IN THE GENERAL COU RI OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURI DIVISiON
95 CVS 1158
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
(OIINTY OF V \KI
HOKE COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCAJION. et al..
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
and
ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD
OF EDUCATION, et a!..
Plaintilfs-Inter\dnors
v.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA;
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OF LAW AS AMICI CURIAE
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES tJNION OF NORTH CAROLINA
LEGAL FOUNDATION, ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES OF
LEGAL AID OF NORTH CAROLINA,
NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE CENTER, NORTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE OF
NAACP BRANCHES
The American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Advocates for
Children’s Services of Legal Aid of North Carolina. North Carolina Justice Center, and the North
( aiolma Conferencc ol N \ \CP Branches ttogethei
is
4mzcr’) submit this memorandum of la
in anticipation of the Courfs April 29, 2009 hearing.
iinici attach to this brief, and hereby incorporate herein by rehrence. a Supplemental
Memorandum of Law liled 1w .4mici seven years ago. soon after this Court requested that parties
interested in the Leandro litii.iation address whether the Court was empowered to order the State
to appropriate the funds necessary “to ensure that all children receive the opportunity to obtain a
sound basic education as required by the constitution” February 6. 2002, Memo. at 2. Hoke
Countt’ Bd. o/Educ. v. North Carolina (Wake Co. Super. CL, Feb. 6, 2002), In response, Amici
submitted the attached memorandum to remind all concerned that centuries-old judicial authority
supports this Court’s “province and duty” both to interpret the law and. where necessary, to
direct the other branches of government “to pertorm a judicially commanded act.” See attached
February 22. 2002. Supplemental Memorandum of Law as Amid Curiae (hereinafter
“Memorandum”), at 3-4, citing Marburv v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) and Bayard
Singleton, I N.C. 5, 6-7 (1787). The Amid concluded seven years ago, and maintain today, that
this Court has the power to enter orders requiring the State of North Carolina to provide
Leanciro-compliant, constitutionally-mandated educational services, Id. at 8.
Arnie! have studied carefully the Court’s recent analysis of “irrefutable evidence of a
complete breakdown in academics in Halifax County Public Schools” (hereinafter “HCPS”).
Letter to Dr. Ham son and Superintendent Atkinson (hereinafter “Letter”), at 9, Hoke County Bd.
of Ediw. v. North Carolina (Wake Co. Super. Ct., March 16, 2009). .linici respectfully submit
that pursuant to the Court’s province and duty. the time is ripe for this Court to direct the State to
fulfill its constitutional obligation to ensure every student in HCPS an equal opportunity to
receive a sound basic education.
The Court. in its Notice of I Jeanne and Order. has “provided the Executive Branch the
opportunity. iniiiallv at least, to exercise its constitutional authority over the Halithx County
School system to remedy the academic disaster” that has long persisted in HCPS Notice of
Hearing, at 14, Hoke County Bd. of Ethic. v.North c’arolina (Wake Co. Super. Ct., March 18,
2009)
The Court
‘Iucompan\ing letter to Di Harrison md Supeiintcndent tkinson elaborate
on the Court’s position:
This is academic genocide and it must be stopped. The State of North Carolina
is responsible and it is time for the State of North Carolina, through its Executive
Branch and the State Board of Education to exercise direct command and control
over the Halifax County Public Schools.
Letter. at 1 0.
Amid respectfully refer the Court to the authorities cited in the attached memorandum as
support for the premise that this Court is fully empowered to craft what relief is necessary to
address the constitutional crisis in HCPS. See attached Memorandum at 5, citing Corurn v.
University ofNorth Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289-290 (1992). At a
minimum, Amici urge the Court to exercise its powers to require the State to devise, /imnd and
implement a comprehensive and detailed plan to fulfill the now vell-accepted components of a
Leandro-compliant education: that every classroom is staffed with a competent, certified, welltrained teacher; that every school is run by well-trained, competent school administrators; and
that sufficient resources are expended in HCPS to ensure that all students, including at-risk
students, receive an equal opportunity to a sound, basic education. See Hoke County Rd. of
Educ. v. State, 358 NC. 605, 636, 599 S.E.2d 356, 389 (2004).
