CGSC
C/M/S 500
Fundamentals
of
Operational Warfighting
DJMO Scenario and Reference Book
for CENTCOM (Notional)
March 2001
This publication contains copyrighted material and may not
be further reproduced without permission of the copyright holder.
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Reference 1.
Road to War-Up to 20 June 20XX ..............................................................
Ref 1-1
Reference 2.
Theater Strategy, U.s. Central Command.....................................................
Ref 2-1
Reference 3.
Staff Officer’s Strategic Estimate Worksheet Notes......................................
Ref 3-1
Reference 4.
Practical Exercise Requirements .................................................................
Ref 4-1
Reference 5.
Road to War (con’t)-Up to 10 July and projected
Forward through August and early September 20XX ....................................
Ref 5-1
Reference 6.
JCS Planning Order...................................................................................
Ref 6
Reference 7.
Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (IJSCP) ...................................
Ref 7
Reference 8.
USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U) .........................................................
Ref 8
Reference 9.
Planning Directory ....................................................................................
Ref 9
Reference 10
Sample JOPES Message and Orders Format ................................................
Ref 10
i
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting
C/M/S 500
Reference 1. Road to War — Up to 20 June 20XX
______________________________________________________________________________
Section I. Introduction
Today is 20 June 20XX. You are a member of
the J-5 (Plans) staff of United States Central
Command (USCENTCOM). As part of a crisis
action planning effort, you have been tasked to
work with the J-3 operations staff to prepare for a
contingency operation into Saudi Arabia. Your
initial responsibility is to conduct a review of the
major political and military events that have led up
to the current crisis.
This appendix paints a “revisionist history” of
events that occurred from the end of DESERT
STORM (1991) to June 20XX (which may be any
year from 1996 to 20__). The key military events
of this teaching scenario begin in June 20XX.
Section II. Political/Military Events
1991-20XX
Summary of key events of 1991-92
1. Political/economic events in theater.
a. The end of 1991 saw the beginnings of
Saddam Hussein’s demise. Intelligence sources
from within Iran and Iraq began reporting growing
discontent and unrest against the dictator. This
unrest became apparent with the formation in Iran
of a new Iraqi political party, the Party of
Righteousness
(HIZBIRR),
whose
stated
objectives were to overthrow Saddam Hussein, to
replace the secular Baath party, and to cleanse the
nation of Iraq of all non-Islamic influences. The
party’s origin was clearly linked to Shiite elements
in Iraq and Iran. The party had strong connections
to Iran’s Party of God (HIZBALLAH) and its
stated objective to export Iran’s Islamic revolution.
Societal unrest in Iraq, aggravated by UN-imposed
sanctions, continued to worsen during late 1991,
thus promoting this new party’s influence within
Iraq. By late December 1991, the party had
developed a strong support base in southern and
central Iraq.
b. In October 1991, the United States Army
began its strategic transition from a forward
deployed force to a force projection Army. The
new Army has as its conceptual focus the
capability to project power around the world using
a contingency corps supported by additional
reinforcing corps.
c. In November 1991, China and North
Korea made overtures to Saddam Hussein’s
faltering government. Both countries offered to
increase trade and to provide military equipment to
replace Iraqi losses suffered during the Gulf War.
Though no formal agreement was reached, new
equipment began to appear in Iraq almost
immediately.
d. At the end of the year, the United Nations
lifted all remaining sanctions against Iraq, thereby
releasing oil export income for Saddam Hussein’s
use. In return, Iraq surrendered all its nuclear,
biological, and chemical warfare materials. This
action further eroded Hussein’s power base by
providing his critics an opportunity to condemn him
for giving in to Western demands.
e. Both Iran and Iraq suffered a loss in
economic power in 1992. World oil production
remained high, forcing prices down, and OPEC
refused their requests to reduce overall production
and raise oil prices. Lower oil prices hindered
Iran’s and Iraq’s military rebuilding efforts and
forced the two nations to rely more on Chinese and
North Korean sources for their military hardware,
using oil-for-weapons barter arrangements. Kuwait
was able to extinguish all its oil fires and return to
its pre-war production levels by April 1992.
f. In the Fall of 1992, HIZBIRR factions
protested Saddam Hussein’s regime by openly
staging riots in Al Basrah. Republican Guard
forces attempted to stop the protest, but the key
members of the protest escaped to safe havens
within the city. The strange inability of this elite
Ref 1-1
unit to gain control of this unrest was not fully
understood in 1992. We now know that its
leadership had already been infiltrated by officers
secretly committed to HIZBIRR party goals.
2. Military events in theater.
a. From February through December 1991,
U.S. forces continued to operate in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia in a peacetime engagement role that
consisted primarily of providing nation assistance.
Special operations forces left in Kuwait continued
to monitor the situation in southeastern Iraq near
Al Basrah. NATO forces also created an
operational contingency force in Turkey to monitor
the Kurdish situation in northwestern Iraq and
eastern Turkey. Nations that had been friendly to
Saddam Hussein’s regime before DESERT
SHIELD/DESERT STORM began helping
Saddam to rebuild his badly mauled army and air
force. In response, the United States and other
allied nations in Europe began to increase the
military strength of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) nations (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman) in return
for basing rights in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
and Kuwait. Coalition military forces redeployed
from the Gulf from February through October
1991. By 28 October 1991, almost all coalition
forces had redeployed from Saudi Arabia.
b. Joint Task Force SABER, consisting of a
special operations battalion in Kuwait and a
complete armored cavalry regiment (207th ACR)
stationed in Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid Military
City near the Iraqi border, remained in theater
after the major redeployment was completed. A
Pre-positioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets
(POMCUS) armored division, was also established
in Kuwait. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
established a new Engineer District in Kuwait. The
U.S. Navy maintained a constant vigil over the
Strait of Hormuz with a carrier battle group.
Several U.S. Air Force elements remained in
Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Composite wings of F15E, F-16, and EF-111 aircraft were left in Incirlik,
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia and began to fly combat
air patrols over northern and southern Iraq on a
regular basis. Saddam Hussein remained quiet and
let his Baath party government function in a
vacuum of power caused by his defeat and loss of
face in the Arab world.
c. Throughout 1992, Kuwait continued to
clean up the post-DESERT STORM battlefield
with assistance from the U.S. Corps of Engineer
District in Kuwait City. Kuwait also announced its
decision to construct a defensive zone on its border
with Iraq. The zone, consisting of a series of
antitank obstacles along Kuwait’s northern and
northwestern border with Iraq, is designed to deter
a direct attack into Kuwait similar to that of 2
August 1990. It is intended to compel an opposing
force to attack Kuwait from the west rather than
from the north along the coast, thereby forcing the
attacker to establish longer lines of communication
and providing additional warning time to the GCC.
d. Early in 1992, the UN Security Council
established a permanent demilitarized zone along
the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders with Iraq.
This zone is 15km wide and runs 10km on the Iraqi
side and 5km on the Kuwaiti side of the current
borders. It allows for a limited amount of warning
of hostile action and gives the UN peacekeeping
force established in December 1991 a specific
area to monitor. It also allows the U.S. Army’s
207th ACR to deploy to the zone on short notice if
a threat or crisis develops.
e. Saudi Arabia capitalized on its Gulf War
success and increased influence by modernizing its
Army and Air Force throughout the year. M1A1
tanks and new F-15 aircraft were incorporated into
the military. Saudi Arabia also worked with the
GCC to begin forming a GCC force of two to four
heavy divisions (U.S. equivalent) with the intent of
deterring any future attack into Saudi Arabia from
the north. The force, called PENINSULA
SHIELD, will eventually be based in Kuwait and in
King Khalid Military City (KKMC), Saudi Arabia.
f. Iraq began to rebuild its military in 1992.
The Iraqi plan, discovered by U.S. intelligence
sources in 1994, was to rebuild the Army to at
least one-half of pre-Gulf War levels. It called for
strengthening the effectiveness of the Air Force
and Air Defense elements of the Iraqi military.
The Baathist party continued to dominate military
leadership throughout the year, but, for the first
time, Iraqi military leaders were allowed to operate
with less control from Saddam Hussein than had
previously been the case. In late 1992, senior
Ref 1-2
military leaders also convinced the dictator of the
need to begin forming a central institute of military
doctrine and arranged for schooling in Russia,
China and North Korea for selected Iraqi officers.
The individual responsible for these initiatives was
General Fazid Izmal. A brigade commander in the
Republican Guard during DESERT STORM,
General Izmal successfully extracted his brigade
from Kuwait without significant losses during
attacks by coalition air forces. He then received a
series of quick promotions based on his highly
successful efforts to rebuild the Iraqi military. By
the end of 1992, Izmal was in almost complete
control of the military. We now know that his
ability to retain influence in the Republican Guard
as a secret leader of the HIZBIRR party would
prove to be a key element in the party’s success.
Saddam Hussein, fearing assassination by the
emerging HIZBIRR party but unable to identify its
leaders, was seen only rarely at public events.
g. The government of Iran continued its
support to the Iraqi HIZBIRR party throughout
1992. Iran also began to improve its army and
develop a stronger doctrinal basis for its military.
Based on lessons learned from their 1980-88 war
with Iraq, the military leaders of Iran improved the
training and equipment of Baseej and
Revolutionary Guard forces and restored the
capabilities of conventional army forces. It placed
an ambitious leader of its Revolutionary Guard
forces as its new military Chief of Staff —
General Abdul Barzan. Barzan had been a key
brigade commander during the Iran-Iraq war and
had played a critical role in reversing Iran’s initial
setbacks through a counteroffensive using humanwave tactics.
3. Events elsewhere (bearing on SWA).
a. USCENTCOM continued to develop
contingency plans for future involvement in the
theater of operations. The command’s contingency
plan is shown in OPLAN 1648.
b. XXI (U.S.) Airborne Corps, based in
CONUS, and II (U.S.) Corps, based in Europe,
were designated as the key forces in
CENTCOM’s deliberate contingency plans for
ground operations in SWA.
c. USCENTCOM also coordinated with the
nations of the GCC to conduct regular joint and
combined exercises in the GCC nations. The first
exercise was scheduled for 1997 in Saudi Arabia.
The next is scheduled for Oman in 20XX. The
approved plan is to rotate the exercise between the
two nations every other year.
Summary of key events of 1993-97
1. Military events in theater.
a. Schools of military doctrine appeared in both
Baghdad and Tehran in 1993. Several high ranking
officers from both nations began attending military
colleges in Russia and other former Soviet Union
republics as early as February 1993.
b. Beginning in late 1993, military analysts
began to assert that Iranian and Iraqi forces were
sufficiently capable to provide a credible defense
against external threats. One analyst projected
that, together, the two nations could form a
credible offensive threat in the region. Estimates at
the time placed the ground forces of both these
nations at one-half to two-thirds of their 1990
strengths. Most of their new equipment is based on
Soviet designs and manufactured in China or North
Korea.
c. The air forces of both nations began flying
an upgraded Chinese version of the MIG-21 during
the summer of 1993. Both nations also began
conducting air exercises in their respective
interiors. Later in the year, national intelligence
sources confirmed the initial use of a more
effective ground-based acquisition radar in these
exercises. The new radar has since been
integrated into the Iraqi air defense system.
d. From late 1993 to 1996, Kuwait constructed its new line of defense from the border
with Iraq on the Persian Gulf to a point in the
desert near 30 degrees north latitude, 47 degrees
east longitude (approximately 80km southwest of
Hulaybah). The line consists of a tank ditch, a
50m-wide antitank minefield, and a barbed wire
fence. Ground radar sensors are spaced at 15km
intervals along what becomes a 100km-long
obstacle.
e. Human intelligence sources provided a
disturbing report to U.S. military analysts late in
1995. The report, from a senior Iraqi defense
official who defected to Jordan, stated that Iraq
Ref 1-3
had developed a powerful armor-piercing round for
its T-72 tanks which gives them the range and
effectiveness roughly equivalent to the T-80.
Limited testing of this new tank round, monitored
by Western intelligence sources, confirmed that the
round is a dangerous new addition to Iraq’s
arsenal. The round was given the code name
SHREDDER. The report gave no information
about the current or projected number of
SHREDDER rounds, and the collection of this data
remains a high priority for U.S. intelligence. With
this report also came the news that the Iraqi Army
had purchased T-80 fire control technology and
was outfitting its T-72 tanks with this system. With
or without a SHREDDER round, this fire control
system now provides the T-72 a high level of
accuracy under nighttime and adverse weather
conditions.
f. Joint and Combined Exercise DESERT
RETURN was conducted in Saudi Arabia in the
fall of 1997. The rapid airlift of portions of the XXI
(U.S.) Corps into Dhahran, Ad Damman, and
Kuwait confirmed a 30-day closure rate of three
divisions. The 21st Infantry Division (Light), the
47th Air Assault Division, the 23rd Armored
Division (using prepositioned equipment), and the
in-place 207th ACR participated in the exercise.
The 55th Infantry Division (Mechanized), stationed
in southeastern Georgia, also sent an observercontroller team to help plan for the 55th’s role in
any future contingency operation. DESERT
RETURN was observed by several invited nations.
Exercise play by the 1st Battalion, 4th Special
Forces Group (FWD) deployed in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia also revealed some uninvited
observers. Early in the operation, the Iraqi military
attempted to send small reconnaissance teams
deep into Saudi Arabia to observe the exercise
covertly. However, SF special reconnaissance
teams observed their movement and alerted
elements of the 207th ACR, which captured
several of the teams along the Iraqi-Saudi border.
A subsequent U.S. diplomatic protest to Baghdad
was ignored by the government of Iraq.
g. Kuwait finished its 100km-long defensive
line along its border with Iraq late in 1996. A
Kuwaiti brigade now keeps the line under constant
observation.
h. By the end of 1996, Saudi Arabia and the
GCC could boast a standing three division corps in
KKMC which fields M1A1 tanks, M2/3 Bradley
fighting vehicles, Vulcan/Stinger and Hawk ADA
units, and MLRS batteries. Using stocks
prepositioned at KKMC, the GCC can form and
deploy in northern Saudi Arabia an additional
heavy division in 90 days. With existing agreements, up to an additional six division equivalents
can be provided by Egypt, the United Kingdom,
France, and Syria 90 days into any crisis. This
potentially provides a total of up to 10 non-U.S.
divisions within 90 days. Mobilization and partial
deployment of four of these divisions was
exercised during DESERT RETURN. By C+135,
seven additional division equivalents can be
provided as a result of still untested GCC
agreements with Pakistan, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya,
Poland, Bangladesh, Turkey, Malaysia, Morocco,
Tunisia, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Indonesia, South
Korea, and the Netherlands. These additional
divisions provide the potential for 17 Coalition
Command (COALCOM) division equivalents to be
in theater by C+135. Five U.S. divisions will bring
the potential friendly OB to 22 by C+135.
i. Late in 1997, citing potential commitments
to contingency operations in the former
Yugoslavia, the U.S. II Corps commander,
working with the NATO chain of command,
requested that a cap be put on deployment of
Europe-based units to other theaters. For CY98, it
was agreed that only three U.S. brigades would be
considered for potential deployment outside of
Europe. These three brigades (Separate MECH
INF, Field Artillery, and Aviation) are apportioned
for planning to USCENTCOM.
j. Seventy C-17 transports join the U.S.
strategic airlift fleet. The aging fleet of C-141
aircraft begins a graduated retirement offset by the
introduction of the C-17s. Joining the U.S. strategic
sealift fleet are 10 new fast roll-on/roll-off SL-7
ships, bringing the total to 20.
2. Political events in theater
a. On 15 May 1993, in a surprise to the
world, the newly proclaimed government of the
Islamic Republic of Iraq announced a coup and
declared Saddam Hussein dead. The HIZBIRR
party claimed responsibility for the overthrow of
Ref 1-4
the “Godless Baath Party” and its “murderous,
corrupt” leader. HIZBIRR spokesmen announced
that the new government would seek close
relations with Iran and that the party’s objectives
are similar to those of Iran’s 1979 Islamic
revolution. The party is opposed to hereditary
family rule, rejects the stationing of non-Islamic
forces in the region, opposes Western attempts to
dominate the region and control its resources, and
favors Islamic solutions to regional issues.
b. Iraq conducted an election during June
1993 that was dominated by the Shi’ite-based
HIZBIRR party. A new president, Jahib
Almazzein, was elected. A popular figure with the
Iraqi people, the new president seemed to project a
future of peaceful cooperation with the GCC as
well as with Iran. However, General Izmal soon
came to dominate all political affairs from behind
the scenes. It was later discovered that his secret
negotiations with General Barzan before the coup
actually secured the necessary Iranian support and
assistance. The details of their agreement,
however, remained unknown for several years.
c. The September 1993 “Declaration of
Principles” agreement between Israel and the
PLO brought some hope that a resolution of the
Palestinian issue was finally at hand. However, an
outbreak of Palestinian riots in the Gaza and violent
protests by radical Israeli settlers in the West Bank
soon dashed hopes for rapid progress in the region.
d. In late December 1997, the president of
the United States announced the formation of a
U.S.-led working committee to resolve any issues
that stand in the way of a comprehensive ArabIsraeli peace treaty. The committee is composed
of the foreign ministers of Israel, its neighboring
Arab nations, Saudi Arabia, and representatives of
the PLO. The SECSTATE also began a round of
visits to Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and
Saudi Arabia just prior to the end of the year.
e. Immediately after the U.S. announcement,
Iran and Iraq announced their opposition to this
latest example of U.S. “coercion” to resolve what
they consider to be a Middle East issue. Iran
formally stated that it would take whatever action
necessary to deter the cooperation of any Arab
country in this attempt at “Western and Zionist
colonialism.”
Summary of key events of 1998-99
1. Military events in theater.
a. In 1998, the 55th MECH Div began planning for a 20XX exercise called DESERT
SUPPORT. This exercise will deploy elements of
the 55th MECH Div from Georgia to Oman near
the Strait of Hormuz. The exercise scenario will
require the division to conduct operations as part of
a joint and combined task force involving GCC
member states.
b. In an effort to enhance the military
cooperation between Iraqi and Iranian military
forces, Jahib Almazzein, the president of Iraq,
extended an invitation to Iran to conduct a small
scale combined CPX in Baghdad in the fall of
1998. According to a joint statement issued by
General Izmal (Iraq) and General Barzan (Iran),
the declared purpose of the exercise was to
“examine the possibility of developing common
command and control operating procedures
between the military forces of the region’s two
major Muslim nations.” The exercise was
conducted in November 1998 and involved
approximately 100 mid-grade and senior-level
officers from both nations. Even before it actually
took place, GCC nations criticized the exercise as
threatening to Gulf stability. In December following
the exercise, General Izmal issued a short
statement praising the capabilities and vision of
Iranian military, political and religious leaders.
2. Political events in theater.
a. Throughout early 1998, several high
ranking Iraqi Sunni military and political leaders
defected to Saudi Arabia. The defectors all
repeated a similar story of increasing economic
difficulties and growing political unrest among the
formerly dominant Sunni population. Individuals
critical of the largely Shi’ite civilian and military
leadership are now frequently harassed by small
groups of soldiers that have received special
training in Iran.
b. In July 1998, on the tenth anniversary of
the cease-fire ending the Iran-Iraq War, the two
erstwhile enemies dedicated identical war
memorials to the soldiers who died in the war. The
monuments, located in the cities of Al Basrah, Iraq,
Ref 1-5
and Abadan, Iran, each bear a statement praising
the bravery and dedication of the soldiers of both
nations and calling for unity between “true
believing” Islamic nations in the future.
c. In a major breakthrough, Israel announced
in early 1999, that it will begin to close some
settlements on the West Bank as part of its
agreement with the PLO. However, Israeli settlers
resisted several attempts to relocate them and, in
some instances, Israeli soldiers refused to comply
with their orders. Radical Palestinian elements
responded to these developments by approaching
the Iraqi government for assistance in stopping
what they feel is Arafat’s betrayal of their cause.
Despite the problems that continue in the occupied
territories, both the Israeli government and the
PLO leadership have vowed to press on with the
implementation of their 1993 agreement. To assist
them, President Bill Clinton appointed former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter as Special Envoy to the
Middle East during a special Israeli-PLO
ceremony at the White House in December 1999.
Carter was tasked with identifying any remaining
problems that would preclude a peaceful
settlement in the region.
Summary of key events of 20XX
1. Political events in theater.
a. The annual Islamic pilgrimage month
began on 7 February 20XX. The first day of the
pilgrimage was marked by a terrorist attack in
Mecca on a crowd of largely Saudi pilgrims going
to the Grand Mosque. A car bomb near the crowd
of pilgrims killed 25 people and wounded 40. The
government of Saudi Arabia denounced the attack
as vile and warned the terrorist group responsible
that this outrage in Islam’s holiest site will be
avenged. No group took immediate responsibility
for the attack, but suspicions ran high in Riyadh
that Iran was culpable. Several Saudi Arabian Shia
radicals from the Kingdom’s eastern provinces
were eventually arrested and beheaded even
though there appeared to be little evidence tying
them to the bombing. Iran also responded to the
attack by releasing an official statement that
recalled and praised the 1979 seizure of the Grand
Mosque in Mecca by 700 Saudi dissidents opposed
to the pro-Western Saudi regime.
b. On 10 May 20XX, a remote controlled
bomb was set off near the Prophet Mohammed’s
tomb in Medina, Islam’s second holiest site, during
a visit of Saudi Arabia’s king. The bomb failed to
harm the king, but five bystanders were killed.
Although no group claimed responsibility,
intelligence sources have since indicated that a
clandestine group of Saudi dissidents — including
both Shia and Sunni members — supported by
Iran, is the most likely suspect. Radio Tehran,
while condemning the location of the attack as an
outrage, nevertheless held the Saudi royal family as
ultimately responsible for having failed to protect
the three holiest sites in Islam: Mecca, Medina, and
Jerusalem. It has repeatedly denounced Saudi
Arabia and other Arab members of the committee
formed in 1997 to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute
for having failed to defend Islam. Iran later issued
a formal statement on 25 May that called for the
formation of a council of “true believing” Islamic
nations to replace Saudi Arabia as custodian of the
Holy Cities.
c. On 10 June 20XX, a riot in Mecca outside
the Grand Mosque killed over a hundred people
and caused considerable damage to portions of the
mosque. Saudi Arabian troops required 24 hours to
restore order. In response to this latest attack,
Riyadh announced that it will close Mecca and
Medina to all Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims and to any
Shia Muslim from Saudi Arabia.
d. On 11 June 20XX, Tehran radio
condemned Riyadh’s action as illegal and contrary
to the fundamental obligation of every Muslim to
make the pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime. The
true culprit for the terrorist incidents, according to
Tehran, was the Saudi royal family, which had
become a “stooge of the Zionist and Western
imperialists” by surrendering Islamic rights in
Jerusalem and “permitting infidel forces to invade
and occupy” Islamic lands. Iran called for a holy
war to wrest control of Islamic shrines from the
“traitors to Islam.” The same day, Baghdad radio
announced that the nation of Iraq fully supports
Iran in its call for a Jihad to retake the holy
places. A highly classified report has now revealed
that military leaders of the two nations also met
secretly in Tehran on the 11th to discuss combined
Ref 1-6
military operations against the “enemies of Islam.”
They agreed to form a military coalition (Iran-Iraq
Coalition — IIC) and to assemble a joint and
combined planning staff with elements in Tehran
and Baghdad.
e. On 15 June 20XX, Iran and Iraq
demanded that Saudi Arabia surrender control of
Mecca and Medina to an Islamic council headed
by the senior Shia cleric — the Marja-e-Taqlid
(Source of Emulation) — an Iraqi ayatollah, or
face the wrath of Islamic “warriors.” On 16 June,
Riyadh denounced the demand as an attempt to
undermine its sovereign authorities and called for
Arab and Muslim unity against Iran and Iraq’s
treachery, and requested an urgent meeting of the
UN Security Council. The UN responded to the
request for assistance by issuing the UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) that follows below.
f. The crisis in SWA appears to have been
triggered by an announcement by the U.S.
president in early January 20XX that his special
envoy, former President Carter, had convinced the
multinational working group on the Middle East
peace process to hold a concluding negotiation
later that month in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The
terrorist attacks in Mecca and Medina are now
believed to have been a direct reaction to this
announcement. The meeting has not yet been held
due to the outbreak of violence.
2. Military events in theater.
a. On 10 January 20XX, Operation SEA
WOLF was conducted by the Navy and U.S.
Marines to practice an amphibious landing on the
coast of Oman. The exercise involved the forces
of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), an airground task force of roughly 15,000 personnel) and
a carrier battle group. Iran vehemently protested
the exercise as a threat to the “peace and stability”
of the region.
b. On 25 January 20XX, USCENTCOM
conducted a CPX, in conjunction with a U.S. Air
Force exercise “Blue Flag,” to prepare for the
planned exercise DESERT SUPPORT in Oman
later in July 20XX. This exercise will deploy
elements of the 55th MECH Div out of Georgia to
Oman near the Strait of Hormuz.
c. On 10 May 20XX, the CJCS directed
USCENTCOM to increase WATCHCON status
in its AOR in reaction to increased tensions
between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Iraq.
d. On 11 June 20XX, CINC USCENTCOM
sent a message to the Chairman, JCS, announcing
the initiation of JOPES crisis action planning
procedures.
e. On 16 June 20XX, national intelligence
assets alerted CENTCOM of the movement of
Iranian and Iraqi forces into the Euphrates river
valley.
f. On 19 June 20XX, CENTCOM received
confirmation by national intelligence that Iran and
Iraq are building a massive force of up to 24
divisions in the Euphrates river valley northwest of
Al Basrah. A division-size force was also observed
in Iran moving southeast toward the Strait of
Hormuz. Additionally, the IIC has obtained access
to near real-time satellite reconnaissance data and
satellite communications from unknown outside
sources. The reconnaissance data is sufficiently
detailed to expose concentrations of military units,
supplies, and equipment anywhere on the Arabian
peninsula and can be communicated directly to
selected Iran-Iraq Coalition (IIC) corps level headquarters.
Ref 1-7
Following is a fictional UN resolution:
Text of UN Security Council Resolution 1002
DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS PRIORITY: Urgent WORD COUNT: 283
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS DATE: June 18, 20XX OB: 3WHEN
Here is the text of UN Security Council Resolution 1002, passed 13 to 1, with China abstaining, on June
18, to condemn the build-up of Iraqi and Iranian forces inside Iraq. The UN demands the immediate
disbandment of the force as a threat to peace and authorizes the immediate use of force by UN members
if the forces are used offensively against any neighbor of Iran or Iraq. There has been no response from
either the government of Iran or Iraq in regard to this resolution. Libya cast the only vote against the
resolution.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL: Alarmed by the indicated build-up of military force by Iran and Iraq
inside Iraq detected on June 16, 20XX, the hostile government threats made by both countries against
Saudi Arabia, and the past history of the use of force by both nations, the Security Council has determined
that the build-up of forces and implied intent of those forces to threaten neighboring countries constitutes a
breach of international peace. Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations: (1)
Condemns the Iranian/Iraqi build-up of forces; (2) Demands that Iran and Iraq immediately disband the
combined force; (3) Calls upon Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to begin immediate negotiations for the
resolution of their differences regarding the status of the Islamic Holy Cities and supports all efforts in this
regard, especially those of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization; (4) Invites member
nations to deploy such military forces as may be required to deter aggressive actions by the Iran and Iraq
that undermine the peace and stability of the Gulf region; (5) Decides to meet again as necessary to
consider further steps to ensure compliance with this resolution; and (6) Reiterates that the UN
Demilitarized Zone created by UNSC Resolution 813 remains in effect and under observation by military
forces under UN control.
Key events list up to 20 June 20XX
JANUARY 20XX
• Iran protests U.S. amphibious exercises in
Oman as a threat to peace.
MARCH 20XX
• Key Arab nations agree to resolve remaining
issues leading to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace.
• Tensions escalate in eastern Europe; NATO
forces assume a higher alert status.
APRIL 20XX
• First terrorist attack in Mecca.
MAY 20XX
• Second terrorist attack in Medina.
• CJCS tells CINC CENTCOM to increase
vigilance in CENTCOM AOR (WATCHCON
situation in Iran/Iraq/ Saudi Arabia is
increased).
JUNE 20XX
• Third violent incident occurs in Mecca.
• Saudi Arabia bans Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims
from the Holy Cities.
Ref 1-8
•
•
•
•
Iran threatens a Jihad to wrest control of the
Holy Cities; Iraq announces its support.
Iraq meets secretly with Iran to form a
coalition (IIC).
Iran and Iraq demand Saudi Arabia turn over
control of Holy Cities to an Islamic council.
Saudi King denounces demand; requests
urgent UN action.
•
•
•
Ref 1-9
Joint crisis action planning begins (J-3 and J-5
staff review “on-the-shelf” plan OPLAN
1648).
National intelligence detects IIC military
build-up.
United Nations approves UNSCR 1002
authorizing deployment of military forces.
Ref 1-10
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting
C/M/S 500
Reference 2. Theater Strategy, U.S. Central Command
______________________________________________________________________________
Executive Summary (JAN 20XX)
We at USCENTCOM are charged with
maintaining watch in this turbulent area, projecting
American presence and influence where possible,
and planning for the use of U.S. forces as required
to protect U.S. vital interests. Operations DESERT
SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and DESERT
RETURN (Fall 1997) reflected continuity with
earlier CENTCOM efforts such as the EARNEST
WILL escort operations during the Iran-Iraq war.
Our experiences and perspectives suggest that the
U.S. is faced with important challenges and opportunities in this AOR.
Operations EARNEST WILL, DESERT
SHIELD, DESERT STORM, DESERT RETURN
and DESERT STRIKE demonstrated our unshakable commitment to protect U.S. interests in this
vital part of the world. We will continue to promote
regional stability, assist friendly states to defend
themselves, maintain access to oil, and work to
limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
And, we are cooperating with countries in the region to stem the flow of illegal drugs and to counter
terrorism. We want to take advantage of this new
era of international cooperation to encourage security and stability for the benefit of all.
Strategic oil and gas reserves and waterways
make the region vitally important to the United
States. The health of an increasingly interdependent global economy, including the economic
strength of the U.S. and the well-being of our
friends and allies, depends on uninterrupted access
to Arabian Gulf oil. Additionally, security of the sea
lines of communication is essential to the unimpeded
flow
of
world
trade
through
USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility.
We view our AOR as consisting of four distinct and interdependent sub-regions: South Asia,
the Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula, the Red
Sea/Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Each
sub-region is unique, presenting its own set of
challenges. Longstanding conflicts between nations, internal ethnic violence and civil war, religious differences, and large armed forces all contribute to unstable conditions in the area.
The South Asia sub-region, made up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, has great potential for increased conflict. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and the civil war in Afghanistan
are a major cause for concern. Drug traffic originating from the “Golden Crescent” portions of
Pakistan and Afghanistan is also troubling. Additionally, the unraveling of the former Soviet Union,
creation of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, and the political instability in Russia and
many of the other republics add uncertainty along
with new opportunities and challenges.
The Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula subregion has a central place in our area of responsibility. There can be no question of U.S. commitment to the stability of this area and the security of
the strategic oil resources and waterways, now
more openly evident in the new bilateral security
agreements we have recently signed with Oman,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. We are also
still negotiating security arrangements with Qatar
and the United Arab Emirates.
The countries of the Red Sea/Horn of Africa
sub-region border the critical sea lines of communication running from the Western Indian Ocean
through the Bab el Mandeb to the Suez Canal. Political upheavals in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia
and the destabilizing activities of Iran, Libya, and
Sudan have reduced our influence in this volatile
region. Egypt, however, remains a key ally, promoting regional stability. We seek to revitalize our
relations with other countries in the region to encourage reform, enhance access, and promote regional stability.
Ref 2-1
Significant challenges to peace in this entire
region remain. The Islamic Republics of Iraq and
Iran are the two countries which pose the greatest
threat of aggressive military action in the region
and they have similar political goals. Iraq remains
intransigent and, despite enormous losses in the
Gulf War, has rebuilt a significant military capability which can threaten its neighbors. Iran has restructured and rearmed its military and remains a
threat to U.S. interests. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
among many countries in the region is also cause
for great concern. The failed efforts of nation
building and peacekeeping efforts in Somalia
eroded both UN and U.S. prestige and credibility.
These difficulties may embolden other regimes in
the region. Other regional challenges include: ethnic and tribal rivalries, border disputes, religious differences, poverty, overpopulation, famine, economic disparity, and water shortages.
The U.S. seeks to deal with challenges to its
vital interests in the CENTCOM area of responsibility through both unilateral and coalition efforts.
The basis for our security relationships in the region is a three-tier concept of defense against aggression:
Tier I — National self-defense.
Tier II — Regional collective defense.
Tier III — Extra-regional coalition defense.
The three-tier concept is a building block approach that calls upon individual nations and regional coalitions to provide for much of the deterrence against aggression in the region. This
approach both enhances the ability of GCC countries to provide for their own defense and limits
U.S. deployments to the region.
Recognizing the unique challenges of our area,
we have also developed a long-term and flexible
CENTCOM theater strategy that is based on five
pillars: forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, power-projection capability from
the U.S., and readiness to fight. The first three pillars — forward presence, combined exercises, and
security assistance — comprise the overseas presence portion of our strategy. The remaining two
pillars — power-projection and readiness to fight
— define the activities associated with deploying
forces to the theater and conducting operations
once they arrive in the region.
Other aspects of our peacetime strategy provide opportunities for the U.S. to remain engaged
in the region. Through the close coordination of
U.S. military and other governmental agencies with
our friends, we are working hard to combat terrorism and stem the flow of illegal drugs. Additionally,
our Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Programs have
helped to improve the health care and physical infrastructure of recipient countries. These activities
greatly enhance U.S. prestige and good will.
Meanwhile, our forces remain trained and ready to
protect U.S. citizens and to conduct noncombatant
evacuation if necessary.
If deterrence fails, we are prepared to transition to our wartime strategy. This strategy is designed to provide an extensive range of options
which permit flexible, measured responses to regional aggression. Our wartime strategy envisions
three phases of operations: flexible deterrent options, defensive operations, and offensive operations. The primary objective of these operations is
to terminate hostilities early, on terms favorable to
the United States and our regional coalition partners.
Our planning effort focuses on a number of
potential regional contingencies. Wartime operations could range from short-duration crises to
major conflicts like the Gulf War of 1990/91. We
must be able to defend critical sea lines of communication while ensuring continual access to Arabian
Peninsula oil supplies. Our strategy requires that
our friends and allies assume an important share of
the responsibility and burden for maintaining the
region’s stability and security.
A number of essential elements contribute to
our ability to build upon our regional strategy in
time of war. Superior military readiness, highly
trained and quality personnel, combined exercises,
timely intelligence, modern equipment, prepositioned equipment and supplies, and strategic mobility provide the ability to shape the battlefield, minimize casualties, and achieve decisive victory.
Continued support for quality personnel, sufficient
force structure; aggressive training; strategic sea
and air lift; and state-of-the-art command, control,
Ref 2-2
communications, and intelligence systems will be
critical to maintaining that advantage.
In summary, the U.S. has vital interests in the
USCENTCOM region and a solid record of engagement and commitment there. We remain prepared to again assist our friends and allies in conducting a collective defense of the region and
ensuring unhindered access to oil. By maintaining
presence and building on our relationships with
them through combined exercises and security assistance, we demonstrate our resolve and willingness to respond to their legitimate defense needs.
As a result of Operations EARNEST WILL,
DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, DESERT
RETURN and DESERT STRIKE, we have significantly improved our credibility and influence in
the area. It is important that we capitalize on these
gains to help provide a more stable and secure future.
I. STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE AREA
The 20 diverse countries in the U.S. Central
Command’s area of responsibility form a unique
and complex region at the intersection of Europe,
Asia, and Africa. As an intercontinental crossroads, this area has long been the scene of military
conflict. Access to the region’s strategic oil reserves and waterways in this area is vitally important to U.S. national interests. Yet the area is replete with tribal, religious, national, and regional
conflicts which constantly threaten influence the
area.
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM clearly demonstrated the value the U.S.
places on the overall stability of this region. They
tested our ability and confirmed our commitment to
protect vital national interests there. More importantly, our actions made a powerful, enduring
statement that naked aggression will not be tole rated by the world community. Exercise DESERT
RETURN further demonstrated our ability to respond to any renewed acts of aggression in the region, while DESERT STRIKE demonstrated our
resolve to act, unilaterally if necessary.
The success of our wartime operations provided us an opportunity to take significant steps
toward advancing our interests in the region. De-
spite difficulties during operations in Somalia, U.S.
credibility remains high and our relations with our
friends of the Gulf Cooperation Council states are
excellent. We have worked with them to pursue
regional defense cooperation arrangements. In
each case, we respect the unique requirements and
circumstances of our partners. We can point to
solid progress throughout the region. Consolidating
and building on our recent gains will pay big dividends in the future.
Strategic Oil Reserves
The Middle East provides 70 percent of the
world’s supply of oil; that oil fuels an increasingly
interdependent global economy. Eleven percent of
U.S. total oil requirement comes from the area.
Many of our European and Pacific allies and trading partners have an even greater reliance on Gulf
oil. This region supplies approximately 27 percent
of West European and 63 percent of Japanese national requirements.
The Middle East will be the key source of oil
production in the future. This region contains 66
percent of the world’s known oil reserves, with
many promising areas yet to be explored. Five nations — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Iraq — control 90 percent of those
reserves. Reserves of easily recoverable oil in the
U.S. and the Commonwealth of Independent
States will be depleted in the 21st century. When
this occurs, the Gulf region will still have over 100
years of proven reserves. Thus, any attempt to
control access to Arabian Gulf oil is a threat to regional and global security, and to U.S. vital interests.
Strategic Waterways
The region’s strategic importance extends far
beyond oil. Strategic waterways include three critical chokepoints: the Suez Canal, the Bab el
Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. In peacetime,
these sea lines of communication are essential to
the smooth flow of world commerce. During conflict, they are critical to our ability to deploy and
sustain forces abroad.
We moved 95 percent of our lift requirements
by sea during Operations DESERT SHIELD and
Ref 2-3
DESERT STORM. Had the use of these sea lines
of communication been denied, our only alternative
would have been to move supplies and equipment
around the Cape of Good Hope with a 40 percent
increase in transit times and a commensurate increase in cost. The denial of free movement
through these chokepoints could have disastrous
consequences during any regional contingency.
The region’s strategic location, vast oil reserves, and critical waterways make stability of
USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility absolutely
vital to the security of the U.S. and its allies. Regional conflicts have the potential to threaten our
interests and again result in the commitment of
U.S. military forces.
Regional Analysis
The USCENTCOM area of responsibility
contains four distinct, yet interdependent,
sub-regions: South Asia, the Arabian Gulf/Arabian
Peninsula, the Red Sea/Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Each sub-region remains dynamic and
unpredictable , each state pursues its own domestic,
regional, and international interests. During the
Gulf War, several states were able to overcome
traditional differences and work collectively to defeat Iraq. However, many difficult issues remain
unresolved. Ethnic diversity, religious differences,
limited water resources, economic disparity, territorial or border claims, and weapons proliferation
command the attention of leaders within the region.
The Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula Subregion (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Republic of Yemen)
remains the most critical sub-region in the
CENTCOM AOR. Operations EARNEST WILL,
DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM
marked a turning point for this sub-region. The
U.S. demonstrated its commitment to regional
peace and stability and its resolve to maintain the
free flow of oil. Success in these operations
opened the door to increased politico-military cooperation throughout the region as amply demonstrated by the success of the DESERT RETURN
exercise in 1995. To date, the U.S. has signed new
security agreements with the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and renewed its
long-standing arrangements with Oman and Bahrain. Discussions continue with Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates. Bilateral security arrangements are only part of the evolving regional security strategy as these states take steps to improve
their military capabilities and make an effort to cooperate with each other in new ways. However,
the security sought by our friends in the Gulf is not
yet assured.
Iran
Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has
been rebuilding its military at an increasing pace in
an effort to reestablish itself as a prominent regional military power. Iran has demonstrated its
capability to threaten neutral shipping and the Gulf
Cooperation Council states by conducting offensive
naval and amphibious exercises in the Arabian
Gulf. It is attempting to modernize its air and
ground forces by purchasing arms from the Commonwealth of Independent States, China, North
Korea, and East European countries. Iran has also
sought to purchase military and industrial items
from Germany, Italy, France, and Japan to facilitate its modernization efforts. However, high domestic inflation, a mounting foreign debt, and reduced oil revenues from an aging oil production
infrastructure have combined to reduce Iran’s ability to modernize as rapidly as desired. If this situation should change, Iran will find many nations
willing to provide sophisticated arms in exchange
for petro-dollars.
While rebuilding its conventional forces, Iran is
concentrating on improving its missile and chemical
weapons capabilities. It currently possesses SCUD
missiles provided by North Korea and may have
acquired missiles with a greater payload from
China. Iran developed offensive chemical weapons
and employed them in response to Iraqi chemical
use during the Iran-Iraq War. Tehran is pursuing
improved chemical agents and delivery means and
is bolstering its chemical stockpiles.
We are concerned that Iran may have embarked on a nuclear weapons program. There has
been civilian nuclear cooperation between Iran and
a number of other countries. Iran could develop a
viable nuclear weapons capability within the next
Ref 2-4
decade.
Iran will play an increasingly important role in
the Gulf if it is able to modernize its infrastructure
and increase oil exports. It is attempting to establish itself as a major regional power by expanding
relations with post-war Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
Islamic republics of Central Asia. Tehran continues to challenge renewed U.S. prestige and ties in
the region, claiming these developments will result
in a permanent U.S. presence on the Arabian
Peninsula. It also remains opposed to the
Arab-Israeli peace talks. We would welcome a
more constructive posture on the part of Iran, but
at this time it continues to pursue a course that
threatens the stability of this region.
Iraq
Iraq lost much of its military power in the Gulf
War, but still retains a significant capability. Its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons production
and research capabilities were found to be far
greater than originally estimated. Iraq may also
retain hundreds of ballistic missiles and some production capability. Its new government continues a
robust spending program designed to rebuild its
military capabilities and, most worrisome, has begun to develop a close military and political relationship with its former enemy, Iran.
Kuwait
Kuwait remains vulnerable because of its geography and limited military capabilities. Iraqi
claims to Kuwait predate Saddam and have survived with the successor regime. As a result, Kuwait is working to guarantee its security through a
series of bilateral defense relationships with the
U.S., the United Kingdom, and France, and has
completed construction of a defensive barrier
against a potential repetition of Iraq’s 1990 invasion. Kuwait has also strengthened its alliance with
other Gulf Cooperation Council states, as well as
with Egypt and others. Its acceptance of prepositioned equipment sufficient for a U.S. armored
division has greatly improved our ability to respond
to a crisis, but has also made its continued security
vital to the region as a whole.
Kuwait has nearly completed the reconstruc-
tion of its country. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Special Operations Forces are actively
assisting in these efforts. Politically, Kuwait continues to make progress towards democratic reform as evidenced by the National Assembly ele ctions planned for October 20XX.
In return for its generous basing rights agreement, Kuwait is pressing hard for increased U.S.
military assistance. The government of Kuwait has
paid over $16 billion to the U.S. to reimburse it for
expenses incurred during Operation DESERT
STORM, has facilitated U.S. access to ports and
airfields, and has borne most of the cost associated
with the prepositioning program. The current, vigorous U.S.-Kuwait exercise program also serves
to allay immediate security concerns. Our improved relations provide opportunities for even
stronger cooperation in the future.
Bahrain
Bahrain is a stable emirate which has provided
invaluable support to the United States. Bahrain
has been the host to the Commander, Middle East
Force since 1949, and has consistently supported
U.S. actions in the Gulf. Although our relationship
with Bahrain has been traditionally close and mutually beneficial, the U.S. and Bahrain signed a
Defense Cooperation Agreement on 27 October
1991 which expands on earlier bilateral agreements
and marks a new era of greater cooperation. Recently, Bahrain has been experiencing some internal unrest among its majority Shia population which
is demanding greater political participation.
A long-term friend, Bahrain desires stronger
military-to-military relations with the U.S. while it
seeks to acquire our state-of-the-art military
equipment to improve its defensive posture. If the
Administration request for new grant assistance
through the U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program is approved, Bahrain will be eligible to receive excess defense articles, a move we support.
France and Great Britain also seek to strengthen
military-to-military ties with the Bahrainis and will
maintain a presence in the Arabian Gulf.
Qatar
Prior to the spring of 1988, our relationship
Ref 2-5
with Qatar was cordial. However, military cooperation was interrupted through the fall of 1990 because of the contentious Stinger missile issue.
During Operations DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM, Qatar proved to be a key supporter of UN actions in the Arabian Gulf. Since
then, our bilateral relations have improved significantly and military-to-military cooperation is expanding.
Qatar is politically and economically active on
several fronts. It is cautiously seeking to normalize
diplomatic and economic ties with Iran, as both
countries share the huge gas reserves off Qatar’s
northern coast. Qatar maintains strong economic
and military ties with both Britain and France, with
the bulk of its military equipment coming from
French sources. It has also shown an interest in
procuring advanced American weapon systems.
United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) proved to
be a key supporter of the U.S. and the Coalition
during the Arabian Gulf War. The Emirates contributed over four billion dollars to defray the costs
of coalition forces and provided logistical support
and basing. Its ports are valuable sites for U.S.
Navy port visits and provide support for our crucial
naval presence.
The U.S. has an important role in improving
the United Arab Emirates’ military capabilities.
The UAE has indicated a need for air defense and
early warning capabilities, and has expressed an
interest in an advanced fighter aircraft and the
MlAl tank. It also asked to buy the AH-64 Apache
attack helicopter. In order to help strengthen our
important friendship, as well as to remain a reliable
defense partner, we must contribute to filling its legitimate defense requirements.
Oman
A strong and independent Oman is important
to regional stability and the flow of commerce
through the Strait of Hormuz. Oman has been a
staunch friend and supporter of U.S. regional
goals. Oman was the first Gulf country to sign an
access agreement with the U.S., and it played an
important role in multinational maritime interception
and diversion operations during the Gulf War. It
has also agreed to host PHIBLEX SEAWOLF this
January and the Operation DESERT SUPPORT
exercise later this summer.
Oman remains a stabilizing influence in the region and has been a leader in enhancing Gulf security. Under Sultan Qaboos’ leadership, Oman has
led the drive to improve the collective defense of
the Gulf Cooperation Council states and is a major
contributor to the GCC’s PENINSULA SHIELD
force. Oman’s steadfast cooperation with the U.S.
improves our ability to respond to threats throughout the region and is key to the success of our
strategic planning.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is the largest and most influential
nation on the Arabian Peninsula, containing two of
Islam’s holiest sites as well as the world’s largest
petroleum producing infrastructure. Its strategic location between the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea
makes it pivotal to the security of the region. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM, and more recently during Operation
DESERT RETURN, the U.S. expanded the close
military-to-military relationship which it has maintained with Saudi Arabia since World War II.
Saudi Arabia provided almost $17 billion to the
U.S. in support of the war effort and funded the
bulk of our costs involved in DESERT RETURN.
Saudi Arabia’s moderate political orientation,
generous foreign aid program, and ongoing efforts
to mediate regional disagreements contribute substantially to maintaining peace and stability in the
Middle East. The Saudis continue to support the
stationing of the U.S.’s 207th ACR and the
PENINSULA SHIELD force at King Khalid
Military City and provide the bulk of the GCC’s
deterrent forces. Resolution of the Kingdom’s border differences with Oman, United Arab Emirates,
and Qatar appears imminent, but the boundary dispute with Yemen is unlikely to be resolved in the
near future. Saudi Arabia is establishing diplomatic
relations with the Central Asian Republics of the
former Soviet Union, and is also cautiously exploring diplomatic relations with the newly democratic
East European states.
Ref 2-6
The U.S. enjoys extremely close military-to-military relations with Saudi Arabia. These
ties reflect the largest Foreign Military Sales Program in the world, financed entirely by Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has greatly expanded its armed
forces and demonstrates a continued willingness to
take a more active military role in the region
through multilateral security arrangements. Saudi
Arabia’s efforts at force modernization, through its
existing military assistance program with the
United States, have provided it with the most highly
capable military on the peninsula.
Jordan
A stable, moderate Jordan is essential to
achieving U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.
It enjoyed a long and cooperative relationship with
the U.S. prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
However, Jordan’s political position during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM
forced the U.S. to cut off all foreign assistance
programs. All of these programs have since been
restored to help Jordan respond to the growing
Iraqi threat in the region .
Jordan faces many domestic and regional challenges as a result of the Gulf War. Its weakened
economy, hard hit by foreign debt, is further burdened by the influx of nearly a quarter-million citizens forced to return to Jordan from Kuwait and
Iraq. Relations with Gulf Cooperation Council
states have improved slowly and are expected to
remain positive. Jordan is addressing internal
problems, continuing the process of democratization, and rebuilding relations with its neighbors. It
has been an active and supportive member of the
regional group working toward resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
Jordan wants to strengthen military-to-military
relations with the United States. It is looking to the
U.S. for help in reorganizing and improving its defenses. Increased U.S. security assistance support
will foster closer rela tions and help Jordan in
maintaining its defensive military readiness. In turn,
this makes it easier for Jordan to accept the security risks associated with its support for the IsraeliPLO peace process and to resist provocative Iraqi
military activities. Supporting Jordan in this way
will reinforce its ability to remain a moderating influence in the region.
Republic of Yemen
In the wake of the Gulf War, Yemen is surviving despite its isolation for having supported
Saddam Hussein. Although Yemen and Oman
seem to be reaching an amicable border settlement, much of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary remains undemarcated and a source of tension.
Yemeni expatriate workers, expelled from many
GCC countries during the Gulf War, are not expected to regain their privileged residency status in
the Gulf states. Additionally, the Yemeni government is not likely to expand its commerce in the
region until it can normalize relations with its m
i mediate neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula.
Yemen’s recent civil war, where northern forces
prevailed against southern secessionists, aggravated long-standing tensions with Saudi Arabia.
With an economy unable to support a military
infrastructure capable of meeting its defense
needs, Yemen has relied on foreign financial aid,
equipment, and advisory assistance to develop its
armed forces. Most of the country’s military
equipment came from the Soviet Union. Termination of U.S. and Saudi security assistance programs during Operations DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM ended military-to-military relationships. Yemen is expanding its military and political relationships with both Iran and Iraq, relationships that could become a regional concern in
the near future. We should watch Yemen closely
to insure it limits its potential involvement in GCC
issues.
II. MAJOR THREATS IN THE REGION
Roots of Conflict:
• Rogue States
• Proliferation of WMD and ballistic
missiles
• Transnational Terrorism
• Resource Competition
• Ethnic and Tribal Strife
• Internal Dissent
• Religious Strife
Ref 2-7
•
•
Anarchy and Lawlessness
Contested Borders
Of the many serious and diverse threats to
U.S. interests among the region’s principal “roots
of conflict,” Iran and Iraq, particularly since the
rise to power of Iraq’s HIZBIRR party, are the
two countries with the military potential and political ambitions to threaten their neighbors. Weapons
proliferation, particularly ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction, add to the volatility.
The potential is high for the use of these weapons
in future conflicts. Regional conflicts over oil, water, borders, and religious issues can threaten U.S.
interests.
Iraq
Despite the losses suffered during Operation
DESERT STORM, Iraq has rebuilt one of the
largest military forces in the region. Immediately
following the war, Iraq began to reconstitute its
forces, repairing and replacing damaged and destroyed equipment and weapon systems. Its new
government has continued along this path while
developing closer political and military ties with
Iran. Iraq’s forces retain a strong defensive capability and efforts to rebuild a major offensive capability are ongoing. Iraq’s most significant obstacles
to procuring and upgrading military equipment are
shortages of foreign exchange and the arms embargo imposed after the Gulf War, but it has been
able to overcome these obstacles with Chinese and
North Korean assistance.
Iran
Iran has become the greatest threat to peace
and stability in the region. Since the end of the
Iran-Iraq War in August 1988, Iran has been
steadily rebuilding its forces. Initially, Tehran relied
on equipment captured from the Iraqis or repaired
through cannibalization. In 1990, Iran began to purchase high-tech weapons using hard currency from
oil profits. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the resultant oil price increase provided Iran with unexpected revenues to accelerate an already ambitious
rearmament program. Even after oil prices fell,
Iran has been able to continue its arms build-up
with oil-for-weapons arrangements. Iranian armed
forces are modernizing with newer and more capable equipment from other nations. As a result of
this ongoing buildup and its developing political and
military ties with Iraq, Iran poses an even greater
threat to U.S. interests in the region. Finally, Iran
continues to support radical terrorist groups in the
region.
Weapons Proliferation
Weapons proliferation, including weapons of
mass destruction and uncontrolled growth of conventional weapons, undermines regional military
balances. The region is now experiencing an expansion of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile capabilities. As more countries feel the
need to arm themselves against a perceived threat
from their neighbors, the opportunity for regional
conflict grows.
Little was known about the extent of Iraq’s
nuclear program prior to Operation DESERT
STORM, but the nuclear-related facilities that survived the war gave us an indication of how far Iraq
had progressed with this technology. UN inspections and confiscations have limited the Iraqi nuclear threat for the near term. However, the Iraqi
scientific infrastructure is still in place and could be
employed in the future.
Prior to Operation DESERT STORM, Iraq
had the most extensive biological and chemical
warfare program in the Middle East and aggressively pursued research and production. It used
several thousand tons of chemical agents in the
war against Iran. Coalition air strikes during Operation DESERT STORM severely damaged numerous facilities associated with biological and
chemical weapons research and production. The
remainder of these facilities were destroyed late in
1991. Dual-use technology, much in evidence in
Iraq, is a major challenge to the much reduced UN
inspection process. Many legitimate pharmaceutical and fertilizer industries could quickly and easily
transition to producing biological and chemical
weapons, as the manufacturing facilities and many
of the chemical ingredients are common to civilian
and military use. Iraq continues use of facilities
which support the production of food and medicine.
Ref 2-8
It is likely that other regional states are working to develop biological and chemical weapons,
and we know that Pakistan possesses, and Iran is
pursuing, a nuclear capability. The presence of any
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons in the region is destabilizing.
Iraq’s technique of conducting mobile missile
launches during the Gulf War demonstrated what
could be achieved with l950 vintage SCUD technology. This strategy enabled Iraqi missile crews to
conduct launches in the face of intense pressure
from coalition reconnaissance and strike aircraft.
The development of larger payload missile systems
with greater precision has provided Iraq with an
improved deep strike capability and means for delivering weapons of mass destruction. Baghdad
probably views such capability as essential to its
military planning. UN resolutions ordering the destruction of Iraq’s ballistic missile program will impede near-term missile production, but we believe
it will pursue a renewed missile development program at the first opportunity. We are concerned
that it may already be cooperating with Iran in this
area.
In recent years, the majority of the conventional arms entering the region went to Iran and
Iraq. This created a genuine threat to friendly
countries, who have responded by purchasing their
own modern weapons to provide a defense against
this growing threat. We recognize that friendly nations have legitimate defense requirements. We
are concerned, however, that unrestricted and unbalanced increases in the number of modern conventional weapons are dangerous and harmful to
developing economies. The U.S. seeks to provide
friendly countries with modern defense systems
appropriate to the threat those countries face,
while pursuing international cooperative measures
to restrain the traffic in arms.
Regional Conflicts
Other regional conflicts can spill over and
threaten U.S. interests and citizens. Oil will remain
the dominant energy source in the world for the
foreseeable future, and competition over existing,
new, or anticipated oil resources could heighten
tensions. This problem may be further aggravated
by low revenues in some oil exporting countries,
such as Iran, due to declining reserves, and in Iraq,
due to low oil prices and production ceilings. Any
conflict which threatens to close regional chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el
Mandeb, and the Suez Canal, or to otherwise disrupt oil supplies would have a dramatic impact on
the world’s economy.
Over the past decade, radical Islamic movements have become an influential and dynamic
force in the political, ideological, cultural, and social
mosaic of the region. Economic hardships, wide
social gaps, and the failure of various Western-oriented ideologies have created conditions
which enable radicalism to thrive. Iran advocates
revolution as a means to establish additional Islamic republics and inspired Iraq’s revolution in
1993. In Jordan and Egypt, organized elements
such as the Muslim Brotherhood are a potent religious and political force working to reverse the
secularization of their societies. The result of Iranian influence on the southern republics of the
Commonwealth of Independent States remains to
be seen. Iranian influence also seems to be behind
the renewal of unrest among Shia populations in
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Radical religious groups
pose a serious challenge to some regimes and
could spark dramatic political changes in the region.
III. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL
OBJECTIVES
Drawing upon a broad range of political, military, economic, and informational instruments, the
National Security Strategy For a New Century
focuses on accomplishing three primary national
objectives:
•
•
•
Enhancing Our Security
Promoting Prosperity at Home
Promoting Democracy
The National Military Strategy outlines two
complimentary, national military objectives that
support our overall national security goals:
Ref 2-9
•
•
Promote stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction.
Thwart aggression through credible deterrence and robust warfighting capabilities.
Consistent with the two complementary strategic concepts of overseas presence and power
projection, our military strategy relies on three interrelated components in order to achieve our objectives. These three components are the tasks of
peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict
prevention, and fighting and winning the nation’s
wars.
USCENTCOM’s regional interests and obje ctives are derived from, and are closely linked to,
U.S. national security objectives and U.S. military
objectives. Our regional interests and objectives include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
To ensure free world access to Southwest
Asian oil resources.
To demonstrate our commitment to the security of our friends and allies in the region.
To enhance regional peace and stability
through the containment of Iran and Iraq.
To prevent domination of the region by
non-friendly powers.
To promote the principles of human rights,
free market economies, and democratic
processes.
To provide for the security of U.S. citizens
and property throughout the region.
To prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction.
To stem the flow of illegal drugs.
To reduce the threat of terrorism.
To deter, and defeat if necessary, military
operations hostile to U.S. vital interests.
These interests and objectives provide the basis for USCENTCOM’s peacetime mission:
•
•
•
Promote and protect U.S. interests.
Ensure uninterrupted access to regional
resources.
Assist friendly states in providing for their
•
own security and contributing to the collective defense.
Deter attempts by hostile regional states to
achieve geo-political gains by threat or use
of force.
These national and regional security objectives
are also the basis for developing USCENTCOM’s
theater strategy. Recognizing the importance and
unique problems of the region, the theater strategy
remains focused on achieving long-range security
goals while retaining the flexibility necessary to respond to fast-breaking threats.
IV. USCENTCOM Theater Strategy
In the seven years since the spectacular victory over Iraqi forces by the DESERT STORM
coalition, America’s presence in USCENTCOM’s
AOR has continued to be a vital part of our national military strategy in an area of great importance to the United States. Economic progress and
a fragile peace have been made possible through
the efforts of the men and women of United States
Central Command. Working closely with their
host-nation counterparts, these soldiers, airmen,
sailors, and Marines are guided by a vision that implements a theater strategy tailored to the unique
and daunting challenges of this distant region:
USCENTCOM Vision
U.S. Central Command: A flexible and vers atile command into the 21st century.…
Trained, positioned, and ready to defend the
nation’s vital interests, promote peace and
stability, deter conflict, and conduct operations spanning the conflict continuum; and
prepared to wage unrelenting, simultaneous
joint and combined operations to achieve decisive victory in war.
USCENTCOM’s strategic challenge revolves
around the fact that the U.S. has vital interests in
the region that are far from its own shores, yet
close to many significant threats. Our strategic response to this challenge reflects the fiscal and political constraints that continue to shape overall
Ref 2-10
U.S. involvement in the region. The “foundations
of stability” depend heavily upon the following
strategic components:
•
•
•
•
•
Lethal mix of forward-deployed forces.
Prepositioning of equipment ashore and
afloat.
Readiness to fight across the conflict continuum
Bilateral relationships with key regional
partners.
Infrastructure, equipment, and host-nation
support agreements to support power projection.
Three-Tier Defense Concept
Our security relationships in the region are built
around a three-tier concept of defense against aggression. This approach allows us to work with our
regional coalition partners to achieve our objectives
and to set the stage for the transition to coalition
defense should deterrence fail. The first tier ni volves actions by each nation to provide the initial
line of deterrence and, if required, defense, against
aggressors. The second tier involves actions by
friendly regional nations to support a threatened
state in attempts to restore stability and preclude
hostilities. It also calls for nations in the region to
provide for the defense of common interests if deterrence fails. The final tier involves direct actions
by the U.S. and other friendly nations to support
threatened states and regional alliances when their
capabilities alone are insufficient to restore stability
or to defend our common interests.
Five-Pillar Strategic Concept
USCENTCOM’s theater strategy consists of
integrated strategic concepts that are represented
by five pillars: forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, power projection, and
readiness to fight. The first three pillars describe
our overseas activities. The fourth pillar deals with
the rapid projection of U.S. forces to the region.
The fifth pillar focuses on our ability to conduct
wartime operations within the theater.
Forward presence cements our credibility,
strengthens deterrence, and facilitates transition
from peace to war. Although naval forces provide
the bulk of our long-term forward presence, access
to ports and airfields is essential to project other
forces into the area. The continued presence of the
207th ACR in northern Saudi Arabia sends a
strong visible message of our commitment to defend this region. Presence is enhanced through ongoing military-to-military interaction, cooperative
defense measures, and prepositioning of equipment
and supplies critical to our responsiveness and
warfighting flexibility.
Combined exercises, the second pillar of our
strategy, are designed to provide the primary foundation for developing strong military-to-military relations and increased coalition training opportunities. Through such activities we maintain access,
advance interoperability with regional partners, enhance forward presence, and improve the individual and collective military capabilities of the GCC
states. Because we fight as we train, the experience gained in the pre-war combined exercise program contributed significantly to the Coalition’s
success in the Gulf War of 1990/91. Combined exercises such as DESERT RETURN 1995 and
DESERT SUPPORT help to solidify our military
relationships, demonstrate our commitment and capability to defend our interests, and supplement our
standing naval presence with short-term air and
ground force deployments to the region.
Security assistance, the third pillar of our strategy, helps develop strong relationships with friendly
nations and promotes increased U.S. influence in
the region. Meeting the legitimate self-defense
needs of our friends reinforces regional deterrence
and stability, while decreasing the time required for
the U.S. to respond should a crisis require coalition
military action. Sales of U.S. weapon systems bolster our credibility as a security partner and significantly improve interoperability between our forces
and those of our friends. They also support the legitimate security assistance needs of our friends,
help to sustain their confidence in us, solidify our
bilateral relationships, facilitate interoperability and
access, and reduce the probability that U.S. forces
will have to fight in the region.
The fourth pillar of our theater strategy, power
projection, defines activities and qualities of U.S.
military forces that support the rapid projection of
Ref 2-11
forces from the U.S. into the Gulf region and the
preparation of those forces for combat operations.
The 70 C-17 transports and 20 fast roll-on/roll-off
SL-7 ships now available for strategic lift significantly improve our ability to transport U.S.-based
forces to the theater and to support them once they
are here. We are now able to accomplish in days
deployment activities that required weeks, or even
months, during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM.
The fifth and final pillar of our strategy is
readiness to fight. This pillar stresses activities that
ensure the Central Command headquarters and individual component commands possess standard
operating procedures that facilitate rapid deployment during crises and enable us to conduct synchronized, high tempo joint and combined wartime
operations. In support of this pillar of our strategy,
we are continually revising our war and contingency plans to reflect emerging developments in
the region. We also conduct extensive warfighting
conferences and command post exercises designed
to help us maintain enhanced levels of readiness.
Wartime Strategy
Our wartime strategy builds on the framework
implemented by our peacetime strategy of deterrence. Should deterrence fail, we would transition
to a wartime strategy of deterring/defeating aggression. This strategy encompasses the full operational continuum from regional to global operations and capitalizes on U.S. technological
superiority. It is based on coalition warfare and is
designed to achieve the following wartime obje ctives:
•
•
•
To deter or defeat further aggression.
To control escalation of hostilities.
To terminate hostilities early, on terms favorable to the United States and our regional coalition partners.
Our wartime strategy envisions three phases
of operations which are embodied in all of our operational contingency planning. These phases are:
•
Early flexible response/deterrent options.
These are preplanned, initial response options
to any crisis, encompassing all of the instruments of national power (diplomatic/political,
economic, and military). They are designed as
a series of flexible actions to be employed sequentially or simultaneously, as needed, to
meet the threat. These options demonstrate
U.S. resolve and bolster the confidence and
self-defense capabilities of friendly nations.
The goal of these options is to forestall conflict
by demonstrating to potential aggressors the
price to be paid for their actions.
• Defensive operations. If deterrence should
fail, our initial focus will be on operations designed to defend critical facilities, lines of
communication, and rear areas. These operations could also be used to create the conditions necessary for the next stage, offensive
operations.
• Offensive operations. The actions in this
stage would be focused on the enemy’s centers of gravity. These operations would be designed to break his will to continue fighting and
to achieve an early termination of the conflict
on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies.
Our strategy emphasizes that our friends and
allies will assume their fair share of the responsibility and burden for maintaining the region’s stability and security. This approach allows the U.S.
to concentrate on those actions necessary to
achieve a speedy, favorable end to any crisis while
reducing risks to national interests.
Additional Operations
In addition to operations directly linked to our
peacetime strategy of deterrence and our threephase wartime strategy, USCENTCOM must conduct activities in support of our broad strategic and
operational objectives. These activities include
noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian/civic assistance operations, and combating terrorism.
