 1996 te herzien?
In haar politieke beleidslijnen heeft de Commissie een doelgerichte herziening van de richtlijn van 1996
vooropgesteld om ervoor te zorgen dat er in de Europese Unie geen plaats is voor sociale dumping. Op
grond van de evaluatie, die ook een raadpleging van belanghebbenden en een effectbeoordeling
omvatte, heeft de Commissie in haar werkprogramma voor 2016 een doelgerichte herziening van de
detacheringsrichtlijnaangekondigd om oneerlijke praktijken aan te pakken. Vandaag is het
aangekondigde wetgevingsinitiatief een feit.
Sinds 1996 zijn de economische situatie en de arbeidsmarkt in de Europese Unie aanzienlijk veranderd.
In de laatste twintig jaar is de eengemaakte markt gegroeid en zijn de loonverschillen toegenomen.
Daardoor is detachering ongewild een aantrekkelijk middel geworden om misbruik te maken van die
verschillen. Het wetgevingskader dat door de richtlijn van 1996 tot stand is gekomen, beantwoordt niet
meer volledig aan deze nieuwe realiteit.
Aangezien detacherende ondernemingen zich bovendien enkel moeten houden aan de minimumlonen
van de gastlidstaat, leidt dit vaak tot sterke loonverschillen tussen gedetacheerde en lokale
werknemers, vooral in lidstaten met relatief hoge lonen. In bepaalde sectoren en lidstaten blijken
gedetacheerde werknemers tot 50 % minder te verdienen dan lokale werknemers.
Aanzienlijke loonverschillen verstoren de gelijke mededingingsvoorwaarden tussen ondernemingen en
ondermijnen de vlotte werking van de eengemaakte markt. Daarom is het zowel vanuit economisch als
vanuit sociaal oogpunt noodzakelijk de voorschriften voor detachering van werknemers aan te passen
aan de huidige economische en sociale omstandigheden.
De herziening biedt bovendien de kans om te zorgen voor een betere coherentie met andere EUwetgeving die na de richtlijn van 1996 is aangenomen. De bestaande richtlijn stemt niet volledig
overeen met andere EU-wetgeving, zoals Verordening (EG) nr. 883/2004 betreffende de coördinatie
van de socialezekerheidsstelsels en de richtlijn betreffende uitzendarbeid. Door relevante bepalingen
op elkaar af te stemmen, zullen de regels veel duidelijker worden voor ondernemingen,
handhavingsorganen en werknemers.
Met het initiatief wil de Commissie een steviger kader vormen voor detachering in de EU dat bijdraagt
aan een eerlijkere en diepere eengemaakte markt.
Wat stelt de Europese Commissie voor?
De Commissie stelt een doelgerichte herziening van de richtlijn van 1996 voor.
Bezoldiging van gedetacheerde werknemers
1) De belangrijkste wijziging heeft te maken met het loon waarop een gedetacheerde werknemer
recht heeft. Volgens de huidige richtlijn hebben gedetacheerde werknemers recht op het minimumloon.
Het nieuwe voorstel voorziet erin dat ook voor hen de regels inzake bezoldiging van de gastlidstaat
gelden, zoals bepaald bij wet of algemeen verbindende collectieve overeenkomsten. Wat bezoldiging
betreft, zullen voor gedetacheerde en lokale werknemers dus dezelfde regels gelden.
Wat is het verschil? Vaak houdt bezoldiging niet enkel het minimumloon in maar ook andere elementen
als bonussen en vergoedingen (bv. kerstbonus) of loonsverhogingen volgens anciënniteit. De lidstaten
zullen op een transparante manier moeten omschrijven uit welke verschillende elementen de
bezoldiging op hun grondgebied bestaat. Als die bij wet of algemeen verbindende collectieve
overeenkomsten zijn vastgesteld, zal daarmee rekening moeten worden gehouden voor de bezoldiging
van een gedetacheerde werknemer.
Het voorstel interfereert op geen enkele manier met de loonvormingsmechanismen van de lidstaten,
maar zorgt ervoor dat gedetacheerde werknemers worden behandeld volgens dezelfde voorschriften
als lokale werknemers als het op bezoldiging aankomt.
Een voorbeeld:
Een werknemer die wordt gedetacheerd naar de bouwsector in België heeft, bovenop het minimumloon
volgens zijn/haar categorie (van 13,379 tot 19,319 euro/uur) recht op elementen van bezoldiging
waarin is voorzien in de algemeen verbindende collectieve overeenkomst voor de bouwsector:
- vorstverletuitkering;
- mobiliteitsvergoeding;
- premie voor bijzondere werken;
- vergoeding voor gereedschapslijtage enz.
2) De Commissie stelt voor dat de voorschriften die zijn vastgesteld bij algemeen verbindende
collectieve overeenkomsten verplicht worden toegepast op gedetacheerde werknemers in alle
economische sectoren.
Wat is het verschil? Momenteel is dit enkel van toepassing op de bouwsector en kunnen de lidstaten
kiezen of ze algemeen verbindende collectieve overeenkomsten toepassen op gedetacheerde
werknemers in andere sectoren. Het staat de lidstaten vrij te beslissen of zij collectieve
overeenkomsten algemeen verbindend maken of niet. Als zij daar echter voor kiezen, wordt de
desbetreffende overeenkomst ook van toepassing op gedetacheerde werknemers.
Een voorbeeld:
Sommige lidstaten hebben algemeen verbindende overeenkomsten in alle sectoren reeds bindend
gemaakt voor gedetacheerde werknemers (AT, BE, ES, FR, EL, FI, IT, NL, PT, SI). Voor die landen zal
de nieuwe regel niets veranderen. Andere lidstaten, zoals DE, IE en LU, hebben deze optie in hun
wetgeving gebruikt, maar enkel voor bepaalde sectoren.
3) In het kader van onderaannemingsketens zullen de lidstaten over de optie beschikken om voor
gedetacheerde werknemers de regels waaraan de hoofdcontractant inzake bezoldiging is onderworpen
toe te passen, ook al zijn die regels het resultaat van collectieve overeenkomsten die niet algemeen
verbindend zijn.
Wat is het verschil? Ondernemingen werken heel vaak — en vooral bij grote projecten — met meerdere
onderaannemers. De lidstaten kunnen de hoofdcontractant verplichten enkel met onderaannemers te
werken die zich houden aan bepaalde bezoldigingsregels, bijvoorbeeld de regels van collectieve
overeenkomsten (algemeen verbindend of niet). Indien een dergelijke regel in de nationale wetgeving
is opgenomen, mogen de lidstaten die regel toepassen op onderaannemers die werknemers detacheren
naar hun grondgebied.
Een voorbeeld: Een Franse bouwonderneming (de contractant) wil uitbesteden aan een lokale Franse
bouwonderneming en aan een Spaanse bouwonderneming. Indien in de Franse wet is vastgesteld dat
de contractant enkel mag uitbesteden aan ondernemingen die de loonovereenkomsten op
ondernemingsniveau eerbiedigen, kan Frankrijk dezelfde regel ook op de Spaanse onderaannemer
toepassen.
Voorschriften inzake uitzendkantoren
Het beginsel van gelijke behandeling met lokale uitzendkrachten zal ook worden toegepast op
gedetacheerde uitzendkrachten, waardoor aansluiting bij de huidige wetgeving inzake binnenlandse
uitzendarbeid wordt verzekerd.
Wat is het verschil? In de EU-wetgeving is al vastgesteld dat in een nationale context voor
uitzendkrachten dezelfde arbeidsvoorwaarden en -omstandigheden moeten gelden als voor hun
collega's in de onderneming waarvoor zij werken. Dat beginsel werd tot dusver niet noodzakelijk
toegepast op werknemers die door een uitzendkantoor van een andere lidstaat werden gedetacheerd.
Het voorstel zou er dus voor zorgen dat ook gedetacheerde uitzendkrachten wat bezoldiging betreft
gelijk behandeld zouden worden.
Een voorbeeld: Momenteel heeft de helft van de lidstaten de optie van de huidige richtlijn opgenomen
in zijn wetgeving. Voor die lidstaten zijn geen wijzigingen nodig.
AT, CY, EE, EL, FI, HR, HU, IE, LV, PT, SI en SK moeten hun nationale wetgeving aanpassen en het
beginsel erin opnemen.
Als een tijdelijke werknemer wordt gedetacheerd naar een onderneming die is gebonden door een niet
algemeen verbindende collectieve overeenkomst (bijvoorbeeld een collectieve overeenkomst op het
niveau van de onderneming), moeten vanaf nu de gunstigste voorwaarden gelden voor de
uitzendkracht die is gedetacheerd door een uitzendkantoor dat in een andere lidstaat is gevestigd.
Langetermijndetachering
De Commissie stelt ook voor dat werknemers die langer dan twee jaar zijn gedetacheerd
(langetermijndetachering) ten minste onder de verplichte beschermingsregels van het arbeidsrecht
van de gastlidstaat vallen. Een vergelijkbare 24-maandenregel bestaat al in de wetgeving betreffende
de coördinatie van de sociale zekerheid.
Wat is het verschil? Momenteel zijn op alle gedetacheerde werknemers reeds een aantal belangrijke
bepalingen van het arbeidsrecht van de gastlidstaat van toepassing, zoals gezondheid, veiligheid en
hygiëne of gelijke behandeling van mannen en vrouwen. Op andere gebieden — zoals de voorwaarden
van arbeidsovereenkomsten — geldt echter het arbeidsrecht van de lidstaat van herkomst. Door de
voorgestelde wijziging zouden op lange termijn gedetacheerde werknemers voor de meeste gebieden
van het arbeidsrecht op exact dezelfde manier worden behandeld als lokale werknemers in de
gastlidstaat. Dat is het geval vanaf de eerste dag als wordt verwacht dat de werknemer voor meer dan
24 maanden zal worden gedetacheerd. In alle andere gevallen wordt de regel toegepast zodra de
detachering langer dan 24 maanden duurt.
Een voorbeeld:
Op werknemers die voor meer dan twee jaar naar Duitsland worden gedetacheerd zullen de Duitse
regels van toepassing zijn die hen bescherming bieden tegen onrechtmatig ontslag, zelfs wanneer het
arbeidsrecht van hun thuisland dergelijke bescherming niet biedt.
Wordt door dit voorstel het beginsel van gelijk loon voor gelijk werk in het kader van
detachering ingevoerd?
Ja, want we hebben te maken met uiteenlopende nationale situaties en het is nodig voor alle
dienstverrichters gelijke mededingingsvoorwaarden te behouden.
In elke lidstaat kunnen er weer andere regels zijn om werknemers een eerlijke bezoldiging te
garanderen. Het voorstel zorgt ervoor dat die regels ten goede komen aan lokale én gedetacheerde
werknemers. Zowel binnenlandse als detacherende ondernemingen zullen alle
bezoldigingsvoorschriften moeten eerbiedigen. In het kader van onderaanneming kan dat zelfs worden
uitgebreid naar voorschriften die zijn vastgesteld in collectieve overeenkomsten of scheidsrechterlijke
uitspraken, of deze algemeen verbindend zijn of niet en ongeacht hun toepassingsgebied of belang op
nationaal niveau. Voor gedetacheerde uitzendkrachten wordt met het voorstel gezorgd voor gelijke
behandeling wat betreft alle basisarbeidsvoorwaarden en -omstandigheden.
Zal de Commissie beslissen welk loon een onderneming aan haar gedetacheerde
werknemers moet betalen?
Nee, dat is een kwestie van contractuele vrijheid.
Met het voorstel wil de Commissie zorgen voor gelijke mededingingsvoorwaarden tussen detacherende
en binnenlandse ondernemingen en waarborgen dat regels die gelden voor binnenlandse
ondernemingen ook worden toegepast op detacherende ondernemingen. Op die manier worden
werknemers beschermd en is er eerlijke mededinging tussen ondernemingen.
Verschillende ondernemingen zullen nog steeds verschillende arbeidsvoorwaarden en bezoldiging
kunnen bieden op voorwaarde dat zij gunstiger voorwaarden bieden dan vereist volgens de regels van
de gastlidstaat.
Zal de voorgestelde herziening de situatie veranderen voor lidstaten die geen stelsel hebben
om collectieve overeenkomsten algemeen verbindend te verklaren?
De voorschriften waardoor de lidstaten die geen stelsel hebben om collectieve overeenkomsten
algemeen verbindend te verklaren zich kunnen baseren op bepaalde andere collectieve
overeenkomsten of scheidsrechterlijke uitspraken (artikel 3, lid 8) blijven ongewijzigd.
Heeft de herziening van de detacheringsrichtlijn gevolgen voor de detachering van
werknemers/dienstverrichting vanuit derde landen?
Dienstverrichters en werknemers uit derde landen hebben enkel toegang tot de EU-markt wanneer een
internationale handelsovereenkomst op basis van wederkerigheid in die toegang voorziet. Wanneer
dienstverrichters uit derde landen toegang hebben tot de EU-markt, moeten zij over het algemeen de
arbeidsrechtelijke regels toepassen van de lidstaat waarnaar zij werknemers detacheren. In de
herziene detacheringsrichtlijn is nog steeds vastgesteld dat "in een niet-lidstaat gevestigde
ondernemingen geen gunstiger behandeling mogen krijgen dan op het grondgebied van een lidstaat
gevestigde ondernemingen". Dat betekent dat de lidstaten voor in een niet-lidstaat gevestigde
ondernemingen die werknemers naar hun grondgebied detacheren minstens dezelfde voorwaarden
moeten laten gelden als voor ondernemingen die vanuit een andere lidstaat werknemers detacheren.
MEMO/16/467
Contactpersoon voor de pers:
Christian WIGAND (+32 2 296 22 53)
Sara SOUMILLION (+32 2 296 70 94)
Voor het publiek: Europe Direct per telefoon 00 800 67 89 10 11 of e-mail
THE NETHERLANDS
WORKERS POSTED TO THE NETHERLANDS
WORKERS POSTED FROM THE NETHERLANDS
87,817
116,060
Workers posted to the Netherlands in 2014: 87,817
Workers posted from the Netherlands in 2014: 116,060
6%
6%
NL
TOTAL EU
NL
5
4
The Netherlands are the fifth EU country per number of
received posted workers
2010
The Netherlands are the fourth EU country per number of
workers posted to other Member States
2010
- 4.1%
2014
TOTAL EU
+ 79%
2014
Trends on posting in the Netherlands (2010-2014)
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
Sent posted workers
100,000
120,000
Received posted workers
Main countries of origin of workers posted
TO the Netherlands in 2014
17.8
* *8
4.8 SK
8.6
2.3
3.1 ES
4.5 IT
UK
7.1 FR
*
34.3
DE
%
5.5 FR
5.8
Main countries of destination of workers posted
FROM the Netherlands in 2014
%
BE 50.9
PT
PL
* = others
23.5
BE
14.7
17.1
* = others
Main sectors of employment of workers posted
TO the Netherlands in 2014
2.3
DE
Main sectors of employment of workers posted
FROM the Netherlands in 2014
8.6
12.0
15.3
10.9
51.0
11.5
15.7
%
2.5
%
22.0
6.6
5.1
4.8
31.2
Construction
Industry (excl. construction)
Construction
Business services (excl. TAW)
Industry (excl. construction)
Temporary agency work
Temporary agency work
Education, health, social work
Education, health, social work
Agriculture
Other services
Other services
Not declared
Not declared
in the EU
EU rules set out the right of companies to offer services in another EU Member State and to temporarily post
workers to supply those services. These rules include safeguards to protect the social rights of posted workers.
--------------------------------------------------WHAT IS A POSTED WORKER?
A worker is “a posted worker”
when he/she has an employment
contract in his/her home country,
but is sent by the employer to work
temporarily in another country
in the context of a cross-border
provision of services.
An example is if a French company
wins a contract in Spain to deliver a
service and sends employees there to
carry out the contract on a temporary
basis.
--------------------------------------------------HOW MANY POSTED WORKERS ARE THERE IN THE EU?
‣ In 2014 there were 1.92 million posted workers in the EU.
‣ T he number of posted workers has increased by 44.4% between 2010 and 2014.
‣ The percentage of posted workers in the workforce remains low (on average 0.7% of total employment).
‣ T he concentration of posted workers in some sectors is however high. The construction sector for example
makes up about 43.7% of the total posted workers. Such concentration is especially high in Belgium,
Luxembourg and Austria.
‣ In 14 Member States, at least 40% of the posted workers come from neighbouring countries;
the percentage can be as high as 80% in some cases.
--------------------------------------------------HOW LONG IS A WORKER POSTED ON AVERAGE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY?
‣ The EU average of posted workers delivering a service in another country is less than 4 months.
--------------------------------------------------Posted workers sent and received in 2014
The countries
sending the
highest total
number
of posted
workers:
Poland,
Germany,
France.
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
PL DE FR SI ES PT SK IT HU BE RO LU AT NL HR UK LT BG CZ EE SE DK IE
sent
FI EL LV MT CY
received
The countries
receiving
the highest
total number
of posted
workers:
Germany,
France,
Belgium.
Share of posted workers in national employment (sending and receiving), 2014
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
LU SI SK PT LI HU HR BE EL EE AT BG DE NL FR PL ES IT CZ UK IE DK FI SE LV MT LT RO CY
Sending MS
Receiving MS
* Data refer to postings to a single member State only
WHAT ARE THE CURRENT RULES AND WHAT IS THE COMMISSION PROPOSING TO CHANGE?
UNDER THE NEW RULES
CURRENT SITUATION
Minimum wage rules apply
Broader set of remuneration rules apply
Temporary, no minimum or maximum limits
If posting is longer than 24 months, posted workers
are equated with local workers
Unequal rules for domestic and cross-border
temporary work agencies
Equal rules for domestic and cross-border temporary
work agencies
WHAT DOES NOT CHANGE?
‣ Other rules on working conditions such as health & safety, protection of pregnant women, equality
between women and men: rules of host country apply
‣ Social security: rules of home country apply if posting is no longer than 24 months
EUROPESE
COMMISSIE
Straatsburg, 8.3.2016
SWD(2016) 53 final
WERKDOCUMENT VAN DE DIENSTEN VAN DE COMMISSIE
SAMENVATTING VAN DE EFFECTBEOORDELING
bij
Voorstel voor een Richtlijn van het Europees Parlement en de Raad
tot wijziging van Richtlijn 96/71/EC betreffende de terbeschikkingstelling van
werknemers met het oog op het verrichten van diensten
{COM(2016) 128}
{SWD(2016) 52}
NL
NL
Samenvatting
Effectbeoordeling van een voorstel voor een richtlijn tot wijziging van Richtlijn 96/71/EG betreffende de
terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers met het oog op het verrichten van diensten
A. Behoefte aan actie
Waarom? Wat is het probleem?
In 2014 waren 1,9 miljoen Europese werknemers ter beschikking gesteld. De ter beschikking gestelde
werknemers vertegenwoordigen weliswaar slechts 0,7 % van het totale aantal werknemers, maar ondersteunen
het grensoverschrijdend verrichten van diensten in de interne markt, met name in de bouwsector en enkele
sectoren voor persoonlijke en zakelijke diensten. Volgens de regels die momenteel van kracht zijn, moeten ter
beschikking stellende ondernemingen in een basispakket van rechten van het gastland voorzien, waaronder
minimumlonen. Die bepaling veroorzaakt aanzienlijke loonverschillen tussen ter beschikking gestelde en lokale
werknemers in de gastlanden, die naar schatting 10 % tot 50 % kunnen bedragen naargelang de landen en
sectoren. Verschillen in loonvoorschriften verstoren de gelijke mededingingsvoorwaarden tussen
ondernemingen want zij leveren ter beschikking stellende ondernemingen een loonkostvoordeel op in
vergelijking met ondernemingen in de gastlidstaten. Waar de richtlijn niet goed aansluit op andere EU-wetgeving
ontstaat binnen het EU-regelgevingskader rechtsonzekerheid met betrekking tot de gelijke behandeling van ter
beschikking gestelde werknemers bij terbeschikkingstelling voor lange termijn. Anderzijds zijn de algemene
voorschriften inzake terbeschikkingstelling waarschijnlijk ontoereikend voor specifieke situaties zoals
terbeschikkingstelling
in
het
kader
van
onderaannemingsketens,
uitzendarbeid
en
intragroepterbeschikkingstelling.
Wat is het doel van dit initiatief?
Het doel van de herziening van de richtlijn van 1996 is de oorspronkelijke doelstellingen te versterken door de
richtlijn aan te passen aan de nieuwe omstandigheden in de economie en op de arbeidsmarkt en
ondernemingen aan te moedigen hun vrijheid van grensoverschrijdende dienstverrichting uit te oefenen in een
klimaat van eerlijke mededinging waarbij de rechten van de werknemers worden geëerbiedigd. Met het initiatief
wil de Commissie met name de EU-wetgeving duidelijker maken, eerlijke loonvoorwaarden garanderen voor ter
beschikking gestelde werknemers en gelijke mededingingsvoorwaarden tussen ter beschikking stellende
ondernemingen en lokale ondernemingen in het gastland.
Wat is de meerwaarde van maatregelen op EU-niveau?
Een regelgevingskader voor de terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers tussen de lidstaten kan alleen worden
opgesteld op EU-niveau. De lidstaten en de sociale partners blijven op het gepaste niveau verantwoordelijk voor
het opstellen van hun wetgeving en het bepalen van de lonen overeenkomstig hun nationale wetgeving en
praktijk.
B. Oplossingen
Welke wetgevende en niet-wetgevende beleidsmaatregelen worden overwogen? Heeft een
bepaalde optie de voorkeur? Waarom?
