MIT
Security Studies Program
Additional Information of Technical Relevance
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 47
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/32aamdc_oif-patriot_sep03.ppt
Small Nose Radius of Tactical Ballistic Missile
Warhead is the Dominant Contribution to the Nose-On
Radar Cross Section (RCS).
For Nose Radii of 1 to 2 inches, the overall RCS will be
less than 0.01 m2, or about a thousand or more times
smaller than a typical aircraft.
As a result, Patriot Units that do not have the benefit of
cueing information will have very short acquisition
ranges against short-range ballistic missiles.
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 48
Estimated Locations
of Patriot Batteries
Cruise Missiles at
300 – 500 ft
Aircraft at
30,000 ft
Aircraft at
15,000 ft
Ranges at Which Patriot Batteries
Can Illuminate Aircraft Flying at
Different Altitudes
Kilometers
0
20
40
60
80 100
Note:
Radar Range Contours Assume that Patriot
Batteries Can Search No Closer Than 3 Degrees
Revision
0
from Local Horizontal Even With Horizon
Diffraction.
April 20, 2004
Page 49
Example of Overlapping Region Between Two
Radars Where One of the Radars Could Create
False Ballistic Missile Targets for the Other
Kilometers
0
20
40
60
80 100
Note:
Radar Range Contours Assume that Patriot
Batteries Can Search No Closer Than 3 Degrees
from Local Horizontal Even With Horizon
Diffraction.
Revision
0
April 20, 2004
Page 50
Estimated Number of Patriot Radars
Simultaneously Tracking
Friendly Aircraft Over Iraq and Kuwait
Roughly 6 to 8 Patriot Radars
Simultaneously Illuminating Aircraft
Location of Karbala F-18
Shoot-Down by Patriot
O
O
O
11
OO
14
9
At Least 13 Patriot Radars
Simultaneously Illuminating Aircraft
5 7
8
4
1
10
12
2
6
Kilometers
3
Estimated Location of Tornado
Shoot-Down by Patriot
0
20
40
60
80 100
Note:
Radar Range Contours Assume that Patriot
Batteries Can Search No Closer Than 3 Degrees
from Local Horizontal Even With Horizon Diffraction.
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 51
Slide 50 from Briefing by the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Defense Command
Original Slide as
Provided in the Briefing
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 52
Slide 50 from Briefing by the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Defense Command
Estimated Locations
of Patriot Batteries
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 53
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 54
Summary of Launches against Kuwait
DTG: 202324Z Mar 03
5
1 x Ababil-100, Distance: 106 km
DTG: 261705Z Mar 03
O
O
EW: CHAT
TARGETS: Camp UDARI
1 x Ababil-100, Missile failure shortly after launch
C5-52 engaged w/ 1 GEM & one 1 PAC II
DTG: 291505Z Mar 03
BDA: Missile destroyed
DTG: 232159Z Mar 03
O
OO
DTG: 241342Z Mar 03
11
EW: None
TARGETS: Camp UDAIRI
BDA: Missile destroyed
DTG: 251246Z Mar 03
14
8
1 x Al Samoud DISTANCE: 152 km
10
1 X Ababil-100 DISTANCE: 128 km
EW: AMDWS, PAWS, COBRA JUDY
EW: HIGGINS, AMDWS,
9
TARGETS: Camps VA, UDAIRI, N. J.
C 5/52 engaged w/ 2 GEM+
TARGETS: Camp DOHA, KUWAIT CITY
KU5 engaged w/2 x GEM, B/2-1 w/1 x GEM +, C/6-52 w/ 2x GEM
5 7
8
BDA: Missile destroyed
DTG: 212208Z Mar 03
9
1 X Ababil-100, Not Engaged, Missile fell short
of Target (Camp Doha), Distance: 115km
C/5-52 engaged w/ 1 x PAC II and 2 x GEM
DTG: 241042Z Mar 03
14
1 X FROG, 85 km, Not Engaged, assessed as
Breach Sites / Harassing Fires
77
1 X Al Samoud DISTANCE: 160 km
11
4
4
1
1 X Ababil-100, Not Engaged, IP Out,
Impact Kuwait Western Desert, no BDA
BDA: Missile destroyed
DTG:201030Z Mar 03
10
12
2
6
1x Ababil 100 DISTANCE: 113 km
2
EW: COBRA JUDY, AMDWS
TARGETS: Camps COMMANDO and DOHA
E 2/43 engaged w/ 2 PAC III
DTG:200924Z Mar 03
1x Ababil 100 DISTANCE: 145km
1
1
DTG: 211001Z Mar 03
1 X Ababil-100 DISTANCE: 162km
EW: COBRA JUDY, AMDWS
EW: ADSI, AMDWS,AEGIS
TARGETS: TAA THUNDER
TARGETS: TAA FOX
6
D 5/52 engaged w/ 3 GEMS
KU5 engaged w/2 X GEMS, KU3 w/1 X GEM
BDA: Missile Destroyed
BDA: Missile destroyed
3
BDA: Missile Destroyed
DTG: 202100Z Mar 03
3
1 X Ababil-100, Not Engaged, Impact in
Northern Arabian Gulf. Flew 187 Kilometers.