• Noncombatant evacuation operations.
When requested by the Department of State
through the Department of Defense,
USCENTCOM will conduct noncombatant
evacuation operations in the region. These operations provide protection and evacuation for
Ref 2-12
•
•
our citizens when they are threatened by natural disasters, civil strife, or international conflict. For example, in January 1991 during Operation Eastern Exit, we successfully
evacuated the American embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, when it came under siege by
rebel forces. Contingency planning for noncombatant operations is based on the most
likely regional scenarios. We use the worst
case situation as the basis for potential
evacuation planning. These plans are updated
periodically as the embassies and consulates
submit their emergency action plans. This enhances USCENTCOM’s ability to evacuate
personnel within the region.
Humanitarian assistance operations. The
Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Program, conducted under Title 10 USC, provides a means
for the U.S. to gain access and demonstrate
presence throughout the region. This program
also provides a vehicle for our government to
respond to either manmade or natural disasters. Projects conducted under this program
have focused on improving medical treatment,
preventive health care, and the country’s infrastructure,
including
water
production/distribution systems. Overpopulation, poverty, and disease in underdeveloped regions
provide challenging, realistic training opportunities for the medical and support personnel of
participating U.S. military units. This medical
and engineering assistance is a cost effective
means for our government to promote favorable relationships with host nations.
Combating terrorism/force protection. Preventing, combating, and recovering from terrorist acts require an integrated effort. This
effort includes defensive measures used to
reduce the vulnerability of our forces and
property, and offensive measures used to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Our
antiterrorism program covers our headquarters, facilities, and security assistance organizations in the region. The program includes
antiterrorism training at service schools for
personnel being permanently assigned to
threat areas, and a local antiterrorism brief
given to all personnel within 48 hours of their
arrival in the area. Organizational security
managers throughout the region have
antiterrorism plans detailing security procedures
for
their
unique
situations.
USCENTCOM personnel conduct annual inspections to review antiterrorism/force protection plans and conduct counterterrorism
exercises to ensure procedures are current
and complete.
USCENTCOM Forces
The forces apportioned to USCENTCOM to
implement our strategy are drawn from the national inventory of available assets. They incorporate the total force comprised of active, reserve,
and civilian elements in air, land, and sea components. Each is flexible and expandable, allowing the
proper response to the scope, duration, or intensity
of any crisis or conflict. To ensure that we retain
our ability to respond effectively, we need to m
i prove our chemical and biological defense capabilities; ballistic missile early warning and identific ation friend or foe systems; intelligence capability
including imagery, reconnaissance, and battle damage assessment; strategic air and sealift; mine
countermeasure capability; and regional infrastructure to include prepositioning and command,
control, and communications.
V. KEY ENABLING REQUIREMENTS
There are a number of requirements that must
be met to enable USCENTCOM to execute its
theater strategy successfully in peace and war.
Our peacetime requirements include a vigorous
combined exercise program, expanded security assistance efforts, improvements in our prepositioned
assets, and the maintenance of a quality, highly
trained force structure. These requirements have
already been elaborated in the discussion of the
five pillars of our theater strategy. Some additional
requirements that directly support our wartime
strategy are: theater missile defense, command and
control, intelligence, mobility, and sustainability.
Theater Missile Defense
Ref 2-13
The proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region requires us to increase our capabilities in the
area of theater missile defense. In particular, we
must improve our space-based assets and the ability to link our satellite communications architecture
directly to our subordinate units. We must also
work to increase the interoperability between the
assets currently available to USCENTCOM forces
and those available to our regional partners.
Command and Control
There is a clear need for improvements in our
permanent communications infrastructure within
the region and in our ability to rapidly expand our
assets in times of crisis. We are working to fulfill
this need through the Southwest Asia Defense Information Infrastructure (SWADII) and the transportable Tactical Contingency Communications
Equipment-Central Asia (TCCE-CA). These systems enable us to create a flexible, integrated
communications system designed to support joint
task force (JTF) operations in the region. Satellite
systems are also an essential element of our interand intra-theater communications architecture.
Intelligence
The region continues to present a significant
challenge to our intelligence gathering efforts. The
diversity of people, terrain, cultures, conditions, the
distance to the U.S., and a limited in-theater intelligence infrastructure compound the problem. We
are working to make national and theater intelligence assets more responsive to tactical and
theater commanders. We have increased the capabilities of our intelligence activities through formal intelligence exchanges and cooperative intelligence initiatives. We have also developed
expanded intelligence data bases, and trained additional Arabic and Farsi linguists. We are refining
our Joint Intelligence Center capabilities through
participation in combined exercises.
Mobility
USCENTCOM relies heavily on strategic lift
to meet its commitments. The extraordinary distances from the continental U.S. to the region
magnify the immense difficulties encountered with
deploying any size force in response to a crisis or
contingency. While existing strategic airlift and
amphibious lift adequately support our current regional contingency plans, strategic lift should remain a high priority on our future agenda, and support for procurement of strategic lift assets must
continue. We need more roll-on/roll-off ships and
additional strategic sealift ships to improve our
force closure profiles. We continue to support the
National Sealift Policy of 1989 designed to alleviate
two systemic problems: the deteriorating capability
of U.S. shipyards and the aging Merchant Marine
Force. These problems contribute to the overall
decline of the Merchant Marine and could jeopardize future deployment efforts.
Sustainability
The remoteness and austere environment of
the area requires a number of unique programs to
support deploying forces. This is especially true in
the case of water production, storage and distribution systems, tactical fuel distribution systems, and
bare-base life support systems. These programs
are necessary during peacetime training as well as
during regional contingency and wartime situations.
Congressional support for sustainability programs is
essential in order to maintain combat capability.
Host nation support was a combat multiplier
during Operation DESERT STORM even though
few written agreements existed. Host nation support augmented our capabilities for fuel, food, water, facilities, and transportation. We were fortunate to have fought Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM in developed countries with
excellent infrastructures, but this was a “best
case” scenario. Future conflicts may not afford us
this same luxury. It is imperative we continue our
pursuit of written host nation agreements to ensure
the necessary support will be available when
needed.
Ref 2-14
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting
C/M/S 500
Reference 3. Staff Officer’s Strategic Estimate Worksheet Notes
______________________________________________________________________________
J5 Notes for Strategic Estimate:
Emerging Crisis in Middle East — Iran/Iraq Coalition Threats to U.S. Interests
Purpose:
Info/decision brief for CINCCENT in preparation for his discussion with the National Security Council
STRATEGIC ESTIMATE PROCESS
1. Mission.
a. Mission Analysis
NSS guidance (Strategy for a New Century):
Core Objectives:
Strategic Priorities:
Interests:
Enhance our security (Life)
Bolster America’s economic prosperity (Pursuit of Happiness)
Promote democracy abroad (Liberty)
Foster regional efforts in key regions
Increase cooperation in confronting new security threats
Strengthen military, diplomatic, and law enforcement tools
Create more jobs and (economic) opportunities for American citizens
Vital:
Physical security of our and our allies’ territories
Safety of our citizens
Our economic well-being
Protection of our critical infrastructure
Access to foreign oil sources
Important: Those that affect our national well-being and the character
of
Objectives:
the world in which we live (examples: Haitian refugees; Bosnia)
Humanitarian: Where our values demand it
To sustain our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces
that are ready to fight.
• Deterring and defeating large-scare, cross-border aggression in two
distant theaters in overlapping timeframes
• Maintaining a substantial overseas presence
• Projecting power efficiently and effectively
• Successfully conducting multiple smaller scale contingencies
• Countering WMD
• Contributing to multilateral peace operations
• Supporting counterterrorism efforts, noncombatant evacuation, counternarcotic operations, and humanitarian assistance
Ref 3-1
To bolster America’s economic revitalization.
• Enhancing American competitiveness
• Creating a government partnership with business and labor
• Enhancing access to foreign markets
• Strengthening macroeconomic coordination
• Providing for energy security
• Promoting sustainable development abroad
To promote democracy abroad.
• Enlarging the community of free market democracies
• Strengthening democratic processes in emerging democracies
• Promoting universal adherence to international human rights and
democratic principles
• Alleviating human suffering through humanitarian programs
NMS guidance (Shape, Respond and Prepare):
Military Objectives:
Promoting peace and stability.
When necessary, defeat adversaries
Strategic Concepts:
Strategic agility.
Overseas presence.
Power projection.
Decisive force.
Strategic Elements:
Shape the international environment
• Promote stability
• Prevent or reduce conflicts and threats
• Peace deterrence
Respond to the full spectrum of crises
• Deter aggression or coercion in a crisis
• Fight and win Major Theater Wars
• Conduct multiple, concurrent SSCs
Prepare now for an uncertain future
• Joint Vision 2010
• Information superiority
• Technological innovation
Strategic Components: Peacetime engagement.
• Military-to-military contact
• Nation assistance
• Security assistance
• Humanitarian operations
• Counterdrug and counterterrorism operations
• Peacekeeping
Deter aggression and prevent conflict.
• Nuclear deterrence
• Regional alliances
• Crisis response
• Arms control
Ref 3-2
• Confidence-building measures
• Noncombatant evacuation operations
• Sanctions enforcement
• Peace enforcement
Fight and win the nation’s wars.
• Clear objectives and decisive force
• Project necessary power to theater of operations
• Fight combined and joint
• Win the information war
• Counter weapons of mass destruction
• Prepare for a second major regional conflict
• Withdraw forces from low priority missions
• Mobilize critical Reserve forces
• Begin plans to win the peace at the outset of conflict
Regional U.S. Interests (NSS):
• Assured access to Gulf oil
• Just, lasting, and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
• Protection of U.S. citizens and property
• Freedom of navigation
• Access to regional markets
• Ensuring security and well-being of Israel
• Helping key regional partners and friends provide for their security
• Free flow of energy—resources at reasonable prices
• Spread of democratic values
• Increased political participation
Regional Interests and Objectives (Theater Strategy):
• Ensure free world access to SWA oil
• Demonstrate commitment to security of friends and allies
• Enhance regional peace and stability by containing Iran and Iraq
• Prevent domination of the region by non-friendly powers
• Promote human rights/free market economies/democratic processes
• Provide for security of U.S. citizens and property
• Prevent spread of WMD
• Stem flow of illegal drugs
• Reduce threat of terrorism
• Deter, and defeat, if necessary, military operations hostile to U.S. interests
Key threats to U.S. Interests and Security (DOD Security Strategy and CENTCOM Theater
Strategy):
• Iran (long-term)
• Iraq (short-term)
• Proliferation of TBMs and WMDs
• Terrorism and radical Islam
• Resource disputes
• General regional instability
Ref 3-3
Objectives and Strategies (OPLAN 1648):
Objectives: Coordinate and establish an effective force to:
• Deter, and if necessary, counter aggression
• Prevent military coercion of friendly states
• Protect U.S. resources and facilities in the region
• Deny enemy access to the same
• Ensure access to regional LOCs
Strategies:
• Deter war
• Improve regional stability
• Counter hostile expansion and influences
• Prepare for war
• Should deterrence fail:
-- Rapidly deploy forces to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
-- Upon generation of adequate combat power and the conduct of an adequate defense,
mass forces and counterattack to restore territorial integrity and the legitimate
governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, if necessary.
ISCP guidance (Regional Military Objectives):
• Maintain freedom of access to Mediterranean Sea, Middle East, Indian Ocean and Africa.
• Protect U.S. economic, political, and military interests.
• Ensure access to oil supplies.
• Prevent any power achieving position endangering U.S. in USCENTCOM AOR.
• Deter overt intervention by outside power.
• Monitor actions that threaten stability in AOR; be prepared to increase U.S. military presence.
Mission (USCENTCOM Theater Strategy):
• Promote and protect U.S. interests
• Ensure uninterrupted access to regional resources
• Assist friendly states in providing for their own security and contributing to the collective
defense
• Deter attempts by hostile regional states to achieve geo-political gains by threat or use of
force
Mission (OPLAN 1648):
When directed, USCENTCOM will deploy forces to the area of operations and take actions to
defend Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian territory against an Iraqi attack; and, if required, restore the
pre-conflict international borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Conflict Termination Objectives:
For successful deterrence of IIC offensive operations: Diminish cohesion of IIC; eliminate
massing of IIC ground and air forces; strengthen defensive readiness of GCC nations; reduce
terrorist attacks; prevent additional proliferation of WMD; support resistance of friendly
governments to IIC attempts at coercion; maintain free flow of oil; maintain current international
borders; maintain freedom of navigation through international waterways. Existing Iraqi and
Iranian governments may remain in place.
For warfighting operations: Destroy IIC offensive capability; eliminate IIC WMD programs;
restore pre-conflict international boundaries; eliminate IIC military alliance; establish regional
stability on terms favorable to U.S. interests; and restore free flow of oil. Current Iraqi and Iranian
government regimes may remain.
Ref 3-4
b. Mission Statement
When directed, USCENTCOM will deploy forces to its AOR and, in conjunction with the GCC and
other friendly nations, deter IIC military attack, coercion, or intimidation against GCC nations, and
maintain air, land, and sea lines of communication. Should deterrence fail, defend U.S. interests and
sovereign territory of friendly coalition states. If required, conduct offensive operations to restore
preconflict international boundaries, destroy the offensive military and WMD capabilities of the IIC,
and establish a stable and secure environment in the Gulf region favorable to U.S. interests.
2. Situation and Courses of Action
a. Situation Analysis
(1) Geostrategic Context
(a) Domestic and international context:
• Strategic oil reserves and waterways make the region a vital interest to the United States.
• IIC poses risk to interdependent world economy and favorable regional balance of power.
• Proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction is a threat throughout
AOR.
• IIC receiving arms and support from China, North Korea, and others.
• IIC military coalition formed to support Iranian regional hegemony, Iraqi territorial claims,
and control of Islamic holy places by Shia clergy; to replace regional monarchies with
Islamic republics; and, to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process.
Immediate Problem. Iranian/Iraqi-sponsored terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabian citizens
and territory, Iranian and Iraqi calls for a Shiite-dominated Islamic council to assume
guardianship of Islam's holy cities (Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem), and Saudi Arabia’s
closure of Mecca and Medina to Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims causes political and religious
instability in the Islamic and Arab worlds. The build-up of IIC forces along the Euphrates
River and of Iranian military forces in the Strait of Hormuz pose immediate, conventional
military threats to the security of GCC nations, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and to
the free flow of oil from the region. Political instability, attempts to undermine friendly regimes
through military and political coercion, and overt acts of intimidation jeopardize the vital
interests of the United States and other industrialized nations and threaten the security of U.S.
friends and allies in the region.
Long-Term Problem. IIC political and military alliance threatens the balance of power in the
Arabian Gulf region. IIC military and political attempts to coerce and intimidate its neighbors,
if unchecked, could influence one or more Gulf states to take political and economic decisions
that simultaneously favor IIC interests and undermine their legitimacy and independence. The
IIC could dictate Saudi and OPEC oil policy and pressure moderate Arab states to withdraw
their support of the Mideast peace process; either result would have important consequences
for the U.S. and the rest of the world. U.S. failure to stand by its regional commitments and
support its regional interests will lead to a decline of its influence in the region and the rest of
the world. Mideast peace accords could fall apart, increasing instability throughout the region.
Ref 3-5
(b) Characteristics of the operational area:
Climate:
-- Hot, dry summers (Jun-Sep) and mild winters (Nov-Apr).
-- High temperature of 105F; seldom reaches freezing.
-- Visibility best in winter; dust, blowing sand and haze in summer.
Topography:
-- Arabian Peninsula is desert plain.
-- Narrow sea lines of operation in Arabian Gulf.
-- Rugged mountains in western Iran.
-- Marshlands between Iraq and Iran and in southern Iraq.
Line of Communications:
Seaports: Ad Damman (35k Mtons clearance; receiver container, general cargo and RORO); Al Jubail (33k Mtons clearance; receive container and general cargo)
Airfields:
Daharan International/KKMC/Riyadh Int'l/Kuwait International
Population Centers:
Daharan
Hail
Riyadh
Jiddah
Hafar al Batin
Mecca
Medina
Khafji
Buraydah
Kuwait City
(2) Analysis of the Enemy
Intent and Capabilities
ACTOR
Iraq
Iran
INTERESTS/
INTENT
- Hegemony
- Control of KU
oilfields
POWER
AVAILABLE
- Reconstituted
military
- Hegemony
- Modernized
military with
WMD
- Silkworm
missiles at the
strait
LIKELY COAS
STRENGTHS
- No domestic
opposition
WEAKNESSES
- No credibility
- Threat of
chemical WMD
- No domestic
opposition
- Vulnerable
coastline
- No credibility
Forces Available
Ref 3-6
- Rebuild military
- Intimidate GCC
nations
- Gain hegemony
then split with
Iraq
ACTOR
Iraq
GROUND
FORCES
AIR FORCES
MARITIME
FORCES
Iran
Ref 3-7
SPECIAL OPS
OTHER
(3) Friendly Situation
Interests and Capabilities
INTERESTS/
INTENT
- Economic/Oil
- Regional
stability
POWER
AVAILABLE
- Solid military
- Diplomacy
STRENGTHS
- Credibility
- National will
WEAKNESSES
- Limited
strategic lift
- Join coalition
France
- Economic/Oil
- Regional
stability
- Solid military
- Diplomacy
- Economic
- Credibility
- Experience
- Power project
- Long LOCs
- Join coalition
Saudi Arabia
- Survival
- Pol/territorial
integrity
- Moderate
military power
- Economic
- Legitimacy
- Vulnerable to
propaganda
- Seek UN and
Western powers
support
ACTOR
United Kingdom
LIKELY COAS
Bahrain
UAE
Jordan
Egypt
Ref 3-8
Forces Available
ACTOR
USA
GROUND
FORCES
AIR FORCES
MARITIME
FORCES
United Kingdom
France
Saudi Arabia
Bahrain
UAE
Egypt
Ref 3-9
SPECIAL OPS
OTHER
(4) Restrictions
(5) Assumptions
• IIC will continue to sponsor terrorism against Saudi Arabia and eventually against U.S.
interests.
• The threat of IIC regional dominance will be considered a greater threat by GCC
governments other than Saudi Arabia than the threat to Riyadh's guardianship of the Holy
Cities. The ability to protect and control the Holy Cities is vital to the legitimacy of Saudi
Arabia's government.
• Saudi Arabia and other GCC nations will ask for military assistance from the U.S. and other
western nations.
3. Courses of Action Analysis
Scenario 1: Deterrence Options — IIC governments may remain intact, continue bellicose rhetoric,
but do not initiate major hostilities. IIC ground forces in Euphrates valley return to normal
locations; military coalition may remain intact. IIC-sponsored terrorist acts reduced .
COA 1: Weaken cohesiveness of IIC and strengthen resolve and readiness of friends and
allies.
Military Aspect:
• Increase forward presence temporarily to underscore U.S. commitment.
• Continue combined exercise operations. Seek opportunity to increase.
• Expand security assistance programs. Ensure GCC training and equipment readiness.
Diplomatic Aspect:
• Use diplomatic forums (UN, bilateral talks) to isolate IIC.
• Bolster resolve of Saudi Arabia and GCC states to resist IIC intimidation
• Indirect influence to exploit IIC weaknesses/tenuous cohesion.
• Pressure China and CIS to close military hardware sales.
Economic Aspect:
• Introduce UN economic sanctions resolution to deter IIC; continue unilateral sanctions
• Economic pressure on countries to stop trade of military equipment.
Informational Aspect:
• Stress past causes and results of 1980’s Iran-Iraq War.
• Stress legitimacy of Saudi Arabia’s guardianship of the Holy Cities.
• Emphasize Iraq’s war crimes and atrocities.
• Begin domestic “debate” about Reserve Component call-up.
COA 2: Strengthen friends and allies. Encourage negotiated settlement over Holy Cities issue .
Military Aspect:
Diplomatic Aspect:
Economic Aspect:
Informational Aspect:
Ref 3-10
Scenario 2: Warfighting Options — IIC increases terrorism, continues force buildup, and clearly
indicates intent to attack GCC nation(s). United Nations supports creation of a coalition to oppose
IIC and authorizes all means necessary to eliminate threat. IIC may initiate major hostilities.
COA 1: Conduct combined defense of the Arabian Peninsula and prepare for offensive
operations, focused on IIC strategic and operational centers of gravity.
Military Aspect:
• Full deployment under OPLAN 1648.
• Combined defense operations to secure strategic and operational LOCs.
• Defend forward to protect ports and airfields.
• Conduct counter-offensive into Iraq and Iran to destroy IIC offensive capability.
• Destroy IIC WMD facilities and programs.
Diplomatic Aspect:
• Solidify coalition forces.
• Active diplomatic effort to forestall attempts to disrupt coalition.
• Diffuse attempt to draw Israel into conflict.
Economic Aspect:
• Enforce sanctions with blockade.
• Seek additional economic pressure on those trading with IIC.
Informational Aspect:
• Major PSYOP to emphasize past grievances between Iran and Iraq.
• Stress legitimacy of Saudi Arabia guardianship role.
• Condemn IIC terrorism and attempts at hegemony.
COA 2: Initiate combined offensive against Iran and Iraq.
Military Aspect:
Diplomatic Aspect:
Economic Aspect:
Informational Aspect:
Ref 3-11
Tasks, Requirements, and Shortfalls
SCENARIO
Deterrence
TASK
- Establish/
maintain air
superiority
FORCE
REQUIREMENTS
CURRENT
CAPABILITY
- Deter attack
-Expand security
assistance
Warfighting
- Defeat attack
-Maintain air
superiority
- Destroy IIC
offensive
capability
4. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action
Ref 3-12
SHORTFALL
CORRECTIVE
PROGRAM
5. Comparison of Own Courses of Action
COA
Suitable
Feasible
6. Recommendation
Ref 3-13
Acceptable
Actor
Interests
United
Kingdom
Survival: No.
Economic: Yes.
Free flow of oil.
World Stability:
Yes. Regional
interests.
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography: No
Strengths
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
a. Precedent from
1990-91.
a. Long lines of
communications.
a. Support UN
sanctions and
initiatives.
Economy: Yes,
Short term.
b. Strong gov’t
with extensive
knowledge of the
region.
b. Lack of
strategic lift.
Nat’l Will:
Probably.
c. Credibility.
Relations w/Ally:
Maybe.
Nat’l Direction:
Yes.
Population: Yes.
Instruments:
Military: Yes
Limited deployability.
Economic: Yes.
Can sustain
sanctions.
Diplomatic: Yes.
Strong
diplomatic corps.
Information:
Yes.
Ref 3-14
c. Former
colonial power.
b. Join military
coalition, if
needed.
c. Request
strategic lift
support.
Actor
Interests
France
Survival: No.
Economic: Yes.
Free flow of oil.
World Stability:
Yes. Regional
interests.
Relations w/Ally:
Maybe.
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography: No.
Strengths
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
a. Credibility.
a. Long lines of
communications.
a. Support UN
sanctions and
initiatives.
b. Former
colonial power.
b. Support
military action, if
required.
Economy: Yes,
b. Experience
in the region.
Nat’l Will:
Probably.
c. Can sustain
sanctions.
Nat’l Direction:
Yes. Strong
gov’t with
experience.
Population: Yes
Instruments:
Military: Yes
Limited strategic
lift.
Economic: Yes.
Diplomatic: Yes.
Good diplomatic
corps.
Information:
Yes.
Ref 3-15
c. Lack of
strategic lift.
c. Use influence.
Actor
Interests
Saudi Arabia
Survival: YES!
Economic: YES!
Vital importance.
World Stability:
Yes.
Relations w/Ally:
Will need help.
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography: No.
Vulnerable.
Economy: Yes,
Can support
allied effort.
Nat’l Will: YES!
Nat’l Direction:
YES!
Population: No.
Not large
enough.
Strengths
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
a. Historical
legitimacy of
custody of Holy
Cities.
a. Vulnerable to
adverse
propaganda after
closing
Mecca/Medina.
a. Defend and,
when possible,
attack.
b. Modernized
military, but
readiness is
uncertain.
c. Viewed as
moderate by
most countries.
d. History of
generous foreign
aid in region.
Instruments:
Military: Yes.
Modernized, but
? readiness.
Economic: Yes.
Diplomatic: Yes.
Has legitimacy of
issues.
Precedent.
Information:
Fair.
Ref 3-16
b. Proximity to
IIC.
b. View as life
and death
struggle.
c. Not surrender
guardianship of
Holy Cities.
d. Seek UN and
Western nation
support.
Actor
Interests
Oman
Survival: Yes.
Economic: Yes.
World Stability:
Yes.
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography: No.
Vulnerable.
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
a. Proven diplomatic track
record in the
region.
a. Small military.
a. Seek Western
support.
Economy: Yes.
Nat’l Will: Yes.
Relations w/Ally:
Will need help.
Strengths
Nat’l Direction:
Yes.
b. Strong
economy, but
extremely oil
dependent.
Population: No.
Small country.
Instruments:
Military: Fair.
Small army.
Economic: Yes.
Diplomatic: Yes.
Precedent.
Information:
Fair.
Ref 3-17
b. Very
dependent on
coalition
support.
b. Support GCC
efforts against
IIC.
Actor
Interests
Kuwait
Survival: YES!
Economic: YES!
World Stability:
Yes.
Relations w/Ally:
Will need help.
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography: No.
Vulnerable.
Strengths
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
a. Proximity to
both Iraq and
Iran.
a. Desperately
seek Western
and other Arab
nation support.
Economy: Yes,
unless attacked
and oil flow
curtailed.
a. Size and
proximity plus
atrocities of ‘9091 generate
natural
sympathy and
worldwide
support.
Nat’l Will: Yes,
but possibly
fragmented by
ethnic divisions.
b. Strong
economy but
very oil
dependent.
Nat’l Direction:
Probably.
c. Perhaps the
“tank ditch”
along border
with Iraq.
Population: Yes,
but dependent
on ethnic tensions .
Instruments:
Military: Limited.
Small, modern
force.
Economic: If oil
flow continues
or out of country
investments are
available.
Diplomatic: Yes.
Information:
Limited if
attacked.
Ref 3-18
b. Small but
modern military.
Uncertain abut
training readiness and materiel sustainment.
b. Support GCC
efforts against
IIC.
c. Increased
diplomatic and
informational
efforts to
generate support
and sympathy.
Probably hire
lobbyists to
advance cause.
Actor
Interests
Egypt
Survival: Not
immediate, but
perceive long
term threat if IIC
is successful.
Economic: Yes.
Desperately
needs
uninterrupted
trade.
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography:
Yes/No. Not
immediately
threatened. Not
overly long WP.
Strengths
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
a. Credibility
from role/action
in ‘90-91.
a. Fragile
economy.
a. Encourage
diplomatic
solution.
b. Controls
access to Suez
Canal.
Economy: No.
Nat’l Will:
Maybe.
World Stability:
Yes. Islamic
discontent may
spread.
Nat’l Direction:
Probably strong
gov’t action and
support.
Relations w/Ally:
Must have
Western support
to participate in
any coalition
effort.
Population:
Uncertain.
c. Largely
viewed as moderate Arab
nation to rest of
world.
Instruments:
Military: Limited,
small, fairly
modern force.
Probably will
need strategic
lift.
Economic: No.
Will probably
need economic
support similar
to ‘90-’91.
Diplomatic: Yes.
Established
diplomatic
record. Has
been involved in
Arab issues.
Information:
Limited.
Ref 3-19
b. Small, fairly
modern military
but hasn’t been
able to afford
significant
readiness
training.
b. Participate in
coalition action,
if Saudi Arabia
can diffuse crisis
over Holy Cities.
Actor
Interests
Turkey
Survival: Not
immediate threat.
Long-term
concern over
balance of power
in region and
spin-off on
Kurdish issue.
Economic: Yes.
Needs free flow
of oil.
World Stability:
Yes. Balance of
power concerns.
Wants to avoid
inflaming
Kurdish issues.
Relations w/Ally:
Yes. Will need
economic and
military assistance, if participating in armed
conflict.
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography: Yes.
Not immediately
threatened, but
can threaten
north flank of
IIC. If granted,
access for other
coalition forces.
Strengths
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
a. Geographic
location.
a. Its own Kurdish problem.
Internat’l problem which can
cause international criticism.
a. Avoid direct
military
involvement
unless more
direct threat.
b. Strong alliance
ties to NATO
partners.
c. Viewed as
moderate Islamic
nation.
Economy: Fair.
Cannot sustain
long-term
hardship
resulting from
problem.
Nat’l Will:
Uncertain.
Depends on how
serious the
inflaming of their
Kurdish
problems.
Nat’l Direction:
Uncertain.
Population:
Don’t know
Instruments:
Military: Good
armed forces.
Will need
strategic lift, if
joining coalition
armed force.
Economic: No.
Will need
assistance
similar to ‘90-91.
Information:
Uncertain.
Ref 3-20
b. Will need
economic
support.
b. Focus on
containing
Kurdish issues.
c. Provide
landing rights, if
supported in
other issues.
Actor
Interests
Israel
Survival: Yes.
Will view any
change in
balance of power
as threat to
survival.
Economic:
Probably not.
World Stability:
Yes. Doesn’t
need anything to
disrupt balance
of power or draw
attention to
Palestinian
problems.
Relations w/Ally:
Generally doesn't
want and can't
afford challenges
to ties with U.S.
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography: No.
Vulnerable to
Scuds and other
weapons of mass
destruction.
Strengths
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
a. Commitment to
survival.
a. Ongoing and
easily inflamed
problems with
treatment of
Palestinians.
a. Avoid direct
confrontation, so
long as it
perceives U.S.
can and will
protect from
direct attack.
b. Strong
national defense
force.
Economy: No.
Nat'l Will: Yes.
To survive at all
cost.
Nat’l Direction:
Yes. Survival
dominates.
Seems to want
peace
negotiations to
succeed.
Population: No.
Ethnic tension
always a threat.
Internal
problems can be
fueled by other
Arabic issues.
Instruments:
Military: Yes, but
only for own
defense.
Economic: No.
Diplomatic: No
influence in Arab
world.
Information: Yes.
Ties to U.S.
lobby groups.
Ref 3-21
b. Likely target
to try and
separate any
coalition.
b. Avoid/
prevent external
events from
rekindling Arab
violence. Maintain peace
accords.
Actor
Interests
Russia
Survival:
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography:
Strengths
Economic:
Economy:
World Stability:
Relations w/Ally:
Nat’l Will:
Probably.
Nat’l Direction:
Population:
Instruments:
Military:
Economic:
Diplomatic:
Information:
Ref 3-22
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
Actor
Interests
China
Survival:
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography:
Strengths
Economic:
Economy:
World Stability:
Relations w/Ally:
Nat’l Will:
Nat’l Direction:
Yes.
Population: Yes.
Instruments:
Military:
Economic:
Diplomatic:
Information:
Ref 3-23
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
Actor
Interests
Jordan
Survival:
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography:
Strengths
Economic:
Economy:
World Stability:
Relations w/Ally:
Nat’l Will:
Nat’l Direction:
Population: Yes.
Instruments:
Military:
Economic:
Diplomatic:
Information:
Ref 3-24
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
Actor
Interests
Iran
Survival:
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography:
Strengths
Economic:
Economy:
World Stability:
Relations w/Ally:
Nat’l Will:
Nat’l Direction:
Population:
Instruments:
Military:
Economic:
Diplomatic:
Information:
Ref 3-25
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
Actor
Interests
Iraq
Survival:
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography:
Strengths
Economic:
Economy:
World Stability:
Relations w/Ally:
Nat’l Will:
Nat’l Direction:
Population:
Instruments:
Military:
Economic:
Diplomatic:
Information:
Ref 3-26
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
Actor
Interests
Survival:
Elements of
Power
Sources:
Geography:
Strengths
Economic:
Economy:
World Stability:
Relations w/Ally:
Nat’l Will:
Nat’l Direction:
Population:
Instruments:
Military:
Economic:
Diplomatic:
Information:
Ref 3-27
Weaknesses
Likely COAs
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting
C/M/S 500
Reference 4. Practical Exercise Requirement (C/M students only)
______________________________________________________________________________
1. Purpose. This practical exercise requires the staff group to analyze the revised strategic estimate,
other applicable strategic guidance, and the scenario’s strategic and operational environments in order to
gain a consensus determination of the first three operational/campaign planning “imperatives”: (1) The
“strategic aim” of the campaign; (2) The political, military, and economic conditions that define the desired
“end state” of the campaign; and (3) The principal operational (military) objectives that, when
accomplished, will achieve or support the achievement of the end-state conditions.
2. Scenario.
a. On 20 June 20XX, the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff directed the J3 to activate the command’s
battlestaff to monitor the situation and plan for future operations. He specifically asked the staff to update
the command’s strategic estimate within the next 36 hours and to begin campaign planning for joint/combined operations to defend Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. (See following text of the Chief’s note)
b. The CINC is currently visiting potential coalition partners in the region. He will return to HQ
USCENTCOM on 21 June for intelligence and operations update briefings. He leaves for Washington
early on the 22d to confer with the President, SecState, SECDEF, CJCS, and probably some key members
of Congress. The focus of these discussions will be the developing crisis in the Gulf and potential political,
military, and economic options available to the United States.
c. The Chief of Staff wants to provide the CINC an update to the strategic estimate to read during
the flight to Washington and to use as a reference document during discussions. Both the CINC and Chief
of Staff anticipate that, as a result of these consultations in Washington, the CJCS will publish a Warning
Order for USCINCCENT to plan operations for the defense of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Although the
CINC would like to review the entire strategic estimate, he is most interested in receiving the staff’s
consensus on the strategic aim to be pursued by all the nation’s instruments of power, the specific
conditions that define the desired end state, and the key military objectives that USCENTCOM must
accomplish to achieve that end state. The Chief of Staff, with the J2, J3, and J5 present, intends to present
this strategic analysis to the CINC during the few hours he will be available.
d. You are a member of the USCENTCOM Planning Cell which supports the full battlestaff. The
Chief, J5 Plans, heads this planning cell. The J5 planners have started to update a strategic estimate using
the format at Appendix B of Joint Pub 3-0. Their analysis is based primarily on the “Road to War,” the
USCENTCOM Theater Strategy and the U.S. Security Strategy for the Middle East. Their incomplete
notes are included in a “draft” Strategic Estimate. Your planning cell should review these notes as a start
point in responding to the CINC’s concerns.
Ref 4-1
3. Requirement. Respond to the following note from the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff:
Date: 20 June 20XX
Memo For J5, USCENTCOM
From LTG T.H.E. Best, C/S, USCENTCOM
Subject: CINC Update on the Gulf Crisis
I just finished talking to the CINC. He’ll be back tomorrow and is looking forward to your analysis of
the developing crisis. He will leave almost immediately for Washington for discussions with the NCA/NSC
and expects the President will make several decisions about the U.S.’s initial responses to the crisis,
particularly its military response. He wants a briefing packet he can use during these discussions that is
based on conclusions drawn from the ongoing strategic estimate your staff has been conducting. As you
know, the CINC is intimately familiar with the estimate’s format and purpose and is likely to ask hard
questions about the rationale behind conclusions. He has specifically asked that you provide the following:
a. IIC Intent/Problem Statement: What are the strategic interests/objectives/intentions of the IIC?
What do its recent statements and actions imply about its true intentions? Are they a prelude to offensive
action or merely a means to pressure the GCC in general and Saudi Arabia in particular to make
concessions? If the latter, what are these concessions?
b. Key U.S. interests at risk: Also list the relevant theater objectives (from the CENTCOM strategy)
most affected as a result of the threat to those interests.
c. Theater Strategic Objectives/Campaign Objectives/Conflict Termination Objectives (Your briefing
should concentrate on this area): Provide the following for two potential scenarios: (1) Successful
deterrence (IIC does not attack), and (2) Unsuccessful deterrence (major military action/warfighting):
• The Strategic Aim (Desired political effect; focus of all instruments of power)
• The End State (Political, economic, and military conditions/conflict termination objectives that
define successful achievement of the Strategic Aim)
• Operational Objectives (Principal military actions required to achieve the end state)
Remember deterrence is the first mission. In both the successful deterrence and “warfighting” scenarios,
the strategic aim/end state must resolve the principal threat(s) to U.S. interests that have brought the
region to the verge of armed conflict. The CINC has specifically requested that the end state in both
scenarios define what constitutes a “stable and secure” regional environment. Be prepared to discuss the
costs and benefits of achieving the end states in both scenarios.
d. Recommended military COA: Provide the CINC your considered advice on what military COA or
series of military actions USCENTCOM should begin to implement now, e.g., show of force, increase in
security assistance, partial deployment, full execution of OPLAN 1648 deployments, etc. Think
strategically, not tactically, and consider the CINC’s Washington audience. Your recommendation will
directly affect the President’s decisions and contribute to the preparation of the Warning/Alert Order that
the Chairman will probably issue in the next few days.
Ref 4-2
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting
C/M/S 500
Reference 5. Road to War (Continued) up to 10 July and
projected forward through August and early September 20XX
______________________________________________________________________________
1. Disposition. The IIC has forces of two armies and a separate corps currently poised in assembly
areas along the Euphrates River Valley and along the roads leading from Baghdad to Al Basrah.
Estimates projecting the IIC build-up based on current information show that more than half of this
coalition force is ready for offensive action, and the remaining forces will be closed and ready by the first
two weeks of September 20XX. Offensive posturing of combat and sustainment forces is confirmed. The
enemy’s assembly area is broken into three major areas:
a. The Iraqi Army units are in an area between Al Basrah (3030N, 4800E) and An Nasiriyah (3104N,
4615E). The area is approximately 175 km long from east to west, and 50 km wide from north to south.
b. The Iranian Army units are in an area roughly located between Al Amarah (3150N, 4709E) and
Aprifa (3144N, 4607E). The area is approximately 125 km from north to south and 125 km wide from east
to west.
c. The elite 1st Iraqi Corps (Governor’s Vanguard) is located in an area roughly centered on As
Samawah (3118N, 4518E). The area is approximately 50 km wide from east to west and 75 km long from
north to south.
2. Strength. The IIC currently has a total of 12 divisions positioned in the areas described above or
moving toward those areas. In total, Iran and Iraq can field greater than 24 divisions along the Euphrates
River within the first two weeks of September (this is not considered likely since this would be all the
military units of the coalition). They are assessed to be well-trained to brigade level and at 100 percent
manning.
3. Reinforcements. The IIC, forming along the Euphrates, is organized into a main body of two
separate armies, the Iraqi (Babylonian) Army and the Iranian (Persepolian) Army. The operational
reserve will probably be the Iraqi 1st Corps (Governor’s Vanguard). However, use of one or more of the
other corps within the two armies should not be ruled out. Other available forces, up to eight divisions, for
the IIC are committed far to the north as the unstable Kurdish situation continues.
4. Air Forces. Iraq has a total of 15 combat squadrons and 4 support squadrons with approximately 400
fighter and ground attack aircraft, 150 support aircraft, and 127 helicopters. Iran has a total of 12 combat
squadrons and 5 support squadrons with nearly 500 fighter and ground attack aircraft, 200 support aircraft,
and over 500 helicopters. This total is based upon intelligence prior to June 20XX. If the Iran-Iraq War and
DESERT STORM are any indication, the IIC will use initial small air strikes to test coalition defenses. If
serious resistance is met or losses occur, the IIC will probably conserve its air forces for later use. If the
IIC transitions to CIS traditional tactics, then large massed aircraft attacks will be directed at coalition
ground forces and targets. Although most IIC aircraft are currently based at airfields in Iran and Iraq,
Ref 5-1
movement of these aircraft to former Soviet republics sympathetic to the Islamic cause cannot be ruled
out should the IIC begin to sustain heavy losses.
5. Naval Forces. The naval forces of the IIC are primarily composed of small coastal patrol vessels, but
they do possess four Garcia Class destroyers and Iran has acquired three diesel, KILO Class submarines.
Iran’s acquisitions have also improved their coastal mining and their anti-ship missile capabilities.
6. Other Forces. The IIC has deployed an Iranian mechanized infantry brigade onto the island of
Jazireh-ye-Qeshm in the Strait of Hormuz. This brigade’s artillery battalion is equipped with Chinese
silkworm missiles, which accounts for the sinking of a Japanese tanker and discontinuation of shipping.
Forward positioning of combat air support squadrons and air reconnaissance presence confirms
assessments that IIC intends to maintain control over shipping in the strait.
7. Logistics. IIC forces appear to have built up 30-day supply and, at current rates, they are estimated
to have a 90-day supply available in early September. Assessment: A 90-day supply is the minimum
required to launch an offensive while 30-day is sufficient to defend.
8. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons. Neither Iran or Iraq have a known nuclear warhead.
However, both now have the potential to create rounds. Sanctions imposed on both countries during the
1991-20XX timeframe kept the two belligerents from having access to the necessary technology or
materials to build nuclear triggers or variable yield warheads. Both countries have the capability to produce
both biological and chemical weapons and are believed to have a stockpile of these munitions in their
arsenals. Their problems are in the delivery means for these weapons, both reliability and quantity.
9. Enemy Capabilities/COAs.
- Attack southeast to take the Persian Gulf coastline, then prepare to attack inland to seize Riyadh.
- Attack south-southeast to take the key cities of Hafar Al Batin and KKMC along the Tapline Road.
- Attack due south towards Riyadh out of contact with coalition forces along the Kuwait border.
- Attack southwest away from defending forces directly for Mecca and Medina.
10. Conclusion. IIC likely to wait for cooler September weather and a buildup of supplies to attempt any
of the COAs.
Key Events List (20 June - 10 July 20XX):
JUNE 20XX
• Saudi King asks U.S. president to send military forces.
• SOF assets on ground confirm national intelligence assessments of the IIC buildup.
• Saudi King and GCC put GCC forces on border.
JULY 20XX
• GCC three division equivalents in place on defensive line along Kuwait/Saudi Arabia borders with
Iraq.
• U.S. president alerts CENTCOM.
• Iran and Iraq declare Holy War on Saudi Arabia to free Mecca and Medina.
• U.S. president requests UN Security Council meeting.
Ref 5-2
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
U.S. president mobilizes forces (M-Day is 5 July 20XX).
UN Security Council meets.
CENTCOM staff publishes Deployment Execution Order based on OPLAN 1648.
207th ACR deploys into UN neutral zone in Kuwait.
U.S. forces, including air, land (U.S. XXI Corps) and sea forces, begin deployment
(CENTCOM’s C-Day: 10 July 20XX).
CENTCOM orders Marine air-ground task force to steam to vicinity of Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian brigade takes Jazireh-ye-Qeshm island in Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian brigade sinks one Japanese tanker and stops other shipping with silkworm missiles.
U.S. Air Force assets, already in theater, begin bombing of the Iranian brigade’s silkworm missile
sites as CONUS fighter wings deploy into theater.
Ref 5-3
JCS
PLANNING
ORDER
Reference 6
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900
Ref 6
UNCLASSIFIED
***FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY***
IMMEDIATE
101000ZJULXX
FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//
TO: AIG 8790
UNCLASSIFIED
OPER/DESERT BLAST//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/JCS PLANNING CONFERENCE//
REF/A/USCINCCENT/202319ZJUNXX/OPREP-1PCA/NOTAL//
ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS 94-8//
HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//
NARR/FORCES ALLOCATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX A USCENTCOM
OPLAN 1648-XX WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE 53D MECH DIV AND THE 25TH AD.
AMPN/SUFFICIENT AERIAL TANKER ASSETS ARE ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT THIS
ALLOCATION//
NARR//THIS IS A CJCS PLANNING ORDER. THE NCA HAS DIRECTED THAT
USCENTCOM CONDUCT EXECUTION PLANNING IN PREPARATION FOR
SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTION IN SWA AND SUBMIT CAMPAIGN PLAN CONCEPT
FOR NCA CONSIDERATION NLT 251000ZJULXX. USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX IS
ACTIVATED FOR DEPLOYMENT ONLY AND WILL BE REVISED AS USCENTCOM
OPORD XX-1.//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1.
(U) REPEATED ACTIONS BY THE IRAN IRAQ COALITION (IIC) INDICATE THAT
HOSTILITIES AGAINST KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE GULF COOPERATION
COUNCIL (GCC) ARE INCREASINGLY LIKELY. AT THIS POINT IT APPEARS THAT THE
MOST LIKELY IIC COURSE OF ACTION WILL BE TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE KUWAITI
AND SAUDI ARABIAN OILFIELDS AT SOME FUTURE DATE. THIS WILL BE AN EFFORT
TO RECOVER LOST ECONOMIC POWER AND TO FURTHER DISCREDIT THE GCC AND
SAUDI ARABIA WITH THE EVENTUAL OBJECTIVES OF TAKING OVER KUWAIT AND
SAUDI ARABIA.
2.
(U) THE GOVERNMENTS OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA HAVE REQUESTED
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO DETER THE IIC THREAT.
3.
(U) THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY HAVE
INDICATED THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT U.S. AND GCC RESPONSES TO THE IIC
THREAT.//
GENTEXT/MISSION/
UNCLASSIFIED
* * * FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY * * *
Ref 6-1
UNCLASSIFIED
***FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY***
4.
(U) WHEN DIRECTED, USCENTCOM WILL DEPLOY FORCES WITHIN ITS AOR
TO ASSIST IN DEFENDING GCC NATIONS AND, IF REQUIRED, WILL CONDUCT
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH GCC ARMED FORCES TO
DESTROY THE IIC OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY, TO RESTORE PRECONFLICT
INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, AND TO RETURN STABILITY TO THE REGION.
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
5.
(U) COURSE OF ACTION. US OPERATIONS MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE
LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ESTABLISH AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE REGION,
OPEN AND MAINTAIN AIR, SEA, AND GROUND LOCS IN THE REGION, PROTECT AND
DEFEND AIR AND SEA PORTS IN THE REGION, CONDUCT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS,
CONDUCT SEA DENIAL OPERATIONS, PROTECT AND DEFEND ESSENTIAL GCC
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RESOURCES AND FACILITIES IN THE REGION, CONDUCT
DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS, SPECIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS FOCUSED ON DISCREDITING THE IIC AND FOMENTING REBELLION
AMONG INSURGENT FORCES WITHIN IIC BORDERS. U.S. OPERATIONS WILL BE
RESTRICTED TO GCC TERRITORY UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THE NCA;
THE NCA IS DISPOSED TO CONSIDER REASONABLE REQUESTS FAVORABLY.
A.
(U)
USCENTCOM. RECEIVE FORCES SPECIFIED IN USCENTCOM
OPLAN 1648-XX WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE 53D MECH DIV AND 25TH ARMD DIV
WHICH WILL REMAIN COMMITTED IN THE EUCOM AOR. COORDINATE AND
PREPARE CAMPAIGN PLAN, OPORD, AND OPLAN AS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT
OPERATIONS. DEVELOP AND COORDINATED PLANS FOR OPERATIONS AS A PART
OF A COALITION; PROVIDE RECOMMENDED COMMAND STRUCTURE IN FUTURE
PLANS. IMMEDIATELY INITIATE AND HOST GCCS/JOPES PLANNING
TELECONFERENCE. COORDINATING AUTHORITY FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THIS PLAN
IS GRANTED EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. REVIEW OPTIONS AND PROVIDE JCS WITH
ANTICIPATED PSYOP, INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL AFFAIRS, AND TARGETING CONCEPTS
ASAP.
B.
(U)
USCINCPAC. PROVIDE AND SUPPORT FORCES, AS REQUIRED IN
USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX, TO USCENTCOM. IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE NAVAL
COMPONENT COMMANDER.
C.
(U)
USCINCACOM. PROVIDE AND SUPPORT FORCES, AS REQUIRED
IN USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX, TO USCENTCOM. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE AIR
BRIDGE FOR DEPLOYING CARGO AIRCRAFT. BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT
OPERATION GARDEN PLOT IF REQUIRED.
D.
(U)
USCINCEUR. PROVIDE AND SUPPORT FORCES, AS REQUIRED,
TO USCENTCOM. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ISRAEL AND TURKEY IN
SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE ARABIAN GULF AREA. BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT
MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS IN THE EUCOM AOR. BE PREPARED TO
ESTABLISH AIR BRIDGE FOR DEPLOYING CARGO AIRCRAFT.
E.
(U)
USCINCSPACE. PROVIDE SPACE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
PREPARE TO PROVIDE DSP SUPPORT TO USCENTCOM AND USEUCOM.
UNCLASSIFIED
* * * FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY * * *
Ref 6-2
UNCLASSIFIED
***FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY***
F.
(U) USCINCSOC. PROVIDE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE IN SUPPORT
OF OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED IN USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX.
G.
(U) USCINCSTRAT. INITIATE TARGET PLANNING PROCEDURES FOR
THE AFFECTED REGIONS IMMEDIATELY. DIRLAUTH WITH USCINCCENT.
H.
(U) USCINCTRANS. PROVIDE TANKER SUPPORT AS REQUIRED TO
SUPPORT DEPLOYING FORCES. INITIATE AND HOST GCCS/JOPES DEPLOYMENT
TELECONFERENCE IMMEDIATELY. PREPARE TO SUPPORT DEPLOYING FORCES AS
REQUIRED IN TPFDD DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES.
I.
(U) DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
J.
(U) DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
K.
(U) DLA. PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO PREPARING, DEPLOYING,
AND REDEPLOYING FORCES AS REQUIRED.
L.
(U) DCS. IMPOSE COMMUNICATIONS MINIMIZE IMMEDIATELY FOR
EFFECTED COMMUNICATIONS.
M.
(U) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. CJCS ANTICIPATES THAT
FORCE MOVEMENTS AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES WILL GENERATE A GREAT DEAL
OF INTEREST FROM POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES AND ALLIES. HOSTILE COLLECTION
ASSETS WILL BE ACTIVE. SOUND OPSEC PROCEDURES WILL BE EXERCISED.
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION ARE: (1) WHEN, WHERE, AND
IN WHAT STRENGTH WILL U.S. FORCES BE DEPLOYED TO THE GULF REGION. (2)
WHICH TYPES OF DEPLOYMENT SYSTEMS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION WILL
BE USED BY DEPLOYING FORCES? (3) WILL THE U.S. DEPLOY FORCES TO THE
REGION? (4) WILL THE U.S. BE WILLING TO USE FORCE TO DETER AGGRESSION? (5)
WILL THE U.S. BE WILLING TO COMMIT FORCES TO THE DEFENSE OF GCC
TERRITORY? (6) WHAT ACTIONS WILL THE U.S. TAKE IF ATTACKED? (7) WILL THE
U.S. COMMIT TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IF UNPROVOKED? (8) WHICH
OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION WILL THE U.S. PURSUE? (9) WHEN, WHERE, AND IN
WHAT STRENGTH WILL U.S. SPECIAL FORCES BE EMPLOYED?
6. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
A.
(U) C-DAY IS 10 JUL 20XX.
B.
(U) SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDS DEPLOYMENT AND
MOVEMENT DATE ARE REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM IMMEDIATELY.
C.
(U) SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDS WILL ENTER
DEPLOYMENT AND PLANNING GCCS/JOPES TELECONFERENCES IMMEDIATELY
UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE.
D.
(U) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF THIS OPERATIONS IN EXCESS OF 90
DAYS.
E.
(U) ROE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX.
F.
(U) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED. INCLUDE
THE JOINT STAFF AND NMCC AS AN INFO ADDRESSEE ON ALL RECORD TRAFFIC.
AIG 1592 IS ESTABLISHED AS THE DESERT BLAST AIG.
G.
(U) NO FORCES WILL DEPLOY WITHOUT NCA APPROVAL. REPEAT NO
FORCES WILL DEPLOY WITHOUT NCA APPROVAL.//
UNCLASSIFIED
* * * FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY * * *
Ref 6-3
UNCLASSIFIED
***FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY***
7. (U) TRANSPORT.
A.
(U) ANTICIPATED AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY WILL BE 1B2.
B.
(U) APPORTIONMENT OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR
PLANNING ONLY AND IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN ALERT,
DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.
C.
(U) TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITIES LISTED IN THE INSTRUCTIONAL
JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN WILL BE ASSUMED.
8. (U) JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA, ORDERS, AND PLANS.
9. (U) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATORS (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE
SERVICES.
10. (U) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL CRISIS REPORTING PROCEDURES
WILL BE FOLLOWED.
11. (U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCENTCOM OPLAN
1648-XX.
12. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT
THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED. PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA QUERIES
SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AND REFERRED TO OASD (PA), DSN 227-5131/5337.
NECESSARY ADDITIONAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE FURNISHED BY
OASD(PS) BY SEPARATE COMMUNICATIONS.
13. (U) COMBAT CAMERA. COMBAT CAMERA WILL DOCUMENT THIS OPERATION
TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION,
OPSEC, OR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY WILL PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA
DOCUMENTATION. EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO
THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, THE PENTAGON THROUGH THE ARFCOS OR
OTHER APPROPRIATED TRANSPORTATION MEANS COMMENSURATE WITH THE
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY.//
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL//
14. (U) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS
RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS,
USCENTCOM WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCSCONTROLLED MOBILE AND TRANSPORTABLE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY,
USCENTCOM PLANS WILL RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE
CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS CRISIS.
15. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS DESIGNATED AS THE
SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCACOM,
USCINCTRANS, USCINCSPACE, USCINCSTRAT ARE DESIGNATED AS SUPPORTING
COMMANDERS. DIRNSA, NIMA, DIA, AND DCS ARE DESIGNED SUPPORTING
AGENCIES.//
DECL/OADR//
UNCLASSIFIED
* * * FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY * * *
Ref 6-4
INSTRUCTIONAL
JOINT STRATEGIC
CAPABILITIES PLAN
(IJSCP)
Reference 7
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900
Ref 7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
Section I. Introduction
1. Background ..................................................................................................................Ref 7-I-1
2. Scope ...........................................................................................................................Ref 7-I-2
3. Implementing Instructions .............................................................................................Ref 7-I-3
4. General Guidance .........................................................................................................Ref 7-I-4
Section II. Strategic Setting
1. General.......................................................................................................................Ref 7-II-7
2. National Military Strategy and Objectives .....................................................................Ref 7-II-7
3. Elements of the Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now ................................................Ref 7-II-8
4. Strategic Concepts .....................................................................................................Ref 7-II-12
Section III. Planning Guidance
1. General....................................................................................................................Ref 7-III-15
2. Planning Flexibility Guidance....................................................................................Ref 7-III-15
3. Deliberate Planning for Two MTWs that Develop Sequentially ....................................Ref 7-III-16
4. Deliberate Planning for Smaller Scale Contingencies ..................................................Ref 7-III-16
5. Planning for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare .............................................Ref 7-III-17
6. Plans for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) ..........................................Ref 7-III-17
7. Access and Host Nation Support ................................................................................Ref 7-III-17
8. Logistics...................................................................................................................Ref 7-III-17
9. Theater Engagement Plans.........................................................................................Ref 7-III-17
10. Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs - Diplomatic, Political) .........................................Ref 7-III-18
11. Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs - Economic, Military) ...........................................Ref 7-III-19
Section IV. Forces
1. Section Description...................................................................................................Ref 7-IV-21
2. Section Outline .........................................................................................................Ref 7-IV-21
Part 1. General Apportionment Information.................................................................Ref 7-IV-21
Part 2. Regional Planning Factors ...............................................................................Ref 7-IV-22
Part 3. Force Apportionment Information ....................................................................Ref 7-IV-23
UNCLASSIFIED
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-i
Section V. Regional Plans
1. Authority...................................................................................................................Ref 7-V-33
2. Regional Plans ...........................................................................................................Ref 7-V-33
3. Regional Planning ......................................................................................................Ref 7-V-36
4. Regional Tasks — Specific .........................................................................................Ref 7-V-38
A. USCINCEUR .....................................................................................................NOT IN IJSCP
B. USCINCACOM..................................................................................................NOT IN IJSCP
C. USCINCCENT .........................................................................................................Ref 7-V-38
D. USCINCPAC .....................................................................................................NOT IN IJSCP
E. USCINCSOUTH.................................................................................................NOT IN IJSCP
F. USCINCSOC......................................................................................................NOT IN IJSCP
G. USCINCSPACE .................................................................................................NOT IN IJSCP
H. USCINCSTRAT.................................................................................................NOT IN IJSCP
I. USCINCTRANS..................................................................................................NOT IN IJSCP
Section VI. Global Plans
1. Authority..................................................................................................................Ref 7-VI-45
2. General....................................................................................................................Ref 7-VI-45
3. Reconstitution...........................................................................................................Ref 7-VI-45
Section VII. Conclusion
1. General......................................................................................................................Ref 7-1-49
2. Planning for Uncertainty..............................................................................................Ref 7-1-49
3. Planning for Deterrence ..............................................................................................Ref 7-1-49
4. Deliberate Planning and Execution...............................................................................Ref 7-1-49
CJCS Instructions to IJSCP
1. Intelligence.................................................................................................................Ref 7-1-49
2. Logistics.....................................................................................................................Ref 7-2-53
3. Nuclear ......................................................................................................................Ref 7-3-59
4. Psychological Operations.............................................................................................Ref 7-4-61
5. Special Operations ......................................................................................................Ref 7-5-63
6. Chemical Warfare; Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents; and
Herbicides......................................................................................................................Ref 7-6-65
7. Geospatial Information and Services ............................................................................Ref 7-7-67
8. Command and Control Warfare ...................................................................................Ref 7-8-71
9. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems .......................................Ref 7-9-73
10. Mobility..................................................................................................................Ref 7-10-77
11. Civil Affairs............................................................................................................Ref 7-11-97
12. Mobilization ...........................................................................................................Ref 7-12-97
13. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) ......................................................Ref 7-13-99
14. Special Technical Operations ................................................................................. Ref 7-14-105
UNCLASSIFIED
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-ii
SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
1. BACKGROUND.
a. The CGSC academic environment precludes the use of actual plans and documents that form a
part of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). Obviously, such planning documents could contain
politically sensitive information. Therefore, most of those documents are classified for operational security
and to protect their politically sensitive nature. In keeping with the college mission, however, students must
become familiar with the types of joint staff guidance available to commanders of unified and specified
commands and chiefs of military Services for accomplishing assigned military tasks. Therefore, this
Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan (IJSCP) was developed. To avoid using classified material, some
information normally found in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) is incorporated into the IJSCP.
b. An actual Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP) outlines the nation’s military strategy by
providing planning guidance and taskings for the upcoming fiscal year to the unified combatant
commanders to develop specific plans. In addition to assigning tasks, the JSCP provides planning guidance,
apportions major combat forces and strategic transportation assets for each plan, and requires each unified
CINC and chiefs of military Services to assess the operational impact of projected manpower and
resource requirements necessary to accomplish assigned tasks. Unresolved shortfalls are then identified to
the CJCS or possibly higher for resolution.
c. Despite the classified nature of the actual documents, students must become familiar with the
types of joint staff guidance available to unified and specified commanders and chiefs of military Services
for accomplishing assigned military tasks. The Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan (IJSCP)
complements classroom instruction by providing JSCP-type guidance so student planners can gain
proficiency in solving planning problems.
d. The IJSCP is a fictional simulation of the real world JSCP and is to be used for CGSC
instructional purposes only. This IJSCP supports student planning exercises focused on a fictional crisis
scenario within U.S. Central Commands (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). It contains
guidance for developing plans in support of CGSC planning problems. A number of areas found in a JSCP
are listed but not provided in detail. This was done to provide students an understanding of what is in a
JSCP and at the same time reduce overall detail. The IJSCP is divided into a number of sections. These
sections reasonably correspond to those found in an actual JSCP.
(1) Section I. INTRODUCTION provides a document overview, implementing
instructions, and general guidance.
(2) Section II. STRATEGIC SETTING provides guidance on threats, national security
and national military objectives, insight into the strategic concept, and regional strategies.
(3) Section III. PLANNING GUIDANCE provides guidance for regional planning, low
intensity conflict, logistics and host nation support.
(4) Section IV. FORCES addresses the forces apportioned for planning and strategic
transportation assets in support of operational planning.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-I-1
(5) Section V. REGIONAL PLANS identifies specific planning tasks to the various
regional and functional CINCs.
(6) Section VI. CONCLUSIONS discusses critical planning considerations for
deterrence, warfighting, uncertainty, deliberate planning, and plan execution.
(7) Annexes, the last portion of the IJSCP, provide essential information in a number of
areas that impact on or need to be considered during the planning process.
2. PURPOSE. The IJSCP provides direction and guidance to commanders of unified and specified
commands to accomplish tasks and missions by stating the national security objective and basic military
objectives. It presents strategic appraisals of major factors that are likely to influence U.S. strategy during
its effective period and it provides strategic planning guidance.
3. SCOPE.
a. IJSCP is a single volume that includes planning guidance, tasks, and forces. It is accompanied
by a number of annexes and is effective for USCENTCOM planning requirements.
b. Much of the data relevant to other combatant commands but not relevant to the USCENTCOM
planning requirements are not included herein.
c. The IJSCP supports and further defines and refines the National Military Strategy (NMS).
d. The timeframe portrayed by this document is FY 199_, where the blank is as indicated in the
college planning exercises.
4. IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.
a. Planning will be conducted per this document and the college curriculum schedule.
b. Commanders are responsible for preparation of current plans for the execution of tasks
assigned in Section V of this document. These tasks conform with the planning guidance in Sections III, V,
and VI and may be further amplified in follow-on guidance.
c. Tasks assigned in Section V are requirements for planning operations, or other actions, by
combatant commanders. Plans are categorized as operation plans or concept summaries.
(1) Operation plans are prepared in either complete format (OPLAN), concept format
(CONPLAN), or concept summary.
(2) Operation plans include disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, protection of U.S.
civilians, nuclear weapons recovery, and continuity of operations.
d. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System JOPES Volume I (Joint Pub 5-03.1, to be
renamed CJCSM 3122.01) outlines the deliberate planning process and gives guidance for
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-I-2
preparation/submission of operation plans and review of operation plans. JOPES Volume II (CJCSM
3122.03) contains planning and execution formats and guidance. CJCSM 3122.02 (TPFDD Manual)
describes building, refining and maintaining force deployment databases for Deliberate and Crisis Action
planning. Formats for classified subjects and detailed functions guidance are contained in the supplement
(classified) to JOPES Volume II, named CJCSM 3122.04.
e. A single plan may suffice for related operations.
f. All plans must conform with domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict
and international agreements that are binding on the United States.
5. GENERAL GUIDANCE. In DJMO planning problems, students may assume accomplishment of
planning responsibilities normally assigned the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval
Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; USTRANSCOM
components; and other DOD agencies. Students are responsible for integrating specific Service planning
responsibilities set forth in CGSC instruction.
a. The NCA directs the combatant commanders. The CJCS passes NCA directives to the
combatant commanders. The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) provides strategic communications from the NCA and CJCS to the combatant commanders.
b. During both the planning and conduct of operations, commanders will exercise command IAW
guidance in the UCP and Joint Pub 0-2.
c. Unified commanders coordinate with American embassies within their geographic borders for
the protection and evacuation of noncombatants. In carrying out that duty, unified commanders:
(1) Prepare necessary military supporting plans.
(2) Prepare necessary operation plans.
(3) Cooperate with chiefs of diplomatic missions in planning.
(4) Implement military plans for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants as
required.
d. All operation plans will include proposed command structure and command relationships.
e. Non-U.S. military forces will be employed IAW multilateral or bilateral agreements or as
directed by the NCA.
f. Within the guidelines in subparagraphs a. and b. above, supported commanders will assess the
capability of non-U.S. military forces that could contribute to accomplishing assigned tasks for inclusion in
operation plans.
g. Non-U.S. military forces of the host government should accomplish major efforts, but U.S.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-I-3
unilateral support will be tailored to maximize the full capability of host government forces.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-I-4
h. Changes from previous JSCP.
(1) General. Since late 1989, events in Europe and Southwest Asia have brought about a
transformation in the international security environment. Along with other events a shift in U.S. military
strategy and associated deliberate planning had to be made, resulting in a new framework for operational
planning.
(2) New Framework for Operational Planning. The new national security environment
requires a much more flexible, adaptive approach to planning for the use of military force in pursuit of U.S.
national security objectives.
(a) Regional threats have become the central basis for U.S. conventional
planning. This IJSCP emphasizes regional planning as a top priority and directs that the Base Case Global
Family of Plans be retained, but, until further notice, not maintained.
(b) The guidance in this IJSCP focuses attention on developing a wide spectrum
of options for responding to a variety of possible crisis conditions. These options are labeled Flexible
Deterrent Options (FDOs), Deploy Decisive Force, and Counterattack.
(3) Prioritization of Work. As a planning guide, the following lists the prioritization of work:
(a) Major Theater War (MTW) plans.
(b) Most likely Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) plans.
(c) Concept Summary for the second of two concurrent MTWs that develop
sequentially.
(d) Remaining SSC plans.
(4) Prioritization for Training. Because of multiapportioned forces for regional planning,
the following prioritization guidelines give an appropriate focus for training readiness.
(a) Units should train first to the operation pla n in which they are an early
deployer.
(b) If a unit is an early deployer to more than one operation plan, it should train to
its MTW plan.
(c) Commanders may use the guidance or tasks in the IJSCP to assist in deriving
Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLS).
i. Forces available for planning.
(1) Forces approved by the CGSC faculty for insertion in this publication are available for
planning purposes per guidance in Sections IV, V, and VI.