De Commissie is van oordeel dat het doeltreffender is gelijke bezoldigingsvoorschriften te introduceren en de
verwijzing naar algemeen verbindende collectieve overeenkomsten naar alle sectoren uit te breiden dan geen
actie te ondernemen om de volgende beleidsdoelstellingen te bereiken: eerlijke loonvoorwaarden voor ter
beschikking gestelde werknemers, gelijkere mededingingsvoorwaarden voor ondernemingen en duidelijkere
wetgeving. Met het oog op duidelijkere wetgeving beschouwt de Commissie het als zeer doeltreffend het
arbeidsrecht van de gastlidstaat toe te passen bij terbeschikkingstelling voor meer dan 24 maanden
overeenkomstig de voorschriften inzake de coördinatie van de socialezekerheidsstelsels, gelijke bezoldiging in
te voeren tussen ter beschikking gestelde werknemers in onderaannemingsketens en werknemers van de
hoofdcontractant door toepassing van de arbeidsvoorwaarden, met inbegrip van eventuele overeenkomsten op
ondernemingsniveau van die laatste, en verplicht gelijke voorwaarden toe te passen voor ter beschikking
gestelde uitzendkrachten en lokaal aangeworven uitzendkrachten.
Wie steunt welke optie?
2
De opties om het beginsel "gelijke beloning voor gelijk werk" in te voeren en het arbeidsrecht van de gastlidstaat
toe te passen bij terbeschikkingstelling voor lange termijn gaan in de richting van wat de voorkeur geniet van
zeven lidstaten (AT, BE, FR, DE, LU, NL en SE), het Europees Verbond van Vakverenigingen en de European
Builders Confederation. Eurociett verleent zijn steun aan de herziening van de richtlijn betreffende uitzendarbeid
die zal zorgen voor een gelijke behandeling van lokale en ter beschikking gestelde uitzendkrachten. Negen
lidstaten (BG, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, SK en RO), BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME en CEEMET hebben laten
weten dat zij liever willen wachten tot de handhavingsrichtlijn voldoende lang wordt toegepast alvorens actie te
ondernemen.
3
C. Effecten van de voorkeursoptie
Wat zijn de voordelen van de voorkeursoptie (indien van toepassing, anders van de belangrijkste
opties)?
Gelijke voorschriften in verband met bezoldiging zullen bijdragen tot een verhoging van de lonen van ter
beschikking gestelde werknemers, zullen loonverschillen met lokale werknemers verkleinen en gelijke
mededingingsvoorwaarden creëren tussen ondernemingen in de gastlanden. Als de concurrentie op basis van
loonkosten wordt teruggedrongen, zal terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers het grensoverschrijdend verrichten
van diensten gebaseerd op specialisatie, innovatie en vaardigheden bevorderen. Als de richtlijn goed aansluit bij
andere EU-wetgeving zal de wetgeving duidelijker zijn voor bedrijven, werknemers en autoriteiten en zullen de
kosten voor mogelijke rechtszaken lager liggen. Door de toepassing van het beginsel van gelijke behandeling in
geval van onderaannemingsketens en terbeschikkingstelling voor lange termijn wordt verwacht dat de
bezoldiging van ter beschikking gestelde werknemers zal stijgen en zij dus een betere sociale bescherming
zullen genieten.
Wat zijn de kosten van de voorkeursoptie (indien van toepassing, anders van de belangrijkste
opties)?
Gelijke loonvoorschriften kunnen de loonkosten van ter beschikking stellende ondernemingen in het
lageloonsegment (1/3 van de situaties) doen stijgen, hoewel de totale loonkosten waarschijnlijk nog steeds lager
zullen liggen dan voor lokale ondernemingen in gastlidstaten door verschillen in socialezekerheidspremies en
vennootschapsbelasting tussen de landen. Doordat loonkosten een kleinere rol gaan spelen in de concurrentie
kan het concurrentievermogen van ondernemingen in lidstaten met lagere loonvoorwaarden, vooral in
arbeidsintensieve sectoren als de bouwsector, afnemen. Voorschriften voor gelijke behandeling bij
terbeschikkingstelling voor meer dan 24 maanden en in het kader van onderaannemingsketens kunnen ook het
belang van loonkosten voor de concurrentie verkleinen, wat gelijkaardige gevolgen zou hebben, hoewel
terbeschikkingstellingen voor lange termijn blijkbaar maar een klein deel van het totale aantal
terbeschikkingstellingen uitmaken. Gelijke behandeling van ter beschikking gestelde uitzendkrachten kan ook
leiden tot een verhoging van de loonkosten voor ondernemingen, hoewel de optie niet in aanvullende
voorwaarden voorziet naast de voorwaarden die momenteel voor lokaal aangeworven uitzendkrachten gelden.
Wat zijn de gevolgen voor bedrijven, kmo's en micro-ondernemingen? Maximaal 8 regels
Er is geen speciale regeling voor kmo's. In de eerste plaats zullen kmo's voordeel hebben van duidelijkere
wetgeving en minder belastende administratieve formaliteiten door risico op rechtszaken. Gelijke
loonvoorschriften en gelijke behandeling in verband met terbeschikkingstelling voor lange termijn en
onderaannemingsketens kunnen vooral gevolgen hebben voor kmo's die grensoverschrijdend diensten
verrichten door middel van terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers in marktsegmenten met lage lonen. Hun
loonkosten zullen immers mogelijk stijgen. Verschillen tussen de landen in socialezekerheidsbijdragen en
andere belastingen, met inbegrip van speciale regelingen voor kmo's in sommige lidstaten, kunnen die impact
echter beperken. Kmo's die door terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers actief zijn in marktsegmenten met hoge
lonen zullen dan weer voordeel halen uit het klimaat van eerlijke mededinging op basis van gelijke
mededingingsvoorwaarden wat loonvoorschriften betreft. Als gevolg van de voorgestelde opties krijgen zij
mogelijk meer ondernemingskansen en potentieel om banen te creëren.
Zijn er significante gevolgen voor de nationale begrotingen en overheden?
Er worden geen kosten voor de nationale begrotingen en overheden verwacht. In de kosten voor voorlichting en
handhaving is reeds voorzien in de handhavingsrichtlijn van 2014, die momenteel wordt omgezet.
Zijn er nog andere significante gevolgen?
De verbetering van de informatie in de draagbare A1-documenten en de omzetting van de handhavingsrichtlijn
zullen de informatie over de dynamiek van de terbeschikkingstelling van werknemers betrouwbaarder maken.
D. Follow-up
Wanneer wordt dit beleid geëvalueerd?
De Commissie zal vijf jaar na de termijn voor de omzetting de impact van de richtlijn beoordelen. Het
4
beoordelingsverslag wordt opgesteld door de Commissie met bijstand van externe deskundigen en in overleg
met de sociale partners en andere belanghebbenden.
5
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Strasbourg, 8.3.2016
SWD(2016) 52 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council
amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the
provision of services
{COM(2016) 128 final}
{SWD(2016) 53 final}
EN
EN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED
PARTIES..................................................................................................................... 4
1.1. Identification ........................................................................................................ 4
1.2. Consultation and expertise ................................................................................... 4
1.3 Scrutiny by the Commission Regulatory Scrutiny Board ..................................... 5
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION............................................................................................... 5
2.1. Policy context ....................................................................................................... 5
2.2. Defining the scope of the issue............................................................................. 9
2.3. Inconsistent playing field for companies grounded on differentiated
wage rules........................................................................................................ 10
2.4. Unclear rules to be applied on specific situations .............................................. 14
2.4.1. Subcontracting....................................................................................... 14
2.4.2. Temporary agency workers ................................................................... 15
2.4.3. Definition of the temporary nature of posting....................................... 16
2.4.4. Intra-corporate posting .......................................................................... 17
2.5. Evolution of the problem without further EU intervention ................................ 18
2.6. EU Right to Act ............................................................................................... 19
3. OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................... 20
3.1. General Policy Objective.................................................................................... 20
3.2. Specific objectives.............................................................................................. 20
3.3. Coherence of the objectives with other EU policies .......................................... 21
4. POLICY OPTIONS....................................................................................................... 21
4.1. Option 1 - No policy change: baseline scenario................................................. 22
4.2. Option 2: clarification of the composition of minimum rates of pay to
codify the rulings of the European Court of Justice ........................................ 22
4.3.1 Option 3a: Application of the same mandatory rules on
remuneration for posted and local workers ....................................... 23
4.3.2. Option 3b: Extension to all sectors of the reference to erga
omnes collective agreements ............................................................. 24
4.4. Option 4: Adapted rules for specific situations of posting................................. 25
4.4.1. Option 4a: long-term postings ............................................................... 25
4.4.2. Option 4b: sub-contracting relations ..................................................... 25
4.4.3. Option 4c: Temporary agency workers ................................................. 26
4.5. Discarded options ............................................................................................... 27
2
4.5.1 Communication by the Commission to clarify the elements of
remuneration applicable to posted workers ...................................... 27
4.5.2. Introduction of equal pay for equal work with respect to a
reference undertaking........................................................................ 27
4.5.3. Clarification of the application of the Directive to the road
transport sector ................................................................................. 28
4.5.4. Option 4d: intra-group posting ............................................................. 28
5. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE POLICY OPTIONS .................................... 29
5.1. Effectiveness ...................................................................................................... 29
5.1.1. Create a level playing field for companies based on equal rules
on wages ............................................................................................ 29
5.1.2. Improve the clarity of EU rules on posting ........................................... 31
5.2. Overall economic impacts .................................................................................. 32
5.3. Overall social impacts ........................................................................................ 41
5.4. Impact on SME's ................................................................................................ 43
5.5. Implementation costs.......................................................................................... 44
5.6. Budgetary Impact ............................................................................................... 44
6. OVERALL COMPARISON OF THE OPTIONS ........................................................ 45
6.1 The preferred options .......................................................................................... 46
7. EVALUATION AND MONITORING......................................................................... 48
7.1. Monitoring.......................................................................................................... 48
7.2. Evaluation........................................................................................................... 49
ANNEX I. - SUMMARY OF THE POSITIONS EXPRESSED BY THE
MEMBER STATES AND THE STAKEHOLDERS ............................................... 50
ANNEX II. - NUMBERS AND FIGURES ON POSTING OF WORKERS ................... 55
ANNEX III. - OVERVIEW OF THE CASE LAW OF THE CJEU ON THE
CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF MINIMUM RATES OF PAY........................... 71
ANNEX IV........................................................................................................................ 76
ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF EQUAL PAY ON
LABOUR COSTS FOR EMPLOYERS AND AFTER-TAX INCOME FOR
WORKERS IN SITUATION OF POSTING............................................................ 76
ANNEX V. - COMPOSITION OF REMUNERATION .................................................. 86
ANNEX VI. - IMPACT OF THE REVISED DIRECTIVE ON
REMUNERATION ................................................................................................... 87
3
1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES
1.1. Identification
Lead DG: DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL)
Other services involved: SG, LS
CWP/Agenda planning reference: CWP 2016, Annex I, initiative n. 8.
1.2. Consultation and expertise
In the framework of the Labour Mobility Package, the Commission launched on 15 July
2015 a public consultation open to EU citizens and organisations, which remained open
for 12 weeks. The consultation included a chapter on the social security rules applicable
to posted workers. Out of 307 respondents who submitted their replies to the public
consultation, 232 respondents replied online to the questions on the coordination rules on
posting (which amounts to 75.57% of the total number of respondents), including 138
individuals (69.35% of the total number of individuals) and 94 organisations (87.04% of
the total number of organisations).
During the preparation of the initiative, the Commission has received written
contributions from 16 Member States, in the form of two joint letters. The first was sent
on 18 June 2015, signed by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Sweden. On 31 August 2015, a second joint letter signed by Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania was
sent to the Commission.
The targeted revision of the Directive was also discussed with Member States'
representatives within the Committee of Experts on Posting of Workers, in a meeting
held on 7 September 2015.
The Commission organised a consultation of European social partners on the Labour
Mobility Package, including the targeted review of the Posting of Workers Directive, in
the form of a roundtable, which was held on 10 June 2015.
A meeting with was held with civil society on 17 June 2015.
Written contributions were received from the following European social partners: ETUC,
BusinessEurope, UEAPME, EFBWW and FIEC, EBC, CESI, CEC and Eurociett.
4
Written contributions were also received from national social partners, namely the
Swedish Association of Industrial Employers, Gesamtmetall , the Confederation of
Industry of the Czech Republic, the Industry Associations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden, the Council of Nordic Trade Unions and the Dutch Trade Union
Confederation (FNV).
Two European NGOs have also sent written contributions: ECAS and Eurodiaconia.
Annex III provides a summary of the positions expressed by the Member States and
stakeholders in written contributions
To increase the evidence basis, a study on wage-setting systems and minimum rates of
pay applicable to posted workers in accordance with 1996 Posting of Workers Directive
in a selected number of Member States and sectors was prepared, on behalf of the
Commission, by the Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini1. An analysis on the economic value
of posting of workers was prepared on behalf of the Commission by HIVA KU Leuven2.
1.3 Scrutiny by the Commission Regulatory Scrutiny Board
The Regulatory Scrutiny Board of the European Commission assessed a draft version of
the present IA and issued a negative opinion on 22 January 2016. A new version of the
Impact Assessment was submitted to the Board on 15 February 2016. A positive opinion
on the new version was issued on 24 February 2016.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
2.1. Policy context3
Posting of workers plays an essential role in the Internal Market, particularly in the crossborder provision of services. It consists of the case in which undertakings post an
employee to another Member State to provide a service. Directive 96/71/EC (hereafter:
'the Directive')4 regulates three variants of posting: the direct provision of services
between two companies under a service contract, posting in the context of an
establishment or company belonging to the same group ('intra-group posting'), and
1
2
3
4
Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini (FGB), Study on wage setting systems and minimum rates of pay
applicable to posted workers in accordance with Directive 97/71/EC in a selected number of Member
States and sectors, December 2015.
De Wispelaere, F. and Pacolet, J., ‘An ad hoc statistical analysis on short term mobility - economic
value of posting of workers’, HIVA KU Leuven, February 2016.
For more information, see Annex II.
Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services.
5
posting through hiring out a worker via a temporary work agency established in another
Member State.
The EU established an Internal Market which is based on a highly competitive social
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress (Article 3(3)TFEU).
The treaty establishes the right for companies to provide their services in other Member
States. It provides that 'restrictions on the freedom to provide services in the Union shall
be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member
State other than that of the person to whom the services are intended' (Article 56 TFEU).
The freedom to provide services may be limited only by rules which are justified by
overriding reasons of general interest, provided that these are justified, proportionate and
applied in a non-discriminatory way.
Altogether, in 2014 (latest data available), there were over 1.92 million postings in the
EU, up by 10.3% as compared to 2013 and by 44.4% with respect to 2010. The upward
trend followed the stagnation of postings during the years 2009 and 20105.
EU-15 Member States represented the destination of 86% of total postings, with
Germany, France and Belgium as the three main countries of destination which
altogether received 50% of total postings in Europe (see figure 1). In proportion to the
domestic employment of the receiving country, posted workers represent a relevant share
in Luxembourg, Belgium and Austria.
5
Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2015), Posting of Workers. Report on A1 portable documents issued
in 2014, Network Statistics FMW&SSC, European Commission. The data include postings to single
Member States (according to art. 12 of Regulation 883/2004) and postings to multiple Member States
(article 13 of Regulation 883/2004). The data also includes the self-employed (on average 8% of total
postings) which are not covered by the posting of Workers Directive. Because no data is available on
the destination of postings to multiple member States, the total figure of sent posted workers (1.92
million) is higher than that of received posted workers (1.45 million, in 2014).
6
Figure 1. Posted workers, breakdown by receiving country, absolute numbers and
% of total employment, years 2010 and 2014.
Source: EMPL elaboration on Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). Note: data on received posted workers
are only available with respect to postings to single Member States (art. 12 of Reg. 883/2004).
Poland, Germany and France accounted for the three largest senders of posted workers in
2014, with EU-15 accounting for 54% of total posted workers sent in that year. The
incidence of posted workers on the domestic employment of sending countries was
highest in Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
Figure 2. Posted workers, breakdown by sending country, absolute number and %
on total employment, years 2010 and 2014.
Source: EMPL elaboration on Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015). Note: data on sent posted workers
include both postings to single Member States and postings to multiple Member States (art. 12, 13 of Reg.
883/2004).
7
Postings involve a small share of the total EU workforce (0.7%), with unique posted
persons accounting on average for 0.4% of EU employment (0.2% in full-time
equivalents). However, the relevance of posting of workers is particularly strong in the
construction sector, in which 42% of total postings are concentrated. Posting of workers
is also important in the manufacturing industry (21.8%) and in other service sectors, such
as personal services (education, health and social work, 13.5%) and business services
(administrative, professional, and financial services, 10.3%). Posting of workers through
temporary agency work represents, on average, 5% of total postings in the EU, albeit
with significant cross-country variations.
Further data on posting of workers are presented in Annex II.
However, it is important to note that strong data limitations on posting of workers remain
an on-going problem6. Comparable figures are based on the portable documents A1 (PD
A1) for social security purposes7, although some Member States, including Belgium,
Denmark, France and Sweden have set up national registration systems, requiring
detailed information from companies posting workers to their country. The accuracy of
the information contained in PD A1 documents cannot be guaranteed due to the lack of
formal controls by the authorities in the sending countries, among other things.
Therefore, the figures presented below represent an estimate of the actual number of
postings taking place and do not provide a precise picture of reality8. Moreover, PD A1
forms include incomplete information on the duration of postings (these forms are not
required for short-term postings below one month of duration and for long-term postings
over 24 months) and the precise economic sector of activity; and they include no
information at all on aspects such as the qualification of posted workers, their earnings,
and the economic value of cross-border services involving posting of workers.
Improvements can be expected from the transposition of the 2014 Enforcement
Directive, in particular the administrative requirements and control measures suggested
by article 9(1). Furthermore, the envisaged revision of the Regulation on social security
6
7
8
See also European Commission (2012) Impact Assessment. Revision of the legislative framework on
the posting of workers in the context of the provision of services. Partie I, SWD (2012) 63 final.
Within the meaning of Article 12 of Regulation No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security
systems, PD A1 forms serve to certify that the holder is covered by the social security legislation of the
Member State of origin. PD A1 could, inter alia, also be issued for persons who are normally
employed, self-employed or both employed and self-employed in two or more Member States (Art. 13
of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004).
The gap in registered posted workers between PD A1 figures and national registers can be significant.
Annex II provides some examples. The gap can be explained by many factors, including in particular
the non-obligation for sending employers to have a PD A1 form for short-term postings below one
month and long-term postings over 24 months (which are instead compulsory registered in national
systems). However, the gap still demonstrates the shortcoming of the data available through social
security forms, which remain the only fully comparable data source.
8
coordination will propose stricter measures to improve the reliability of the A1 forms,
and therefore of the data, provided by sending Member States.
2.2. Defining the scope of the issue
Posting of workers constitutes an essential resource for the functioning of the Internal
Market. The 1996 Directive sets the EU regulatory framework to establish a balance
between the objectives of promoting and facilitating the cross-border provision of
services, providing protection to posted workers and ensuring a level-playing field
between foreign and local competitors. It stipulates a 'core set' of terms and conditions of
employment of the host Member State which are mandatory to be applied by foreign
service providers, which include (article 3(1) of the Directive): maximum work periods
and minimum rest periods; the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates;
minimum paid annual holidays; the conditions of hiring-out of workers; health, safety
and hygiene at work; protective measures in favour of pregnant women, young mothers,
children, and young people; equality of treatment between genders; and other provisions
of non-discrimination.
The 2014 Enforcement Directive9 has provided for new and strengthened instruments to
fight and sanction circumventions, fraud and abuses. It addresses problems caused by socalled "letter-box companies" and increases the Member States’ ability to monitor
working conditions and enforce the rules applicable. Inter alia, the Directive lists
qualitative criteria characterising the existence of a genuine link between the employer
and the Member State of establishment. The Enforcement Directive also lays down
provisions to improve administrative cooperation between national authorities in charge
of posting. For instance, it provides for an obligation to respond to requests for assistance
from the competent authorities in other Member States within two working days in the
case of urgent requests for information and within 25 working days in non-urgent cases.
Moreover, the Directive lists national control measures that the Member States may
apply when monitoring compliance with the working conditions applicable to posted
workers. The full effects of the Directive should become tangible as of mid-2016, as
Member States will have until 18 June 2016 to transpose the Directive.
The current initiative does not address any issue touched upon by the Enforcement
Directive. Neither the Enforcement Directive nor the measures taken to transpose it into
national laws will be in any way affected by the present initiative. Rather, it focuses on
issues which were not addressed by it and pertain to the EU regulatory framework set by
the original 1996 Directive. Therefore, the revised posting of Workers Directive and the
Enforcement Directive are complementary to each other and mutually reinforcing.
9
Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the
provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative
cooperation through the Internal Market Information System ( ‘the IMI Regulation’ ).
9
Problem Tree
Drivers
Reference to minimum
level of pay
Universal systems not in
all the Member States
Problems
Consequences
Un-level playing field
for companies due to
different rules on wages
between posted and local
workers
Deteriorated acceptance
of posting
Incentives for companies
to replace locally hired
workers with foreign
service providers
Lack of clarity of what
elements are covered by
minimum pay
Social dumping
Unfair competition
Unclear rules to be
applied (implementation
difficulties)
Legal uncertainty/higher
litigation costs (for
companies and workers)
Lack of clarity regarding
the temporary nature of
posting
Inconsistency between
different EU rules
2.3. Inconsistent playing field for companies grounded on differentiated wage rules
The 1996 Posting of Workers Directive establishes a structural differentiation of wage
rules applying to posted and local workers which is the institutional source of an un-level
playing field between posting and local companies, as well as of segmentation in the
labour market.
Wage differentiation originates from three mechanisms set in place by the Directive.