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 55
Summary of Launches against Kuwait
O
O
O
11
OO
14
9
5 7
8
4
1
O
O
10
12
2
6
O
3
11
OO
14
9
5 7
8
4
1
10
12
2
6
3
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 56
MIT
Security Studies Program
Extracted Slides from the Army Air Defense Artillery Briefing
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 57
Extracted Slides from the Army Air Defense Artillery Briefing (Page 1 of 3)
UNCLASSIFIED
(DES TROY AS OPSEC SENSITIVE)
Joint EW Archite cture
Most advance d ever –
TES, DSN CNF B ridge ,
page rs, AC10, WOTS,
ADSI, C2PC, AMDWS,
AEGIS , COBRA
JUDY
32nd AAMDC
No loss of life or
e quipment due to an
Iraqi TBM
9 for 9
1st ever PAC III, GEM,
and GEM+ kills
LNOs in 6 countries
1-7 ADA
15 C-5s, 21 C17s
La rgest movement
of Patriot by air
1st e ver Wartime
Coalition Patriot
Ope rations
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Desert Storm –vsvs- Iraqi Freedom
1 st Eve r support of
the USMC by a
Patriot Brigade
Joint Attack Ope ra tions
Succe ssful finding, fixing and
killing Ene my TBMs
Innovative use of
Float equipment –
“Shortstop”
What was Different?
IMD TF Operations in 8 Countries
“PLAYBOOK”
Re inforce Maneuver
coverage approved by LTG
McKierna n
32nd AAMDC Playbook
10 “Plays” that provided flexibility
S ECR ET/ORCON R EL MCFI/X4
PL Arifjan
Trig ger: M aneuver for ces clear PL
Arifjan (Max ran ge o f SRBM to Arifjan )
224th BDE (NORTH)
1 x FROG-7 BN
2 X ASTROS BN
1 X ABABIL-100 BTRY (DS)
1 X ABABIL-50 BTRY (DS)
Task: C/2-1 deploys forward in V C or ps
Zone (OPC ON 5-52), A/2-1 remote
launch fro m KNB to protect Arifjan and
SPOD
Pur pose: Pr ovid e Config 3 coverage
forwar d, mitigate risk to SPOD with
remote lau nch
Operation al B enefit: Provides one
additio nal Co nfig 3 forwar d
V Corps
MEF
3 x Config 3
2 x Config 3
PATRIOT Forward of PL F lorid a LD + 24-36
SEC RET/OR CON RE L MCFI/X 4
X
28
30
20
15+
II
11
10
X
0
225th
AL Samoud
11+
INITIAL OB
LOCATED BUT
NOT SE CURED
4
1
SECURED OR UNACCOUNTED
DESTROYED IN
FOR
PLACE
ABABIL -100
FROG-7
MISSILES
40
200
200
600
Summary of Launches against Kuwait
5
DTG: 261705Z Mar 03
O
O
1 X FROG, 85 km, Not Engaged, assessed as
Br each Sites / Harass ing Fires
OO
DTG: 241342Z M ar 03
11
TARGETS: Camp UDAIRI
BDA: Miss ile destr oyed
DTG: 270831Z Mar 03
EW : HI GGI NS, AM DWS,
9
TARGETS: Camps VA, UDAIRI, N. J.