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(2) Availability of reserve forces is based on the given mobilization assumptions.
(3) (Unless otherwise directed) Services will publish a list of combat support and combat
service support forces available to each CINC. The list will be based on the need to support major combat
forces made available for planning.
j. Shortfall identification. Per JOPES procedures, supported commanders will report unresolved
shortfalls to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an assessment of associated risks and the
threat that can be met.
k. Command relationships. Forces apportioned for planning will remain under the command of
their providing organization until specified otherwise by the National Command Authorities.
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SECTION II
STRATEGIC SETTING
1. GENERAL.
a. The National Security Strategy. The primary goal of U.S. foreign policy issue since the 1970s has
been to develop a framework of durable peace and economic stability throughout the world. Emphasis has
been placed on multilateral economic assistance and freer trade between nations to effectively bring about
economic change, development, and social justice. The premise underlying the above aims is that the
United States will continue to play a leading role in world affairs, never a preponderant role. The national
security strategy’s three core objectives are:
(1)
To enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are
ready to fight and win.
(2)
To bolster America’s economic prosperity.
(3)
To promote democracy abroad.
b. The following national strategic priorities are established to advance these core national security
objectives:
(1)
Foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe.
(2)
Create a stable, prosperous Asia Pacific community.
(3)
Prosper in the global economy.
(4)
Be an unrelenting force for peace.
(5) Move strongly to counter growing dangers to our security: WMD, terrorism, international crime,
drugs, illegal arms trafficking, and environmental damage.
(6) Maintain a strong and ready military.
c. The National Military Strategy. This IJSCP implements, through the deliberate planning process,
the National Military Strategy (NMS). A detailed account of the strategic setting can be found in the
NMS. The following summary relates aspects of deliberate planning to that setting and strategy.
2. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY. The Strategy — Shape, Respond, Prepare Now. Our
National Military Strategy depends first and foremost upon the United States remaining secure from
external threats. A secure homeland is fundamental to U.S. global leadership; however, it is not the only
prerequisite. To protect and promote U.S. national interests, our national military objectives are to Promote
Peace and Stability and, when necessary, to Defeat Adversaries that threaten the United States, our
interests, or our allies. U.S. Armed Forces advance national security by applying military power to Shape
the international environment and Respond to the full spectrum of crises, while we Prepare Now for an
uncertain future.
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3. NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES.
a. Promote Peace and Stability. Promoting peace and stability means creating and sustaining security
conditions globally and, in key regions, allowing the peaceful pursuit of our interests and the just resolution
of international problems through political means. This does not imply a resistance to change; rather, it
underscores a desire for peaceful change. Pursuit of this objective supports the President’s 1997 National
Security Strategy by ensuring that no critical region is dominated by a power hostile to the United States
and that regions of greatest importance to the U.S. are stable and at peace. Such stability reduces the
likelihood of widespread conflict and allows the pursuit of our interests by other instruments of national
power. Where a potential regional hegemony threatens our interests and those of our allies through the
buildup or use of armed forces, U.S. military power may be concentrated to assure allies and friends,
redress the imbalance, and deter or defeat aggression. Where the risk to peaceful political intercourse
stems from other sources, U.S. forces may conduct operations or otherwise contribute to efforts that seek
to prevent conflict and reduce threats. Our role as a global leader is underscored by U.S. forces
performing tasks that encourage other nations to resolve problems through negotiation and compromise
rather than by aggression and intimidation.
b. Defeat Adversaries. In the event of armed conflict, U.S. Armed Forces will render an adversary
incapable of armed resistance through destruction of his capacity to threaten our interests or by breaking
his will to do so. This sets the military conditions for winning the peace. In conducting combat operations,
the United States will use all means available, commensurate with the national interest at stake, the risks
involved, and international law. We will endeavor to commit decisive force to ensure that we achieve the
objectives established by the NCA and conclude hostilities in the shortest time possible and on terms
favorable to the United States.
4. ELEMENTS of the STRATEGY: SHAPE, RESPOND, PREPARE NOW.
a. U.S. Armed Forces pursue these national military objectives in support of the President’s
integrated approaches of shaping, responding, and preparing now, which synchronize all elements of
national power to achieve our security objectives. Our use of military force should be guided by several
considerations. First, military force should be used judiciously and decisively. Military missions must be
clearly stated, with achievable military objectives that support national political aims. Second, on most
occasions, our forces will operate as a joint team, harmonizing the unique and complementary strengths
and capabilities of each of our Services. Third, while retaining unilateral capability, whenever possible we
must seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on
their strengths. Finally, we must ensure that the conditions necessary for terminating military involvement
and withdrawing military forces are clearly established.
b. Shaping the International Environment. U.S. Armed Forces help shape the international
environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military
engagement. The shaping element of our strategy helps foster the institutions and international
relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and
reducing conflict and threats, and deterring aggression and coercion.
c. Promoting Stability. Through peacetime engagement activities, U.S. Armed Forces promote
regional stability, increase the security of allies and friends, build coalitions, and ensure a more secure
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global environment. The commanders-in-chief of our unified commands, based on guidance from the NCA
and CJCS, develop plans and employ forces and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote U.S.
interests and regional security objectives.
(1) Our international exercise program is one such activity. Exercises enhance interoperability and
readiness and demonstrate our ability to form and lead effective coalitions. They demonstrate our
capabilities and resolve to friends and potential adversaries alike. They provide realistic conditions for
working with the technologies, systems, and operational procedures that will be crucial in times of crisis.
International exercises also provide geographic familiarity and foster an understanding of cultures, values,
and habits of other societies. Exercises encourage burden sharing on the part of friends and allies, and
facilitate regional integration.
(2) Through other engagement activities, such as information sharing and a wide range of
contacts between our military and the defense establishments of other nations, we promote trust and
confidence and increase the security of our allies, partners, and friends. Partnership for Peace, defense
cooperation activities, foreign military sales, the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program, and other programs establish long-term professional relationships between our Armed Forces
and the future military leadership of other countries. Military-to-military contacts with countries that are
neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes build constructive security relationships, help to promote the
appropriate role of armed forces in a democratic society, and enhance stability.
d. Preventing or Reducing Conflicts and Threats. Conflict prevention means the reduction, mitigation,
or neutralization of the causes of conflict. Though the military by itself can rarely address the root causes
of conflict — as it often stems from political, economic, social, and legal conditions that are beyond the
core competence of the military to resolve — military forces can provide a degree of fundamental security
and use their unique operational and logistical capabilities to help civil initiatives succeed. Such military
operations can have important strategic value when they promote the overall stability the U.S. seeks, thus
reducing the need for greater military effort later.
(1) The U.S. effort to prevent conflict and reduce threats includes arms control measures as an
essential part. Verifiable arms control agreements, as well as confidence building and transparency
measures, help reduce tensions and dangers. Military resources are an important component of this effort,
particularly in the conduct of reciprocal inspection, verification, and, in some cases, enforcement activities.
Bringing worldwide arsenals into conformity with international nonproliferation standards helps to reduce
uncertainty about potential threats and allows countries to direct resources to safer, more productive
relations. The United States remains committed to our obligations under bilateral and international arms
control agreements. Expanding arms control efforts to address the use or possession of WMD, the
development of WMD technology, and the control and transfer of fissionable materiel are also extremely
important to enhancing U.S. security.
e. Peacetime Deterrence. Deterrence means preventing potential adversaries from taking aggressive
actions that threaten our interests, allies, partners, or friends. It is the military’s most important contribution
to the shaping element of the President’s strategy. Deterrence rests in large part on our demonstrated
ability and willingness to defeat potential adversaries and deny them their strategic objectives. Our
deterrence capability gives allies and friends the confidence necessary for normal political discourse and
peaceful resolution of differences. The critical elements of deterrence are our conventional warfighting
capabilities: forces and equipment strategically positioned; our capability to rapidly project and concentrate
military power worldwide; our ability to form and lead effective military coalitions; and our capacity to
protect our homeland, forces, and critical infrastructure from the full range of potential threats. Our
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strategic nuclear forces complement our conventional capabilities by deterring any hostile foreign
leadership with access to nuclear weapons from acting against our vital interests. Our nuclear forces may
also serve to convince such leaders that attempting to seek a nuclear advantage would be futile.
f. Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises. Given the strategic environment, the U.S. military
undoubtedly will be called upon to respond to crises across the full range of military operations, from
humanitarian assistance to fighting and winning MTWs and conducting concurrent smaller-scale
contingencies. U.S. forces must be able to respond to crises from a posture of global engagement. In the
event of a major theater war the United States will need to be extremely selective in undertaking
substantial engagement activities and smaller-scale contingency operations. More than likely, we would
have to disengage from activities and operations not deemed vital in order to better posture our forces to
deter or defeat aggression in a second major theater war. A credible U.S. force-in-being, despite multiple
demands, is a key stabilizing influence in the world. Responding to multiple concurrent contingencies
requires careful consideration to ensure our forces are not dissipated and, therefore, either unable or
perceived as unable to respond to more critical threats.
g. Deterring Aggression or Coercion in Crisis. The first response in any crisis normally consists of
steps to deter an adversary so the situation does not require a greater U.S. response. This generally
involves signaling our commitment by enhancing our warfighting capability in a theater or by making
declarative statements to communicate U.S. intentions and the potential cost of aggression to an
adversary. We may also choose to emphasize our resolve by responding in a limited manner, for example,
by enforcing sanctions or conducting limited strikes. The deterrent posture and activities of our armed
forces ensure we remain prepared for conflict should deterrence fail.
h. Fighting and Winning Major Theater Wars. As a global power with worldwide interests, it is
imperative that the United States be able to deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border
aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies. For
the time being, we face this challenge in the Arabian Gulf region and in Northeast Asia. However, even
should these challenges diminish, this capability is critical to maintaining our global leadership role. Lack of
such a capability would signal to key allies our inability to help defend mutual interests, thus weakening our
alliances and coalitions. Because such weakness would not escape the attention of potential adversaries, it
might make two simultaneous crises more likely. U.S. commitment to one crisis would present the
opportunity, otherwise unrealized, for another aggressor to act. Even more dangerous, it could inhibit the
United States from responding to a crisis promptly enough, or even at all, for fear of committing our only
forces and thereby making us vulnerable in other regions of the world. The capability to fight two major
theater wars initiated in rapid succession is of critical importance as it helps deter opportunism, promote
stability, and provides the depth and flexibility to deal with unanticipated challenges.
(1) In this regard, a particularly challenging requirement associated with fighting and winning
major theater wars is being able to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of their objectives in two
theaters in close succession, one followed almost immediately by another. Maintaining this capability is
absolutely critical to our ability to seize the initiative in both theaters and to minimize the amount of territory
our allies and we must regain from aggressors. Failure to halt an enemy invasion rapidly would make the
subsequent campaign to evict enemy forces from captured territory much more difficult, lengthy, and
costly. Such failure would also weaken coalition support, undermine U.S. credibility, and increase the risk
of conflict elsewhere.
i. Conducting Multiple, Concurrent Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations. Future challenges to our
interests will likely require use of our forces in a wide range of concurrent operations short of major
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theater war. Swift action by military forces may sometimes be the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve
conflict, thereby precluding greater effort and increased risk later. Using some of our unsurpassed
capabilities in the pursuit of common interests and values demonstrates leadership and encourages
confidence and greater contributions by others, reducing the demand on us in the long run. U.S. military
forces provide a full array of capabilities that can be tailored to give the NCA many options in pursuing our
interests. Our capacity to perform shows of force, limited strikes, opposed interventions, no-fly zone and
sanctions enforcement operations, interposition or observation operations, and other missions allows us to
deter would-be aggressors and control the danger posed by rogue states. U.S. forces can perform peace
operations and humanitarian assistance operations, and can evacuate noncombatants from dangerous
situations, whether opposed or unopposed. U.S. forces will act unilaterally and in concert with security
partners, using all means authorized by the President and the Congress, to counter international terrorism
at home and abroad. Unique military capabilities can also support domestic authorities in combating direct
and indirect threats to the U.S. homeland, such as the illegal drug trade, especially when the potential for
violence exceeds the capability of domestic agencies.
j. Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future. As we move into the next century, it is imperative that
the United States maintain the military superiority essential to our global leadership. To be able to respond
effectively in the future, we must transform U.S. combat capabilities and support structures, but while we
do so, our forces must remain engaged worldwide and ready to fight and win two nearly simultaneous
major theater wars. Success demands a stabilized investment program in robust modernization that exploits
the RMA. It also requires fundamental reengineering of our infrastructure and streamlining of our support
structures through the RBA to realize the cost efficiencies necessary to recapitalize the force. Though
difficult to accomplish, such tasks are essential to reaching new levels of joint warfighting effectiveness.
(1) JV 2010 is the conceptual template for joint operations and warfighting in the future. It
provides the azimuth for the Services’ visions, thus ensuring the future interoperability of the joint force.
Because we will often act in concert with like-minded nations, as we implement JV 2010 we must also
retain interoperability with our allies and potential coalition partners. This vision of future capabilities guides
our warfighting requirements and procurement, and focuses technological development. JV 2010’s key
enablers of information superiority and technological innovation will transform the current concepts of
maneuver, strike, protection, and logistics into the new operational concepts of dominant maneuver,
precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. Turning these concepts into reality
will help us to conduct decisive operations in any environment, a characteristic JV 2010 calls “full
spectrum dominance.” JV 2010 rests on the foundations of information superiority and technological
innovation.
k. Information Superiority. Information superiority is the capability to collect, process, and
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of precise and reliable information, while exploiting or denying an
adversary’s ability to do the same. While it is dependent upon superior technology, systems integration,
organization, and doctrine, it is not an inherent quality but, like air superiority, must be achieved in the
battlespace through offensive and defensive information operations. Information superiority yields
battlespace awareness, an interactive, shared and highly accurate picture of friendly and enemy operations
as they occur. Information superiority allows our commanders to employ widely dispersed joint forces in
decisive operations, engage and reengage with the appropriate force, protect the force throughout the
battlespace, and conduct tailored logistical support.
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l. Technological Innovation. As we reshape our forces to meet the challenges of a changing world,
we will leverage emerging technologies to enhance the capabilities of our servicemen and women through
development of new doctrine, organizations, material, and training. Development and acquisition
of new systems and equipment will improve our ability to conduct decisive operations and achieve full
spectrum dominance. However, they are not a panacea. We must recognize that each includes inherent
vulnerabilities, each must be applicable across the range of operations, and each must enhance the human
capability of our forces.
m. Balanced Evolution. The fundamental challenge for our Armed Forces is to shape and respond in
the current and near-term security environment while we concurrently prepare for the future. Because our
forces are engaged worldwide every day, their transformation to achieve the new capabilities described in
JV 2010 is necessarily evolutionary. Through a rigorous process of experimentation, assessment,
refinement, and doctrinal development, we can meet our responsibility to maintain ready forces today
while taking steps to transform those forces to be superior tomorrow. This transformation of our forces is
not a choice between people and technology, but about how to integrate the strengths of both to give the
Nation the best possible military capability. It involves much more than the acquisition of new military
systems. It means harnessing new technologies to give U.S. forces greater military capabilities through
advanced concepts, doctrine, and organizations so that they can dominate any future battlespace.
5. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS.
a. Strategic concepts are key ideas that govern our use of military force and forces as we execute
the strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare Now. These ideas are also important considerations that guide
how our forces are trained, equipped, and organized.
b. Strategic Agility. Strategic agility is the timely concentration, employment, and sustainment of U.S.
military power anywhere at our own initiative, at a speed and tempo that our adversaries cannot match.
Our forces must be able to seize and maintain the momentum of operations rapidly to meet multiple
demands in an uncertain and complex strategic environment. Strategic agility requires our Armed Forces
to be versatile, that is, to conduct multiple missions simultaneously across the full range of military
operations in geographically separated regions of the world. This versatility, and the equally important
abilities to orchestrate, command, control and support dispersed joint forces, permit the decisive application
of our strengths against enemy weaknesses. Strategic agility is essential if we are to remain globally
engaged but not find ourselves improperly positioned or otherwise unable to respond to crises.
c. Overseas Presence. Overseas presence is the visible posture of U.S. forces and infrastructure
strategically positioned forward, in, or near key regions. Permanently stationed and rotationally or
temporarily deployed forces promote security and stability, prevent conflict, give substance to our security
commitments, and ensure our continued access. Overseas presence enhances coalition operations by
promoting joint and combined training and encouraging responsibility sharing on the part of friends and
allies. Overseas presence contributes to deterrence by demonstrating our determination to defend U.S.,
allied, and friendly interests in critical regions while enabling the U.S. to rapidly concentrate military power
in the event of crisis. The presence of our forces provides commanders with a flexible array of options to
respond promptly to aggression. Overseas presence forces embody global military engagement. They
serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies; contribute uniquely to the stability, continuity,
and flexibility that protects U.S. interests; and are crucial to continued democratic and economic
development.
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d. Power Projection. Power projection is the ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain U.S.
forces in and from multiple, dispersed locations. Complementing overseas presence, power
projection strives for unconstrained global reach. Power projection assets are tailored to regional
requirements and send a clear signal of U.S. commitment. Being able to project power means being able
to act even when we have no permanent presence or infrastructure in a region. If necessary, it means
fighting our way into a denied theater or creating and protecting forward operating bases. The ability to
assemble and move to, through, and between a variety of environments, often while reconfiguring to meet
specific mission requirements, is essential to offsetting an adversary’s advantages in mass or geographic
proximity. Global power projection provides our national leaders with the options they need to respond to
potential crises.
e. Decisive Force. Decisive force is the commitment of sufficient military power to overwhelm all
armed resistance in order to establish new military conditions and achieve political objectives. In cases not
involving armed resistance, decisive force means that U.S. forces will be wholly sufficient to accomplish
the full scope of their military tasks. Decisive force in the early stages of a crisis can be critical to
deterring aggression. The concept does not promise quick or bloodless solutions to military challenges, but
does require that, where the actual commitment of military power is anticipated, such force will be clearly
superior to that of any potential adversary.
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SECTION III
PLANNING GUIDANCE
1. GENERAL.
With the end of the Cold War and resulting changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
many of the traditional planning concepts of previous IJSCPs are ill-suited for contemporary contingency
planning. It has become clear from an assessment of these changes and from the lessons of DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM that fixed values assigned to planning assumptions for warning and
political decisions regarding force movements, reserve call up, mobilization, and other executive
emergency measures, while necessary to develop operational plans, may and most likely will change at
execution. What is also fairly clear, and critically important to recognize and plan for, is that crisis response
always entails an element of risk encompassing diplomatic, political, economic, and military considerations.
Because of this, warning time or, more correctly stated, available response time is far more likely to be
well used by key decision makers if they have a menu of discriminate preplanned response options from
which to choose, gauged to a range of crises.
2. PLANNING FLEXIBILITY GUIDANCE.
a. Therefore, this IJSCP introduces the concept of adaptive planning. Its premise is that a crisis can
arise under a variety of circumstances that will, in turn, elicit a variety of likely or possible responses.
Accordingly, the IJSCP assigns planners the task of developing several response options keyed to a
specific set of conditions at the onset of a crisis. Although CINCs are directed in Section V to apply these
concepts to specific tasks and develop options considering specific threats, the intent is to produce plans
varied and flexible enough so they can be applied and with some modification adapted to unforeseen
regional threats or unexpected contingencies as well.
b. Flexible Deterrent Options. Adaptive planning underscores the importance of early response to an
emerging crisis. It facilitates early decision making by laying out a wide range of interrelated response
paths that begins with multiple deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to avoid the classic response
dilemma of too much too soon or too little too late. These deterrent-oriented early response options are
called Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs).
(1) FDOs using military forces and resources should be combined with diplomatic, political, and
economic actions by non-DOD agencies to demonstrate to a potential adversary a clear signal of U.S.
resolve. Therefore, during the planning process, CINCs will plan requests for appropriate diplomatic,
political, and economic options as well as military options. The intent is to give the NCA a wide range of
options, encompassing all the elements of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military).
Examples of diplomatic, political, economic, and military options are shown on Pages III-18 to III-20.
(2) All regional operation plans will have FDOs. It is expected that FDOs will have a regional
flavor, uniqueness, or variation. It is also expected that certain FDOs will be linked to actions not under the
direct purview of the supported CINC, such as lift staging and readiness upgrades in CONUS. For the
most part, as initial military responses, plans for flexible deterrent options should use active, in-place forces
and theater lift assets (Case 1 forces). Some portions of the augmentation forces listed in the Case 2 force
list (early deployers for Deploy-to-Fight Option) may be used. It is envisioned that a single FDO should be
approximately brigade, squadron, or battle group size. Combat support and combat service support should
be furnished primarily by active-duty support forces.
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(3) In planning FDOs, CINCs should avoid placing forces in a position where they may be
sacrificed if a potential adversary is not deterred. In addition, FDOs should facilitate escalating to the
deploy-decisive force response should it appear that signaling of resolve has not been effective. Finally,
FDOs should also be capable of rapid de-escalation should the crisis appear defused.
(4) To facilitate the review of these FDOs, CINCs will include them as part of their CINC’s
Strategic Concept for each operation plan during concept review per the appropriate CJCSM 3122.03 (old
JOPES Volume II) format. The description of these options will include anticipated mobilization and
transportation enhancements, if required.
c. Deploy-Decisive Force. If decision makers elect not to make a response or an adversary may not
be deterred by FDOs, planners must prudently plan for later actions (less timely from a deterrent
perspective) resulting from the receipt of unambiguous warning. These actions must include the rapid
deployment to the crisis region initially of a sufficient and supportable warfighting force to defend U.S.
interests, followed by decisive force to end the conflict quickly.
d. Counterattack. There is also the distinct possibility that a crisis would begin with an attack against
U.S. forces or vital interests without prior warning or deterrent moves. U.S. force deployments would,
therefore, not occur until after conflict had been initiated. The CINC may consider using an existing plan
as a common reference for a point of departure, saving valuable time and permitting execution to begin
almost immediately. Thus, such a concept for the deployment and employment of assigned and
apportioned forces will be included in the MTW plans directed in Section V.
e. Specific Guidance for Adaptive Planning and TPFDDs. In general, adaptive planning OPLANs
required in Section V will have a Deploy-Decisive Force TPFDD that includes the Presidential Selected
Reserve callup and partial mobilization. For TPFDD development, the ordering of cases within the force
tables (Cases 1 to 4) does not preclude the CINC from sequencing forces as required to meet his concept
of operations with decisive force. The intent of sequencing force apportionment in these cases is to furnish
a regional focus to forces, minimize multiapportionment of early deployers, and offer the flexibility of
having plans to respond to other contingencies.
2. DELIBERATE PLANNING for TWO NEAR SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR THEATER
WARS (MTWs) THAT DEVELOP SEQUENTIALLY.
Major regional threats to U.S. interests could occur in a number of different places. Because potential
foes could consider U.S. involvement in one crisis as affecting our ability to protect interests elsewhere,
plans should support the possibility of two concurrent major theater wars. Planning for two concurrent
MTWs does not mean that our military strategy is designed to fight multiple wars. It simply enables us to
deter an adversary or defend vital national interests in a theater while our attention is focused elsewhere.
The NCA will establish priorities and decide on deployment or redeployment of forces based on global
strategic requirements at the time of execution. Under these circumstances a CINC will prepare a
CONCEPT SUMMARY dealing with the consequences, requirements, constraints, and shortfalls of
executing the second of two concurrent MTWs.
4. DELIBERATE PLANNING for SMALLER SCALE CONTINGENCIES (SSC).
SSC plans are for operations against a less compelling threat than those involved in an MTW. Thus, an
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SSC is limited in scale and duration and involves primarily active forces mainly for crises and conflicts like
URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE. Nevertheless, where appropriate, plans for SSCs will adopt the
adaptive planning structures described in this section. CINCs planning for SSCs can plan to use some
reserve forces where and when they consider it appropriate and necessary to move a force. CINCs must
clearly identify the circumstances where this use will be required in their SSC plans. Section V further
explains assumptions for both MTWs and SSCs.
5. PLANNING for NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, and CHEMICAL WARFARE.
All plans developed at CGSC will be based on the assumption that opponents neither possess NBC
weapons nor will obtain them for the duration of the planning period. While it may be argued that this is an
unrealistic assumption, time constraints preclude adding this complex issue to an already difficult planning
task.
6. PLANS for MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW).
For this planning period, specific areas of interest are Operational Training and Deployments, Security
Assistance, Protection of U.S. Citizens Abroad (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations and Combating
Terrorism), Combating Drugs, and Humanitarian Assistance. CJCSI Supplemental Instruction 13, “Military
Operations Other Than War,” contains general guidance and considerations for planning in these areas.
7. ACCESS and HOST-NATION SUPPORT.
Any U.S. operation may require access by U.S. forces to lines of communication and facilities not in
U.S. territory, air space, or territorial waters. Plan for allied contributions to logistics, lift, administration,
rear area security, medical, and C3I support, and allied combat forces, whenever feasible. Specific
assumptions for regional and global tasks are found in Sections V and VI, respectively.
8. LOGISTICS.
a. General. Guidance and planning factors for support, materiel sustainment, and strategic mobility
are found in Sections IV, V, and VI and CJCSI Instructions, 2, 10 and 12.
b. Threat Distribution. As a result of lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM, plans will include, as much as practicable, guidance distributing the threat among
Service components and identifying the expected duration of each phase of the operation. Deliberate
threat distribution in joint operations is to ensure those resources support the CINC’s Strategic Concept as
it applies to the joint force as a whole. Independent resourcing by Service component commands that does
not take into account the operational contributions of all Service component commands, collectively, or the
expected duration of specific phases of the operation may place unacceptable strains on critical strategic
lift assets and can impede the closure of forces.
9. THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANS (TEP).
Theater engagement plans will be developed by all regional CINCs. Current national military strategy
and national strategic goals will be incorporated into these plans. They will be tailored to fit each theater of
operations and areas of responsibility.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-III-17
DIPLOMATIC FDOs
ALERT & INTRODUCE SPECIAL TEAMS
- PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
- MTT
- COMMUNICATIONS
PREPARE TO WITHDRAW U.S. EMBASSY
PERSONNEL
REDUCE NATIONAL EMBASSY PERSONNEL
REDUCE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC TIES
TAKE ACTIONS TO WIN SUPPORT OF ALLIES
ENCOURAGE OTHER NATIONS TO PRESSURE
RESOLVE THE CRISIS
INCREASE CULTURAL GROUP PRESSURE TO
INITIATE NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION
PURSUE MEASURES TO INCREASE REGIONAL
SUPPORT
PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE STEPS TO PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION
IDENTIFY THE NATIONAL LEADER WHO
MAY BE ABLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
COORDINATE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
RESTRICT ACTIVITIES OF DIPLOMATS
ALTER EXISTING MEETINGS, PROGRAMS OR
SCHEDULES
HEIGHTEN INFORMATIONAL EFFORTS
DIRECTED AT
- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
- THE PEOPLE WITHIN THE NATION
- THE ALLIES OF THE OPPONENT
- THE COALITION FORMED TO OVERCOME
THE CRISIS
USE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
DEVELOP OR WORK WITHIN AN EXISTING
COALITION (AVOID UNILATERAL ACTIONS
WHEN POSSIBLE)
SHOW INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE
INFORMATIONAL
HEIGHTEN PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE
PROBLEM AND POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT
GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT
TAKE MEASURES TO INCREASE PUBLIC
SUPPORT
GAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT
MAINTAIN AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH THE
PRESS
HEIGHTEN INFORMATIONAL EFFORTS
COORDINATED EFFORTS TO INFORM:
- QUICKLY
- HONESTLY
- WITHIN SECURITY RESTRAINTS
IMPOSED BY THE CRISIS
TAKE STEPS TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN
CONFIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC
KEEP SELECTED ISSUES AS LEAD STORIES
PROMOTE U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES THROUGH
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENTS
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-III-18
ECONOMIC FDOs
FREEZE MONETARY ASSETS IN THE U.S.
ENCOURAGE CORPORATIONS TO RESTRICT
TRANSACTIONS
SEIZE REAL PROPERTY IN THE U.S.
REDUCE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
FREEZE INTERNATIONAL ASSETS WHERE
POSSIBLE
EMBARGO GOODS AND SERVICES
ENACT TRADE SANCTIONS
REDUCE U.S.-FUNDED PROGRAMS
HEIGHTEN INFORMATIONAL EFFORTS
DIRECTED AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
QUESTIONING THE SOUNDNESS OF
CONTINUING ACTIONS WITH THE
OPPONENTS BUSINESSES
REDUCING OR ELIMINATING
CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS
MILITARY FDOs
EMPLOY READILY IN-PLACE ASSETS
MOVE MPS TO REGION
UPGRADE ALERT STATUS
DEPLOY SURFACE ACTION GROUP TO REGION
INCREASE STRATEGIC
RECON DEPLOY CVBG TO REGION
DEPLOY AWACS TO REGION
START CONTINGENCY FORCE DEPLOY
ACTIONS
INCREASE COLLECTION EFFORTS
BEGIN MOVING FORCES TO APOEs/SPOEs
INITIATE OR INCREASE SHOW OF FORCE
ACTIONS
MOVE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY
BRIGADE TO REGION
EMPLOY ELECTRONIC MEASURES
DEPLOY THE FORWARD DEPLOYED ARG/MEU TO
THE REGION
AIRCRAFT FLY-OVERS
ACTIVATE PROCEDURES TO BEGIN RESERVE
CALLUP
INCREASE EXERCISE ACTIVITIES,
SCHEDULES AND SCOPE
PRE-STAGE OR DEPLOY CONTINGENCY
READY BRIGADES
INCREASE MILITARY EXCHANGES AND
STAFF VISITS TO THE AREA
INCREASE NAVAL PORT CALLS OR AIR
SQUADRON VISITS TO THE AREA
INCREASE THE USE OF SOF FACILITIES
-SPECIALLY DESIGNED TEAMS
PRESTAGE AIRLIFT
INCREASE MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS
PRESTAGE AIRLIFT SUPPORT ASSETS
IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY
PERSONNEL RETIREMENTS, LEAVES,
PRESTAGE SEALIFT AND AIRLIFT RECEPTION
ASSETS TO APOEs/SPOEs
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-III-19
INSTITUTE PROVISIONS OF EXISTING HOST
NATION AGREEMENTS
OPEN PREPO STOCKAGE FACILITIES
USE NAVAL OR AIR CAPABILITY TO
ENFORCE SANCTIONS
EMPLACE LOGISTICS INFRASTRUCTURE
WHERE POSSIBLE
OPEN AND SECURE SLOCs/ALOCs
INCREASE PSYOPS/MISSION AWARENESS
DEPLOY TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-III-20
SECTION IV
FORCES
1. SECTION DESCRIPTION. Section IV of the IJSCP deals with forces and general strategic
considerations and guidance. The information is generally limited to an appraisal of the USCENTCOM
area of responsibility, its strategic importance, and possible impact on the roles of U.S. military forces.
a.
Strategic forces and general purpose forces comprise American military strength.
(1) Strategic forces are the primary deterrent to nuclear attacks against the United States or its
allies. They compel an aggressor who is contemplating less than an all-out attack to recognize the
unacceptable risk of escala tion, and they reduce the likelihood of intimidation. Our strategic forces are
based on a doctrine of strategic sufficiency, that is, sufficient force to inflict a level of damage that will
deter a potential aggressor from attacking. “Strategic sufficiency” also means possession of available
forces that are adequate in quantity and that have the qualitative characteristics to maintain a stable
strategic balance despite technological and numerical changes.
(2) General purpose forces, on the other hand, are essential because they must cover the range of
conflicts that strategic forces alone can deter. If general purpose forces are weak, aggression by
conventional means and attempts by political coercion might seem inviting. To minimize those possibilities,
U.S. general purpose forces are manned and equipped so they can meet a major threat to American and
allied interests in Europe or Asia and simultaneously cope with a minor contingency elsewhere. The
presence of potentially hostile countries in Asia and Europe requires counterpoising allied forces that are
capable of maintaining a successful defense in either theater until reinforced.
2. SECTION OUTLINE.
a. PART 1. GENERAL APPORTIONMENT INFORMATION. Quantitatively, fewer forces
are available during FYXX than the objective force levels recommended, but those forces are considered
adequate to support U.S. strategy within the limits of prudent military risk.
(1) Major Combat Forces available to unified commanders for planning are shown.
(2) Where possible, missions and tasks will be accomplished with assigned forces. If required,
augmentation and supporting forces will be kept to a minimum consistent with sound military strategy and
operational considerations.
(3) Planned active force disposition is shown in Tables IV-4 through IV-6. Required combat
support and combat service support forces will be requested by component commanders through Service
channels.
(4) Forces specified for use in operation plans will not exceed those authorized in the force tables
in a given situation.
NOTE: Forces are not assigned to a unified commander by the IJSCP. Assignment of
Forces to the various CINCs is promulgated semi-annually by a separate JCS secretarial
memorandum (SM).
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-21
(5) Supported commanders who determine during planning that forces made available or assigned
are inadequate shall advise the JCS as expeditiously as possible regarding:
(a) Force and materiel shortfalls.
(b) Estimate of risk as a result of shortfalls.
(c) Estimate of threat level.
(d) Recommended changes in tasks, if appropriate.
(6) JCS approval of an operation plan constitutes a de facto approval of forces planned. Actual
force levels may be altered, however, at the time a plan is executed.
(7) The JCS will direct the assignment of actual augmentation or support forces at the time a plan
is executed.
(8) Commanders of unified and specified commands may be required to alter courses of action in
the event force levels are reduced for execution.
b.
PART 2. REGIONAL PLANNING FACTORS.
(1) Command and Control.
(a) Command and control passes from the NCA to the CINCs of the unified and specified
commands, through the Chairman of the JCS, who passes NCA instructions directly to the operating
forces. The critical component of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is the National
Military Command Center (NMCC), through which the NCA receives information and passes instructions.
(b) During both the planning and conduct of operations, commanders will exercise
command IAW guidance in the UCP and JCS Pub 2.
1. USCINCEUR
Omitted
2. USCINCCENT
a. Without mobilization, forces available to USCENTCOM should be able to
simultaneously:
(1) Maintain essential forward presence at current levels.
(2) Conduct small-scale, short-duration operations in support of minor
contingencies within the unified command area of responsibility and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
b. With mobilization, forces available to USCENTCOM should be able to
undertake only one of the following:
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-22
(1) Reinforce in the NATO area and, in concert with allies, conduct the
initial defense of the NATO area.
(2) Be prepared to curtail operations and provide assistance to unified
and/or specified commands if so directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(3) Reinforce essential forward presence.
(4) Conduct operations in support of U.S. interests in a major theater war
(MTW).
c.
3. USCINCACOM
Omitted
4. USCINCPAC
Omitted
5. USCINCSO
Omitted
6. USCINCSOC
Omitted
7. USCINCSPACE
Omitted
8. USCINCSTRAT
Omitted
9. USCINCTRANS
Omitted
PART 3. FORCE APPORTIONMENT SUMMARY.
(1) The forces in this IJSCP are apportioned and are effective for planning purposes upon receipt
and for operations during FYXX. Forces available to unified commanders for planning purposes are listed
in the tables that follow. The forces listed are in addition to those assigned to the unified commands.
Actual assignment or reassignment of forces is authorized only by the JCS or higher authority.
(2) The forces listed in the tables that follow are major combat forces only.
(3) Support of major combat forces is the responsibility of the Service and military departments as
outlined in UNAAF and DOD instructions. Unified commanders, through their component commanders,
are responsible for determining the availability of combat support and combat service support units not
listed in the tables. Service capability plans may be used for identification of such forces. Under no
circumstances will a unified commander plan for the use of forces which exceed the level of
major combat forces authorized. (Exception: Unless directed by the NCA as discussed under
deliberate planning for two near simultaneous MTW’s on page 7-III-16).
(4) Major combat forces identified in Part 3 of Section IV provide for two levels of involvement:
(a) Forces available for contingencies which require partial mobilization.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-23
(b) Forces available for support of allies and minor contingencies which require no
mobilization.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-24
NOTE: Although only two force availability tables are provided for use in this IJSCP, it is
important to understand the full spectrum of planning for which the unified commanders
are responsible. The IJSCP, as promulgated by JCS, identifies five force levels available
for planning, which range from full mobilization down to minor contingencies for which no
mobilization is required. It is this source that the unified commanders use to determine
what additional type combat forces are available to them for planning purposes.
NOTE: Forces are not assigned to a unified commander by the IJSCP. Assignment of
Forces to the various CINCs is promulgated semiannually by a separate JCS secretarial
memorandum (SM).
(5) Service Planning Considerations.
(a) Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the NCA for responding to
crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal authorities available before a Presidential declaration of
national emergency or a congressional declaration of a national emergency or war (Joint Pub 4-05, chap
4). The statutory authority, basic policies, and procedures for mobilizing elements of the reserve component are set forth in Title 10, United States Code; DOD Directive 1235.10; and other related DOD
memorandums and instructions.
(b) Whenever the President and Congress determine that more units and organizations are
needed for national security than are in the regular components of ground and air forces, units of the Army
National Guard, together with units of other reserve components necessary for a balanced force, will be
ordered to active duty and retained as indicated in the levels of mobilization as follows:
1. Presidential Selective Reserve Callup (PSRC): The expansion of the active
armed forces with reserve component units and/or individual reservists, by the authority of Congress or the
President, to satisfy an emergency requirement for a force which can meet that requirement. PSRC
authority makes up to 200,000 selected Reservists available for up to 270 days. President publishes
Executive Order and informs the Congress within 24 hours on anticipated use.
2. Partial mobilization: The expansion of the active armed forces, short of full
mobilization, resulting from action by Congress or the President, to mobilize reserve component units
and/or individual reservists to meet all or part of the requirements of a particular contingency and/or
operational war plans or to meet the requirements incident to hostilities. Units mobilized to meet such
requirements will be ordered to active duty at authorized strength. Partial mobilization differs from
selective mobilization in that it would normally be associated with requirements for contingency plans
involving external threats to the national security. Presidential or Congressional proclamation of a national
emergency makes up to one million Reservists available for up to 24 months.
3. Full mobilization: Passage of legislation or a joint resolution of the Congress
declaring war or national emergency brings remaining Reserve component personnel on to active duty.
The Retired, Standby Reserves, and Ready Reserves become available that were not previously called.
4. Total mobilization: Passage of legislation authorizing additional force structure
and manpower. Total mobilization adds new units and personnel to the active inventory.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-25
(c) Selection of Units for Mobilization. Actual selections will depend upon the reason for
the mobilization and the domestic and international situations that exist at M-Day; whether or not units will
be mobilized according to their authorized strengths; whether or not military service obligations and
enlistment’s will be extended; and if individuals from the ready reserve are to be mobilized. During
planning for and/or execution of a partial mobilization, consideration should be given to the following
factors when selecting units to be mobilized:
1. Units with highest training, logistical and personnel readiness should be selected
first.
2. Units within the types and organizational structuring desired should be selected
from as wide a geographical area as is feasible.
3. Selection of units previously mobilized should be avoided, if possible.
4. Select only those units necessary to meet the stated objectives.
5. In order to achieve maximum utilization of resources within the period for
which they are to be mobilized, plan for their deployment as soon as practicable following mobilization.
(6) Active and Reserve Force Mobilization Capability.
(a) U.S. Army total mobilization capability is outlined in table IV-1.
(b) U.S. Naval total mobilization capability is outlined in table IV-2.
(c) U.S. Air Force total mobilization capability is outlined in table IV-3.
(d) Tables IV-1 through IV-3 indicate the major combat elements of the U.S. Army, U.S.
Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force quantified by active and reserve status as well as the total.
Forces listed in the tables are not necessarily authorized for planning by all unified
commanders. Authorization for planning is found in Section V of the IJSCP.
NOTE: For purposes of CGSC instruction, reserve force quantities are limited to those
that may be considered under partial mobilization in support of USCENTCOM planning.
(7) Planned U.S. Active Force Disposition in Peacetime.
(a) Army disposition of active forces outlined in table IV-4.
(b) Naval disposition of active forces outlined in table IV-5.
(c) Air Force disposition of active forces outlined in table IV-6.
(d) Tables IV-4 through IV-6 indicate the planned disposition of major combat active duty
forces to the indicated unified or specified commander. The tables do not constitute assignments that are
accomplished semiannually by separate JCS special memorandum. As with tables IV-1 through IV-3,
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-26
the forces listed are not necessarily authorized for planning by all unified commanders. Planning
authorization is found in Section V of the IJSCP.
(8) Forces available for contingencies (Mobilization not Authorized).
(a) The major combat forces listed in tables IV-7 through IV-9 are available to the unified
commander for CENTCOM for planning and are in addition to those forces regularly assigned. The forces
listed herein are available to unified commanders for developing contingency plans in specific countries
and other areas designed by higher authority where support of U.S. national interests might likely evolve
into hostilities.
(b) Use of Forces for Regional Contingency Planning.
1. Forces listed in the table may be deployed to the operational control of or in support of
another command.
2. In developing plans pursuant to this section, supported commanders should place
primary emphasis on the use of FORSCOM forces where augmentation or supporting forces are essential
to a plan.
3. During execution or implementation planning, if forces listed in the table are planned for
use by more that one supported commander, priorities will be established by the NCA and JCS. (For
example, the CJCS Planning Order excludes the 53d MECH and 25th ARMD Div on page 6-1.)
4. Strategic mobility assets for the movement of the forces listed herein will be planned
for in accordance with CJCSI 10 to IJSCP.
5. Planned deployments/employment of the type forces listed herein should be based on
the TOE strengths.
6. Forces will be available for deployment at their home base in accordance with the times
listed in the table. Times indicated are based on the alert date. Loading, deployment, and forward staging
times are additional planning considerations.
7. Forces envisioned for deployment in support of a contingency plan must be kept within
the support commander’s capability to receive, redeploy or employ, and support.
(c) Description of Tables.
1. Tables IV-7 through IV-9 provide types and quantities of force elements available for
planning by unified commanders. Tables are provided for Army, Naval, and Air Force combat elements.
2. The first four columns indicate the number of force elements which may be planned for
by the particular unified command. The next column provides the force element description. The next
column shows the amount of time (in days or weeks) required after notification before the force element
could depart home station. The last two columns show geographical location of the unit and the owning
command.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-27
TABLE IV-1
U.S. ARMY FORCES MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY
MAJOR ELEMENT
Army HQ
Corps HQ
Division
Brigade (Separate)
Regiment
SF Group
ADA Command
FA Brigade
ACTIVE
4
4
10
1
2
5
3
6
RESERVE
--8
15
3
2
-7
TOTAL
4
4
18
16
5
7
3
13
TABLE IV-2
U.S. NAVAL FORCES MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY
MAJOR ELEMENT
Fleets
CV/CVN (Note 1)
CV Wing (Note 2)
CG (Note 3)
DD/DDG (Note 4)
FFG (Note 5)
Mine Warfare (Note 6)
Amphib Warfare (Note 7)
SS/SSN (Note 8)
SSBN (Note 8)
Mine CM Sqdn (Note 9)
MEF (Note 10)
ACTIVE
4
11
11
33
38
34
11
29
66
18
2
3
RESERVE
-1
2
--16
5
2
---*
TOTAL
4
12
13
33
38
50
16
31
66
18
2
3
NOTES: The following information is provided to give students a feel for how many people, ships and
aircraft are available.
1. 5,000 people per ship
2. 50 Fighter/Attack A/C per Wing
3. 400 person crew
4. 300 person crew
5. 230 person crew
6. 95 person crew
7. 6,000 people/6 ships per group
8. 150 people per boat
9. 4-8 helos per Sqdn
10. 49,700 USMC; 2,600 USN; and 40 + ships
* Marine Reserve forces will augment Active MEFs.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-28
TABLE IV-3
U.S. AIR FORCES MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY (PAI)
MAJOR ELEMENTS
Numbered Air Force
Bomber Sqdn
Tanker Sqdn
Fighter Sqdn
Air Defense Sqdn
Transport/Tanker Sqdn (
C-5 (110)
C-17 (46)
C-141 (141)
C-130 (479)
C-9A (23)
KC-135 E/R (497)
KC-10 (54)
Special Opns Sqdn
AWACS (28)
Rivet Joint Sqdn (16 A/C)
U-2 Sqdn (29 A/C)
EW Sqdn (USN/USAF)
Airspt Sqdn
ACTIVE
11
8
15
27
-37
4
2
7
9
2
15
4
4
25
1
1
4
12
RESERVE/GUARD
4
3
29
24
12
69
3
1
7
30
1
27
2
7
5
-----
TOTAL
15
11
44
51
12
106
7
3
14
39
3
42
6
11
30
1
1
4
12
TABLE IV-4
PLANNED PEACETIME DISPOSITION OF U.S. ARMY ASSIGNED FORCES
MAJOR
ELEMENT
Army HQ
Corps HQ
Divisions
Brigades
Regiment
SF Group
ADA Cmd
FA Bde
EUCOM
ACOM
CENTCOM
PACOM
SOUTHCOM
SOCOM
TOTAL
1
1
1
--1
1
1
1
3
8
-2
-1
4
1
----1
---
1
-1
1
-1
1
1
---------
-----2
---
4
4
10
1
2
5
3
6
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-29
TABLE IV-5
PLANNED PEACETIME DISPOSITION OF U.S. NAVAL ASSIGNED FORCES
MAJOR ELEMENT
Aircraft Carrier
Cruiser
Destroyer
Frigate
Submarine, Attack
Submarine, Ballistic
Amphibious Ship
Mine CM Sqdn
Mobile Logistics
MEF
Mine Warfare
PACOM
5
12
23
16
32
9
13
1
15
2(-)
2
ACOM
6
13
26
18
32
9
13
1
15
1
22
CENTCOM
1
2
4
4
4
-3
-2
1 MEU
2
TOTAL
12
27
53
38
66
18
29*
2
34
3
26
* Includes LCCs, TAH, and TAVBs.
TABLE IV-6
PLANNED PEACETIME DISPOSITION OF U.S. AIR FORCE ASSIGNED FORCES
MAJOR
ELEMENT
# Air Force
Bomber Sqdn
Tanker Sqdn
(KC-135/KC-10)
Fighter Sqdn
Airlift Sqdn
C-5 (A/C)
C-17 (A/C)
C-141 (A/C)
C-130 (A/C)
C-9A (A/C)
Spec Ops Sqdn
U-2
AWACS (A/C)
Rivet Joint
EW Sqdn
Airspt Sqdn
EUCOM
PACOM
CENTCOM
SOUTHCO
M
TRANSCO
M
SOCOM
ACC
TOTA
L
2
-
4
-
-
-
4
44
-
5
11
-
15
11
44
12
(20)
(2)
3
(4)
3
15
(10)
(2)
3
(4)
3
(12)
(1)
(4)
4
(6)
(1)
1
30
(104)
(25)
(150)
(308)
(12)
1
8
-
29
(24)
(29)
(18)
(16)
4
-
56
30
(104)
(25)
(150)
(380)
(18)
14
(29)
(30)
(16)
4
12
(A/C) = aircraft #’s
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-30
TABLE IV-7
U.S. ARMY FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
(MOBILIZATION NOT AUTHORIZED)
EUCOM
2
PACOM
1
1
2
CENTCOM
2
2
2
1
1
2
-
1
1
1
-
1
2
2
1
1
2
-
1
1
-
2b
6
1
ELEMENT
Corps HQ
AR Div
INF Div
INF Div
(MECH)
ABN Div
AASLT Div
AV Bde (Cbt)
ACR
MECH Bde
(SEP)
SF Group
FA Bde
RGR Regt
TIME (weeks)
1
1
LOCATION
CONUS
CONUS
SOURCE
FORSCOM
FORSCOM
2
CONUS
FORSCOM
1
a
2
2
2
CONUS
CONUS
CONUS
CONUS
CONUS
FORSCOM
FORSCOM
FORSCOM
FORSCOM
FORSCOM
1
2
1
CONUS
CONUS
CONUS
SOCOM
FORSCOM
FORSCOM
Footnotes:
a. One brigade in 2 weeks; two additional brigades in 3 weeks.
b. Should include: SF, SEALS, AFSOF, CA, and PSYOPS.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-31
TABLE IV-8
U.S. NAVAL FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
(MOBILIZATION NOT AUTHORIZED)
ACOM
1
EUCOM
1
PACOM
-
CENTCOM
3
-
-
1
2
-
1
-
-
1
1
-
1a
-
-
1
1a
1
-
-
1
1
2b
1c
ELEMENT
Carrier
Battle Grp
Carrier
Battle Grp
Carrier
Battle Grp
ARG
w/MEU*
ARG
w/MEU**
MEF (-)
ARG/MEU*
**
DATE
Immediate a
LOCATION
Norfolk
SOURCE
ACOM
Immediate
San Diego
PACOM
Immediate
Naples, IT
EUCOM
Immediate
Norfolk
ACOM
Immediate
San Diego
PACOM
Immediate
Immediate
San Diego
Okinawa
PACOM
PACOM
Footnotes:
a. Source dependent on contingency operation, total of up to 5 to CENTCOM.
b. U.S. CENTCOM contingency MEF is same force as indicated for ACOM. Actual
employment will be contingent on crisis priority.
c. PACOM MEU can swing for CENTCOM contingencies when approved by NCA/JCS.
* From II MEF.
** From I MEF.
*** From III MEF.
Initial employment of the MEF’s may be through use of MPS.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-32
TABLE IV-9
U.S. AIR FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
(MOBILIZATION NOT AUTHORIZED)
CENTCOM
16
2
6
5
2
1
4
2
2
8
3
3
2
(24)
(8)
(8)
(8)
4
2
2
8
1
1
1
3
1
1
(13)
(8)
(5)
7
4
2
1
1
ELEMENT
Fighter Sqdn
F-117A
F-16
F-15C
F-15E
A-10
ECS Sqdn
EA6B (USN/USAF)
EC-130
Bomber Sqdn*
B-1
B-52
B-2
RS A/C
RC-135 (A/C)
E-8 (A/C)
U-2 (A/C)
Tanker Sqdn***
KC-10
KC-135
Spec Ops Sqdn
AC-130
EC-130 (CS)
HC-130
MC-130
MH-53
MH-60
AEW Sqdn (A/C)
E-3A (A/C)
ABCCC (A/C)
Airlift Sqdn
C-130E
AMOS
TACP
JCSE**
DATE
Immediate
LOCATION
CONUS
SOURCE
ACC
ACC
ACC
ACC
Immediate
CONUS
TRANSCOM
Immediate
CONUS
AFSOC
Immediate
CONUS
ACC
Immediate
CONUS
ACC
Immediate
CONUS
Joint Staff
Footnotes:
* ECS/Bomber/RS resources provided by ACC as directed by JCS.
** JCSE is listed here solely for space conservation.
*** Tanker/Airlift resources provided by AMC (21AF) as directed by JCS.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-IV-33
SECTION V
REGIONAL PLANS
1. AUTHORITY.
a. Execution authority for all plans rests with the NCA. Commanders exercise authority, command,
and discharge responsibilities as directed by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Unified Action Armed
Forces (UNAAF).
b. Operation planning will be conducted in accordance with Joint Pub 5.03-1, Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
c. Contingency plans will provide for:
(1) Deterrent options consisting of different sizes and types of forces designed to show U.S.
resolve in defense of U.S., allied, and friendly nation interests.
(2) Deployment of major U.S. combat forces to achieve U.S. objectives.
(3) Implementation of post-combat operations to assist governments in the reestablishment of
essential civil services.
2. REGIONAL PLANS.
a. General. The focus for current planning is regional, and conflict may arise under a variety of
circumstances from slow-building to imminent conflict situations.
b. Planning Assumptions. Assumptions governing regional conflicts, applicable to all CINCs, are in
Table V-1 and will be incorporated into operation plans as appropriate. Items not under U.S. control must
be covered by plan assumptions concerning them.
TABLE V-1
IJSCP REGIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
R-1 No Attacks
on U.S. assets in
space
R-2 CINCs will
plan to use the
mobilization &
transportation
necessary to
move and sustain
the force.
R-3 LOCs
outside the
theater will
remain open.
R-4 The
threatened
nation will
furnish bases for
reinforcement
and support.
R-5. PWRMS will
be per FY 20__
programs.
R-6
Mobilization
will not occur
except as noted.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-33
R-6 Nuclear and
lethal chemical
weapons will not be
made available to the
enemy. (classification
necessitates this
assumption)
c. Common Tasks and Planning Considerations. A number of tasks and planning considerations are
common to all commands. Table V-2 lists selected common regional tasks. Commands may develop plans
for the situations the commander considers necessary. Planning considerations are included to assist the
development of OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries.
TABLE V-2
COMMON REGIONAL TASKS
(1) Rules of Engagement
(2) Movement of Forces
(3) Command Relationships
(4) Nuclear Weapons Control
(5) Intelligence Coordination
(6) Special Operations
(7) Civil Affairs
(8) Host-nation Support
(9) Deescalation/Conflict Termination
(10) Support for Host-nation
Restoration
(11) Continuity of Operations
(12) Conduct Exercises
(13) Reconnaissance Operations
(14) Maritime Operations
(15) Air Traffic Control
(16) NASA Support
(17) Humanitarian Assistance
(18) Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs)
(19) Military Deception
(20) Search and Rescue
(21) Psychological Operations
(1) Rules of Engagement (ROE). Establish and maintain ROE in conformity with peacetime ROE
for U.S. Forces. Submit proposed ROE for those situations not covered by existing rules to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval or staffing and forwarding to the NCA for approval.
(2) Movement of Forces. When appropriate, include considerations for the movement of forces as
specified in Forces (Section IV). Plan operations security (OPSEC) and deception as required.
(3) Command Relationships. Supporting CINCs coordinate planning with supported CINCs,
participate in the planning process, and prepare supporting plans as required. Commanders establish
relationships with international commands, organizations and activities, and participate in combined
planning as required. Include necessary actions to receive and deploy units and support contingency
deployments.
(4) Nuclear Weapons Control. Not applicable.
(5) Intelligence Coordination. The Joint Intelligence Centers will coordinate with Service, DOD
and national agencies.
(6) Special Operations. Coordinate with USCINCSOC on special operations matters.
(7) Civil Affairs (CA). Conduct CA activities in support of U.S. National Military Strategy to
successfully fulfill the U.S. legal and treaty obligations, coordinate host-nation and nation-building activities,
and, if necessary, perform additional civil-military operations.
(8) Host-Nation Support. Include provisions for using HNS to meet in-country and intratheater
requirements. Areas for consideration of HNS programs are reception and onward movement of forces
and selected logistic and security functions.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-34
(9) Deescalation and Post-Conflict Planning. Include considerations for deescalation, crisis
termination, and post-conflict requirements throughout the planning cycle as required.
(10) Support for Host-Nation Restoration. At the conclusion of hostilities, planning for and the
implementation of operations directed at normalization of host-nation operations will take place.
Interagency coordination and responsibilities will dominate as priorities and requirements are identified and
programs implemented with the consensus of the host-nation leadership.
(11) Continuity of Operations. The integration of military and civil operations is complicated but
paramount to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives or maintenance of U.S. interests in any contingency.
(12) Exercises. Plan and conduct exercises across the operational continuum. Project positive
perceptions of U.S. and allied capabilities to respond credibly to any crisis. Exercises should consider
interoperability; incorporate indications; warning and alerting procedures; joint and combined command,
control, and communications (C3) involving the National Military Command System (NMCS); and tests of
selected military and supporting civil functions. Commands will submit after-action reports on exercises.
(13) Reconnaissance Operations. Plan for maximum efficient use of all available assets.
(14) Maritime Options. The following range of maritime options should be included in plans.
(a) From conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations to seizing and destroying
the ships and aircraft of hostile nations and conducting aerial minelaying.
(b) Controlling and protecting U.S. and allied shipping and LOCs in critical areas.
(c) Conducting mine countermeasures operations against mine warfare operations by
hostile forces.
(d) Deploying amphibious forces and/or maritime pre-positioned force squadrons or
pre-positioning ships to the region as an indication of the possible use of ground forces or for the purposes
of deception or surveillance.
(15) Air Traffic Control. Include provisions in existing plans for continued support by the FAA for
air traffic control operations in the AORs of the combatant commands during periods of war or national
emergency.
(16) NASA Support. Support NASA, as directed, and be prepared to conduct search and rescue
missions in support of the space transportation system (STS).
(17) Humanitarian Assistance. Hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, drought, and manmade events
may require DOD forces to lend support to government disaster relief assistance agencies with minimum
notice and support civil agencies, as directed by the DOD executive agent.
(18) Enemy Prisoners of War. Include provisions for the internment of EPWs.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-35
(19) Military Deception. Conduct military deception operations to support OPSEC, deterrence,
preparation for hostilities, intervention operations, combat operations, and attainment of other strategic
objectives.
(20) Search and Rescue. Establish a theater search and rescue system for the recovery of
personnel and materiel. Include provisions for coordinating the capabilities of available theater Service and
allied resources.
(21) Psychological Operations. Conduct psychological operations (PSYOP) in coordination with
the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions in support of national objectives, policies, interests, and military
missions.
3. REGIONAL PLANNING.
a. General. As discussed in Section III, Planning Guidance, CINCs may be required to prepare
operation plans for either Major Theater Wars (MTWs) or Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs) by
preparing OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries.
(1) Plan for the exercise of combatant command (COCOM) of all assigned forces and all
augmentation forces assigned.
(2) Plan, as required, to establish joint task forces under designated commanders to execute
military operations.
(3) Be prepared to accept foreign national military forces under operational control or tactical
control when directed by the NCA IAW treaties or agreements between the governments of the United
States and host or third nations.
(4) Be prepared to operate in conjunction with foreign military forces when directed by the NCA.
(5) Conduct concurrent security assistance and/or foreign internal defense planning as required by
JCS memorandums.
(6) All operation plans will include proposed command structure and command relationships.
(7) IAW the provisions of JCS Pub 3, Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance
(JLPPG), unified commanders coordinate with appropriate Department of State representatives in
countries within their geographic boundaries for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants. In
carrying out that duty, unified commanders:
(a) Prepare necessary military supporting plans.
(b) Prepare necessary operation plans.
(c) Cooperate with chiefs of diplomatic missions in planning.
(d) Implement military plans for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants as
required.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-36
b. Regional Planning — Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). To help deter regional
conflicts and promote stability, especially in Third World countries, innovative strategies are required to
support representative governments. The intent is to undertake a policy of forward presence including
diplomatic, political, economic, and military actions aimed at preventing conflict, enhancing regional
stability, and building coalition. In general, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are
categorized as follows: Operational Training and Deployment; Security Assistance (including
peacekeeping operations); Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad (including NEO and Combating Terrorism);
Combating Drugs; and Humanitarian Assistance. By engaging in these activities we strengthen
deterrence, build U.S. influence, develop alliance cohesion, and contribute to the prevention of war.
(1) Guiding Principle. The guiding principle for U.S. involvement is deterrence. The responsibility
for resolving interregional conflict lies with the host nation. Unless that nation is willing and able politically
to solve its problems, no amount of U.S. assistance will ensure a lasting solution. The strategic
environment is characterized by a mix of conditions and threats that can be dealt with only by a balanced
application of the elements of national power: political, economic, diplomatic, and military. Strategies and
plans must reflect U.S. national interests and be realistic in expectation. Planning should include national
power options that, when directed by the NCA, permit rapid transition from periods of peace to conflict
and back to peace.
(2) Planning Considerations. Planning for and conducting MOOTW operations should consider the
following:
(a) Primacy of the Political Element. Political objectives affect military planning at every
level. Courses of action may often slip outside traditional military doctrine.
(b) Unity of Effort. Efforts from other government agencies and host-nation institutions
must be integrated and coordinated during OPLAN and CONPLAN development.
(c) Adaptability. The skill and willingness to modify doctrine, tactics, techniques,
procedures, training, equipment, and organization is necessary for successful operations.
(d) Legitimacy. Legitimacy of the host nation is a central concern to all parties involved.
Military contributions and operations should be designed to enhance the host nation’s position and
legitimacy.
(e) Perseverance. Civilian and military leaders may have to reject limited or short-term
objectives and successes in favor of actions supporting long-term goals.
(f) Restricted Use of Force. ROEs will usually be more restrictive, more detailed, and
subject to more political scrutiny than in other types of conflicts. The use of force should be only that
necessary to solve the particular problem at hand.
(3) Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Detailed discussion of MOOTW operations
and planning guidance and considerations for security assistance, protecting U.S. citizens abroad (including
NEO and combating terrorism), combating drugs, and humanitarian assistance are found in CJCSI
Instruction 13, “Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).”
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-37
4. REGIONAL TASKS — SPECIFIC. Specific regional objectives, tasks, and force apportionments
are listed in the following sections.
a. USCINCEUR
Omitted
b. USCINCACOM
Omitted
c. USCINCCENT
(1) Regional U.S. strategy is influenced by:
(a) Local tensions in the Middle East periodically threaten to break into open conflict. The
Arab-Israeli conflict is foremost among them, but progress in either a resolution or at least normalization of
relations appears to be progressing. Potential unrest is endemic in the region. The continued drive by the
Palestinian people for a homeland, a problem that can spill over into the USCENTCOM area, continues. In
the Persian Gulf, the consolidation of new political entities and structures remains unstable. Personal,
religious, ethnic, economic, ideological, and a variety of other rivalries divide the Islamic world. Subversive
movements threaten many of the moderate, stable governments. At the same time, potential and active
insurgencies, aided and supported from the outside, are triggered against a number of less liberal or
responsive governments.
(b) The protracted Iraq-Iran war damaged much of the oil-producing infrastructure in
those two states. While a peace settlement was agreed to prior to the coalition effort against Iraq, the
underlying causes for conflict remain valid and continue to threaten other oil-producing states within the
region. The agreement also enabled Iraq to resume its anti- Israeli focus. Damage to Iraqi petroleum
production and the trade embargo established for the resolution of the Kuwaiti invasion has further irritated
Iraq. Arms merchants continue to take advantage of regional volatility by supplying arms to Iran, Iraq, and
any other party with funds to purchase munitions.
(c) The United States, the newly independent southern tier of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, and other governments have competitive interests in Southwest Asia, the Middle East,
and the contiguous waters. This competition is a further source of tension that adds to local instabilities and
poses the risk of a wider and more dangerous conflict.
(2) Regional U.S. strategic interest is described as:
(a) Unrestricted use of international air and sea lines of communication (LOCS) in the
Mediterranean Sea is essential to U.S. and allied interests. During hostilities, nonsupport of U.S. unilateral
actions by allies and friendly powers would make Mediterranean Sea LOCs even more critical.
(b) The Middle East area sits on the southeastern flank of NATO and is astride the routes
to Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Far East. It is rich in oil resources, and it dominates access to the
Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. Those realities, combined with intra-Arab differences and a
conflict of interest between with Israel and the numerous Arab states, make the Middle East one of the
most strategically important and explosive areas in the world.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-38
(c) Unrestricted use of international air and sea lines of communication through the Indian
Ocean is vital to the continued flow of oil and other resources from the Middle East to the United States
and its allies. Failure to maintain these LOCs would evoke grave consequences.
(3) Regional U.S. military objectives are to:
(a) Maintain freedom of access to the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East, the Indian
Ocean, and Africa.
(b) Protect U.S. economic, politic al, and military interests.
(c) Ensure access to oil supplies.
(d) Prevent any power from achieving a military or political position that would endanger
U.S. interests in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.
(e) Deter overt intervention by any outside power.
(f) Monitor internal and external actions that threaten the stability of the USCENTCOM
area of responsibility and be prepared to increase the U.S. military presence.
(4) Threats to regional U.S. interests are defined as follows:
(a) Exploitation or expansion of existing differences in Middle East countries by the
building up of military supplies. Those actions have serious implications for the stability and balance of
power in the area. Expanding instability and friction in Africa along with equipment, advisers, and training
present real threats to U.S. and allied interests in the region and a general threat to stability.
(b) Locally precipitated military actions are always possible, with or without foreign
assistance, as a result of traditional animosities or the ambitions of individual leaders.
(5) USCENTCOM responsibilities:
(a) Exercise combatant command and operational control of all assigned forces and
augmented forces assigned through a Service component or an established subordinate joint command
which is directly responsible to him. CINCCENT will exercise directive authority in the area of logistics to
assure economy and efficiency of operations and to eliminate duplication and overlapping operations.
(b) Neither directly command any Service, i.e., act as a component commander, nor
directly command a subordinate force except through a commander he has designated.
(c) Divide the command geographically into subordinate unified commands if that is
necessary due to geographic compartmentalization, political considerations, or to ensure coordination and
efficient performance of certain territorial administrative matters.
(d) Establish, as required, joint task forces under designated joint commanders to execute
military operations. A JTF organization command and control will conduct operations up to 180 days.
Subunified command structure may be considered if the timeframe is extended significantly.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-39
(e) Assign missions that require operations by a uni-Service force to the commander of
that Service component.
(f) Exercise operational control of any foreign national military forces placed under its
jurisdiction; such control, to the maximum extent possible, is to be exercised through a combined command
arrangement.
(g) Will accept command authority over the forces of any beleaguered foreign national
government that agrees to place its military forces under U.S. military jurisdiction. That nation relinquishes
command and control of those forces until it is in a position to resume direction and support of its own
forces.