First, the Directive stipulates that posted workers are guaranteed only the minimum rates
of pay, as part of a "hard core of clearly defined protective rules", in the receiving
Member State. Minimum pay is defined either by the law or by universally applicable
collective agreements which have been declared universally applicable. In the absence of
universally applicable collective agreements, Member States may decide to base
themselves on collective agreements which are generally applicable to all similar
undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned, or
10
collective agreements which have been concluded by the most representative employers'
and labour organizations at national level and which are applied throughout national
territory10. Thus, unless there are collective agreements that fulfil these conditions,
posted workers are only entitled to whatever statutory minimum wage that there might be
in the receiving country. However, even when collective agreements are applicable, it is
widely reported that sending companies tend to pay the rates applicable to the lowest pay
group, rather than the adequate pay group corresponding to workers' job tasks,
educational level and seniority11. In summary, the existing Directive has an in-built
structural wage gap between posted and local workers.
Second, the composition of the minimum rates of pay guaranteed to posted workers in
the host Member States is unclear and sensibly varies across the Member States. The
Directive leaves the definition and composition of 'minimum rates of pay' applicable in
their country to the Member States and the social partners. For example, while certain
bonuses or allowances (such as Christmas bonus or bad-weather allowance) are
constituent parts of the pay in some Member States, they are not in others. Annex V
provides an overview of the types of bonuses and allowances included across different
Member States. The European Court of Justice has clarified selected issues of the
concept12. Nevertheless, the lack of a clear standard generates uncertainty about rules and
practical difficulties for the bodies responsible for the enforcement of the rules in the host
Member State; for the service provider when determining the wage due to a posted
worker; and for the awareness of posted workers themselves about their entitlements. In
practice, the notion of "minimum rates of pay" which can in a number of Member States
include seniority allowance, quality bonuses and 13th month bonuses, seems to be
wrongly interpreted without these components, as meaning 'minimum wage' (see Annex
V).
Third, there are uncertainties concerning the effectiveness of the Directive in Denmark
and Sweden where, in the absence of a statutory minimum wage and a scheme for the
extension of collective agreements, minimum rates of pay are set by collective
agreements that are applicable nationwide but leave ample room for integration to
company-level agreements, in line with productivity and skill requirements. Following
the Laval ruling13 through which the European Court of Justice has challenged the
10
11
12
13
See in particular article 3(8) of the 1996 Posting of Workers Directive.
FGB (2015), Wage Study. This situation primarily affects workers posted from low-wage EU Member
States in low-skill occupations. Workers with higher bargaining power vis-à-vis their employers are
reported to receive wages in line with the standards of the receiving countries.
Commission v. Germany (C-341/02), Isbir (C-522/12). In the recent case Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry
(C-396/13), the Court ruled that the 'minimum rates of pay' which a host Member State can require to
be paid to posted workers include: holiday allowances, daily flat-rate allowances for posted workers to
compensate them for disadvantages entailed by the posting, and compensation for travelling time, on
equal terms as local workers. Moreover, it acknowledged the validity of different hourly pay levels
attached to the categorisation of employees into pay groups in collective agreements to the sense of the
Directive, provided that the conditions are universally binding and transparent.
C-341/05 - Laval un Partneri.
11
validity of company-level agreements to set the working conditions for posted workers,
both countries have amended national legislation to clarify the application of their wagesetting systems in the terms set by the Directive14 . While general agreements set basic
wage floors in some relevant exposed sectors, company-level agreements play an
essential role in setting a level playing field with local companies, but the number of such
collective agreements with cross-border service providers seems to be low15..
Figure 3 provides a synoptic view of the level of minimum rates of pay (as a ratio of the
average wage in the whole economy) under different wage regimes and the number of
workers posted to each Member State from lower-wage countries who are likely to
receive only the minimum rates of pay in the receiving country.
Figure 3. Minimum rates of pay guaranteed by the Directive and potential range of
posted workers affected, by receiving country, whole economy, 2010
Source: EMPL calculations on Eurostat data and Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015) data. No data for CY.
Note: in minimum wage countries (MW) the minimum pay is calculated as the ratio between the monthly
statutory minimum wage and the nominal average wage in the construction sector; in Member States with
universally applicable collective agreements (CA), and collective agreements concluded at national level
(in accordance to article 3(8) of the Directive), the minimum rate of pay is calculated as the ratio between
the nominal monthly wage of the lowest pay group (elementary worker) and the average wage in the
construction sector.
14
15
Malmberg, J. (2010), The impact of the ECJ judgements on Viking, Laval, Rueffert and Luxemburg
on the practice of collective bargaining and the effectiveness of social action, European Parliament
Study
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110718ATT24274/20110718ATT
24274EN.pdf)
FGB Study (2015), Denmark and Sweden Country reports.
12
Differentiated rules on wages translate into a competitive advantage for posting
companies over local companies in receiving countries, with the former being able to
adhere to lower wage bound than the latter, while competing for the same business in the
same (host) country. This is particularly true in domestically-provided services, such as
construction and personal services, given their labour-intensive and price-sensitive
character and the fact that delocalisation of these activities is not possible. In light of EU
labour market conditions, including wage differentials and diversity of wage-setting
regimes, in the context of an enlarged European Union, the balance struck by the 1996
Directive to establish a climate of fair competition has changed considerably. As
illustrated by figure 9 (Annex II), the gap between Member States on minimum wages
has constantly increased since 1996, from a ratio between the lowest and the highest
minimum wage of 1:3 to 1:10. Moreover, differentiated wage rules seem in contradiction
with the principle according to which cross-border service providers should pursue their
activities in another Member State "under the same conditions as are imposed by the
State on its own nationals" (Article 57 TFEU).
The labour market effect of these provisions is segmentation between posted and local
workers. Posted workers are reported to receive a lower remuneration level than local
workers, especially in high-wage EU receiving countries, such as Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Because of the absence of data on the
earnings of posted workers, only gross estimates exist. However, the wage gap (in
compliance with the Directive) is estimated to range from 10-15% in the Danish
construction sector, up to about 25% - 35% in the construction sector in the Netherlands
and Belgium, and up to 50% in the road transport sector in Belgium16. The wage gap
constitutes a source of labour market segmentation insofar as it implies differentiated
rules applying to posted workers on aspects such as composition of pay, correspondence
of certain bonuses, and longer working hours.
Wage differentiation is reported to be especially acute in two cases. First, posted workers
in labour-intensive sectors, such as the construction sector and road transport are more
likely to receive minimum pay rates than posted workers in high-end service sectors, e.g.
finance and insurance. This is because in these sectors labour cost differentials are one of
the key drivers of posting of workers while posted workers tend to have low skills17. By
16
17
See Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini (FGB), Study on wage setting systems and minimum rates of pay
applicable to posted workers in accordance with Directive 97/71/EC in a selected number of Member
States and sectors [henceforth quoted as "FGB - Wage Study"], Final report, November 2015; Schiek,
Oliver, Forde, Alberti, "EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law", Study for the
EMPL
Committee,
European
Parliament,
September
2015
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/563457/IPOL_STU%282015%29563457
_EN.pdf); M. Houwerzijl, "The Dutch Understanding of Posting of Workers in the context of Free
Services Provision and Enlargement: a Neutral Approach?", in: S. Evju, Cross-Border Services,
Posting
of
Workers
and
Multilevel
Governance,
University
of
Oslo,
2013
(http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/freemov/publications/books/cross-border.html)
See ISMERI Europa, Preparatory Study for an Impact Assessment concerning the possible revision of
the legislative framework on the posting of workers in the context of the provision of services, Final
13
contrast, in sectors or for professions in which posting is driven by skills shortages, such
as the care services sector, or workers have higher skills, wages are not reported to be a
problematic issue18. Second, unequal wage treatment particularly affects workers posted
from low- to high-wage countries. While the 1996 Directive does not preclude companies
from applying more generous conditions than the minimum standards of the receiving
country, workers posted from low-wage countries tend to lack the bargaining power to
obtain more generous conditions in line with the wage standards of the receiving
countries. On the receiving end, the Directive provisions can exert downward wage and
overall labour cost competition on local companies and workers in high-wage Member
States19, including through possible risks of replacement of local workers with posted
workers. It also risks destabilising coordinated wage-setting regimes and the bargaining
autonomy of the social partners in those regimes.
2.4. Unclear rules to be applied on specific situations
The 1996 Directive addresses different types of posting through a one-size-fits-all
principle. In specific situations, however, the rules have not proved to be up to standard
with changing economic and labour market conditions and do not provide sufficient legal
clarity. Unclear rules undermine the efficient functioning of the Internal Market by
creating uncertainties among undertakings, workers and their representatives, and public
authorities.
2.4.1. Subcontracting
Posted workers in the context of sub-contracting chains are in a situation of particular
vulnerability. Subcontracting chains involve a client, or principal contractor,
externalising single specialities or tasks to other companies or self-employed workers.
Workers may be posted to another member State in order to execute that service.
Subcontracting is an extensive practice in the building and construction sector, as well as
in other industries and service sectors, such as shipbuilding, transport, tourism and the
cleaning industry20. The compression of production costs through the subcontracting of
specific tasks to trans-national subcontractors is one of the drivers of the phenomenon
and may be a source of downward wage pressure in the context of posting both on posted
and on local workers, as well as a source of risk of job displacement for local workers21.
18
19
20
21
Report, March 2012; J. Cremers, In search of cheap labour in Europe. Working and living conditions
of posted workers, European Institute for Construction Labour Research – AIAS, 2010.
FGB (2015), Wage Study.
EFBWW and FIEC, Joint Position, 29 February 2015; European Builders Confederation, Open Letter
to Maryanne Thyssen, 5 October 2015; Council of Nordic Trade Unions, 20 January 2016.
Y. Jorens, S. Peters, M. Houwezijl, Study on the protection of workers' rights in subcontracting
processes in the European Union, June 2012.
See Lillie, N. (2012), "Subcontracting, posted migrants and labour market segmentation in Finland",
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40(1): 148-167 N. Lillie and I. Wagner, Subcontracting,
insecurity and posted work: evidence from construction, meat processing and ship building, European
Trade Union Institute, 2015
14
As there is little comprehensive data, it is difficult to estimate the extent of subcontracting through cross-border service providers and posting of workers. Overall, in
2011 (latest available data) payments of companies to subcontractors ranged between less
than 15% (RO, PT, DK, and IT) to over 30% (UK, SK, and CZ) of turnover in the
construction sector (figure 10, Annex II).
The 2014 Enforcement Directive recognised that "compliance with the applicable rules in
the field of posting in practice and the effective protection of workers' rights in this
respect is a matter of particular concern in subcontracting chains" (recital 36) while
introducing a system of joint liability of the main contractor22. The Enforcement
Directive hence determines who can be held liable for wage payment but does not
address the question of what wage a posted worker in a subcontracting chain is entitled
to.
2.4.2. Temporary agency workers
The posting of temporary agency workers to a user undertaking established in another
Member State is a rather specific situation, compared with the typical situation of
workers posted in the context of a contract of service. In the case of temporary agency
workers, the movement of the worker to the host Member State constitutes the very
purpose of the provision of services and the posted worker carries out his tasks under the
control and direction of the user undertaking.
Posted agency workers are exposed to the risk of differentiated treatment with respect to
temporary agency workers directly recruited in the host Member States because of the
problematic interaction between the Posting of Workers directive and the Directive
2008/104/EC on temporary agency work (TAW)23.
While the TAW Directive establishes that temporary agency workers should be granted
the same working and employment conditions of workers as comparable workers of the
user undertaking, in the Posting of Workers directive the same principle is not
mandatory. Article 3(9) provides that temporary agency workers posted from another
Member State are granted the application of the hard core of rights as nationals, including
minimum rates of pay, but are not granted equal treatment as comparable workers of the
user undertaking, unless a Member State has ruled so.
22
23
Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the
provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative
cooperation through the Internal Market Information System ( ‘the IMI Regulation’ )
A.Van Hoek and M. Houwerzijl, Comparative Study on the legal aspects of the posting of workers in
the framework of the provision of services in the European Union, 2011.
15
The majority of Member States (15) has transposed article 3(9) to ensure that the equal
treatment principle also applies to posted temporary agency workers, but thirteen
Member States (Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland,
Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Slovakia) do not set any specific provision for
this category of workers, with the general conditions for posted workers applying24.
As a result, temporary agency workers who are posted to the latter group of countries are
exposed to risks of differentiated pay and working conditions with respect to locally
recruited agency workers. National temporary agencies are faced with unfair competition
since the workers assigned by agencies established in another Member State are
potentially paid lower wages. It should be noted, however, that the Posting of Workers
Directive does not affect the regulation of the temporary agency industry with respect to
aspects such as restrictions on particular sectors or licencing systems in the Member
States.
2.4.3. Definition of the temporary nature of posting
The 1996 Directive defines the nature of posting as having a temporary character, for the
"limited period of time" necessary for a worker to carry out in another Member State the
work for which he or she has been posted25. However, the Directive does not provide any
temporary limitation to the posting of workers or any limitation to the assumption that
they do not integrate into the labour market of the host Member State.
The lack of a definition of the temporary limitation of posting creates a mismatch with
the Regulation on the coordination of social security systems26. The Regulation sets at 24
months the maximum duration of postings after which posted workers are compulsorily
integrated in the social security regime of the host Member State for the entire period of
posting. The same rule does not apply for working conditions under the Posting of
Workers Directive. Workers posted for long periods remain entitled to the minimum
standards of the host Member State, as far as remuneration, working time, and paid
holidays are concerned, while remaining subject to the income tax regime of the home
country.
The inconsistency of the EU regulatory framework on posting represents a problem as
such as a matter of clarity of rules, while bearing significant adverse consequences on the
fairness of competition between posting and local companies. Companies posting
workers for long-term services can continue applying a more advantageous set of
minimum-standard labour rules with respect to local companies, thus gaining a
competitive edge based on the application of unequal wage rules.
24
25
26
Austria does not provide for equal treatment of posted temporary agency workers, but established more
generous conditions than the minimum core of rights.
A.Van Hoek and M. Houwerzijl, 2011.
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the
coordination of social security systems.
16
In turn, workers posted for long periods are de facto integrated in the labour market of
the host Member State, but they do not benefit from the principle of equal treatment with
nationals as EU mobile workers (within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU) do, as far as
working conditions are concerned. Workers in long-term postings are more exposed to
abuses of their working conditions27.
The Commission identified this problem in the preparation of the Enforcement Directive,
but no policy option was presented at that time since the initiative focused only on
problems related with the enforcement of the existing rules 28.
2.4.4. Intra-corporate posting
In addition to the typical situation of posting in the context of a contract of services
between undertakings established in different Member States and to temporary agency
workers, the Directive also covers intra-corporate posting, i.e., the posting to an
establishment or to an undertaking owned by the group in the territory of another
Member State.
The specificity of this situation is two-fold: first it has a rather weak link with the
provision of services, being mainly confined to staff mobility within undertakings of the
same group. Secondly, similarly to the agency worker, the link between the posted
worker and the undertaking in which he/she temporarily performs the tasks is much
stronger, since the worker carries out the tasks under the control and direction of the
undertaking to which he/she has been posted. It also creates a difference of treatment
between EU and third-country nationals. Indeed, Directive 2014/66/EU on the conditions
of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate
transfer provides, in its Article 5(4)(b) that third country nationals must be given a
remuneration "not less favourable than the remuneration granted to nationals of the
Member State where the work is carried out occupying comparable positions".
By providing for the same rules as for the typical situation of posting under a contract of
services, the Directive does not address the specificities of this situation and could create
a distortion of competition between companies having (or not) subsidiaries in different
Member States, as well as a difference of treatment between EU and third-country
nationals.
27
28
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), A Revision of the Posting of Workers Directive. Eight
proposals for improvement. Final Report from the ETUC Expert Group on posting, 2010.
(https://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/final_report_ETUC_expert_group_posting_310510_E
N.pdf).
European Commission, SWD(2012) 63 final.
17
2.5. Evolution of the problem without further EU intervention
With the continuing pick-up of economic activity in the EU29, posting of workers can be
expected to continue growing at a steady pace based on the evidence that the growth of
posting is strongly correlated to the growth of GDP30. If postings continue to grow at the
annual growth rate of 11.1% showed between 2010 and 2014, the total number of
postings may reach up to 3 million workers by 2018. While the increase in the number of
postings represents an indicator of a vigorous Internal Market for cross-border services,
its social acceptance among companies and workers may risk being weakened by
concerns about the fairness of EU rules.
The regulatory framework would nevertheless be subject to some changes as a
consequence of two factors, notably the transposition of the 2014 Enforcement Directive
and the application of current – and possibly, future – case law of the European Court of
Justice.
The transposition of the Enforcement Directive
On 18 June 2016, the deadline for the transposition of the 2014 Enforcement Directive at
national level elapses. The Enforcement Directive tackles a number of important issues
related to the fighting and sanctioning of circumventions, fraud and abuses. Member
States are called upon to set up stronger rules to unmask fraudulent competition practices
by companies through the use of so-called "letter-box companies". The Directive will
also simplify and improve access to information on terms and conditions of employment
in the host Member State, both for employers and to posted workers. Moreover, the
improvement of administrative cooperation between the Member States, in particular as
concerns the exchange of information, will support the fight against abuses of the posting
of workers covering up undeclared or illegal work activities. The set-up of stronger
monitoring systems at national level will increase the availability of reliable data on the
posting of workers across the EU Member States, and enhance inter alia the ability of the
social partners to monitor and enforce the correct application of the provisions set by
collective agreements. The cross-border enforcement of administrative penalties and
fines will also ensure that the sanctions are effective and dissuasive even in case of a
short presence of the cross-border service provider in the host Member State.
The Enforcement Directive will be effective essentially in situations of fraud (letter-box
companies, etc.). It will therefore mainly contribute to preventing severe forms of
distortion of competition. To the extent to which wage differentiation and unfair
competition practices are a matter of poor enforcement at national level, the transposition
of the Enforcement Directive will contribute to tackling the problems listed above.
29
30
European
Commission,
European
Economic
Forecast,
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eeip/pdf/ip011_en.pdf ).
ISMERI Europe (2011)
18
Autumn
2015
The effects of the jurisprudence by the European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice has clarified on successive occasions the notion of
"minimum rates of pay". In particular, the case Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry (C-396/13)
has established that a host Member State can require sending companies to include in the
payment to posted workers holiday allowances, daily flat-rate allowances to compensate
workers for disadvantages entailed by the posting, and compensation for travelling time,
on equal terms as local workers.
Moreover, the ruling acknowledged that if collective agreements set different pay levels
related to the categorisation of employees into pay groups, these pay levels need to be
considered as valid in line with the Directive, provided that the conditions are universally
binding and transparent.
While the ruling has an immediate effect on the rules applicable to posting companies
and posted workers, its effects will continue to be monitored closely.
In the more recent case Regio-Post (C-115/14)31, the Court's ruling has tackled an issue
in relation to subcontracting activities in public procurement. It established that Member
States can require tenderers of public procurements and their subcontractors to pay their
employees a set minimum wage. They can also exclude those tenderers and
subcontractors who are unwilling to respect that minimum wage level.
In summary, the case law of the European Court of Justice has contributed to
progressively clarify the provisions of the EU regulatory framework (see Annex II for a
summary of recent case law).
The case law of the Court is nevertheless, by definition, unpredictable since it depends on
the number and nature of the cases brought before the Court. Moreover, the Court can
clarify but not amend the provisions of the Directive.
2.6.
EU Right to Act
A regulative framework for posting of workers between Member States can only be
established at EU level. The aims are to facilitate the cross-border provision of services
through posting of workers by improving the clarity and transparency of applicable
labour market rules in the host Member State(s) of posted workers; to ensure a level
playing field for competition in the provision of services between posting companies and
local companies in the host Member State, while ensuring that posted workers have an
adequate level of protection while working in the host Member State.
31
RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt Landau in der Pfalz (C-115/14)
19
EU action in the form of a Directive is warranted to encourage the freedom to provide
services across borders on the basis of article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU).
The Directive currently provides for a uniform and EU-wide regulative framework
setting a hard core of protective rules of the host Member State which need to be applied
to posted workers, irrespective of their substance. Therefore, in full respect of the
principle of subsidiarity, the Member States and the social partners at the appropriate
level remain responsible for establishing their labour legislation, organising wage-setting
systems and determining the level of remuneration and its constituent elements, in
accordance with national law and practices. The envisaged initiative does not change this
approach. It thus respects the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and does not
interfere with the competence of national authorities and social partners.
The proposed policy options respect the limits laid down in primary EU law and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Proportionality is one of the factors against which the
developed policy options have been assessed. The principle of equal treatment, including
on pay, is enshrined in Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is also at
the core of EU secondary law on fixed-term contracts, part-time work or temporary
agency work. More recently, the EU has developed a consistent legal acquis on equal
treatment, including pay, in matters such as racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation.
3. OBJECTIVES
3.1. General Policy Objective
The general objective is to ensure the smooth functioning of the Internal Market by
adapting the terms and conditions set by the 1996 Directive to the new economic and
labour market conditions, diverting the basis of competition away from wage costs and
workers' working conditions and thereby increasing the fairness of the Internal Market.
3.2. Specific objectives
The specific objectives that correspond to the problems identified are to:
•
create a level playing field for the cross-border provision of services through
equal rules on wages applicable to posted and to local workers;
•
improve the clarity of EU rules on posting by improving the consistency between
different pieces of EU legislation.
In the context of this impact assessment, the level playing field for companies is
understood as the same set of rules applying for the remuneration of labour within a
20
given Member State, which generates equal opportunities for companies. The scope of a
level playing field to other elements such as taxes, legal form of companies, access to
loans, etc. is outside the scope of this initiative.
3.3. Coherence of the objectives with other EU policies
The targeted review of the Posting of Workers Directive figures prominently among the
initiatives proposed by the Commission to achieve the objective of a deeper and fairer
Internal Market, as one of the chief priorities for its mandate. The proposal of targeted
amendments to the Posting of Workers Directive integrates and complements the
provisions set in the Enforcement Directive, which is to be transposed by 18 June 2016.