C 5/52 engaged w/ 2 GEM+
5 7
8
BDA: Miss ile destr oyed
4
4
1
1 X Ababil-100, Not Engaged, IP Out,
Impact Kuw ait Western Desert, no BDA
1x Ababil 100 DISTANCE: 145km
10
1 X Ababil-100 DISTANCE: 128 km
EW: AMDWS, PAWS, COBRA J UDY
DTG:200924Z Mar 03
Stables
DTG: 251246Z Mar 03
14
8
1 x Al Samoud DISTANCE: 152 km
TARGETS: Cam p DOHA, KUWAIT CITY
1 X Ababil-100, Distance : 144 km
KU5 engaged w /2 x GEM, B/2-1 w /1 x GEM +, C/6-52 w / 2x GEM
EARLY WARNING: HI GGINS, AMDWS,
12
BDA: Miss ile destroyed
TARGETS: CP DOHA, KUWAIT CITY
DTG:201030Z Mar 03
10
2 12
6
2.7 KM from
Intercept to COIC
9
1 X Ababil-100, Not Engaged, M is sile fell short
of Targe t (Camp Doha), Distance: 115km
C/5-52 e ngaged w/ 1 x PAC II and 2 x GEM
Intercept point
CAMP DOHA, Kuwait (CNN ) -- The Iraqi military
came within se conds o f po ssibly wiping ou t
the headquarters of the coalition ground
forces with a mi ssile on March 27, U.S. military
official s said. The mi ssile wa s intercepted and
de stroyed by a U.S. Patriot m issile shortly
before it could have hit its target.
14
O
77
DTG: 241042Z M ar 03
11
DTG: 291505Z Mar 03
BDA: Missile destr oyed
EW: None
Volley 12 “Saddam's decapitation strike”
The Defense of CFLCC Headquarters
1 x Ababil- 100, M is sile failure shor tly after launch
C5-52 engaged w/ 1 GEM & one 1 PAC II
1 X Al Samoud DISTANCE: 160 km
DTG: 212208Z M ar 03
11
6
4
7
ASSE SSED
DESTROYED IN
COMBAT OPS
AL SA MOUD
SYSTEM
LAUNCHERS
Al Hussein
10
Al Samoud
11+
Ababil-100
15+
FROG-7
46
DTG: 232159Z M ar 03
ASSESSMENT:2
ASSESSMENT
:2--5 Launchers & 88 Missiles
46
40
226th
X
TARGETS: Camp UDARI
WARHEAD:: 1,135 Pounds shapedWARHEAD
shaped-charge
warhead; capable penetrating
40 to 60 inches of steel on impact
50
X
228th
Tech Spt
EW: CHAT
(57 NM) 105 KM
60
X
II
1 x Ababil-100, Distance : 106 km
MAX RANGE:
RANGE:
70
227th
DTG: 202324Z Mar 03
CRUISING ALT.:
ALT .:
MOD I:330, 660, 1000 Feet
MOD II:100, 165, or 330 Feet
Separate Batteries
in Many Countries
80
225th BDE (SOUTH)
1 X FROG-7 BN
1 X ASTROS BN
1 X ABABIL-100 BTRY
Iraqi Cruise Missile Threat
IRAQI CSSC-3 SEER SUCKER
Force ProtectionNon-contiguous
Asymmetrical Threat
Offensive Operations –
integrated with CAOC
MEF
Operations
PostPost-Hostility SSM Situation
2 x U/I Al Samoud BN (National)
(+ 1 Config 3)
Risk: Sing le point o f failure
Arifjan /SPOD/KN B
1 st employme nt of
Battery Command
Post (2 BNs)
Short Range TBMs
Cruise M issiles
X
228th BN (Tech Spt)
Plays were briefed to COMCFLCC and
the V Corps Commander, and were
used by subordinate commanders for
deliberate planning.