(h) Maintain and, in conjunction with Department of State, renegotiate bilateral
agreements for establishing basing rights and support facilities which now exist with Oman, Egypt, and
Kenya.
(i) In countries without status of forces agreements, civil affairs will be a national
responsibility except in combat zones occupied by U.S. forces. Those combat areas will be turned over to
national governments concerned as soon as the tactical situation permits.
(j) Effect coordination with:
1. Other DOD commanders to ensure a positive and clearly defined
understanding regarding geographic and functional assignments of responsibility.
2. Commanders of adjacent areas under DOD jurisdiction in all matters
concerning delineation of respective areas of responsibility.
(k) Each USCENTCOM component commander:
1. Will employ the forces of his component.
2. Provides logistic and administrative support to all U.S. forces assigned to his
component.
3. Provides logistic support, less Class I, to all allied forces placed under
operational control of his component.
(6) USCENTCOM Assigned Regional Tasks:
(a) Specific task assignments for USCINCCENT are listed in Table V-3A. All common tasks that
are listed in Table V-2 are to be included in these plans.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-40
TABLE V-3A
USCENTCOM ASSIGNED REGIONAL TASKS (RT)
CINC TASK
PLAN TASK
ASSUMPTIONS
SUPPORTING CINCS
RT-1 Prepare an OPLAN
for the unilateral support
of Saudi Arabia/Kuwait in
case of aggression and in
support of U.S. interests.
OPLAN
R-1, R-2, R-3, R-4, R-5,
R-6
USCINCACOM
USCINCEUR
USCINCPAC
USCINCSOC
USCINCTRANS
USCINCSPACE
USCINCSTRAT
RT-2 Prepare an OPLAN
for the unilateral support
of Egypt in case of
aggression and in support
of U.S. interest.
OPLAN
R-1, R-2, R-3, R-4, R-5,
R-6
USCINCACOM
USCINCEUR
USCINCPAC
USCINCSOC
USCINCTRANS
USCINCSPACE
USCINCSTRAT
CONPLAN
(omitted)
(omitted)
RT-3 Prepare a
CONPLAN.....
(7) USCINCCENT Regional Force Tables: Regional forces apportioned for planning are listed in
Table V-3B.
TABLE V-3B
USCENTCOM FORCES APPORTIONED FOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY
PLANNING
ARMY FORCES (ARCENT)
IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)
ARMOR CAVALRY REGIMENT (FWD) (1)
AUGMENTATION FORCES (USACOM/FORSCOM)
CORPS HQ (2)
CORPS ARTILLERY HQ (2)
CORPS COMBAT SUPPORT (2)
CORPS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (2)
LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION (1)
MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION (2)
ARMOR DIVISION (2)
AIR ASSAULT DIVISION (1)
ARMOR CAVALRY REGIMENT (1)
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (1)
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE (6)
AVIATION BRIGADE (2)
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BRIGADE (1.3)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-41
NAVY FORCES (NAVCENT)
IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)
CARRIER BATTLE GROUP (CVBG) (1)
FLEET SUPPORT SERVICE GROUP (FSSG) (1)
AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON (PHIBRON) (1)
SSN w/DRY DECK SHELTER (1)
AUGMENTATION FORCES (USACOM/USPACOM)
CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS (CVBG) (4)
SURFACE ACTION GROUP (SAG) (2)
ASW PATROL SQUADRON (VP) (1)
MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUP (1)
FLEET SERVICES SUPPORT (0.3)
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP (PLT1BGRU) (1)
AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON (PHIBRON) (1)
MARINE FORCES (MARCENT)
IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT SPECIAL OPERATION CAPABLE (MEUSOC) (1)
AUGMENTATION FORCES (USACOM/USPACOM)
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB) (AMPHIBIOUS) (1)
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MPF) (1)
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (1)
AIR FORCE FORCES (CENTAF)
IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)
AWACS AIRCRAFT\E-3A (4 A/C)
TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQUADRON\C-130 (2)
AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY DETACHMENT (1)
AUGMENTATION FORCES (CONUS BASED/ACC/TRANSCOM)
FIGHTER SQUADRONS\F-117 (2)
FIGHTER SQUADRONS\F-15C (6)
FIGHTER SQUADRONS\F-15E (5)
FIGHTER SQUADRONS\F-16 (11
FIGHTER SQUADRONS\A-10 (6)
BOMBER SQUADRONS\B-1 (1)
BOMBER SQUADRONS\B-2 (6 A/C)
BOMBER SQUADRONS\B-52 (2)
EA-6B-USN/USAF SQUADRONS (2)
ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES SQUADRON\EC-130 (1)
AWACS AIRCRAFT\E-3A (2 A/C)
ABCCC (1 A/C)
TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQUADRONS\C-130 (4)
AIR REFUELING DETACHMENT\KC-135 (6)
AIR REFUELING DETACHMENT\KC-10 (2)
AERO RESCUE AND RECOVERY SQUADRON (RESERVE/ANG) (1)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-42
SPECIAL FORCES (SOCCENT)
IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)
SPECIAL FORCES BN(-) (1)
SOF THEATER NSWTU (1)
JSOTF HQ (1)
AUGMENTATION FORCES (USSOCOM)
JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPS TF (1)
JOINT CA/MILITARY OPS TF (JCAMOTF) (1)
AFSOF SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP (2)
AFSOF WING AUGMENTATION (6 SQDNS) (1)
RANGER BN (1)
d. USCINCPAC
Omitted
e. USCINCSO
Omitted
f.
USCINCSOC
Omitted
g. USCINCSPACE
Omitted
h. USCINCSTRAT
Omitted
i.
Omitted
USCINCTRANS
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-V-43
SECTION VI
GLOBAL PLANS
1. AUTHORITY. Execution authority for all plans rests with the NCA.
2. GENERAL. The focus for current military (except for nuclear) planning no longer centers on global
conflict but on regional contingencies. The base case family of plans will be retained, but put aside until
further notice. No work will be done on base case planning until notification.
3. RECONSTITUTION. Reconstitution is designed to increase our combat capability by creating new
forces. New units would be created beyond existing force capabilities to meet possible emergency
situations or major new threats. Reconstitution will occur in the range between full mobilization and the
upper bonds of total mobilization. Reconstitution is a key ingredient in our post-Cold-War military strategy
to deal with a resurgent global threat.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-VI-45
SECTION VII
CONCLUSION
1. GENERAL. The world has changed in many dramatic ways recently. The national military strategy
reflects those changes, with the shift in focus to regional planning and flexible planning offering more
options for decision-makers. Forces must be ready to move from CONUS or forward-deployed locations
to the scene of a crisis able to mass overwhelming force and terminate conflict swiftly and decisively. The
strategy recognizes the very positive developments in the former Soviet Union and acknowledges the
changes brought about through the arms control process.
2. PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY. It is the intention of the IJSCP to offer guidance that will lead
to plans that are balanced between the details necessary for specific contingencies and the breadth
required for unknown or unforeseen contingencies that may be necessary during execution.
3. PLANNING FOR DETERRENCE and WARFIGHTING. The main focus of adaptive planning
and FDOs is deterrence. Although plans must allow for flexibility in deterrent action, they also must
provide for the deployment and employment of decisive force to defeat an adversary should deterrence
fail. The Deploy Decisive Force and counterattack options are focused on warfighting and must not
become graduated responses to an adversary’s military actions.
4. DELIBERATE PLANNING and EXECUTION. Deliberate planning allows commanders and
planners to think through problems that are similar to those that may actually arise. For this reason alone,
the concepts herein and the process that follows will be of great value. This IJSCP implements the new
national military strategy in support of the U.S. national security strategy.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 7-VII-47
CJCSI 1 TO IJSCP
INTELLIGENCE
1. PURPOSE. This CJCSI Instruction contains an Intelligence Estimate Overview and lists essential
elements of information (EEI) required in joint planning. The Intelligence Estimate Overview contains
information to assist planners in developing COAs/CONOPs.
2. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OVERVIEW.
a. The past few years have seen tremendous change in the world political picture. The rapid collapse
of communism has brought about changes that few would have anticipated only a few years ago. These
changes have come so quickly that it has been difficult to predict the impacts of evolving away from a
bipolar world. While the likelihood of conflict on a global scale has been significantly reduced, the change
to a multipolar world has greatly increased the probability of smaller-scale regional conflicts.
b. Without the Soviet Union as a moderating influence on its ex-client states, some nations are less
inhibited in pursuing their own ambitions and goals. Drawing U.S. forces down to the base force level (and
beyond) may be seen by such nations as offering an opportunity for their own expansionist aims.
c. The world is now much less stable than it was only a few years ago. Many of the governments of
less-developed nations have only tenuous grasps on power, and a worldwide economic recession will make
it difficult for them to remain in power. Civil unrest and war are likely in or between a number of nations,
and neighboring nations may be drawn in either to aid participants or settle long-standing regional disputes.
d. The USCENTCOM AOR has been a source of continual problems in recent history. It is a region
marked by contrasts and political instability. It is the seat of two major religions. It sits between the
impoverished nations of Africa and the uncertain awakening of the far Eastern nations. These factors will
continue to shape the political landscape of the region in the coming years
e. The following questions can assist strategists and operational planners when developing course of
action/concepts of operation:
(1) With the demise of the Soviet Union having run its course and the CIS now beginning to assert
itself abroad, how will U.S. interests in the region be affected?
(2) What are the prospects for long-term or sustained U.S. military presence in the region?
(3) What are the likely potential conflicts in the region?
(4) How will political instability in the region affect U.S. interests?
(5) With the political instability in the region, where is the United States likely to be forced to
conduct NEO?
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3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI).
a. EEI listed below depict the type of information that would come from the Joint Staff. This
information requires continual updating to assess enemy military capabilities, vulnerabilities, and area
characteristics; receive advance warning of attacks; carry out initial wartime operations; and fulfill the
intelligence requirements of higher authority.
b. Essential elements of information (EEI) for USCENTCOM area of responsibility are as follows:
(1) CIS
(a) Where and under what conditions would the CIS commit its own forces?
(b) What are the military objectives, strategies, and vulnerabilities of the CIS?
(c) What are the CIS estimates of the U.S. military objectives, strategies, capabilities, and
vulnerabilities?
(2) OTHER COUNTRIES
(a) Will any country, acting separately or in concert with other powers, initiate combat
operations?
(b) What countries are most capable of pursuing independent military courses of action? Under
what circumstances and to what extent?
(c) What countries are most susceptible to being brought into the U.S. sphere of influence?
(d) What pro-free world or neutral countries are most susceptible to outside influences?
(e) In what countries of strategic importance to the United States do conditions of incipient
insurgency exist?
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TABLE 1
PROSPECTS FOR USCENTCOM NEO l99X-20XX
COUNTRY/AREA
AFGHANISTAN
BAHRAIN
DJIBOUTI
EGYPT
ERITREA
ETHIOPIA
IRAN
IRAQ
JORDAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
OMAN
PAKISTAN
QATAR
SAUDI ARABIA
SEYCHELLES
SOMALIA
SUDAN
UAE
YEMEN
THREAT LEVEL
123456789
4
8
6
6
4
5
2
2
5
6
8
8
4
7
7
8
1
2
8
3
COMMENTS
NOTE: Threat level scale starts with 1 as the highest threat and decreases to 9 as the lowest.
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CJCSI 2 TO IJSCP
LOGISTICS
1. GENERAL.
a. Purpose. This annex contains policy and guidance for the conduct of logistics operations in
combatant commands and joint task forces (JTFs).
b. Policies outlined are consistent with published joint publications and directives. NOTE: Joint Pub
4.0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, and subordinate publications in the 4.0 series
should be used as appropriate.
c. Each Service is responsible for the logistics support of its own forces except when logistics
support is otherwise provided for by agreements.
d. Combatant commanders will do the following:
(1) Exercise directive authority in logistics to ensure economy and efficiency of operations and to
eliminate duplication and overlapping of operations. This does not release the Services from their
responsibilities to man, equip, train, and sustain their Service components.
(2) Review reports, budgets, and requirements of Service components for adequacy, as required,
consistent with Service directives.
(3) Coordinate priorities and programs to use supplies, facilities, and personnel effectively within
the theater.
(4) Coordinate the total logistic effort through Service components and other subordinate
commands.
(5) Allocate common-user resources to components and subordinate commands.
(6) Establish joint boards and offices at the combatant command level to ensure economy and
efficiency of operations.
(7) Establish coordination with other DOD supporting commands.
(8) Make maximum use of inter-Service support and common/cross-servicing agreements to
eliminate unnecessary duplication.
(9) Establish policies within the command in functional areas of logistics to ensure economy and
efficiency of operations consistent with existing joint publications.
(10) Assume temporary operational control of all logistic forces in case of an emergency,
consistent with Joint Pub 0-2.
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e. Component commanders will do the following:
(1) Component commanders are responsible for logistics support of their forces and direct
communications with appropriate headquarters on all supply matters. Component commanders will keep
the CINC informed of the status of supply matters affecting readiness of the force.
(2) Furnish logistics support of assigned forces within the command except as already done by
common/cross-servicing.
(3) Forward logistic requirements to the combatant commander when directed.
(4) Communicate directly with appropriate Service departments on all logistic matters except
those the unified commander directs to be forwarded through him.
(5) Identify logistic forces required to support operation planning.
(6) Use standard Service planning factors as outlined in approved publications except as otherwise
directed.
(7) Furnish qualified personnel to serve on joint boards and offices.
f. Other Subordinate Commands. Logistic responsibilities of subunified commands and joint task
forces and their assigned components parallel those of the combatant command. Service components of
subordinate commands will communicate uni-Service requirements through the Service components of the
combatant command and not directly to the appropriate Service department.
2. SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION.
a. General
(l) Supply responsibilities of the combatant commander and assigned components follow those
outlined in paragraph l.
(2) Maximum use will be made of common/cross-servicing to eliminate duplication.
(3) Priorities for critical materiel will be established by the combatant commander.
(4) Standard Service planning factors will be used but may be modified to more accurately reflect
situational considerations.
(5) Theater supply levels will be established at 30 days for all classes of supply except Class III.
(See paragraph 2b.) Requests for variations from this policy must be approved by the Joint Staff.
Time-phasing of supplies into the theater will be established by the combatant commander.
(6) Standard requisitioning procedures will be established by Service components within the
theater as soon as practical.
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(7) Supplies will be given to forces of allied nations and indigenous personnel only as directed by
higher authority. Emergency authority may be granted by the combatant commander.
b. Petroleum, oils, and lubric ants
(1) A Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) will be established by the combatant commander to
coordinate petroleum supply requirements within the theater.
(2) Combatant commanders will monitor petroleum supply levels in the theater and submit
requirements for bulk fuels and packaged products under procedures established by the Defense Fuel
Supply Center.
(3) To the extent practical, management of POL will be assigned to a single Service within the
theater.
(4) Service components are responsible for determining POL requirements for assigned forces.
(5) Theater level of supply for petroleum products is established at 15 days.
c. Procurement. The combatant commander will coordinate all procurement activities within the
theater to ensure that Service competition for limited resources is minimized. A Joint Procurement
Coordinating Board may be established within the policies outlined in Joint Pub 4-01.
3. MAINTENANCE.
The combatant commander is responsible for coordinating maintenance within the command. The
Services will attain a self-sufficient military capability and capability for direct maintenance support to their
tactical elements. Where practical and without jeopardizing military effectiveness of tactical units,
maintenance facilities for joint use should be established.
4. MEDICAL SERVICES.
a. The combatant commander will establish policies and procedures for a coordinated medical
service program within the theater.
b. Service components are responsible for furnishing medical services to assigned forces except as
already done by inter-Service support agreements or directed by higher authority.
c. To the maximum extent feasible, joint use of medical facilities will be encouraged to avoid
duplication.
d. A Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) will be established as outlined in Joint Pub 4-0.
e. Non-U.S. medical facilities will be used only in extreme emergencies.
f. Treatment of foreign nationals will be authorized only when considered essential by the combatant
commander and will consist of minimum emergency care.
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g. For planning, a 60-day intertheater evacuation policy will be the objective. Modification of this
policy is authorized for contingencies when medical capabilities do not permit reasonable implementation.
Combatant commands will recommend intertheater evacuation policy if deviation from that planning is
necessary.
h. Maximum use will be made of air evacuation.
i. Standard Service planning factors will be used but may be modified to more accurately reflect
situational considerations.
5. MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION.
a. The combatant commander will allocate common-user transportation and assign priorities. Service
component commanders will supply resources as directed.
b. For operations planning, the combatant commander will consolidate and submit movement
requirements to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to facilitate strategic movement planning.
c. USTRANSCOM Transportation Component Commands (TCCs)
(1) The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is responsible for military traffic, land
transportation, and operation of common-user ocean terminals in CONUS.
(2) The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for furnishing military common-user sea
transportation services.
(3) The Air Mobility Command (AMC) is responsible for furnishing common-user airlift services.
(4) Control of the TCC is under USTRANSCOM and is outside the scope of the combatant
commander.
(5) The combatant commander will establish liaison with TCCs when they are supporting the
combatant command mission.
(6) Support to TCCs will be given by the combatant command as required. Requests for support
will be initiated by the TCC and forwarded to the appropriate commander.
d. Standard Service planning factors will be used but may be modified to more accurately reflect
situational considerations.
e. A Joint Transportation Board (JTB) will be established by the combatant commander to
coordinate theater transportation requirements.
f. Strategic Mobility. Transportation resources allocated for planning from DOD agencies are
outlined in CJCSI Instruction 10.
g. Responsibility for establishing and operating port facilities rests with the using component or, in the
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case of multiple users, the Service with the most forces.
6. GENERAL ENGINEERING AND BASE DEVELOPMENT.
a. Requests for negotiation of new or revised agreements for use of bases will be initiated by the
combatant commander when operational or political situations dictate. Requests will be validated by the
Joint Staff.
b. Maximum use will be made of existing facilities in the theater to minimize civil engineering support
requirements.
c. The combatant commander will allocate real estate and facilities consistent with existing
agreements. A joint agency may be established if necessary.
d. The combatant commander will coordinate civil engineering support requirements and establish
centralized control of programs when necessary. Theater civil engineering support programs will be
consistent with approved plans.
e. Construction standards will be held to the lowest level consistent with mission requirements. Only
construction considered operationally essential will be approved for short-term operations.
f.
The combatant commander will establish civil engineering support priorities.
g. Service components will supply resources for completion of civil engineering support programs.
Army and Navy components will normally support Air Force requirements.
h. Service components are responsible for identifying civil engineering support requirements in
support of assigned forces.
i. Contract construction for all Services will be negotiated by the Service designated as construction
agent for the geographic area concerned.
j.
Standard Service planning factors will be used for civil engineering support.
7. AIR AND WATER PORTS.
Non-military air and water ports located outside CONUS are responsibility of the CINC. Each Service
has primary responsibility for coordination of loading/unloading its units.
8. HEALTH SERVICES.
The responsibility for the coordination and integration of health services remains with the CINCs. The
use of joint medical assets will be coordinated by the CINCs to support operational requirements.
9. MORTUARY AFFAIRS.
CINCs are responsible for the search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of
deceased personnel with their AOR. The responsibility applies to allied, third country, enemy dead, and
local populace.
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10. HOST-NATION SUPPORT.
a. CINCs will ensure that proper negotiations for host-nation support is conducted with proper
authorities. This may include but is not limited to the following: air and surface transportation; petroleum,
oils, and lubricants (POL); telecommunications; civilian labor; rear area protection; facilities; contracting;
acquisition of equipment; supplies; services; and medical support.
b. CINCs must coordinate with the host nation for the use of facilities.
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CJCSI 3 TO IJSCP
NUCLEAR
1. PURPOSE.
This annex gives broad guidance to combatant commanders planning for nuclear operations.
2. GENERAL.
Planning for the employment of nuclear weapons requires adherence to the same basic principles and
procedures as for employment of conventional weapons. However, special consideration is necessary to
ensure that these weapons will be used with the utmost discrimination because of their increased
destructive power and wide area coverage. Operation plans developed by combatant commanders will
contain appropriate supporting nuclear plans.
3. RELEASE AUTHORITY.
The decision for U.S. forces to use nuclear weapons rests with the President of the United States.
Following Presidential authority, the combatant commanders exercise the sole authority for release of
weapons within their respective commands. Combatant commanders may further delegate this authority to
major subordinate commanders.
4. NUCLEAR POLICY.
a. Strategic Planning
(1) Planning for the strategic employment of nuclear weapons will be per the National Strategic
Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP). The Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) is an agent for
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who maintains the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS)
to perform targeting and planning functions. The JSTPS develops and maintains the National Strategic
Target List (NSTL), Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), and National Strategic Requirements List
(NSRL).
(2) Combatant commanders will coordinate, through their representatives to the JSTPS, all
operation plans containing nuclear weapon employment options.
b. Tactical Planning
(1) When preparing contingency plans with nuclear weapon employment options, combatant
commanders will comply with the following operational constraints:
(a) Although early nuclear employment will generally not be authorized except in response to
an enemy nuclear attack, the United States retains the right to first use of nuclear weapons.
(b) Every reasonable effort will be made to limit attack in the vicinity of densely populated
areas.
(c) Weapon yields and surface bursts will be limited to those essential to mission
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accomplishment.
5. AUGMENTATION, SUPPORTING, AND DEPLOYING FORCES.
a. Supporting commanders deploying forces in support of or in augmentation of supported
commanders will ensure that such forces are deployed with their full nuclear delivery system capability.
b. Nuclear weapons allocation, handling, and storage will be per approved plans.
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CJCSI 4 TO IJSCP
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
1. PURPOSE.
This annex gives information and guidance for use by combatant commanders during joint
psychological operations (PSYOP) planning.
2. GENERAL.
a. The Secretary of State has responsibility for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of
interdepartmental psychological activities of the U.S. government in overseas areas. PSYOP policies will
be disseminated through U.S. Information Agency channels to U.S. Information Service (DISA)
representatives in a host country.
b. In a theater of operations, USIA will furnish representatives to serve on the staff of the combatant
commander to advise and guide military PSYOP planners.
c. Combatant commanders will control the execution of all psychologic al warfare operations under
the policy guidance of the Department of State.
d. When U.S. combat forces are committed to an overseas operation short of a declaration of war or
at the request of a friendly foreign government, PSYOP will be conducted by the military under the overall
guidance of the U.S. ambassador in country, or the Secretary of State in the absence of a U.S.
ambassador.
e. Where insufficient guidance exists or conflicts arise regarding joint operational employment of
forces, the matter will be referred to the Joint Staff for decision and/or policy guidance.
3. SPECIFIC PLANNING GUIDANCE.
a. All PSYOP plans developed by a combatant commander must stem from national policy and
strategy for a particular country or area.
b. Combatant commanders will ensure the integration of supporting PSYOP plans into the operation
plans.
c. The combatant commander's responsibilities regarding PSYOP planning include the following:
(1) Preparation of PSYOP plans, orders, directives, and requests for support.
(2) Coordination of PSYOP intelligence requirements.
(3) Analysis of target audiences.
(4) Determination of psychological objectives.
(5) Coordination and allocation of PSYOP resources, using available friendly foreign military and
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civilian support and facilities.
(6) Analysis of PSYOP effectiveness.
(7) Giving PSYOP technical support to subordinate and supporting commanders.
(8) Coordinating psychological support requirements with other interested staffs and agencies.
d. In PSYOP planning, particular attention must be paid to enemy courses of action, availability of
indigenous resources, assets of all U.S. agencies, and the time available to produce and pretest PSYOP
information and propaganda materials.
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CJCSI 5 TO IJSCP
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
1. PURPOSE.
This annex gives information and planning guidance regarding special operations within the combatant
command.
2. GENERAL PLANNING GUIDANCE.
a. Combatant commanders will conduct special operations in support of U.S. national interests during
conditions of war and in support of revolutionary uprisings considered appropriate and approved by the
NCA.
b. Coordination and control of special operations will be retained at the highest level possible
consistent with conventional warfare mission, command relationship agreements, and assets available.
c. Combatant commanders will establish a Special Operations Command (SOC) for the conduct of
special operations where elements of two or more Services are assigned or attached. Other governmental
agencies may be included.
d. Subject to any joint support agreements, component commanders are responsible for the
administrative and logistic support of their Service elements assigned to a SOC.
e. Emphasis should be placed on the political, economic, sociological, and psychological conditions in
the human environment that may be exploited to enhance special operations.
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CJCSI 6 TO IJSCP
CHEMICAL WARFARE; NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL DEFENSE; RIOT CONTROL AGENTS; AND HERBICIDES
1. PURPOSE.
This annex gives broad guidance to combatant commanders planning for chemical operations and
biological defense.
2. GENERAL.
The United States no longer employs chemical or biological weapons
3. CHEMICAL POLICY.
a. Plans will not be made for the use of chemical weapons and such weapons will not be used.
b. All U.S. forces will be trained, equipped, and supplied for chemical defense operations.
c. All operation plans will include defensive measures to be used if chemical weapons are employed
by the enemy.
4. BIOLOGICAL POLICY.
a. Plans will not be made for the use of biological weapons and such weapons will not be used.
b. All U.S. forces will be trained, equipped, and supplied for biological defense operations.
c. All operation plans will include defensive measures to be used if biological weapons are employed
by the enemy.
5. AUGMENTATION, SUPPORTING, AND DEPLOYING FORCES.
Supporting commanders deploying forces in support of or in augmentation of supported
commanders will ensure that such forces are deployed with their full chemical protective system
capability.
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CJCSI 7 TO IJSCP
GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND SERVICES
1. PURPOSE. (The Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) CJCSI to the IJSCP)
a. Provides planning guidance to the CINCs; the Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA); and Chiefs of the Services regarding MC&G support to U.S. and allied military operations.
b. Assigns MC&G tasks to the CINCs; the Chiefs of the Services; and the Directors, NIMA and
DIA.
c. Indicates the capabilities of the DOD MC&G community to support projected military
requirements during the IJSCP timeframe.
2. PLANNING GUIDANCE.
a. The MC&G annexes to OPLANS drive requirements for MC&G products and services.
Guidance on preparation, format, and content of MC&G annexes is provided in Joint Pub 5-03.1.
b. Available standard maps, charts, digital products, and related materials are identified in NIMA
catalogs. Data bases for geodetic and geophysical surveys, and other MC&G-related source materials are
also maintained by NIMA.
c. Requirements for these standard NIMA MC&G products are formally established and submitted
by the CINCs, Services, and other Defense agencies and published by NIMA.
d. NIMA provides an evaluation of the adequacy of the standard products available to fulfill
validated requirements.
e. Many areas of the world are not covered by a NIMA or co-producer large-scale (1:50,000 scale)
map, and available maps may not be current or accurate enough to satisfy operational requirements.
NIMA has co-production agreements to produce and exchange maps, charts, and digital products with
many nations. NIMA provides CINCs with substitute foreign or commercial map products for contingency
planning purposes.
f. New and revised MC&G products are normally provided to operational units automatically
through subscriber accounts established at NIMA using their DODAACs. These products are obtained
for normal operations, planning, and unit-held MC&G contingency stocks for initial operations in
accordance with Service MC&G doctrine and OPLANS. More copies of MC&G products can be
obtained for normal operations, contingency planning, or crisis situations.
g. NIMA holds prepositioned MC&G contingency stocks at forward-deployed NIMA offices
overseas and in CONUS depots for operational commands. These stocks generally support sustained
operations prescribed by the Defense Planning Guidance. Transportation to move stocks both intertheater
and intratheater must be planned in advance by the CINCs and their component commands. Movement
requirements for stocks will be in OPLAN TPFDDs.
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h. Requirements for new or modified MC&G products and services and the geographic areas to
which they pertain must be identified early in the planning cycle and documented in the appropriate
OPLANS.
i. In all joint operations, coordinates referenced to the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84) shall
be used. Universal use of the WGS 84 position reference system will eliminate confusion regarding which
system is being used in reporting positions. If some preexisting circumstance precludes using WGS 84, the
CINCs shall coordinate on position reference procedures to be used. When reporting positions, a complete
reference to the source datum for the coordinates must be included in the report and will contain map or
chart producer, series, sheet number, edition, date, and datum for all coordinates derived from maps, charts
or cartographic products.
j. For combined operations, CINCs will coordinate with allied commands on position reference
procedures to be used. WGS 84, with appropriate transformations for the local datum, is recommended to
ensure commonality between all forces involved. Datum references must be given close attention due to
the wide variety of datums used by other countries to complete their maps and charts or derive
coordinates.
3. TASKS to UNIFIED COMMANDS. CINCs will:
a. Prepare MC&G annexes to their OPLANS IAW Joint Pub 5-03.1 with provisions for using
survey ships of the Navy and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) when
transferred to CINC operational control.
b. Maintain, within their headquarters, the staff capability to direct command MC&G activities.
c. Coordinate all applicable MC&G programs and activities with NIMA, and advise NIMA when the
command has excess production capabilities.
d. Maintain a capability to distribute MC&G materials to assigned forces and maintain contingency
stocks.
e. Validate and submit MC&G area, product, and service requirements of their commands to NIMA.
f.
Assess the responsiveness of NIMA to their operational needs.
4. NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY SUPPORT.
As a combat support agency, NIMA is responsible for providing a wide variety of MC&G products,
services, and training in direct support of the unified commands, their component commands, the Services,
and other Defense and Federal agency users. As program manager for the DOD MC&G program,
NIMA is responsible for data collection, production, storage, training, international cooperation, and other
associated functions such as participating in the distribution process.
5. SERVICE SUPPORT TO THEATER COMMANDER.
a. General. The capabilities addressed in this section are Service activities dedicated to support
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commanders in theaters of operation. They complement NIMA capabilities and support.
b. Army. The Army provides tailored topographic products and services in support of its own combat
operations. Although some Army topographic forces may be assigned joint Service support responsibilities
by the unified command within whose area they operate, the configuration and size of these forces depend
on force allocation rules tied to supported Army forces. Army topographic units have the capabilities to:
(1) Prepare terrain analysis type products reflecting mobility and countermobility, intervisibility,
etc., to support tactical operations.
(2) Analyze effects of terrain and weather on combat operations and weather system
performance.
(3) Produce both map and image-based graphics, photomaps, and expedient revisions to standard
maps.
(4) Establish third- or higher-order survey control points for ground control.
(5) Store, maintain, and distribute standard and nonstandard MC&G products.
c. U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy MC&G program provides support to the theater commanders through
NIMA products. Operational control of Navy assets belongs to the theater commander where surveys are
being conducted. Tactical control is delegated to NAVOCEANO, who recommends ship deployment to
the Military Sealift Command. In time of national emergency, Navy assets provide direct CINC support in
whatever role required.
d. U.S. Marine Corps. The mission of the topographic platoons is to supplement normal mapping
sources, to establish primary ground control points in support of force units, and to collect coast and
landing-beach data during peacetime and limited mobilization. The Marine Corps topographic platoons
have the capability to:
(1) Prepare multicolor map substitutes and photomaps.
(2) Conduct third- and lower-order geodetic ground-control surveys and establish primary
ground-control points.
(3) Maintain original geodetic data (trig lists) of all primary ground-control points established by the
platoon.
(4) As independent survey teams, collect coast and beach data in support of amphibious
operations and, when required, assist NAVOCEANO in hydrographic survey activities.
(5) Accomplish terrain analysis activities as required.
e. U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Air Force possesses no organic production capacity or resources for
mapping; however, they have the capability to produce points for targeting.
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CJCSI 8 TO IJSCP
COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE
1. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this annex is to give information and guidance to combatant commanders on
counter-C3 planning.
2. OBJECTIVE.
The objectives of counter-C3 are to destroy enemy C3, disrupt the enemy’s communications, deceive
the enemy as to the true situation, and deny information to the enemy commanders.
3. GENERAL.
Counter-C3, supported by intelligence, integrates the various approaches having the common goal of
reducing the effectiveness of opposing C3 capabilities.
4. PLANNING GUIDANCE. Counter-C3 planning should be accomplished for at least the following
operations:
a. Campaigns and combat operations
b. Crisis-related operations
c. Reconnaissance and surveillance
d. Logistic movements
e. Deployments
f.
Demonstrations and shows of force
g. Exercises
5. COORDINATION.
Counter-C3 planning requires detailed integrating throughout all phases of the deliberate planning
process.
6. RESPONSIBILITY.
Combatant commanders are responsible for counter-C3 planning needed to ensure mission
accomplishment. The counter-C3 estimate will summarize counter-C3 objectives and concepts critical to
successful execution.
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CJCSI 9 TO IJSCP
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS
1. PURPOSE.
This annex gives information and guidance to combatant commanders on joint command, control, and
communications support; responsibilities; and procedures.
2. GENERAL.
a. The required communications capability will come from the Defense Communications System
(DCS), other National Communications System operating agency systems, or other DOD communications
systems (tactical and special purpose). Regardless of the source, communications personnel furnished to a
commander will be under his operational control and will be an integral part of his command and control
system.
b. It is imperative that communications and ADP systems be compatible with and make maximum
use of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).
c. The Joint Staff, through the combatant commands, the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA), and the military Services, will ensure that the commander at each echelon has the
communications necessary to accomplish the assigned mission.
3. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.
a. National Communications System (NCS)
(1) NCS encompasses the DCS and selected communications assets of the Department of State,
Federal Aviation Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, General Services
Administration, Departments of Commerce and Interior, Federal Communications Commission, U.S.
Information Agency, and Department of Energy.
(2) The objective of the NCS is to ensure that the important federal telecommunications resources
are so interlinked that the aggregate will function as a single system.
(3) The Secretary of Defense is the executive agent for the NCS and the Director, DISA, is the
manager, NCS.
b. Defense Communications System (DCS)
(1) DCS is a single worldwide complex comprising a composite of certain DOD communications
systems/networks under the management, control, and operational direction of the DISA. DCS includes all
nontactical, long-haul, point-to-point, and switched network telecommunications facilities, personnel, and
materiel within DOD.
(2) Organic facilities of the field armies, fleets, air forces, and fleet Marine forces, posts, camps,
bases, stations, and air defense facilities are excluded.
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c. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
(1) The DISA is an agency of DOD under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of
Defense, responsive to CJCS and combatant command C-3 requirements. The agency supports worldwide
DCS through subcommands and DISA field organizations located with combatant commands and at major
military and governmental population centers.
(2) Combatant command, subordinate command, and JTF nontactical communications support,
including command and control, operations intelligence, weather, logistics, and administrative functions, is
offered through the DCS facilities and managed by the DISA field organizations. DISA field organizations
further serve as the points for integration of the station/tactical communications excluded in paragraph b(2)
into the worldwide communications system.
4. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
a. Chiefs of DISA field organizations and Service component commanders respond to the
operational needs of the combatant commanders.
b. Combatant commanders will develop agreements that clearly delineate their relationships with
DISA field organizations within their areas of responsibility.
c. Combatant commanders have command authority over the Service operating elements of the DCS
through the Service component commander. DISA field organizations exercise operational direction over
the DCS operating elements. Hence, the operating elements are subject to authoritative direction from
different sources. To avoid conflict, combatant commanders will exercise combatant command in the
direct operation of DCS by expressing their DCS operational requirements to the senior DISA field
organization serving their area of responsibility.
d. Combatant commanders are authorized to assume temporary operational control of the DISA field
organization and DCS within their assigned geographic areas in case of a major emergency.
e. The authority and responsibilities of the combatant commander include control, review, and
coordination of assigned communications resources and/or actions affecting such resources.
f. The combatant commander is responsible for reviewing and coordinating major DCS
communication requirements, projects, systems, networks, and related resources that are initiated within
his command.
g. The combatant commander will designate the points where interface of various communications
services between the DCS and tactical communications system will occur. Such points will normally
include the following:
(1) Component command headquarters.
(2) Joint task force headquarters.
(3) Other subordinate element headquarters directly controlled by the combatant command.
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h. The component commanders have the following common functions and responsibilities in joint
operations:
(1) Furnish communications personnel, equipment, and supplies for the effective performance of
assigned tasks.
(2) Furnish, organize, and train communications personnel for joint operations.
(3) Supply, operate, and maintain command and control facilities organic to their own tactical
forces.
(4) Supply, operate, and maintain assigned facilities of the DCS and terminal equipment of DCS
access circuits.
(5) Furnish, operate, and maintain communications for distress, disaster, emergency, and safety as
directed and per mutual agreements.
(6) Offer the capability of meeting the DCS interface standards.
(7) Cooperate with and assist other Services in the accomplishment of their communications
functions.
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CJCSI 10 TO IJSCP
MOBILITY
SECTION I — GENERAL INFORMATION
1. Purpose. Provide mobility planning guidance to support regional planning tasks assigned in the IJSCP.
2. Scope. CJCSI 10, in conjunction with the JOPES transportation reference files provides:
a. Deliberate planning guidance on the use of airlift, sealift, and air refueling assets that may be
planned for use during OPLAN development in support of IJSCP tasking.
b. The characteristics and capabilities of individual types of strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and air
refueling assets for deliberate planning.
3. Movement Planning Guidance. USTRANSCOM-controlled common-user lift is the pool of
strategic transportation assets, either government owned or chartered, that are under the operational
control of AMC, MSC, or MTMC for the purpose of providing, in peace and war, common-user
transportation to the Department of Defense. These assets range from common-user organic and/or
chartered commercial assets available day-to-day to a larger pool of common-user assets phased in from
other sources. Lift assets from organic and other sources are delineated in Sections II and III.
4. Apportionment and Allocation of Assets. Airlift, sealift, and air refueling assets are available for
planning as specified in Sections II, III, and IV. CJCS approval of an OPLAN does not guarantee a
specific allocation of airlift, sealift, or air refueling assets for execution. Apportioned levels of mobility
assets are for the deliberate planning and movement support of a particular OPLAN and are based on the
best projections available of expected future capabilities. Specific assets available for actual allocation
during a crisis at some unknown time should be expected to differ somewhat.
5. Transportation Feasibility Criteria. The new JOPES standard model for gross transportation
analysis, JFAST, should be used for the gross transportation evaluation of all OPLANs and Concept
Summaries. Combatant commanders should determine the gross transportation feasibility of their plans’
decisive force response before submitting it to USTRANSCOM for further TPFDD refinement.
6. Interface with JOPES. The mobility planning data presented in this document and the JOPES
transportation reference files are primarily intended for use in conjunction with JFAST for the purpose of
gross transportation feasibility evaluations. Table I-1 lists the two-digit MOBCODES.
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Ref 7-10-77
Table I-1
MOBILIZATION CODE REFERENCE TABLE
Airlift and
and Sealift
MA
MB
MC
MD
OPLAN
Segment
FDO
Early Dep.
Initial Res.
Counterattack
Mob
Guide
None
None
PSRC
Partial
Component
Fleets
AMC, MSC
AMC, CRAF I, MSC, RRF, SRP
AMC, CRAF I, MSC, RRF, SRP
AMC, CRAF I, II, and
III, MSC, RRF, SRP
(1) CRAF Stage I and Stage II aircraft are available for loading at the deployment airfield within
24 hours of notification of commercial carriers. Aircraft in the aeromedical segment of Stage II require an
additional 24 hours for proper configuration. As a guideline for deliberate planning, CRAF Stages I and II
are generally first associated when the PSRC is authorized (usually at the Deploy Decisive Force
response).
(2) CRAF Stage III aircraft are available for loading at the deployment airfield within 48 hours of
notification of commercial carriers. As a guideline for deliberate planning, CRAF Stage III is generally
associated only when Partial Mobilization is authorized. Although these guidelines are considered
appropriate to the intent of adaptive planning response options, CINCs may plan for CRAF as necessary.
SECTION II — INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT MOVEMENT
1. General. This section presents the airlift assets and capabilities available to support time-phased
transportation requirements. The airlift planning factors found in this annex and the JOPES reference files
are provided to assist the planner in developing airlift capability estimates during deliberate planning. These
estimates can be used in making a gross analysis of the airlift feasibility of an OPLAN. For execution
planning, all deliberate planning guidelines and factors must be modified with the most current knowledge
of mission requirements, current lift availability, and the environment in which the operation occurs or is
expected to occur. The general categorization of aircraft as either organic or nonorganic is introduced to
distinguish between assets the U.S. government already owns and can control through internal measures
and those assets that require coordination outside government channels. (All assets require crews to
operate them. All crews for organic assets are within the Active or Reserve military structure; whereas,
all crews for nonorganic assets are outside the Active and Reserve structure.)
2. Sources and Availability of Intertheater Airlift Assets. USTRANSCOM-controlled
common-user airlift assets from organic and other sources are described below:
a. USTRANSCOM-controlled common-user organic aircraft consists of 64 C-5, 15 C-26, and 91
C-141 active inventory aircraft. Half of the aircrews necessary to operate these aircraft are from the
Reserve forces. An additional 40 C-5, 10 C-17, and 50 C-141 aircraft are assigned to either the Air
National Guard or the Air Force Reserve. The total organic USTRANSCOM-controlled airlift fleet is 104
C-5, 46 C-17, and 141 C-141 aircraft. Because of maintenance and other high priority DOD support
missions, not all organic aircraft should be planned to be available to a supported CINC. See Table 2 for
the number of organic military aircraft to be used for deliberate planning. An additional number of KC-10
aircraft may be planned to be available for cargo operations.
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b. CRAF is a program in which the Department of Defense and Transportation augment military
airlift capability with civil aircraft owned by a U.S. entity or citizen. When fully mobilized, the CRAF
provides over 90 percent of the total passenger lift and over 35 percent of airlift cargo. When DOD airlift
requirements, in response to a defense-oriented emergency, exceed USTRANSCOM-controlled organic
military airlift capability, USCINCTRANS may incrementally implement the CRAF (with SecDef
approval) in three stages.
Stage I: Long-range international (LRI) passenger and cargo aircraft. These aircraft may be
activated during smaller scale contingencies when the airlift requirements exceed AMC’s military airlift
capability.
Stage II: Long- and short-range international, aeromedical evacuation and Alaskan section
aircraft. These may be activated to augment AMC’s military airlift capability during a major theater war.
Stage III: Up to a total CRAF capability from all segments. These aircraft may be activated for a
national emergency requiring greater than Stage II capability, up to total mobilization.
Aircraft are allocated in accordance with DOD requirements to a route segment according to
their capabilities. The segments are Long Range International (LRI) (for both cargo and passenger
requirements), Short Range International (SRI) (for both cargo and passenger requirements),
Aeromedical, Domestic, and Alaskan. The Aeromedical segment of CRAF (AECRAF) consists of B-767
aircraft, which are allocated only to Stages II and III of CRAF. The Domestic and Alaskan segments are
not used for deliberate planning of OPLAN support.
3. Application of Airlift Planning Factors. The airlift planning factors in this annex and the JOPES
reference files are provided to assist the planner during deliberate planning to develop airlift capability
estimates. If the supported CINC determines these guidelines are too restrictive, coordinate with the Joint
Staff and USTRANSCOM. These estimates are not constrained by enroute and theater factors but can
be used in making a gross analysis of the airlift feasibility of an OPLAN. Planners should be aware that
these planning factors are based on average performance characteristics and are applicable only for broad
planning purposes. For execution planning, all deliberate planning assumptions and factors must be
modified with the most current knowledge of mission requirements and the environment in which the
operation occurs or is expected to occur. Therefore, it may be necessary to refer to appropriate aircraft
loading manuals in determining detailed capabilities of individual aircraft types to move specific cargo
loads, and ensure the related settings and default values are accurate in mobility models for airlift closure.
AF Pam 10-1403, Airlift Planning Factors, contains planning factors and detailed explanations of the
methodology used in computing airlift capabilities.
a. FDOs developed in response to MTWs and SSCs may include plans for the use of military aircraft
to transport passengers with their accompanying baggage, cargo exclusively, or a mix of
passengers/baggage and cargo. This policy applies to planning for missions departing both CONUS and
non-CONUS locations. This policy also pertains to the movement of medical patients and medical
equipment and supplies (Class VIIIA and VIIIB), and for the return of aeromedical crews and related
equipment to the theaters of operation.
b. During the initial 96 hours, consideration will be given to the impact of AMC essential mission
support movement requirements and the time required for fleet generation of airlift delivery capability to fill
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CINC requirements. AMC mission support, aeromedical evacuation system assets, and aerial port force
positioning requirements must be incorporated within the TPFDD to facilitate development of flow plans
and to maximize aircraft utilization.
c. Planning availability rate for C-5 A/B and C-141 is 12 hours/day/aircraft (45 day surge), and 8
hours/day/aircraft (thereafter). Planning availability rate for C-17 is 15 hours/day/aircraft (45 day surge),
and 12 hours/day/aircraft (thereafter).
d. The average cargo payload for each type of aircraft by type of cargo (bulk, oversize, outsize) that
can be deliberately planned for movement over an indicated distance is listed in JOPES reference files.
Variation in aircraft configurations require that cargo carrying capacities be categorized by aircraft loading
characteristics. Categories are used for broad planning purposes only. Airlift of a specific item of
equipment is governed by the dimensional and floor-loading restrictions of the particular aircraft available.
(For further guidance see AF Pam 10-1403.)
e. For deliberate planning of Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) airlift, the standard
passenger capability of available aircraft will be used. For KC-10 and CRAF cargo aircraft, pallet
subflooring and sufficient cargo straps are required before moving NEO passengers. Three percent of the
total estimated NEO requirements should be used for deliberate planning to estimate the aeromedical NEO
movement requirements. The three percent rate includes 1.5 nonmedical attendants (average) per medical
NEO patient requiring evacuation. The emergency NEO airlift capability by type of aircraft for execution
planning is in Table II-5. These loading figures are based on seating NEO passengers on the cargo
compartment floor of cargo-configured aircraft. Movements under these circumstances are expected to
occur only under extreme emergencies.
f. Aeromedical evacuation (AIREVAC) planning factors for wartime strategic lift of patients can be
found in Table II-6. Intertheater air evaluation in deliberate planning will be accomplished using
backhaul/retrograde missions on apportioned common user C-141s as much as possible. AECRAF
augmentation requires CRAF Stages II or III activation. The numbers of specific types of aircraft and
their characteristics for deliberate planning are listed in the JOPES reference files. In regional planning,
AECRAF augmentation (requiring CRAF Stages II or III augmentation) for strategic AIREVAC is
assumed only for the Deploy Decisive Force or Counterattack; all CRAF aeromedical augmentation
aircraft are assumed available to the supported CINC. For deliberate planning, USCENTCOM will
assume all B767s are extended range aircraft.
g. The basic IJSCP tasks USCINCTRANS to develop strategic mobility FDOs for all geographic
CINCs. As a minimum, for strategic airlift, the following FDOs should be developed:
(1) Assembling and staging USTRANSCOM-controlled airlift assets.
(2) Assembling and staging of CRAF Stages I through III.
(3) Assembling and staging of appropriate allied air assets.
These FDOs will be coordinated and refined during the planning process.
4. Intertheater Airlift Analysis Guidance. The JOPES transportation reference files provide the
planner with a means of developing and testing the gross transportation feasibility of the air movement
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
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portion of an OPLAN. Gross transportation feasibility evaluations should be performed from the earliest
stage of constructing a time-phased arrival sequence of IJSCP apportioned forces. As more forces
(combat/ CS/CSS) and sustainment approximations become known, the gross transportation feasibility
evaluations should become more detailed. At this stage the assistance of USTRANSCOM, with its
in-house systems, may be requested.
After all forces and sustainment requirements are calculated, a refined transportation analysis is
performed by the TCCs. After TCC analysis, if CINCs must accept delayed closures that may negatively
affect their concept of operations, they must provide an impact assessment of these movement shortfalls
on their concept of operations.
Table II-1
Organic USTRANSCOM-Controlled Airlift Assets
W/O dec of Emergency
C-5
C-17
C-141
KC-10
Total
PAA
64
26
91
54
Other
DOD
24
7
50
40
PSRC
C-5
C-17
C-141
KC-10
104
46
141
54
15
7
20
5
39
6
45
29
50
33
76
20
Partial Mobilization
C-5
C-17
C-141
KC-10
104
46
141
54
15
5
20
5
20
5
20
29
69
36
101
20
Full Mobilization
C-5
C-17
C-141
KC-10
104
25
150
54
15
4
10
5
9
1
15
19
80
41
116
30
MAINT
10
7
15
5
Avail for
Planning
30
12
26
9
Table II-2
Organic USTRANSCOM-controlled Airlift Capability for SSCs
USCENTCOM SSC C000-C090
FDO
C5
C-17
Decisive Force
PRSC
Part Mob
11
12
15
30
50
69
C141
55
85
110
KC-10
S/T Per Day
9
20
20
4,964
7,478
9,487
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Ref 7-10-81
Table II-3
Organic USTRANSCOM-Controlled Airlift Capability
for SSCs and NOPLAN Contingencies
Unconstrained
C5
C17
C141
KC-10
S/T Per Day
FDO
30
11
55
10
8,401
Decisive Force
PRSC
Part Mob
50
69
12
15
85
110
20
20
12,695
16,126
FDO
30
11
55
10
6,883
Decisive Force
PRSC
Part Mob
50
69
12
15
85
110
20
20
10,330
13,102
FDO
30
11
55
10
5,877
Decisive Force
PRSC
Part Mob
50
69
12
15
85
110
20
20
8,770
11,112
FDO
30
11
55
10
4,530
Decisive Force
PRSC
Part Mob
50
69
12
15
85
110
20
20
6,830
8,663
FDO
30
11
55
20
3,814
Decisive Force
PRSC
Part Mob
50
69
12
15
85
110
20
20
5,753
7,287
2,500 NM
3,500 NM
4,500 NM
5,500 NM
6,500 NM
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Table II-4
CRAF Assets and Capabilities
USCENTCOM SSC — Apportionment
Cargo
Stage I
LRI
SRI
Aircraft
PAX
Stage I
LRI
SRI
Aircraft
Unconstrained
S/T Per Day
10
0
6,940
0
Unconstrained
PAX Per Day
10
0
4,010
0
CRAF Availability by Activation Stage (planning factors) *
*
AIRFRAME
STAGE I (Cargo/Pax)
STAGE II (Cargo/Pax)
B-747
B-757
B-767
DC-8
DC-10
L-1011
MD-11
4/10
0/3
0/3
3/0
6/7
0/10
6/2
8/20
0/9
0/18
6/0
24/26
0/13
14/15
Planning availability rate for all CRAF aircraft:
CRAF is available 24 hours after activation:
10 hours/day/aircraft (45 day surge).
10 hours/day/aircraft (thereafter).
Table II-5
Emergency NEO Capability
Aircraft Type
C-5
C-17
C-141B
C-130
KC-10
KC-135
B-747-100/200C/200F
DC-10-30CF
DC-89-61/63CF
STAGE III
(Cargo/Pax)
24/43
0/9
0/93
14/0
59/65
0/35
30/24
Emergency Pax Capability
600
300
288
100
427
250
600
500
360
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Ref 7-10-83
Table II-6
Aeromedical Evacuation — General Planning Data
A/C Type
C-141B
C-130
C-9
B-767
Patient
Planning
Factor
70
50
40
100
Load
Time
(min)
Config
Time
(min)
60
30
35
300
90
30
40
0
Crew
Composition
Nurse
Tech
2
2
4
4
3
3
6
SECTION III — STRATEGIC SEALIFT
1. General. This section presents information on the sealift assets available to support time-phased
common-user transportation requirements. General information on non-common-user sealift assets is
presented to help delineate their differences. Detailed common-user sealift planning data are located in
JOPES reference files. The estimates on ship types, numbers, capabilities, sources, and apportionments
are judged to be reasonable planning estimates for sealift capabilities for the IJSCP planning period. The
information on sealift assets and associated deliberate planning guidance is provided for estimating gross
transportation feasibility only. The general categorization of ships as either organic or nonorganic is
introduced to distinguish between assets the U.S. government already owns and can control through
internal measures and those assets that require coordination outside U.S. government channels. (NOTE:
As a caution, a too restrictive interpretation of the above general categorizations of organic and nonorganic
should not be made since both categories of assets require civilian crews, and all civilians are outside of
the Active and Reserve military structure and must be gained through implementation of labor contracts.)
2. Sources and Availability of Strategic Sealift Assets
a. The availability of ships for the sealift of cargoes is centered around two principles of who or what
owns the ship and in what nation is the ship registered (its flag). These two precepts, as well as the actions
required to gain control of the ship (by implementing a program, requisitioning, etc.), underlie how and why
the categorization of source is formed and used in planning.
(1) The availability of ships already controlled by the U.S. government (organic) is more easily
predicted than for ships that the government must temporarily charter from the private sector (and/or
coordinate with foreign governments for “free” charters (nonorganic)). For deliberate planning, ships of
U.S. government ownership are further categorized between those already in active service or in reduced
operating status (Source: MSC) and those that first require activation and crewing before they can be used
(Sources: RRF and NDRF).
(2) Privately owned U.S. registered ships, which first must be chartered to gain their use, remain
subject to U.S. law. Foreign flag ships are not subject to U.S. law unless inside U.S. territorial waters.
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Control of a portion of the privately owned U.S. flag ships can be gained by implementing certain
contractual programs (Source: SRP) or, if necessary, control of any U.S. flag ship (including those possible
through SRP implementation) can be gained by means of requisitioning (Source: USNC). For planning,
privately owned and foreign registered ships are further categorized into three sources. The first category
consists of ships that NATO nations (except the United States) have earmarked for only the rapid
reinforcement of Europe (Source: NATO). The second category is a small group of ROK ships restricted
for contingencies involving the Korean Peninsula (Source: KFS). The third category is foreign flag ships
that are majority owned by U.S. citizens or corporations and have a reasonable assurance that the foreign
nations where the ships are flagged will not hinder attempts to enforce U.S. requisitioning law (Source:
EUSC). NATO and KFS ships are expected to be provided to the United States when their particular
situation warrants, while the third category, EUSC, is composed of foreign flagged (and crewed) ships that
are assumed to be subject to requisitioning under U.S. law.
b. Sealift assets used for the deliberate planning of the carriage of common-user requirements in
regional plans tasked by the IJSCP are controlled by USTRANSCOM. Sealift assets used in deliberate
planning for other than common-user requirements, such as the afloat pre-positioning of specific cargoes
(MPS and PREPO), specialized aviation activities (TAVB), or acute medical care (T-AH), are not
controlled through USTRANSCOM channels and are apportioned as forces in Section V of the IJSCP.
Ships of the APF are intended to individually chop to USCINCTRANS after discharge of their pre-loaded
cargoes and release by the supported commander, and are then to participate in the movement of
common-user requirements. Ships of the RRF that have been specifically modified to augment the Navy’s
Combat Logistic Force (CLF) (nine console -capable dry cargo ships, seven modular-delivery capable dry
cargo ships, and two modular delivery capable PAL tanker) have been excluded from the common-user
apportionment of organic ships for the counterattack option. These specifically modified RRF ships are
included in common-user apportionments for FDO and Decisive Force options only.
3. Sources of Common-User Organic Strategic Sealift Assets.
a. MSC Controlled Fleet. U.S. government-owned or American merchant ships under charter to the
U.S. government (i.e. MSC ships) fall into one of three subcategories based on their mission: the Strategic
Sealift Force (SSE) (common-user shipping), Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF), and Special Mission
ships. While MSC retains OPCON of all ships, only SSE ships support common-user requirements under
the auspices of USTRANSCOM. The FSS are one type of ship in the SSE category and are kept in
96-hour reduced operating status (ROS-4). The FSS are lay-berthed on the East and Gulf coasts.
b. Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). This is a special source and category of ships within the NDRF that
provide readily available dry cargo ships (i.e., RO/RO, breakbulk, LASH, SEABEE), tankers, and
passenger ships to augment the movement of strategic common-user requirements. This program also
includes other non-common-user ship categories such as auxiliary crane ships (T-ACS), tankers
configured with an offshore petroleum discharge system (OPDS), and ships for naval CLF augmentation.
All RRF ships are maintained by MARAD with various availability dates (5 to 20 days). Selected RRF
ships are lay-berthed near or in expected ports of embarkation or activation facilities.
c. National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) (minus the RRF). These U.S. government-owned ships
serve as the U.S. strategic reserve capability. The NDRF’s militarily useful assets include World War II
Victory-class breakbulk ships, other dry cargo ships, troopships, and tankers. These ships are located at
three fleet sites — The James River, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; and Suisun Bay, California. These ships
require major industrial shipyard repairs and, therefore, will not be considered for activation until shipyard
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industrial capability has met naval and RRF requirements. They should not be considered for deliberate
planning.
4. Sources of Common-User Nonorganic Strategic Sealift Assets.
a. NATO. Ships committed by individual NATO countries (other than the United States) to augment
U.S. common-user sealift for the rapid reinforcement of Europe by U.S. forces. NATO member nations
have made commitments to provide 400 dry cargo ships for this purpose. To provide a high level of
confidence in the availability of at least 400 dry cargo ships, more ships are nominated than the
commitment requires. Only 400 ships are available for deliberate planning. Tankers capable of carrying
clean products are also nominated toward meeting NATO PAL requirements, and passenger ships are
nominated toward meeting troop requirements (including Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE)) for NATO.
These assets form the NATO Sealift Ships List, which is updated semiannually by PBOS. These assets
would become available only after a North Atlantic Council decision to reinforce NATO.
b. U.S. Flag. All ships owned by U.S. citizens and registered in the United States. This category is
inclusive of ships enrolled in the SRP.
(1) Sea Readiness Program (SRP). Militarily useful active U.S. flag merchant ships that can be
brought under charter to the U.S. government to augment the USTRANSCOM controlled fleet by
invoking the emergency charter clauses of the SRP agreement. SRP enrollment is based on the past and
present financial obligations of shipping companies (and obligates these companies to commit a specified
capability, not specific ships). SRP call-up would occur only after the following successive actions have
been completed:
(a) First, USTRANSCOM determines that SSE capability is insufficient to meet
escalating requirements, even when augmented by voluntary charters from the open charter market (U.S.
and foreign flag) and also when further augmented by activation of the RRF.
(b) Second, the Secretary of Defense determines that the non-RRF portion of the NDRF
cannot be made available in sufficient time or numbers to meet stated requirements.
(c) Finally, the Secretary of Transportation confirms both that sufficient numbers of ships
are available from the SSE, the commercial charter market, and the RRF, based on DOD-provided
requirements and that the adverse economic impact of SRP implementation will not be great enough to
justify requisitioning instead.
(2) USNC. Militarily useful U.S. flag merchant ships that are not enrolled in the SRP, but which
can be requisitioned into government service (primarily for common-user movements) under jurisdiction of
Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. This Act provides that “whenever the President shall
proclaim that the security of the national defense makes it advisable or during any national emergency by
proclamation of the President, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of Transportation to requisition ships or
purchase any vessel or other watercraft owned by citizens of the United States.” Under this authority,
requisitioning of U.S. flagged ships based on known or anticipated requirements could be implemented.
(3) Effective U.S. Control (EUSC). Ships that are majority owned by U.S. citizens or parent U.S.
companies located or incorporated in the United States but registered/flagged in certain specific foreign
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countries for which there are bilateral understandings are manned with foreign crews and are militarily
useful or can be used to support the civil economy. Only militarily useful EUSC ships are listed here. For
planning purposes, there is reasonable assurance that these ships can be requisitioned by the United States
(primarily for common-user movements) under the requisitioning authority of Section 902 of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 cited above.
(4) Foreign Flag. An unknown number of foreign flag ships that may be available at the time of
execution from the open charter market or from “at the moment” foreign nation offerings. Because of the
more significant uncertainty involved than for those categories above, such ships are not planned to be
available for deliberate planning. Ships available from this source would greatly influence decisions about
SRP call-up and other actions at execution.
5. Programs of Non-Common-User Strategic Sealift.
a. Afloat Preposition Forces (APF). A force consisting of two major components: the Maritime
Pre-positioning Force (MPF) and the Pre-positioning (PREPO) ships. Although there are similarities, each
serve different Services’ requirements and should not be thought of as a single entity. In both cases, the
Services are responsible for the maintenance of all prepositioning cargoes, and any conflicts concerning
apportionment of these ships after USCINCTRANS assumes control will be resolved by the JCS Joint
Transportation Board.
b. Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVB). Two T-AVBs provide dedicated sealift for movement
of a USMC aviation intermediate activity (organic to deploying units) to support the rapid deployment of a
MAGTF aviation combat element. T-AVBs are designed to provide Intermediate Maintenance Activity
support at the destination. Complete offload and release to USTRANSCOM for common-user movements
is not envisioned.
c. Hospital Ships (T-AH). Two T-AHs (1,000-bed afloat hospitals each) provide afloat health care
facilities in support of amphibious task forces, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force elements, and forward
deployed Navy elements of the fleet and fleet activities. T-AH operations are critical during combat when
hospital facilities have not been established ashore.
6. Special Strategic Sealift Features.
a. All refined POL products (e.g., military specification fuels), especially aviation grade fuels, must
be carefully transported to prevent contamination. Tankers may have coated or uncoated tanks. All
tankers capable of carrying a range of clean POL products are considered militarily useful. Before the
movement of any aviation grade fuel, a tanker must meet much more stringent standards. The availability
of tankers listed in the JOPES ASSETS file accounts for probable cleaning delays. Changing patterns in
the U.S.-tanker fleet inventory indicate a continuing decline in the number of handy-size, small,
shallowdraft tankers (see tanker categories below). This development requires specific plans to employ
the remaining larger tankers. Such planning should consider the standard commercial practice of using
light-loaded, medium-to-large tankers, and lighterage, to carry POL transferred from larger tankers
through shallow-draft ports. Militarily useful tankers are divided into five categories:
Tanker Type
Shallow-draft
Small
Handy-size
Barrel Capacity
50,000 or less
50,001 - 180,000
180,001 - 235,000
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Medium
Large
235,001 - 320,000
320,001 - or greater
b. At the supported CINC’s discretion, selected USTRANSCOM-controlled tankers made available
for point-to-point movement of common-user requirements may be planned for underway replenishment
(CONSOL) of fleet oilers (i.e., temporary CLF augmentation). The supported commander’s TPFDD will
specify CONSOL requirements by fuel type, quantity, EAD, LAD, and ocean area (GEOLOC) in nonunit
POL records.
c. The total inventory of passenger ships available for planning is 26. This number comprises 3
NDRF, 2 RRF, 2 U.S.-flag, 7 EUCS, and 12 NATO assets. The Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE) can
be supported by assets drawn from all sources apportioned common-user assets.
d. The basic IJSCP tasks USTRANSCOM to develop strategic mobility FDOs for all geographic
CINCs. As a minimum, for strategic sealift, the following FDOs should be developed:
(1) Assembling and staging terminal transportation units.
(2) Assembling and staging USTRANSCOM- controlled sealift assets, including readying and
staging the FSS.
These FDOs will be coordinated and refined during the planning process.
7. Strategic Sealift Support to an AFOE. An Amphibious Task Force (ATF) is a task organized force
which includes Navy forces and a Marine Landing Force (LF). A Marine LF is composed of two integral
echelons: the Assault Echelon (AE) and the Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE). Each echelon is planned
to be carried by separate groups of ships. The first echelon, the AE, is composed of assault troops,
vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies required to initiate the assault. Except under extraordinary
conditions, this echelon is exclusively carried and supported by Navy amphibious assault ships. The Navy
possesses sufficient amphibious assault ships to transport only the AE of two MEBs while maintaining the
forward presence of one deployed MEU and ARG Bravo. The second echelon, the AFOE, also composed
of assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies, is required to support and sustain an already
initiated assault in the AOA and, in order to accomplish its purpose, is normally required within five days
after the initiation of the assault landing. Some AFOE forces and materials may, however, be required to
arrive simultaneously with the AE and offload sooner than D+4. Planned merchant ship support for an
AFOE will be based on the number and capability of USTRANSCOM- controlled common-user ships
capable of offloading in the stream, and which have been coordinated between the supported CINC and
USTRANSCOM for dedication to this mission. The supported CINC will list in Annex D of the OPLAN
the number, type, capability, SPOE, and required availability relative to C-day of formerly common-user
ships coordinated with USTRANSCOM for planned support. The ships required to transport an AFOE
will be deleted from the common-user sealift file used for evaluating the supported CINC’s common-user
sealift requirements.
8. Application of Strategic Sealift Planning Factors.
a. The notional sealift planning factors, except ship draft and ship length, located in the JOPES
ASSETS and CHSTR reference files are simple arithmetic averages based on the aggregated individual
characteristics of actual ships in a specific ship category (e.g., fast breakbulk) given a specific type of
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contingency (e.g., contingencies with partial mobilization). The ship draft and length planning factors
represent the maximum draft and length existing within a ship category given a specific contingency type.
The speed planning factor is the average speed acquired at design full-load draft using 80 percent of
maximum commercial horsepower on trial with a clean bottom, a smooth sea, and no wind. The average
load and unload rates are only for planning purposes and could differ in actual operations.
b. Strategic common-user sealift capability data for deliberate planning is listed in the ASSETS file
and based on an assigned mobilization code for each adaptive planning element for tasked OPLANs.
Sealift capability is expressed as the number of ships of a specific type from one specific source at the
earliest date (relative to C-day) that are expected to be able to be on-berth and ready to load cargo for
their initial voyage against the matrix of worldwide ports listed below:
(1) East Coast — Norfolk, Virginia
(2) Gulf Coast — New Orleans, Louisiana.
(3) West Coast — Oakland, California.
(4) Hawaii — Honolulu, Hawaii.
(5) Diego Garcia — Diego Garcia.
(6) Greece — Piraeus, Greece.