The targeted revision of the Posting of Workers Directive will interact with the planned
revision of the Regulation on the coordination of social security systems (Reg. No.
883/2004). The revision of social security coordination rules aims at facilitating the full
exercise of citizens' mobility rights while at the same time ensuring an equitable
distribution of the financial burden among the institutions of the Member States
involved. Included in the said proposal of revision is the requirement for Member States
to certify the information contained in the Portable Documents A1, which constitute the
information basis for data on posted workers. Such provision may contribute to
improving the reliability of data on the posting of workers and the evidence-basis for
policy initiatives at national and EU level.
The amendments to the Posting of Workers Directive complement the Internal Market
Strategy aimed at enhancing transparency and simplicity of rules for EU businesses. In
the preparatory consultations led by the Commission with about 300 stakeholders, mostly
SMEs, 30% of companies providing services across borders reported problems with
existing rules on posting of workers, such as burdensome administrative requirements,
paperwork, fees and registration obligations. The lack of clarity of labour market rules in
the country of destination is also considered a relevant hindrance to cross-border service
provision, especially among SME's32. A clarification of certain rules under the Posting of
Workers Directive may positively complement the Internal Market Strategy to address
these concerns.
4. POLICY OPTIONS
To reflect the holistic character of the initiative, the policy options are presented as a
compact set of possible measures. Each option is nevertheless to be understood as
opposed to the baseline scenario.
32
European Commission, Upgrading the Single Market: more opportunities for people and business
Commission, COM(2015) 550final, 28 October 2015
21
4.1. Option 1 - No policy change: baseline scenario
The Commission does not take any initiative to revise the 1996 Posting of Workers
Directive. It monitors and evaluates the transposition of the Enforcement Directive and
takes stock of its implementation, while it is left to the case law of the European Court of
Justice to clarify the legal uncertainties in the EU regulative framework.
The entry into force of the Enforcement Directive will contribute to a better detection and
sanction of situations of fraud (letter-box companies, non-compliance with the rules of
the Member State of origin on taxes or social contributions, etc.).
The European Court of Justice could continue contributing to the clarification of the
notion of "minimum rates of pay", although this is entirely dependent on the cases
brought to the Court.
This option has the support of nine Member States33, Business Europe, UAPME, the
European representations of the metal, engineering and technology industries
(CEEMET), temporary agency work industry (Eurociett, except for issues related to the
temporary agency work sector, see below) and the Confederation of the Managers
(CEC).
4.2. Option 2: clarification of the composition of minimum rates of pay to codify the
rulings of the European Court of Justice
This option entails a revision of the 1996 Directive with the aim of codifying the case
law of the European Court of Justice, with particular reference to the case Sähköalojen
ammattiliitto ry (C-396/13). This option implies some changes to clarify the notion of
"minimum rates of pay" and its composing elements.
The revision would define that minimum rates of pay applicable to posted workers may
include, if set by the law of the Member State:
• holiday allowances;
• daily flat-rate allowances to compensate workers for disadvantages entailed by
the posting; and
• compensation for travelling time, on equal terms as local workers.
Moreover, changes would also include the recognition of different pay levels attached to
the categorisation of employees into pay groups in collective agreements, provided that
the conditions are universally binding and transparent.
A fuller list of case law is provided in Annex III.
33
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania.
22
This option codifies case law, but it would not create any additional effect on the pay
conditions applicable to posted workers with respect to the status quo. By codifying the
case-law of the Court at a certain point in time, it could prevent its development in future
cases.
4.3. Option 3: Changes to the provisions of the Directive regarding pay
4.3.1 Option 3a: Application of the same mandatory rules on remuneration for posted and
local workers
This option establishes a new balance in working conditions, including remuneration,
between posted and local workers in the host countries by removing the reference to the
"minimum" rates of pay applicable to posted workers. The pay applicable to posted
workers would thus encompass all the elements of remuneration that are paid to local
workers if they are laid down by law or by collective agreement which are generally
applicable to all similar undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or
industry concerned, or by collective agreements which have been concluded by the most
representative employers' and labour organizations at national level and which are
applied throughout national territory. In order to ensure that the rules on remuneration
applicable to posted workers are proportionate and do not impede the provision of
services, it could be specified that the applicable rules on remuneration should be all the
elements of remuneration rendered mandatory by national law, regulation or
administrative provision, collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been
declared universally applicable and/or, in the absence of a system for declaring collective
agreements or arbitration awards to be of universal application, other collective
agreements or arbitration awards within the meaning of paragraph 8 second
subparagraph, in the Member State to whose territory the worker is posted. .
This option would continue respecting the differences of wage-setting systems in Europe.
Therefore, EU Member States would be affected differently by the option.
•
In Member States in which terms and conditions of employment are set by law or by
collective agreements not universally applicable (BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LV, LT, MT,
PL, RO, SK, UK) this option would make applicable to posted workers elements of
remuneration set by law that are not so far expressly considered as part of the
"minimum rates of pay", if any, such as, for instance, of a Christmas allowance or a
compensation for work during public holidays or night work;
•
In Member States with collective agreements made universally applicable to some
sectors (IE, DE, LU) or professions (CY) or in all sectors (AT, BE, ES, FI, FR, EL,
IT, NL, PT, SI), or by nationwide collective agreements in accordance with Article
3(8) of the Directive (DK, SE), the option would add up to the pay of posted workers
elements of remuneration set by the relevant collective agreement that are not so far
23
expressly considered as part of the "minimum rates of pay". Since collective
agreements tend to be more detailed than statutory provisions on the elements of
remuneration, the option would have a higher impact than in the case above.
Elements of remuneration to be applied to posted workers are totally dependent on
the terms of each collective agreement and may include elements such as seniority
allowances, allowances and supplements for dirty, heavy or dangerous work, 13th/14th
month bonuses.
Existing provisions leaving the faculty to Member States to exempt short-term postings
of less than one month from the application of the rules on pay will not be changed34.
4.3.2. Option 3b: Extension to all sectors of the reference to erga omnes collective
agreements
The option establishes that posted workers must be granted the rates of pay laid down by
law or by collective agreement made universally applicable in all economic sectors.
The modification would overcome the current provision which establishes that the
application of collective agreements made universally applicable is currently mandatory
only for the construction sector and optional for all other sectors. This option envisages
extending the validity of universally-binding collective agreements for posted workers to
all sectors of the economy. Thus, all collective agreements applicable erga omnes would
automatically be applicable to posted workers, as well.
Member States would be differently affected by this provision.
This provision may have an impact on Member States which give generally binding force
to collectively-agreed pay rates in some sectors or professions only (DE, IE, LU, CY).
These Member States will be encouraged to extend this practice to posted workers in all
sectors.
This option would have no impact either on Member States which already extend the
validity of collective agreements to all sectors, in line with the faculty given by Article
3(10) of the 1996 Directive (AT, BE, ES, FR, EL, FI, IE, IT, NL, PT, SI); or on countries
which do not made collective agreements universally applicable (BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU,
LV, LT, MT, PL, RO, SK, UK, as well as DK, SE).
This option would go in the direction supported by seven Member States35, the European
Trade Union Confederation, and the European Builders Confederation.
34
35
Article 3 (3).
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.
24
4.4. Option 4: Adapted rules for specific situations of posting
4.4.1. Option 4a: long-term postings
Option 4a would include a provision according to which the labour law of the host
Member States applies to the employment contract of workers posted for longer than 24
months, from day one of posting.
The proposal provides that, whenever the anticipated or the effective duration of posting
exceeds 24 months, the posted worker is deemed to be carrying out his tasks habitually in
the host Member State. By application of the rules of the Rome I Regulation36, the
employment contract will be governed by the law of the host Member State37. In case of
replacement of a posted worker, this option envisages that the cumulative duration of
posting is taken into account with regard to workers who were posted for at least six
months (who would thus benefit from the application of the labour law of the host
Member State).
This provision would meet the objective of aligning the Posting of Workers Directive
with the conditions set by the Regulation on the coordination of social security systems
as regards long-term posting, thus eliminating a source of inconsistency in the EU
regulatory framework.
The proposal would tackle the distortions to competition caused by the application of
lower-standard wage rules by posting companies in host Member States in the event of
long-term postings and correct the internal inconsistency of the EU regulatory framework
as regards the definition of the temporary nature of posting.
This provision would affect workers posted to all Member States, provided that the
anticipated or effective duration of posting is longer than 24 months.
This option goes in the direction of specifying the temporary duration of posting
advocated by seven Member States, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council of
France and the Socio-Economic Council of the Netherlands, as well as by the European
Builders Confederation. The European Builders Confederation and the Economic, Social
Environmental Council of France also propose that social partners are delegated to set the
maximum duration of postings at sector level.
4.4.2. Option 4b: sub-contracting relations
This option would give Member States the faculty (but not the obligation) to provide that
the workers of any subcontractor must be granted the same remuneration as the workers
36
37
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6.
Or, in case of an express choice of the law applicable, the provisions "that cannot be derogated from
by agreement" will be applicable.
25
of the contractor, including the rules laid down in collective agreements not universally
applicable (for instance, company-level agreements) which are binding to the contractor.
To avoid discriminating against cross-border service providers, the option would provide
that Member States can only implement this principle for both national and cross-border
service providers.
This provision would add a further level of protection for posted workers in
subcontracting chains which would constitute a major change with respect to the existing
situation. The current Directive provides no specific conditions for subcontracting chains.
While this option may potentially be exercised by all Member States, an essential
precondition for it to have an impact is that the main contractor transparently applies a
not universally applicable collective agreement at any level, including company-level
agreements. The added value of this option would be more evident if applied in Member
States where collective agreements are not universally applicable or the company is the
dominant level of wage bargaining, including DK, SE, and the UK, inter alia. The option
would not affect posted workers who already benefit from more favourable conditions of
employment in accordance with their individual contract or the rules of the Member State
of origin.
4.4.3. Option 4c: Temporary agency workers
Option 4 includes the provision to render mandatory the application to cross-border
temporary agency workers of the principle of equal treatment of temporary agency
workers with respect to comparable workers in the user undertaking, set by Article 5 of
Directive 2008/104/EC.
This change would improve the consistency between the Posting of Workers Directive
and the Temporary Agency Work Directive by eliminating any source of uncertainty as
regards the application of the principle of equal treatment to agency workers.
Currently, it is up to the host Member State to decide whether it applies to these workers
the general rules on posting (i.e. minimum rates of pay laid down in law or erga omnes
collective agreements) or the terms and conditions of employment that are applicable to
temporary agency workers at national level.
The option only concerns temporary agency workers assigned by temporary agencies
established in a different Member State than the user undertaking. The main receiving
Member States have made use of the possibility to provide for equal treatment between
national and cross-border temporary agents. The option would require legislative
amendments in AT, CY, EE, EL, FI, HR, HU, IE, LV, PL, PT, SI, and SK.
26
While no stakeholder has expressed any explicit position on this option, Eurociett has
supported the principle of equal pay for equal work for posted agency workers and the
application of the full set of regulations in the Temporary Agency Work Directive to
posted agency workers. General favour for an EU initiative on posted agency workers
has also been expressed by the European Trade Union Conference, the European
Builders Confederation, and the Economic, Social and Environmental Council of France.
4.5. Discarded options
4.5.1 Communication by the Commission to clarify the elements of remuneration
applicable to posted workers
This option would envisage an interpretative Communication which builds on the case
law of the European Court of Justice to clarify the elements of remuneration applicable to
posted workers across the EU Member States.
However, considering the wide range of views on this issue, a non-legislative option
would have a very limited impact and would not attain the objectives of ensuring the
fairness of posting and of increasing legal clarity for companies, workers and public
authorities.
4.5.2. Introduction of equal pay for equal work with respect to a reference undertaking
This option would envisage the introduction of the principle of equal pay for equal work
at company level by requiring that posted workers are guaranteed the terms and
conditions of employment covering remuneration that would be applicable if the posted
workers were employed by a reference undertaking or, in its absence, a similar
undertaking established in the host Member State. In the case of a subcontracting chain,
the proposal would imply that the posted workers should receive the same remuneration
treatment as the employees of the contractor established in the host Member State of
which the service provider is a direct or an indirect subcontractor (hereafter the
"reference undertaking").
This proposal may be most effective to attain the objective of providing equal treatment
to posted workers since it would ensure full equal treatment for posted workers compared
with workers of the undertaking of reference. However, it risks failing the test of
proportionality and compatibility with the Internal Market, as it would create more
obligation on companies posting workers from other Member States than on local
companies in the host Member State. Moreover, the complexity of the mechanism of
identifying a reference or similar undertaking may increase the risk of judicial litigation
in the implementation phase.
27
4.5.3. Clarification of the application of the Directive to the road transport sector
This option would consist in defining that the application of the Directive to international
transport operations other than cabotage (which is always covered by the Directive)
requires the existence of a sufficient link with the host Member States. In order to
provide a high level of legal certainty, the criteria to determine the existence of a
sufficient link should be expressly set out. In any case, given that cabotage falls in any
case within the scope of the Directive, international transport operations combined with a
cabotage operation should also fall within the scope of the Directive. For other
international transport operations, the sufficient link should be expressed in the number
of transport operations in a given Member State within a reference period (one month, for
instance) or in any other way that is applicable in practice and enforceable in the host
Member State.
This option would be effective to achieve the objectives of providing a more balanced
playing field in the transport sector and enhance legal clarity for companies. However, as
more evidence is required in order to establish an adequate definition of a "sufficient
link" as regards to international transport operations, a sector-specific regulation is
deemed more suitable to tackle the problem.
4.5.4. Intra-group posting
This option would concern workers posted between two establishments or undertakings
of the same group, established in two Member States. It would provide that the
remuneration of these posted workers is not less favourable than the remuneration
granted to workers employed in the establishment or undertaking where the workers has
been posted occupying comparable positions.
This option would aim at aligning the protection granted to EU nationals and thirdcountry nationals in case of intra-corporate posting by extending equal treatment to
posted workers, in line with Directive 2014/66/EU. However, the option has been
discarded because it would be an obstacle to the free provision of services which would
not be justified and proportionate.
The Court has recognised that the protection of workers is an overriding objective of
general interest that can justify obstacles to the provision of services on condition that it
is appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the legitimate objective or objectives
pursued and that it proportionate, i.e., that it does not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objective. This option cannot be seen as necessary for the protection of
posted workers and would, in any case, go beyond what is necessary to reach the
objective.
28
5. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE POLICY OPTIONS
This section summarises the economic and social impacts of each policy option. No
environmental impact has been identified. The analysis includes an evaluation of the
specific impact of the proposals on small and medium enterprises (SME's).
As noted in section 2.1, one fundamental caveat to the analysis of the impact is the scarce
availability of data. To partially compensate for this, a multiplicity of sources of
qualitative evidence has been used, based on stakeholders' assessment of the situation in
particular sectors and workplaces. Where possible, national data sources have been used
to complement EU data, in the understanding that national sources are not representative
of other Member States. Finally, proxies have extensively been used to simulate the
impact of the proposed provisions on remuneration levels, as well as on the economic
value of posting.
5.1. Effectiveness
The analysis of effectiveness addresses the degree to which the options achieve the
specific objectives of the revision of the Directive: create a level playing field for
companies based on equal rules on wages; and improve the clarity of EU rules on
posting, including by eliminating inconsistencies between different pieces of EU
legislation.
5.1.1. Create a level playing field for companies based on equal rules on wages
Under options 1 and 2, differentials in rules on wages with posted workers may narrow
as a consequence of the recent case law of the European Court of Justice, most notably
the case Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry (C-396/13), establishing that some allowances may
be part of the pay of posted workers and that pay groups set by universally binding
collective agreements should be respected for posted workers. The impact is expected to
be significant especially in the construction sector, where collective agreements are a key
source to determine the wage level of posted workers, either because they are declared
universally binding or because they are signed by the most representative employers' and
workers' associations in accordance with Article 3(8) of the Directive (see table 1). In
those countries, the respect of pay groups may imply some wage raises, if –as reported by
some stakeholders – employers tend to apply only the lowest pay group, under the status
quo38. However, posted workers will still be entitled to minimum pay rates only, while
the application of the Court's case law would have no impact on sectors and in countries
where collective agreements are not binding. Therefore, the structural differentiation in
pay rates and the resulting distortion of competitive conditions will persist.
38
See section 5.2
29
Table 1. Sources of minimum rates of pay for posting of workers in the EU 28
Statutory
Binding collective agreements
Nationwide
minimum wage
agreements (Art.
Selected sectors
All sectors
3(8)
or professions
BG, CZ, EE, HR,
HU, LV, LT, MT,
PL, RO, SK, UK
DE, IE, LU, CY
AT, BE, ES, FR, EL,
FL, IT, NL, PT, SI
DK, SE
Note: In DE, the sector-specific wage minima apply in fourteen sectors (waste management, training
services, construction industry, roofing trade, electrical trades, industrial cleaning services, money and
valuable services, scaffolding erection, agriculture, forestry and horticulture, painting and decorating
trades, care provision, slaughter and meat processing, stonemason and stone sculptor, the textile and
clothing industry, laundry services and temporary agency work sector). In LU, collective agreements are
universally binding in the main nine sectors of posting (building and associated trades, transport, road
haulage and road passenger transport; cleaning of buildings; security guarding; brewing; printing; banking
and insurance; social sector and care; temporary agency work). In IE, Employment Regulation Orders with
statutory effects are currently in place in the catering, contract cleaning, hairdressing, hotels, retail and
trades and in the security industry sectors. In CY, minimum wages have statutory effects for some
professions only, namely shop assistants, clerks, child-care workers, personal care workers, security
guards, and cleaners at business/corporate premises.
Option 3a and 3b would establish equal rules on remuneration and extend the
effectiveness of universally binding collective agreements to workers posted in all
economic sectors. By overcoming the "minimum rates of pay" standard set by the current
Directive, this option would achieve the utmost degree of effectiveness in attaining the
objective of levelling the playing field as regards wage rules. Through the extension of
the validity of universally binding collective agreements to all sectors beyond the
construction sector, which is currently not mandatory, this option reinforces the wagesetting instruments to determine the rates of pay of posted workers. In several Member
States, including among the largest recipients, the provision would have no impact as
collective agreements are already enforced erga omnes in all sectors (see table 1). An
impact may be exerted on DE, IE, LU and CY. These Member States will need to extend
to posted workers those wage rates at sector- or professional level which they decide to
declare universally binding in all sectors, while this is currently compulsory only for the
construction sector. Obviously, the decision on whether or not to make a collective
agreement legally binding will continue to rest with the Member States. This option
would not affect Member States in which collective agreements are not universally
binding and only the statutory minimum wage is applicable to posted workers, unless
they regulate to this effect. Likewise, this option would not have any effect on the wagesetting regimes of DK and SE in those sectors where nationwide collective agreements
do not set any remuneration standard.
30
Option 4 would reinforce the attainment of the objective of a more balanced level
playing field by filling specific legislative gaps. In particular, the equal treatment rule
would eliminate competition on wage rules among subcontractors in a production chain.
As regards to long-term posting, the application of the equal treatment principle from day
one would reduce differentials in the working conditions of long-term posted workers
and contribute to reducing wage differentials with local workers. The clarification of the
interplay between the posting of workers and the temporary agency workers directives
would improve the level playing field by aligning legislation on the working conditions
of posted temporary agency workers across the EU.
Figure 4. Summary of the impact of options on wages
Wage conditions
Equal treatment
Suppression
of
the
reference to minimum
Universal
collective
agreement applicable in all
sectors
Universal
collective
agreement, minimum level
for
construction
and
optional for other sectors
Legal Minimum wage
Options 1 & 2
Option 3
Option 4
Optional for temporary
agency workers
Optional for temporary
agency workers
Temporary agency, Longterm
Optional / subcontracting
All the Member States
AT, BE, CY, DE, ES, FR,
EL, FI, IE, IT, LU, NL,
PT, SI
AT, BE, CY*, DE**, ES,
FR, EL, FI, IE***, IT,
LU****, NL, PT, SI
AT, BE, CY, DE*, ES,
FR, EL, FI, IE**, IT,
LU***, NL, PT, SI
BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU,
LV, LT, MT, PL, RO,
SK, UK
BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU,
LV, LT, MT, PL, RO,
SK, UK
Collective agreements (art.
SE, DK
SE, DK
3(8))
* for 6 professions ** in 14 sectors *** in 6 sectors **** in 9 sectors
BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU,
LV, LT, MT, PL, RO,
SK, UK
SE, DK
5.1.2. Improve the clarity of EU rules on posting
Under option 1, legal clarification is left to the pronouncements of the European Court of
Justice upon the occurrence of judicial litigation on selected aspects. As shown in Annex
III, the Court's jurisprudence has clarified the concept and composition of pay on several
occasions. However, delegating finding a solution for the problems identified to the
Court implies the permanence of uncertainty for companies and workers until the
occurrence of a case of judicial litigation. The risk of further judicial litigation on issues
of pay, among other aspects, and the related costs for businesses and workers, cannot be
prevented through non-action.
Option 2 brings some added value with respect to option 1. By modifying the EU
Directive to reflect the rulings of the Court of Justice, this option would increase the
clarity of the main EU legislative source. However, it would not tackle the identified
legal situation with temporary agency work, subcontracting, long-term posting, and intra31
group transfers; nor would this option prevent further cases of judicial litigation on the
components of pay emerging again in the future.