AMDWS mission
sharing and a ir
pic ture with 48
boxes, 19 units;
including 1st UK Div
and I MEF
EAC SHORAD
M ission
32d AAMDC
SECFOR
224th
227th BDE (CENTER)
1 X ASTROS BN
1 X M-2001
BN
II
1 X FROG-7 BN
1 X ABABIL-100 BTRY
1 X ABABIL-50 BTRY
I
2-1
SEC RET/O R CON RE L M CFI/X 4
45 CH47 Sorties to
deliver supplies
UNCLASSIFIED
(DES TROY AS OPSEC SENSITIVE)
226th BDE (DS to RGFC)
3 X FROG-7 BN
CONF IG 3
Assumptio ns: No Al H ussein fir ed,
~+24hr from L D initiate
PATRIOT PLAYBOOK
CZAR of
Ope rational
Protection (MP,
NBC, ADA)
AC/RC Integration
1st ever Re mote
Launc h Operations
X
PLAY 2
Cruise Missile
Threat is Here and
Now
PrePre-Hostility SSM Situational Template
"Let me begin by saying this will be a campaign unlike
any other in history — a campaign characterized by
shock, by surprise, by flexibility, by the employment of
precise munitions on a scale never before seen and by
the application of overwhelming force," Gen. Franks
Description: C/2-1 (Arifjan) deploys to V
Corps zone, OPCON 5-52, A/2-1 (K NB )
con ducts r emote laun ch fr om Arifjan
Joint Are a Air
De fense Plan
41 BTRYS, 7 BNS, 4 BDES,
6500 SOLDIERS
92% Ope rationa l
Rate during wa r
LARs, MIRs, OAIs
comba t multiplie rs!
SECRE T/ORCON REL MCFI/X4
Separate Battalion Missions1-7 ADA Jordan, 1-1 ADA 4ID
CFLCC/CFACC Roles
Attack Ope rations
Pre-co mbat operations:
destroyed 2 Ababil-100 TELS
Multi-service
SADCs
32d Army Air and Missile Defense
Command
Corps Bde Operations
Expectations - high
Leak Proof Defense
1069 Missiles Moved
Systems (PAC II/PAC III)
Missiles (GEM, GEM+, PAC II, PAC III)
BCP’s, Remote Launchers, Link 16
14J and 140A
32d AAMDC
EW provide d to
Kuwait. Activate d
170 Sire ns
Textbook
Deployment
(rail, se a, air)
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Force Modernization-
270 degree coverage
270 degree operations
1x Ababil 100 DISTANCE: 113 km
2
COIC
ENGAGEMENT: KU3 2 x GEM , C/6-52 2 x GEM
The attack ca me as Lt. Gen.
Da vid McKiernan, coalition
ground for ce s commander,
wa s mee ting with other top
military officials.
BDA: Missile destr oyed
EW: COBRA JUDY, AMDWS
TARGETS: Cam ps COMMANDO and DOHA
E 2/43 engaged w/ 2 PAC III
11
DTG: 211001Z M ar 03
1 X Ababil-100 DISTANCE: 162km
6
EW: COBRA JUDY, AMDWS
EW: ADSI, AM DWS,AEGIS
TARGETS: TAA THUNDER
TARGETS: TAA FOX
D 5/52 engage d w/ 3 GEMS
KU5 e ngaged w /2 X GEMS, KU3 w /1 X GEM
BDA: M issile Destroye d
BDA: Miss ile destr oyed
3
BDA: Miss ile Destroyed
DTG: 202100Z M ar 03
3
1 X Ababil-100, Not Engaged, Impact in
Nor ther n Arabian Gulf. Flew 187 Kilometers .