These Leandro components must be more than aspirational; they must be made available
in/iict for every I-ICPS student. For example. at present, strongprimnaItcie evidence suggests a
devastating shortage of effective teachers in IICPS. In 2007-08. according to the North Carolina
Department of Public Instruction, 24% of HCPS middle school teachers and 29% of HCPS high
school teachers did not have a teacher’s license. See NC Report Cards,
http://www.ncreportcards.org (last visited Apr
(i
2009), These percentages lagged Ihr behind
statewide averaces of 9% of middle school teachers and 11% of hith school ieachers’ lacking
liLensul e Id
imu i urge thL ( owl to
rLquHL
th
it
a mndator LomponLnt ot
in\
pi opos il
Ii om
the State to fulfill its constitutional obligations include a detailed and comprehensive plan to
provide students in 1-ICPS with effective, licensed teachers no later than the beginning of the
2009-2010 school year.
In its 2002 final Judgment, this Court described in detail the components of a Leandro
compliant public education that abandoned the old way of allowing at-risk children to fall
through the cracks:
Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution,
as interpreted by Leandro, guarantee to each and every child the right to an equal
opportunity to obtain a sound basic education requires that each child be afforded
the opportunity to attend a public school which has the following educational
resources at a minimum:
First, that every classroom be staffed with a competent, certified, well-trained
teacher who is teaching the standard course of study by implementing effective
educational methods that provide differentiated, individualized instruction,
assessment and remediation to the students in that classroom.
Second, that every school be led by a well-trained competent Principal with the
leadership skills and the ability to hire and retain well-trained teachers who can
implement an c/fr ctive and cost-effective instructional program that meets the
needs ofat-risk children so that they can have the equal opportunity to obtain a
sound basic education by achieving grade level of above academic performance.
Third, that every school be provided, in the most cost-effective manner, the
resources necessary to support the effective instructional program within that
school so that the educational needs ofall children, including at-risk children, to
have the equal opportunity to achieve a sound, basic education can be met.
“Section Four
Ethic
—
Hoke County & Beyond
Judgment,” at 109-I l0,Ho ke County Bd. of
Vorth Carolina (Wake Co Super Ct, April 4 2002) Se en years since the
Court crafted the above vision of a constitutionally-required sound basic education, a
contrary fate still awaits majorities of students in many school districts who are poor,
racial minorities, English language learners, and/br disabled. In HCPS, and throughout
North Carolina, at-risk students are not receiving “effective educational methods that
4
provide differentiated, individualized instruction, assessment and remediation to the
students in that classroom,” supra., and the State, thus far, has avoided any obligation to
show how, “in the most cost-effective manner,” it will provide “the resources necessary
to support the effective instructional program within [the schools of North Carolinal so
that the educational needs of all children, including at-risk children,” are met. Supra.
In prior pleadings, Amici have directed the Court’s attention to the state law that requires
a Personal Education Plan (“PEP”) for every student at risk of academic failure. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1 15C-105.41 (2009). Amici submit that I 15C-105,41 provides ample additional basis for a
directive from this Court to require the State to show with specificity how it plans to meet not
only the Leandro-compliant components discussed above, but also the legislature’s mandate that
the needs of at-risk students be met with a PEP that includes, as required by 16 N.C,A.C.
6D,0505 (2008), a diagnostic evaluation, intervention strategies, and monitoring strategies for
any student at risk of educational failure.
Amid support the Court’s present focus on Halifax County and urge the Court to require
the State to use this opportunity once and for all to devise, fund and implement a plan that fully
delivers Leandro rights to at-risk children in HCPS. The authorities relied upon in the attached
2002 Memorandum remain in force and support this Court’s authority to exercise its equitable
powers to craft an appropriate remedy to redress the present harm in HCPS, Two years after
Amici filed the attached memorandum, Leandro 11(2004) upheld the now bedrock principle that
the State is ultimately responsible, including financially, to provide every child in every school
district an equal opportunity to a sound basic education and that the judiciary can and must act
should the State fail to meet this constitutional responsibility, lioke County, 358 N.C. at 638,
599 S.E.2d at 391 (affirming this Court’s order requiring the State to “assess its education-related
[financial] allocations to the county’s schools so as to correct any deficiencies that presently
prevent the coun1’ from offering its students the opportunity to obtain a Leund.ro_conforrning
education”).