Options 3a and 3b contribute to improving clarity on the constituent elements of
remuneration and to reducing existing cross-sector differences in the mandatory
application of collective agreements. First, by equalising the rules on remuneration
between posted and local workers, this option would clear any room for interpretation on
the constituent elements of the wage to be applied to posted workers. It would thus
contribute to minimising the risk of further judicial litigation on this very point. Second,
the option would increase the certainty that the minimum pay set by all universally
binding collective agreements apply to posted workers, regardless of their sector of
employment. Within the scope of EU competences, however, the provision would not
harmonise the set of instruments applicable to posted workers across the Member States,
nor the diverse structure of collective agreements, including the definition of pay groups
and bonuses and allowances, which remain a prerogative of the social partners in national
wage-setting practices.
Option 4 contributes to legal clarity by intervening on specific situations by removing
mismatches with other pieces of EU legislation. The thrust of option 4 reaches out to
posted employees in subcontracting chains, in line with the attention conferred by the
2014 Enforcement Directive. The advantage of this option is that it would extend the
applicability of company-level agreements in Denmark and Sweden where these are the
predominant source of wage-setting, thus filling a legislative gap in the existing
Directive. Further contributions to the legal clarity stem from aligning pieces of EU
legislation in the case of long-term posting (with Regulation No. 883/2004) and
temporary agency work (with Directive 2008/104/EC), by establishing similar rules
between posted workers and third-country nationals.
5.2. Overall economic impacts
The economic impact of the options is assessed against the objectives of promoting a
level playing field in the context of the Internal Market based on the application of equal
rules on wages, and of improving legal clarity for companies.
Limited labour market and economic significance
The economic context of posting of workers is one of a rather limited significance in the
national labour markets, with the number of postings accounting for 0.7% of total EU
employment, descending to 0.4% if only unique posted workers are counted and further
down to only 0.2% in full-time equivalents39. Overall, the employment impact of new
39
Postings make up 0.7% of total EU employment, but the figure includes single workers being posted
multiple times during the same year. Therefore, unique persons are normally the more comparable
figure but only a few member States provide data. See Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015)
32
legislation may be circumscribed to specific segments of the European labour market,
including in those Member States where posting represents significant shares of the
domestic employment population, such as Slovenia (11.5%) and Luxembourg (20.7%)
from a sending perspective40, and Belgium (3.6%) and Luxembourg (9%) from a
receiving perspective.
The provision of cross-border services through posting of workers may be thus assumed
to have a limited economic impact on sending or receiving countries. In the absence of
any data on the turnover or added value gained through posting of workers, figures can
only be reconstructed via proxies. To take the representative construction sector, crossborder services represent an overall small share of total turnover in the sector (calculated
as the ratio of turnover from export activities on total turnover), amounting to just 0.7%
of total turnover in the EU28 (figure 11, Annex II)41. Exceptions are SI, EE, DK and LU,
where the cross-border trade intensity makes up about 5% of total turnover. It should be
noticed however that not all cross-border construction services are carried out through
posting of workers (e.g. they could be carried out by hiring local workforce).
Two posting models
The wage rules set by the Directive impact differently on the economic context in which
posting takes place. Posted workers tend to support the provision of labour-intensive
services in the context of low value chains, including construction, transports and some
personal services. Labour cost differentials give a competitive edge to posting companies
which thus tend to strictly apply the minimum rate of pay required in the host country.
Wage cost competition is particularly relevant as posted workers support the provision of
domestically-provided services which cannot be delocalised. On the other hand, posted
workers are also employed in the context of the provision of high-productivity services,
such as financial services or of particularly skilled labour in high value chains. In line
with the possibilities given by the Directive, this segment of posted workers tends to be
paid higher wages than the minimum, or at the level of the home country if this has
higher wage standards than the receiving country42.
Wage-based competition does not exhaust the phenomenon of posting of workers in the
EU. Empirical evidence points to the fact that, while labour cost differentials remain one
important driver of posting43, there is no strict correlation between price level or tax
wedge differentials and the volume of sent posted workers (figure 12 and 13, Annex II).
40
41
42
43
Taking into account unique persons posted, however, the labour market impact of sent posted workers
decreases to 4.2% of total employment in Slovenia and 4.7% in Luxembourg (Pacolet and De
Wispelaere 2015). As noted in footnote (39), this implies that single workers are posted multiple times
during the same year.
See also, European Commission, A Single Market Strategy for Europe - Analysis and Evidence,
SWD(2015) 202 final, 28 October 2015.
ISMERI Europe (2011) and FGB (2015).
ISMERI Europe (2011).
33
This is because in high value chains skills shortages or factors such as specialisation or
quality of the service play an important role in the cross-border provision of services.
Wage cost differentials may be estimated to be the driving factor of flows from low- to
high-wage countries, which represented one third of the total stock in 2014, and part of
the comparative advantage for a further 15% of workers being posted from medium- to
high-wage countries (figure 5). However, the remaining 50% of postings flow between
countries with similar wage levels, where it can be assumed that the search for adequate
skills rather than cost reductions constitute the main trigger for businesses to look for
cross-border service providers. In this case, the wage rules set by the Directive are not
reported by the stakeholders to create any particular problem.
Figure 5. Flow of postings between EU Member States divided by wage group (high,
medium, low), % on total posting, year 2014
Notes: EMPL calculations. High-wage (above EU average wage, year 2012): DK, LU, SE, FI, BE, NL,
DE, FR, AT, IT, IE; Medium-wage (around EU average, 2012): CY, ES, EL, MT, SI, PT; Low-wage (less
than half of the EU average wage): HR, CZ, EE, PL, SK, HU, LV, LT, RO, BG; no data on the destination
of postings from CY, DK, and the UK.
Posting of workers tends to be pro-cyclical, satisfying demand for services in more
dynamic economies and contracting in the event of a downturn, which is reflected in the
correlation between the number of postings and overall economic growth (figure 15,
Annex II). However, the possibility for posting companies to wage costs through the
current rules promotes the deepening of specialisation of low-wage countries in the
provision of labour-intensive services in low value chains, most notably construction
services, to high-wage countries. Figure 6 shows that 70% of postings from low-wage
member States occur in industry and construction sectors, as compared to about 50% and
40% of postings from medium- and high-wage countries, respectively. Posting rules thus
favour a strong role of wage-based competition in these services markets. Minimum34
standard rules on wages add up to differentials in labour and income taxation between
Member States and generate significant gaps in total labour costs for employers44.
Figure 6. Posted workers sent in 2014, breakdown by economic sector and group of
countries
Source: EMPL calculations on Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015); High-wage (above EU average wage,
year 2012): DK, LU, SE, FI, BE, NL, DE, FR, AT, IT, IE; Medium-wage (around EU average, 2012): CY,
ES, EL, MT, SI, PT; Low-wage (less than half of the EU average wage): HR, CZ, EE, PL, SK, HU, LV,
LT, RO, BG; no data on the destination of postings from CY, DK, and the UK.
Concentrated impact on receiving country
On the receiving end, current rules favour flows of posted workers into a set of highwage economies, with DE, FR, BE, AT, NL receiving 81% of workers posted from lowwage countries, and a few economic sectors, most notably the construction sector (figure
15). In this sector, posted workers represent up to 20% of domestic employment in BE,
and over 10% in AT and LU (figure 6, Annex II)
The labour market impact of the in-flow of workers to which lower pay rules apply in
high-wage Member States is not univocal, although data limitation constrains in-depth
analysis. There is some evidence that posted workers complement domestic employment
in the whole economy by filling job vacancies for skills or positions which are not
44
While nominal social security contribution rates or corporate or income tax rates may not differ widely
(see figures 16-19 in Annex II), the labour cost gap is more relevant the lower the reference wage.
35
present in the domestic labour market45. However, while this seems to be the case of
workers posted in high value chains, a closer analysis of posting in low value chains in a
representative receiving Member State such as Belgium shows that potential substitution
effects have been at play. Figure 7 shows the share of posted workers in the construction
sector increasing since 2010 with overall domestic construction employment decreasing
at the same time.
Figure 7. Belgium, trends in employment, self-employment and posted workers, all
economy and construction sector, 2010-2014.
Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2016) calculations on LIMOSA and BNB data
In other Member States, domestic employment growth remains subdued with respect to
the growth of received posted workers. In this perspective, posted workers risk crowding
out especially national low-skilled jobs with which they compete in the receiving market
(figure 20, Annex II).
Under option 1 (baseline scenario) and largely under option 2, unchanged rules would
be likely to provide the context for the growth of posting of workers at a steady pace with
respect to recent years in line with economic growth.
45
Della Pellegrina, L. and Saraceno, M. (2013), "Posted workers: complements or substitutes for local
employment? Empirical evidence from the EU", Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper n. 136
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2287841).
36
Option 3a and option 3b are expected to have an impact on raising the wage level of
posted workers, particularly those posted from low-wage, and to a lesser extent from
medium-wage Member States to high-wage Member States.
The application of equal rules on wages (option 3a) would imply that posted workers
would be entitled to all elements of remuneration laid down by law or by universally
applicable collective agreement. The quantification of possible wage increases is very
difficult, as bonuses and allowances strongly vary across the member States and sectoral
collective agreement (see Annex VI). On the basis of the distribution displayed in figure
5 for the year 2014, option 3a can be estimated to affect between around 700,000 to
900,000 workers being posted from low- to high-wage countries, and to a lesser extent,
from medium- to high-wage countries which are assumed to receive the minimum rate of
pay under the current scenario. The elimination of the reference to "minimum rates of
pay" will facilitate the application of the Directive to the industrial relations systems of
DK and SE by overcoming the problems related to the definition of "minima" which
were among the causes of the dispute in the Laval case. Nevertheless, option 3a would
affect workers posted to DK and SE only to the extent that nationwide collective
agreements between the most representative social partners set remuneration standards,
in the absence of both a statutory minimum wage and universally applicable collective
agreements. The option would not affect workers being posted from high- to lower-wage
countries, as they are reported to usually be paid the same wage levels as in their home
Member State.
Option 3b may potentially affect only workers posted from lower-wage countries to the
Member States which currently give statutory effect to collective agreements only in a
selected number of sectors, most notably DE, IE and LU. The potential beneficiaries
would be up to 300,000 workers46. Workers in sectors currently excluded from the
application of sectoral minimum pay may benefit from the increased protection of
applicable agreements.
By increasing the reach of equal rules on wages to workers posted from low-wage
countries, the main economic impact of options 3a and 3b would principally be on
labour-intensive services in low value chains but will remain limited. From the receiving
perspective, local companies in high-wage Member States, especially cost-sensitive small
and medium enterprises (SME's), would benefit from a more balanced level playing field
vis-à-vis posting companies from lower-wage countries, thus increasing their cost
competitiveness. However, it should be emphasised that equal rules on wages would
translate neither into equal nominal wages between posted and local workers, nor into
equal levels of labour costs. While the current gap in wage outcomes would narrow
46
The number overlaps with workers affected by option 3a. It refers to workers posted from lower wage
countries to DE, IE, LU and CY. However, available data do not allow to disaggregating information
to the level of detail necessary to know how many of those 300,000 are already covered by sectoral
collective agreements.
37
down, pay structures would remain differentiated more in line with wage distribution in
the domestic labour market of the receiving Member State. Furthermore, social security
and other tax differentials would still generate an advantage on total labour costs for
companies established in countries with lower nominal rates than those in the receiving
one. The simulation carried out in Annex IV shows that companies from high-tax
Member States (e.g. BE or FR) would still be at a cost disadvantage with respect to
posting companies from low-tax countries, even in an extreme situation of equalisation of
wage costs (which is part of the discarded option)47.
For the same reasons, from a sending perspective, the cost competitiveness of posting
companies in labour-intensive sectors established in low-wage Member States would be
reduced with respect to the baseline scenario, but it would not be eliminated by options
3a and 3b. Tax differentials would still play a role in determining lower total labour
costs. On the one hand, stricter rules on wages may have an adverse impact especially on
SME's providing cross-border services in sectors such as constructions with the risk of a
possible loss of business opportunities. On the other hand, option 3a would have the
advantage of enhancing legal clarity as concerns the elements of remuneration applicable
to posted workers, which are currently a possible object of dispute and legal action. On a
more macro-level, higher wage costs may drive companies established in low-wage
Member States to invest in non-cost factors to open markets, such as the skills of their
workforce and service innovation. In the long-run, the effect of equal rules on wages may
contribute to shifting economic specialisation towards higher value chains.
Within the Internal Market, consumers of construction services may possibly be affected
by price increases. However, the effect on prices would be unlikely to be automatic, as
the limited increase of wage costs may simply reduce the mark-ups of construction firms
which are estimated to be relatively higher in sending countries such as CZ, PL, SK and
PT48.
Lower-wage service providers to DK and SE would not be affected by option 3a and 3b.
At the same time, posting of workers in more capital-intensive sectors such as high-end
manufacturing, telecommunications and technological services are expected to be less
affected by the modification of the Directive, to the extent that posting in these sectors is
mainly motivated by the search for adequate skills which are not present in the domestic
market.
The application of equal treatment envisaged by option 4a and 4b is expected to have a
strong impact on levelling the playing field in cases of long-term postings and posting in
47
48
K. Maslauskaite, Posted workers in the EU: State of Play and regulatory evolution, Notre Europe,
Policy paper 107, 2014 (http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/postedworkers-maslauskaite-ne-jdimar14.pdf?pdf=ok).
See Molnar, M. and Bottini, N. (2010), How Large are Competitive Pressures in Services Markets?
Estimation of Mark-Ups for Selected OECD countries, OECD Journal: Economic Studies (2010),
http://www.oecd.org/eco/reform/49850122.pdf
38
the context of subcontracting, albeit on a limited segment of posting. They also
contribute to improving legal clarity though fine-tuning different pieces of EU
legislation, thus avoiding the risk of judicial litigation.
Option 4a would add the reduction of differentials in working conditions, including
equal rules on wages, to the alignment of labour taxation costs envisaged for long-term
postings by Regulation 883/2004 on social security coordination. The lack of data as
regards long-term postings does not allow the estimation of how many workers would be
affected by this option49. However, available data suggest that long-term postings may
represent a small share of total postings. The average duration of posting was 103 days in
2014, with a maximum of 257 days of workers posted from Ireland (see figure 8, Annex
II)50. Sample data from Austria find that 4-5% of total postings to that country are longer
than a year51, while the maximum length of a registered posting in France amounted to
1,288 days in a temporary agency work enterprise in 2012 but only 553 days in 201352.
In the construction sector, the maximum duration of postings is reported to be seldom
longer than 6 months53. Therefore, it can be concluded that, while substantial, the
changes introduced by option 4a would be circumscribed to a limited group of posted
workers.
The impact of this option on the reduction of labour cost differentials would be more
significant with respect to long-term postings from low-wage and high-wage countries.
The margins for competition on labour costs for sending companies from lower-wage
countries, in particular SME's, in low value chains would be reduced, as an effect of the
application of equal rules on wages, as well as of the labour law provisions of the host
Member State. On the other hand, local companies in receiving Member States would
increase their cost competitiveness on more ambitious service provisions, and shift the
determining competitiveness conditions on non-cost factors.
Option 4b would be optional for Member States to introduce in order to reduce the scope
of wage cost competition in sub-contracting chains. The relevant feature of this option is
that it provides the possibility to apply the rules on remuneration applicable to the main
contractor to any subcontractor, including rules stemming from non-universally
applicable collective agreements, for instance at company level, if the main contractor is
49
50
51
52
53
As recalled above, PD A1 forms are not issued for postings up to 24 months, as beyond that duration
posted workers are socially insured in the host country.
J. Pacolet and F. De Wispelaere, Posting of Workers. Report on A1 portable document issued in 2014,
December 2015.
L&R Sozialforschung, Entwicklungen im Bereich des Lohndumpings, Wien, May 2014
(http://www.lrsocialresearch.at/sozialforschung/archiv-de/591Entwicklungen+im+Bereich+des+Lohndumpings).
DGT, Analyse des declarations de detachement des enterprises prestataires de services en France en
2013, November 2014 (http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Bilan_PSI_2013.pdf).
According to data on Germany provided by SOKA Bau, 90% of postings in the construction sector
lasted less than six months, FGB (2015), Country Report, Germany. See also European Builders'
Confederation, Open Letter on Posting of Workers, 5 October 2015.
39
bound by one. Therefore, this option may have an effect on all wage-setting systems,
including DK and SE, as well as Member States with full wage decentralisation, such as
the UK. Despite the fact that sub-contracting is reported to be a wide-spread practice in a
number of sectors, including construction, cleaning, and manufacturing industries, there
is no data which allows to estimating the number of workers involved. According to
Eurostat figures, in 2011, the relevance of payments to subcontractors in the construction
sector amounted to over 30% of turnover in the UK, SK, and CZ and to less than 15% in
RO, PT, DK, and IT (figure 11, Annex II). Based on the assumption that subcontracting
mainly involves low-skilled workers in low-wage and labour intensive sectors54, it could
be estimated that the potential range of workers affected may fall in the range of up to
676,300 postings in 2014, including workers posted in sectors such as construction,
agriculture, hunting and fishing sector, accommodation and food service activities, and
freight transport by road sector.
The application of equal treatment between posted workers in subcontracting chains with
respect to the wage rules applicable to workers at the main contractor companies would
have the effect of strongly compressing wage differentiation between the main contractor
and its sub-contractors, including both local and foreign ones. Option 4b – proposed to be
facultative for Member States to apply – would reduce the cost competitiveness
especially of SME's posting workers from low- to higher-wage countries and result in
some losses of business opportunities for companies placing their competitiveness on
cost factors. However, option 4b would still entail the payment of the social security
contributions at the rate of the country of origin, thus preserving some room of
manoeuvre on total labour costs for sending firms. While equalising the level playing
field would benefit domestic firms, especially SME's, in higher-wage countries vis-à-vis
low-wage competitors, the provision would reduce room for cost competitiveness for
local companies, as well. Final consumer prices may be pushed upwards to the extent
that the main contractor would have a reduced leverage to optimise total service costs
through competition between sub-contractors.
Option 4c targets a very limited group of posted workers. It would promote the
adaptation of rules on equal treatment for posted temporary agency workers in thirteen
Member States (figure 8). However, while these Member States are the destination of
7.5% of total posted workers in 2014, with Austria and Finland making up the lion's
share of this figure, only Portugal has a relevant share of workers posted to the country
through temporary work agencies (11.4%). Based on 2014 figures, this option may affect
up to 1,000 workers posted to the thirteen Member States requiring legislative adaptation.
In general, the regulation may have a cost-increasing impact to the extent that unclear
rules on the treatment of posted agency workers in these Member States lead to lower
working conditions standards for these workers. However, the impact would be
54
Jorens, Y., Peters, and Houwerzijl, M. (2012), Study on the protection of workers' rights in
subcontracting processes in the European Union, commissioned by DG EMPL - VC/2011/0015.
40
concentrated in countries where the agency work sector makes up low (between 4-5%) to
very low (less than 2%) shares of total in-flowing postings55.
Figure 8. % Share of temporary agency workers on total posting received, 2014
Source: EMPL, on the basis of data provided by Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015)
5.3. Overall social impacts
The social impact of the initiative is measured against the objectives of fair conditions of
competition among companies based on equal rules on wages applying to posted and
local workers in the host country; and of providing more certain rules to posted workers
and their representatives both in sending and receiving countries.
Under option 1 (status quo) and, to a large extent, option 2, unequal rules on wages
generate a segmentation between posted and local workers, affecting in particular
workers posted from low- to higher-wage countries in labour-intensive sectors. To
provide the same services, posted workers are entitled to minimum rates of pay, while the
unclear status of pay increases according to skill or qualification levels are reported to
create significant gaps in pay with equivalent domestic workers56. Wage differentials
between posted and local workers are reported to vary across member States and sectors,
from 10 up to 50% less. Unequal rules on wages may have an adverse impact on lowskilled workers in labour-intensive sectors of high-wage receiving Member States,
through downward wage competition at the local level and displacement of job
opportunities. On the other hand, wage differentials have a relatively lower impact on the
overall welfare of workers posted from low-wage to higher-wage countries to the extent
that minimum pay levels in high-wage countries exceed average take-home pay in the
55
56
Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015.
As noted already, no issue is identified with workers being posted from high to lower-wage Member
States as these tend to be paid the same wage levels as in the home country (FGB 2015). The Directive
allows for more favourable wage treatment. See also Cremers (2011), In search of cheap labour.
41
home country. As an illustrative example, in 2010, the level of the statutory minimum
wage in Belgium (EUR 1,415) was almost twice as high as the average wage of a
construction worker in Poland (EUR 752). Moreover, as shown in the simulation carried
out in Annex IV, lower social security and income tax rates in the home Member State –
where taxes are paid - may contribute to smoothing differentials in net earnings between
posted and local workers, although gaps remain significant.
The implementation of the Enforcement Directive and of the rulings of the European
Court of Justice may contribute to mitigating differentials, including through more
effective inspection systems. However, any smoothing effect would not be an intentional
consequence of clearer and more effective EU legislation either on the clarification of the
composition of pay for posted workers, or on the application of rules across different
economic sectors.
Option 2 is not expected to produce substantive changes with respect to the status quo.
The codification of the case law into the Directive may advance some steps on legal
clarity, as individual workers may access information about their entitlements about pay
from one single and clearer legal text. However, while in practical terms the rulings of
the European Court of Justice are already applicable, they only tackle part of the
problems identified and do not provide an effective solution to unequal rules on wages,
and their social consequences.
Option 3a and 3b are expected to have a relevant impact both on reducing wage
differentials between posted and local workers and on clarifying the entitlements of
posted workers across sectors.
While, as mentioned in section 5.2, these options do not aim at equal wage outcomes,
they would contribute to clarifying the entitlement of posted workers to all the
remuneration elements envisaged by universally applicable collective agreements or
agreements signed by the most representative organisations, including bonuses and
allowances, such as seniority pay or the Christmas bonus, inter alia, on equal terms as
local workers57. Option 3a is expected to exert some effects also on Member States
where rates of pay are set through statutory regulation insofar as elements of pay
mandated by law to local workers (e.g. the 13th month bonus) would become applicable
to posted workers.