PATRIOT Launch
“Stay calm, continue the BUA, and let PATRIOT take care of it.” COMCFLCC
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 58
Extracted Slides from the Army Air Defense Artillery Briefing (Page 2 of 3)
Summary of CSSCCSSC-3 Launches
Summary of Launches in Iraq
What TAMD Forces Protected
DTG: 272 056 Z Mar 03
13
13
1 X SRBM (Aba bil-100 or ER FROG)
4
5
EN GAGEMENT : No ne
5
22ndnd&&33rdrdCSSC-3
CSSC-3LAUNCH
LAUNCH––28
28Mar
Mar
DTG: 020020 Z Apr 03
11ststCSSC-3
CSSC-3LAUNCH
LAUNCH––20
20Mar
Mar
DTG: 010600Z Apr 03
1
Baghdad
15
EA RLY WARNI NG: NONE
EARLY WARNING: CO BRA JU DY;
HIGGINS; TACDAR
3
Camp Commando (BDA: None)
2
2
Missile Deflector (BDA: None)
3
Sharq Mall, Kuwait City (BDA: Minor Damage)
The “Future” Cruise
Missile threat is here
today
WHAT WAS THERE
TAR GETS: LSA Bushma ster
DTG: 020150Z Apr 03
C 2/1 engaged w/ 2 x PAC III
2 x FROG-7, 95 km & 7 5 km, Not
Engage d, Targe te d at LSA
Bushma ster, No B DA
16
15 17
BDA: Missile Destroyed
101st AAD Aviation Assets - 100+ Helos / 4,000 Soldiers
200924ZMAR03
2
201030ZMAR03
Camp Commando
Al Jahra
I MEF / Marine Engineer Group HQ - 4,700 Marines
100,000 Civilians
5
202324ZMAR03
Camp Udairi
11th AHR and Combat Support Hospital - 4,000 Soldiers
6
211001ZMAR03
7
TAA FOX
Al Jahra
Camps
NJ / NY / PA
1st Forward Service Support Group - 4,500 Marines
100,000 Civilians
232159ZMAR03
8
241042ZMAR03
Camps VA / NJ
V CORPS Main / 101st AAD - 8,000 Soldiers
10
251246ZMAR03
12
270831ZMAR03
15
010600ZAPR03
16
1 x FROG-7, 63 km, Not Enga ged,
Ta rgeted a t LSA Bushma ster, IP Out,
No B DA
1 X Al Samoud DISTANCE: 1 50 km
1
LOCATION
1
BD A: Unkn own
Mosul
4
Umm Qsar (BDA: None)
DTG
TARGETS: Possible Ba dr Corps Ca mp
44thth&&55ththCSSC-3
CSSC-3LAUNCH
LAUNCH––31
31Mar
Mar
Safwan (BDA: None)
VOLLEY
EA RLY WA RNI NG: DSP-A, SBIRS
First coordinated
multiple missile launch
(Volley 17)
TAA Thunder
101st AAD - 12,000 Soldiers
Camp Commando
I MEF / Marine Engineer Group HQ - 4 ,700 Marines
17
Camp Doha
LSA Bushmaster
Camp Doha / CFLCC HQ - 8,000
11 AHR, 101st AAD Aviation Assets, V CORPS Log Assets
10,000 Soldiers
EARL Y WARNING: GC CS, AMDWS
KEY T RENDS: Fir st coordinated
multiple missile la unch.
Early Warning
DSP
Estimated Launch to Impact Timeline
COBRA JUDY
Final Thoughts
AEGIS (USS HIGGINS)
1
Minute
2
Minutes
3
Minute s
~ 40 Sec to
~ 30
~ 20
~ 70 Sec for TES to ~ 20
Sec Profile & broa dcast Se c asse ss& w arn Se c for
for
PAWS & Conf page r
to
TDDS/ TIBS
el lipse
Bridge
a lert
dete ct
4
Minutes
5
Minutes
Proven….
~ 6-7 min
• You will fight as you train
Time for MS Cs & Base Cl uste rs
to go through Ba ttle Drills
Impact
PATRIOT CRC,
ICC AND ROC
JDN (TADIL-J)
TES
US GROUND KU MOI
FORCES (CIV DEF)
AL HUSSEI N
La unch
1st indica tion
of l aunch at
CFLCC HQ.