Amici urge the Court to exercise all equitable powers necessary to require the State to
meet its constitutional obligations to the students in I ICPS. While Amid join the Court in
recognizing the urgency of this situation, Amici respectfully request that the Court, if necessary.
return this litigation to an adversarial process so that all parties have an opportunity to be heard,
engage in any necessary discovery, and otherwise prepare a record should any party elect to
challenge an Order of this Court in the appellate division.
CONC I. US! ON
For the reasons stated herein, Amid respectfully request that the Court intervene with an
appropriate remedial order if the State, after being afforded full due process rights under the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, fails to devise, fund and implement a detailed,
comprehensive plan for reversing the academic tragedy in 1-lalifax County Public Schools.
Respectfully submitkd this the day of April 2009
yorth Carolina Justice Center
A CL U of North Carolina Legal Foundation
By:
By:
Jack Holtzman
Katherine Lewis Parker
NC. State Bar No.13548
PC). Box 28068
Raleich. NC 2761 1
(919) 856-2165
I in ni ddiess jack Li nLjut1L oig
N.C. State Bar No .36263
PC). Box 28004
Raleich. NC 27611
(919) 834-3466
Email address: ac1uncklpjpc.rr.com
6
_______
ldvocatt’s fror Children S .Services O
IL uI A Id Of North (‘arolina
Non/i Carolina State
By:
By:
Lewis Puts
%J( Slate Bar No. 20592
Erwin Byrd
NC. State Bar\o. 34435
201 \V. Main Street. Ste. 400
Durham. NC 27702
(919) 226-0051 ext. 422
Email address: LEWiS Pi Iegalaidnc,org
Alan i\lcSurelv
(‘onfreiicc
ofV4. ICT Branches
Li
N.C. State Bar No. 15540
114 West Parrish Street Second Floor
1)urham. NC 27701
(919) 682-4700
Email: 1ayers cimcsurelv.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of the foregoing Memorandum of’ Law, together with attachment. was this day
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to:
CIravson G. Kellev. Esquire
Ihomas J. Ziko, Esquire
Laura Crumpler. Esquire
Office of the Attorney General
NC. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602-0629
Counsel for Defendants
Robert W. Spearman, Esquire
Melanie Black Dubis, Esquire
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LL.P.
P.O. Box 389
Raleigh, NC 27602
Counsel/br P!a,nIif/’
II. Lawrence Armstrong, Jr.. Esquire
Armstrong Law, PLLC
119 Whitfield Street
P.O. Box 187
En field, NC 27823
Counsel/br Plainii//.
Ann L. Majestic, Esquire
Tharrington Smith, L.L.P.
209 Fayetteville Street Mall
P.O. Box 1151
Raleigh, NC 27602
Counsellor Charlotte-Me cklenhurg Schools as Plaintiff lntervenor and Re-aligned Defendant
Audrey Anderson, Esquire
hogan & Hartson, L.L.P.
555 13th Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Counsel for (hariofle feekleithurg .Schoois as Pluinti/t-Jntervcnor and l?e-alined Defendant
0
0
Julius Chambers. Esquire
S. Luke Largess, Esquire
Ferguson, Stein, Chambers,
Wallas, Adkins. Gresham & Sumter. PA.
P.O. Box 36486
Charlotte. NC 28636
Counsellor Penn PlaintiffIntervenors
Jack Boger
Ashley Osinent
UNC Center for Civil Rights
Van Hecke-Wettach Hall
Campus Box 3380
Chapel Hill NC 27599-3380
CounselJör Penn Plaint/fInrervenors
This, the
It
day of April, 2009
c-)
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF WAKE
TN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
95CVS 1158
HOKE COUNTY BOART)
OF EDUCATION. et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
)
and
)
)
ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD
OF EDUCATION, et al..
)
Plaintiffs-Intervenors
)
)
)
V.
)
)
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA;
)
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. )
Defendants
)
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW AS AMId CLRL4E OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL
FOUNDATION, INC, CAROLINA LEGAL ASSISTANCE, INC., AND THE
NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CENTER
The American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Inc.,
Carolina Legal Assistance. Inc.. and the North Carolina Justice & Community
Development Center (together, “amici”) submit this supplemental memorandum of law
as amid curiae in response to the Court’s “fax only memo” of Febniarv 6, 2002. In that
memo. the Court framed the following question:
In the event that the State is required to spend more money to ensure that all
children receive the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education as required by
the Constitution. where is the State going to get those funds and
what means
vill the Legislature have available to provide those funds7
i\Viili the State
have to raise taxes or can the State simply say that it won’t raise taxes and thus
cannot provide further funds.