Option 3b may have a beneficial effect for the social protection of workers posted from
low-wage to higher-wage countries in sectors where collective agreements are not
universally applicable. In DE, IE, LU, the statutory minimum wage represents the
minimum rate of pay in sectors in which sectoral minimum wages are not given statutory
57
FGB, Wage Study, 2015; see Annex VI for a preliminary reconstruction of the elements of wage which
would become applicable to posted workers under option 3.
42
effects. In these Member States, option 3b would promote the extension of sectoral
minima to all sectors.
On the other hand, both options entail the risk of an inflow of dependent posted work
into self-employment as a possible unintended consequence of more equal wage
standards. As collective agreements do not apply to the self-employed, companies may
find it more advantageous to recruit on independent work arrangements, falling outside
the protection scope of the Directive. In 2014, registered posted self-employed were
roughly 8% of total postings, at fairly stable levels with respect to previous years.
Nevertheless, bogus or false self-employment is reported to be a problematic issue as far
as posting is concerned, even though part of the problem source for the phenomenon rests
with labour market segmentation and enforcement of labour law in the sending Member
States58.
Options 4a would enhance the social protection of workers posted for long-term periods
with an impact on the remuneration of posted workers similar to that of option 3.
Options 4b and 4c would have a strong beneficial impact on workers posted in the
context of subcontracting chains or via temporary work agencies. The promotion of the
principle of equal treatment aims at raising the protection especially of workers posted
from low-wage Member States by conferring the entitlement to the remuneration
conditions set by company-level agreements. Especially in the case of posted agency
workers, options 4c would increase the level of protection in the thirteen countries where
the principle of equal treatment is formally not in force. However, as discussed in
section 5.2, little data availability limits the possibility to quantify the impact of these
options. Stronger enforcement tools and coordination provided for by the Enforcement
Directive would contribute to greater effectiveness of these options on the ground.
5.4. Impact on SME's
The envisaged initiative does not increase the administrative burden or costs to crossborder service providers and to SME's in particular. The issues concerning the
administrative requirements and control measures that Member States can impose on
cross-border service providers was dealt with by the Enforcement Directive (Article 9).
None of the options considered here has any impact on these aspects.
SMEs especially in receiving high-wage Member State would benefit from this initiative,
as a level playing field would enhance their capacity to compete on non-wage factors.
This beneficial effect is stressed by some SME stakeholder, as well59. In turn, possible
increases in wage costs may have some adverse effects especially on SMEs basing their
58
59
See, for instance, Cremers, In search of cheap labour, 2010; LO (Swedish Trade Union Confederation).
Beyond dreams and belief. Pictures of posting in practice and the need for an amended Posting of
Workers Directive, 2015
European Builders Confederation, Open Letter to Marianne Thyssen, 5 October 2015.
43
competitiveness on wage costs, which is reflected in the concerns of other European
stakeholder associations about the opportunity to revise the Directive60.
The costs of access to information to the conditions of remuneration applicable to posted
workers in different receiving Member States would not be substantially modified by any
of the considered options with respect to the status quo. However, option 3a would
contribute to facilitating the application of collective agreements, as these would be
applicable in their entirety, with respect to the current difficulty of identifying the
components of "minimum rates of pay".
In any case, it should be noted that Article 5 of the Enforcement Directive requires that
Member States ensure that the information on the terms and conditions of employment
which are to be applied and complied with by service providers is made generally
available free of charge in a clear, transparent, comprehensive and easily accessible way
in a single national website on posting.
5.5. Implementation costs
The revision of the 1996 Directive would not bear any implementation cost. In fact, all
implementation costs will be included in the transposition of the 2014 Enforcement
Directive, due by 18 June 2016.
In line with the dispositions of the Enforcement Directive, the Commission will assess
and evaluate the implementation and explore the enforcement mechanisms put in place
by the Member States.
Some options could diminish administrative costs, by improving legal clarity and
reducing the frequency of judicial litigation.
5.6. Budgetary Impact
No extra budgetary impact is envisaged for the implementation of the proposed revision.
As noted above, the transposition of the Enforcement Directive should comprehend all
implementation costs.
However, the proposed changes may have an impact on public budgets in the form of
extra social security revenues for sending Member States, resulting from the increase of
the wage basis on which social security charges are levied – especially for posting flows
from low- to higher-wage countries. It is estimated that social security revenues
represent, on average, 0.7% of total monthly revenues and 0.2% of total yearly revenues
60
UAPME, reply on Mobility package consultation, 25 July 2015.
44
for sending Member States, with higher values (up to an estimated 4.9% in SI) in
countries where sent posted workers represent a strong share of the domestic
workforce61. A marginal wage increase for posted workers may further benefit social
security revenues in sending Member States, even though there is a risk that possible
losses of business opportunities in receiving countries may render the effect neutral.
6. OVERALL COMPARISON OF THE OPTIONS
The table below synthetizes the main impacts of the options for different groups of
stakeholders.
Table 3. Impact on main groups and stakeholders
OPTIONS
Posted
workers
Local workers
(host country)
Posting
undertakings
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
Local
undertakings
(host country)
0
0
Public
authorities
0
0
0
0
Social
Partners
3a
no
reference
to minima
(+) equal
conditions
(++) less
downward
wage
pressure
3b
Reference
to CA
(+) equal
conditions
(++) less
downward
wage
pressure
(-) Higher
wage costs
4a.
longterm
postings
(++) equal
treatment
(++)
no
competition
on
labour
standards
(-)
Higher
wage costs
(+) level
playing
field
on
wage rules
(+) budget
impact
(++) level
playing
field
on
wage rules
(0)
(++)
level
playing field
on
labour
costs
(+) budget
impact
(+) respect
of
IR
systems
(+) respect
of
IR
systems
(0)
(-) Higher
wage costs
4b.
subcontracting
4c. temporary
Agency work
(++)
equal
wage
++ less wage
pressure
on
subcontractors
(--)
Higher
wage costs
(++)
equal
treatment
++
less
competition
on
labour
standards
(0/+) clearer
rules to be
applied
(0/+) clearer
rules to be
applied
(++)
level
playing field
on wage costs
(0)
budget
impact / adm
cost
(0)
(+)
simplification
(0)
The options are compared in terms of effectiveness in reaching the objectives, in social
and economic impact and coherence. Based on the impact analysis presented above, the
following comparison of options can be drawn.
61
De Wispelaere, F. and Pacolet, J. (2015), Impact of social security coordination and income taxation
law applicable to posted workers on welfare states: from tax competition towards upward social
convergence, KU Leuven working paper, November 2015 (https://hiva.kuleuven.be/nl/docs/workingpapers/HIVA_WP2015_01.pdf )
45
Table 4. Comparison of options
OPTIONS
1
2
3a
3b
4a. longterm
postings
4b.
subcontracting
4c. temp.
Agency
work
Objectives
Ensure fair wage
conditions to posted
workers
Ensure a level playing
field for companies
Improve legal clarity
0
0
++
+
++
++
++
0
0
++
+
++
++
++
0
+
++
+
++
+/0
++
Social impact
0
0
+
Impact
+
++
++
+
Economic impact
Budgetary impact
Cost effectiveness
0
0
0
0
0
+/0
0/+/0
++/+
+/0
++/+
-+/0
+/0
0/0
++
0/+/0
+
Option 2, codifying the case law of the European Court of Justice, has a modest impact
on improving legal clarity of the EU regulatory framework, but has no value added with
respect to the status quo.
Options 3a and 3b have an effective impact on attaining the policy objectives with an
expected high social impact and a valuable economic impact on contributing to a more
balanced level playing field. The risk of adverse impact on the competitiveness of
posting undertakings is rather limited. It does not address specific problems with the
effectiveness of the Directive on regulating particular cases of posting.
Options 4a, 4b, and 4c attain the objectives of legal clarity with a view on the current
mismatches between the Directive and different pieces of EU legislation and a level
playing field for companies as far as specific problems in the context of posting are
concerned. Option 4b may have a strong economic impact on subcontracting chains.
While effective in attaining these objectives, these options alone are not sufficient to
comprehensively address the general problems identified with the existing Directive.
A wider variety of options (communication by the Commission, equal pay, specific
intervention on the road transport sector) have been considered and discarded, as they
have been deemed inadequate or disproportionate to tackle the identified problems.
6.1 The preferred options
In light of the comparison of the options, the preferred options are a combination
between options 3 and 4. Option 3 revises the general regulatory framework of posting of
workers, while option 4 tackles specific problems related to the posting of workers.
46
As for option 3, the introduction of equal rules on the remuneration of posted workers,
coupled with the extension of the validity of universally binding collective agreements to
posted workers in all economic sectors, addresses the identified problems of
differentiated wage treatment of posted workers with respect to local workers in the host
country, and the unfair competition advantage of posting undertakings based on different
wage rules than those applicable to local companies. By removing the reference to
"minimum" rates of pay applicable to posted workers, all the elements of remuneration
legally applicable to local workers in host Member States become applicable to posted
workers, as well. Universally binding collective agreements are automatically applicable
to posted workers in all economic sectors, not only in the construction sector and
optionally in other sectors, as currently is the case.
Option 4 integrates the principles set by option 3 through the introduction of equal
treatment in a number of problematic issues which are currently unclear because of
mismatches between different pieces of EU legislation. By establishing equal treatment
on working conditions with respect to local workers in host countries in cases of postings
lasting over 24 months, the Posting of Workers Directive aligns with the regulation of
social security, thus filling a long-standing gap in EU legislation. The applicability of the
remuneration conditions set in company-level collective agreements of the main
contractor to all undertakings in a sub-contracting chain tackle the vulnerability of posted
workers in subcontracting situations in line with the 2014 Enforcement Directive. By
compulsory application to posted workers of the same rules set in the Temporary Agency
Work Directive, a legislative mismatch is corrected for the benefit of legal clarity and
improved consistency of the EU regulatory framework.
Table 5. Summary of expected impact of the selected options
Content
3a
Impact
Minimum rates of pay replaced by Member States affected: AT, BE, DK, ES, FI, FR, EL, IT,
a reference to remuneration.
NL, PT, SE, SI
(Inclusion of additional elements Impact on workers: additional remuneration elements for
into the remuneration such as about 700,000 to 900,000 posted workers
seniority allowance, 13th, 14th
Impact on companies: more level playing field in
month bonuses)
receiving countries, limited impact on wage
competitiveness of sending companies
Impact on budget: higher social security revenues for
sending Member States.
3b
Extension of the reference to Member States affected: DE, LU, IE, CY
extended collective agreements to
Impact on workers: higher pay rates for about 300,000
all sectors (not only construction)
posted workers affected (2014 data);
Impact on companies: more level playing field in
receiving countries, limited impact on wage
competitiveness of sending companies.
Impact on budget: higher social security revenues for
47
sending Member States
4a
Application of labour law of the Member States affected: all
host MS for posting with duration
Impact on workers: no clear data, estimated marginal
higher than 24 months
share of total posted workers;
Impact on companies: level playing field in the receiving
countries, reduced margins of competition on labour costs.
Impact on budget: none
Member States affected: all (optional)
4b
Impact on workers: no clear data. Equal pay rates with
respect to workers at main contractor estimated up to
Possibility to introduce equal
700,000 workers;
treatment in subcontracting chains
Impact on companies: level playing field in receiving
countries, significant impact on wage competitiveness of
sending companies
Impact on budget: none
4c
Equal
treatment
for
temporary agency workers
posted Member States affected: AT, CY, EE, EL, FI, HR, HU, IE,
LV, PL, PT, SI, SK;
Same conditions for cross-border Impact on workers: up to 1,000 posted agency workers to
and national temporary agency MS requiring legislative adaptation;
workers
Impact on companies: higher pay rates for sending
companies in line with work agencies in the receiving
country
Impact on budget: none
7. EVALUATION AND MONITORING
Monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the preferred options consist of a number of
inter-related processes.
7.1. Monitoring
The Commission will monitor the transposition of the Enforcement Directive and its
implementation in the Member States. No later than June 2019, the Commission is
expected to submit a report on the application and implementation of the Enforcement
Directive. Further implementation reports by the Commission will include aspects related
to the revised Posting of Workers Directive in the future.
The Expert Committee on Posting of Workers (ECPW) regularly scrutinises and
discusses various problems related to the Directive. Albeit not constituting a proper
48
monitoring committee, the ECPW can give an important contribution to the transposition
of the revised Directive and to the analysis of its impact over the years.
The improvement of the information contained in the Portable Documents A1 – which is
included in the revision of the Regulation on social security coordination presented by
the Commission in the 2015 Mobility Package – will be key to enhancing the reliability
of the information basis to monitor the dynamics of the posting of workers phenomenon.
On the basis of evidence provided by the PD A1 forms, the Commission will continue to
produce yearly reports on the flows of posted workers throughout the EU Member States,
to be presented and discussed in the ECPW. At the same time, the possible set-up by
some Member States of more extensive control systems and data bases concerning the inflow of posted workers in their countries, as provided for by the 2014 Enforcement
Directive, will further contribute to monitor aspects of the revised Directive for which
data reliability has been found problematic. The newly established European Platform to
enhance cooperation in tackling undeclared work will contribute with its work to monitor
abuse of the posting of workers' rules.
The Commission will also promote independent studies, including in collaboration with
the social partners and the EU sectoral dialogue, to survey sector-specific aspects of the
directive, including the application of wage rules and of other working conditions such as
working time, and duration of postings.
7.2. Evaluation
The Commission will proceed to a fully-fledged evaluation of the impact of the revised
Directive five years after the deadline for transposition. The evaluation report will
include an assessment of whether the operational objectives of the revised Directive have
been reached. A particular focus will be cast on the application of the "equal pay for
equal work" principle, its economic effects on the competitiveness of sending enterprises
and flow of posted workers, and sector-specific issues in the temporary agency work
industry and road transport sector, among others. This evaluation report will be
developed by the Commission with the assistance of external experts, on the basis of
terms of reference developed by the Commission services. Stakeholders will be informed
of and consulted to comment on the terms of reference through the ECPW, and they will
also be regularly informed of the progress of the evaluation and its findings. The
evaluation report will be made public.
49
ANNEX I. - SUMMARY OF THE POSITIONS EXPRESSED BY THE MEMBER STATES AND
THE STAKEHOLDERS
The targeted review of the 1996 Posting of Workers Directive has been the object of a
roundtable with the social partners and non-governmental organisations, which was held
on 22 July 2015 to identify the main remaining problems beyond the transposition of the
Enforcement Directive and discuss the possible necessity for further EU action. While
the messages conveyed by the social partners and other stakeholders' organisations on
that occasion addressed the main issues of the Directive in a more general way, the social
partners and some Member States followed up with written position papers with more
precise policy preferences later on.
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden have
claimed support for a modernisation of the Posting of Workers Directive establishing the
principle of 'equal pay for equal work in the same place'62. These Member States
suggested that the provisions regarding working and social conditions, most notably
including remuneration, applicable to posted workers should be amended and widened;
the set-up of a maximum duration limit to postings should be considered, with particular
regard to aligning provisions with the EU Regulation on coordination of social security;
the applicable conditions to the road transport sector should be clarified; the information
basis contained in the Portable Documents A1 should be strengthened in its reliability;
cross-border cooperation between inspection services should be improved; and a study on
the extent and impact of bogus self-employment in the context of posting should be
promoted.
In a separate opinion, the French authorities have proposed to reinforce the core rights
granted to posted workers with a view to including an obligation for the posting
employer to pay for lodging expenses and any other cost incurred by the worker in the
context of posting; to establish a minimum and a maximum duration period for postings;
to tackle double postings of temporary agency workers; to extend the mechanism of joint
liability currently applying to the construction sector to all other sectors; to clarify the
application of the Directive to the road transport sector, most notably as regards the
mechanism of joint liability; and to establish an EU-level structure of cooperation and
coordination of labour inspectorates and authorities to facilitate controls on postings.63
On top of this, the French Economic, Social and Environmental Committee proposed to
delegate to the European social partners at sectoral level the establishment of a maximum
duration cap on postings; to limit the possibilities to post a worker to the Member State in
62
63
Letter to Marianne Thyssen, Luxembourg 18 June 2015.
Note des Autorités Françaises, 30 September 2015.
50
which he or she habitually resides and to establish a minimum of three months of
affiliation to the social security system of a country before a worker can be posted.64
The Socio-Economic Council of the Netherlands also has advised to consider the
introduction of an explicit limit to the temporariness of posting, as well as to clarify other
concepts such as wage elements and untaxed allowances, and other applicable working
conditions to posted workers.65
The European Parliament is discussing a draft Resolution66 which calls to addressing
regulatory gaps with a view to implementing the principle of "equal pay and equal social
protection for the same work". The draft Resolution proposes to extend the legal basis of
the Posting of Workers Directive beyond the freedom of movement and to provide
services, to the social policy chapter (Articles 151 and 153 TFEU). While the draft
Resolution posits that posted workers and local workers should receive equal pay,
including by taking into consideration the role of social security contributions and
posting-specific bonuses, it also calls to limiting the maximum period of posting and
excluding temporary work agencies from the scope of the Directive. Specific measures
are also advocated for the transport industry, in particular to clarify the rules on cabotage.
Favourable to revising the Directive have also been the European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC), the European Builders Confederation (EBC) representing the
SME employers in the construction sector, the EU Trade Union of Building and
Woodworkers (EFBWW), the Dutch Trade Union Confederation (FNV), the Estonian
Trade Union Confederation and the Council of Nordic Trade Unions. The EU social
partners in the construction industry have also asked the Commission to assess a number
of issues related to the Directive.
The ETUC has expressed support for a revision to ensure the principle of equal
treatment67. In this context, however, the ETUC called the Commission upon respecting
the principle of autonomy of the social partners to negotiate wages and the plurality of
national industrial relation systems, by establishing provisions on the constituent
elements of pay and having the effect of favouring company-level over sector-level
collective agreements68. In turn, the ETUC advised that the Commission reviews
provisions regarding the requirement of a previous period of employment in the country
of origin to be especially applied to posted temporary agency workers, new rules on
64
CESE, Les Travailleurs detaches, 2015-24.
Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER), Arbeidsmigratie, Advies 14/09, December 2014
66
Report on Social dumping in the European Union (2015/2255 (INI), Committee on Employment and
Social Affairs.
67
ETUC, Paris Manifesto, Stand Up in solidarity for quality jobs, workers' rights and a fair society in
Europe, 1 October 2015.
68
ETUC, Targeted review of the Posting of Workers, ETUC contribution, 28 August 2015.
65
51
combatting bogus self-employment, and better enforcement measures, in particular
inspections and more reliable social security forms69.
The European Builders Confederation (EBC), representing SMEs in the construction
sector, has expressed support for reopening the 1996 Directive in line with the principle
"equal pay for equal work in the same place". Concerning this directive, the EBC
proposes to extend the legal basis of the Posting of Workers directive in line with the
social security regulation and the services directive; to delegate the sector-level social
partners with setting a temporary limit to postings; to tighten rules on the activities of
temporary work agencies in the construction sector, with particular reference to the
provision of information as regards their activities; and to tackle the issue of bogus selfemployment. EBC also proposes the creation of a common database of social security
forms.
The Council of Nordic Trade Unions (NFS) has welcomed the prospect of a revision of
the Directive calling for the close involvement of the social partners and the governments
of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) in its
preparation70. The NFS has agreed with the principle of equal pay for equal work, which
it considers the foundation of collective bargaining in the Nordic countries and a means
to avoid wage competition and discrimination. However, it takes stock of the ambiguity
introduced by the European Court of Justice as regards to the conformity of the labour
market model of the Nordic countries with the Posting of Workers directive.
In a joint position, the EU social partners of the construction sector (the European
Federation of Building and Woodworkers, EFBWW, and the European Construction
Industry Federation, FIEC) have asked the Commission, among other things, to define a
maximum duration of posting, elaborate a EU harmonised module for preliminary
declaration for posting, and provide legal clarity as regards to the position of posted
temporary agency workers in the light of the Temporary Agency Work Directive71. In a
single letter, the EFBWW has encouraged the Commission to provide the instruments for
the principle of "equal pay for equal work in the same workplace" to be widely applied72.
ECAS (European Citizens' Action Service) has stressed the need to align the definition of
posted worker between the Posting of Workers Directive and the Regulation on social
security coordination.
69
70
71
72
ETUC, letter to Marianne Thyssen, Brussels 22 July 2015.
Council of Nordic Trade Unions, Labour Mobility package – Revision of the Posting of Workers
Directive, 20 January 2016.
EFBWW and FIEC, Joint Position. Towards a level playing field in the European construction sector.
Joint proposals of the EU sectoral social partners, 27 February 2015. The
EFBWW, Observations regarding the proposed EU Labour Mobility Package, 29 February 2016.
52
On the other hand, nine other Member States, Business Europe, UAPME (representing
European small and medium enterprises), Eurociett (representing the temporary work
agency industry), CEEMET (representing employers of the metal, engineering and
technology-based industries), Gesamtmetall (the employer association of the German
metalworking industry) and the Association of Industrial Employers of Sweden, the
Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic, and the Industry Associations of
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have expressed their opposition to the
review of the Directive, at this stage.
In a joint letter, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland,
Slovakia and Rumania have argued that a review of the 1996 Directive is premature and
should be postponed after the deadline for the transposition of the Enforcement Directive
has elapsed and its effects carefully evaluated and assessed. These Member States have
expressed the concern that the principle of equal pay for equal work in the same place
may be incompatible with the single market, as pay rate differences constitute one
legitimate element of competitive advantage for service providers. Moreover, they have
taken the position that posted workers should remain under the legislation of the sending
Member State for social security purposes, and no measure should thus be taken to revise
the linkages between the posting of workers and the social security coordination in this
sense. Finally, they called upon the Commission to considering action only insofar as
evidence is rigorously analysed concerning the challenges and specificities of crossborder service provision.