I nitia te the
PA Sys &
Confere nce
Bridge Alert
“SCUD” ale rt
Impact
e llipse
a ppears
Area s at
risk
announce d
PAWS ,
Confere nce
Bridge &
CFLCC Cmd
Net (SATCOM )
NAVCENT
CJFSOCC
CFLCC (CAMP DOHA)
Base
Localized
EW
Saudi Military
Kuwaiti Civil
Defense
(152 sirens)
Actual total warning
30 - 45 Seconds
Launch to Impact
= Time sa ved by announci ng
“Kuw ai t” at risk - not w aiti ng for
e stima ted impa ct ellipse
CENTCOM FD-FR DRSN
LESSONS/OBSERVATIONS ((-)
• Non-contiguous battlefield exposes us all
1
Minute
2
Minutes
~ 3-4 min
Time for MSCs & Base
Cluste rs to go through
Ba ttle Drills
Impact
AL SAMOUD /
ABABIL-100
La unch
1 st indica tion
of l aunch at CFLCC
HQ. Initia te the PA
Sys & Conference
Bri dge Alert “SCUD”
a lert
Areas a t
risk
a nnounced
PAWS, Conf
Bridge &
CFLCC Cmd
Net
Pager
goe s
off
~ 1:00 min
or
~ 2:00 min
(wa rning time once
EW gets to the MSC/ Ba se)
LESSONS/OBSERVATIONS ((-)
Systems Deficiencies
Joint Deficiencies
– C4I Lacking – Internal and external voice & data capability -– Controlling
• Patriot is lethal
~ 3-4 min
~ 40 Se c to
~ 30
~40 Sec ~ 20
to cl ear to get a sse ss& wa rn Se c for
(PAWS &
page r
horizon be st
ale rt
& to JDN track Conf Bridge )
V OI CE EW FROM CFLCC HQ
CAOC (PSAB)
Pa ger
goe s
off
– SRBMs more challeng ing – non-contiguous battlefie ld requires 360°
• There is no difference between SHORAD AND HIMAD.. but the
equipment. The fundamental tasks to guarantee freedom of
maneuver are the same
• There is no difference between EAC and Corps Patriot; all must
be trained under one standard
• Basic fundamentals carry the fight; again
The “Way Ahead”
• OIF validated the inherently “Joint Nature” of Theater Missile Operations
coverage
Authority to shooter links
• Joint Exercise/ Experiments enhance combat readiness (RS, UFL, IL,
CJTFEX (JCIET))
– Interoperability v ia Link 16 to Battery Level
• Voice over TADIL-J / Link 16
• Voice to airborne controller
Operational Deficiencies
• Theater Air Defense net
Need rev ised Tactical SOP for Patriot Cre ws w/ focus on engagement
operations
– Impacts of dense joint / coalition battlespace Ł
• Training, Doctrine, Material Solutions
– Space based warning not effective for SRBMs
EMI Ł Spurious tracks, IFF
– EAD / EAC unit tra ining to include CSS training
• “CTC Like” training opportunity required for AMD forces
• C2 limitations pose greatest risk now and in the future
• Operations on non-contiguous battlefield
• Resourcing of CSS units
• Enhance capabilities to counter the evolving threat
– PATRIOT organization
• 4 Btry vs. 5 Btry battalion
• PAC II in PAC III Task Force
• Theater-level air defense command required
Completed Action
•Today- 32d AAMDC with Joint Responsibilities
•Tomorrow- Standing Integrated Missile Defense JTF
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 59
Extracted Slides from the Army Air Defense Artillery Briefing (Page 3 of 3)
AMD LESSONS LEARNED (+)
ACHIEVING THE AMD “STANCE”
TACTICAL
Joint Operations
•Joint (AEGIS) early warning and situational awareness w/ Link 16
•Role as DAADC w/ CFACC – Counter-TBM team (Attack Operations), AADP
•Role as TAAMDCOORD w/ CFLCC-Operations w/ V Corps, I MEF
•Operational Force Protection
Combined Operations
• Integration of US & Coalition TMD operations: Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel, Dutch, UK
• C2 of Kuwait PATRIOT (46 ADA (KWT) TACON to 11 BDE in Feb 03)
• Host nation early warning
Performance
•PATRIOT lethality proven – 9 of 9- confirmed warhead kills 8 of 9
•OR Rate for the Patriot force >92% during combat operations
•Stance and flexibility – Playbook, Shortstop, EAC remissioning, Asymmetric
defense
•Divisional ADA – Combined arms contribution, fight as a battalion, security
missions, CMO
DATA
•PATRIOT IN IRAQ COULD NOT TALK TO
TAOC IN KUWAIT
• NO SATCOM
•AWACS CAN’T TALK TO GROUND
BASED UNITS
RESULT: NO VOICE LINK BETWEEN
BATTALION HQS AND HIGHER
AUTHORITY (ID AND ENGAGEMENT)
FIX: MTOE AND JOINT
ACTION: ADAS / 32 ND AAMDC
JDN
•AWACS/CRC DID NOT ALLOW GROUND AND
SEA BASED DATA TO BE DISPLAYED
RESULT:
•DIFFERENT AIR PICTURE AT
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF COMMAND
•1ST TIME PATRIOT WAS
AWARE OF INCOMING TBM WAS W HEN IT’S
RADAR SAW IT
FIX: MAXIMIZES JOINT
EFFORTS IN DEFINING THE JDN
ACT ION: DCD
TWT
•SHORTAGE OF HSDIO CARDS
RESULTED IN PAC-2 UNITS NOT
TRANSMITTING/RECEIVING DATA FROM
ICC/TAOC/CRC
•PAC-2 AND PAC-3 INCOMPATABILITY
RESULT: AUTONOMOUS UNITS
FIX: HSDIO CARDS FOR PAC-2 UNITS
PATRIOT & MEADS TRANSITION
ACTION: LTPO AND 32ND AAMDC
•MAX LIFE IS 10,000 HRS.