.
.
.
February 6. Memo, at 2. Hoke Count-v Bd. ofEduc. v, Vorth Carolina (Wake Co. Super.
Ct.. Feb. 6. 2002). After undertaking legal research, we now offer the Court our
considered thoughts on this question.
I.
THE COURT HAS CLEAR AUTHORITY UNI)ER THE
NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION TO REQUIRE
THE STATE TO UNDERTAKE DUTIES TI-tAT MAY ENTAIL
ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
A.
The Authority to Declare What the Constitution Requires
The North Carolina Constitution provides that
[t]he judicial power of the State shall
he vested in. a General Court of
Justice. The General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial
department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a co
ordinate department of the government.
.
Art. IV,
§
.
.
.
.
1. The Constitution also assures that every citizen may turn to the courts for a
remedy when constitutionally protected rights are violated:
All courts shall he open; every person for an injury done him in his lands, good,
person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and
justice shall be administered without favor. denial. or delay.
Art. I.
§
18.
The North Carolina Constitution specifically guarantees the legal right in question
here, to public education: that cuarantee appears in two separate clauses, both of which
place affirmative duties on the State of North Carolina:
The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State
to guard and maintain that right.
Art, I. -S 15.
The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and
uniform system of free public schools. wherein equal opportunities shall be
provided for all students.
Art, IX,
§ 2, cI.
I
(emphasis
added).
The most definitive interpretation of these Articles, of course. has come in
Leandro v. State. 346 XC. 336. 488 S.E.2d (1997). where the Court has concluded “that
Article I. Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution
combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic
education in our public schools,” id. at 347. 488 S.E.2d at 255, and that “it is the duty of
this Court under the North Carolina Constitution to be the final authority in interpreting
that constitution.” Id. at 354, 488 S.E.2d at 259.
The Supreme Court added in Leandro:
If on remand of this case to the trial court, that court makes findings and
conclusions from competent evidence to the effect that defendants in this case are
denying children of the state a sound basic education
it will then be the duty
of the court to enter a judgment granting declaratory relief and such other relief as
needed to correct the wrong while minimizing the encroachment upon the other
branches of government. Corum v. University of.MC.330 N.C. 761, 784. 413
S.E. 2d 276. 291. cerl. denied. 506 U.S. 985.
.
.
.
Leandro n State, 346 N.C. at 357. 488 S.E.2d at 261.
This holding relies upon a principle of judicial authority at least as ancient as the
seminal 1803 decision of the Chief Justice John Marshall in Marhurv v. Madison. 5 U.S.
1 7 (1 803) Marbw i as cv ei 1aw er knows rests on thi. bedrock proposition that
ijt
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
IA. at I 77— whether that interpretation might require the Court to issue a writ of
mandamus to the executive branch (in Mahury, no less a personage than Secretary of
Siate .[ames Madison) directinu the executi e to perform a judicially commanded act. or
alternatively, whether that interpretation might lead to a judicial declaration that a solemn
act passed by Congress is unconstitutional and cannot be judicially enforced.
North Carolina boasts an even earlier adoption of this principle. In Bayard v.
Singleton. 1 N.C. 5, 6-7 (1787), the North Carolina Supreme Court. speaking through
Justice Samuel Ashe, upheld the proper v rights of a former British subject, despite an
1785 law of the General Assembly to the contrary, The Court explained that
[n]otwithstanding the great reluctance they might feel against involving
themselves in a dispute with the Legislature of the State, yet no object of concern
or respect could come in competition or authorize them to dispense with the duty
they owed the public, in consequence of the trust they were invested with under
the solemnity of their oaths
[and thus] the Constitution. standing in full
force as the fundamental law of the land, notwithstanding the act [of the General
Assembly] on which the present motion was grounded, the same act must of
course. in that instance, stand as abrogated and without any effect.
.
.
.
.
1 NC. at 6-7. Between them. Marburi and Bavard render indisputable this Court’s
authority to provide an interpretation of the Constitution that is binding on both the
executive and the legislative branches.