(7) United Kingdom — Liverpool, United Kingdom.
These data represent only the general patterns and rates of strategic shipping. These patterns and
rates are based on positional “snapshots” taken from naval intelligence data, but do not represent fixed or
actual schedules. The projected availability is only for the purpose of determining a gross movement
capability and should not be applied to specific supplements of the transportation problem, such as the
requirement for berthing space.
c. Several withhold estimates are made during ASSETS file construction to reflect other expected
simultaneous sealift requirements. Withhold estimate categories vary dependent on scenario and source of
ship. Withhold considerations are made for:
(1) Maintenance. A certain percentage of ships are undergoing overhaul or repair at all times.
These ships would not be available for execution and so are not available for planning. A 4 percent
maintenance withhold reflects this expectation.
(2)Economic Support. Support for the civil economy acknowledges that the flow of certain raw
materials to support the industrial base as well as other commodities must continue to flow during wartime.
Raw materials are moved principally by large dry or liquid bulk carriers which, because of the time and
expense required to convert them into militarily useful assets, are not used in deliberate planning.
Containerized subsistence and industrial base support for Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico are drawn
down from militarily useful container ships. This application assumes a certain drawdown of stocks and
assumes the imposition of rationing of defense-related commodities.
(3) DOD Support. Support for worldwide DOD activities other than the primary supported unified
command.
9. Strategic Sealift Analysis Guidance. The methods and sealift planning factors in Annex J and the
JOPES transportation reference files provide the planner with a means for developing and testing the sea
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movement portion of an OPLAN. The JFAST model should be used where available. If JFAST is not yet
available at a given site and if the plan is in TPFDD format, the TFE model is recommended. If, applying
all factors, the plan cannot be supported using apportioned sealift assets and it is not feasible to adjust the
plan’s concept of operations to stay within specified limitations, possible actions the planner may consider
include:
a. Adjusting delivery dates.
b. Switching a portion of the sealift requirement to airlift if residual airlift capability exists.
c. Matching cargo configuration to ship availability. For example, expanded use of containerization
where possible may improve closure times if container vessels are available and other vessel types are
not.
d. Combining the above actions.
Table III-1
Organic USTRANSCOM-Controlled Sealift Assets
Total
Ships
Maintenance
Withholds
Avail. for
Planning
No Mobilization
Dry Cargo
Tanker
13
2
1
1
12
1
PSRC
Dry Cargo
Tanker
42
4
2
1
40
3
Partial Mobilization
Dry Cargo
Tanker
49
10
2
1
47
9
356
84
5
2
351
82
Full Mobilization
Dry Cargo
Tanker
Table III-2
USTRANSCOM-Controlled Sealift Capability
USCENTCOM Region (SSC)
Organic
FDO
No Mobilization
Dry
12
Tanker
1
Capacity (000)
Sq Ft/BBLs
1,139/3,083
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Decisive Force
PSRC
Partial Mobilization
Nonorganic
FDO
No Mobilization
Decisive Force
PSRC
Partial Mobilization
39
5
2
6
5,773/6,360
7,332/13,000
0
0
0/0
13
22
2
6
1,640/2,100
2,775/7,500
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SECTION IV — THEATER AIRLIFT MOVEMENT
1. General. This section presents information on C-130 theater airlift assets for support of theater airlift
planning. CINCs may incorporate additional aviation assets in theater airlift planning only if so apportioned
by Service documents. Detailed C-130 aircraft characteristics are located in the JOPES CHSTR
reference file. Availability of C-130 aircraft assets is based on the apportionment of theater airlift forces
by contingency type. Theater airlift requirements will be documented in supported CINC’s OPLANs and
Concept Summaries.
2. Sources of Theater Airlift Assets. The majority of theater airlift assets consist of military C-130
aircraft. Although these airlift assets do have limited strategic capability, this capability will NOT be
deliberately planned to be used for OPLANs or CONPLANs, concept summary developments, or
TPFDD refinements (except from CONUS to the Caribbean and Central America). Only during
execution planning may this limited strategic capability be incorporated, at the supported CINC’s
discretion, into planning.
3. Application of Theater Airlift Planning Factors. Theater airlift planning factors, JOPES CHSTR
reference file, and data presented in AFP 76-2 are provided to assist the CINC planner in developing
theater airlift capability estimates. Estimates produced from these sources are to be used to make a
general analysis of the theater air-movement feasibility of a contingency response and in determining the
general level of airlift mobilization necessary to support greater levels of required airlift support. Planning
for specific operations must be modified with the best available knowledge of mission requirements and
the environment in which the operation occurs or is expected to occur. Therefore, it will be necessary to
refer to appropriate aircraft and loading characteristics manuals to determine the capabilities of individual
types of aircraft to move specific cargo loads. For theater level planning, the relationship between runway
length, range, average payload, etc., as detailed in AFP 76-2, should be used when estimating theater airlift
capability.
4. Theater Airlift Analysis Guidance. The theater airlift planning factors must be complemented by
those outlined in AFP 76-2. In an operational environment, aircraft capabilities are significantly constrained
by mission profiles, aircraft characteristics, and the exigencies of the tactical situation.
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CJCSI 11 TO IJSCP
CIVIL AFFAIRS
1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this annex is to offer information and guidance on principles,
responsibilities, and authorities for joint planning of civil affairs operations in the combatant commands.
2. GENERAL.
a. The term "civil affairs" has three common usages:
(1) Civil affairs concept — embraces the totality of the relationships of a military commander with
the civilian environment.
(2) Civil affairs operations — obtains for a military commander essential civilia n support and
assists in the attainment of politico-military objectives. This may involve the performance by military forces
in an area of operations of some or all of the functions normally performed by civil government.
(3) Civil affairs organization — consists of staffs and units particularly designed and trained to
supervise and conduct civil affairs operations in support of military forces.
b. Planning for and conducting civil affairs is the responsibility of every echelon of command.
c. Each commander of a military unit, regardless of size or organizational position, must comply with
the applicable provisions of international law, treaties, or agreements with respect to inhabitants,
governments, and economies of occupied, liberated, or host countries.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY. The assignment of responsibilities within the U.S.
government for civil affairs is as follows:
a. The Department of State is the agency primarily charged with the formulation of foreign policy
and has primary or collateral interest in policies concerning
(1) the governments with whom U.S. Armed Forces will deal,
(2) the degree to which commanders of U.S. Forces will intervene in the government of a
particular country,
(3) the level at which the economy of a given country will be maintained by civil affairs operations,
(4) the level of AID support,
(5) matters involving psychological warfare, information, and propaganda, and
(6) plans for turning civil affairs activities over to civilian control.
b. The Department of Defense coordinates with other federal departments and agencies and
prescribes DOD policies affecting civil affairs activities.
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c. The Joint Staff will do the following:
(1) Formulate policies within broad policy guidance obtained from OSD for transmittal to
combatant commanders necessitated by military situations.
(2) Ensure adequate coverage of civil affairs in all joint plans.
(3) Establish a Joint Civil Affairs Committee, if necessary, at the outbreak of hostilities.
d. Combatant commanders' responsibilities:
(1) Plan for the conduct of civil affairs operations that are appropriate in their areas of
responsibility as an integral part of their missions.
(2) Secure, through the Joint Staff, civil affairs units and personnel needed to execute their plans
the same way they secure other forces.
(3) Arrange for political advisers on their staffs, to be obtained from the Department of State.
(4) Ensure the adequacy of civil affairs planning by all subordinate commanders.
(5) Combatant commanders are authorized, but not required, to delegate authority for civil affairs
to one of the Service components of their commands, normally the Army component commander.
e. Services and Service component responsibilities:
(1) The Army will do the following:
(a) Act as executive agent for the Joint Staff for civil affairs planning.
(b) Train and furnish civil affairs units and personnel needed in combatant commands, except
where such responsibility is assigned to other Services.
(c) Furnish to the other Services, at their request, civil affairs personnel as required.
(2) The Navy and/or Marine Corps will do the following:
(a) Train and deploy civil affairs personnel needed to support the operations of the forces,
activities, and facilities of the Navy and Marine Corps.
(b) Furnish specially qualified personnel to the Army as instructors or specialists in the
Department of Army civil affairs training and operational units.
(3) The Air Force will furnish to the Army, as requested, specially qualified personnel for service
in the Department of Army civil affairs training and operational units as instructors or specialists in matters
of primary concern to the Air Force.
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(4) All components will perform missions in the field of civil affairs that are directed by
appropriate authority.
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CJCSI 12 TO IJSCP
MOBILIZATION
NOT PUBLISHED
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CJCSI 13 TO IJSCP
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)
1. PURPOSE. This CJCSI gives informational guidance to combatant commanders for planning joint
operations in support of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).
2. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW includes forces based overseas,
periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, security and
humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts.
a. Ways. Consistent with the NMS, MOOTW operations are categorized as operational training and
deployments, security assistance, protecting U.S. citizens abroad, combating drugs, and humanitarian
assistance.
b. Means. MOOTW operations depend on the collective efforts of all governmental departments and
agencies. Some of the governmental agencies and international organizations that may be involved include
the Departments of State, Justice, and Agriculture; DEA; UN; and NATO. A U.S. ambassador’s country
team is the focal point for coordinating all U.S. governmental agency actions in a particular nation. The
CINC provides the theater focus and interest. The CINC also provides the regional coordination point for
the various military resources employed throughout the theater and closely coordinates with the country
teams to ensure unity of effort.
(1) Maritime Forces. MOOTW of maritime forces demonstrates our ability to protect our
interests, expeditiously respond to crises, avoid burden sharing disputes, and project combat power in the
littoral region. During a crisis, offshore presence demonstrates U.S. interest, commitment, and power
without the potential of putting land-based forces in a crisis region.
(2) Land-Based Forces. The MOOTW of air and ground forces usually connotes a longer
commitment in a region. Forward basing of forces and prepositioning of equipment and supplies facilitate
rapid response and enhance the capability to project forces. Forward bases and access agreement provide
forward staging areas for crisis response, an in-place infrastructure, and often enhance stability.
c. Flexible Deterrent Options. Flexible deterrent options are actions to preempt or precipitate actions
or reactions that may result in the protection of U.S. interest or the promotion of U.S. influence. FDOs
may provide the means to use MOOTW operations to counter instabilities when they threaten national
vital interests before the only alternative is to cross the threshold from peace to conflict.
3. Planning Guidance. MOOTW operations contribute to the deliberate planning process because
through the day-to-day peacetime activities various aspects of operations plans (OPLANs and
CONPLANs) can be validated, procedures and plans developed or refine, and forces can become familiar
with the environment in which they may have to fight.
a. CINCs are not tasked to develop operations plans for MOOTW operations. However, if a CINC
should desire to develop such a plan, it is called a functional plan (uses the concept of a campaign plan).
Campaign planning provides strategic unity of effort through which the CINC guides the planning of joint
operations within their theater of operation. Campaign plans for Military Operations Other Than War
(MOOTW) operations may be designed to facilitate crisis response through the execution of selected
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flexible deterrent options developed during deliberate planning.
4. Planning Considerations. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) operations may include:
a. Support for the accomplishment of theater objectives.
b. Validating plans or portions of plans tasked in the JSCP.
c. Coordinating closely with the country teams.
d. Strengthening U.S. ties with allies.
e. Advancing military-to-military contacts.
5. Operational Training and Deployments. Many specific DOD activities are authorized by law to be
carried out during operational training and deployments. Examples of these activities include humanitarian
and civic assistance, special operations forces (SOF) training of foreign armed forces, and
exercise-related construction. While operational training and deployments are not part of the deliberate
planning process, in the long run they contribute to the accomplishment of wartime missions tasked in the
IJSCP.
6. Security Assistance. Security assistance (SA) encompasses various military and economic
assistance programs for allied and friendly foreign countries conducted by the United States. One of the
primary methods used to carry out our foreign and national security policy is through the transfer of
defense articles and services, military training, and economic assistance.
a. Security Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense. FID programs seek to help other governments
free and protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Although SA encompasses
far more than FID, it plays a major FID role through logistic assistance, training, and advisory support.
b. Programs. Generically, SA refers to the range of U.S. programs that are authorized by the
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. The military component of SA implemented by the Department of
Defense in accordance with policies established by the Department of State has as its principal
components the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP),
and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Also included are the Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) program and the special authorities that provide emergency drawdowns of
defense inventories. DOS directly manages the other main components of SA, including the Economic
Support Fund (ESF) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).
c. Peacekeeping Operations.
(1) General. Military PKO support diplomatic efforts to maintain a negotiated peace or truce,
covering a wide spectrum of activities. The United States normally provides observe personnel and/or
logistics to support an international or multinational peace initiative requiring one of the following types of
operations:
(a) Peace observation.
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(b) Internal Supervision and Assistance.
(c) Monitor Terms of Protocol.
(2) Tasks. Examples of tasks peacekeeping forces may be involved in are:
(a) Supervision of Free Territories.
(b) Supervision of Cease-Fires.
(c) Supervision of Withdrawals and Disengagements.
(d) Supervision of Prisoner of War Exchanges.
(e) Supervision of Demilitarization and Demobilization.
(f) Maintenance of Law and Order.
(3) Planning Considerations for PKO.
(a) Establishing clear objectives for a PKO before committing U.S. personnel.
(b) Maintaining a neutral non-hostile posture because the success of peacekeeping is based on
the perceived neutrality of the peacekeepers.
(c) Establishing clear and understandable rules of engagement.
(d) Ending the U.S. participation in the PKO whenever any of the belligerent withdraw their
consent for the presence of U.S. personnel in the operation.
(e) Maintaining the capability for evacuation, force protection and security operations, and
rapid transition to self-defense operations.
7. Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad.
a. General. NEO may be executed as a contingency operation in response to a deterioration of order
or as a result of a natural disaster in a host nation. NEO categorizes are permissive, uncertain, or hostile.
The goal of NEO is the protection and evacuation of American citizens, designated foreign nationals, and
property.
b. Plans. The U.S. ambassador or chief of diplomatic mission is responsible for the preparation of
Emergency Action Plans (EAP) that address the evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated aliens from a
foreign country. The conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of these EAPs is the
sole responsibility of the supporting military commander
c. Threat. Theater NEO planning is based on uncertainty — uncertainty of time, location, and
condition.
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d. Planning Guidance.
(1) Plan for worst case — hostile evacuation.
(2) Incorporate the procedures developed by the chief of mission for evacuee notification,
movement to assembly areas, and documentation.
(3) Integrate NEO plans with those of the country team and, where appropriate, the host nation or
to other nations.
(4) Assess potential threats and our ability to conduct NEOs at various threat levels.
8. Combating Terrorism. An effective program to combat terrorism requires both offensive (counter
terrorism) and defense (anti-terrorism) measures. Military forces must maintain their coordinated
worldwide capability to combat terrorism as outlined in the National Security Strategy and National
Military Strategy.
9. Combating Drugs.
a. General. The production, distribution, and sale of illegal drugs threaten stability by endangering the
legitimacy of democratic institutions, thus posing a direct threat to the security of the United States. Plans
must reflect the multinational and multiagency approach to the problem. DOD efforts must be coordinated
with and complement the efforts of the other U.S. agencies and cooperating foreign governments in
attacking the illegal entry of drugs into the United States. The counterdrug guidance of the Secretary of
Defense establishes a three-pronged attack against the threat and is directed at the following:
(1) Countries that are the source of the drugs.
(2) Countries that allow the transit of drugs from their source to the United States.
(3) Distribution networks in the United States.
b. DOD Missions. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned responsibilities to the
Department of Defense including:
(1) Act as single lead U.S. agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit
of illegal drugs into the United States in support of the counterdrug activities of federal, state, local, and
foreign law enforcement agencies.
(2) Integrate into an effective communications network the command, control, communications,
and technical intelligence assets of the United States to interdict the movement of illegal drugs into the
United States.
c. Planning Guidance.
(1) Plan and conduct operations to detect and monitor aerial and maritime transit.
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(2) Provide available assets to assist drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) responding to drug
trafficking activity.
(3) Collect, process, and disseminate all source, drug-related intelligence.
(4) Encourage and support host nation law enforcement programs.
(5) Coordinate with other federal agencies and/or cooperating host nations engaged in counterdrug
activities.
(6) Conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises as required by negotiated agreements and treaties.
10. Humanitarian assistance.
a. General. Increasingly, U.S. forces will be called upon to conduct humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief operations. Planning considerations need to include options for peace, potential hostilities,
during hostilities, and post hostilities.
b. Military Capabilities for Assistance. DOD has transportation, material, special skills logistics,
medical, engineer, military police (civil affairs, PSYOP, etc.), and personnel assets unmatched in other
departments or agencies of the federal government. When properly applied, these resources may
significantly enhance the efforts of other governmental assistance programs. Commanders of combatant
commands are encouraged, where possible, to integrate humanitarian assistance activities and objectives
into their MOOTW operations.
c. Integrated Effort.
(1) Every effort should be made to ensure the coordination of military and civil agency efforts.
Organizations that may be involved include:
(a) Host nation.
(b) Country team.
(c) UN or other international organizations.
(d) USG agencies.
(e) Nongovernment or private volunteer and contracted organizations.
(f) Supporting CINCs.
(2) DOD involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations must be requested
by the Officer of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Agency for International Development (AID/OFDS), and
approved by Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD(ISA)).
(3) Disaster Relief. The Department of State is the lead agency for the USG.
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d. Planning Considerations.
(1) Focusing problem resolution actions on the host nation. The U.S. role is to help nations provide
for themselves. The U.S. military is best suited for emergency relied, not sustained assistance.
(2) Integrating military assistance objectives and missions into plans, where possible, including
involvement of other USG agencies.
(3) Involving other nations, as much as possible, to show world community concern and
involvement.
(4) Formulating assistance operations using the format of a phased campaign plan with a clear
cutoff point. The military is best suited for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief by providing relief
assistance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.
(5) Developing and maintaining the capability for conducting adequate force protection and
security operations either unilaterally or with the support of the host nation.
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CJCSI 14 TO IJSCP
SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
1. PURPOSE. This CJCSI contains planning guidance for special technical operations. For this IJSCP,
the only area presented in this section will include the effective use of electronic warfare (EW) and its
integration into military operations.
2. GENERAL. The increased application of electronics in the development of weapon system control
and guidance systems, command and control communications, and reconnaissance systems has created
new requirements for EW. An explanation of terms used in electronic warfare follows.
a. Electronic Warfare. EW is military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to
determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action that retains
friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. There are three divisions within EW as follows:
(1) Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM). ESM is the division of EW involving actions
taken to search for, intercept, locate, record, and analyze radiated electromagnetic energy to exploit those
radiations in support of military operations. Thus, ESM is a source of EW information needed to conduct
electronic countermeasures (ECM), threat detection, electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM),
warning avoidance, target acquisition, and homing.
(2) Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). ECM is EW involving actions taken to prevent or reduce
an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. ECM includes the following:
(a) Jamming. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy with
the object of impairing the electronic devices, equipment, or systems being used by the enemy.
(b) Deception. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, enhancement, or
reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to mislead an enemy in the interpretation or use
of information received by its electronic systems. There are three categories of deception: manipulative
deception, which is the alteration of friendly electromagnetic emission characteristics, patterns, or
procedures to eliminate revealing or convey misleading telltale indicators; simulative deception, which is
the creation of electromagnetic emissions to represent friendly imaginary or actual capabilities; and
imitative deception, which is the introduction of electromagnetic radiation into enemy systems, thereby
imitating their own emissions.
(3) Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). ECCM is EW involving actions taken to ensure
friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s use of EW.
b. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT is the generic term that includes communications
intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
(FISINT). SIGINT planning is not discussed in this annex. However, the scope and responsibilities for
these activities are set forth in DOD Directives S3115.7, “SIGINT”; S3115.4, “COMINT”; and S3115.2,
“ELINT.”
3. EW POLICY.
a. EW Program. The establishment and maintenance of superiority in EW is essential to the
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
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successful conduct of modern warfare. Therefore, a dynamic and progressive EW program must be
implemented and maintained to support the missions of U.S. forces.
b. Combatant Commands. Combatant commanders are responsible for planning and conducting EW
operations in support of objectives, missions, and tasks assigned by the CJCS. Authority to employ ECM
may be delegated to commanders of joint task forces or other subordinate commanders. Commanders at
all echelons have authority to perform ESM and ECCM. Combatant commanders will issue command
policy guidance pertaining to EW.
c. Service Responsibility. Responsible for implementation of CJCS EW policy as follows:
(1) Develop, plan, program and budget for, organize, train, test, maintain, and employ EW forces,
capabilities, and systems required to support U.S. military objectives.
(2) Advise the Joint Staff of any inability to furnish the EW forces or capabilities required to meet
U.S. objectives.
(3) Keep JCS, CINCs, and components fully informed of EW developments and requirements.
(4) Frequently exercise the EW system, including communications, electronics, and weapon
systems, through planned military maneuvers.
(5) Maintain close liaison with the other Services to prevent duplication of effort in EW programs
and equipment that may be readily adaptable to multi-Service requirements and coordinate use of
Service-unique assets in joint training exercises.
(6) Establish signals security (SIGSEC) measures (EMCON for Navy) and security restrictions
for use in employing electronic equipment, techniques, and tactics.
(7) Periodically review and update the EW assistance program for equipment, training aids,
training courses, and publications releasable to Reserve forces and friendly foreign governments.
4. AUGMENTATION, SUPPORTING, AND DEPLOYING FORCES. Supporting commanders of
deploying forces in support of or in augmentation of supported commanders will ensure that such forces
are deployed with their full EW system capability.
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USCENTCOM
OPLAN
1648-XX (U)
Reference 8
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900
Ref 8
UNCLASSIFIED
CENTCOM J5
SUBJECT: USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
See Distribution
(Annex Z)
1. (U) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX, which provides for the defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, is
attached.
2. (U) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX fulfills a requirement established in section V 4.C.(6)(a) RT-1
of ISCP 20XX and is effective for planning purposes only until approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
3. (U) Elements of USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX were coordinated with USCINCTRANS,
USCINCPAC, USCINCACOM, USCINCEUR, USCINCSOC, USCINCSPACE, and USCINCSTRAT
during preparation.
4. (U) The supporting plans will be prepared and forwarded to this headquarters for review within 60
days after approval of USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX.
FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
28 FEB 20XX
USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX
COPY ___ OF ___ COPIES
CONTROL NO.
CLASSIFIED BY:
DECLASSIFY OADR
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UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
28 FEB 20XX
USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE (U)
(U) This classification guidance provides users with subjects requiring protection, specifies the level of
protection to be afforded those subjects, and establishes the time period during which the protection must
be continued.
SUBJECTS REQUIRING PROTECTION
PROTECTION REQUIRED DURING
COA
EXEC
DEVEL PLING
IMPL
POST
IMPL
(NOT APPLICABLE)
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UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
28 FEB 20XX
USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS AND RECORD OF CHANGES (U)
(NOT APPLICABLE)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
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UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
280600Z FEB XX
USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (U)
CONTENTS
PAGE
Security Instructions and Record of Changes
Ref 8-4
Plan Summary
Omitted
Table of Contents and List of Effective Pages
Ref 8-5
Basic Plan
Ref 8-9
ANNEX A.
Appendix 1.
Appendix 2.
Appendix 3.
Appendix 4.
Appendix 5.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Tab C.
Tab D.
TASK ORGANIZATION
Time Phased Force and Deployment Lists
Extract of Shortfall Identification
Force Module Identification
Deterrent Options
Active and Reserve Component Apportionment Tables
OPLAN MTW/SSC (FDO)
OPLAN MTW/SSC (MFDO)
OPLAN MTW/SSC (Deploy to Fight)
OPLAN MTW/SSC (Counterattack)
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Ref 8-A-1-33
Ref 8-A-3-39
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Omitted
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Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX B.
Appendix 1.
Appendix 2.
Appendix 3.
Tab A.
Appendix 4.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Appendix 5.
Appendix 6.
Appendix 7.
Appendix 8.
Appendix 9.
Appendix 10.
Appendix 11.
INTELLIGENCE
Essential Elements of Information
Signal Intelligence
Counter Intelligence
Collection Priorities and Targets
Targeting
Target List (Nuclear)
Target List (Conventional)
Human Resource Intelligence
Intelligence Support to EW and C3CM
Imagery Intelligence
Intelligence Support for OPSEC, PSYOP, and Military Deception
Measurement and Signature Intelligence
Planning Guidance — Captured Enemy Equipment
Enemy Order of Battle
Ref 8-B-41
Ref 8-B-1-49
Omitted
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Ref 8-B-11-53
ANNEX C.
Appendix 1.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Tab C.
OPERATIONS
Nuclear Operations
Nuclear Options
Nuclear Options Analysis (Distributed to Joint Staff Only)
Reconnaissance Operations to Support Nuclear Options
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-5
UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix 2.
Appendix 3.
Appendix 4.
Appendix 5.
Appendix 6.
Appendix 7.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Tab C.
Tab D.
Tab E.
Tab F.
Tab G.
Tab H.
Appendix 8.
Appendix 9.
Appendix 10.
Appendix 11.
Appendix 12.
Appendix 13.
Appendix 14.
Appendix 15.
Appendix 16.
Tab A.
Appendix 17.
Appendix 18.
Appendix 19.
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations;
Riot Control Agents and Herbicides
Electronic Warfare Operations
Psychological Operations
Special Operations
Search and Rescue Operations
Military Deception
Estimate of Adversary
Friendly Actions
Comparative Analysis
Deception Objectives
Execution Schedule
Monitoring Procedures
Security Guidelines
Special Concerns and Risk and Value Assessments
Rules of Engagement
Reconnaissance
Counter-Command, Control, and Communications
Air Base Operability
Planning Guidance — Visual Information and Combat
Camera Documentation
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Escape and Evasion Operations
Counterattack
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Force List
Amphibious Operations
Operations Graphic
Operations Graphic
Omitted
Omitted
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Omitted
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Omitted
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Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Ref 8-C-18-57
Ref 8-C-19-58
ANNEX D.
Appendix 1.
Tab A.
Appendix 2.
Appendix 3.
Appendix 4.
Tab A.
Tab B.
LOGISTICS
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Supply
Estimate of POL Support Requirements
Mortuary Affairs
Sustainability Analysis
Mobility and Transportation
Enroute Support Requirements
Reception and Onward Movement
Ref 8-D-59
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX E.
Appendix 1.
PERSONNEL
Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and
Other Detained Persons
Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained
U.S. Personnel
Finance and Disbursing
Legal
Military Postal Service
Aerial Mail Terminals
Military Post Offices
Omitted
Appendix 2.
Appendix 3.
Appendix 4.
Appendix 5.
Tab A.
Tab B.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-6
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
UNCLASSIFIED
ANNEX F.
Appendix 1.
Appendix 2.
Appendix 3.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Personnel Requirements for JIBs and Sub-JIBs
Equipment Requirements for JIBs and Sub-JIBs
Release of Information Concerning Adverse Incidents When
One or More than One Servie is Involved
General Ground Rules for Media
Code of Conduct for Participants
Ref 8-F-65
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX G.
CIVIL AFFAIRS
Omitted
ANNEX H.
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Omitted
ANNEX J.
Appendix 1.
Appendix 2.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
Command Relationships Diagram
Mortuary Affairs
Ref 8-J-79
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX K.
COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS
Communications Security
C3 Protection
Communications Planning
Joint Circuit List
Joint Communications Coordination Center (JCCC)
Satellite Communications Planning
UHF SATCOM Network List
UHF SATCOM Network Diagram
SHF SATCOM Network List
SHF SATCOM Link List
SHF SATCOM Network Diagram
Defense Courier Service
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX L.
Appendix 1.
OPERATIONS SECURITY
Operations Security Estimate
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX M.
Appendix 1.
Appendix 2.
Appendix 3.
MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY
Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Requirements List
Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Transportation Requirements
Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Reports (Optional)
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX N.
SPACE OPERATIONS
Omitted
ANNEX P.
Appendix 1.
Appendix 2.
Appendix 3.
WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT
List of WHNS Agreements
WHNS Reliability
Presumed WHNS
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX Q.
Appendix 1.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Appendix 2.
MEDICAL SERVICES
Joint Medical Regulating System
Medical Regulating Office Staffing Requirements
Medical Regula ting Command and Control Diagram
Joint Blood Program
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Appendix 4.
Appendix 5.
Appendix 1.
Appendix 2.
Appendix 3.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Appendix 4.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Tab C.
Tab D.
Tab E.
Appendix 5.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-7
Ref 8-F-3-73
Ref 8-F-4-75
Ref 8-F-5-77
UNCLASSIFIED
Tab A.
Tab B.
Tab C.
Tab D.
Tab E.
Appendix 3.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Appendix 4.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Tab C.
Tab D.
Appendix 5.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Appendix 6.
Appendix 7.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Appendix 8.
Tab A.
Appendix 9.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Appendix 10.
Appendix 11.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Joint Blood Program Operational Structure
Theater Blood Components Requirements and Capabilities
Theater Blood Components Distribution
Joint Blood Program Manpower Requirements
Blood Program Facility Requirements
Hospitalization
Hospital Bed Requirements
Hospital Bed Assessments
Patient Evacuation
Medical NEO Evacuees (Total Demand During Period)
Evacuees (Peak and Total Demand During Period)
Medical Evacuation Resources
Evacuation Assessment
Returns to Duty
Returns to Duty (Supportable Theater Evacuation Policy)
Returns to Duty (Objective Theater Evacuation Policy)
Population at Risk or Loss Report
Medical Logistics (Class 8A System)
Medical Logistics and Supply Unit Locations
Medical Class 8A Resupply Sustainability Analysis
Preventive Medicine
Disease Threat by Geographic Area and Country
Command, Control, and Communications
Medical Command and Control Diagram
Medical Communications Dia gram
Host Nation Support
Medical Sustainability Assessment
Medical Sustainability Assessment
Medical Personnel Assessment
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
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Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX R.
Appendix 1.
Tab A.
Tab B.
Tab C.
Appendix 3.
CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES
Inter-Service Chaplain Support
List of ICS Agreement
ICS Reliability
Presumed ICS
Commander-Staff Chaplain Relationships
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
ANNEX X.
EXECUTION CHECKLIST
Omitted
ANNEX Z.
DISTRIBUTION
Omitted
NOTE: The letters “I,” “O,” and “S” through “W” are intentionally omitted as annex designations.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
280600Z FEB XX
USCINCCENT OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
DEFENSE OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA (U)
(U) REFERENCES:
a. (U) Map: TOC-H-6A, 6B, 6C, 6D; Stock #TPCXXHO6D, 1:5000,000.
b: (U) Map: Joint Operations Graphics (Air); NH 38-11, 12, 15, 16; 1:250,000.
c. (U) Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan, 19XX.
d. (U) AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, 1997.
e. (U) AFSC Pub 2, Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint
Forces, August 1992.
(U) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A.
1. (U) Situation.
a. (U) General. This is a unilateral USCINCCENT OPLAN which provides for the U.S. defense of
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi attack. This OPLAN would probably be implemented upon
receipt of unambiguous warning of an Iraqi attack through Kuwait into Saudi Arabia or an attack into
Kuwait only. This OPLAN is in response to Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan, Part V, tasking to
prepare an OPLAN for the unilateral support of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the event of future
aggression and for the support of U.S. interests therein. This OPLAN also could provide for the security
of U.S. forces, citizens, installations, and resources in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
(1) (U) Strategic Significance. The area’s strategic importance is emphasized by the fact that
approximately two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves are located in the Arabian Peninsula/Arabian
Gulf region. Beyond the oil itself, this area also contains strategic waterways which facilitate the flow of
world commerce. On the east side of the Arabian Peninsula, the Strait of Hormuz provides maritime
access to Gulf oil fields and associated transhipment facilities. On the west side of the Peninsula, the Red
Sea line of communication stands as one of the most strategically important waterways in the world. In
time of peace, this waterway is important to international commerce. In the event of a conflict, it provides
a strategic lifeline for the timely deployment and sustainment of friendly forces. The strategic significance
of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is that they account for approximately 25 percent of the world’s oil
production, contain almost 50 percent of the world’s oil reserves, and Saudi Arabia is the center of
Islamic culture. The defense of Kuwait is of particular importance to the U.S. in the wake of the Gulf War
of 1991. Even after the overwhelming defeat at the hands of coalition forces during Operation DESERT
STORM in 1991, Iraq may still have aspirations to annex Kuwait. Iraq may also feel a need to seize all or
part of Saudi Arabia to punish its largest neighbor for the extensive support provided to Coalition forces
during 1991/1992 and to establish itself as a power in the Arab world by seizing and controlling the
critical oil facilities in Eastern Saudi Arabia, or by seizing and controlling The Two Holy Mosques at
Mecca and Medina.
(2) (U) Objectives and Strategy. U.S. objectives are to coordinate and establish an effective force
to deter and, if necessary, to counter aggression, prevent military coercion of frie ndly states, protect our
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
resources and facilities in the region, deny enemy access to the same, and ensure access to the regional
lines of communication. The strategy of the U.S. is designed to: deter war, improve regional stability,
demonstrate a commitment to the region, counter hostile expansion and influences, and prepare for war.
Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to rapidly deploy U.S. forces to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Once adequate combat power has been generated and an adequate defense has been conducted, the
strategy is to mass forces and to counterattack to restore the territorial integrity and legitimate
governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia if they have been violated.
(3) (U) Purpose. This plan provides a concept for the deployment and employment of U.S. forces
to assist in countering an attack by Iraq into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
b. (U) Area of Concern.
(1) (U) Area of Responsibility. The USCINCCENT AOR consists of the countrie s of Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E., Oman, Yemen, Ethiopia,
Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, Sudan; and the Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman,
and the Indian Ocean areas to the USCINCCENT boundaries. (See Appendixes 18 and 19 to Annex C.)
(2) (U) Area of Interest. The area of interest encompassed by this plan includes the airways and
land area of the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq; and the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of
Oman, Arabian Gulf, and related sea lines of communication. On order, the AOI will be designated as a
theater of war. (See Appendixes 18 and 19 to Annex C.)
(3) (U) Area of Operations. The area of operations for this plan is defined as the airspace and land
areas of friendly nations, and the international airspace over and international water of the Red Sea and
Arabian Gulf. On order, the Area of Operation will include the airspace, territorial waters, and land areas
of Iraq. On order, the AOO will be designated as a theater of operations (See Appendixes 18 and 19 to
Annex C).
c. (U) Enemy Forces. Iraq’s combat power lies in its ground forces. Iraq began to rebuild its military
during the 1992-94 time period using its oil revenue to trade on the bla ck market and with China and
North Korea. Iraq’s military is currently equivalent to 19 divisions. Seven of these 19 divisions are
located near the border with the CIS, and 12 are stationed along the Euphrates River from Turkey to Al
Basrah. (See Annex B.)
d. (U) Friendly Forces.
(1) (U) Unassigned Forces.
(a) (U) General. This operation plan was written using U.S. forces only because the provision
of forces by other nations is so dependent upon circumstances surrounding the conflict that they cannot be
accurately predicted either in size, type, or source. However, information on friendly forces that may
participate is provided for general reference.
1 (U) Saudi Arabian Ground Forces and National Guard could provide a limited defense
and delay against an attack by Iraqi ground forces. The Saudi Air Force is capable of maintaining limited
air superiority over Saudi territory and does possess a small offensive air capability. Coordination
between deployed U.S. forces and Saudi forces would be required to maximize Saudi capabilities, to
include the integration of air and sea missions and the establishment of operational boundaries for ground
forces.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
2 (U) Kuwaiti ground forces are too small in both number and combat power to protect
their territory without assistance from the other GCC nations. Kuwaiti Air Forces and surface-to-air units
are capable of inflicting significant losses on enemy aircraft.
3 (U) Given similar circumstances of an unprovoked attack, other GCC states could at
least be expected to provide the similar numbers and types of ground forces seen during DESERT
STORM. Additional purchases of modern aircraft and increased pilot training have improved the overall
air defense and offensive capabilities of the GCC member states.
4 (U) Great Britain has contributed forces to various operations in the Arabian Gulf area,
to include a mechanized division and numerous aircraft to DESERT STORM. Based on past history,
Great Britain could be expected to contribute sizable ground, naval, and air forces to protect GCC
interests.
5 (U) France participated in DESERT STORM with a light division and air and naval
assets. Based on past history, France could be expected to contribute forces to protect GCC interests.
(2) (U) Specific Ta sks.
(a) (U) Department of the Army, Air Force, and Navy.
1 (U) Provide logistics and administrative support to Service forces.
2 (U) Provide intelligence support to USCENTCOM as requested.
3 (U) Provide personnel replacements and administrative support as required.
4 (U) Coordinate and provide for interface with joint, Defense Communications Agency,
and other Service communications-electronics (C-E) systems as required.
(b) (U) Department of State (DOS).
1 (U) Obtain use of foreign bases, overflight rights, and transit rights, as required, and
establish status of forces agreements (SOFA).
2 (U) Seek use of the offices of other nations in the region to effect a political solution to
a crisis through negotiation.
3 (U) Initiate political and diplomatic activity to gain international support — including
the UN, GCC, EC — for economic sanctions and possible military support against Iraq.
4 (U) Attempt to limit through diplomatic means the number of nations supporting Iraq.
5 (U) Assist in the arrangement of host nations support.
6 (U) Identify military assistance requirements for NEO.
7 (U) Provide guidance and direct the evacuation of U.S. citizens in the AOR if required.
(c) (U) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
1 (U) Provide intelligence support as required.
2 (U) Provide interface with Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence services
operating in the region.
(d) (U) USEUCOM, USACOM, USPACOM.
1 (U) Provide forces as directed.
2 (U) Provide for safe movement of forces in respective AORs.
3 (U) Provide basing support for air and naval operations in USCENTCOM’s AOR as
required.
4 (U) Coordinate chop of naval forces entering USCENTCOM’s AOR with
USNAVCENT.
5 (U) Provide logistical support for transient forces.
(e) (U) USACOM. Provide forces, as directed by appropriate authority, to meet deployment
and employment requirements; reassign forces under the COCOM of USCENTCOM.
(f) (U) USTRANSCOM.
1 (U) Coordinate all air and sea movements.
2 (U) Provide airlift, air rescue, and air weather support as required.
3 (U) Provide sealift as required.
4 (U) Provide aerial and seaport movement control.
(g) (U) USSOCOM. Provide forces as required; reassign forces under the COCOM of
USCINCCENT.
(h) (U) National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). Provide charting, mapping and
geodesy support, to include multispectral imagery, as required.
(i) (U) USSPACECOM. Assure U.S. access to space-based resources as required.
(j) (U) National Security Agency (NSA).
1 (U) Provide/coordinate cryobiological support requirements for implementation of this
plan or any portion thereof. Provide signal intelligence (SIG) support as required.
2 (U) Provide a cryptological support group to USCENTCOM Headquarters (Forward).
3 (U) Work with supported and supporting commands in developing effective electronic
warfare (EW) strategies and advising the commands of potential losses in intelligence.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(k) (U) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Provide communication support as
required.
(l) (U) United States Information Service (USIS).
1 (U) Coordinate foreign information policy guidance with DOS, DOD, and
USCINCCENT Public Affairs entities.
2 (U) Conduct radio broadcasts over Voice of America facilities in support of
USCINCCENT, as mutually agreed upon with DOD.
3 (U) Provide liaison officers to USCINCCENT, USCENTAF, USARCENT,
USNAVCENT, and SOCCENT, as required.
(m) (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
1 (U) Direct deployment of communications assets, strategic airlift, and sealift in support
of this plan.
2 (U) Direct supporting U.S. commands to provide resources, IAW this plan, when
directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA).
3 (U) Provide Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) support to USCENTCOM
as required.
(n) (U) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Provide logistics support, as required.
f.
(U) Assumptions.
(1) (U) The military threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is an air and ground attack by Iraq.
(2) (U) Forces in the Task Organization (Annex A) will be available for plan execution IAW
ISCP apportionment.
(3) (U) UN Security Council-sponsored sanctions and blockades will be placed into effect.
(4) (U) Forward positioning of Iraqi armor and mech units will yield at least 45 days
unambiguous warning of an Iraqi invasion into either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, and that the NCA will
direct execution of this OPLAN immediately upon receipt of such warning.
(5) (U) Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will request U.S. assistance and permit deployment of U.S.
forces into their sovereign territories upon receipt of unambiguous warning of an Iraqi attack.
(6) (U) Gulf Cooperation Council nations will permit overflight and basing rights for U.S. air and
naval forces.
(7) (U) Republic of Yemen, Jordan, Ethiopia, and Sudan will not allow overflight rights to U.S.
friendly nations, nor will they allow the use of their territories in any way.
(8) (U) Iraq will use chemical weapons in an attack against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia; nuclear
weapons will not be used.
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(9) (U) Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will provide extensive host nation support.
(10) (U) Sufficient airlift and sealift is available to execute this plan as written.
(11) (U) The New Independent States (NIS) will not intervene in a military conflict in Kuwait or
Saudi Arabia nor provide support to Iran and Iraq.
(12) (U) NATO states will support U.S. operations by continuing to allow overflight and
in-transit rights. NATO forces will not be committed in “out of area operations” under a NATO sanction
or under NATO commander.
(13) (U) Egypt will insure the Suez Canal remains open and is available for use.
(14) (U) The NCA will direct execution of the PSRC 200K reserve call-ups.
(15) (U) Iraq will attempt to purchase space-derived data/intelligence from third party sources.
g. (U) Legal Considerations.
(1) (U) In the absence of a declaration of war, the War Powers Resolution requires a detaile d
report to Congress within 48 hours following the introduction of forces equipped for combat into foreign
territory. If deployment of advance elements triggers this requirement, operational security could be
compromised prior to deployment of the main body.
(2) (U) The War Powers Resolution requires that unless the Congress declares war or enacts
specific legislation authorizing continued use of U.S. forces, the President must remove all U.S. forces
within 60 to 90 days of their introduction. The resolution also provides for termination of military
operations in less than 60 days, if so directed by Congress.
(3) (U) Although military operations conducted pursuant to this plan may occur in the absence of
a declaration of war, it is the declared policy of the U.S. that all captured enemy personnel, whether
members of the regular or irregular forces will be accorded the status, treatment, and protection of
“prisoner of war” as defined in the Geneva Convention of 1949. It is also the declared policy to the
United States to demand that U.S. military personnel captured by the enemy be accorded the status of
POWs, as defined in the Geneva Convention.
(4) (U) Preceding implementation of OPLAN 1648-XX, it is assumed that Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait will request U.S. military assistance.
(5) (U) Peacetime ROE will be in effect until supplemental ROE are identified in subsequent
directives.
(6) (U) Enemy prisoners of war (EPWS) will not be transferred to the custody of any foreign
power that is not a signatory to the Geneva POW Convention or, if a signatory, when there is reason to
believe that the EPWS will be mistreated.
(7) (U) CENTCOM JA will be notified of all requests by the international committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) representatives to visit EPW facilities, internment centers, and displaced persons facilities.
(8) (U) Captured enemy weapons, documents, and equipment become property of the U.S.
government. Retention of those items by individual soldiers as “war trophies” is prohibited.
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(9) (U) Prior to any negotiation of SOFAs or other international agreements, coordination will be
made with CENTCOM SJA.
(10) (U) Jurisdiction over civilian personnel remains with the local court of the foreign country
concerned, if such courts are operating. To the extent practical, custody of non-U.S. civilian personnel
will transferred be to local authorities. Commanders will coordinate with their supporting Staff Judge
Advocates before transfer of custody.
(11) (U) Upon commencement of hostilities, the parties to the conflict will be notified of the
hospital ship’s name and locations.
2. (U) Mission. When directed, U.S. Central Command will deploy forces to the area of operations and
take actions to defend Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian territory against an Iraqi attack; and if required, restore
the pre-conflict international borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
3. (U) Execution.
a.
(U) Concept of Operations.
(1) (U) General. USCENTCOM forces will conduct operations in three phases in order to: (a)
deter Iraqi aggression into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia, (b) rapidly deploy defensive forces as far forward
as possible to confront Iraq with a formidable defense, and (c) conduct an effective defense should Iraq
choose to attack. The phases of the operation may overlap and are discussed in more detail below.
(a) (U) Phase I. Deterrence (C-Day thru D-Day). At the first sign of ambiguous warning
(threatening Iraqi activity), USCENTCOM will initiate Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to deter Iraqi
aggression into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia. FDOs, designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve and confront
Iraq with the prospect of unacceptable costs for aggression, include all of the instruments of national
power (economic, diplomatic, informational, and military). Likely FDOs include, but are not limited to,
the following:
1 (U) Economic, diplomatic, informational.
a (U) Initiate diplomatic talks with the Iraqi government.
b (U) Solicit support from the UN and regional friends.
c (U) Request all nations to cease trading with Iraq.
d (U) Freeze Iraqi assets in the U.S. and seek support from other nations in doing
the same.
e (U) Expel Iraqi diplomats from the U.S.
f (U) Establish trade embargo against Iraq.
2 (U) Military.
a (U) Reposition in-theater forces (207th ACR, MEU Afloat, and CVBG).
b (U) Deploy four (4) Fighter Squadrons.
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c (U) Deploy electronic surveillance aircraft.
d (U) Conduct multilateral exercises in theater.
e (U) Alert major forces for deployment.
If deterrence is successful, de-escalation measures may be implemented at the direction of the NCA. If
deterrence fails, forces will be properly positioned to facilitate follow-on deployment in Phase II and the
establishment of the defense in Phase III.
(b) (U) Phase II. Deployment/Force Build-Up (C+5 through C+90). In the deployment
phase, emphasis is placed upon rapidly deploying from CONUS and OCONUS locations into the main
APODS and SPODS at Dhahran, King Khalid Military City, Ad Dammam, Kuwait City, and Al Jubayl
IAW the time-phased force and deployment list (Appendix 1 to Annex A). Priority of deployment is to
those forces necessary to defend our initial center of gravity, which is our capability to deploy combat
forces into theater. In order, those forces are fighter aircraft and electronic surveillance aircraft to conduct
defensive counter-air operations; light, airborne, airmobile, or amphibious ground forces to protect PODS
from ground attack; and command and control assets. Naval assets will deploy as rapidly as possible to
the Arabian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea in order to establish immediate control over the sea
LOCs into the theater. Priority of deployment after the initial defensive forces (those that are critical to
protecting the continued deployment) will be based upon the principle of providing (a) antiarmor forces,
(b) long-term support forces, and (c) offensive-oriented forces, in that order. USCENTAF will be
responsible for reception at APODS; movement from APODS will be the responsibility of USARCENT.
The deployment phase will continue until all forces have arrived in theater IAW the TPFDL, but is
expected to be complete NLT C+90. Priority of initial defense will be to: (1) APODS and SPODS that
provide for continued deployment; (2) C2 facilities; (3) force assembly and build-up areas; and (4)
forward defensive positions. Space systems will be positioned to provide support to the initial deployment. Priority will be intel/recon, communications, weather, multispectral imagery, and
position/navigation systems.
(c) (U) Phase III. Defensive (C+45 thru Indefinite). The defensive phase, initiated with the
arrival of the USARCENT 47th AA Div, 23d AR Div, 55th MECH Div, 21st LT Inf Div, 53d MECH
Div, 209th ACR, 15th AVN Bde, the 11th and 12th ADA Bns, and the USMARCENT I MEF, is designed
to repel an Iraqi attack into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia. During this phase, our center of gravity will shift
to become our ground combat forces. This phase is sub-divided into three sub-phases designed to: (1)
improve and strengthen defensive postures; (2) blunt and defeat an invasion; and (3) restore international
boundaries with counter-offensive operations if required. This phase will terminate upon direction of the
NCA based upon a decrease in the threat of aggression or the defeat of hostile forces.
1 (U) Sub-Phase IIIa. Defensive Posturing (C+45 thru D-Day). This subphase is
designated to strengthen and improve the theater defensive posture established not later than C+45. This
phase consists of the time between establishment of an effective defense and the commencement of
hostilities. This phase may be as short as a matter of hours, or as long as a period of months. During this
phase initial, alternate, and final ground defensive positions will be established well forward and
improved to the maximum extent possible. (See Appendix 19 to Annex C for the ground defense scheme
and see tasking paragraphs for USARCENT and USMARCENT task.) Defensive air operations will be
maintained at heightened levels commensurate with sustained operations capabilities. Naval operations
will continue to insure the unhindered use of sea LOCs and prevent any Iraqi offensive naval operations
in the Arabian Gulf. Theater logistics will be improved as rapidly as possible, and joint training will be
conducted on a continuous basis. This sub-phase will continue until Iraqi attack commences, or until so
directed by the NCA.
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2 (U) Sub-Phase IIIb. Defensive Combat (D-Day thru D+7). This phase is implemented
when an Iraqi attack is initiated against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. During this phase U.S. air forces initiate
theater counterair operations, interdictions, and close air support to gain air superiority, destroy, delay,
disrupt, or divert attacking Iraqi ground forces. USARCENT and USMARCENT, supported by tactical
air and naval surface fire support, will delay and attrite attacking enemy forces as far forward as possible,
and establish in-depth defenses on suitable terrain. In the MARCENT portion of the theater of operations,
defensive operations will focus primarily on critical ports, oil facilities, major population centers, and key
terrain along the Arabian Gulf coast. In the ARCENT portion of the theater of operations, defensive
operations will focus primarily on major population centers and resources of potential military value at
King Khalid Military City, Hafar Al Batan, and the approaches to Riyadh. The ability to withstand
chemical attack on friendly forces is dependant upon active chemical defense and through ATBM assets.
This phase will continue until the enemy has been sufficiently attrited to allow counteroffensive
operations, estimated to occur on or about D+7. If this phase commences prior to C+45, major combat
forces will continue to deploy to the theater of operations and will be employed to reinforce the defense or
to conduct counteroffensive operations, depending upon the theater operational situation.
3 (U) Sub-Phase IIIc. Counteroffensive (D+7 thru D+20). This phase will be
implemented once force ratios favor counteroffensive operations. During this phase the ground forces of
USARCENT and USMARCENT will initiate supporting counteroffensives to fix and destroy Iraq forces
in their respective sectors. The theater reserve (designated by ARCENT), comprised of at least two heavy
mechanized Div’s, an ACR, and an aviation brigade, will then conduct the main theater counteroffensive
to destroy the Iraqi center of gravity, which is the operational reserve, if it has penetrated into Kuwait or
Saudi territory. If the Iraqi operational reserve has not penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, the U.S.
theater reserve will either be held in reserve and not committed, or will be committed in support of
USARCENT or USMARCENT to destroy those Iraqi forces that have penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi
Arabia. Only upon the direction of the NCA will offensive ground operations be conducted in Iraq. This
phase will be terminated when all Iraqi forces have been expelled from Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia and
U.S. forces are again postured into adequate defense positions along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian
borders as per sub-phase IIIb (Defensive Combat) of this OPLAN. U.S. forces will remain in consolidated
defensive positions until so directed to redeploy by the NCA. Post conflict operations will be conducted
as required with USARCENT serving as the USCENTCOM executive agent for post-conflict operations.
a (U) USMARCENT. Marine forces will initially establish a screen along the
Northern Kuwait border from vicinity 3000N4800E to 2958N4707E to provide early warning. Defenses
along the FEBA will be established from vicinity 2940N4809E to 2928N4717E. Units in the defense will
engage enemy forces as far forward as possible causing Iraqi units to deploy into attack formations and
slow their advance. The movement to subsequent defensive positions will be delayed for as long as
possible and must be coordinated with USARCENT, USNAVCENT, USCENTAF, and SOCCENT and
must not occur until given permission by USCINCCENT. If required, a strong point defense will be
established around Kuwait City as a last ditch defensive effort to save this facility.
b (U) USARCENT. Army forces will initially establish a screen along the
western Kuwait and the Northern Saudi Arabian border from vicinity 2958N4707E to 2905N4634E to
2810N4415E to provide early warning. Defenses along the FEBA will be established from vicinity
2928N4717E to 2742N4434E. Army forces will also establish a security force of at least air assault
division size and capability to guard and secure the theater left flank from vicinity 2810N4415E to
2630N4521E. In addition, ARCENT will provide a heavy mechanized division as the theater reserve to be
positioned vicinity 2710N4815E. Units in the defense will engage enemy forces as far forward as possible
causing Iraqi units to deploy into attack formations and slow their advances. The movement to subsequent
defensive positions will be delayed for as long as possible and must be coordinated with
USAMARCENT, USNAVCENT, USCENTAF, and USSOCCENT and must not occur until given
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
permission by USCINCCENT. If required, strong point defenses will be established around KKMC and
Hafar Al Batin as a last ditch effort to save these critical facilities.
c (U) Supporting Forces.
(1) (U) USCENTAF (JFACC). The JFACC is the supported commander for
counter air, interdiction and strategic attack missions throughout the theater in accordance with the JFC
concept of operations. The JFACC will support land component commanders with close air support and
interdiction within their areas of operation. During the defensive combat phase (phase IIIb), air
operations will be focused on gaining air superiority, destroying WMD capability and destroying,
delaying or disrupting Iraqi heavy forces. When the counteroffensive phase (phase IIIc) begins, air
operations will focus on maintaining air superiority, close air support and interdiction.
(2) (U) USNAVCENT. Naval forces will support the land battle by gaining
maritime superiority, conducting coastal defense along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian coast line,
providing naval fire support, and participating in the air effort as coordinated by JFACC. Naval forces
will make available to the JFACC all sorties in excess of those required for naval warfare task (see
coordinating instructions).
(3) (U) COMSOCCENT. SOF will support the overall operations to defend
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Special operations forces will deploy along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian
borders and conduct special reconnaissance and electronic surveillance to provide early warning to
friendly forces. These forces will conduct operations within designated special operations areas (SOAs).
Operations will not be conducted into Iraq without the permission of CINCCENTCOM. Upon initiation
of hostilities, the SOAs will be terminated and the SOF forces withdrawn. The focus of SOF operations
after an Iraqi attack will be against enemy C3 modes and line of communications. COMSOCCENT will
also conduct and coordinate the theater CSAR efforts as required and will be prepared to conduct foreign
internal defense operations with friendly nations in theater.
b. (U) TASK.
(1) (U) Phase I. (Deterrence, Ambiguous Warning thru D-day).
(a) (U) USARCENT.
1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives. Priority of
deployment is to those forces designated in para 3a(1)(a).
2 (U) Assume responsibility for reception of forces at SPOD’s Dhahran, Al Jubayl, and
Ad Dammam.
3 (U) Assume responsibility for transportation and theater support activity theater-wide,
IAW interservice support agreements.
4 (U) Support NEOs as required.
5 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.
(b) (U) USCENTAF.
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1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives. Priority of
deployment is to those forces that can be rapidly deployed to establish a theater air defense system as
designated in para 3a(1)(a).
2 (U) Assume responsibility for reception of forces at APODs and coordinate with
ARCENT for hand-off of deploying force movement and transportation from APODs.
3 (U) Support NEOs as required.
4 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.
(c) (U) USMARCENT (Designated on C-Day).
1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives. Priority of
deployment is to those forces that can be rapidly deployed to secure critical PODs designated in para
3a(1)(a).
2 (U) Assume responsibility for reception and transportation of USMC forces arriving at
APOD/ SPOD Kuwait City.
3 (U) Support NEOs, as required.
4 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.
(d) (U) USNAVCENT.
1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives. Priority of
deployment is to those forces that can rapidly secure and retain access to the critical sea LOCs of the
Arabian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.
2 (U) Provide cargo handling personnel and equipment to augment USARCENT terminal
service, fixed port, and JLOTS operations as required.
3 (U) Conduct port security and harbor defense, as required to maintain access to SPODs.
4 (U) Assume OPCON of Military Sealift Command Forces in theater and conduct
theater sealift operations as required.
5 (U) Support NEOs as required.
6 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.
7 (U) Conduct protection of shipping operations to ensure freedom of navigation in the
Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden sea lines of communication.
(e) (U) COMSOCCENT.
1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives.
2 (U) Assume OPCON of Special Forces (except PSYOP and Civil Affairs) upon their
entry into the USCENTCOM AOR.
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3 (U) Conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations in support of Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, and other GCC states, as directed.
4 (U) Support NEO and combat search and rescue as directed.
5 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.
(2) (U) Phase II (Deployment/Force Build -Up, C+5 thru C+90).
(a) (U) USARCENT.
1 (U) Support or implement deterrent measures by continuing to deploy forces and
defending critical facilities.
2 (U) Be prepared to defend port facilities vic Dhahran, AD Dammam, Al Jubayl, and
KKMC.
3 (U) As combat forces arrive in theater, establish defensive sector from 2958N4707E to
2810N4415E.
4 (U) Assume OPCON of Army PSYOP and civil affairs units upon arrival in AOR, and
conduct PSYOP and civil affairs operations with the intent of deterring Iraqi aggressions. Assume
command, less OPCON, of all other Army SF forces upon their entry into the AOR.
5 (U) Serve as USCCENTCOM coordinating authority for civil affairs and PSYOPs
operations.
6 (U) Provide combat support and combat service support to USCENTCOM forces in
theater IAW interservice support agreements.
7 (U) Provide a brigade-sized mechanized force to serve as the theater reserve NLT
C+20. Position reserve vic 2710N4815E.
8 (U) Assume responsibility for rear operations in the Joint Rear Area effective C+4.
9 (U) Position follow-on forces in tactical assembly areas generally northwest of Ad
Damman and Al Jubayl and prepare for future operations.
10 (U) Provide one MP battalion for the defense of HQ USCENTCOM in Riyadh
commencing C+10.
(b) (U) USCENTAF.
1 (U) Support or implement deterrent measures by continuing to deploy forces and
establishing combat air patrols over Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
2 (U) Serve as the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) commencing C+2 to
ensure the unity of effort for the conduct of theater air operations. The JFACC will exercise TACON of
AAC tanker sorties operating in support of USCENTCOM air operations and will exercise TACON of
Navy and Marine sorties provided IAW subparagraphs below.
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3 (U) As combat forces arrive in theater, prepare air tasking orders on a daily basis to
counter an Iraqi offensive.
4 (U) Serve as the area air defense commander (AADC) with the authority to establish
and operate a joint integrated air defense and airspace control system.
5 (U) Serve as the airspace control authority (ACA).
6 (U) Serve as the coordinating authority for USCENTCOM interdiction operations with
the responsibility of coordinating interdiction planning and operations outside the ground force
commanders defensive sectors.
7 (U) Assume responsibility for theater aeromedical evacuation operations.
8 (U) Coordinate strategic reconnaissance operations with USSTRATCOM.
9 (U) Assume command, less OPCON, of U.S. Air Force special operations forces in the
CENTCOM AOR.
10 (U) Provide TACPs to forward deploying ground forces.
11 (U) Support PSYOP and civil affairs operations.
(c) (U) USNAVCENT.
1 (U) Support or implement deterrent measures by continuing to deploy forces and by
establishing control of the sea LOCs in the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.
2 (U) Conduct Port Security and Harbor defense with priority of effort to Kuwait City,
Ad Damman, Dhahran, and Al Jabayl, in that order.
3 (U) Assume OPCON, or TACON of all U.S. Naval Forces entering the USCENTCOM
AOR (except U.S. Navy SOF).
4 (U) Conduct mine countermeasure operations in the Straits of Hormuz, Red Sea, and
Arabian Gulf.
5 (U) Coordinate the efforts of any supporting naval forces operating outside the
USCENTCOM AOR.
6 (U) Conduct MPF operations in the vicinity of Kuwait City.
7 (U) Provide air support to the JFACC IAW coordinating instructions paragraph below.
8 (U) Be prepared to provide CAP over the Suez Canal, if requested by Eqypt.
(d) (U) USMARCENT.
1 (U) Support or implement deterrence measures to deploy forces and defend critical
facilities.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
2 (U) Be prepared to defend port facilities vic Kuwait City.
3 (U) As combat forces arrive in theater, establish defensive sector from 3000N4800E to
2958N4707E.
4 (U) Be prepared to conduct sustained operations ashore.
5 (U) Be prepared to reembark forces for subsequent amphibious operations.
6 (U) Provide ANGLICO teams to Army forward units, as requested.
7 (U) Operate the Port of Kuwait City as a strategic sustainment port.
(e) (U) COMSOCCENT.
1 (U) Assume OPCON of all special operations forces (except PSYOP and Civil Affairs)
upon their entry into the USCENTCOM AOR and conduct special operations to support deterrent
measures.
2 (U) Conduct foreign internal defense (FID) operations in support of Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, and other GCC states, as requested.
3 (U) Identify escape and evasion nets for airmen downed in Iraq in coordination with
other government agencies, as required.
4 (U) Provide liaison personnel to other USCENTCOM components and to Kuwaiti and
Saudi Arabian agencies, as required to coordinate SOF operations.
5 (U) Commence special reconnaissance operations and electronic surveillance of Iraqi
forces. Cross border operations authorized only when permission is granted by USCINCCENT.
6 (U) Serve as coordinating authority for all USCCENTCOM search and rescue
operations.
(3) (U) PHASE III (DEFENSE, C+45 THRU INDEFINITE).
(a) (U) USARCENT.
1 (U) Establish defensive sector from 2928N4717E to 2742N4434E. Defend as far
forward as possible. Guard theater left flank from 2810N4415E to 2633N4521E.
2 (U) Continue PSYOP and Civil Affairs operations.
3 (U) Continue to provide theater CS and CSS, as directed.
4 (U) Provide a heavy mech division as theater reserve positioned vic 2710N4815E.
Theater reserve committed only by permission of USCINCCENT. Be prepared to provide a two-division
heavy corps (with ACR and AVN Bde) to the CINC for the conduct of theater counteroffensive
operations.
5 (U) Serve as the joint rear operations commander.
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6 (U) Be prepared to reinforce USMARCENT.
7 (U) Be prepared to conduct counteroffensive operations to eject enemy forces and
restore the integrity of the Kuwait and Saudi Arabian borders.
8 (U) Be prepared to reestablish defensive positions from 2810N4415E to 2958N4707E.
9 (U) Assume responsibility for enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations. Establish
theater EPW retention facilities.
10 (U) Be prepared to conduct post conflict restoration and clearing operations. Serve as
the CENTCOM executive agent for post conflict operations.
(b) (U) USCENTAF.
1 (U) Serve as the JFACC IAW coordinating instructions listed below.
2 (U) Serve as the AADC IAW coordinating instructions listed below.
3 (U) Serve as the ACA IAW coordinating instructions listed below.
4 (U) Conduct counterair, close air support, and interdiction operations, as required.
5 (U) Conduct airdrop, airland, and aerial resupply operations, as required.
6 (U) Support COMSOCCENT, as required.
7 (U) Be prepared to support counter-offensive operations, as directed.
(c) (U) USNAVCENT.
1 (U) Continue port security/harbor defense operations.
2 (U) Continue to conduct protection of shipping operations in the SLOCs.
3 (U) Continue countermine operations.
4 (U) Conduct counterair, CAS, and interdiction operations in support of the JFACC
IAW coordinating instructions below.
5 (U) Provide Naval Surface Fire Support, as requested and planned.
6 (U) Destroy all Iraqi naval assets.
7 (U) Be prepared to conduct amphibious operations.
8 (U) Be prepared to support counteroffensive operations.
9 (U) Support COMSOCCENT, as required.
10 (U) Coordinate employment of any supporting naval forces.
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11 (U) Support combat search and rescue, as required.
12 (U) Be prepared to receive HQ USCENTCOM aboard U.S. Navy command and
control ship if required.
(d) (U) USMARCENT.
1 (U) Establish defensive sector from 2940N4809E to 2928N4717E. Defend as far
forward as possible.
2 (U) Be prepared to reinforce USARCENT.
3 (U) Be prepared to conduct counteroffensive operations to eject enemy forces and
restore the integrity of the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders.
4 (U) Be prepared to reembark Marine forces of MEB size and conduct amphibious
operations behind enemy advances vic Mina Abd Allah to Mina Saud on the Kuwaiti coast.
5 (U) Be prepared to reestablish defensive positions from 2940N4809E to 2928N4717E.
6 (U) Be prepared to conduct post-conflict restoration and clearing operations.
7 (U) Provide air sorties to the JFACC IAW coordinating instructions below.
8 (U) Conduct sustained operations ashore.
9 (U) Defend Kuwait City at all costs.
(e) (U) COMSOCCENT.
1 (U) Conduct special reconnaissance and direct action missions in support of the theater
interdiction effort. After an Iraqi attack, infiltrate into Iraqi rear areas within Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and
conduct operations to disrupt and delay Iraqi advances.
2 (U) Continue FID missions with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
3 (U) Coordinate with Joint Rescue Coordination Center for combat search and rescue
operations.
4 (U) Be prepared to assist ground force commanders in conducting counteroffensive
operations, as required.
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
(1) (U) C-Day will be designated by the NCA.
(2) (U) D-Day is the day Iraqi forces initiate hostilities against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.
(3) (U) This OPLAN effective for planning upon receipt and for execution when directed.
(4) (U) Cross-border operations into Iraq require CINCCENT approval.
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(5) (U) Direct liaison is authorized among all components. Keep HQ USCENTCOM advised of
all significant operational or logistical coordination.
(6) (U) Authority to initiate mining operations in the AOR is held by USCINCCENT.
(7) (U) Be prepared to integrate forces of other friendly nations into the OPLAN.
(8) (U) Be prepared to provide liaison teams to other friendly nations.