•NO TIMER ON TWT
RESULT: SOLDIER DOESN’T KNOW HOW MANY
HOURS ON HIS TWT
RECOMMENDATION:
1) ESTABLIS H PROCEDURES TO TRACK TWT USE
2) ESTABLIS H TWT WARM-UP CRITE RIA
ACTION: LTPO
TRAINING
COMPRESSOR/DEHYDRATION
UNIT
AMD STANDARD
BEARER
•CURRENTLY RE QUIRES SOLD IER W/
STOPWATCH TO TIME ON AND OFF C YCLES
FOR AN HOUR TO DETERMINE FMC/NMC
RESULT: PROCEDURE NOT PRACTICAL IN
WAR
RECOMMENDATION: E ITHER CHANGE
WAVE GUIDE PRESSURIZATION S YSTEM OR
ADD THIS CHECK INTO BIT (TELLS
OPERATER IF CDU IS OVERHEATING)
ACTION: LTPO
•SOLDIERS 100% RELIANT ON
PATRIOT WEAPON SYSTEM
•NO STANDARD FOR TRAINING
PROFICIENCY
•RECOGNITION OF TECHNICAL/
TACTICAL COMPETENCE
RESULT: ACROSS THE FORCE
THERE ARE VARYING DEGREES
OF STANDARDS
FIX:
1) INITIATE MASTER GUNNER
COURSE
(1 ST CLASS 2ND QTR FY04)
2) DEVELOP/PUBLISH PATRIOT
GUNNERY MANUAL
3) DEVELOP AMD TOP GUN
PROGRAM
4) TRAIN NEW POST-OIF TSOP
ACTION: ADAS / 32 ND AAMDC
CABLES ON THE FRONT-END
•3 CABLES; NO D IAGNOSTICS
•IF SOLDIER REPLACES ONE CABLE THAT
APPEARS TO BE DEFECTIVE – A P ROBLEM
IS INTRODUCED THAT IS NOT DETECTABLE
WITH DIAGNOSTICS
RECOMMENDATION: ESTABLISH LIFE
EXPECTANCY ON CABLES, REPLACE ALL 3
ACTION: LTPO
HIGH FAILURE RATES
•RF WINDOWS
•WAVE GUIDE
•EDRS
OFF-SHIP/AIRCRAFT READINESS
CHALLENGED AIRSPACE CONT ROL
FRIENDLY PROTECT
OPERATOR TRAINING
IN AN AMBIGUOUS
ENVIRONMENT
•ON-LINE TRAINING
MODE/TROOP PROFICIENCY
TRAINER DOES NOT PRESENT
OPERATOR WITH
MISCLASSIFIED OR FALSE
TRACKS
•PCOFT – INCAPABLE OF
SCRIPTING SPURIOUS TRACKS
FIX:
UPDATE OTM/TPT/PCOFT
SOFTWARE
ACTION: LTPO / 32ND AAMDC
PROFESSIONALIZE THE FORCE
TRAINING
•OPERATORS FOCUS SOLELY
ON TBMs; DID NOT WORK ID
OF UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT ON
SCOPE
•LOST SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS OF AIR TRACKS
•AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS
PROCEDURES NOT CLEAR.
RESULT: LOSS OF
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
FIX: TRAIN SCOPE
AWARENESS – ALL AIR
PLATFORMS.