B.
The Authority to Require the Commitment of Resources
Some might object that Marbury and Bavard. although unmistakably establishing
the rule ofjudicial supremacy in interpretation, does not warrant the further conclusion
that a court may direct a legislature to expend funds to implement a constitutional right.
Yet such a contention is clearly refuted by state and federal precedents.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Leandro itself appeared well aware that an
extraordinary order on the General Assembly might he required upon further findings of
fdct. Thus. the Court stated that if children are not receiving a sound basic education. the
trial court would have “the duty.
.
.
to enter a judgment granting declaratory relief and
such other reliel as needed to correct the wronc
4
bile minimizina the encroachment on
the other branches of government.” Id. at 357. 488 S.E.2d at 261 (emphasis added)
. The
Court explicitly contemplated that this would include creating an educational fund
or
placing the General Assembi in a situation where it was essentially forced to act.
Id. at
353. 356. 488 S.E.2d at 258. 260.
In crafting the relief the Leandro decision reminded this Court of the importance
of minimizing “the encroachment upon other branches of government.” Id. That
reminder, however, clearly presupposed that some remedies might well require an
encroachment, and it necessarily implied that such an encroachment would be within
the
court*s power. While the judiciary cannot
directly appropriate public funds or withdraw
funds from the General Assembly, at least where no constitutional right has been
violated. see Article V.
§
7: State v. Davis. 270 N.C. 1. 13-14. 153 S.E.2d 749. 758
(1967), it can order the General Assembly to supply funds to meet its constitutiona
l duty.
Conirn v. Universiti of North Carolina. 330 N.C. 761. 782, 413 S.E2d 276. 289-290
(1992). In Coruin, the Supreme Court held that. in the absence of an adequate state
statutory or common law remedy, the North Carolina Constitution is self-executing.
Id. at 782. Whether an adequate state remedy already exists is immaterial, since “one
whose state constitutional rights have been abridged has a direct claim against the State
under our Constitution.” Id. i-low it protects these rights will depend on the facts
of the
c ise but
it
is iihin thc trial judge s poxer to craf the neccssar\ relict
Id at
74
413
S,E.2d at 290. See also Beardv. North aroIina. 320 \.C. 126, 130. 357 S.f.2d 694.
696 (1 9$7 (recognizing that “[tjhe Court has the inherent authority to do what is
reasonably necessary to effectuate its constitutional duty: the administration of
justicc”:
Mehanc Graded Sch. Dist, vAlamance Connt, 211 NC. 213. 189 S.F. 873 (l937
N
(upholding the issuance of a writ of mandamus to require the County of lamance to
A
assume certain bonded indebtedness— incurred by the Mehane Graded School District in
building a school building for its increased student population—on the ground that the
State has a constitutional duty to provide for a general and uniform state system of public
schools, and that
providing
for schools is “a necessary expense.” one which is
“mandatory”); City ofHickory v. Catawba County, 206 N.C. 165, 173 S.E. 56 (1934)
(same).
This principle is equally well recognized in the federal sphere. In Edeirnan v.
Jordan. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). the [nited States Supreme Court. speaking through thenAssociate Justice Rehnquist held that while the Eleventh Amendment (which normally
bars suits against a State by a citizen), would forbid a federal court to grant retroactive
payment of welfare benefits to beneficiaries whose benefits had been wrongfully
withheld, it did not bar a federal court from directing that future payments be made, even
though that order would necessarily require the State to incur substantial future
expenditures. Indeed, the Court noted that it had exercised even more intrusive authority
to vindicate other rights in the past:
What is asked by the instant case is minor compared to the relief granted in
Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218 [1963]. In that case we authorized entry of
an order putting an end to a segregated school system. We held, inter alia, that
“the District Court may, if necessary to prevent further racial discrimination,
require the Supervisors to exercise the power that is their to levy taxes to raise
funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a
public school system in Prince Edward County like that operated in other counties
in Virginia. Id. at 233.”
415 US. at 683-84. See also Ouemn v, Jordan, 440 US. 332. 337 (noting that “a federal
court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment. may enjoin state officials to
conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an
injunction
may
have an ancillary effect on the state treasurv”;
Jenkins
v. Xlissouri, 495
U.S. 33, 57 (1990) (holding that it was “clear that a local government with taxing
authority may he ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit set by [the Missouri] state
statute where there is reason based in the Constitution [such as the local school district’s
long-time under funding of majority-black schools] for not observing the statutory
limitation”).