(9) (U) Due to the sensitivity to foreign troops on Arab soil, U.S. forces should avoid any actions
which may violate the customs of Arab nations.
(10) (U) Reporting requirements will be IAW the USCENTCOM Crisis Action SOP.
(11) (U) All units will be prepared to conduct chemical and biological defense operations.
(12) (U) Boundaries. See Appendix 19 to Annex C.
(13) (U) JFACC responsibilitie s include planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking based on
USCINCCENT apportionment decisions. The JFACC will direct the air effort to ensure integration of
service air operations within USCENTCOM concept of operations. Naval forces will make available to
COMUSCENTAF all sorties in excess of those required for assigned naval warfare task.
COMUSMARCENT will retain operational control of his organic air assets. COMUSMARCENT will
make sorties available to the JFACC for tasking through the MAGTF Air Combat Element Commander
for air defense, long-range interdiction, and reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support
requirements will be provided to the JFACC for tasking to support the joint force as a whole.
(14) (U) The Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) will integrate all service air defense forces
into the theater air defense systems IAW the overall air defense priorities of USCINCCENT. The AADC
will establish weapons control measures and fire control procedures. Land- and sea-based SHORAD and
POINT AIR DEFENSE systems will remain under the OPCON of their respective component
commanders. Army and Navy area defense systems will be controlled by the AADC.
(15) (U) USCINCCENT will serve as the Joint Force Ground Component Commander.
(16) (U) The JFACC will coordinate JFC-directed, theater-wide missions with a ground AO with
the affected commander to ensure accomplishment of the JFC’s overall objectives (Ref. JP 3-09, p. I-3).
4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
a. (U) Concept of Support. Logistic support for forces is a Service responsibility. USCENTCOM
will exercise directive authority for logistics and will assign cross and common servicing responsibilities
IAW the developing situation and ability of service components to insure equitable distribution of
resources provided by service components, host nations, or through private enterprise. Components and
forces in support of USCENTCOM will comply with the instructions of their respective commands and
may coordinate with other Services via logistic channels. Components and supporting commands will
coordinate interservice, common, and cross-servicing agreements. Copies of agreements will be provided
to USCENTCOM ATTN: CJ4 (CENTCOM J4). Support for CENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX will be
provided in three phases as follows:
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-25
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(1) (U) Prior to the implementation of this or any derivative of this OPLAN, the main effort will
be to insure the readiness of forces tasked to support operations under COCOM of CINCCENT. This
Headquarters will coordinate with Service components to insure specific units identified by the Services
to support requirements under this plan have their METL and are training for operations in the SWA Area
of Operation.
(2) (U) Phase I. Deterrence Phase (C-Day thru D-Day). Initial efforts in this OPLAN in concert
with identifying friendly centers of gravity is to establish a functioning COMMZ and to take the
necessary actions to protect it. Within this broad scope, Service components will comply with policies
and procedures outlined in the ISCP tables of data and USCENTCOM SOP for sustainment and logistical
planning. Priorities for the use of facilities and supplies will be coordinated by the CENTCOM J4. The
reinforcement of CJ4 forward to coordinate the basing of deploying forces, complete as necessary any
remaining Host Nation Support Agreements in conjunction with the USCENTCOM Logistics
Coordination Center (CENTCOM LCC) located at the American embassies in Riyadh and Kuwait City.
LCC will coordinate with CJ4 forward to coordinate service and supporting CINC’s requirements prior to
the deployment of HQ, USCENTCOM, from MACDILL AFB during Phase II. USARCENT is
responsible for APOD reception activities and movement to initial deployment locations. This phase
continues until deployment of forces listed at Annex A is complete; anticipate comple tion of this phase at
C+90.
(3) (U) Phase II. Deterrence/Force Build-up Phase (C+5 thru C+90). Priority of effort is to the
development of the COMMZ and the logistical support base to sustain forces throughout the Area of
Operation. Upon establishment of the COMMZ, COMUSARCENT is designated Joint COMMZ
Commander. Joint Boards will be established as soon as practical to coordinate the sustainment effort
with initial effort to movement, petroleum, medical, public affairs, and medical regulating in order.
Supply build-up to levels indicated in Annex D to this plan is essential to insure continuity of support to
deployed forces. These actions will logistically posture USCENTCOM for a strong defense and transition
to Phase III of this plan should deterrence fail and defensive operations be initiated. Be prepared to
provide common item support to allied forces as directed.
(4) (U) Phase III. Defensive Phase (C+45 thru Indefinite). Sustain ment of Phase III will be
implemented in three subphases to track with the tactical concept of operations, paragraph 3a of this
OPLAN.
(a) (U) Phase IIIa. Defensive Posturing (C+45 thru D-Day). Priority of effort during this
phase is the improvement of the logistic posture of deployed forces throughout the Area of Operations.
The improvement and possible relocation of supply stocks and facilities to sustain a coordinated defense
of the theater rather than deploying forces will mark this subphase. Forward basing of priority supplies
will be essential. However, this process must remain within the commander’s intent for deception
operations. Actions which must be accomplished prior to the completion of this phase include the
establishment of the jo int boards to coordinate movement, petroleum, and medical regulation.
(b) (U) Phase IIIb. Defensive Combat (D-Day thru D+7). During the defense, it is essential to
establish the logistical preconditions necessary to prosecute decisive combat operations. While defensive
operations continue, staging of supplies forward will insure that sustainment is not the sole limiting factor
of the combatant commander.
(c) (U) Phase IIIc. Counteroffensive (D+7 thru D+20). Sustainment of offensive operations to
restore the national borders and transition to defensive operations on those borders is the priority effort
during this phase. Service components will be prepared for the reception of rotating units and the
redeployment of forces directed to other locations/supporting CINC’s AORs as required.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-26
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(5) (U) There are two likely sequels to this OPLAN, each of which will be conceptually
developed and drafted as internal taskings to CJ4. The first involves a unilateral redeployment similar to
what was done following Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, and the second involves a long-term
defensive posture along the secured boarders.
b. (U) Logistics, Annex D
Ref 8-D-59
c. (U) Personnel, Annex E.
Omitted
d. (U) Public Affairs, Annex F.
Omitted
e. (U) Civil Affairs, Annex G.
Omitted
f.
Omitted
(U) Environmental Services, Annex H.
g. (U) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy, Annex M.
Omitted
h. (U) Space Operations, Annex N.
Omitted
5. (U) Command and Control.
a. (U) Command Relationships.
(1) (U) USCINCCENT will be the JFC and will have COCOM of all assigned forces in the
Theater of War.
(2) (U) Theater of War for this plan is defined as that area identified in paragraph 1b and
Appendixes 18 and 19 to Annex C of this plan.
(3) (U) Command Relationships as per Annex J.
b. (U) Command Posts. HQUSCINCCENT will be located at MACDILL AFB until relocation to
Riyadh during Phase II. A rear HQ will remain open at MACDILL AFB.
c. (U) Succession to Command. USCINCCENT, USDEPCINCCENT, USARCENT, USCENTAF,
USMARCENT, and USNAVCENT, in that order.
(1) (U) USCINCCENT JCEOI (Omitted).
(2) (U) JCSE arrives in Theater on C+1.
ANNEXES
A-TASK ORGANIZATION
B-INTELLIGENCE
C-OPERATIONS (Appendixes 18 and 19)
D-LOGISTICS
F-PUBLIC AFFAIRS
J-COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-27
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
ANNEX A TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
TASK ORGANIZATION (U)
ORGANIZATION
COMMANDER
USCENTCOM
USCINCCENT
U.S. Army Forces (33D Army) CENTCOM
COMARCENT
U.S. Air Forces CENTCOM
COMCENTAF
U.S. Naval Forces CENTCOM
COMNAVCENT
U.S. Marine Forces (Ashore) CENTCOM
COMUSMARCENT
U.S. Special Ops Command CENTCOM
COMSOCCENT
TASK ORGANIZATION BY COMPONENT COMMANDS (U)
USCENTCOM—Ground Forces
USARCENT
33D Army
33rd TCC
3rd PERSCOM
113th MP Gp
530th AMMO Gp
110th TAACOM
515th MI Bde
110th ENCOM
86th MEDCOM
37th PETROL Gp
103rd Press Camp
33rd TAACOM
46th TRANSCOM
TA FINANCE COMMAND
720th TAMCA
111th ASG
112th ASG
18th Eng Const
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-A-29
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
XXI Corps (U.S.)
47th Div (AASLT)
23rd Arm Div
55th Mech
21st Lt Inf Div
207th ACR (In-theater)
312 Mech Bde (Sep)
21st Corps Arty
76th FA Bde
77th FA Bde
78th FA Bde
15th Avn Bde
41st Chem Bde
21st Engr Bde
21st MI Bde
21st MP Bde
71st Sig Bde
21st COSCOM
11th ADA Bn
II Corps (U.S.)
25th Arm Div
53rd Mech Div
209th ACR
2nd Corps Arty
62nd FA Bde
63rd FA Bde
64th FA Bde
12th Avn Bde
12th ADA Bde
42d Chem Bde
52d Engr Bde
22nd MI Bde
22nd MP Bde
72nd Sig Bde
2nd COSCOM
USCENTAF
HQCENTAF
9th Air Force
Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW)
AEW
AEW
AEW
AEW
34th Composite Wing
23d Composite Wing
Resulting Aircraft Available
108 F-15C
190 F-16C
24 F-117A
90 F-15E
12 EA6B
108 A-10/OA-10A
5 U-2
34 B-52H
16 KC-10
121 KC-135R/E
4 RC-135
11 E-3
2 E-8A
104 C-130H
5 AC-130
10 EC-130
5 EC-130H
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-A-30
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
4 HC-130
8 MH-53
8 MH-60
4 C-12A
4 C-21A
24 B-1B
6 B-2A
USNAVCENT
5 CVBG Task Forces (w/F-14s, F/A-18s, and EA-6Bs)
1 LCC (Command Ship)
1 AGF (Command Ship)
2 SAG
1 PHIBRGM
2 PHIBRON
USMARCENT
I MEF
1st Marine Div
7th Marines
3rd Marines
6th Marines
11th Marines (arty)
1st Assault Amphibian Bn
1st Tank Bn
1st Light Armored Recon Bn
3rd Light Armored Recon Bn
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
Marine Aircraft Group 11 (fixed wing)
Marine Aircraft Group 16 (rotary wing)
Marine Air Control Group 38
Marine Wing Support Group 37
1st Force Service Support Group
General Support Group
General Support Group 2
(Afloat)
14th MEU (SOC)
27th MEU (SOC)
2nd MEB
Regimental Landing Team 2
Marine Aircraft Group 20
Brigade Service Support Group 2
USSOCCENT
4TH SF Group
6th SF Group
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-A-31
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
76 Ranger Regt
169th Special Operations Aviation TF
528th Special Ops Spt Bn
112th Signal Bn
685th Special Operations Wing (Air Force)
3219 SEAL Tm
3220 SEAL Tm
3221 SEAL Tm
3222 SEAL Tm
SEAL Delivery Vehicles
Special Boat Unit
ALEX P. FOSTER
General
Commander in Chief
Appendixes:
1—Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
2—Extract of Shortfall Identification
3—Force Module Identification (Omitted)
4—Deterrent Options (Omitted)
5—Active and Reserve Component Apportionment Tables (Omitted)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-A-32
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
25 JULY 199X
(U) APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
US AIR FORCE TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST (U)
(U)
FORCE
ORGANIZATION
BEDDOWN BASE
ARRIVAL
HQ CENTAF
9TH AIR FORCE
DHAHRAN
DHAHRAN
C+6
C+17
1ST AEW
18 F-15C
18 F-15C
18 F-15C
18 F-15C
18 F-15C
18 F-15C
27 FS
71 FS
51 FS
117 FS
55 FS
53FS
DHAHRAN
DHAHRAN
DHAHRAN
HAIL
TABUK
HAIL
C+2
C+3
C+10
C+29
C+37
C+11
388TH AEW
18 F-16C
18 F-16C
18 F-16C
18 F-16C
17 FS
33 FS
32 FS
31 FS
AL DHAFRA
AL DHAFRA
AL DHAFRA
AL DHAFRA
C+3
C+4
C+4
C+5
37TH AEW
18 F-16C
18 F-16C
18 F-16C
12 F-117A
12 F-117A
4 FS
308 FS
62 FS
17 FS
16 FS
AL KHARJ
AL KHARJ
DOHA, QATAR
KHAMIS MUSHAIT
KHAMIS MUSHAIT
C+38
C+7
C+36
C+5
C+5
4TH AEW
18 F-15E
18 F-15E
18 F-15E
18 F-15E
18 F-15E
335 FS
313 FS
303 FS
295 FS
293 FS
THUMRAIT
AL KHARJ
THUMRAIT
THUMRAIT
THUMRAIT
C+6
C+8
C+9
C+11
C+13
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-A-1-33
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
FORCE
ORGANIZATION
BEDDOWN BASE
ARRIVAL
27TH AEW
18 F-16C
18 F-16C
12 EA6B
18 F-16C
10 F-16C
552 FS
523 FS
40 ECS
551 FS
550FS
TAIF
TAIF
TAIF
TAIF
TAIF
C+12
C+19
C+9
C+10
C+28
23RD COMPOSITE WING (PROVISIONAL)
18 A-10/OA-10A
18 A-10/OA-10A
18 A-10/OA-10A
18 A-10/OA-10A
18 A-10/OA-10A
18 A-10/OA-10A
5 U-2
14 B-52H
20 B 52H
10 KC-10
2 KC-10
2 KC-10
2 KC-10
356 FS
23 FS
117 FS
118 FS
121 FS
222 FS
171 RS
2 BW
91 BS
40 AREFS
32 AREFS
34 AREFS
42 AREFS
KKMC
KKMC
KKMC
KKMC
KKMC
KKMC
TAIF
CAIRO WEST
DIEGO GARCIA
RIYADH
DIEGO GARCIA
JEDDA
SEEB
C+9
C+37
C+40
C+45
C+14
C+28
C+6
C+7
C+4
C+28
C+4
C+4
C+10
34TH COMPOSITE WING
15 KC-135R
15 KC-135R
20 KC-135R
8 KC-135R
15 KC-135R
16 KC-135R
19 KC-135R
5 KC-135R
3 KC-135R
5 KC-135R
4 RC-135
6 E-3
5 E-3
1 E-8A
1 E-8A
18 C-130H
18 C-130H
18 C-130H
18 C-130H
16 C-130H
16 C-130H
5 AC-130
6 EC-130E
70 AREFS
31 AREFS
306 AREFS
41 AFEFS
132 AFEFS
37 AFEFS
38 AFEFS
39 AFEFS
133 AFEFS
33 AFEFS
170 SRS
1 AWAC S
2 AWAC S
173 RS
173 RS
131 AS
132 AS
133 AS
134 AS
158 AS
105 AS
95 SOS
42 ACCS
JEDDA
JEDDA
JEDDA
SEEB
SEEB
KKI
KKI
KKI
CAIRO WEST
DIEGO GARCIA
RIYADH
RIYADH
RIYADH
RIYADH
RIYADH
RIYADH
RIYADH
RIYADH
RIYADH
KUWAIT INTL
DHAHRAN
AL KHARJ
RIYADH
C+8
C+8
C+16
C+27
C+43
C+10
C+10
C+10
C+7
C+4
C+5
C+6
C+42
C+7
C+34
C+7
C+7
C+27
C+27
C+34
C+42
C+10
C+13
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-A-1-34
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
4 EC-130E(VS)
5 EC-130H
4 HC-130
4 MC-130
8 MH-53
8 MH-60
4 C-12A
4 C-21A
4 B-1
6 B-2A
193 SOG
41 ECS
15 SOS
16 SOS
17 SOS
18 SOS
110 AE
111 AE
RIYADH
JEDDAH
AL KHARJ
AL KHARJ
AL KHARJ
AL KHARJ
RIYADH
RIYADH
DIEGO GARCIA
CONUS
C+28
C+8
C+15
C+15
C+23
C+23
C+4
C+4
C+7
Air Force Units with no self-deploying capability
8 Weather Detachments
1 Air Mobility Element (AME)
2 Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCE)
3 Mobile Airport Squadrons
2 Prime Beef Squadrons
2 Prime Rib Squadrons
1 Tactical Airlift Element
2 Red Horse Squadrons (Heavy Construction)
1 Numbered Air Force Staff for the JFACC
1 Air Operations Center (AOC)
2 Air Support Operations Centers (1 per Army Corps)
6 Combat Control Teams
2 Special Operations Command & Communications Teams (SOCCT)
2 Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facilities (MASF)
3 Control and Reporting Posts
6 Forward Air Control Posts
C+30
C+3
C+3
C+30
C+30
C+10
C+3
C+35
C+5
C+7
C+50
C+75
C+1
C+10
C+15
C+35
U.S. NAVAL TIME-PHASES FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST (U)
NAVAL UNIT
LAD
MPS (2) at Diego Garcia
MPS (3) at Guam
MPS (1) at Norfolk
LCC (Command Ship)
AGF (Command Ship)
SAG
SAG
PHIBRON
PHIBRON
PHIBGRY
CVBG
CVBG
CVBG
CVBG
CVBG
C+7
C+20
C+30
C+21
C+14
C+14
C+14
C+1
C+20
C+35
C+1
C+10
C+14
C+20
C+40
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-A-1-35
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
EXTRACT FROM US GROUND FORCES
TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST (U)
ARMY UNITS
POD
EAD
LAD
RDD/CRD
33D ARMY HQ (AIR)
33D ARMY HQ (SEA)
TA FINANCE CMD
720 TAMCA
46 TRANSCOM
76 RANGER RGMT
4TH SFG
6TH SFG
530 AMMO GP
33D TCC(A)
3D PERSOM
33D TAACOM (AIR)
33D TAACOM (SEA)
111TH ASG (AIR)
111TH ASG (SEA)
110TH TAACOM
112TH ASG (AIR)
112TH ASG (SEA)
18TH ENG CONST (AIR)
18TH ENG CONST (SEA)
86TH MEDCOM (AIR)
86TH MEDCOM (SEA)
110 ENCOM (AIR)
110 ENCOM (SEA)
103 PRESS CAMP
113 MP GP (AIR)
113 MP GP (SEA)
515TH MI BDE (AIR)
515TH MI BDE (SEA)
37TH PETROL GP (AIR)
37TH PETROL GP (SEA)
RIYADH
AD DAMMAM
RIYADH
DHAHRAN
DHAHRAN
RIYADH
RIYADH
RIYADH
KING KHALID MIL
RIYADH
RIYADH
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
DHAHRAN
JUBAYL
DHAHRAN
KING KHALID MIL
KUWAIT
KING KHALID MIL
KUWAIT
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
RIYADH
AD DAMMAM
RIYADH
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
RIYADH
AD DAMMAM
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
C+1
C+20
C+1
C+1
C+13
C+14
C+10
C+12
C+17
C+21
C+27
C+7
C+9
C+40
C+37
C+52
C+52
C+54
C+60
C+63
C+60
C+61
C+65
C+66
C+17
C+65
C+67
C+42
C+43
C+49
C+50
C+26
C+26
C+9
C+13
C+26
C+20
C+12
C+19
C+28
C+41
C+47
C+53
C+53
C+57
C+57
C+72
C+72
C+72
C+77
C+77
C+80
C+80
C+84
C+84
C+27
C+85
C+85
C+57
C+58
C+58
C+60
C+26
C+26
C+9
C+13
C+27
C+20
C+13
C+28
C+28
C+30
C+47
C+30
C+30
C+60
C+60
C+75
C+75
C+75
C+77
C+77
C+80
C+80
C+85
C+85
C+27
C+85
C+85
C+60
C+61
C+62
C+63
C+5
C+14
C+24
C+24
C+28
C+77
C+80
C+27
C+30
C+47
C+49
C+31
C+5
C+14
C+24
C+24
C+28
C+80
C+80
C+30
C+30
C+50
C+50
C+31
XXI CORPS
XXI CORPS HQ
47TH AA DIV (AIR)
21 LT INF DIV (AIR)
21 LT INF DIV (SEA)
47TH AA DIV (SEA)
21 COSCOM (AIR)
21 COSCOM (SEA)
23D ARMD DIV (AIR)
23D ARMD DIV (SEA
76TH FA BDE (AIR)
76TH FA BDE (SEA)
15TH AVN BDE (AIR)
KING KHALID MIL
KING KHALID MIL
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAN
KUWAIT
KING KHALID MIL
KUWAIT
KING KHALID MIL
KUWAIT
KUWAIT INTERNAT
KUWAIT
DHAHRAN
C+1
C+8
C+2
C+22
C+23
C+12
C+40
C+12
C+17
C+12
C+11
C+20
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 8-A-1-36
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
15TH AVN BDE (SEA)
11TH ADA BN (AIR)
11TH ADA BN (SEA)
41 CHEM BDE (AIR)
41 CHEM BDE (SEA)
71 SIG BDE (AIR)
71 SIG BDE (SEA)
21 ENGR BDE (AIR)
21 ENGR BDE (SEA)
55 MECH DIV (AIR)
55 MECH DIV (SEA)
312 MECH BDE (AIR)
312 MECH BDE (SEA)
21 CORPS ARTY-(AIR)
21 CORPS ARTY-(SEA)
21 MP BDE (AIR)
21 MP BDE (SEA)
21 MI BDE (AIR)
21 MI BDE (SEA)
JUBAYL
KUWAIT INTERNAT
KUWAIT
KING KHALID MIL
KUWAIT
KUWAIT INTERNAT
KUWAIT
KUWAIT INTERNAT
KUWAIT
DHAHRAN
JUBAYL
KUWAIT INTERNAT
KUWAIT
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
KUWAIT INTERNAT
KUWAIT
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
C+31
C+14
C+17
C+17
C+19
C+25
C+27
C+14
C+16
C+23
C+25
C+29
C+31
C+17
C+19
C+23
C+25
C+17
C+19
C+31
C+30
C+31
C+65
C+73
C+40
C+43
C+38
C+40
C+38
C+38
C+50
C+49
C+60
C+61
C+40
C+67
C+40
C+67
C+31
C+31
C+31
C+65
C+73
C+45
C+45
C+40
C+40
C+38
C+38
C+50
C+50
C+60
C+60
C+40
C+67
C+40
C+67
C+50
C+68
C+21
C+30
C+36
C+40
C+40
C+41
C+41
C+30
C+30
C+42
C+87
C+67
C+67
C+49
C+64
C+50
C+65
C+48
C+67
C+75
C+76
C+65
C+65
C+65
C+66
C+48
C+70
C+25
C+42
C+42
C+45
C+45
C+49
C+49
C+30
C+30
C+51
C+51
C+63
C+67
C+62
C+65
C+65
C+65
C+67
C+67
C+76
C+76
C+65
C+65
C+66
C+68
II CORPS
II CORPS HQ (AIR)
II CORPS HQ (SEA)
207 ACR
209 ACR (AIR)
209 ACR (SEA)
53 MECH DIV (AIR)
53 MECH DIV (SEA)
12TH AVN BDE (AIR)
12TH AVN BDE (SEA)
12TH ADA BN (AIR)
12TH ADA BN (SEA)
72 SIG BDE (AIR)
72 SIG BDE (SEA)
52 ENGR BDE (AIR)
52 ENGR BDE (SEA)
22D MP BDE (AIR)
22D MP BDE (SEA)
22D MI BDE (AIR)
22D MI BDE (SEA)
42 CHEM BDE
42 CHEM BDE
25 ARMD DIV (AIR)
25 ARMD DIV (SEA)
II CORPS ARTY (AIR)
II CORPS ARTY (SEA)
2D COSCOM (AIR)
2D COSCOM (SEA)
AL MANAMAH
MINA SULMAN
KUWAIT
DHAHRAN
JUBAYL
AL MANAMAH
AD DAMMAM
AL MANAMAH
MINA SULMAN
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
AL MANAMAH
MINA SULMAN
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
L MANAMAH
MINA SULMAN
AL MANAMAH
INA SULMAN
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
AL MANAMAH
MINA SULMAN
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
C+31
C+33
C+6
C+28
C+30
C+29
C+31
C+35
C+37
C+28
C+30
C+31
C+33
C+42
C+44
C+43
C+44
C+45
C+47
C+47
C+49
C+65
C+67
C+58
C+60
C+60
C+61
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Ref 8-A-1-37
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
MARINE UNITS
MEU (AFLOAT)
MEU (AFLOAT)
I MEF
NOTES:
POD
KUWAIT INTERNAT
EAD
LAD
RDD/CRD
C+1
C+20
C+4
C+1
C+20
C+45
C+1
C+20
C+34
(1) USMC A/W WILL BE BEDDOWN IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:
KUWAIT CITY, BAHRAIN, AS WELL AS AFLOAT.
(2) THE MPS GOODS WILL BE OFF LOADED IN KUWAIT CITY AND AL
JUBAYL.
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Ref 8-A-1-38
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
25 JULY 199X
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
EXTRACT OF SHORTFALL IDENTIFICATION (U)
UNIT
POD
EAD
LAD
SHORTFALL
33D TAACOM (AIR)
33D TAACOM (SEA)
21 CORPS ARTY (SEA)
II CORPS HQ (SEA)
72 SIG BDE (AIR)
72 SIG BDE (SEA)
DHAHRAN
AD DAMMAM
AD DAMMAM
AL MANAMAH
AL MANAMAH
MINA SULMAN
C+7
C+9
C+19
C+31
C+31
C+33
C+53
C+53
C+61
C+50
C+82
C+87
23 DAYS
23 DAYS
1 DAY
2 DAYS
31 DAYS
36 DAYS
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
APPENDIX 18 TO ANNEX C (Operations) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
Operations Graphics (U)
CENTCOM AOR
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Ref 8-C-18-57
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
APPENDIX 19 TO ANNEX C (Operations) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
Operations Graphics (U)
ARCENT
MARCENT
ARCENT
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Ref 8-C-19-58
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 199X
ANNEX B TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX
INTELLIGENCE
REFERENCES:
a.
(U) Map: TPC-H-6A, 6B, 6C, 6D; Stock # TPCSSH06D, 1:500,000.
b.
(U) Map: Joint Operations Graphics (AIR); NH 38-11, 12, 15, 1:250,000.
1. (U) Mission and Concept of Intelligence Operations.
a. (U) Mission. The combined intelligence mission is to provide that intelligence required by the
Commander in Chief before, during and after execution of the supporting plan, and to contribute to the
intelligence needs of supporting and subordinate components and commanders from all nations involved
in the execution of the plan. This mission includes all aspects of intelligence operations.
b. (U) Concept of Intelligence Operations. The concept of intelligence operations is to collect,
process, produce and disseminate appropriate intelligence in a timely manner in response to Priority
Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Requests for Intelligence Information (RII) needed to fulfill
approved Essential Elements of Information (EEI).
2. (U) Situation.
a. (U) Characteristics of Area of Operations.
(1) (U) Military Geography.
(a) (U) Topography.
1 (U) Existing Situation.
a (U) General. The Republic of Iraq dominates the Fertile Crescent region of Southwest Asia.
Bounded by Syria and Jordan on its east; Turkey on the north; Iran on the west; and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and the Persian Gulf on the south, Iraq is strategically located to dominate regional affairs. About the size
of California, Iraq stretches along its border with Iran and Turkey to reedy marshes in the Southeast. Iraq
is a land of contrast; desert plains occupy most of Iraq with the exception of the Tigris and Euphrates
River valleys, which are the most fertile in the Southwest Asia. Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf is limited
to the Shatt al-Arab region. An area of historical dispute between Iraq and Iran, the Shatt al-Arab
waterway provides Iraq with a narrow corridor to the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly one of Iraq’s objectives
in its failed attempt to retain Kuwait was to improve its access to the Persian Gulf.
b (U) Terrain. Iraq can be divided into four major geographical zones or regions: the desert in the
west and southwest, the rolling upland between the upper Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the mountains in
north and northeast region, and the alluvial plan through which the Tigris and Euphrates river flow.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(1) (U) The desert region west and southwest of the Euphrates River is part of the Syrian Desert.
Covering sections of Syria and Jordan, this desert is sparsely inhibited and consists of vast stony plains
intersected with sandy subregions.
(2) (U) The upland region of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers is part of a larger area that extends
westward into Syria and Turkey. Water flows in deeply cut wadis (valleys) hampering irrigation efforts.
This region is predominantly desert.
(3) (U) The mountainous region begins southwest of Mosul and Kirkuk, extending to Turkey and
Iran. Mountains range from 1,000 to ,000 meters near the Iranian and Turkish borders. With the exception
of a few valleys this region is suitable only for grazing. At lower elevations in the steppes and foothills,
adequate rainfall make cultivation possible.
(4) (U) The alluvial plain region begins north of Baghdad and extends to the Persian Gulf.
Described as a delta plain interlaced with irrigation canals and intermittent lakes, for years this region was
subject to flooding by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. From the late 1960s to the mid70s, government
efforts were increasingly devoted to flood control. In southern Iraq, an area (15,600 square kilometers)
from Al Qurnah and extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian border is predominantly marsh land.
2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The mountainous and upland regions provide the most
natural defense. Avenues of approach are limited in these regions, and the Iraqis should be able to defend
this region with a small force. The delta plain and southern marsh lands limit avenues of approach to
major road networks. This region is less defensible than the mountainous region and the Iraqis should be
able to contain an attack. The Syrian Desert is the least defensible and the Iraqis are vulnerable to mobile
operations in this region.
3 (U) Effect on Friendly Course of Action. The vast Syrian Desert region is ideal for mobile
operations; however, cover and concealment is limited and water is scarce. The upland region limits
mobile operations to improved/unimproved roads and dirt tracks. Some cover and concealment is
provided by the numerous wadis in the region. Mobile operations are severely restricted in the
mountainous region. Vehicles are limited to the few road networks, and during rainy season the area may
be impassable. In the delta region vehicle movement is restricted to the present road network. Marsh land
in southern Iraq would impede light operations.
a (U) Hydrography.
(1) (U) Existing Situation. Iraq’s coastline is severely limited and not suited for large scale
amphibious operations. Linking the port city of Basra with the Persian Gulf, amphibious operations in the
Shatt al-Arab area would be limited.
(2) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. With a limited coastline the threat of a major amphibious
operation in this region is limited. Iraq should be able to defend this area with a small force. Lacking
multiple outlets to the Persian Gulf, Iraq’s naval operations are limited to port security and coastal patrol.
(3) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. It would be difficult to launch large-scale
amphibious operations against Iraq without violating the territory of neighboring countries. Amphibious
actions would be limited to small boat operations.
b (U) Climate and Weather.
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(1) (U) Existing Situation. The average temperatures in Iraq range from higher than 48 degree C
(120 Fahrenheit) in July and August to below freezing in January. A majority of the rainfall occurs from
December through April and is more abundant in the mountainous region and may reach 100 centimeters
a year in some places. The summer months are marked by two kinds of wind phenomena: the southern
and southeasterly sharqi, a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts to eighty kilometers an hour, occurs
from April to early June and again from late September through November; the shamal, a steady wind
from the north and northwest, prevails from mid-June to mid-September. Dust storms accompany these
winds and may rise to height of several thousand meters, closing airports for brief periods of time.
(2) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Extremes of temperatures and humidity, coupled with the
scarcity of water, will effect both men and equipment. During dry season, clouds of dust caused by
vehicle movement will increase detection capabilities in desert regions. Flash flooding in wadis and
across roads will hinder trafficability and resupply efforts during the rainy season. Clear, cloudless skies
make air superiority a prerequisite to successful offensive operations throughout Iraq. Air operations may
be reduced during windy season.
(3) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Climate and weather will have the same effect on
friendly courses of action as on the threat.
(2) (U) Transportation.
(a) (U) Existing Situation.
1 (U) Road nets. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq’s road system stretched over 20,000 kilometers with
approximately 60 percent of the roads paved. These roads included four-lane highways linking Baghdad
with Basra and Mosul. Smaller highways have been repaired with the exception of key bridges along the
southern route of the Baghdad/Basra highway. Traffic in this area has been reduced by 25 percent.
2 (U) Railroads. Iraq has a well-developed rail system available for military transport and supply.
The rail system consists of over 2,000 kilometers of railroads linking the major cities with the capital of
Baghdad. The railroad system suffered minimal damage during the war and is operating at 80 percent
capability. It is estimated that Iraqi trains can average about 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It is not known
how many armored vehicles can be carried on each Iraqi flat car; however, a fair estimate would be one or
two APCs or one main battle tank per car.
3 (U) Ports. Iraq’s port city of Basra is the country’s major port and handles the bulk of dry cargo.
Located at the northern end of the Shatt al-Arab, Basra was vulnerable to Iranian attacks during the
Iran-Iraq War and much of its cargo was diverted to the port of Aqaba in Jordan. The smaller ports of
Umm Qasr and Az Zubay handle far less cargo but grew in importance during the war between Iran and
Iraq. Extensive damaged sustained during the recent Gulf War has significantly reduced the port’s
capability. It’s believed to be operating at less than 50 percent of its minimum thru-put capability per day.
4 (U) Airfields. Iraq has 94 usable airfields — 56 with permanent surface runways; 6 with
runways over 3,659 meters; 50 with runways over 2,438 meters; 12 with runways over 1,220 meters.
Most of these airfields were damaged during the Gulf War; however, they have been repaired and are
functioning at full capacity.
5 (U) Pipelines. Iraq has four existing oil export pipelines: northward, via Turkey; south, via
offshore terminals in the gulf (Al Faw area); south via Saudi Arabia; and west via Syria. Regional politics
continue to govern the use of these pipelines. For example, during the Iran-Iraq War, Syria denied the
shipment of Iraqi oil through its pipeline and onward to the Mediterranean terminals. And more recently
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
during the Gulf War all pipelines with the exception of Al Faw were shut down by the host countries.
Today it’s believed oil shipments have resumed through the Al Faw terminal and northern pipeline
through Turkey.
6 (U) Rivers. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers dominate Iraq’s river system and their waters are
essential to the life of the country. Small boats are able to negotiate major portions of these rivers, but a
navigable inland waterway does not exist throughout the river valley and delta plain.
(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Present transportation net will limit the Iraqi’s ability to
quickly reinforce the different regions of the country. Lack of roads in the mountainous region will
require the military to rely on its limited airlift capability to move supplies and personnel in that area. In
the south, marshlands will force the Iraqis to utilize major roads for vehicular traffic. Lacking adequate
access to the Persian Gulf, naval operations will be limited. The multitude of airfields in the country will
enable the air force to operate from diverse locations.
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Regional transportation nets will have the same
effect on friendly courses of action. The use of heavy tactical airlift for movement of supplies and troops
will reduce these limitations.
(3) (U) Telecommunications.
(a) (U) Existing Situation. Severely damaged during the Gulf War, Iraq’s telecommunications
system is limited. The system consists of coaxial cables, radio-relay links, and radio communication
stations, the bulk of which services Baghdad and the major cities. Of the nine AM stations and 81
televisions stations, 60 percent are functioning. Iraq is a signatory to Intelsat and Inmarsat. However, only
a few earth terminals are in operation for international telephone and telegraph communications. The Iraqi
military does not possess portable SATCOM terminals to access these systems.
(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Iraq’s limited telecommunications will have a detrimental
effect on command and control as well as logistics. Actions against communications facilities could
seriously disrupt the presently overloaded facilities.
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Limitations in the present telecommunications
system, will enable friendly forces to exploit the enemy’s command and control capability.
b. (U) Politics.
(1) (U) Existing Situation.
(a) (U) Government systems. Iraq is an authorization one-party state headed by the Ba’th Arab
Socialist Party. The President serves as head of state and government and as chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the top decision-making body in Iraq. In accordance with the
Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, executive and legislative powers are exercised by the president
and Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) respectively. Legislative functions are split between the
RCC and a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly. The 250 members of the Assembly are elected
to four-year terms according to proportionate representation. In practice, real power rests with the
president and the RCC, with the Assembly serving as a rubber stamp to RCC decisions.
(2) (U) Political Dynamics. Since his ascendancy to the presidency in 1979, Saddam Hussein has
established himself as the country’s strong leader. Exercising a heavy hand approach, Saddam Hussein
effectively removed his opposition and maintained control of the government. The Gulf War revealed the
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
vulnerabilities of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’th party government and civil war erupted throughout the
country. Today significant unrest continues with the Kurdish population in the north and pockets of Shiite
resistance in the south.
(3) (U) Foreign Relations. The Gulf War has not significantly changed Iraq’s orientation in
foreign affairs. Iraq continues with its nonaligned but necessary relationship with the NIS and East
Europe. Although dis appointed with the lack of support during the war, cooperation continues on a
number of economic and military issues. On the regional front, Iraq continues to maintain a hard-line
position with regard to a Middle East peace settlement, winning the support of many of the Palestinians
throughout the region. Relations with its neighbors have not improved since the Gulf War and diplomatic
relations with the U.S. remain broken.
(b) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. While the Gulf War and subsequent civil turmoil has
weakened the central government, the president and the RCC remains firmly in control of the government
and the armed forces. Military operations vis-a-vis foreign forces in areas of civil unrest will require
additional troops to govern the population. Commanders will continue to be hampered by the rigid
command and control exercised by the RCC.
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Friendly forces should be able to exploit Iraq’s
internal situation by aiding partisan forces. The lack of decentralization in Iraqi command and control will
enable friendly forces to maintain the initiative in military operations.
c. (U) Economics.
(1) (U) Existing Situation. Oil exports fuel the Iraqi economy. With an annual gross national
product (GNP) of $40 billion, approximately 40 percent is provided by the petroleum sector. Iraqi oil
exports will continue to dominate the country’s economy. Much of Iraq’s oil wealth was used to purchase
armament and build the military. This, combined with the financing of two wars and the requirement to
pay war reparations, has severely weakened the Iraqi economy. The future of Iraq’s economy lies with its
ability to meet pre-war petroleum export levels, while undergoing an economic austerity program.
(2) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. Dependence on foreign trade and petroleum exports to
generate foreign currency makes Iraq susceptible to operations against her lines of commerce and supply.
(3) (U) Effects on Friendly Course of Action. Iraq’s heavy reliance on the petroleum sector to
sustain its economy makes the oil fields, pipelines and its off-shore terminal facility at Al Faw lucrative
strategic targets. Seizure or destruction these facilities would hasten the destruction of Iraq’s military.
d. (U) Sociology.
(1) (U) Existing Situation. Estimated at 16 million in 1986, Iraq’s population is divided among
the two largest ethnic groups (Arabs and Kurds) and several smaller ethnic communities. These groups
include Assyrians, Turkomans, Iranians, Lurs and Armenians. Approximately 95 percent of Iraqis are
Muslims, and Islam is officially recognized as the state religion. Of these Muslims, 55 percent are Shiites
with a majority residing in southern Iraq. Living in the northern mountainous region of Iraq, Kurds make
up approximately 20 percent of the country’s population. A fiercely independent people, historically the
Kurds have resisted central government rule. A major Kurdish rebellion ended in 1975 following the
Algiers agreement between Iraq and Iran; however, recent fighting erupted during the Gulf War and
isolated pockets of resistance continue today. Less troublesome than the Kurds, the Shiites remain a
potential problem in southern Iraq.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(2) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. Mistrust of the Kurds and Shiites will make Iraqi military
operations in these regions difficult. Additional armed forces will be necessary to govern these while
conducting military operations against a foreign power.
(3) (U) Effects on Friendly Courses of Action. Friendly forces should be abler to exploit these
divisions within Iraq. Support to Kurdish and Shiite partisan groups could serve as a force multiplier
when conducting military operations against Iraq.
3. (U) Enemy Capabilities.
a. (U) Ground Capabilities. Significantly reduced during the Gulf War, the Iraqi Army has
reconstituted and is operating with an estimated force of 400,000 men. The Iraqis have seven corps HQs
functioning as the operationa l headquarters for the Army. During war, these headquarters communicate
directly with the General Headquarters (GHQ), the Army’s highest echelon of command. The corps
frequently have operational control of five to seven divisions. These divisions could be a mix of up to six
infantry divisions, one to two armored, and one to two mechanized infantry divisions. Other units organic
to the corps include brigade-size or larger artillery and air defense artillery units, a reconnaissance
battalion, one or two commando brigades, and other support units. The burden of support operations and
the command and control of additional elements often force corps to send out a forward command post.
b. (U) Air Capabilities. The priority of Iraq’s rearmament has gone to improve its severely damaged
air capability. It is believed the Iraqis now have 300 plus combat aircraft in their inventory. Mostly of
Soviet origin, these aircraft have been updated with the latest avionics and include Su-17/20/22
FITTERSs, Su-265/FROGFOOTs, and MiG-25/FOXBATs. The Air Force also holds a small inventory of
French Mirage F-1s. In addition to combat aircraft, the Iraqis have a substantial inventory of attack and
transport helicopters.
c. (U) Naval Capabilities. Iraq’s naval capability is limited. It consists of several light cruisers and
patrol boats used primarily for coastal security and maritime assistance.
d. (U) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare Capabilities. Amid speculation that Iraq had
acquired the technology to develop nuclear weapons, to date Iraq does not posses a nuclear weapon
capability. Although the bulk of Iraq’s biological and chemical capability was reduced during the Gulf
War, Iraq does maintain the capability to employ chemical weapons.
4. (U) Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.
a. (U) Worst Case. The Iraqis have the military capability to launch an attack through Kuwait and
into the Iraq/Saudi Arabia neutral zone. With United Nation military observers in the demilitarize zone,
the Iraqis would precede this attack with an extensive political and military deception campaign. The
Iraqis would be able to employ and sustain up to 24 divisions in this attack. The Iraqis would use their
helicopters early in the attack to secure critical Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian command and control and key
petroleum facilities.
b. (U) Probable Course of Action. Constrained by United Nations embargoes on the purchase of
military equipment, the Iraqis have nonetheless been able to obtain military equipment through
international arms dealers. Continuing with the incremental rearmament of their armed forces is Iraq’s
most probable course of action. While it is unlikely that Iraq would threaten Saudi Arabia at this point, it
is not beyond the realm of possibility that they would attack if the appropriate political deals could be
made to preclude another coalition effort on the part of the U.S. To date, significant improvements have
been made in Iraq’s Air Force, air defense, and command and control capabilities.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
5. (U) Conclusion. The Iraqi strengths are significant. Units are at 95 percent strength in personnel and
equipment. The soldiers will view this as a Holy War, if initiated, and appear willing to die for
martyrdom. They appear better trained than past experience has shown. They are using a modified form
of Soviet Doctrine and, having taken their lack of knowledge of the operational art to heart, have been
closely studying and emulating a form of Soviet operational art. They are making better use of their
armor, mech infantry, and artillery in a synchronized battle than seen in 1990/91. Our intelligence sources
tell us that they will not assume a defensive posture and passively wait for us to attack their position.
They will also make better use of any American citizens that they can bring under their control, learning
from their earlier mistakes. Their weaknesses are also significant. Their intelligence will be ineffective
and they have no current access to satellites. Iraq does not appear ready for capable of task organizing
outside of its brigade-sized units and limits itself to barrage-style artillery attacks. These attacks can be
exploited if the barrage is avoided. Their logistics base and capability to support a deep thrust into Saudi
Arabia is suspect.
6. (U) Intelligence Activities.
a. (U) Direction. Initial intelligence requirements have been satisfied by this Annex and Appendix I,
EEI. Components and supporting commands will assess the adequacy of available intelligence for both
planning and operational use.
b. (U) Collection Management. USCENTCOM exercises collection management authority (CMA)
for collection assets organic to the command.
c. (U) Reporting. Intelligence information collected in response to EEI of the OPLAN will be
forwarded immediately by U.S. Forces to the USCENTCOM/J2 IAW appropriate USCENTCOM
directives.
d. (U) Processing. During the execution of this OPLAN, intelligence information received by
USCENTCOM will be processed and evaluated by the USCENTCOM/J2.
e. (U) Production.
(1) (U) U.S. Forces.
(a) (U) Joint intelligence reporting procedures will apply to all components and supporting
commands under the operational C2 of USCENTCOM. These reports should provide accurate and timely
intelligence information on which to base future operational decisions.
(b) (U) Components and supporting commands will produce their own required intelligence or
advise USCENTCOM of their inability to do so and request assistance. The USCENTCOM J2, when
possible, will then produce the necessary reports or request assistance from higher HQs.
f.
(U) Dissemination.
(1) (U) Timely dissemination of intelligence to all interested components and supporting
components and supporting commands of Joint Forces and Theater of Operations Commander and
USCENTCOM is essential. Normally this flow of intelligence will be accomplished by means of General
Service (GENSER) communications using an “Immediate” or “Flash” precedence. TENCAP information
dissemination is in accordance with appropriate service directives. If these means are inoperative or
backlogged, then consideration should be given to using an alternate means such as secure voice, secure
facsimile, or messenger.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(2) (U) The principle intelligence report produced by the USCENTCOM components and
supporting command intelligence staffs is the intelligence summary (INTSUM). The INTSUM will be
submitted by the components and supporting commands to the USCENTCOM/J2 as required.
g. (U) Counterintelligence. Will be performed under joint agreement between counterintelligence
authorities of the host nation and all other participating nations.
7. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks.
a. (U) Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units.
(1) (U) Acquire basic and current intelligence required by deploying forces.
(2) (U) Prepare CI and security plans for predeployment of deploying forces.
(3) (U) Ensure that CI and security subjects are a part of intelligence training at all levels of
command.
(4) (U) Ensure that prior arrangements are made with commanders of staging bases for the
security of forces and movement information.
(5) (U) Ensure that forces maintain adequate planning stocks of maps and charts.
(6) (U) Ensure that adequate coordination has been made with the intelligence staff of the
coalition forces which occupy adjacent sectors.
b. (U) Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. All friendly forces operating within the
Operational Theater of Saudi Arabia are requested to forward information of intelligence interest to the
combined intelligence staff by the most expeditious means available.
8. (U) Miscellaneous Instructions.
a. (U) Survival, Escape, Resistance, and Evasion (SERE). Component Commanders will ensure that
personnel receive indoctrination and training in SERE techniques and are issued equipment, as
appropriate.
b. (U) Collection and Reporting. Joint unconventional warfare forces will collect and report, within
capabilities, intelligence information observed and obtained.
ENCLOSURES
Appendix 1—EEI
Appendix 4—Targeting
Appendix 11—Iraqi Ground Order of Battle
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B, USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (U)
1. (U) General.
a. (U) The purpose of this appendix is to identify the essential elements of information (EEI) in
support of USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX.
b. (U) All military and civilian agencies participating in the collection effort are requested to report
information pertinent to these questions by the most expeditious means possible.
2. (U) Essential Elements of Information.
a. (U) Will Iraq attack U.S. and/or friendly forces deployed to the Arabian Gulf region? If so, when,
where, in what strength, and with what weapons?
b. (U) What are Iraqi intentions toward American, UN and other Western citizens in Kuwait and
Iraq? What are the locations of potential American hostages in Kuwait and Iraq?
c. (U) Will Iraq employ chemical weapons? If so, when, where, and what type?
d. (U) Will Iraq use short-range ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia? If so, when, where, what
type, and with what payload?
e. (U) Identify the strength, dispositions, subordination, capabilities and intentions of Iraqi forces
deployed in attack positions, especially the Govenor's Vanguard Corps. What is the C2 structure of the
Iraqi forces?
f. (U) Will terrorist actions be directed against U.S. and friendly forces? If so, how, when, and
where?
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HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B, OPLAN 1648-XX
TARGETING GUIDANCE (U)
1. (U) General.
a. (U) The purpose of this appendix is to provide guidance on the formulation of a Joint Targeting
Coordination Board (JTCB) and to provide priority targets for destruction/neutralization in the event
OPLAN 1648-XX is executed.
b. (U) A JTCB will be organized and the JFACC or his representative will chair the board. All
service components, SOF, and primary staff will participate. The J2, through the JIC will provide advice
and possible locations on the following target types.
(1) (U) Initial priority will be to Offensive Counter Air (OCA) with emphasis on airfields, radars
and C2 nodes for Iraqi Air Defense forces.
(2) (U) Second priority will be Iraqi 2 notes for the control of ground forces.
(3) (U) Third priority will be lines of communication (LOCs) into the Saudi/Kuwaiti area of
operations.
(4) (U) Fourth priority will be Iraqi ground forces, especially the operational reserve.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B, USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
IRAQI GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE (U)
UNIT
IRAQI GHQ
901 SF BDE
902 COMMAND BDE
907 SCUD BDE
908 SCUD BDE
909 SCUD BDE
910 SCUD BDE
GOVERNORS VANGUARD CORPS
11 GV TANK DIV
12 GV TANK DIV
13 GV MECH DIV
14 GV MECH DIV
101 GV SF BDE
102 GV COMMANDO BDE
BABYLONIAN ARMY
II CORPS
21 TANK DIV
22 MECH DIV
23 INF DIV
24 INF DIV
201 GV SF BDE
201 GV SF BDE
III CORPS
31 TANK DIV
32 MECH DIV
33 INF DIV
3B4 INF DIV
301 SEP MECH BDE
302 COMMANDO BDE
IRAQI RESERVE
VII CORPS
71 TANK DIV
72 MECH DIV
73 MECH DIV
74 MECH DIV
75 INF DIV
76 INF DIV
77 INF DIV
701 SEP MECH BDE
702 COMMANDO BDE
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
Iraqi Air Order of Battle:
(1) (U) Baghdad Sector:
Airfield
Aircraft
Unit
Al Asad
30 SU-17
25 MIG-25
8 MIG-21 (Rec)
40 SU-24
30 SU-17
30 MIG-21
40 MIG-23
20 SU-25
12 TU-12
18 Hunter
18 TU-16
14 Candid
12 Candid
42d Ftr/bmbr Regt
32d Intcptr Regt
37th Recce Regt
29th Bmbr Regt
452 Ftr Bmbr Regt
33d Intcptr Regt
34th Intcptr Regt
45th Ftr/Bmbr Regt
27th Ftr/Bmbr Sqdn
61st Air Tng Sqdn
28th Bmbr Sqdn
62d Trans Sqdn
63d Trans Sqdn
Al Muhammadi
Al Taqaddum
Balad SE
K2
Rasheed
Saddam Intl
Shayka Mazhar
Dispersal Fields:
Al Iskandriyah
Al Jarrah
Al Numanlyah
Al Sahra
Kut Al Hayy E.
Samarra E.
(2) (U) Iraqi Western Sector:
Airfield
Aircraft
Unit
H2
20 MIG-23
7 MIG-25
20 MIG-27
30 SU-17
15 MIG-21
6 MIG-21 (Rec)
35th Intcptr Regt
32d Intcptr Regt
46th Ftr/Bmbr Regt
47th Ftr/Bmbr Regt
38th Incptr Regt
37th Reece Regt
H3
Dispersal Fields:
Bashur
Erbil NW
Maraygah S.
Qayyarah S.
Qurrah Bay
Tail Afar
Tail Ashtah New
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(3) (U) Iraqi Southern Sector:
Airfield
Aircraft
Unit
Basrah W.
Jalibah
20 SU-25
30 SU-17
6 MIG-21 (Rec)
20 MIG-23
15 MIG-21
45th Ftr/Bmbr Regt
42d Ftr/Bmbr Regt
37th Reece Regt
35th Intcptr Regt
33d Intcptr Regt
Shibah
Tallil
Dispe rsal Fields:
Amara New
Ar Rumaylah
As Salman N.
Ghalayasan New
Nejef New
Qalat Salih
Qalat Sikar
Salwan
Wadi Al Khirr
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
ANNEX D TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
LOGISTICS (U)
(U) REFERENCES:
a. (U) JCS Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations.
b. (U) AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, 1997.
c. (U) USCINCCENT Planning Directive, 19XX.
d. (U) CJCS Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan (ISCP), 19XX.
1. (U) General
a. (U) Purpose. This annex provides policy and guidance for the logistics support of deployed U.S.
forces operating within the Area of Operations for the implementation of USCINCCENT OPLAN
1648-XX.
b. (U) Concept of Logistic Support.
(1) (U) Paragraph 4 of basic OPLAN 1648-XX
(2) (U) Logistics support of deployed forces remains a service responsibility. CINCCENT
exercises directive authority for logistics to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort to support
deployed forces. Maximum use will be made of cross and common servicing as early in the deployment
sequence as possible.
c. (U) Assumptions. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will provide host nation support as previously agreed
in bilateral agreements and will, within the means available, provide ad-hoc support to deployed forces on
a cost reimbursable basis.
d. (U) Resource Availability. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will provide to U.S. forces available classes
of supply to include Class I, III, IV and water to the extent possible. These items will be managed as
crit ical supplies.
e. (U) Planning Factors.
(1) (U) Conservative estimates, i.e. FM 101-10-1/2 and sound judgment, will be utilized in
calculating supply requirements for assigned and attached forces. Historical information from Operations
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM with modification may be useful.
(2) (U) U.S. components will use planning factors published in appropriate service directives for
defensive operations using a moderate rate.
f. (U) Responsibilities.
(1) (U) Kuwait will provide logistic support to U.S. forces IAW paragraph 1d of this annex.
(2) (U) Saudi Arabia will provide logistic support to U.S. forces IAW paragraph 1d of this annex.
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(3) (U) Commander, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT) will provide:
(a) (U) Inland surface transport to USCENTCOM forces.
(b) (U) Receive, store, issue, and provide theater distribution of class I, I(W), II, III(P), III(B),
IV, common V(W) and VI to U.S. component forces.
(c) (U) Support for COMSOCCENT as required.
(d) (U) Inter-Service cross and common servicing as required.
(4) (U) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) will provide:
(a) (U) Support to Naval and Marine forces both ashore and afloat.
(b) (U) Inter-Service cross and common servicing as required.
(c) (U) Port augmentation to COMUSARCENT as required.
(5) (U) Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command (COMCENTAF) will provide:
(a) (U) Theater airlift in support of U.S. forces.
(b) (U) Base support for HQ USCENTCOM.
(c) (U) Support to SOCCENT air force component as required.
(d) (U) Inter-Service cross and common servicing as required.
(6) (U) Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command (COMUSMARCENT) will provide:
(a) (U) Inter-Service cross and common servicing as required.
(b) (U) Port augmentation to COMUSARCENT as required.
(7) (U) Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Central Command (COMSOCCENT)
will coordinate service peculiar requirements with USCENTCOM.
(8) (U) Joint Transportation Board, Joint Petroleum Office, Joint Medical Regulating Office,
Joint Central Graves Registration Office, Joint Facilities and Utilization Board, and Joint Movement
Center will assume coordination functions as per USCINCCENT SOP upon arrival during Phase II of this
plan. Locations TBD.
2. (U) Supply and Distribution.
a. (U) General Guidance.
(1) (U) Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will provide supplies and distribution IAW paragraph 1d above.
(2) (U) U.S. forces will continue to receive supplies from CONUS and supporting CINCs.
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b. (U) Specific Guidance.
(1) (U) Distribution and Allocation.
(a) (U) Prepositioned logistic resources PWRMS are available for planning at the following
locations:
OMAN
KENYA
BAHRAIN
DIEGO
1,000
1,500,000
13,500
23,000
2,000
550,000
4,000
1,500
250
300,000
25,000
1,450,000
92,000
53,000
GARCIA
CLASS I (ST)
CLASS III (GAL)
CLASS V
OTHER (ST)
(b) (U) Existing terminals and LOCs are identified in the USCINCCENT Planning Directory.
(2) (U) Level of Supply.
(a) (U) Resupply as required by service doctrine to maintain a four-day operational safety
level for all units.
(b) (U) Supply Build-up.
1 (U) All classes, except class III and VII: 15 days of supply as of C+30; 30 days of
supply as of C+60.
2 (U) Class III: Five days of supply as of C+30; 15 days of supply by C+60.
3 (U) Class VII as determined by each service.
(3) (U) Salvage. U.S. forces will dispose of salvage material IAW applicable service policies and
directives.
(4) (U) Captured Enemy Material. U.S. forces will collect, locate, safeguard and dispose of
captured enemy material IAW national/service policy on the disposition and use of captured enemy
material.
(5) (U) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. USCENTCOM Assigned and attached forces
are responsible for providing local purchase support for their forces IAW service policies.
(6) (U) POL. Appendix 1 (Omitted).
(7) (U) Inter-Service Logistic Support. Components requiring support will initiate ISSAs with
components providing support. Provide copies to USCENTCOM J4 with copies of negotiated ISSAs.
(8) (U) Mortuary Services. A mortuary affairs collection point will be established and operated by
USARCENT at a location to be determined by CJ4 ICW the Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO).
Service components are responsible for evacuation to the collection point. Cemeteries will not be
established in the area of operation. All remains will be evacuated to CONUS.
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(9) (U) Ammunition. USCINCCENT components will develop ammunition support plans IAW
DOD and service directives. ARCENT will provide common class V(W) support to USCINCCENT
components. Munitions support pr ovided through ISSAs will be provided to the maximum extent
possible. Copies of ISSAs will be provided CJ4.
3. (U) Maintenance and Modification.
a. (U) General Guidance.
(1) (U) Maintenance of service unique equipment remains a service responsibility.
b. (U) Specific Guidance.
(1) (U) USARCENT Maintenance Depot in Egypt will offer maintenance depot level overhaul for
all common items of equipment for all services. USARCENT will provide personnel augmentation as
necessary to accommodate the increased workload. No equipment will be evacuated until C+30 to
facilitate the rapid turn-around of shipping.
(2) (U) USARCENT will establish a general support maintenance capability in Saudi Arabia NLT
C+42.
(3) (U) Maintenance priorities will be based upon component requirements to field and sustain
weapon systems in a combat-ready status as quickly as possible.
(4) (U) Cannibalization and controlled substitution are authorized as directed by component
commanders.
4. (U) Medical Services. USCENTCOM Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) will be established at
Riyadh to coordinate the movement and evacuation of sick and injured personnel within and from the area
of operation. Initial theater evacuation policy is 10 days and changing to 25 days on or about C+45.
Maximum use will be made of host nation facilities. Specific guidance follows:
a. (U) USCENTCOM JMRO will regulate movement throughout the first three phases of this
operation. In the event CINCCENT should create a JTF with responsibility for a subordinate area of
operation, sub-area JMROs will be established.
b. (U) USCENTAF will establish casualty staging facilities and operate the aeromedical evacuation
system.
c. (U) USNAVCENT will establish casualty staging facilities and operate a naval medical
evacuation system.
d.
(U) Hospitalization.
(1) (U) Service components will specify time-phased bed requirements based upon service
planning factors.
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(2) (U) Availability of hospital facilities prior to the TPFDD medical facilities are:
USARCENT
2200 beds
USCENTAF
450 beds
USNAVCENT
1150 beds
Total
3800 beds
(3) (U) In situations where these facilities become saturated, hospital facilities in EUCOM area of
responsibility will be the first priority back-up. Any changes to this policy or the medical annex to this
plan will be coordinated with the command surgeons of USPACOM and USEUCOM.
(4) (U) Blood products are furnished through the U.S. Armed Services Blood Program Office and
are managed by the USCENTCOM Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO) to be co-located with the JMRO
in Riyadh.
(5) (U) Host nation hospital beds will not be used to offset component combat zone bed
requirements; how ever, they will be used to augment communication zone requirements.
5. (U) Mobility and Transportation.
a. (U) General. All USCENTCOM forces will follow procedures as outlined in USCENTCOM
directive 55-1, Transportation SOP, and component service policy.
b. (U) Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis.
(1) (U) All commanders will develop service specific implementing support plans to this
OPLAN. Supporting plans will include resupply and distribution procedures.
(2) (U) All commanders will maximize use of organic wheeled vehicles for surface transport
requirements. Requests beyond organic capability are to be submitted to the supporting area commands
for resolution.
(3) (U) During periods of increased tension, road networks will become highly congested with
military and civilian traffic. Careful and continuous coordination with host nation movement control
officials is directed to insure safe passage for both military and civilian requirements.
(4) (U) This OPLAN is grossly transportation feasible given the TPFDD at Annex A and the
mobility assets apportioned for planning in the ISCP. Risk may be minimized through coordination with
SACEUR to obtain international assets from the NATO shipping pool in support of this plan. SACEUR
will advise CINCUSCENTCOM and CJCS of details of negotiations.
6. (U) Civil Engineering Support Plan.
a. (U) USCENTCOM ICJ4 will coordinate all engineering support plans. USARCENT will develop
CESP for Saudi Arabia and USMARCENT will develop the CESP for Kuwait.
b. (U) Maximum use will be made of existing military facilities and installations. Use of civilian
and/or other government facilities, except ports and airfields, will not be utilized without permission of
the host nation authorities.
c. (U) Civil engineering support projects will be limited to those that are operationally essential.
Construction will not exceed initial standards.
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7. (U) Sustainability Assessment. CINCUSCENTCOM can sustain operations in support of this OPLAN
provided the force structure is not significantly increased over that shown at Annex A. In the event that
additional forces are earmarked for deployment to the Area of Operation, assistance will be required for
EUCOM and PACOM.
8. (U) Security Assistance.
a. (U) General Guidance. USCENTCOM will continue to assist the State Department in the
execution of security assistance programs IAW existing directives and memorandums of agreement.
b. (U) Specific Guidance. Component commanders will coordinate any service-peculiar new
requests for assistance with the security assistance office at the U.S. embassy, Riyadh.
9. (U) OPSEC Planning Guidance for Logistics. Adequate measures will be developed and implemented
by all forces to enhance operations security without impacting on mission accomplishment. The logistical
posturing of the theater for sustainment of operations can provide the enemy with valuable intelligence
information. Action will be taken at all levels to ensure security of this information.
ALEX P. FOSTER
General
Commander in Chief
Appendixes:
1 — Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply (Omitted)
2 — Mortuary Services (Omitted)
3 — Medical Services (Omitted)
4 — Mobility and Transportation (Omitted)
5 — Civil Engineering Support Plan (Omitted)
6 — Nonnuclear Ammunition (Omitted)
7 — Sustainability Assessment (Omitted
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
ANNEX F TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (U)
(U) REFERENCES:
a. (U) USCINCCENT 021500Z Feb 87, “CENTCOM Deployments Public
Affairs Guidance.”
b. (U) USCINCARRED 041440Z Feb 87, “Public Affairs Guidance on Media
Coverage/ Photography of Special Forces in Training.”
c. (U) Letter, subject “USCENTCOM Public Affairs Guidance,” dated 22 Oct 85.
d. USCENTCOM Reg 360-1, “Public Information.”
1. (U) Situation.
a. (U) General.
(1) (U) This annex assigns responsibilities and provides guidance for the conduct of public affairs
(Public Information and Command/Internal Information) in support of operations described in Annex C.
(2) (U) Overall responsibility for public affairs will remain with the Director of Public Affairs,
USCENTCOM.
(3) (U) Whenever possible, coverage of operational activity should focus on combined military
operations, combined humanitarian assistance activities, and engineer activities.
(4) (U) Public affairs participation will be based on actual, real world requirements. Accordingly,
the introduction of pseudo news media or events into any element of the operation is not authorized.
(5) (U) In an open society, the public can be expected to have access to military information
which does not damage national security with the exception of information controlled by operational
security restrictions.
b. (U) Enemy. See Annex B.
c. (U) Friendly.
(1) (U) Department of State (DOS). Responsible for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and
diplomacy, and conducts information programs through the U.S. Information agency (USIA).
(2) (U) Department of Defense (DOD). Responsible for the conduct of U.S. military operations
and information programs worldwide, through unified/theater commands. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, plans, coordinates, executes, and monitors defense information
programs.
(3) (U) American Embassy. Headed by a U.S. ambassador appointed by and representing the
President of the United States; is responsible for all U.S. activities and citizens in the host country. The
ambassador is assisted by senior representatives of the DOS, USIA, and DOD, and is the approving
authority for execution of U.S. information programs in the host country.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(4) (U) Host Country PAO. Conducts information programs in support of forces; is capable of
supporting dissemination of U.S. and/or combined information products to host country or regional
audiences; can provide indispensable advice in the planning, preparation, and coordination stages.
d. (U) Assumptions.
(1) (U) USCINCCENT will provide proposed PA guidance to OASD (PA) IAW procedures
described in Ref a, and OASD (PA) will provide guidance for releasing information upon receipt of
USCINCCENT proposed PA guidance.
(2) (U) The American public will be informed to the maximum extent possible consistent with
operational security and troop safety. This release of information can best be accomplished through U.S.
and international media.
(3) (U) NCA will make initial announcements concerning major military aspects of this plan.
(4) (U) Forces hostile to U.S. efforts will attempt to discredit U.S. efforts through the media.
(5) (U) The information agencies of the U.S. government and of the host country (HC) can be
expected to cooperate in an effort to explain military aspects of this plan.
(6) (U) Media interest will focus on U.S. presence in the operational area.
(7) (U) Relative freedom of movement could result in media overflights and news media visits in
the operational area without prior coordination.
(8) (U) Distance to operation, site, poor road networks, and the length of the operation may all
lead to excellent opportunities for media flights, tours, and group visits at coordinated times. DOD Reg
4515.13R will be adhered to.
(9) (U) A public affairs detachment will be deployed to support the operation.
2. (U) Mission.
a. (U) The public affairs mission is to provide both timely and factual on-the-scene coverage of the
operation to both the internal military audience and the American public through national, regional, and
local news media.
b. (U) All public affairs actions associated with this operation will be consistent with essential
military security and within policy guidance provided by higher authority.
c. (U) The following goals will be accomplished by public affairs personnel participating in this
operation.