Similarly, BUSINESS EUROPE73 has considered a priority to ensure the correct
transposition of the Enforcement Directive as it deems that most of the challenges with
posting of workers are related to poor enforcement and lack of controls in the Member
States. Business Europe has also suggested that the reopening of the Directive may
reduce posting activities because of the uncertainty that the negotiation would create
among companies. While supportive of measures to increase the reliability and
transparency of Portable Documents, Business Europe has considered that the principle
of "equal pay for equal work" would create an undue interference of the EU in the free
determination of wage levels by the social partners and recalls that a level playing field
for competition is created by a large body of EU law addressing various aspects of labour
law. These arguments were also shared by the representatives of employers of the metal,
engineering and technology industries (CEEMET)74, by the Confederation of European
Managers (CEC), by the Swedish Association of Industrial Employers, the Industry
Associations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and by the
Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic.
73
74
Business Europe, letter to Marianne Thyssen, 5 October 2015.
CEEMET, Position against a Revision of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the
framewoek of the provision of services, 5 October 2015.
53
GESAMTMETALL has also called the Commission to clarifying the practical
implications of the principle of "equal pay", as well as to taking into account the possible
impact of this principle on the free provision of cross-border services, with notable
reference to the competitiveness of undertakings established in countries with low wage
standards.
Likewise, UAPME has taken the view that the Posting of Workers Directive should not
be modified before the transposition of the Enforcement Directive is completed and its
effects evaluated.
EUROCIETT75, representing the temporary work agency industry, is of the view that
there is no need for reopening the 1996 Directive. With particular reference to the
temporary agency work sector, Eurociett maintains that the 2008 Temporary Agency
Work Directive already provides for the implementation of the equal pay for equal work
principle in all the Member States. While it argues that information access for companies
and workers and data collection on the industry should be enhanced, it calls for a more
in-depth legal analysis of the interplay between the directives on Posting of Workers and
on Temporary Agency Workers. As the latter already provides for the implementation of
the principle of equal pay for equal work in the host countries, Eurociett sees no need to
modify the Posting of Workers Directive.
75
Eurociett, Posting of agency workers and the cross-border provision of services, 9 November 2015.
54
ANNEX II. - NUMBERS AND FIGURES ON POSTING OF WORKERS
The posting of workers in the EU has steadily picked up since 2010 on an average
annual rate of increase of 9.6%, to reach over 1.9 million postings in 2014. Overall,
the number of posted workers, calculated as number of portable documents A1 (PD A1)
issued, has increased by 44.4%, between 2010 and 2014 (figure 1)76. Although data are
not fully comparable due to changes in the social security registration system in 2010, the
number of postings has rebounded after a downward break in the first dip of the
economic crisis between 2007 and 2009. Currently, the total figure is composed of
postings to a single Member State (on average 75% of total postings in 2014), postings to
two or more Member States (about 22% of the total) and postings in the framework of
common agreements between Member States (2%) and of flight or cabin crew members
(0.05%).
Figure 1. Number of social security certificates for posted workers issued to a single
and to two or more Member States (in millions), 2007-2014
Source: DG EMPL calculations on PD A1s data.
Note: From 2010, the PD A1 form has replaced the previous E101 form. Data are not fully
comparable, because the E101 form could be issued for posting periods up to 12 months – to be
possibly prolonged for another 12 months, whereas under PD A1 rules the maximum duration of
postings is 24 months.
The following analysis is mainly based on EU social security data measuring
postings to single Member States. This is motivated by the facts that EU data are the
only comparable source of information across all Member States; and that data on
76
Workers posted from and to EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) are
included in the calculation, as flows always involve EU countries.
55
postings to two or more Member States do not include any information regarding the
destination of workers and therefore cannot be fully matched with information on
receiving Member States77. However, for the sake of completeness of information,
specific data will be presented when relevant.
Variation in the number of posted workers has been very different across the EU
between 2010 and 2014, also reflecting the different impacts of the crisis. The highest
increases in sending countries were recorded in Greece, Slovakia Lithuania, and
Bulgaria– with more than double as many PD A1 issued in 2014 than in 2010 – and
especially in Slovenia – where the number of posted workers sent more than tripled
during the same period, although the absolute numbers remain low. In turn, Sweden,
Germany, Belgium, Slovenia, Austria and, especially, Estonia recorded the highest
increases among receiving countries, while the receipt of posted workers substantially
dropped in Cyprus, Greece, Spain and Bulgaria.
The contribution of posting to adjusting labour demand within the EU partly
explains the fact that the number of postings has increased faster than expected.
According to simulations, the number of postings was projected to increase to 1.07
million by 2013 and reach up to 1.12 million in 2015. Actual data show that this
projection has been underestimated by over 700,000 postings for each of the years 2013
and 201478. In particular, the flows of posted workers have been directed to the Member
States with relatively better economic performances during the crisis, such as Germany.
Posting has thus proved to be also an important mechanism to adjust labour demand
within the EU.
EU 15 Member States remain the main destination of posted workers. In absolute
numbers, Germany (414,200), France (190,850) and Belgium (159,750) have been the
Member States receiving the highest number of postings in 2014. In proportion to overall
domestic employment, however, the receipt of posted workers had the strongest impact
on Luxembourg (9%), Belgium (3.6%) and Austria (2.5%), while they make up around
1% of employed persons in Germany, the Netherlands, and France.
All Member States are senders of posted workers, but their incidence on domestic
labour markets varies across the Member States. Poland (266,700), Germany
(232,800) and France (119,700) record the highest absolute number of postings sent.
However, while sent posted workers account for 1.7% of the total employed population
77
78
It should be noticed that data also include self-employed workers working temporarily in another
Member States, who do not fall into the scope of the Posting of Workers Directive. The self-employed
make up on average 8% of total postings, with a higher importance in Germany, Italy, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia.
ISMERI Europe (2012), p. 81 projected postings to be 1.07 in 2013 and about 1.1 million in 2014,
whereas actual numbers proved to be, respectively 1.74 and 1.92 million. See also European
Commission (2012) Impact Assessment. Revision of the legislative framework on the posting of
workers in the context of the provision of services. Partie II, SWD (2012) 63 final.
56
in Poland, they make up about 0.6% in France and Germany. In fact, among sending
countries, posted workers have a stronger significance especially in Luxembourg and
Slovenia, where they represent respectively 20.7% and 11.5% of the domestic employed
population, followed by Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Portugal79.
These figures may underestimate the actual number of posted workers. From a
receiving perspective, data from national compulsory registration systems show a
relevant gap between EU and national figures, with the latter being up to five times
higher in the case of Denmark (table 1). National estimations should carefully take into
account full-time equivalents and the number of unique persons posted. However, EU
social security data do not include information neither on short-term nor on long-term
postings, as in these cases PD A1 forms are not required.
Table 1. Comparison between EU and national data sources on received posted
workers, year 2014
Country
Number of PD A1 received
(EU data)
159,753
Belgium
(LIMOSA)
Denmark
10.869
(RUT)
France
190,848
Sources: Member States communications to the Commission
Number of registrations
(national data)
Number of declarations: 499,840
Number of unique persons: 205,279
59,351
228,650
Postings to multiple Member States reflect the phenomenon of highly-mobile
workers and are a significant part of total posted workers sent by some Member
States. While Poland records 428,400 posted workers sent in 2014, Germany has
255,700 and France 125,200. Figure 2 below shows that for Member States such as
Denmark, Latvia, Czech Republic and the Netherlands the figure of total postings can be
up to four times higher than the figure of postings to single Member States only. This
data could be understood as reflecting the extent of the phenomenon of highly-mobile
workers in specific sectors, such as transports. However, there is a lack of data
concerning the sector of activity of this group and the destination of these postings.
79
If forms for unique persons only are taken into account, the percentage share of sent posted workers
on the total employed population drops to 0.3% in France, 4.7% in Luxembourg and 4.2% in Slovenia.
However, this information is not available for many Member States, including Germany and Poland.
57
Figure 2. Posted workers sent to single destinations and total posted workers sent
(including to multiple Member States), selected Member States, year 2014.
Source: EMPL calculations on Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015)
Overall, some Member States are net senders and others net recipients of posted
workers. Poland, Latvia, and Slovenia were among the highest net senders of posted
workers, with levels which have increased over the period 2010-2014 (figure 3). In turn,
Germany, Belgium, Austria, France and the Netherlands were amongst the highest net
recipients. Except for in the Netherlands, the faster increase of receipts over sent posted
workers during the crisis period has accentuated the balance in these countries. Contrary
to most other Member States, Italy and Spain have turned from being net receivers to
becoming net senders of posted workers between 2010 and 2014, mostly due to the
impact of the economic crisis.
58
Figure 3. Net balance between postings sent and received, 2010 and 2014 (in
,000)
Source: EMPL calculations. Note: calculations are done on the basis of postings to single Member States
only, due to the lack of data on the receipt of workers posted to multiple member States.
Posting between companies represents the most widespread type of posting,
although there is no data on other types of postings. Directive 96/71/EC distinguishes
between three types of postings, namely posting between a company and a service
provider, posting of workers within the same group and posting through temporary work
agencies. Although it is quite commonplace that the first type of posting is the most
widespread, the grand majority of the Member States does not collect data to distinguish
between the three types. As regards intra-group posting, only France provides data. In
2013, intra-group posting accounted for 3% of total postings80. Concerning posted
temporary agency workers, available data from PD A1 documents for the year 2014
show that they make up on average 5% of total postings, yet with relevant cross-country
variation. Agency workers represent over 10% of total postings received by the
Netherlands, Belgium, France and Portugal, but up to 35% of total postings sent from the
Netherlands and 25.7% of those sent from Belgium in 201481.
80
81
DGT, Analyse des déclarations de détachement des entreprises prestataires de services en France en
2013, Novembre 2014.
Frequently missing information concerning the sector of activity on the PD A1 forms suggests caution
as regards the handling of data on sectoral breakdowns of postings.
59
All in all, posting of workers still involves a very small fraction (0.7%) of the EU
employed population. In full-time equivalents, it can be estimated that posted workers
account for 0.26% of EU employment. However, the labour market impact is especially
concentrated on specific sectors and Member States.
The construction sector accounts for the largest sector for posting of workers,
followed by the manufacturing industry and different types of services (figure 4).
Overall, the construction sector absorbs 32.7% of total postings in the EU28, thus
proving the most relevant sector for the provision of cross-border services. Industrial
sectors, such as the metalworking industry, account for about another quarter of total
postings. The service sector makes up 32% of total postings, which can be further
disaggregated into personal services (education, health and social work), business
services (finance and insurance, real estate, administrative, professional and technical
services, including temporary agency work), and transports (including road transport and
information and communication systems), as well as other services, such as wholesale
and retail trade (1.4% of total postings) and food and accommodation services (0.4%).
Agriculture employs 1.6% of total posted workers in the EU
Figure 4. Posted workers in the EU28, breakdown by economic sector (%, 2014)
Source: DG EMPL elaboration on Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015)
The incidence of posted construction sector workers on domestic labour markets is
especially strong in some Member States. In Slovenia, Sweden, Finland, Austria,
Belgium, and Latvia posted construction sector workers represented over half of total
workers received in 2014. Measured as a proportion of the domestic employed workforce
in the sector, posted workers made up 20% of Belgian construction workers in 2014, and
60
about 10% and Austrian and Luxembourgish workers (figure 5)82. From a sending
perspective, construction workers represent over 50% of posted workers sent from
Estonia, Portugal and Slovenia, and followed by Hungary, Poland and Luxembourg with
shares slightly below that level.
Figure 5. % Share of received postings in the construction sector on total construction
workers, year 2014
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
BE AT LU DE SI FI SE FR NL EE HR SK DK ES LV IT LT CZ HU CY IE RO BG MT EL PL UK PT
Source: DG EMPL calculations on Eurostat data
The service sector, mainly personal and business services, absorbs another 32.9% of
posted workers. From a receiving perspective, financial and business services, as well as
personal services represent the majority of postings received in Malta, Greece, Portugal
Cyprus and Bulgaria. In turn, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Belgium and
Luxembourg post a sizeable share of their workers in the services sector, particularly
among financial and professional services, and personal services such as health and
social work. While a minor share of total postings involves the agriculture sector, its
share amongst sending countries is highest (6.5%) in Estonia and Romania.
Geographic proximity is a key context factor of posting dynamics. The majority
(52%) of posted workers are sent to a neighbouring state, with peaks of over 70% in
Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands (figures 6 and 7). Conversely,
neighbouring countries make up over 70% of posted workers received by Luxembourg,
Austria and the Czech Republic. For instance, Belgium mainly receives posted workers
from and sends its own posted workers mainly to France, the Czech Republic mainly
receives its posted workers from Slovakia, and Germany to the Netherlands, France,
Switzerland and Austria.
82
While the number of PD A1 issued in the construction sector may not reflect the actual number of
posted construction workers (as the same worker could be posted more times during the same year),
the method allows cross-country comparisons.
61
Figure 6. Workers posted to neighbouring and non-neighbouring Member States as %
of total postings, from a sending perspective, 2014
Source: DG EMPL elaboration on Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015)
Figure 7. Workers posted from neighbouring and non-neighbouring Member States as
% of total received postings, 2014.
Source: DG EMPL elaboration on Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015)
Posting is generally limited in time (figure 8). Available data suggests that the average
duration of posting is less than 4 months (100 days in 2013, 103 days in 2014). However,
there are significant differences between the Member States. Whereas the average
duration of postings from France, Belgium and Luxembourg does not last over 33 days,
workers posted from Estonia, Hungary and Ireland tend to stay for over 230 days. It
should be noted that in some Member States workers are posted multiple times per year
62
for short periods. Indeed, by weighting the number of postings with the number of
'unique persons' posted, the same worker is posted on average 1.7 times per year.
Figure 8. Average duration of postings (in days) by sending Member State (2014)
Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015)
The incompleteness of information, however, suggests much caution in the interpretation
of data. While data on the duration from PD A1 data is only available for twelve EU
Member States (plus Iceland)83, it should be reminded that PD A1 forms are not due for
postings envisaged to be longer than two years, as in that case workers will be covered by
the social security legislation of the Member State of employment84. Therefore, longterm
postings
are
not
included
in
the
above
figure.
83
84
The countries are Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovenia. There is however a small improvement with respect to the
seven Member States for which data were available in 2013 (Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy,
Hungary, Slovenia and Iceland). Pacolet, De Wispelaere, "Posting of Workers. Report on A1 portable
documents issued in 2012 and 2013", European Commission, December 2014.
If postings are based on common agreements between the Member States (in line with article 16 of
Regulation 883/2004), posting periods are extensible up to 5 years.
63
STATISTICAL ANNEX - ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Figure 9. Dispersion of the monthly minimum wages in the EU (1999-2015)
Source: Eurostat. Note: highest value is the minimum wage in Luxembourg. Lowest value is the minimum
wage (in Portugal from 1999 to 2003; in Latvia from 2004 to 2006; in Bulgaria from 2007 to 2015, except
for 2013 (Romania)
Figure 10. % share of payment to, and income from subcontractors on total
turnover, construction sector, 2011
Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics [sbs_is_subc_r2], EMPL calculation.
No data available for FR and PL.
64
Figure 11. Intensity of cross-border services on total turnover in the construction
sector, 2014
Source: EMPL calculations on Eurostat data.
Figure 12. Sent posted workers and differentials in social security contributions
(2008-2014)
Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2016) on Eurostat data
65
Figure 13. Sent posted workers and price differentials (2008-2014)
Source: Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2016)
Change in Share of
(received workers/posted workers) 2010-2013
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Figure 14: Change in the share of received workers in total posted workers and
GDP growth (2010-2013).
DK
EE
CZ
FR BE
AT
PL
CY
PT
HU
NL
SI
MT IS
FI
RO
IE
ES
LU
GB
DE
LT
LV
SK
IT
BG
-.1
0
.1
GDP Growth 2010-2013
66
.2
.3
Figure 15. Posted workers received in 2014, breakdown by sector and selected
group of countries
Source: EMPL calculation on Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015)
Figure 16. Social contribution rates, paid by employees, EU 28, year 2014
Source: OECD-EC tax benefit indicators. Note: data 2014; except BG, HR, LT, LV, MT, RO 2013 - CY
no data
67
Figure 17. Personal income tax rates, at 67% and 100% of average wage (single
person), 2014
Source: OECD-EC tax benefit indicators. Note: data 2014.
Figure 18. Social contribution rates paid by employers (at 50/67/100% of the
average wage) , EU 28, year 2014
Source: OECD-EC tax benefit indicators. Note: SSCer (data 2014; except BG, HR, LT, LV, MT, RO 2013
- CY no data.
68
Figure 19. Top corporate income tax rates, EU28, year 2015
Source: European Commission, Tax Reforms in the Member States
69
Figure 20. Annual % changes in received posted workers, total construction sector
employment, and low-skilled construction workers, AT, BE, LU (2008-2014)
Source: EMPL calculations on Eurostat data
70
ANNEX III. - OVERVIEW OF THE CASE LAW OF THE CJEU ON THE CONSTITUENT
ELEMENTS OF MINIMUM RATES OF PAY
In the table below, the case law of the CJEU is summarized, distinguishing between the
two perspectives:
1.
the host Member State perspective: is the host Member State entitled or obliged
to consider a certain element as being part of the notion of minimal rates of pay?
2.
the comparative perspective: when assessing whether the amount effectively
paid to the posted worker complies with the minimum rates of pay, must the Member
State take into account a specific element as being part of the notion of minimal rates of
pay?
In the first case, the elements in consideration are provided for by the law of the host
Member State or by a collective agreement declared universally applicable. When the
Court decides that this element is part of the notion of minimum rates of pay, this means
that it needs to be part of the remuneration granted to the posted worker.
In the second case, the elements at stake are not foreseen in the law of the host Member
State or in a collective agreement declared universally applicable, but they are effectively
paid to the worker in accordance to the employment contract, the law of the Member
State of establishment or a collective agreement binding to the undertaking posting the
workers. When the Court decides that such an element must be taken into consideration
as being part of the minimal rates of pay, the ruling has no impact on the constitutive
elements of the host Member State, it only concerns the comparison between the amount
paid to the worker and the amount that must be paid in accordance with the applicable
rules of the host Member State.
71
Table 1: Are the elements below to be considered constituent elements of minimum
rates of pay?
Case
Host MS
perspect
ive
Not ruled
yet
Bonuses
in
respect of the
13th and 14th
month
Case
C341/02,
§31
Quality
bonuses
Case
C341/02,
§39
Not ruled
yet
Bonuses for
dirty, heavy or
dangerous
work
Case
C341/02,
§39
Not ruled
yet
Lump
sum
payments
determined in
the context of
the negotiation
of a collective
agreement
Case
C‑522/
12,
§40-42
Depends
on the
intention
of the
parties to
the
collectiv
e
agreeme
nt
Capital
formation
contribution
Case
C‑522/
12,
§43-45
No
Comparative
perspective
Reasoning of the CJEU
Yes, they are
constituent
elements of
minimum
rates of pay
No, they are
not constituent
elements of
minimum
rates of pay
On condition that they are paid regularly,
proportionately, effectively and irrevocably during the
period for which the worker is posted.
No, they are
not constituent
elements of
minimum
rates of pay
Allowances and supplements which are not defined as
being constituent elements of the minimum wage by the
legislation or national practice of the host Member State,
and which alter the relationship between the service
provided by the worker, on the one hand, and the
consideration which he receives in return, on the other,
cannot be treated as being constituent elements of the
minimum wage.
It is entirely normal that, if an employer requires a
worker to carry out additional work or to work under
particular conditions, compensation must be provided to
the worker for that additional service without its being
taken into account for the purpose of calculating the
minimum wage.
Allowances and supplements which are not defined as
being constituent elements of the minimum wage by the
legislation or national practice of the host Member State,
and which alter the relationship between the service
provided by the worker, on the one hand, and the
consideration which he receives in return, on the other,
cannot be treated as being constituent elements of the
minimum wage.
It is entirely normal that, if an employer requires a
worker to carry out additional work or to work under
particular conditions, compensation must be provided to
the worker for that additional service without its being
taken into account for the purpose of calculating the
minimum wage.
Only the elements of remuneration which do not alter the
relationship between the service provided by the worker,
on the one hand, and the consideration that he receives in
return, on the other, can be taken into account in
determining the minimum wage within the meaning of
Directive 96/71.
It depends whether the parties to the collective wage
agreement intended, in that way, to introduce an increase
in wages in consideration of the work, during the
negotiation of such a collective agreement, of
anticipating, by those lump sum payments, the
application of the new salary scale.
The capital formation contribution seems, in view of its
objective and its characteristics, to alter the relationship
between the service provided by the worker and the
consideration which he receives by way of remuneration
for that service.
72
Guaranteed
pay for hourly
work and/or
piecework in
accordance
with
the
categorisation
of employees
into
pay
groups
C‑396/
13,
§40-45
Yes
Daily
allowance
C‑396/
13,
§46-50
Yes
Compensation
for
daily
travelling time
C‑396/
13,
§53-57
Yes
Since its aim, by the formation of a capital amount that
the worker will benefit from in the longer term, is to
achieve an objective of social policy supported, in
particular, by a financial contribution from the public
authorities, it cannot be regarded, for the application of
Directive 96/71, as forming part of the usual relationship
between the work done and the financial consideration
for that work from the employer.
The rules in force in the host Member State may
determine whether the calculation of the minimum wage
must be carried out on an hourly or a piecework basis.
However, those rules must be binding and must meet the
requirements of transparency, which means, in
particular, that they must be accessible and clear.
The minimum wage calculated by reference to the
relevant collective agreements cannot be a matter of
choice for an employer who posts employees with the
sole aim of offering lower labour costs than those of
local workers.