Pursuant to these precedents, federal courts in North Carolina have ordered
extensive prospective relief against the State in a number of important cases. See, eg.,
Thomas S. v. Flaherry. 699 F.Supp. 11 78 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (holding that mentally
retarded adults have a constitutional rights to treatment, finding that North Carolina’s
treatment was deficient, and ordering the State Department of Human Resources to
provide extensive prospective relief). aff’d 902 F.2d 250
M. v, Hunt, 657 F,2d 55. 56
(
t
4
h
(
t
4
h
Cir. 1990). See also Willie
Cir. 1981) (upholding consent decree under which North
Carolina undertook to provide extensive special treatment to “a class of minors whose
special characteristics—mental, emotional or neurological handicaps, violent and
aggressive hehavion—allegedlv entitled them under the federal constitution and federal
and state statutes to special treatment and education by the State that was not beine
pio\i&d ) c/Smith
State, 349 N C 332, 507 S L 2d 419 (1998) (concluding that an
act of the General Assembly exempting some taxpayers from an intangibles tax violated
the uniformity clause of the North Carolina Constitution, with the apparent consequence
that the State would be obligated to repay taxes already collected).
CONCLUSION
In sum. this Court has ample authority to enter declaratory or. if necessary,
injunctive orders that would require the State of North Carolina to provide
constitutionally necessary educational services under Leandro. It would not be the
Courts role, of course. to dictate precisely how those services are to be funded. That
responsibility falls to the General Assembly. Yet, as we have suggested in our
memorandum of law filed on January 31, 2002. the Court might well order the parties to
confer on what educational services will be necessary to reach all at-risk children. then to
determine whether those services can be provided with currently available resources, and
finally, if necessary, to present a plan to the Court—for review and approval or
modification—-that would require the State to commit whatever fiscal or other resources
are constitutionally necessary to meet the promise of Leandro and afford, to every single
child in North Carolina. the opportunity for a sound basic education.
This, the
—
day of February, 2002.
Deborah K. Ross
State Bar No. 17590
P.O. Box 28004
Raleigh, NC 27611
(9l9 834-3466
Deborah Greenblatt
State Bar No. 2847
P.O. Box No. 2446
Raleigh, NC 27602
(919) 856-2195
Counsel for the
American Civil Liberties Union
of North Carolina Lecal Foundation. Inc.
Counsel for Carolina Legal
Assistance. Inc.
Carlene McNuftv
State Bar No. 1248$
John Charles Bocer
School of Law. CB 3380
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, NC 27599
(9l9 843-9288
$
Sheria Reid
State Bar No. 24477
224 S. Dawson Street
P0 Box 28068
Raleigh. NC 27621 1
(919) 856-3192
Counsel for the North Carolina Justice
& Community Development Center
Gregory C. Maihoit
State Bar i 6275
Attorney at Lax
123 Forest Road
Raleigh. NC 27605
(919) 833-4541
CERTIFiCATE OF SERVICE
A copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Law was this day placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to:
Edwin NI. Speas. Jr., Esquire
Thomas J. Ziko. Esquire
Office of the Attorney General
N,C. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602-0629
Ann W. McColl. Fsq.
P.O. Box 17505
Raleigh, NC 276 19-7505
Robert W. Spearman, Esquire
Robert H. Tiller, Esquire
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein. L.L.P.
P.O. Box 389
Raleigh. NC 27602
Thomas M. Stern. Esq.
Law Office of Thomas Stern
P.O. Box 2206
Durham. NC 27702-2206
H. Lawrence Armstrong. Jr., Esquire
Hux. Livermon & Armstrong
P.O. Box 217
Enfield, NC 27823
Julia F. Youngman, Esquire
Smith Helms Mullis & Moore, L.L.P.
P.O. Box 27525
Raleigh, NC 27611
Audrey Anderson, Esquire
Kevin J. Lanigan, Esquire
Paul A, Minorini, Esquire
Hogan & l-Iartson. L.L.P.
555 1 3th Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
This, the
day of February. 2002
Carlene MeN ultv
10