ACTION: ADAS/32nd AAMDC
STRATEGIC
•17 C5s AND 21 C17s
TO MOVE 5 PATRIOT MINIMUM
ENGAGEMENT PACKAGES
TO JORDAN
•PATRIOT LAUNCHERS DO
NOT F IT ON LOWER DECKS OF
ALL SHIPS; MOSTLY
WEATHER-DECKS
RESULT: LIMITED A IR FRAMES
DEVOTED TO MOVE PATRIOT
OIF VALIDAT ED T HE REQUIREMENT FOR MEADS
ACO/SPINS
•OIF SPINS WERE NOT TIMELY
•UNITS NOT AGGRESSIVE IN
RECEIVING ACO/SPINS
•ACMS NOT USED TO ROUTE
FRIENDLY AC
RESULT: UNITS OPERATING
OFF DIFFERENT DATA
FIX: JOINT TRAINING
ACTION: ADAS/32N D AAMDC/DIV ADA
•173RD AIRBORNE
REGIMENT MOVED BY
AIR TO BASHURE A IRFIELD,
NORTH EAST IRAQ; A
C-130 ONLY A IRF IELD
•IRAQ LAUNCHED TWO
FROGS TOWARD THE IR
LOCATION
•CENTCOM REQUES TED
PATRIOT SUPPORT
• DUE TO NON-CONTINGUOUS
BATTLEFIED, PATRIOT COULD NOT
MOVE OVER LAND TO DEFEND 173RD
•PATRIOT RE QUIRES C-17/C-5
RESULT: UNDEFENDED AND
EXPOSED FORCES
Pursue AMD-Vision
RADAR RELIABILITY
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS/UNDERSTANDING
VOICE
OPERATIONAL
•PATRIOT IS A SECTORED WEAPON;
DOES NOT PROV IDE 360 DEGREE
COVERAGE
•NON-CONTIGUOUS BATTLEF IELD
INCREASED REQUIRED F IRE UNITS;
MULTIPLE PTLs
•HEAVY TRUCKS STUCK ROUTINELY
•COMBINED ARMS INTEGRATION
(+)DIVIS IONAL (-)PATRIOT
•ASYMMETRICAL THREA T – STINGE R
OVERMATCHED
RESULT: EXPOSURE OF HIGH VALUE
ASSETS TO TBMs AND CRUISE
MISS ILES
BASIC FUNDAMENTALS
PATRIOT GENERAL
KNOWLEDGE
•OPERATORS AT ALL LEVELS
DIDN’T FULLY UNDERSTAND
TABULAR ENTRY VALUES.
•PROCEDURES NOT
ESTABLISHED FOR
HARMONIZING THE PATRIOT
WEAPON IAW METT-TC.
RESULT: OPERATOR NOT
ENABLING THE WEAPON
SYSTEM.
FIX:
•RE-WRITE TSOP; INCLUDE
LINKAGE BETWEEN
IPB(DOCTRINAL/SITUATIONAL
TEMPLATE) TO TABULAR
ENTRIES.
• GROW EXPERTS IN THE
FORCE
ACTION: ADAS/32nd AAMDC
PROFESSIONALIZE THE FORCE
SHOOT
•MUST SHOOT INDIVIDUAL
AND CREW-SERVED
WEAPONS TWICE A YEAR
•CONVOY LFX A MUST
•RING MOUNT READINGS
•IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS SPORTS
•WEAPONS MAINTENANCE
•MUZZLE AWARENESS
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
MOVE
•CONVOY PROCEDURES
•MANEUVER / COMBINED
ARMS
•VEHICLE RECOVERY
OPERATIONS
•MTOE REVIEW –
PLUGGERS; NVGs
•UP-ARMORED HMMWVs
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS
COMMUNICATE
• RADIO MAINTENANCE
• FIELD EXPEDIENT ANTENNAS
•URIDIUM PHONES/SATCOM MTOE
• MEDEVAC/CALL FOR FIRE
• USAF “FIREWALLS” PROHIBITS
AMDWS, C2PC, CHAT
• AIRBORNE PLATFORMS; CAN’T
TALK TO PATRIOT
FIX – “CTC-LIKE EXPERIENCE”
COMBINED ARMS/JOINT
COE/NON-CONTIGUOUS
TRAINED/COMPETENT OCS AND OPFOR; TBMs, CMs UAVs,
ASYMMETRIC THREATS
LESSONS LEARNED; COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE
LEADER DEVELOPMENT – LEADER TRAINING PROGRAM
UPDATE MTPs AND JOINT DOCTRINE
LFX – DUST FACILITY/ CONVOY LFX
WARRIOR FOCUS
Revision 0
April 20, 2004
Page 60