(1) (U) Increase public understanding of U.S. Central Command operations.
(2) (U) Increase the internal military community’s understanding of the U.S. Central Command
and its component/subordinate commands.
(3) (U) Highlight the readiness and capabilities of participating commands.
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(4) (U) Support overall operation objectives outlined in this plan.
(5) (U) Counter hostile disinformation.
(6) (U) Support U.S. regional objectives.
3. (U) Execution.
a. (U) Concept of Operations. The Director of Public Affairs, USCENTCOM, is responsible for the
conduct of U.S. military public affairs within the region.
(1) (U) Public affairs actions will be accomplished in collaboration with both U.S. embassy
diplomatic representatives and host country armed forces.
(2) (U) The responsibility of planning, coordinating, and directing military public affairs field
operations rests with the CENTCOM public affairs officer, who will work in close coordination with the
Public Affairs counselor of the American embassy and the HC public affairs officer.
(3) (U) Initial concurrent news releases will be made from the seats of government by OASD-PA
and HC armed forces. (See Ref k for detailed procedures on development of public affairs guidance and
procedures.) Subordinate commanders may hold press interviews and issue press releases only after
coordination with CENTCOM PAO and receipt of amplifying public affairs policy guidance.
(4) (U) The CENTCOM PAO will determine the best date for a media day(s) and make
arrangements for transportation and accommodation of media to cover activities.
(5) (U) The CENTCOM PAO will provide written after-action PA evaluations to USCENTCOM.
b. (U) Tasks.
(1) (U) USCINCCENT will:
(a) (U) Provide OASD (PA) with proposed policy guidance on PA matters, and when
approved by OASD (PA), provide approved guidance to all subordinate commanders participating in the
operation.
(b) (U) Coordinate and control all theater PA activities of commands concerned with this
plan.
(c) (U) Maintain liaison with OASD (PA) on policy matters.
(d) (U) Ensure that public affairs elements are properly equipped and staffed, and provide
ready access to voice and message communications connecting USCENTCOM headquarters, the joint
task force, and the nearest State Department PA representative. This support will be provided unless
unavoidable military necessity, related to mission and/or safety of U.S. Armed Forces requires all
available assets.
(e) (U) Furnish communicatio ns facilities for PA personnel.
(f) (U) Furnish equipment as needed.
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(g) (U) Coordinate for military audiovisual/operational documentation.
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
(1) (U) Command Relationships. See Annex J.
(2) (U) CENTCOM public affairs officer is authorized to provide UNCLASSIFIED synopsis of
operations after coordination in both public affairs and operations channels. Response to media query is
authorized as prescribed in Appendix 2. Spokesmen may confirm presence of troops, ships, and aircraft
where they are plainly visible to news media and confirmation of their presence is requested.
(3) (U) The physical security of PA personnel, equipment, and visiting media is a command
responsibility and will be incorporated into all planning.
(4) (U) Communiqués, briefings, and news summaries will be required. Specific requirements
will be transmitted after plan implementation.
(5) (U) Public affairs activities will be incorporated in established operational reports.
(6) (U) Materials produced during the execution of this plan will be approved by the CINCCENT
public affairs officer, who will coordinate with the U.S. embassy public affairs counselor and host country
armed forces prior to public release. If there is no concurrence, the materials will not be released but
instead forwarded through USCENTCOM for SECDEF/SECSTATE review and decision.
(7) (U) Hometown news release items should be generally approved by CENTCOM PAO or his
designated representative. However, subordinate commands are encouraged to pursue an aggressive
Hometown News Release Program including Reserve and National Guard personnel participating in the
operation.
(8) (U) Close coordination will be maintained at all levels with USIA and the American embassy
concerned, as well as HC armed forces public relations.
(9) (U) Timely, accurate, and appropriate information will be made available regarding casualties.
(10) (U) Routine coordination will be made with PSYOP commands and staffs to preclude
contradictory efforts. However, PA will not be used for PSYOP purposes, nor will PSYOP staffs be
permitted to participate in public affairs operations.
(11) (U) In the event of an accident or incident, the commander of the forces involved is
responsible for immediately notifying the nearest public affairs office, who will in turn coordinate directly
with the CENTCOM or DOD public affairs officers.
4. (U) Accreditation.
a. (U) USCINCCENT will not recommend accreditation of news media representatives (NMRs) to
the DOD. However, correspondents will be expected to certify association with recognized media by
formal identification. All representatives of legitimate news organizations will be afforded equal
consideration with regard to releasable information on this operation.
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b. (U) All news media representatives will be required to comply with HC requirements prior to being
afforded access to U.S. military activities. CENTCOM; PAO should obtain names and NOK notification
for U.S. media representatives.
c. (U) The CENTCOM public affairs officer, on behalf of his commander, is responsible for U.S.
news media representatives in the area of operations in coordination with the U.S. embassy and host
nation.
d. (U) Media access may be cleared through and confirmed by public affairs channels when
required.
5. (U) Field Press Wartime Information Security Program (WISP). Field press censorship will not be
applicable for this operation and may only be invoked by OASD (PA) message.
6. (U) Arrangements for News Media Representatives (NMRs).
a. (U) General. Several events in this operation provide an opportunity to facilitate public
understanding of the USCENTCOM mission and scope of the operation and merit consideration for
media tours.
b. (U) Facilities. Facilities and logistics support will be provided on a noninterference-with-mission
basis when commercial facilities are not available.
c. (U) Inoculations. Correspondents accompanying forces in the field should have the same
inoculations required for military personnel participating in the operation.
d. (U) Expenses. In the absence of commercial facilities, messing and billeting may be extended to
NMRs on a space available basis. The expenses will be borne by individual news media representatives.
e. (U) Pools. Depending on the situation, it may be necessary to select a small group or pool of
media representatives to cover certain aspects of the operation. It is important that all types of media are
represented and that the pool be as large as transportation facilities permit. News media participation in
the pool will be contingent on proper identification and compliance with HC requirements for news
media.
f. (U) Simulated Rank. Correspondents will be afforded the privileges of an officer for messing,
billeting, and transportation. This provision applies to reserve and retired officers acting as news media
representatives regardless of their reserve or retired grade.
g. (U) Briefings. The CENTCOM PAO will arrange for UNCLASSIFIED briefings by the
commander or his representative. The briefings will outline — as far as possible and within the bounds of
security — plans and operations.
h. (U) Media Days. This will be the preferred method of handling media (See Para 3a.)
i. (U) Communications. Commands at which two PAOs are physically located will provide the
media communications service when commercial facilities are not available. Commercial news copy will
be transmitted by military communications facilities free of charge and in accordance with Annex K.
Commercial news copy will normally be transmitted with the precedence of ROUTINE; however, the
CENTCOM PAO may approve up to a precedence of IMMEDIATE in exceptional circumstances. When
commercial facilities are not available, no attempt will be made to censor news copy to be filed over
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
military communications facilities unless field press WISP has been invoked by higher authority.
However, copy filed over military communications facilities may be reviewed before transmission, and
potential violations of military security may be called to the attention of the sender. If the copy is not
redrafted to overcome valid security objections, it is entirely within the prerogative of the commanding
officer of the communications facility to refuse to accept it for transmission. However, force will not be
used to withhold the drafted material, nor will material be confiscated without authorization from higher
headquarters. Many media teams are expected to have their own mobile satellite communications
terminals. Use of these terminals can result in the near real-time release of text and visual reports to the
rest of the world, to include Iraq and others. Media may be reminded that 18 USC, 793e makes it a
criminal offense to photograph, publish, or refuse to surrender classified information.
j. (U) Courier Flights. If government communications facilities are not available, the on-scene
commander will provide an air-courier flight for forwarding news materials to appropriate processing or
news filing points.
k. (U) Travel. CENTCOM will plan for and provide authorized media representatives military travel
into and within the area of operations when such travel has been approved by OASD (PA) and is in
connection with assignments to cover this operation and commercial transportation is not available.
Appropriate “hold harmless” agreements will be executed prior to travel and invitational travel orders will
be issued as required.
7. (U) Security. Certain precautions are required by the presence of correspondents in the operating
areas.
a. (U) Execution of this operation presents a variety of challenges in maintaining military security as
well as diplomatic or political propriety. Security at the source offers the best protection of classified
information. Diplomatic and political implications of statements of news releases to media representatives
should be weighed carefully at all echelons of command.
b. (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) must be protected.
c. (U) Access to operations, intelligence, and other classified areas must be controlled. Media will
normally be accompanied by a PAO or NCO. Newsmen will not be permitted to visit those portions of
installations which have been restricted for security reasons. They will not be excluded from operational
areas solely on the grounds of personal danger but will be warned when danger exists and advised that the
government assumes no responsibility. The commander is the sole and final judge in determining when
their presence interferes with operations.
d. (U) Security at the source is essential.
e. (U) No correspondent is cleared for classified information.
f.
(U) Correspondents will assume that all statements made to them are “for the record.”
g. (U) “Off the record” or “deep background” statements will not be included in briefings for
members of the press corps.
h. (U) The on-scene commander will review all materials to be released locally for OPSEC
considerations.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
8. (U) Audiovisual.
a. (U) Operational documentation, traditionally a staff function of the J3, becomes a critical public
affairs requirement. The ability to rapidly, clearly, and geographically portray the circumstances
surrounding a contingency to key decisionmakers and the public can have a profound effect on their
perceptions and decisions to support or subvert ongoing operations.
b. (U) The CENTCOM Public Affairs staff will coordinate and define public affairs documentation
requirements.
c. (U) Release authority for audiovisual materials is described in coordinating instructions, this
Annex.
9. (U) Internal Audience.
a. (U) Commanders at all levels are responsible for implementing vigorous command information
programs to insure they are kept well-informed, in order to reinforce confidence in the chain of command,
and counter the effects of hostile propaganda and disinformation.
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HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ADVERSE INCIDENTS WHEN MORE THAN
ONE SERVICE IS INVOLVED (U)
1. (U) Purpose. To provide basic procedures for the release of information concerning adverse
incident/accidents to aircraft, vehicles, ammunition, missiles, ships or facilities, and casualties to
personnel involving more than one military service.
2. (U) Applicability. This appendix applies to personnel of the United States Army, the United States Air
Force, the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps, the United States Coast Guard, and
civilians serving or accompanying those forces when they are participating in joint operations. It applies
to the U.S. Central Command within the geographic limits of the operation area.
3. (U) Definitions. For the purpose of this appendix, four categories of adverse incidents are established.
They are:
a. (U) Emergency. Any incident which results in the death of one or more operation participants, or
which will, in all probability, result in the death of one or more operation participants.
b. (U) Accident/Injury. Any incident which involves serious injury to one or more operation
participants not causing death, but requires his/her withdrawal from the operation. Also included are
incidents which cause a short delay in operation events or incidents which would have resulted in an
emergency if emergency procedures had not been successful. Aircraft accidents are included in this
category to include mishaps, crashes, or emergency landings.
c. (U) Civil Disturbance. Any incident involving the local population which would tend to disrupt
the peace and order of the operation. The incidents may range from a nonviolent demonstration to actual
physical interference with the conduct of the operation.
d. (U) Routine. All injuries, equipment failures, etc., which are not classified as emergencies,
accidents or civil dis turbances. Incidents in this category will not involve adverse incident procedures.
4. (U) Basic Procedures.
a. (U) During joint operations, initial release of information concerning all emergencies of the
accidents/injuries will be made by CENTCOM PAO after coordination with the Service(s) involved. All
initial inquiries from the public concerning these accidents or incidents will be referred to the CENTCOM
PAO, regardless of the Service involved. Where necessary, the appropriate CENTCOM PAO will
coordinate with U.S. embassy PAO and HC RPPP. It is important, in this regard, that information not be
held at any one level, but that prompt, accurate information be available for release. Bad news does not
get better with age.
b. (U) Participating commands and units will notify the CENTCOM PAO as expeditiously as
possible when an emergency or accident occurs. The CENTCOM PAO will inform OASD/PA, USIS, the
U.S. embassy, and RPPP of the HC armed forces immediately upon notification of any emergency,
accident, and incident involving major damage to facilities or any other potentially newsworthy incident.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
The Service(s) involved will immediately report the adverse incident through its (their) public affairs
channels in accordance with applicable regulations.
c. (U) An adverse incident during a joint operation will generate requests from NMRs to visit the
scene of the incident. NMRs may visit the scene under escort of public affairs personnel or by a
representative designated by the on-scene command (OSC). While NMRs are on-scene, they will have
access to the accident on a non-interference basis within the limits of established security policy and if
their personal safety is not endangered. Personal safety decisions will be made only by the OSC.
d. (U) The CENTCOM PAO or his/her designated representative will be the CINC’s official
spokesperson on-scene, and all initial on-scene media queries will be referred to him/her.
e. (U) Photography of an adverse incident will be permitted if no classified material is exposed.
Determination as to the exposure of classified material will be made by the cognizant Service. If there is
doubt as to the exposure of classified material, photographers will be advised they cannot take
photographs and that taking photographs of classified material is in violation of federal law. Federal
Criminal Statutes 28, U.S.C. 795 and 797 may render them liable for criminal prosecution. However,
force will not be used to prevent photography. Film and/or videotape will not be confiscated without
authorization from higher authority.
f. (U) After the initial news release has been made, or after the NMRs have departed the scene, the
responsibilities for follow-on public affairs actions relative to adverse incidents may be delegated to the
Service involved in accordance with applicable regulations, including the release of information
concerning the personnel or equipment involved. All follow-on public affairs activity will be coordinated
with the CENTCOM PAO. At this time, if not previously identified, other Services assisting or
participating in rescue operations may make public release of their part in these operations.
g. (U) If not stated in the initial release, a statement that an investigation is being or will be
conducted to determine the exact cause of the incident will be included in a subsequent release. If no
subsequent release is planned, this information will be available to respond to queries.
h. (U) Release of information concerning incidents involving civil disturbances will be coordinated
with U.S. embassy PAO and HC armed forces public relations.
5. (U) Casualty Information Actions.
a. (U) Names of casualties will normally be released only by the Service to which casualties belong.
Where facts of the emergency are obvious to the public or covered by NMRs on-scene, the operation
public affairs officer may announce, when queried, the number of known dead, the number of known
survivors, and the number of known injured survivors.
b. (U) The CENTCOM PAO will inform NMRs that release of names of casualties will be made by
the parent Service involved after casualties’ next of kin have been notified and that all subsequent
queries concerning casualties should be addressed to the public affairs office of the parent
Service.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
GENERAL GROUND RULES FOR MEDIA (U)
1. (U) General.
a. (U) The principle of maximum information to the public will be followed, consistent with safety
and security. The situation in any military operation is such that correspondents may come into
possession of information which has not been released officially under set ground rules. Such information
is not to be transmitted by American or allied spokesmen in regard to their respective national forces.
b. (U) Restrictions will be kept to a minimum but may be applied by a commanding officer when
the security of an operation warrants such action. Correspondents will be advised of restrictions by the
commanding officer or public affairs officers of the unit involved.
2. (U) Ground Rules.
a. (U) Releasing Authority. CINCCENT or CENTCOM PAO are sole releasing authorities for all
military infor mation material contained in any medium (audio-visual, photography, drawings, etc.)
gathered or produced within the area of operations.
b. (U) Release of Cleared Information. Information cleared for official release will be made
available to the press through one or more of the following means.
(1) (U) Press releases.
(2) (U) Press briefings.
(3) (U) Call outs.
(4) (U) Special press handouts.
(5) (U) Interviews.
c.
(U) Categories of Releasable Information Following Initial Official Release.
(1) (U) General.
(a) (U) Arrival of major units in country or within operational areas when officially
announced by U.S. spokesman.
(b) (U) Approximate friendly force strength figures, by Service, after announced by DOD
spokesman.
(2) (U) Air, Ground, Sea Operations (Past and Present).
(a) (U) Friendly force size in an operation.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(b) (U) Nonsensitive tactical operations details.
(c) (U) Identification and location of military targets and objectives currently or previously
under attack.
(d) (U) Origin of air operations (i.e., land-based or carrier-based).
(e) (U) Date/time/location of previous conventional military missions/activities.
(f) (U) Previous conventional mission results.
(g) (U) Number of aerial combat/reconnaissance mission/sorties flown in theater of
operational area.
(h) (U) Type forces involved (infantry, armor, Marines, carrier battle group, interceptor,
fighter bombers, etc.).
(i) (U) Weather/climate conditions.
(j) (U) Allied participation by type.
(k) (U) Operations nicknames.
d. (U) Categories of Information Not Releasable.
(1) (U) General.
(a) (U) Any information — general, implied, or specific — regarding any aspect of actual or
conceptual future military plans, activities, or operations. Includes all information directly or indirectly
associated with combat, combat support, or combat service support endeavors (i.e., operations, logistics,
administration, politico-military, civil affairs, C S, etc.).
(b) (U) Information on any command, control, personnel, operational or support
vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or shortfalls.
(c) (U) Rules of engagement details.
(d) (U) Information on friendly force security and deception measures/countermeasures.
(2) (U) Air, Ground, Sea Operations (Past and Present).
(a) (U) Information on intelligence collection activities to include targets.
(b) (U) Information on the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover,
deception, targeting, direct/indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
(c) (U) Information on classified or “unique” operations methodology/tactics (air ops angles
of attack, speeds, etc.; naval tactical/evasive maneuvers, etc.).
(d) (U) Information on classified special operations and special purpose operation and
activities.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PARTICIPANTS (U)
(U) Each participant of a combined operation in the Middle East must remember that his or her personal
conduct, appearance, and attitude while enroute to or from and while in the country will reflect upon his
or her fellow soldiers, the United States Central Command, the U.S. military in general, and our country.
(U) It is incumbent upon each of us to ensure that we continuously show respect to the people of the host
nation, their culture and traditio ns, and their roads and towns. To do so will ensure that we will project
our image of professionalism in areas of the country unaccustomed to American military activities
firsthand.
(U) In order to maximize favorable impressions of the U.S. military by the local inhabitants, as well as
minimize the chances of trouble, there must be strict compliance with the following rules:
• Remember you are guests. Any contact with the local inhabitants must be courteous, professional,
and low-key.
• All local inhabitants must be respected both during duty hours and while off-duty. Do not get
involved in altercations with local residents. Likewise, houses, crops, and other property in the area
will be respected. Damage to such costs us, the taxpayers.
• Any off-limits areas and restrictions must be strictly observed.
• No non-prescription drugs will be tolerated.
• No alcoholic beverages will be taken to or possessed in the area.
• Uniforms must be correct and as neat as conditions allow.
• All exercise participants are prohibited from handling both wildlife and domestic animals in the
area.
• Be familiar with and observe the rules of engagement, which are specified in plans or as
determined by your commander.
(U) In addition, the following safety points will be observed as appropriate to prevent accidents:
• Ground guides will be used when backing any vehicle larger than 3/4 ton.
• Drive defensively; be alert to hazardous road conditions (e.g., heavy blowing sand).
• Livestock, such as cattle and sheep, are common in many areas. Drivers should pay special
attention for wandering animals.
• Prevent heat strokes by promptly seeking medical assistance when you become overheated.
(U) The Bottom Line - Remember you are in a sovereign country, and you are guests invited to help.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX
ANNEX J TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)
(U) REFERENCES:
a. JCS Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms.
b. JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
c. JCS Pub 10, Tactical Command and Control, and Communications Systems
Standards.
d. JCS Pub 12, Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and
Procedures for Joint Operations, Vol. 1-4.”
1. (U) General.
a. (U) Purpose. To establish the relationship between:
(1) (U) National Command Authorities (NCA).
(2) (U) Other unified and specified commands.
(3) (U) International commands and organizations.
(4) (U) Coordinating authorities.
(5) (U) U.S. diplomatic missions.
(6) (U) Government departments or agencies that support the operations.
(7) (U) Forces and agencies of other nations.
b. (U) Scope.
(1) (U) This annex establishes the command relationships pertaining to military operations by
USCENTCOM and supportin g forces, in accordance with JCS direction, in the geographic area of the
Middle East, specifically the Arabian Peninsula.
(2) (U) During the planning phase of operations, USCENTCOM component commanders,
supporting commanders, and designated planning agents will pre-prepare plans and provide information
in support of this plan, further designating subordinate commands and planning agents as necessary.
2. (U) Command Lines.
a. (U) Service Components.
(1) (U) Commander, U.S. Army Central (COMARCENT), provides theater- level support to
USCENTCOM as required and is designated as Joint Land Component Commander (JLCC) for Phases
III through V of this plan.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(2) (U) Commander, U.S. Central Air Forces, (COMCENTAF), provides theater-level support to
USCENTCOM as required and is designated as Joint Air Component Commander (JACC) and Area Air
Defense Commander (AADC) for this plan.
(3) (U) Commander, U.S. Navy Central, (COMNAVCENT), provides theater-level support to
USCENTCOM as required. Prior to the establishment of the amphibious landing force ashore (AOA dissolved), operational control of designated Marine Corps forces will be exercised by COMNAVCENT.
(4) (U) Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Central, (COMMARCENT), provides theater-level
support to USCENTCOM as required. After Marine Corps forces are placed under the OPCON of JLCC
(Phase IV), COMMARCENT assumes OPCON of Theater Reserves and the Theater Reserve
responsibility.
(5) (U) Commander, Special Operations Command Central (COMSOCCENT) provides
theater-level support to USCENTCOM as required.
b. (U) Other Subordinate Commands. N/A.
c. (U) Augmentation Forces. Augmentation forces will be provided by direction of the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff. They will be used to complete Theater Army logistics structure and provide other
required support. Duration of mobilization is from M-Day to 60 days past termination of hostilities.
Deployment of augmentation forces will be IAW TPFDL (Annex A), as amended.
3. (U) Support and Coordination Relationships.
a. (U) Supporting Military Forces.
(1) (U) Per JCS direction, USCENTCOM is the supported commander for operations outlined in
this plan. USCINCACOM, USCINCPAC, USCINCTRANS, USCINCSOC, USCINCSPACE,
USCINCSTRAT, USCINCEUR, and the services support USCENTCOM in the development and
execution of plans to support operations outlined herein.
(2) (U) As the situation develops, USCENTCOM will request augmentation forces from the JCS
as required and as outlined in Annex A. Operational control (OPCON) of Naval Forces will pass from
USCINCACOM and USCINCPAC to USCENTCOM COMNAVCENT at H-12 hours prior to D-Day. In
the event that augmentation forces deploy by air, OPCON will pass to the appropriate component
commander upon arrival at the aerial port of debarkation (APOD). Operational control of augmentation
forces from USCINCPAC will pass to USCINCACOM when these forces enter USCINCACOM’s
geographic area of responsibility. Operational control of other augmentation forces approved by the JCS
will pass to USCENTCOM or component commander in accordance with procedures stated above.
b. (U) Coordinating Authorities. None.
c. (U) Supporting Agencies. Per SOP.
d.
(U) Inter-Service Support Agreements. All inter-Service logistics agreements are in effect.
e. (U) Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies. All coordination with diplomatic agencies will be
done by HQ, CENTCOM. Subordinate organizations will communicate coordination requirements to the
J-6. USCINCCENT will maintain close coordination with the Chiefs of Mission of the U.S. embassies in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and those nations bordering Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
4. (U) Relationships with International and Foreign Commands and Organizations.
a. (U) Relationships with GCC Forces. It is anticipated that the GCC will form a headquarters to
command all GCC Forces. This command will be co-equal with USCENTCOM headquarters.
Coordination will be conducted through C3IC (see para 5). Units operating alongside GCC units will
exchange liaison elements.
b. (U) FAR. If French forces are committed to defense of Saudi Arabia, diplomatic efforts will be
made to have FAR ground forces placed under OPCON of 33d Army. French air forces committed to
defense of Saudi Peninsula will remain under French control but will coordinate air operations with
USCENTAF.
c. (U) British Armored Division. If British Armored Division is committed to defense of Saudi
Peninsula, diplomatic efforts will be made to have division placed under OPCON of U.S. II Corps. British
air forces committed to defense of Saudi Peninsula will remain under British control but will coordinate
air operations with USCENTAF.
d. (U) Saudi I Corps is expected to remain under control of the GCC headquarters.
5. (U) Planning Relationships. A Coalition, Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center
(C3IC) will be established with USCENTCOM headquarters and GCC headquarters representatives to
plan and coordinate all operations.
ALEX P. FOSTER
General
Commander in Chief
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PLANNING
DIRECTORY
Reference 9
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900
Ref 9
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
USCENTCOM PLANNING DIRECTORY
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDERS IN CHIEF, U.S. UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
SUBJECT: U.S. Central Command
1. Effective 1 January 1983, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was activated as a unified
command. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT), exercises command as
provided herein and as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
2. USCINCCENT, with headquarters located at MacDill AFB, Florida, is the commander of
USCENTCOM comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his mission. His general area of
responsibility (AOR) for the conduct of normal operations includes the MIDDLE EAST, the land mass of
INDIA, the RED SEA, the PERSIAN Gulf, the HORN OF AFRICA, SUDAN, EGYPT, and the majority
of the INDIAN OCEAN.
3. USCINCCENT will have responsibility for the conduct of normal operations with the authority and
responsibilities of a unified commander, as outlined in the UCP, UNAAF (JCS PUB 0-2), and DOD
Directive 5100.1, or as may be amended in subsequent correspondence.
4. The USCINCCENT, in coordination with USCINCLANT, USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC,
USCINCSOC, USCINCSTRAT, USCINCSPACE, and USCINCTRANS as necessary and, when
required, in conjunction with adjacent allied commanders, will develop plans for the conduct of
operations to fulfill U.S. commitments and to control and protect lines of communication in the
USCENTCOM AOR.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
INTRODUCTION
1. (U) During each assignment, officers accumulate information needed in the performance of their
duties. The information collected covers a broad spectrum of items including:
— Phone numbers.
— Points of contact in other organizations.
— Copies of unit SOPs.
— Copies of the internal SOPs of other organizations with which you deal.
— Specific data on weapons systems and equipment.
— Mobility information for air and sealoading.
— Reports and reporting formats.
— General reference data related to your specific job.
2. (U) This publication provides you with a collection of some of the information you would have
acquired over a period of time in an assignment to Headquarters, United States Central Command. While
it is not all inclusive, it does give you information which will be of assistance during the planning
exercises in C500.
3. (U) Formalized documents included in this document are copies of the USCENTCOM’s Planning
Guidance to the staff for deliberate planning in the AOR and a memorandum from JCS entitled
Assignment of Forces which provides a list of the forces available to CINCCENT for planning purposes.
Both of these documents would normally be classified. Unclassified versions have been given to you to
facilitate instruction. The key point here is that, while you would no doubt have access to these
documents and the information contained therein, they would be secured in a classified document
container and not included in your personal continuity or policy and precedent files.
4. (U) This information, in conjunction with the information found in your Instructional Strategic
Capabilities Plan (ISCP), your defensive OPLAN 1648, and CINCs Theater Strategy, should all facilitate
your learning process in the area of unified staff operations and operational planning.
5. (U) Any suggestions for additional information that should be included in this publication should be
provided to your instructor.
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Ref 9-iii
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title
Page
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION
Ref 9-i
INTRODUCTION
Ref 9-iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ref 9-v
WARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHY
Ref 9-1
TAB A FRIENDLY ORDER OF BATTLE—COALCOM
Ref 9-A-7
TAB B FRIENDLY ORDER OF BATTLE—BRITISH, FRENCH, AND SAUDI
Ref 9-B-9
TAB C SWA ORDER OF BATTLE—PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE
Ref 9-C-13
TAB D INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE—IRAQ
Ref 9-D-17
TAB E INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE—IRAN
Ref 9-E-23
Encl 1—Temperature Data
Omitted
TAB F AREA STUDY OF GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
Ref 9-F-33
TAB G USCENTCOM AREA STUDIES
Omitted
TAB H LOGISTICS
Ref 9-H-35
App 1—Mobility and Transportation
Ref 9-H-1-41
Encl 1—Air Fields and Encl 2—Port Data
Ref 9-H-1-1-43
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
USCINCCENT WARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHY
(Issued Prior to June 199X)
(U) This (notional) planning philosophy provides USCINCCENT’s guidance for the development of
USCENTCOM Operational Plans. It is intended to be used as the basic planning guidance for operations
within the USCENTCOM AOR. Current guidance from higher authorities (NCA, CJCS, JCS) has been,
and will continue to be, incorporated into this directive and subsequent plans.
REFERENCES (U):
a. (U) USCENTCOM AOR Map
b. (U) USCENTCOM Theater Strategy
c. (U) USCENTCOM Intelligence Estimates
d. (U) USCENTCOM Area Studies
1. (U) MISSION: Developed by students.
2. (U) COMMANDER’S ANALYSIS:
a. (U) Strategic Problem. Problems affecting USCENTCOM forces are the ability of U.S. forces to
react to missions within the USCENTCOM AOR and the fact that most of the forces apportioned to
USCENTCOM are CONUS-based. It will be very difficult to deploy forces required to confront the
various threats, and it will be even more difficult to adjust to new threat requirements. All apportioned
and/or assigned USCENTCOM forces must, therefore, remain as flexible as possible — ready to adjust to
various threats, mobilization, deployment, employment and sustainment conditions, environments, and
requirements. Lead times for reaction to orders will be extended as much as possible.
b. (U) General. At the initiation of hostilities, USCENTCOM will consist of the following
subordinate commands, also referred to as Service component commands: USARCENT, USCENTAF,
USNAVCENT, and USMARCENT. In addition, SOCCENT will serve as a functional component
command. These forces will operate under the combatant command (COCOM) authority of CINCCENT.
Subunified commands and/or joint task forces (SUCs/JTFs) may be organized on an “as required” basis
from existing resources and assigned to conduct joint-combined (if combined forces are available) land,
sea, air, and special combat operations on an area basis within specific subordinate theaters of operations.
When SUCs/JTFs are organized, Service components will provide component command combat and
sustainment forces to these warfighting commanders.
c. (U) Theater Organization. For planning purposes, should major operations become necessary
anywhere in the USCENTCOM AOR, CINCCENT envisions structuring any one or all of the following
five major theaters of operations within the USCENTCOM AOR using assigned USCENTCOM forces:
(1) (U) Northern Theater of Operations (Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan);
(2) (U) Central Theater of Operations (Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United
Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, to include the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Gulf of Aden);
(3) (U) Southern Theater of Operations (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya);
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-1
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(4) (U) Western Theater of Operations (Egypt, Sudan).
(5) (U) Maritime Theater of Operations (Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, and
the Indian Ocean areas to the USCENTCOM boundary). The maritime region may be subdivided and
portions assigned to other theaters of operation on a mission/OPLAN basis.
3. (U) ASSUMPTIONS: Theater planning and actions are based on assumptions derived from an
assessment of the strategic environment and operational implications to include global implications which
could include “implied” assumptions. The following planning assumptions are not all inclusive and may
need modification based upon threats and the situation, etc.:
a. (U) Regional conflicts, with the potential to spill over and directly involve U.S. military forces,
are the principal threat to U.S. interests in USCENTCOM’s AOR. The most probable near-term threats to
regional stability are the reemergence of a militant Iraq, Iran’s continued export of radical
fundamentalism, and insurgencies in the Horn of Africa. Conflict may erupt for one of several reasons:
(1) (U) Insurgencies.
(2) (U) An attempt to gain control of and secure oil field complexes.
(3) (U) Secure port facilities in the area.
(4) (U) Occupy key or critical terrain to control the strategic choke points in the region.
(5) (U) Border conflicts.
(6) (U) Religious riva lries.
(7) (U) Given the improvement in relations between the United States and the Russian republics,
USCENTCOM believes the potential for direct conflict with many of these regional republics has been
significantly reduced for the near term. In the long term, however, we face the challenge of countering
increasing influence as they actively pursue their respective strategic interests in the region. It is unlikely
Russian forces will attempt to conduct conventional operations in the USCENTCOM AOR. However,
unconventional and covert operations in support of selected organizations and countries may occur in the
AOR.
b. (U) U.S. unilateral forces will not be augmented by coalitions or alliances from outside the
USCENTCOM AOR (e.g., NATO forces) unless independent nations elect to assist. Coalitions from within
the USCENTCOM AOR will be available to assist USCENTCOM (e.g., GCC); however, command and
control arrangements with these forces have not been established.
c. (U) Partial mobilization will be required to conduct sustained conventional land, sea, or air
operations within the USCENTCOM AOR. A presidential call-up of 200,000 personnel of the Selected
Reserve, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Stage I, and partial sealift mobilization will occur on or
about C-day.
d. (U) Host nation support will be made available by nations who have requested U.S. support.
Support and basing rights of other countries must be rapidly negotiated.
4. (U) SUPPORTING COMMANDS and AGENCIES: USCENTCOM planning requires the support
of all Department of Defense (DOD) commands, agencies, and the State Department country teams in the
AOR. Specifically:
a. (U) Combatant commands that may become USCENTCOM supporting commands when so
directed by NCA through CJCS are:
U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCACOM/ACOM)
U.S. European Command (CINCEUR/EUCOM)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-2
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC/PACOM)
U.S. Space Command (CINCSPACE/SPACECOM)
U.S. Special Operations Command (CINCSOC/SOCOM)
U.S. Strategic Command (CINCSTRAT/STRATCOM)
U.S. Transportation Command (CINCTRANS/TRANSCOM)
b. (U) U.S. government agencies that may be tasked to support USCENTCOM operations in the
AOR are:
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
National Security Agency (NSA)
5. (U) FORCES APPORTIONED: The force list in the ISCP contains apportioned, assigned, and
augmenting U.S. forces designated for planning to USCENTCOM. They include currently assigned
forces that are in theater conducting ongoing continuous missions. The combat and combat support forces
for each Service, which are not apportioned in the ISCP, have been identified by the component
commanders after consultation with their respective Services.
6. (U) COALITION FORCES: For planning purposes, there are a number of allied and friendly forces
that may be of assistance to USCENTCOM in promoting coalition warfare:
a. (U) France. French forces in Djibouti consist of nearly 5,000 ground, air, and naval forces.
Strategic mission is containment of Yemen across the Bab el-Mandeb and keeping the strategic
chokepoint open.
Ground Forces:
3,800 Personnel
33 Tanks
Air/Air Defense Forces:
850 Personnel
10 Fighter Aircraft
Naval Forces:
200 Personnel
5-8 Ships
(U) Force d’Action Rapide. May be deployed to assist forward deployed French forces in
Djibouti. Consists of marine infantry, light armor, airborne/air-mobile /alpine capabilities.
b. (U) United Kingdom. Great Britain has no permanent bases in the Middle East or SWA.
Periodically, British Royal Navy forces conduct combined training and exercise maneuvers with several
Persian Gulf nations. British-Omani agreements incorporate some British military personnel (mostly
officers) in the ground forces of Oman. Additionally, there are many British technical assistants in Oman
to include some 1,000 expatriate workers. In 1990/91, British participation in Operation Desert Shield and
Operation Granby (British name for Desert Storm) demonstrated British resolve to contribute to regional
stability when they deployed several thousand British soldiers and airmen to the region.
c. (U) Gulf Cooperation Council. Established in 1981, the GCC has moved quickly to establish an
effective multinational Arab relationship. The GCC has worked for joint-combined defenses for the
deterrence of war in the region. The GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force is a combined force of nearly 80,000
ground, air, and naval forces training together on a frequent basis. It has a standing combined land force
based at King Khalid Military City in Saudi Arabia. Total GCC forces in the region are:
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-3
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
Country
Army
Pers/Tanks
Air Forces/
Air Def
Pers/Fighters
Navy
Pers/
Surf Ships
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
2,000/34
11,000/275
24,000/39
5,000/24
75,000/540
40,000/113
200/4
6,150/59
2,150/51
300/25
17,500/54
4,000/28
560/2m*
1,000/8m
2,000/4m
700/3m
5,500/13m-3M**
1,500/6m
Totals
157,000/1025
30,300/375
11,260/36m-3M
*Minor surface combatants
**Major surface combatants
d. (U) Other friendly nations’ forces in the USCENTCOM AOR. While other friendly nations are
limited in force structure, if deterrence fails several have expressed a willingness to support military
operations — most constructive of these are Pakistan and Egypt. The following country personnel figures
reflect approximate strengths:
Country
Army
Djibouti
Egypt
Kenya
Pakistan
3,700
320,000
18,345
450,000
Air Forces/Air Def
Navy
300
109,000
3,000
25,000
50
20,000
650
13,000
7. (U) GUIDANCE:
a. (U) Nuclear and Chemical Weapons. The United States reserves the right to first use of nuclear
weapons. There have been known uses of chemicals in the Soviet incursions of other countries in the past
and were used by both Iran and Iraq during their war. Thus, USCENTCOM planners will assume that
these weapons are available in the region and may be used by these countries, and they will plan defenses
accordingly.
b. (U) Mobility Resources. All support operations will remain the responsibility of the Service
component commands. USCINCCENT will retain directive authority for logistics. Maximum use of
common/cross servic ing will be made to eliminate duplication. Required stockage levels will be 15 days
of supplies (except class III) NLT C+30 and 30 DOS NLT C+60. AWR-2 and POMCUS from Europe are
not available for use without JCS/NCA decision. Initial resupply and buildup will be from AWR-3 and
AWR-5, and follow-on supplies will arrive from CONUS AWR-1. Initial resupply will be by airlift until
SLOC are operational. Medical evacuation policy goal is 30 days. Personnel will deploy by air, unit
equipment by sea and air where appropriate. Protection priorities for sustainment are:
(1) (U) SLOCs/SPODS
(2) (U) ALOCs/APODS
(3) (U) bases/facilities
(4) (U) PWRS (AWR/MPS/APA)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-4
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
c. (U) Command and Control.
(1) (U) Command relationships. CINCCENT exercises combatant command (COCOM) authority
over all USCENTCOM assigned forces. No other commander will be granted COCOM of forces in the
USCENTCOM AOR. Service component commanders generally exercise command over those
subordinate Service component forces deploying to the AOR. Subunified commanders and joint task
force commanders, if organized, will exercise only OPCON (and perhaps only TACON) of forces
assigned or attached to them for the duration of their missions or for a specified time. (See each OPLAN/
CONPLAN for specific command relationships.)
(2) (U) Command Post: HQ, USCENTCOM will deploy to the AOR during a significant crisis.
USCENTCOM (FWD) remains always present in AOR on board a U.S. Navy command ship, vicinity
BAHRAIN. Alternate USCENTCOM headquarters will remain at MacDill AFB. Depending on the
situation, component commands will deploy to the AOR as directed by CINCCENT.
8. (U) TASKS:
a. (U) On notification by NCA, planning staff will meet to develop detailed plans and orders.
Notification messages will be sent to all subordinate commands to increase troop readiness and prepare
for movement. Liaison elements will immediately be exchanged as prearranged. All prearranged
intelligence, reconnaissance, and PSYOP actions will commence. Deception operations will be initiated
according to separate deception plans. Depending upon the situation, selective early deployment of SOF,
specified logistical assets, and C2 staff may commence.
b. (U) The Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan (ISCP) directs that specific country and strategic
location CONPLANs and OPLANs be developed. These plans should be developed based on the task of:
(1) (U) U.S. unilateral support to the following countries in the event of future aggression and for
support of U.S. interests therein:
Country
Saudi Arabia/Kuwait
Egypt (Suez Canal)
Oman
Qatar/Bahrain
UAE
Pakistan
Somalia
Kenya
All countries
Type of Plan
PID
OPLAN
OPLAN
CONPLAN
CONPLAN
CONPLAN
CONPLAN
CONPLAN
CONPLAN
USCENTCOM Emergency
Evacuation Plan (for U.S.
and other designated
foreign nationals)
1648
1649
1650
1652
1653
1655
1657
1658
1677
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-5
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(2) (U) Prepare plans for unilateral action to reopen the following strategic chokepoints in the
event of aggression, closure and maintain freedom of navigation:
Country
Type of Plan
PID
Straits of Hormuz
CONPLAN
Straits of Bab el Mandab
CONPLAN
(NOTE: These plans are not yet in usable form.)
1651
1656
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
(1) (U) CINCCENT will determine theater objectives based upon his theater strategy priorities
and the political and military situation at hand. Component commanders and JTF commanders will be
afforded maximum authority and support to design and fight the battle within their own respective
assigned areas.
(2) (U) Specific employment of joint forces will be designed to:
— Secure air and sea LOC into AOR.
— Establish required lodgement areas for operations and sustainment.
— Deter any threat intervention into the AOR military situation.
— Reestablish lost territorial control by legitimately recognized governments in AOR.
— Protect international maritime shipping and other economic interests.
— Deny hostile control of the Persian Gulf, littoral, oilfields, or other key facilities.
— Deny hostile attainment of air and sea ports facilities in the AOR.
— Protect U.S. and allied citizens, installations and facilities.
(3) (U) Deployment and movement capabilities will be first priority for protection during any
crisis. We must be able to deploy into theater in order to secure strategic objectives.
(4) (U) All component commands will mobilize and alert according to their Service systems.
(5) (U) All CENTCOM operations are restricted to CENTCOM AOR and supporting LOCs;
supporting commands may conduct supporting operations from outside the CENTCOM AOR.
(6) (U) Service components will prepare supporting plans for all assigned plans.
(7) (U) Planning data for sustainment is located in TAB H.
d. (U) Strategic Constraints. Accomplishment of the CENTCOM mission may be impeded if the
following factors exist:
(1) (U) Other priority military actions are in progress or imminent in the world. This would
reduce the availability of forces, sustain ment, or transportation assets needed for the execution of this
plan.
(2) (U) Lack or shortage of a host nation or other friendly nation support for basing, overflight,
transit, or sustainment.
(3) (U) Delay in the political decision to use military force which would prevent adequate
planning and deployment time.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-6
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
TAB A
FRIENDLY ORDER OF BATTLE
Coalition Command (COALCOM)
(U) This section shows the framework of command and the major forces of the coalition forces which are
in the Theater of War for this scenario. Note that not all of the forces listed here are in the Theater of
Operations. Forces of the Saudi Arabian military (West Regional Command) are positioned as immediate
protection for the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. These forces are earmarked below; they will meet any
threat from Yemen directed at the holy cities. Also shown is the 45-day, 90-day, and 135-day status of
deployment for the non-U.S. forces of the coalition.
NOTE: Shown below are division and brigade equivalents. A division counts as three brigades.
(by C+90)
COALCOM Forces
GCC (Peninsula Shield Force) Corps
1st Mech Div (SA)
Mech Div (KU)
Mech Div (OM)
I (SA) Corps
2nd Mech Div (SA)
3rd Mech Div (SA)
3rd Armd Div (EG)
Euro Corps
1st Armd Div (UK)
FAR (FR)
(By C+135)
West Regional Command (SA)
4th Mech Div (SA)
Mech Bde (SANG)
Mech Bde (SANG)
COALCOM Support
Med Bn (Sweden)
Truck Bn (Bahrain) x 2
Inf Bn (Poland)
Inf Bn (Denmark)
Mech Bn (Pakistan)
Chem Bn (Germany)
Supply Bn (Greece)
Engr Bn (Italy)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-A-7
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
TAB B
FRIENDLY ORDER OF BATTLE
British, French, and Saudi
1st British Armoured Division {15.45}
— 7th Armoured Brigade {4.85}
Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (57 Challenger MBTs) {1.0}
Queen's Royal Irish Hussars (57 Challenger MBTs) {1.0}
1st Staffordshire Infantry (45 Warrior IFVs) {0.85}
39th Regiment, Royal Engineers
664th Helicopter Squadron (9 Lynx) {1.0}
10th Air Defense Battery (Javelin)
40th Field Regiment (24 M109 SP howitzers) {1.0}
— 4th Armoured Brigade {3.40}
14/20 King's Hussars (43 Challenger MBTs) {0.75}
1st Royal Scots Infantry (45 Warrior IFVs) {0.85}
3d Royal Fusiliers Infantry (45 Warrior IFVs) {0.85}
23d Regiment, Royal Engineers
46th Air Defense Battery (Javelin)
2d Field Regiment (24 M109 SP howitzers) {1.0}
Following are Division Troops:
— 16/5 Queen's Royal Lancers Recon Battalion (24 Scorpion,
24 Scimitar, 12 Striker) {0.50}
— 4th Army Air Regiment (24 Lynx with TOW, 12 Gazelle) {3.0}
— 32d Heavy Artillery Regiment (16 M109, 12 M110) {1.65}
— 29th Heavy Artillery Regiment (12 MLRS) {2.0}
— 12th Air Defense Regiment (24 tracked Rapier)
— 32d Regiment, Royal Engineers
Following are EPW handling infantry battalions:
— 1st Coldstream Guards
— Royal Highland Fusiliers
— King's Own Scottish Borderers
French Force Action Rapide (FAR) {16.25}
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-B-9
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
— Daquet Division (French 6th Light Armored Division, Reinforced)
1st Foreign Legion Armored Regiment (35 AMX-10RC) {1.0}
1st Regiment de Spahis (35 AMX-10RC) {1.0}
2d Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment (VAB APCs) {0.50}
NOTE: VAB = Vehicule De L'Avant Blinde APC
21st Marine Infantry Regiment (VAB APCs) {0.50}
68th Marine Artillery Regiment (155T/Mistral SAM) {2.0}
6th Foreign Legion Engineer Regiment
Reinforced by the following units:
From the 4th Airmobile Division:
—————— 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment (10 20mm gunships/30 AT
helicopters with HOT ATGM) {3.0}
—————— 1st Transport Helicopter Regiment
—————— 1st Infantry Regiment (airmobile) {1.0}
From the 9th Marine Division:
—————— 2d Marine Infantry Regiment (VAB APCs) {0.50}
—————— Detachment, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment (269 men) {0.25}
—————— 11th Marine Artillery Regiment (155T) {1.75}
From the 10th Armored Division:
—————— 4th Dragoon Regiment (40 AMX-30B2 MBTs) {1.25}
—————— 17th Reconnaissance Squadron (40 AT helicopters) {3.5}
Source for British and French units: Caffrey, Matt and Chadwick, Frank; Gulf War Factbook, published by
GDW, Bloomington, Illinois, copyright 1991
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-B-10
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(U) The TTUSA must coordinate with two Saudi corps during the defensive phase of the scenario and
with one Saudi corps during the offensive phase. For purposes of understanding and to help offset the
problems of coordination, the structure of a proposed Saudi armored and mechanized division are given
here to help the user understand what type of unit is on his/her flank:
1st Saudi Arabian Armored Division {22.29}
— Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) 10th Mechanized Brigade {6.68}
—
2 Tank Battalions (1 w/58 M1, 1 w/58 M60A3) {1.68+2.25=3.93}
—
1 Mech Inf Bn (w/M113) {1.25}
—
1 FA Bn (w/155 SP howitzers) {1.5}
—
Combat Service Support Units as required
— RSLF 8th Mechanized Brigade {6.68} – organized same as 10th Bde
— RSLF 20th Mechanized Brigade {6.68} – organized same as 10th Bde
— RSLF 14th Field Artillery Battalion (155 SP) GS to division {1.5}
— RSLF 2d Antitank Company (M113/TOW) DS to division {0.75}
— Combat Support units as required GS to division
— Combat Service Support units as required GS to division
Saudi Arabian Mechanized Infantry Division {17.75}
— RSLF 4th Armored Brigade
—
3 Tank Battalions (French AMX-30 MBT) {3.0}
— RSLF 9th Mechanized Brigade {5.25}
—
3 Mech Inf Bn (w/M113) {3.75}
— 1 FA Bn (w/155 SP howitzers) {1.5}
—
Combat Service Support Units as required
— RSLF 21st Mechanized Brigade {5.25} – same as 9th Bde
— RSLF 15th MLRS Battalion – GS to division {2.5}
— RSLF 4th Airborne Battalion – OPCON in offense {1.0}
— RSLF 3d Antitank Company (M113/TOW) DS to division {0.75}
— Combat Support Units as required
— Combat Service Support units as required
(U) NOTE: Both of these two Saudi units are fictional for use in this scenario. Saudi Arabia does not
currently have divisional headquarters, but uses corps and brigade.
COALITION AIRCRAFT BEDDOWN FOR C/M/S 500
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-B-11
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
Location
Origin
No/Type
Sort/Rate
Mission
Shaikh Isa
Bahrain 1
5 F-5E
36 sorties
(CAP)
Shaikh Isa
Canada
30 CF-18
60 sorties
(AI, CAS)
Al Karj
France
12 Mirage 2000
36 sorties
(AI, CAS)
King Fahd
Italy
8 Tornado
16 sorties
(AI, CAS)
Riyadh
Kuwait
15 Mirage F-1
30 sorties
(AI, CAS)
Al Minhad
Oman
36 Jaguar,
Hawker Hunter
36 sorties
(AI, CAS)
Doha
Qatar
8 Mirage F-1C
16 sorties
(AI, CAS)
King Fahd
Tabuk
KKMC
Tabuk
Dharan
Saudi Arabia
48 Tornado IDS
53 F-5E/F
69 F-15C
10 RF-5E
36 BAE-167
96 sorties
106 sorties
210 sorties
20 sorties
72 sorties
(AI, CAS)
(CAP)
(CAP)
(Recce)
(Strike)
Al Dafra
UAE
57 Mirage 2000/5AD
114 sorties
(AI)
Jiddah
UK
42 Tornado GR Mk 1
84 sorties
(AI)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-B-12
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
TAB C
SWA ORDER OF BATTLE
Preliminary Guidance
(U) This tab provides the user with preliminary information on the IIC order of battle. With this
information, the user will be able to determine the relative combat power of each of the Iranian and Iraqi
units. Additionally, the type of equip ment found in each “type” unit is listed.
(U) Comparison Values/Relative Combat Power. This section provides the user with a baseline for
beginning his/her analysis of combat power. This model is based on the figures provided in ST 100-9,
1990 edition. These values are notional and for instructional purposes only. (Additional comparison
bvalues/relative combat power figures are available in CGSC Student Text 100-3.) Real values would be
classified or based on an actual situation. During the course of this scenario, the user should reevaluate
these figures based on the situation presented. For example, in the counter-offensive phase of the
scenario, the user should consider the effect of the air campaign in attrition of the enemy and reduce his
combat power. The user can do this by using these values as his starting point for comparison. All values
are based on the use of Soviet-style equipment or its equivalent. These equipment types are noted
throughout the Enemy Order of Battle to give the user a constant frame of reference in doing Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield.
(U) U.S. versus IIC Combat Unit Comparison Values:
MANEUVER
United States
(J-series MTOE)
Light Inf Bn
AASLT Inf Bn
M113 Mech Bn
M2 Mech Bn
M60A3 Armor Bn
M1 Armor Bn
M1A1 Armor Bn
M1A2 Armor Bn
ACR Squadron
Div Cav Sqdn
Div Cav Sqdn w/
Attack Hel
Atk Hel Bn (AH-64)
Atk Hel Bn (AH-1)
Iran-Iraq Coalition (IIC)
(Soviet Equipment or its Equivalent)
= 0.75
= 1.25
= 1.5
= 2.0
= 2.25
= 3.0
= 3.15
= 3.25
= 2.75
= 1.5
= 2.0
= 4.0
= 3.0
Mech Bn (BTR 50)
Mech Bn (BMP 2)
Tank Bn (T-72)
Tank Bn (T-62)
Tank Bn (T-55)
Commando Bde
Recon Bn
AT BN (T-12)
Infantry Bn
Type III Inf Bn
GV Recon Bn
Helo Sqdn (Hind)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-C-13
= 1.0
= 1.5
= 1.55
= 1.2
= 0.65
= 1.0
= 1.0
= 1.0
= 0.75
= 0.50
= 1.6
= 3.0
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
ARTILLERY
United States
(J-series MTOE)
FA Bn (105 towed)
FA Bn (155 SP)
FA Bn (155 towed)
FA Bn (203 SP)
MLRS Battery
ATACMS Battery
Iran-Iraq Coalition (IIC)
(Soviet Equipment or its Equivalent)
= 0.75
= 2.0
= 2.0
= 2.0
= 2.0
= 2.0
FA Bn (M46) = 0.7
FA Bn (FROG) = 1.05
FA Bn (2S3) = 1.1
FA Bn (2S5) = 1.2
FA Bn (SCUD) = 1.3
FA Bn (2S7
= 1.4
FA Bn (BM 21) = 2.2
FA Bn (BM 22) = 2.9
Use same
number
for towed
version.
DEFENSIVE PREPARATION: Both forces; 12-24 hours multiply by 1.3; 24-48 hours by 1.5
and over 48 hours by 2.0 .
(U) Using the values from the table, the user can now calculate the relative combat power of the IIC
forces he faces and his own U.S. forces for any analysis leading to a specific course of action. A sample
of the calculations is shown here to demonstrate how to use the values.
(U) Governor’s Vanguard Corps:
11th GV Tank Div:
10 bns x 1.55 per Tank Bn (T-72)
6 bns x 1.5 per Mech Bn (BMP -2)
1 bn x 1.6 per Recon Bn
4 bns x 1.1 per FA Bn (2S3)
1 bn x 1.2 per FA Bn (2S5)
3 bns x 1.0 per Commando Bn
TOTAL
=
=
=
=
=
=
15.50
9.00
1.60
4.40
1.20
3.00
=
34.70
(U) IIC Artillery (GHQ for Iran and GHQ for Iraq):
6 bns x 0.70 per FA Bn (M46)
3 bns x 1.20 per FA Bn (2S5)
3 bns x 1.40 per FA Bn (2S7)
4 bns x 2.20 per FA Bn (BM21)
3 bns x 2.90 per FA Bn (BM22)
=
=
=
=
=
4.20
3.60
4.20
8.80
8.70
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-C-14
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(U) For this teaching scenario, there are three categories of units. Type I units are the most elite, have the
best equipment, and are trained to the highest standard within the coalition. The Type I units for this
scenario are the divisions and brigades within the Governor’s Vanguard of Iraq. This corps of Type I units
represents a future version of the Republican Guard seen during the Gulf War of 1990/91. The Type II
units for this notional enemy force are all the units of II and III Corps (Iraq) and those of IV and V Corps
(Iran). Type II units are also found in all the strategic reserves of Iran and Iraq (VII, VIII, and IX Corps).
The Type II units represent the standing regular armies of both countries and also any Pasdaran of Iran,
which could be held in a standing army status with better training and equipping than seen during the
1980-1989 Iran/Iraq War. The Type III units are the least-trained, poorest-equipped units of the two
countries and represent the popular army/rapid conscripting efforts of both countries. For this scenario,
Type III units are found in Iran’s VI Corps. Finally, a rough rule of thumb for the scenario is that Type I
units have the T-72 with improved munition round (“Shredder”), Type II units have the T-62 or its
equivalent Chinese/North Korean make, and Type III units have the T-55 or its equivalent non-Soviet
make.
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Ref 9-C-15
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
TAB D
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, IRAQ
1. (U) MISSION (Omitted).
2. (U) ENEMY SITUATION.
a. (U) Characteristics of Area of Operations.
(1) (U) Military Geography.
(a) (U) Topography.
1 (U) Existing Situation.
a (U) General. The Republic of Iraq dominates the Fertile Crescent region of Southwest
Asia. Bounded by Syria and Jordan on its west; Turkey on the north; Iran on the east; and Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and the Persian Gulf on the south, Iraq is strategically located to dominate regional affairs. About
the size of California, Iraq stretches approximately 167,924 square miles. From 10,000-foot mountains
along its border with Iran and Turkey to reedy marshes in the Southeast, Iraq is a land of contrast. Desert
plains occupy most of Iraq with the exception of the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys, which are the
most fertile in the Southwest Asia. Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf is limited to the Shatt al-Arab region.
An area of historical dispute between Iraq and Iran, the Shatt al-Arab waterway provides Iraq with a
narrow corridor to the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly one of Iraq’s objectives in its failed attempt to retain
Kuwait was to improve its access to the Persian Gulf.
b (U) Terrain. Iraq can be divided in to four major geographical zones or regions: the
desert in the west and southwest; the rolling upland between the upper Tigris and Euphrates rivers; the
mountains in north and northeast region; and the alluvial plain through which the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers flow.
(1) (U) The desert region west and southwest of the Euphrates River is part of the
Syrian Desert. Covering sections of Syria and Jordan, this desert is sparsely inhabited and consist of vast
stony plains intersected with sandy sub-regions.
(2) (U) The upland region of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers is part of a larger area
that extends westward into Syria and Turkey. Water flows in deeply cut wadis (valleys) hampering
irrigation efforts. This region is predominately desert.
(3) (U) The mountainous region begins southwest of Mosul and Kirkuk, extending to
Turkey and Iran. Mountains range from 1,000 to 4,000 meters near the Iranian and Turkish borders. With
the exception of a few valleys, this region is suitable only for grazing. At lower elevations in the steppes
and foothills, adequate rainfall make cultivation possible.
(4) (U) The alluvial plain region begins north of Baghdad and extends to the Persian
Gulf. Described as a delta plain interlaced with irrigation canals and intermittent lakes, for years this
region was subject to flooding by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. From the late 60s to the mid-70s,
government efforts were increasingly devoted to flood control. In southern Iraq, an area (15,600 square
kilometers) from Al Qurnah and extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian border is predominantly
marshland.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The mountainous and upland regions provide the
most natural defense. Avenues of approach are limited in these regions, and the Iraqis should be able
defend it with a small force. The delta plain and southern marshlands limit avenues of approach to major
road networks. Less defensible than the mountainous region, the Iraqis should be able to contain an attack
in this region. The Syrian Desert is the least defensible, and the Iraqis are vulnerable to mobile operations
in this region.
3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. The vast Syrian Desert region is ideal for
mobile operations. Unimproved roads and numerous dirt tracks provide both east/west and north/south
movement. However, cover and concealment is limited, and water is scarce. The upland region limits
mobile operations to improved/unimproved roads and dirt tracks. Some cover and concealment is provided by the numerous wadis in the region. Mobile operations are severely restricted in the mountainous
region. Vehicles are limited to the few road networks; during rainy season, the area may be in passable. In
the delta region, vehicle movement is restricted to the present road network. Marsh land in southern Iraq
would impede light operations.
(b) (U) Hydrography.
1 (U) Existing Situation. Iraq’s coastline is severely limited and not suited for large-scale
amphibious operations. Linking the port city of Basra with the Persian Gulf, the Shatt al-Arab is Iraq’s
only channel for ocean going vessels. Amphibious operations in the Shatt al-Arab area would be limited.
2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. With a limited coastline, the threat of a major
amphibious operations in this region is limited. Iraq should be able to defend this area with a small force.
Lacking multiple outlets to the Persian Gulf, Iraq’s naval operations are limited to port security and
coastal patrol.
3 (U) Effect on Frie ndly Courses of Action. It would be difficult to launch large-scale
amphibious operations against Iraq without violating the territory of neighboring countries. Amphibious
actions would be limited to small boat operations.
(c) (U) Climate and Weather.
1 (U) Existing Situation. The average temperatures in Iraq range from higher than
48 degrees C (120 Fahrenheit) in July and August to below freezing in January. A majority of the rainfall
occurs from December through April and averages between 10 and 18 centimeters (4-7 in.) annually.
Rainfall is more abundant in the mountainous region and may reach 100 centimeters a year in some
places. The summer months are marked by two kinds of wind phenomena. The southern and southeasterly
sharqi, a dry and dusty wind with occasional gusts to 80 kilometers an hour, occurs from April to early
June and again from late September through November. The shamal, a steady wind from the north and
northwest, prevails from mid-June to mid-September. Dust storms accompany these winds and may rise
to heights of several thousand meters, closing airports for brief periods of time.
2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Extremes of temperatures and humidity, coupled
with the scarcity of water, will effect both men and equipment. During dry season, clouds of dust caused
by vehicle movement will increase detection capabilities in desert regions. Flash flooding in wadis and
across roads will hinder traffic ability and resupply efforts during the rainy season. Clear, cloudless skies
make air superiority a prerequisite to successful offensive operations throughout Iraq. Air operations may
be reduced during the windy season.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Climate and weather will have the same
effect on friendly courses of action as on the threat.
(2) (U) Transportation.
(a) (U) Existing Situation.
1 (U) Road nets. Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq’s road system stretched over 20,000
kilometers with approximately 60 percent of the roads paved. These roads included four-lane highways
linking Baghdad with Basra and Mosul and smaller highways providing access to Iraq’s different regions.
Damage sustained during the war has been repaired; with the exception of key bridges along the southern
route of the Baghdad/Basra highway, traffic in this area has been reduced by 25 percent.
2 (U) Railroads. Iraq has a well developed rail system available for military transport and
supply. The rail system consist of over 2,000 kilometers of railroads linking the major cities with the
capital of Baghdad. The railroad system suffered minimal damage during the war and is operating at 80
percent capability. It is estimated that Iraqi trains can average about 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It is not
know many armored vehicles can be carried on each Iraqi flat car; however, a fair estimate would be one
or two APC’s or one main battle tank per car.
3 (U) Ports. Iraq’s port city of Basra is the country’s major port and handles the bulk of
dry cargo. Located at the northern end of the Shatt al-Arab, Basra was vulnerable to Iranian attacks during
the Iran-Iraq war, and much of its cargo was diverted to the port of Aqaba in Jordan. The smaller ports of
Umm Qasr and Az Zubay handle far less cargo but grew in importance during the war between Iran and
Iraq. Extensive damage sustained during the recent Gulf war has significantly reduced the port’s
capability. It is believed to be operating at less than 50 percent of its maximum thru-put capability of
50,000 short-tons per day.
4 (U) Airfields. Iraq has 94 usable airfields: 56 with permanent surface runways, 6 with
runways over 3,659 meters; 50 with runways over 2,438 meters; and 12 with runways 1,220 meters. Most
of these airfields were damaged during the Gulf war; however, they have been repaired and are functioning at full capacity (for location of major airfields see enclosure 1).
5 (U) Pipelines. Iraq has four existing oil export pipelines: northward via Turkey, south
via offshore terminals in the gulf (Al Faw area), south via Saudi Arabia, and west via Syria. Regional
politics continue to govern the use of these pipelines. For example , during the Iran-Iraq War, Syria denied
the shipment of Iraqi oil through its pipeline and onward to the Mediterranean terminals. And more
recently during the Gulf war, all pipelines with the exception of Al Faw were shut down by the host
countries. Today it is believed oil shipments have resumed through the Al Faw terminal and northern
pipeline through Turkey.
6 (U) Rivers. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers dominate Iraq’s river system, and their
waters are essential to the life of the country. Small boats are able to negotiate major portions of these
rivers; however, a navigable inland waterway does not exist throughout the river valley and delta plain.
(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Present transportation net will limit Iraq’s ability to
quickly reinforce the different regions of the country. Lack of roads in the mountainous region will
require the military to rely on their limited airlift capability to move supplies and personnel in that area. In
the south, marshlands will force the Iraqis to utilize major roads for vehicular traffic. Lacking adequate
access to the Persian Gulf, naval operations will be limited. The multitude of airfields in the country will
enable the Air Force to operate from diverse locations.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Regional transportation nets will have the same
effect on friendly courses of action. The use of heavy tactical airlift for movement of supplies and troops
will reduce these limitations.
(3) (U) Telecommunications.
(a) (U) Existing Situation. Severely damaged during the Gulf war, Iraq’s telecommunications
system is limited. The system consists of coaxial cables, radio-relay links, and radio communication
stations, the bulk of which services Baghdad and the major cities. Of the 9 AM stations and 81 televisions
stations, 60 percent are functioning.
(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Iraq’s limited telecommunications will have a
detrimental effect on command and control as well as logistics. Action against communications facilities
could seriously disrupt the presently overloaded facilities.
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Limitations in the present telecommunications
system will enable friendly forces to exploit the enemy’s command and control capability.
(4) (U) Politics.
(a) (U) Existing Situation.
1 (U) Government Systems. Iraq is an authoritarian one-party state headed by the Ba’th
Arab Socialist Party. The president serves as head of state and government and as Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the top decision-making body in Iraq. In accordance with the
Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, executive and legislative powers are exercised by the president
and Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) respectively. Legislative functions are split between the
RCC and a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly. The 250 members of the Assembly are elected
to four-year terms according to proportionate representation. In practice, real power rest with the
president and the RCC, with the Assembly serving as a rubber stamp to RCC decisions.
2 (U) Political Dynamics. Since his ascendancy to the presidency in 1979, Saddam
Hussein has established himself as the country’s strong leader. Exercising a heavy hand approach,
Saddam Hussein effectively removed his opposition and maintained control through loyal security forces.
Today significant unrest continues with the Kurdish population in the north and pockets of Shiite
resistance in the south.
3 (U) Foreign Relations. The Gulf war has not significantly changed Iraq’s orientation in
foreign affairs. Iraq continues with its nonaligned but necessary relationship with FSU countries.
Although disappointed with the lack of Russian support during the war, cooperation continues on a
number of economic and military issues. On the regional front, Iraq continues to maintain a hard-line
position with regard to a Middle East peace settlement, winning the support of many of the Palestinians
throughout the region. Relations with its neighbors have not improved since the Gulf war, and diplomatic
relations with the U.S. remain broken.
(b) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. While the Gulf war and subsequent civil turmoil has
weakened the central government, the president and the RCC remains firmly in control of the government
and the armed forces. Military operations vis-a-vis foreign forces in areas of civil unrest will require
additional troops to govern the population. Commanders will continued to be hampered by the rigid
command and control exercised by the RCC.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Friendly forces should be able to exploit Iraq’s
internal situation by aiding partisan forces. The lack of decentralization in Iraqi command and control will
enable friendly forces to maintain the initiative in military operations.