The rules for categorising workers into pay groups,
which are applied in the host Member State on the basis
of various criteria including the workers’ qualifications,
training and experience and/or the nature of the work
performed by them, apply instead of the rules that are
applicable to the posted workers in the home Member
State. It is only where a comparison is made between the
terms and conditions of employment, referred to in the
first subparagraph of Article 3(7) of Directive 96/71,
applied in the home Member State and those in force in
the host Member State that the categorisation made by
the home Member State must be taken into account when
it is more favourable to the worker.
The allowance takes the form of a flat-rate daily
payment.
The allowance is not paid in reimbursement of
expenditure actually incurred on account of the posting,
as referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 3(7)
of Directive 96/71.
In fact, the allowance is intended to ensure the social
protection of the workers concerned, making up for the
disadvantages entailed by the posting as a result of the
workers being removed from their usual environment.
It follows that such an allowance must be classified as an
‘allowance specific to the posting’ within the meaning of
the second subparagraph of Article 3(7) of Directive
96/71.
That provision of the directive states that such an
allowance is part of the minimum wage.
Accordingly, the daily allowance at issue must be paid to
posted workers such as those concerned in the main
proceedings to the same extent as it is paid to local
workers when they are posted within Finland.
The question raised does not concern compensation for
the costs incurred by the workers concerned in travelling
to and from their place of work but solely the question as
to whether Article 3 of Directive 96/71 must be
interpreted as meaning that compensation for daily
73
Coverage of
the cost of
accommodatio
n
C‑396/
13,
§58-60
Meal vouchers
C‑396/
13,
§61-63
Holiday pay
C‑396/
13,
§64-69
No
No
All
workers
entitled
because
of EU
law
Not ruled yet
travelling time is to be regarded as an element of those
workers’ minimum wage.
According to the relevant provisions of the Finnish
collective agreements, compensation for travelling time
is paid to workers if their daily commute to and from
work is of more than one hour’s duration.
Since such compensation for travelling time is not paid
in reimbursement of expenditure actually incurred by the
worker on account of the posting, it must, in accordance
with the second subparagraph of Article 3(7) of Directive
96/71, be regarded as an allowance specific to the
posting and thus be part of the minimum wage.
Even though the wording of Article 3(7) excludes only
the reimbursement of expenditure on accommodation
which has actually been incurred on account of the
posting and the employer has defrayed the
accommodation costs of the workers concerned without
the latter having first to pay them and then seek to have
them reimbursed, the method which the employer has
chosen to cover such expenditure has no bearing on the
legal classification thereof.
The very purpose of Article 3(7) of Directive 96/71 does
not permit expenditure connected with the posted
workers’ accommodation to be taken into account in the
calculation of their minimum wage.
The Court observes that the provision of those vouchers
is based neither on any law, regulation or administrative
provision of the host Member State nor on the relevant
collective agreements invoked by the Sähköalojen
ammattiliitto, but derives from the employment
relationship established in Poland between the posted
workers and their employer.
Furthermore, like the allowances paid to offset
accommodation costs, these allowances are paid to
compensate for living costs actually incurred by the
workers on account of their posting.
Accordingly, it is clear from the actual wording of
paragraphs 1 and 7 of Article 3 of Directive 96/71 that
the allowances concerned are not to be considered part of
the minimum wage within the meaning of Article 3 of
the directive.
As regards payment in respect of holidays, it must be
recalled at the outset that, under Article 31(2) of the
Charter, every worker has the right to an annual period
of paid leave.
That right, which is set out in Article 7 of Directive
2003/88/EC from which that directive permits no
derogation, provides that every worker is entitled to a
period of paid annual leave of at least four weeks. The
right to paid annual leave which, according to settled
case-law, must be regarded as a particularly important
principle of EU social law, is thus granted to every
worker, whatever his place of employment.
The Court’s case-law also makes clear that the term
‘paid annual leave’ in Article 31 of the Charter and
Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 means that, for the
duration of annual leave within the meaning of those
provisions, remuneration must be maintained and that, in
74
other words, workers must receive their normal
remuneration for that period of rest.
According to that case-law, Directive 2003/88 treats
entitlement to annual leave and to a payment on that
account as being two aspects of a single right. The
purpose of requiring payment to be made in respect of
that leave is to put the worker, during such leave, in a
position which is, as regards his salary, comparable to
periods of work.
Thus, the pay which the worker receives during the
holidays is intrinsically linked to that which he receives
in return for his services.
Accordingly, Article 3 of Directive 96/71, read in the
light of Articles 56 TFEU and 57 TFEU, must be
interpreted as meaning that the minimum pay which the
worker must receive, in accordance with point (b) of the
second indent of Article 3(1) of the directive, for the
minimum paid annual holidays corresponds to the
minimum wage to which that worker is entitled during
the reference period.
75
ANNEX IV
ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF EQUAL PAY ON LABOUR COSTS FOR
EMPLOYERS AND AFTER-TAX INCOME FOR WORKERS IN SITUATION OF POSTING
The following analysis simulates the impact of differentials in social security
contributions and corporate and personal income tax rates between sending and receiving
Member States on labour costs for firms and after-tax income for posted.
This simulation has only an illustrative value and neither does it correspond to the
desired outcome of the proposed options nor aims at fully representing the reality of
posting. 'Equal Pay' is therefore a fictitious scenario. It is used to illustrate the most
extreme change but does not represent the outcome of the proposed revision which
should instead fall between the 'status quo' and the 'equal pay' levels, depending on the
applicable collective agreement, as well as other contingent characteristics such as firm
size, worker's skill, seniority, and job position. Absent any systematic data collection,
this simulation constitutes a useful proxy in order to better understand the role of the
home country rule enshrined in Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social
security systems as regards the payment of social security charges and taxes on posting
of workers.
Methodological remarks
To construct the simulation, the three main receiving countries were taken as an example
(BE, DE, FR). Sending countries were selected on the basis of differentials both in home
wage standards, including one high-wage (NL), one medium-wage (PT) and two lowwage Member States (RO, PL), and in levels of labour and income taxation.
The exercise is developed on the basis of the wage of a low-skill manual worker in the
representative construction sector. The reference wage is taken from the Eurostat
Earnings Survey 2010 (latest data available) which provides data on wages per
occupation and sector, inter alia. The EC-OECD tax-benefit database is the source for
social security rates and income taxes.
The simulation analyses the status quo and three scenarios of change:
Status quo: foreign company paying / posted worker receiving the minimum pay set by
the sectorial collective agreement of the host country, and social security contributions in
the home country.
Scenario 1: foreign company paying / posted worker being paid the average wage of the
sector in the host country, and social security contributions in the home country on the
basis of the full wage of the host country
76
Scenario 2: foreign company paying / posted worker being paid the average sectorial
wage of the host country, and social security contributions on the same basis as Scenario
1, as well as corporate / personal income tax in the home country
To simulate the minimum rates of pay received by posted construction workers in the
status quo, the exercise takes the monthly salary level of the lowest-skilled occupation in
the receiving countries, that is, elementary worker. The assumption is that under the
status quo, employers will tend to pay posted workers with the minimum contractual
level, regardless of the actual skill level of the posted worker.
To simulate the scenario involving income taxation, the exercise assumes a company /
worker posted / being posted to another Member State for a period of six months, that
being the only source of profit / work revenue in the corresponding year. The company is
assumed to employ 10 manual workers for 6 months and to pay corporate tax on the basis
of a EUR 500,000 yearly turnout.
Data
Country
Average
wage manual
[elementary]
worker,
constructions
(EUR, 2010)
Social
security
employee
(100%
AW)
Social
security
employer
(100 %
AW)
Corporate
income tax
(%
turnout)
Personal
income
tax
(100%
average
wage)
Receiving countries
Germany
Belgium
France
2,533
[2,081]
2,615
[2,615]
1,714
[1,388]
16.16
17.12
29.65
16.03
22.96
10.79
33.99
21.83
27.69
10.16
33.33
10.59
Sending countries
Poland
613
14.37
15.26
19
5.96
Romania
324
21.88
9.77
16
10.45
Portugal
773
19.19
8.89
21
13.14
3,082
8.97
13.9
25
14.58
Netherlands
77
SIMULATION 1 – Labour costs for posting and local employers
Germany
Scenario 1. Monthly labour costs
4000
2,942
3000
3,087
2,897
3,019
2480
2536
2380
2,760
2268
2000
1000
0
Local
Poland
Romania
equal pay
Portugal
Netherlands
status quo
Scenario 2. Yearly labour costs
350,000
324,770
300,000
276,640
241,820
250,000
246,220
267,100
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
Local
Poland
Romania
78
Portugal
Netherlands
Belgium
Scenario 1. Monthly labour costs
4000
3215
3187
2991
3117
2850
3000
1830
1718
2000
1790
1637
1000
0
Local
Poland
Romania
Equal pay
status quo
79
Portugal
Netherlands
France
Scenario 1. Monthly labour cost
2500
2,146
2000
2,089
1,960
1692
1587
2,043
1654
1,868
1513
1500
1000
500
0
Local
Poland
Romania
Equal Pay
Status quo
80
Portugal
Netherlands
Comments
The simulation of the status quo depicts part of the baseline scenario in the receiving
Member States. Social security contribution levels paid by employers in the selected
sending countries are in all cases lower than in the receiving countries. Since social
security charges are paid on lower wage levels, the total labour cost are substantially
lower (up to 80% in the case of Polish workers in Belgium) than in the receiving
countries.
The case of the Netherlands is telling of the role of taxation in determining labour cost
competitiveness. While nominal wage costs are higher in the home country than in all
other receiving countries, the low social security contribution rate (one third of the
French one) results in lower total labour costs of posted workers from the Netherlands.
Scenario 1 shows that differentials in social security charges have a similar effect if
equal pay is simulated, i.e. if posted workers are paid the same rate as local workers, but
where differentials are lower (e.g. between Romania and Belgium or France) the gap in
labour costs substantially narrows. However, the case of Germany shows that if the social
security charges of the recipient Member State are lower than those of sending countries,
the labour cost competitiveness of posted workers from low-wage countries is
eliminated.
Scenario 2 shows that lower corporate income tax rates in all sending Member States
vis-à-vis receiving countries may contribute to the overall fiscal premium of tax
regulations in a situation of posting, even in a situation of equal pay. In that scenario, the
cost gap is reduced with respect to the status quo but sending companies seem to have
more leverage to compress costs than local firms, including if provisions established an
equal pay rule. Clearly, the present simulation depicts a very simplified fiscal framework
and should be understood only as an indicative sign of potential cost gaps.
In practice, labour costs for posted worker are increased by supplementary allowances
specific to posting, whereas the non-application of a number of allowances granted to
local workers may contribute to lower nominal wages for posted workers. The simulation
has provided a tool to visually understand the implications of current and possible rules
on the economic drivers of posting.
81
SIMULATION 2 – after-income earning of posted and local workers
Germany
82
Belgium
83
France
84
Comments
This simulation analyses the impact of social security contributions paid by employees
and personal income taxes on the potential take-home pay of posted workers vis-à-vis
local workers.
In the case of employees, patterns in levels of social security contributions are less clearcut as in the case of employers. Social security rates are higher in Poland and in the
Netherlands than in Belgium and France, therefore net pay should be lower, nominal
wages being equal. However, it is true that personal income taxes (here considered on a
single person earning 100% the average wage) are generally lower in most sending
countries than in the receiving countries, with the Polish rate being one third of the
French rate). Despite some exceptions, income tax differentials may contribute to higher
take-home pay for posted workers than local workers, pay being equal.
This situation is reflected in the scenario construed by the simulation.
In the status quo, lower nominal wages result in lower net pay of posted workers all
across the board. However, the role of tax differentials emerges in the equal pay scenario
1. For instance, the lower social charges in Portugal than in Belgium produces that the
take-home pay of workers posted from Portugal is higher than that of Belgian workers,
nominal wages being equal. Instead, Romanian posted workers will receive a lower takehome pay than Belgians with the same wage because of higher social security
contributions in Romania.
In scenario 2, the low tax differentials between France and most of the origin countries
of posted workers results in a slightly better situation of local workers than posted
workers, whereas in high-tax Belgium local workers remain significantly worse off than
posted workers from Poland, Romania and Portugal.
85
ANNEX V. - COMPOSITION OF REMUNERATION
Element of wage
Is considered part Is NOT considered EC case law: are EC case law:
of the minimum part of the minimum to be considered must be accepted
rates of pay
rates of pay
as minimum rates as being part of
of pay is present minimum rates of
in the host MS
pay if effectively
paid to posted
workers
BE, DE, EL, AT,
FR*, LU*, PL, SI,
IT
and BE, EE, EL, ES,
for AT, FR*, LU**, PL,
or SI, IT
Seniority allowance
Allowances
supplements
dirty,
heavy
dangerous work
Quality bonuses
BG, CY, EE, FR**,
HU, IE, LT, LU**, LV,
SK, UK, MT, CZ, NL
BG, CY, DE, FR**,
HU, IE, LT, LU**, LV,
SK, MT, CZ and NL
No
BE, EE, ES, FR AT, BG, CY, DE, EL,
HU, IE, IT, LT, LU**,
LU*, PL and SI
LV, SK,UK MT, CZ
and NL
th
Yes
13 month bonuses BE, EL, ES, AT, BG, CY, DE, EE,
FR*, IT, LU and FR**, HU, IE, LT,
(Christmas
PL
LU**, LV, SI, SK, UK,
allowances)
MT, CZ and NL
SI
BE, CY, CZ, DE, EE,
Travel expenses
ES, FR, HU, IE, IT,
LT, LV, NL, PL, SK,
UK, EL and AT
Yes,
if
the
Lump sum payments
intention is to
determined
in
increase
the
collective agreement
wages
Yes.
Categorisation
of
employees into pay
groups
Yes
Daily allowance to
compensate
for
posting
Yes
Compensation
for
daily travelling time
Yes
Holiday pay longer
than 4 weeks
No
Meal vouchers
Notes:
*
In collective agreements.
**
In national law
86
ANNEX VI. - IMPACT OF THE REVISED DIRECTIVE ON REMUNERATION
Option 4a
Option 4b
Option 4c
Option 4d
Sectoral
extension
Long-term
Subcontracting
Temp
agency
work
Intracorporate
Already
implemented,
no impact
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Already
implemented,
no impact
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Option 3
Equal rules
on pay
(elements to
be added)
AT
BE
Quality
bonuses
Legislative
changes
required to
implement
the
principle of
equal
treatment
Impact
with
depends on national
whether the temporary
main
agency
contractor is workers.
bound by a
Impact
nonlimited
universally
since TAW
applicable
represent
CA.
less
than
Impact
1%
of
limited since posted
AT usually workers.
makes CA
universally
applicable.
For
all
MS,
legislative
changes
will
be
required.
There are
no reliable
figures on
the number
intracorporate
posting,
but
it
seems to
represent
only
a
marginal
proportion
of posted
workers.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Impact
Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111
limited since
BE usually
makes CA
universally
applicable.
BG
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Impact
limited since
only around
30%
of
workers are
covered by
CA
and
workers
posted
to
BG
are
likely
to
benefit from
more
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
CY
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
88
Legislative
changes
required to
implement
the
principle of
equal
treatment
Impact
with
depends on national
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
including on whether the
remuneration. main
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
temporary
agency
workers.
Impact
limited
since TAW
represent
around 6%
of a low
Impact
number of
limited.
Around 50% posted
of workers workers.
are covered
by CA and a
large
proportion
of workers
posted
to
CY
could
benefit from
more
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
CZ
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Impact
limited since
only around
38%
of
workers are
covered by
CA
and
89
workers
posted
to
CZ
are
likely
to
benefit from
more
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
DE
Legislative
Currently,
Legislative
Allowance
required
14 change
for dirty or only
only if MS
sectors.
required.
dangerous
decides to
National
work;
labour
law avail itself
Quality
this
will apply to of
bonuses
faculty.
workers
posted
for
more than 2 Impact
depends on
years,
including on whether the
remuneration. main
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
agent
workers
already in
place.
With around
60%
of
workers
covered by
CA
and
universally
applicable
CA only in
some
sectors, the
impact
could
be
significant.
DK
No
impact
since DK has
no mechanism
to make CA
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
90
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Impact
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
agent
depends on workers
years,
including on whether the already in
place.
remuneration. main
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
With around
80%
of
workers
covered by
CA and no
universally
applicable
CA,
the
impact
could
be
significant.
EE
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
91
Legislative
changes
required to
implement
the
principle of
equal
treatment
Impact
with
depends on national
whether the temporary
main
agency
contractor is workers.
bound by a
Impact
nonlimited
universally
since TAW
applicable
represent
CA.
around 1%
Impact
of a low
limited since number of
only around posted
33%
of workers.
workers are
covered by
CA
and
workers
posted to EE
are likely to
benefit from
more
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
EL
ES
Quality
bonuses
Legislative
changes
required to
implement
the
principle of
equal
treatment
Impact
with
depends on national
whether the temporary
main
agency
contractor is workers.
bound by a
Impact
nonlimited
universally
since TAW
applicable
represent
CA.
around 4%
Impact
of a low
limited since number of
EL usually posted
makes CA workers.
universally
applicable.
Already
implemented,
no impact
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Already
implemented,
no impact
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Impact
limited since
ES usually
92
makes CA
universally
applicable.
FI
No
information
Already
implemented,
no impact
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
With around
90%
of
workers
covered by
CA and only
a
few
universally
applicable
CA,
the
impact
could
be
significant.
FR
Already
implemented,
no impact
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
93
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
CA.
Impact
limited since
FR usually
makes CA
universally
applicable.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
HR
-
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
HU
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
94
Legislative
changes
required to
implement
the
principle of
equal
treatment
Impact
with
depends on national
whether the temporary
main
agency
contractor is workers.
bound by a
Impact
nonlimited
universally
since TAW
applicable
represent
CA.
less
than
Impact
2% of a
limited since low
only around number of
33%
of posted
workers are workers.
covered by
CA
and
workers
posted
to
HU
are
likely
to
benefit from
more
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
Legislative
changes
required to
implement
the
principle of
equal
treatment
Impact
with
depends on national
whether the temporary
main
agency
contractor is workers.
bound by a
Impact
nonlimited
universally
since TAW
applicable
represent
CA.
around 4%
Some
of a low
impact.
number of
Around 40% posted
of workers workers.
are covered
by CA and
CA at the
level of the
undertaking
are
common.
IE
Currently only
Seniority
7 sectors
allowances;
Quality
bonuses;
13th month
allowance
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
IT
Quality
bonuses
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Already
implemented,
no impact
95
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
including on whether the already
place.
remuneration. main
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Impact
limited since
IT usually
makes CA
universally
applicable.
LT
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Impact
depends on
whether the
main
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Impact
limited since
only around
15%
of
workers are
covered by
CA
and
workers
posted to LT
are likely to
benefit from
more
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
96
in
LU
Currently only Legislative
9 sectors
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
With around
50%
of
workers
covered by
CA
and
universally
applicable
CA only in
some
sectors, the
impact
could
be
significant.
LV
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
97
Legislative
changes
required to
implement
the
principle of
equal
treatment
Impact
with
depends on national
whether the temporary
main
agency
contractor is workers.
bound by a
Impact
nonlimited
universally
since TAW
applicable
represent
CA.
less
than
Impact
2% of a
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
limited since
only around
30%
of
workers are
covered by
CA
and
workers
posted
to
LV
are
likely
to
benefit from
more
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
MT
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
low
number of
posted
workers.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Some
impact.
Around 60%
of workers
are covered
by CA and
CA at the
level of the
undertaking
are
common.
NL
Seniority
Already
allowances;
implemented,
Allowance
no impact
for dirty or
dangerous
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
98
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
work;
Quality
bonuses;13th
month
allowance
of
this crossborder
faculty.
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Impact
limited since
NL usually
makes CA
universally
applicable.
PL
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Impact
depends on
whether the
main
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Limited
impact.
Around 25%
of workers
are covered
by
CA.
Although
CA at the
level of the
undertaking
are
common,
workers
99
posted to PL
are likely to
benefit from
more
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
PT
RO
No
information
Legislative
changes
required to
implement
the
principle of
equal
treatment
Impact
with
depends on national
whether the temporary
main
agency
contractor is workers.
bound by a
Some
nonimpact
universally
since TAW
applicable
represent
CA.
around
Impact
12%
of
limited since workers
IT usually posted to
makes CA PT.
universally
applicable.
Already
implemented,
no impact
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
100
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Impact
limited since
only around
35%
of
workers are
covered by
CA
and
workers
posted
to
RO
are
likely
to
benefit from
more
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
SE
No
impact
since SE has
no mechanism
to make CA
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
With around
90%
of
workers
covered by
CA and no
universally
applicable
CA,
the
impact
could
be
significant.
SI
Legal change Legislative
required,
change
101
Legislative
required
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Impact
depends on
whether the
main
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Impact
limited since
IT usually
makes CA
universally
applicable.
SK
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
102
Legislative
changes
required to
implement
the
principle of
equal
treatment
Impact
with
depends on national
whether the temporary
main
agency
contractor is workers.
bound by a
Impact
nonlimited
universally
since TAW
applicable
represent
CA.
around 1%
Impact
of a low
limited since number of
only around posted
35%
of workers.
workers are
covered by
CA
and
workers
posted
to
SK
are
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
likely
to
benefit from
more
favourable
conditions
in the home
MS.
UK
Legal change
required,
impact
dependent on
the
number
and content of
CA
made
universally
applicable
Legislative
change
required.
National
labour
law
will apply to
workers
posted
for
more than 2
years,
including on
remuneration.
No impact:
equal
treatment
between
local and
crossborder
temporary
Impact
agent
depends on workers
whether the already in
main
place.
contractor is
bound by a
nonuniversally
applicable
CA.
Legislative
required
only if MS
decides to
avail itself
of
this
faculty.
Some
impact.
Around 30%
of workers
are covered
by CA and
CA at the
level of the
undertaking
are
common.
103