(5) (U) Economics.
(a) (U) Existing Situation. Oil exports fuel the Iraqi economy. With an annual gross national
product (GNP) of $40 billion, approximately 40 percent is provided by the petroleum sector. Believed to
hold oil reserves of approximately 75 billion barrels, Iraqi oil exports will continue to dominate the
country’s economy. Much of Iraq’s oil wealth was used to purchase armament and build the military.
This, combined with the financing of two wars and the requirement to pay war reparations, has severely
weakened the Iraqi economy. The future of Iraq’s economy lies with its ability to meet pre-war petroleum
export levels, while undergoing an economic austerity program.
(b) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. Dependence on foreign trade and petroleum exports to
generate foreign currency makes Iraq susceptible to operations against her lines of commerce and supply.
(c) (U) Effects on Friendly Courses of Action. Iraq’s heavy reliance on the petroleum sector
to sustain its economy makes the oil fields, pipelines, and its off-shore terminal facility at Al Faw
lucrative strategic targets. Seizure or destruction of these facilities would hasten the destruction of Iraq’s
economy.
(6) (U) Sociology.
(a) (U) Existing Situation. Estimated at 16 million in 1986, Iraq’s population is divided
among the two largest ethnic groups (Arabs & Kurds) and several smaller ethnic communities. These
groups include Assyrians, Turkomans, Iranians, Lurs and Armenians. Approximately 95 percent of Iraqis
are Muslims, and Islam is officially recognized as the state religion. Of these Muslims, 55 percent are
Shiites with a majority residing in southern Iraq. Living in the northern mountainous region of Iraq,
Kurds make-up approximately 20 percent of the country’s population. A fiercely independent people,
historically the Kurds have resisted central government rule. A major Kurdish rebellion ended in 1975
following the Algiers agreement between Iraq and Iran. However, recent fighting erupted during the Gulf
war, and isolated pockets of resistance continue today. Less troublesome than the Kurds, the Shiites
remain a potential problem in southern Iraq.
(b) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. Mistrust of the Kurds and Shiites will make Iraqi
military operations in these regions difficult. Additional armed forces will be necessary to govern these
areas while conducting military operations against a foreign power.
(c) (U) Effects on Friendly Courses of Action. Friendly forces should be able to exploit these
divisions within Iraq. Support to Kurdish and Shiite partisan groups could serve as a force multiplier
when conducting military operations against Iraq.
(7) (U) Science and Technology (omitted).
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
3. (U) ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a. (U) Ground Capabilities.
(1) (U) Organization. Significantly reduced during the Gulf War, the Iraqi Army has
reconstituted its divisions and is operating with an estimated active force of 400,000 men and 500,000
reservists. The Iraqis have seven corps headquarters functioning as the operational headquarters for the
Army. During war, these headquarters communicate directly with the General Headquarters (GHQ), the
Army’s highest echelon of command. The corps frequently have operational control of three to five
divisions. These divisions could be a mix of up to three infantry divisions, one to two armored, and one to
two mechanized infantry divisions. Other units organic to the corps include brigade-size or larger artillery
and air defense artillery units, a reconnaissance battalion, one or two commando brigades, and other
support units. The burden of support operations and the command and control of additional elements
often force corps to send out a forward command post.
b. (U) Air Capabilities. The priority of Iraq’s rearmament has gone to improve its severely damaged
air capability. It’s believed the Iraqis now have 500 plus combat aircraft in their inventory. Mostly of
Soviet origin, these aircraft have been updated with the latest avionics and include Su-17/20/22 FITTERs,
Su-25/ FROGFOOTs, MiG-25/FOXBATs, and MiG-29/FULCRUMs. The air force also holds a small
inventory of French Mirage F-1s. In addition to combat aircraft, the Iraqis have a substantial inventory of
attack and transport helicopters.
c. (U) Naval Capabilities. Iraq’s naval capability is limited. It consists of several light cruisers and
patrol boats used primarily for coastal security and maritime assistance.
d. (U) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare Capabilities. Despite United Nations efforts to
verify the existence of and dismantlement of facilities to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons of mass destruction, there is still evidence that Iraq does possess a very limited nuclear weapon
capability, and unverified chemical and biological stores. Although the bulk of Iraq’s biological and
chemical capability was reduced during the Gulf war, Iraq does maintain the capability to employ
chemical weapons.
4. (U) ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a. (U) Worst Case. The Iraqis have the military capability to launch an attack through Kuwait and
into Saudi Arabia. With United Nation military observers in the demilitarized zone, the Iraqis would
precede this attack with an extensive political and military deception campaign. The Iraqis would be able
to employ and sustain up to 24 divisions in this attack. The Iraqis have improved their helicopter airlift
capability and would employ helicopters early in the attack to secure critical Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian
command and control and key petroleum facilities.
b. (U) Probable Course of Action. Constrained by United Nations embargoes on the purchase of
military equipment, the Iraqis have nonetheless been able to obtain military equipment through
international arms dealers. Continuing with the incremental rearmament of their armed forces is Iraq’s
most probable course of action. While the Iraqi military is presently capable of conducting offensive
operations, it is unlikely the Iraqis would initiate hostilities unless threatened by a foreign power. To date,
significant improvements have been made with Iraq’s air force, air defense, and command and control
capabilities.
5. (U) CONCLUSION. (Purposely omitted; students analysis provides this information.)
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
TAB E
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, IRAN
1. (U) MISSION. USCENTCOM, within the CENTCOM AOR, will deny hostile countries the ability
to threaten with military force or to use military force to impose their will on the United States, its allies,
and friends; will ensure freedom of sea, air, and space regions as defined by international law, treaty, or
agreement; will support U.S. initiatives in the application of national, diplomatic, economic, and
informational power; will protect U.S. nationals and others as directed; and will assist selected
governments in promoting regional stability and in defeating aggression, subversion, and insurgency.
2. (U) ENEMY SITUATION.
a. (U) Characteristics of the Area of Operations.
(1) (U) Military Geography.
(a) (U) Topography.
1 (U) Existing Situation.
a (U) General. Iran is strategically important as a part of the land bridge between Asia
and Europe, and it has been so since the beginning of time. The Islamic Republic of Iran is bounded in the
north by the CIS Republics and the Caspian Sea, in the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the south by
the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and in the west by Iraq and Turkey.
(U) Iran is almost entirely ringed by mountains, with a central interior plateau at about
1,000 meters above sea level. Mountainous rimland covers nearly half of Iran’s territory. The longest and
largest mountain range, the Zagros Mountains, extends from the northwest to the southeast, paralleling
the Persian Gulf and getting ever wider as it reaches Pakistan. Near Pakistan, the Zagros, with a series of
rugged ridgelines, become even more imposing and connect with the Elburz, which runs east to west from
Afghanistan. The Elburz is a thin chain of rugged mountains that combine with the Zagros and form an
extremely formidable barrier to a CIS Republic invasion from the north. The eastern highlands consist of
a series of isolated mountain ranges separated by lowlands that, to a large extent, are impassable or feed
into sand, gravel deserts, or swampy areas of the Central Plateau. The Kavir, a salt swamp that is next to
impossible to cross, covers part of the Central Plateau. A mechanized force would be roadbound in most
of Iran, especially in the Zagros.
(U) Geographically, a scarcity of water, inaccessibility to water, and unhospitable terrain
characterize Iran. Except for the northern area, poor soil and a lack of precipitation preclude any
significant degree of cultivation. Large sections of Iran’s terrain are so hostile they are virtually
uninhabited.
b (U) Terrain.
(1) (U) The Central Plateau. Iran is located on a high triangular plateau that is actually a
part of a larger plateau that includes parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Approximately half of Iran is in
the sparsely settled Central Plateau, an almost totally desert area that is some of the driest and most barren
in the world. Muddy black salt marshes dot the area and present dangers to travelers. Settlement is
confined to oases and the flanks of small mountain chains. The region has no outward drainage, occupies
a serie s of closed basins with elevations of 2,000 to 3,000 feet, and is almost completely surrounded by
mountains. The basins have central drainage areas that remain dry for months or years. The lowest parts
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
of the Central Plateau may have holes a few inches deep that dry up and leave salt crests known as kavirs.
As evaporation occurs, the thick plates of crystallized salt increase in size, press against each other, break
up, and give the appearance of glaciers. Slimy black mud marshes lie underneath the salt crust. The
marshes, called dashts, are dangerous to cross and are generally unexplored. The extensive Dasht-i-Kavir
and Dasht-i-Lut Deserts are located in the Central Plateau.
(2) (U) The Zagros. The Zagros begin where Iran borders Turkey, the CIS Republics and
Iraq, and they extend south and east into Pakistan. In the northwest, the Zagros start as an alternation of
high tablelands and lowland basins with a number of lakes. They become even more imposing as they
move toward the southeast and change to a series of parallel razorback ridges. Some of the peaks are
more than 12,000 feet high.
(3) (U) The Elburz. Joining the Zagros Mountains in the northwest and extending east
along the southern edge of the Caspian Sea is the narrower but equally high Elburz Range. Although few
mountains in this range exceed 10,000 feet, Mount Damavand at 16,000 feet is the highest in Iran. The
Elburz Range is a formidable barrier to north-south movement because of its sheer drop-off into the
Caspian Sea.
(4) (U) The Eastern Ranges. The broken and irregular ranges of mountains in the east
extend from the CIS Republics on the north to Pakistan in the south. They are barren, but their interspersing valleys are fertile. In the north the mountains are 7,000 to 9,000 feet high and are generally
arable above 4,000 feet.
(5) (U) The Coastline. Iran’s coastline is generally smooth and shallow. Two lagoons that
require constant dredging make possible the well-sheltered ports of Bandar-e Khomeyni on the
northwestern end of the Persian Gulf and Bandar-e Anzali on the Caspian Sea.
2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The northwest and the north afford the best natural
defense features (the Zagros and Elburz mountains) because rugged terrain would limit threat avenues of
approach. The terrain of the oilfields favors the attacker. Avenues of approach out of Afghanistan in the
east generally favor an attacker, but Iran’s rugged terrain would even greatly hinder those approaches.
Should the attacker cross the terrain of the oilfields and seize the Port of Bandar Abbas, he could
dominate the vital Strait of Hormuz.
3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Both the Zagros and Elburz mountains are
formidable barriers to vehicular traffic, especially north-south traffic. East-west movement is somewhat
better because the eastern ranges funnel out into two major deserts of the Central Plateau. Operations
throughout Iran would be adversely affected.
(b) (U) Hydrography.
1 (U) Existing Situation.
a (U) Iran’s southern coast extends eastward a distance of approximately 550 kilometers
from Bandar Abbas to the Pakistan border. The shoreline is generally straight with a few natural harbors.
The offshore approaches are clear and do not pose major obstacles to navigation.
b (U) To the west, a shallow wave-cut platform of silt, sand, and mud lines the coast and
extends 100 to 600 meters seaward. Associated with the shallow platform are numerous bars, shoals, and
reefs. Bandar Abbas reaches a maximum depth of 6 fathoms over a limited area adjacent to the seaward
entrance. The gradient to the high-water mark is slight and uniform throughout. The silty bottom is
unstable and subject to shifting caused by random currents. One natural channel leads to the port area.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
Four major islands guard the approach to Bandar Abbas. They are Qeshm, Hengam, Larak, and Hormoz.
Two beaches suitable for amphibious landings are west of Bandar Abbas.
c (U) Although many ports in the Persian Gulf are north of Bandar Abbas, the small
maneuver area and the silting effect on the Iranian side of the Gulf do not lend themselves to amphibious
assaults. However, other amphibious operations can be conducted.
d (U) Currents along the near shore are of minor signif icance. From April to October the
monsoon drift from the southwest Arabian Sea results in an east-west longshore current of approximately
1 nautical mile per minute. Storms associated with the monsoon weather conditions are most prevalent
along the coast during July. The resultant high seas and heavy surf conditions are of particular
significance. Except for the few embayments, the entire coastline is exposed. The effects of the high seas
in the embayments are considerably abated; however, large clouds of dust and sand that accompany high
winds may reduce visibility.
2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Long stretches of usable beach make Iran susceptible
to amphibious and deception operations. The Iranian military would be hard pressed to defend their entire
coastline.
3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. The presence of usable beaches broadens the
possible courses of action for friendly forces amphibious operations. The beaches can be used to
supplement port facilities in the event hostile forces occupy the coastal areas.
(c) (U) Climate and Weather.
1 (U) Existing Situation.
a (U) The south is one of Iran’s hottest and driest regions. Mean daily temperatures are
highest in the interior basins where they reach more than 110o F on most summer days (May through
September). Coastal temperatures, moderated by proximity to the sea, usually peak in the mid-80s and are
uncomfortable because of the high relative humidity. Major temperature aberrations occur in the
mountains in the east and in the Sistan Basin where winter temperatures are cold and normally drop
below freezing on many days in December and January.
b (U) Conditions in the Bandar Abbas area are basically semidesert with persistently high
temperatures and high relative humidity. Precipitation, vegetation, and surface water sources are nearly
nonexistent. Limited quantities of poor-quality ground water are generally available from moderate
depths beneath the coastal plain, but the area’s major sources of water are several deep wells and limited
desalinization facilities. The outstanding aspect of surface temperature common to most of Iran is the
large seasonal variation. In the Chah Bahar area, however, seasonal variations are somewhat stable. Mean
daily minimum temperatures during winter months average in the middle 50o F and the low 60s;
maximum daily temperatures are in the 70s. During the summer months, average afternoon temperatures
are in the 90s because of cloudiness associated with the moist onshore monsoonal flow. Summer nights
are very warm. Mean daily minimums at low elevations range in the high 70s and 80s.
c (U) The southern coast of Iran receives less than 5 inches of precipitation during an
average year. In addition to the normal summer and autumn aridity, long periods of drought may result
when winter and spring precipitation is deficient. To further complicate matters, a large portion of a
month’s precipitation may fall in one day. This is particularly true during summer when rainfall is very
infrequent and is usually limited to relatively brief showers.
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d (U) Along the Gulf of Oman, onshore monsoonal winds prevail throughout the day
during the summer months, and the sea breeze strengthens this flow in the afternoon. During most of the
remainder of the year when the onshore monsoonal flow is absent, surface winds along this coast display
the regular land-sea variations.
e (U) In contrast to the rest of Iran, the region bordered by the Gulf of Oman experiences
maximum cloudiness during the summer months. This phenomenon, caused by monsoonal intrusions into
the area, results in about 20 percent cloud cover during May and June. Likewise, the region experiences
increased cloudiness between sunset and dawn. Along the eastern extent of the Gulf, ceilings less than
5,000 feet are not uncommon during the night and early morning hours of the summer months.
Occasionally the ceilings drop to 2,000 feet.
2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Extremes of temperatures and humidity coupled with
the scarcity of water will have an adverse effect on men and equipment.
3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Climate and weather will have the same
effect on friendly courses of actions as on the threat. Clear, cloudless skies make air superiority a
prerequisite to successful offensive operations throughout Iran. During the wet season, flash flooding in
wadis and across roads will hinder traffic ability and resupply.
(2) (U) Transportation.
(a) (U) Existing Situation.
1 (U) Roadnets. Iran’s mountains and deserts make direct travel impractical, difficult, and
hazardous. Road maintenance has historically been very difficult and expensive and has resulted in a
system that is constantly in need of repair. Vast central and southeastern plateaus, whic h make up most of
Iran, contain arid desert sand and clay soils that are constantly windblown and support little or no life.
Wheeled vehicles negotiating those areas are confined to roadways. Cross-country movement in tracked
vehicles ranges from fair to extremely difficult and even impossible in certain areas. The road network
links the major population centers and economic areas. Main arteries form a T-pattern, with the crossbar
extending from the northwest corner of Iran to the northeast along the southern edge of the Caspian Sea.
The vertical runs through Tehran down to the Persian Gulf and finally to Kerman. Other roads link the
T-pattern with most of the country along the Persian Gulf plain, including the ports of Khorramshahr,
Bandar-e Khomeyni Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas.
2 (U) Railroads. The railroad system suffers from the same need of repair as the road
network. The railroad connects Khorramshahr and Bandar-e Khomeyni to Qom.
3 (U) Ports. Iran has a number of highly sophisticated seaports developed essentially for
petroleum exports. In the area of operations, the ports are Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar.
a (U) Bandar Abbas.
(1) (U) Location: 27o 8’N; 50o 12’E; approximately 10 kilometers west of city.
(2) (U) Accessibility: The approach channel is 9.5 meters deep. Harbor approaches
are exposed to gales. Worst weather occurs June and July. Tides can be as high as 3.05 meters.
(3) (U) Capacity: Six berths provide 1,050 meters for general cargo. Depth of the
berths does not exceed 10.5 meters. Also available are:
— An ore-loading berth and an oil berth.
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— Equipment for loading and offloading: one 60-ton floating crane and three mobile
cranes of 25-ton capacity, 18-ton capacity, and 7-ton capacity.
— Two utility boats, four forklifts of 2-ton and 3-ton lifting capacity, two tractors
with 30-ton and 10-ton trailers, and 200 wooden pallets.
(4) In the harbor are two 550-horsepower tugs for towage. The daily loading and
offloading rate is approximately 15,000 tons (based on an 18-hour day). The ore-loading plant has a
loading capability of 300 tons per hour. The grain-loading elevator has a capability of 3,000 tons per day.
Under construction are a ship-building port and a ship-repairing port. The facilities include two
permanent drydocks for ships of 500,000 deadweight tonnage, one floating dry dock for ships of 40,000
deadweight tonnage, and one ship lift for handling vessels up to 20,000 tons. The partially completed new
port has four wharves 720 meters in length for special cargoes and an open area of 60,000 square meters
for storage.
(5) (U) Clearance: Two roads that feed into a single major highway of the Bandar
Abbas road network lead out of the Bandar Abbas port area. Some local trucking is available.
(6) (U) Storage: Four warehouses have a capacity of 40,000 cubic feet of cargo
storage. Cold storage is limited to 25,000 tons, and petroleum storage is only 100,000 barrels. Near the
construction site are 10 acres of open storage.
b (U) Chah Bahar.
(1) (U) Location: 25o 17’N; 60o 37’E.
(2) (U) Accessibility: The approach is 12 meters deep. Worst weather is in summer.
Tides can be as high as 5 meters.
(3) (U) Capacity: Three jetties for ships with a 12-meter draft and a container
terminal. Anchorage is extensive.
(4) Storage: Cold storage is limited to 5,000 tons; 54,000 square feet of indoor
storage area are available.
(5) Clearance: Clearance is based on a single road and a very limited trucking
capacity.
4 (U) Airfields. Iran has about 20 major airfields capable of supporting military aircraft.
Additionally, numerous smaller fields are usable for light aircraft and can be prepared to accept aircraft
up to C-130 in size. Nearby countries have major international airports that can support combat aircraft.
5 (U) Principal Towns and Cities.
a (U) Tehran. Tehran, a relatively young city, is the capital city of Iran and an
industrial center and is located at the foot of the Elburz Range. Its population is about 3.5 million, and
another 4 million live in its metropolitan area.
b (U) Tabriz. Tabriz, located in the northwest corner of Iran, is the capital of East
Azerbaijan Province and has historically been a major population center because water is available from
Lake Urmia. Tabriz boasts a population in excess of 400,000.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
c (U) Esfahan. Esfahan is the capital of Esfahan Province, has a population of about
300,000, and is the principal center of Iran’s textile industry. Esfahan was the capital of the Safavi
Dynasty in the 17th century. Because of its wonderful architectural monuments of the Safavi period, it is
one of the most beautiful cities in the world. It is situated on the southern periphery of the Central Plateau,
about 260 miles from Tehran.
d (U) Shiraz. Shiraz, the capital of Fars Province, is located about 250 miles
southeast of Esfahan. It is renowned for its beautiful gardens and pure water. Its population is about
200,000.
e (U) Mashhad. Mashhad, capital of the Khorasan Province, is located in the
northeastern corner of Iran. It has about 250,000 inhabitants and is most famous for the Shrine of Imam
Reza, one of the holiest characters in the Shia literature.
f (U) Kermanshah. Kermanshah is a sizable town on the main road between Tehran
and Baghdad.
g (U) Hamadan. Hamadan is a town about the size of Kermanshah. It is astride the
road to Baghdad.
h (U) Abadan. Abadan, principally an oil refinery town, is located on the
Shatt-al-Arab of the Persian Gulf.
i (U) Khorramshahr. Khorramshahr is adjacent to and just upstream of Abadan. It is
Iran’s principal non-oil port and one of two southern terminals of the Trans-Iranian Railway (the other
terminal being Bandar-e Kohmeyni on the Khor Musa, an inlet near the head of the Persian Gulf).
j (U) Bushehr. Bushehr is a small but important port near Kharg Island on the Persian
Gulf shore.
k (U) Bandar Abbas. The small city of Bandar Abbas in Hormozgan Province is
located on the Persian Gulf shore in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz. It is the port for eastern Persia.
l (U) Kerman. Kerman, a center of Persian culture, is the capital of Kerman Province,
which bor ders Baluchistan va Sistan Province. Kerman is also a copper mining center.
m (U) Zahedan. Zahedan, the province capital, has a cosmopolitan population of
93,000 Baluchis, Indians, Pakistanis, and Persians. A thriving smuggling business keeps the bazaars of
this market center well stocked with merchandise.
6 (U) Pipelines. Multiple pipelines extend north and south from Iran’s oilfields. Most of
the southern pipelines terminate at the Khark Island complex. The pipelines are part of a highly sophisticated petroleum production network that includes crude oil and natural gas.
7 (U) Rivers. Iran has no navigable rivers. Most of the rivers become mere trickles during
the summer months.
(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The scarce and uneven distribution of the ground
transportation net should markedly affect Iranian supply and reinforcing operations. Even on the Central
Plateau where avenues of approach are more defined, the extremes of the terrain and climate would
impede the rate of advance and would take their toll in vehicles. The use of helicopters and airborne units
to overcome terrain considerations can be expected.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Iran’s poor ground transportation net will
likewise effect friendly ground operations. Friendly forces will require substantial heavy and tactical
airlift assets for the rapid movement of supplies and forces. Securing Iran’s ports are critical for the initial
deployment and subsequent operations of friendly forces.
(3) (U) Telecommunications.
(a) (U) Existing Situation. The telecommunications infrastructure is limited. The bulk of the
system services Tehran and the major cities of north-east Iran. Facilities in the major cities of southern
Iran are limited and practically without redundancy in equipment.
(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Iran’s limited telecommunications will have a
detrimental effect on command and control as well as logistics. Action against communications facilities
could seriously disrupt the presently overloaded facilities.
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Limitations in the present telecommunications
system, will enable friendly forces to exploit the enemy’s command and control capability.
(4) (U) Politics.
(a) (U) Existing Situation.
1 (U) Government Systems. The current Iranian government, as volatile as it may be, is
run by parliamentary procedures. The party in control is the Islamic Republican Party. Provincial
governments are not centralized as in the sense of state -to-federal government in the United States.
Rather, they are “influenced,” and many, not trusting the stability of the current government, adhere to
their own local political needs. Because no direct line of command and control exists for provincial
elements, Iran is governed by a procedure somewhat akin to a feudal system.
2 (U) Political Dynamics. Iran has been in turmoil since the death of its religious leader,
the Ayatollah. Several factions are struggling for power in Tehran. One faction is headed by a moderate
leader who was recently elected president. He has the support, generally, of the Bazaris (middle class),
merchants, and most intellectuals, and claims the loyalty of most elements of the armed forces in his
constitutional role as commander in chief. Opposing him are elements of several religious groups who
fear the Islamic Fundamentalist Revolution is being betrayed by the moderates whom they disparagingly
call Westernizers. But these religious groups are in conflict with each other — mainly over the best way
to achieve Islamization of the country and the region. The Leftists are divided between the Tudeh Party
(Moscow-oriented communists) and the Marxist Nationalists (ideologically oriented toward Libya and
Syria); these two groups are in conflict with each other over interpretation of Marx and Lenin and
reconcilia tion of their teachings with those of Islam.
3 (U) Foreign Relations. Since the revolution, Iran has taken a nonaligned stance based
essentially on its style of Islamic revolutionary fervor. Iran has treated its neighbors and the United States
coolly. In fact, the government and the people have been looking inward in their dealings with all
foreigners.
(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Political uncertainty, the Iran-Iraq war and internal
divisions concerning support to the Shiites in southern Iraq have all contributed to weakening the central
government. Short of a national emergency, the central government may have difficulty in sustaining the
political support for long-term military operations.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Friendly forces should be able to exploit Iran’s
internal situation by aiding the traditional anti-government groups such as Kurds and Baluchi tribesman.
(5) (U) Economics.
(a) (U) Existing Situation.
1 (U) Iran uses its oil revenues to establish an industrial base for self-sustaining growth in
the future. Its largest source of employment is industry, which ranges from handcrafted carpets to steel
technology and petrochemicals. Agriculture employs about 30 percent of the work force, and grains are
the major products.
2 (U) The revolution and the war with Iraq have caused a major breakdown in Iran’s
economic system. Iran has attempted to sell its “national treasures” (high-value items confiscated from
the Shah after the revolution). The money was used to finance the war effort, which reportedly cost more
than $40 billion.
3 (U) Oil export is the mainstay of Iran’s economy, but a depressed world oil market has
created a cash-flow problem of major proportions for the central government. Additionally, poor
management of the oil infrastructure has contributed to a reduced oil flow.
4 (U) Many of Iran’s trading partnerships were dissolved after the revolution, most
notably its partnership with the United States. Potential trading partners, suspicious of Iran’s economy,
require cash payments. The requirement for cash payments puts a heavy economic burden on a country
that is already under an economic strain.
(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Iran’s heavy reliance on oil production to earn foreign
exchange credits makes the oilfields and oil-producing infrastructure lucrative strategic objectives.
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Dependence on foreign trade makes Iran
susceptible to operations against her lines of commerce and supply. The vulnerability of the oilfields and
other means of petroleum production must be considered in any friendly course of action.
(6) (U) Sociology.
(a) (U) Existing Situation.
1 (U) General. Iran, a nation smaller in area than the United States east of the Mississippi,
has a population estimated at about 37 million. Once largely composed of nomads and tribesmen, the
population is now almost evenly divided between rural and urban inhabitants. Nomads and seminomadic
tribesmen account for less than 5 percent of the total population. The principal language is Persian, which
is known as Farsi in Iran. More than half of the population speaks Farsi, and the minorities use it as a
second language. Turkish, the second major spoken language, is followed by Kurdish and Arabic. As may
be expected from a nomadic culture, a number of dialects exist among the tribes. For example:
— In southeastern Iran, Afshars of Kerman Province speak Turkish.
— Farther east, Baluchis, the most prominent tribe in the area, speak a mixture of Persian
and Turkish.
— Afghans, in northeastern Iran, speak Pushtu.
2 (U) Labor Force. About 30 percent of Iran’s population is involved in agriculture. The
other 70 percent is in services or petroleum.
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3 (U) Education. Despite a basically free education at primary and secondary levels,
literacy in Iran is only about 40 percent. Financial assistance may be provided at higher levels.
4 (U) Religion. Shiism, the official religion in Iran, has a following of about 90 percent of
the population. Other religions include Armenian Christianity, Assyrian Christianity, Bahaism, Judaism,
Sunnism, and Zoroastrianism.
5 (U) Social Values. The revolution in part was a reaction to the Shah’s modernization, or
Westernization, of Iran. Islamic fundamentalism, as Khomeini preached it, became the way of life for the
Iranians. The importance of Shiism to the people and government of Iran must therefore not be
underestimated. Although Shiism underscores all government actions and thinking, disenchantment with
some precepts of the Islamic revolution is apparent.
(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Internal divisions within the clergy, government and
ethnic communities has weaken the central governments ability to respond to a crisis. Iran is susceptible
to indigenous unrest and turmoil fueled by external forces.
(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Friendly forces should be able to exploit these
divisions within Iran. Support to anti-government groups could serve as a force multiplier when
conducting military operations against Iran.
(7) (U) Science and Technology (Omitted).
3. (U) ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a. (U) Ground Capabilities. The Iranian Army has approximately 350,000 men organized into
various armor/infantry divisions (10-12 divisions total) and combat support/service support units. Four
army headquarters have responsibility for the training, sustainment, and operations of these forces. The
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has up to 15 divisions (approximately 100,000 men). Rebuilding from
their long and costly war with Iraq, the Army is equipped with an assortment of military equipment. Their
armored divisions are organized around 100 U.S.-made M-60A1s; 100 British-made Chieftains; and
several hundred Soviet T-54/55s, T-62s, and T-72s. Artillery pieces are from both western and eastern
European sources with the majority of hardware coming from the CIS Republics.
b. (U) Air Capabilities. Iranian air capabilities are limited. Years of fighting coupled with poor
sustain ment and training programs has severely weakened the Iranian air force. Numbering approximately
30,000 men, the Iranian air force is organized around 185 combat aircraft and several squadrons of
transport aircraft.
c. (U) Naval Capabilities. Iranian naval capabilities are limited but improving. Iran’s reliance on the
Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as their oil outlet has shaped their military improvements. Equipped with
three Kilo class submarines and several small frigates, destroyers and support vessels, its primary mission
is coastal security. Principal naval bases are located at Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Kharg, Bandar-e-Anzelli
and Bandar-e-Khomeini.
d. (U) Nuclear Capabilities. None.
e. (U) CB Capabilities. Artillery and missiles; known agents: mustard gas and cyanide; probable
agents: nerve gas.
f.
(U) Joint Capabilities. None.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
4. (U) ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a. (U) Worse Case. Iran’s improved relationship with Iraq may contribute to combined political and
military activities in the Persian Gulf. Of major concern to the U.S. is a combined operation whereby Iraq
attacks Kuwait and Iran in a supporting role attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz to U.S. and allied
naval forces. In such a contingency the introduction of Iranian ground forces in Kuwait cannot be ruled
out.
b. (U) Probable Course of Action. It is unlikely that Iran will depart from its present course of
rebuilding its armed forces and maintaining the status quo in the region. After years of fighting, the
central government’s priority of effort has been in consolidating its power and laying the political
framework for Iran’s future.
5. (U) CONCLUSIONS. (Purposely omitted; student analysis provides this information.)
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
TAB F
AREA STUDY OF GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)
1. (U) INTRODUCTION. Recognizing the need to develop coordinated responses to regional threats,
the GCC was established in May 1981. Including the countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Oman, the GCC has made considerable progress in
cooperative economic, diplomatic, and military security efforts. The GCC states have a combined
population of 12 to 15 million, a land area of about 2,653,000 square kilo meters, and a combined annual
gross domestic (GDP) of about $210 billion. Saudi Arabia is the dominant GCC country with its larger
economic/military infrastructure and geographical advantage. Holding vast oil resources estimated to be
30 percent of the free world’s known reserves, the politically moderate and strategically located Saudi
Arabia is the key player within the region and an influential force in international affairs. Since the GCC’s
establishment, Saudi Arabia has been the driving force in encouraging politic al, economic, and military
cooperation between the member states.
2. (U) GEOGRAPHY. The GCC countries share a similar topography and climate. The land is largely
flat desert covered with loose sand and small rocks. Low outcroppings of limestone form rolling hills,
stubby cliffs, and shallow ravines in many of the countries. Inland, the climate is generally hot and dry
with temperatures frequently reaching 48 degrees centigrade. The coastal plains are hot and humid with
annual rainfall less than 120 millimeters. At higher elevations, temperatures are considerably cooler with
an increased annual rainfall. The Persian Gulf dominates this region and provides the crucial waterways
and outlets for the export of oil and other maritime traffic. Within the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz
is the most critical maritime chokepoint; its opening to international maritime traffic is essential for
maintaining access to the strategic resources of the region.
a. (U) Road Nets. Road nets are limited within in each country and generally serve to link the
capital with the major cities and ports. Major four-lane highways can be found in Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait linking them with the other rich Persian Gulf countries. This includes a causeway completed in
the mid-1980s which provides a land-link between the island state of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. These
roads can support heavy loads such as tractor trailer and heavy equipment trucks. Vehicle traffic is limited
to the existing road nets unless vehicles are equipped with all terrain capabilities.
b. (U) Ports. Port facilities throughout the GCC countries are modern and capable of handling most
maritime vessels to include super tankers. Superb ship repair facilities are located in Bahrain and the UAE
where their location adjacent to one of the busiest shipping routes has transformed ship repair from a
small business venture into a major regional industry. For additional information on GCC ports, see
Logistics Annex of USCENTCOM Planning Guidance.
c. (U) Pipelines. A petroleum dominated economy, petroleum pipelines are the lifeline of the
GCC’s economic infrastructure. The primary oil producing countries of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Oman and the UAE own thousands of miles of pipelines linking the oil fields with oil refineries and port
export facilities.
3. (U) DEMOGRAPHICS. Arabs are the predominant ethnic group, and Islam is the predominant
religion within each country. Bahrain is unique in that it includes a fairly large number of citizens of
Iranian origin. Although most Bahrainis are Arabs, 70 percent are Shia Moslems and 30 percent Sunni.
Most GCC countries depend on a large foreign work force to provide their basic government services.
They include Palestinians, Egyptians, Iranians, Pakistanis, Indians and thousands of Asians. This is
especially true in Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi Arabia where this work force provides most of the skilled
and unskilled labor requirements.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
4. (U) POLITICS. The GCC members share similar political systems whereby their countrie s are
governed by ruling families. In most countries political parties are nonexistent, and all political,
economic, military, and foreign relations decisions are made by the head of state with the advice of other
family members or an advisory council. The UAE perhaps has the most progressive political system with
the federation of seven amirates, as defined in the 1971 Provisional Constitution. Power is divided
between federal and amirate governments with the head of state chosen by a Supreme Council of Union
composed of rulers of the seven amirates.
5. (U) ECONOMICS. The petroleum industry dominates the economies of the GCC countries.
Containing approximately 70 percent of the free world’s proven oil reserves, it is unlikely the petroleum
sector will decline in the near future. In fact, it is estimated that while U.S. economically exploitable
reserves could be depleted in 20 to 40 years, the Persian Gulf region will still have over 100 years of
proven reserves. In 1981, the GCC members signed its Unified Economic Agreement with the intent of
reducing redundancy and increasing economic cooperation between the GCC countries. Joint venture
successes between Baharain and Oman have encouraged planners to magnify the concept of cooperative
planning and development strategies. From approximately $29,000 in the UAE to $13,000 in Bahrain, the
GCC countries enjoy one of the highest per capital incomes in the world. Understandably, the quality of
life is very good in these countries. Most countries provide free health/dental care, subsidized housing,
and free university education.
6. (U) SECURITY AND DEFENSE. The need to find a more credible and effective means to deal with
regional military threats was the primary reason the GCC was established. Today the Peninsula Shield
Force, the military arm of the GCC, provides a military complement to the economic, trade, cultural, and
other areas of cooperation between the GCC countries. Far from being an integrated regional military
alliance, the GCC has made impressive gains in military cooperation. In 1983, troops from all the GCC
states participated in joint military exercises in Abu Dhabi. Involving more than 6,500 troops, “Shield of
the Peninsula” exercised the GCC’s ability to conduct various joint and combined operations. Considered
a success by participating members, this exercise provided the framework for subsequent joint and
combined exercises by the GCC states. Far from being a unified and integrated regional military force,
improvements continue in the joint and combined operations arena and in the development of a regional
air defense capability. See USCENTCOM Planning Directive for GCC countries military balance.
7. (U) CONCLUSION. Cooperation among the GCC states continues to improve on all levels. Since
1981, the GCC has made tremendous progress on economic and military issues. Militarily, problems exist
in air defense coordination and interoperability of the various armed forces. Continuing with
joint/combined exercises and coordinating the procurement of military equipment will help improve this
area. In the event of a major threat to GCC interest (as in the case of Iraq), the GCC will require external
support. Holding vast financial resources, the GCC wields a tremendous amount of influence in world
affairs and are key players in promoting regional stability. The GCC has demonstrated a moderate
approach to solving regional issues and continued cooperation among the member states is necessary for
maintaining stability in this very volatile and strategically important region.
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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
TAB H
LOGISTICS
Appendix 1 to Tab H. Mobility and Transportation
1. (U) GENERAL. This section consolidates available air and seaport capabilities information for
deployment planning in CENTCOM.
2. (U) CONCEPT. Intertheater movement of all forces, equipment, and supplies will be programmed
through the JDS as coordinated by USTRANSCOM. Personnel movement will be by air, equipment and
supplies by sea, with critical items movement by air on an exception basis. MTMC will maintain
responsibility for port operation. Intratheater movement will initially be coordinated by USCENTCOM J4
and transferred to the Theater Army Commander once it is operational.
3. (U) Resources availability is contained in the ISCP.
4. (U) Necessary movement data, resources, and available airfields and sea ports are contained in the
enclosures to this appendix.
2 Enclosures
1. Air Field Data
2. Port Data
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Ref 9-H-1-41
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
Enclosure 1 to Appendix 1, Tab H. AIR FIELDS
NAME
LOCATION
RUNWAY
CAPABILITIES
LOGISTICS SUPPORT
REMARKS
23°36'N
58°17'E
11,762x148 ft paved
runway
Up to C5
Maintenance facilities available; NAVAIDS
excellent weather forecasting available; fuel
storage capability 850,000 gallons; water
supply adequate; parking facilities can be
expanded up to 3 sqdns of C141 aircraft in
surge.
International airport best airport in Oman;
monsoon weather Apr-Sep for all Omani
airports; 3 sqdns of SOAF located.
Masirah
20°41N
58°53"E
10,005x148 ft paved
runway;
7,000x150
compacted gravel
C141
Facilities for two fighter sqdns plus 1 C130
sqdn; 700,000 gallon fuel storage; all weather
capability.
Water desalinization plant needed. Additional
POL can be pumped from jetty. Road from
port makes for excellent resupply. At D+1 can
process up to 25,000 soldiers a day.
Salalah
17°02'N
54°06'E
8,967x148 ft
concrete;
6,000x150 ft natural
material
C141
Base facilities other than water in short
supply; limited all weather capability; fuel
storage capability of 40,000 gallons.
Additional fuel (2M gallons) available at Port
Haysut but only two 3,600 gallon tank
vehicles available to move it.
Thumrait
17°40'N
54°02'E
1,123x148 ft
C5
Maintenance and logistics are adequate; fuel
storage capability is 300,000 gallons; limited
all weather capability; water is in short
supply.
Primary tactical airbase of SOAF can support
1 US fighter sqdn; fuel supplies come overland
by road from Muscat or Port Raysut.
SOMALIA:
Berbera
10° 24'N
44 57'E
13,615x174 ft
asphalt, natural
material
C5
Mogadishu
02°01'N
45°18'E
10,355x148 ft
C5
23°59'N
35°28'E
9,840x130 ft
OMAN:
Seeb
EGYPT:
Ras Banas
Fuel storage 400,000 gallons; limited
maintenance facilities. All weather capability.
Limited fuel storage capability of under 10,000
gallons; fuel trucked in from port.
C130
Recently refurbished facilities can support
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Ref 9-H-1-1-43
Capable of holding up to 1 air wing of tactical;
can be used for carrier diverts. Road available
from port to airfield for resupply.
International airport adjacent American
embassy compound which has sufficient area
of 50 acres for AIREVAC hospital; can be
used for carrier divert.
At D+1 can process up to 25,000 soldiers per
day; water desalinization plant needed.
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
either one sqdn of tactical or logistic air; fuel
capability is 200,000 gallons.
NAME
LOCATION
RUNWAY
CAPABILITI
ES
LOGISTICS SUPPORT
REMARKS
KENYA:
MOI
International
04°2'S
39°36'E
10,991x148 ft
asphalt
C5
Excellent facilities for logistics and
maintenance; fuel storage capacity is 4 million
gallons in refinery next to airport; ammunition
storage sites available.
Capability for all US aircraft; port adjacent to
airfield; 1 sqdn of tactical aircraft can be
maintained for indefinite period.
01°17'S
36°52'E
7,999x151 ft
C141
Most modern facilities in area of operation;
fuel storage capacity 1 million gallons; no
limitations on water but hanger space and
billeting extremely limited.
-----------------------------------------------
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES:
Sharjah
International
25°20'N
55°31"E
12,336x148 ft
C5
NAVAIDS available; Fuel storage750,000
gallons; adequate water available. Maintenance
facilities limited with most maintenance done
in Dubai.
International airport. light pattern same as
Dubai for landings and takeoffs.
Dubai
International
25°15'N
55°21'E
13,123x151 ft
C5
All weather; NAVAIDS available fuel storage;
750,000 gallons adequate water available.
Maintenance facilities limited. Plenty of
storage and ramp parking space in area
adjacent to runway.
Excellent condition. International airport.
Ras Al
Khaimah
International
25°37'N
55°56'E
12,336x148 ft
C141
All weather; NAVAIDS available. No
maintenance facilities. Limited ramp space.
----------------------------------------------
Nairobi
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-44
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
NAME
LOCATION
RUNWAY
CAPABILITI
ES
LOGISTICS SUPPORT
REMARKS
30°55'N
41°08'E
10,007x148 ft
asphalt
C5
Fuel available.
------------------------------------------------
Dhahran
26°16'N
50°10'E
12,008x148 ft
asphalt
C5
Maintenance hangers; ramp spaces; large open
area for storage. Fuel available.
------------------------------------------------
Hafr Al Batin
28°20'N
46°08'E
10,007x148 ft
asphalt
C141
Fuel available.
-----------------------------------------------
Jubail
27°03'N
49°24'E
13,123x165 ft
C5
Fuel available.
-----------------------------------------------
King
Khalid Int'l
24°58'N
46°43'E
13,779x197 ft
asphalt
C5
Fuel available.
-----------------------------------------------
Rafha
29°38'N
43°30'E
9,843x148 ft
asphalt
C5
25°16'N
55°56'E
15,000
C5
All weather; NAVAIDS available.
Maintenance available but limited.
Close to support.
27°13'N
56°23'E
12,020
C5A
All weather; NAVAIDS in disrepair. Limited
ramp space.
29°14'N
47°59'E
11,152x10 ft
C5A
All weather; NAVAIDS; maintenance, fuel
available.
SAUDI
ARABIA:
Arar
QATAR:
Doha
IRAN:
Bandar Abbass
KUWAIT:
Kuwait
International
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-45
Close to support.
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-46
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
Enclosure 1 to Appendix 2, Tab H. PORT DATA
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-47
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-48
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
PORT
HARBOR
ANCHORAGE
CRANES
STORAGE
CLEARANCE
Natural
ALONGSIDE
BERTHS
None
OMAN:
Mina Al Fahal
23°40'N
58°30'E
Extensive in winter
1-6 ton
Petroleum and limited
lighterage only.
Road; limited trucking.
Port Raysut
16°56'N
54°01'E
Natural w/jetty
12
3 barges serve as
anchorage. Maximum
length: 91m-5.2m draft
1-70 ton
1-30 ton
2-7 ton
Grain-30,000 tons;
Cement-6,000 tons.
Road; limited trucking
available.
Port Qaboos
(Muttrah)
23°37'N
58°35'E
Natural protected
8-9 mtr draft;
4-4 mtr draft;
max length: 168m
Grain-30,000 tons;
Cement-6,000 tons;
Cargo-60,000 sq ft;
Cold Storage-5,000 tons;
Refrigeration-5,000 tons;
20 acres-open storage.
35 km to Seeb Int'l. Underground conveyor belt at berth;
3 for bulk cement and grain;
tractors available for RO/EO
container ships.
Jetty
Man-made channel
3-10 meter draft
draft from pier
10 acres open storage;
Petroleum storage for 25,000
BBL;
Cold storage-5,000 tons;
Refrigeration-5,000 tons.
Road from port to airbase;
pipeline to storage tanks at air
base.
None
Masirah Island
22°N58'E
Extensive; but subject
to extremely bad
weather from Apr-Sep;
lighterage needed.
3-25 ton;
1-60 ton
floating
crane
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-49
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-50
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-51
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-52
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
PORT
HARBOR
ALONGSIDE
BERTHS
ANCHORAGE
CRANES
STORAGE
KENYA:
Mombasa
4°04'N
39°40'E
Has two harbors on
both sides of
Mombasa Island
16-11m draft; max
length 315m.
12-all classes;
4-27m draft;
2-VLCC at oil
terminal.
2-3 ton;
9-7 ton;
1-60 ton
floating
crane.
Cold store-4,000 cu ft
Cargo-93,000 sq ft
Coal-12,000 tons
Petroleum-420,000 BBL.
Sheltered bay.
2-8.8m draft;
2-8m draft;
1-11.5m draft (for
POL).
Extensive
2-5 ton;
up to 25
tons.
Cargo-15,750 sq ft;
Open store-10 acres;
Petroleum-20,000 BBL.
Two roads off wharves.
Mogadiscio
20°N,
45°E
Natural w/man-made
jetty.
2-9.5m draft;
2-8.5m draft;
1-11.5m draft
(for POL).
Extensive
1-40 ton;
2-3 ton.
Open storage-50 acres;
Cargo-20,000 sq ft;
Petroleum-120,000 BBL.
Vehicles by road; US embassy
compound near port capable of
open storage up to 50 acres.
Kismayu
0°23'S
42°32'E
Sheltered bay;
L-shaped pier
4-8.5m draft
Extensive
3 cranes
up to25
tons
Cargo-10,000 sq ft
Open storage-15 acres
Vehicles by road.
Jetty;
man-made channel.
10-8.23m draft;
6-11m draft (2 of
these berths are
container capable).
Extensive
3-6 ton
(mobile);
2-6 ton
gantry
cranes.
Cold store-5,000 cu ft;
Cargo-100,000 sq ft;
Petroleum-500,000 BBL;
Silos-10,000 tons.
Road-limited.
10
Mobile:
2-3 ton;
1-5 ton;
2-10 ton;
1-20 ton.
Cold Store-500 tons;
Warehouse-14,480 sq mtrs;
Open storage-23,780 sq
meters.
Multiple roads; local trucking
available.
SOMALIA:
Berbera
10°26'N
45°01'N
BAHRAIN:
Mina Sulman
26°12'N
50°37'E
QATAR:
Doha
25°17'N
51°33'E
Natural
4-9.14m draft;
4-8.5m draft.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-53
CLEARANCE
By road large quantity vehicles
available at refinery.
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-54
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
Cold store-4,000 cu ft
Cargo-93,000 sq ft
Coal-12,000 tons
Petroleum-420,000 BBL.
Cargo-15,750 sq ft;
Open store-10 acres;
Petroleum-20,000 BBL.
Open storage-50 acres;
Cargo-20,000 sq ft;
Petroleum-120,000 BBL.
Cargo-10,000 sq ft
Open storage-15 acres
Cold store-5,000 cu ft;
Cargo-100,000 sq ft;
Petroleum-500,000 BBL;
Silos-10,000 tons.
Cold Store-500 tons;
Warehouse-14,480 sq mtrs;
Open storage-23,780 sq
meters.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-55
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-56
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
PORT
HARBOR
ALONGSIDE
BERTHS
ANCHORAGE
CRANES
STORAGE
CLEARANCE
Natural; channel manmade
5-9.75m draft;
1-10.50m draft;
6-11.5m draft;
3-5.8m draft
(lighterage only).
Limited.
3x5-5 ton;
1x1-10
ton;
Lighterage
available,
mobile
cranes up
to 80
D.W.T.
Warehouse-20,600 cu mtrs;
No cold storage available.
Multiple roads; limited
trucking.
Jebel Ali, Dubai
25°01'N
55°02'E
Man-made
72-14m draft
Limited.
2 container
cranes.
Unknown; see Port Rashid.
Multiple roads; some trucking.
Port Rashid
25°16'N
55°16'E
Natural
6-9.0m draft
74-deep water
Limited.
Mobile:
3-5 ton,
5-10 ton,
3-20 ton,
9-40 ton,
2 container
cranes 35
ton.
Warehouse-163,724 sq mtr;
Open storage-10 acres.
Multiple roads (some Dubai
congestion); local trucking.
Port Khalid Sharjah
25°22'N
55°22'E
Natural
12-deep water
Limited.
Cranes up
to 200
tons.
RO/RO facilities for containers
Cold storage-4,500 tons
Warehouse-18,300 sq mtrs
Multiple roads; local trucking.
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES:
Abu Dhabi
24°33'N
54°20'E
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-57
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-58
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
PORT
HARBOR
ANCHORAGE
CRANES
STORAGE
CLEARANCE
Man-made
ALONGSIDE
BERTHS
12.2m draft
Mina Sagr,
Rasal Khaima
25°58'N
56°03'E
Extensive.
Selfsustaining
vessels
only
Warehouse-size unknown;
no refrigerated storage
Single road; limited trucking
available.
Abu Dhabi
24°33'N
54°20'E
Man-made
27-5.18 to12.9m
5
3-5x5 ton
1-1x10 ton
Petroleum-250,000 BBL;
Cold store-25,000 tons;
Cargo-200,000 tons;
Refrigeration-25,000 tons;
15 acres-open storage.
Multiple roads; trucking
available.
Natural.
6-10.5m;
1-10-5 (Oil berth);
1-10.5 (Ore loading berth).
Unknown.
Cargo-160,000 cu ft;
Cold storage-25,000 tons;
10 acres-open storage;
Petroleum-100,000 BBL.
Four forklifts; 2 tractors w/a
10-ton trailer and a 30-ton
trailer.
Bandar Khomeini
30°26'N
49°05'E
Natural (Land-locked).
3-8.53m
----------------
Coverage storage--94,000 tons;
Open yard-15,000 tons;
Open storage-1 acre.
Railroad single road.
Bushire
28°59'N
50°50E
Man-made channel.
A single quay for
loading/offloading.
Limited for ships less
than 9.14m draft and
170m length.
Open storage only.
Lighterage available for
unloading/loading. Limited to a
single road.
IRAN:
Bandar Abbas
27°8'N
56°12'E
Mobile:
1-25 ton,
1-18 ton,
1-7 ton,
1 floating
crane 60
tons.
None.
6-5 ton
(mobile);
1-7 ton
(mobile electric).
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-59
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
PORT
HARBOR
Chah Bahar
25°17'N
60°37'E
Natural.
Kharg Island
29°14'N
50°20'E
Port of Mahshahr
30°27'N
49°11'E
SAUDI ARABIA:
Damman
26°30'N
50°12'E
ALONGSIDE
BERTHS
3 jetties for ships
of 12 mtr draft; 1
container terminal
ANCHORAGE
CRANES
STORAGE
CLEARANCE
Extensive; in winter
subject to winter
swells.
------------
Cargo-54,000 sq mtr;
Cold storage-5,000 tons.
Limited to a single road; limited
trucking available at present
time.
Man-made.
3-16.76m;
10-10.5m; sea
island terminal
closed due to ext
war damage.
Extensive to 20.81m
draft
Destroyed
by war
Petroleum-1,000,000 BBL;
Open storage-10 acres.
Pipeline only; some lighterage
available. Rate of 100 5 tons/
hr for petroleum.
Man-made.
6-12.0m; extensive
war damage
6-11.73 tanker
terminals.
Limited; high winds
from June to August
with accompanying
dust.
10-10 ton
(mobile).
Bunkering facilities each berth.
Rate of 2,000 tons/hr for fuel
oil and 500 tons/hr for RO/RO
capability at jetty.
25-14.0m draft;
2-9.0m draft;
1-12.0m draft.
Limited.
6 container
cranes;
63 portal
cranes;
131
mobile
cranes of
13.51 to
155 tons;
380
forklifts.
Warehouse-170,850 sq mtr;
Open storage-2,655,000 sq
mtrs.
Multiple roads; trucking
available.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-60
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
PORT
HARBOR
ALONGSIDE
BERTHS
19-11m draft;
4-8.0m draft
(RO/RO only);
20 under development.
ANCHORAGE
CRANES
STORAGE
CLEARANCE
Jeddah
21°28'N
39°14'E
Natural.
Extensive.
1-35 ton;
26 mobile
cranes of
varying
sizes.
Warehouse-400,000 sq mtrs.
Multiple roads; trucking
available.
Jubail
27°01'N
49°40'E
Man-made.
8-12.0m draft;
8-14.0m draft.
Limited.
Mobile:
6-20 ton,
4-50 ton,
2-100 ton.
Covered storage-18,300m;
Open storage-10 acres;
180,000 sq mtr RO/RO
container area.
Multiple roads.
Man-made.
10-10.6m draft;
2-3.23m draft;
Off-shore
onloading.
Limited.
24-3 ton;
8-6 ton;
1-90 ton
mobile;
1-100 ton
floating;
2-30 ton.
Covered storage-42,900m;
Open storage-211,425m
available.
Multiple roads; rail; trucking.
Mina Al Ahmadi
Tankers only.
----------------
------------
-----------------------------
------------------------------
Mina Saud
Tankers only.
----------------
------------
------------------------------
-------------------------------
KUWAIT:
Mina Abdulla
29°01'N
48°12'E
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 9-H-1-1-61
SAMPLE JOPES MESSAGE
And ORDERS FORMATS
Reference 10
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900
Ref 10
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
SAMPLE OPREP-3 COMMAND ASSESSMENT Message Report
{PRECEDENCE (FLASH/IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY/ROUTINE)}
FROM: USCINCCENT//BRIGHT STAR//
TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC
{OTHER ADDRESSES AS REQUIRED}
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/OPREP-3PCA/USCENTCOM/001//
REF/A/VMG/HQ USCENTCOM/030056ZOCTXX//
AMPN/PINNACLE VOICE REPORT FM FWD BRIGHT STAR ELEMENT TO NMCC//
FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//
GENTEXT/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/
1. ( ) DAMAGE TO BLUELAND A/C. VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 030056Z
OCT ______________.
2. ( ) THE BLUELAND XXX TACTICAL FTR WG REPORTED AT 030030Z OCT
REBEL FORCES INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED EXPLOSIVE
CHARGES ON TWO BLUELAND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING CONSIDERABLE
DAMAGE TO ALL A/C.
3. ( ) ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS
ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.
4. ( ) INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
5. ( ) NO DAMAGE OR INJURY TO US FORCES OR EQUIPMENT IN POSITION
FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.
6. ( ) ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3P REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//
DECL/OADR//
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-A-1
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
SAMPLE OPREP-3 CINC’s ASSESSMENT Message Report
{PRECEDENCE}
FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC
{OTHER ADDRESSEES AS REQUIRED}
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCCENT//
REF/A/VMG/USCINCCENT/120050ZAPRXX//
AMPN/VOICE REPORT TO NMCC//
FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//
GENTEXT/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/
1. ( ) REBEL FORCES HAVE ATTACKED BLUELAND A/C AT DESERT WEST
AB.
VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 120050Z APR _____.
2. ( ) USCENTCOM FWD {BRIGHT STAR} HAS REPORTED REBEL FORCES
INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES ON
TWO
BLUELAND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO THE
A/C.
3. ( ) ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS
ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.
4. ( ) INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
5. ( ) US FORCES IN POSITION FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR ARE ON
INCREASED ALERT AND WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF
BLUELAND, AS REQUIRED.
6. ( ) SUPPORT INITIALLY WILL BE LIMITED TO AERIAL WARNING AND
SURVEILLANCE USING E-3AS AND RC-135S CURRENTLY IN PLACE AT
DESERT WEST AB FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.
7. ( ) ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3 REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//
DECL/OADR//
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-B-1
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
SAMPLE CJCS WARNING ORDER
{PRECEDENCE}
FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
{OTHER ADDRESSEES AS REQUIRED}
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
ORDTYP/WARNORD/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//
ORDREF/OPLAN/USCINCCENT..XXX//
HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//
5UNIT
/UNITDES
/UNITLOC
/CMNTS
/JTF HEADQUARTERS
/
/
/JCSE (JTF SUP DET)
/
/
/198TH MECH BRIGADE
/
/
/2ND ARMOR BRIGADE
/
/
/112TH PSYOP CO
/
/
/CVBG
/
/
/MARITIME PREPOS SHIPS
/
/
/MEB
/
/
/123RD COMP WG
/
/
/91 TAS
/
/
/312 COMPAERWG
/
/
AMPN/SUFFICIENT USTRANSCOM AERIAL TANKER ASSETS TO SUPPORT THIS
OPERATION ARE APPORTIONED FOR PLANNING//
NARR/( ) THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. REQUEST USCINCCENT COMMANDERS
ESTIMATE WITH ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION FOR NCA
CONSIDERATION BY 231000Z NOV____. USTRANSCOM WILL PROVIDE
PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES AND FORCE CLOSURE PROFILES TO
THE SUPPORTED CINC UPON REQUEST.//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-C-1
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
1. ( ) THE SITUATION IN ORANGELAND IS EXTREMELY TENSE FOLLOWING
AN ATTEMPTED COUP BY PRO-YELLOWLAND REBELS ON 20 NOV. THE
CAPITAL REMAINS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, BUT EL ASSID AIRFIELD
SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL HAS FALLEN TO REBEL FORCES. YELLOWLAND,
RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR AID BY THE REBELS, FLEW IN ELEMENTS
OF TWO COMMANDO UNITS FROM EL ODD TO EL ASSID AIRFIELD AND HAS
CONDUCTED TU-22/BLINDER BOMBING MISSIONS FROM EL ODD AGAINST THE
CAPITAL. THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AGAINST THE CAPITAL IS AS YET
UNDETERMINED. PRESIDENT NOSS OF ORANGELAND HAS REQUESTED
IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE FROM BLUELAND UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR
MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN YELLOWLAND AND
ORANGELAND HAVE BEEN
AT A HIGH LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. COL HOMM SUPPORTED AN
EARLIER COUP ATTEMPT IN MID-FEBRUARY AND, IN RECENT MONTHS, HAS
INCREASED ARMS SHIPMENTS TO REBEL FORCES WHILE DETAINING
DISSIDENTS IN CAMPS WITHIN YELLOWLAND. THE LATEST COUP ATTEMPT
FOLLOWS IN THE WAKE OF HOMMS CALL FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE
GOVERNMENT AND A RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE ANTAGONISTIC
REBEL FORCES. AS A RESULT OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE
AREA, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) HAS MADE DIPLOMATIC
INQUIRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT
BLUELAND EFFORTS IN ORANGELAND.
2. ( ) THE GOB WILL ASSIST US FORCES AND PROVIDE NECESSARY
ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND HOST NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.
3. ( ) EASTLAND MAY BE EXPECTED TO DENY BASING ACCESS TO SUPPORT
THIS OPERATION.//
GENTEXT/MISSION/
4. ( ) WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT
MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOB TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND
STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS).//
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
5. ( ) COURSES OF ACTION. US ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE
LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ASSIST IN NONCOMBATANT
EVACUATION
OPERATIONS (NEO), CONDUCT SHOW OF FORCES, PROTECT AND DEFEND
BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS, CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY
OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED, AND PARTICIPATE IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE.
A. ( ) USCINCPAC. THE 15TH MEB AND MPS SHIPPING IN USCINCPAC
OPLAN XXXX ARE NO LONGER ALLOCATED TO USCINCPAC.
B. ( ) USCINCLANT. PROVIDE ONE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMPOSED OF
AN AMPHIBIOUS MEB AND REQUISITE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPPING TO
USCINCPAC.
C. ( ) USCINCTRANS. PLAN FOR EARLY DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE
INVOLVEMENT AND PLAN TO PROVIDE HIGHEST PRIORITY MOVEMENT OF
QUALIFIED MATERIAL DURING THIS OPERATION.
D. ( ) DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
E. ( ) DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-C-2
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
F. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. EACH COA SHOULD BE
EVALUATED IN TERMS OF THE OPSEC MEASURES NEEDED TO ENSURE THE
CONDITIONS OF ESSENTIAL SECRECY REQUIRED FOR ITS EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION. IN
ADDITION TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI)
DELINEATED IN THE REF, YOUR OPSEC PLANNING SHOULD ALSO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING EEFI: (PROVIDE ADDITIONAL NCA AND CJCS
EEFI, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING THE CURRENT SITUATION).
6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE
A. ( ) PSYOP MISSION STATEMENT
B. ( ) PSYOP OBJECTIVES
(1)( ) PERSUADE OPPOSING FORCES NOT TO FIGHT.
(2)( ) PERSUADE LOCAL POPULACE NOT TO INTERFERE.
C. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO STRESS
(1)( ) US ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL.
(2)( ) US FORCES ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WIN.
D. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO AVOID
(1)( ) STEREOTYPES OF RELIGION, RACE, ETC.
(2)( ) PROMISES THAT CANNOT BE KEPT.
E. ( ) PSYOP OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
(1)( ) DATE TO INITIATE IN-THEATER PSYOP.
(2)( ) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
(3)( ) TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY.
(4)( ) COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.
7. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE.
8. ( ) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE.
9. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) GUIDANCE.
A. ( ) CA MISSION STATEMENT.
B. ( ) CA OBJECTIVES
(1)( ) FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL
MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY
OPERATIONS.
(2)( ) ASSIST COMMAND COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL LAW OR
HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS MEETING ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN POPULACE
NEEDS.
(3)( ) DETERMINE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT
CAPABILITY OR RESOURCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.
(4)( ) ASSIST IN OBTAINING AVAILABLE INDIGENOUS AND
HOST-NATION SUPPORT.
(5)( ) SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF
OPERATIONS.
(6)( ) FACILITATE COMMANDERS ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING
DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS IN FRIENDLY NATIONS.
(7)( ) COORDINATE SUPPORT FOR RESTORATION OF BASIC SERVICES
IN AN OCCUPIED OR FRIENDLY COUNTRY.
C. ( ) CA OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS
(1)( ) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
(2)( ) TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY.
(3)( ) COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.
(4)( ) COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-C-3
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
10.( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
A. ( ) TENTATIVE M-DAY AND F-HOUR. 210001Z NOV ___.
B. ( ) TENTATIVE C-DAY AND L-HOUR. 290001Z NOV ___.
C. ( ) ANTICIPATED D-DAY. 1 DEC ___.
D. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
E. ( ) DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BY
USCINCCENT.
F. ( ) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
G. ( ) NO CHANGE IN USCINCCENT ROE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF IS
EXPECTED.
H. ( ) SUPPORTING COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR
DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY SUPPORTED COMMANDERS. FOR EXAMPLE,
USCINCTRANS WILL PROVIDE AIR-REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED TO
SUPPORT OPERATIONS.
I. ( ) UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE
POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.
J. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/
11.( ) TRANSPORT.
A. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.
B. ( ) ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR INITIAL
PLANNING, SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN PLANNING, ALERT,
DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.
(1)( ) GENERAL. FOR PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION WAS
AUTHORIZED ON 17 NOV ___ IN SUPPORT OF EXECUTION OF USCINCPAC
OPLAN XXXX. AIRLIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAF
STAGE II. SEALIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED
FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG
MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.
(2)( ) AIRLIFT. SUPPORTED CINC (USCINCPAC) FOR OPLAN XXXX
MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP, ANNEX J, APPORTIONMENT
APPROXIMATELY ___ PERCENT OF THE TOTAL CAPABILITY AT PARTIAL
MOBILIZATION AND CRAF STAGE II).
(3)( ) SEALIFT. USCINCPAC CAN CONTINUE TO PLAN ON USING ASSETS
APPORTIONED BY JSCP, ANNEX J, IN THE APPROPRIATE TABLES UNDER
PARTIAL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS, INCLUDING USTRANSCOM AND ASSETS
FROM THE RRF AND SRP.
(4)( ) THE JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD (JTB) HAS DETERMINED THAT
A MINIMUM OF _____ PERCENT OF TOTAL AIR AND SEA-LIFT CAPABILITY
MUST BE ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER THEATERS AND
TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL LOCS. FURTHER, IF REQUIRED, THE JTB HAS
APPROVED TWO SETS OF LIFT ALLOCATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT AND
SUSTAINMENT AS FOLLOWS:
(A)( ) IF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX IS IMPLEMENTED ALONE,
USCINCPAC MAY PLAN ON ALL REMAINING CAPABILITY (____ PERCENT).
(B)( ) IF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX AND USCINCCENT OPLAN
XXXX ARE IMPLEMENTED CONCURRENTLY, USCINCPAC MAY CONTINUE TO
PLAN ON JSCP, ANNEX J, APPORTIONMENT UNDER PARTIAL MOBILIZATION
CONDITIONS WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS AS OUTLINED BELOW. USCINCCENT
MAY PLAN FOR ASSETS MADE AVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF DECLARATION OF
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-C-4
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AND ACTIVATING CRAF STAGE III (AT
APPROXIMATELY USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX C-DAY MINUS 4 FOR CRAF STAGE
III). THE AIRLIFT ASSETS INCLUDE UP TO ___ WIDE-BODY CARGO, ___
WIDE-BODY PASSENGER, ___ NARROW-BODY CARGO, ___ NARROW-BODY
PASSENGER, ___ C-5, ___ KC-10, AND ___ C-141 AIRCRAFT. IF
REQUIRED, SPECIFIC PHASING OF THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE OUTLINED IN
THE USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX ALERT ORDER. REGARDING AND SHALLOW
DRAFT TANKERS ARE ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE A MODIFICATIONS TO
USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX PLANNING, THE TEMPORARY RELEASE OF
USTRANSCOM AIRCRAFT FROM USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL BE ON
A ONE-FOR-ONE EXCHANGE FOR COMMERCIAL CAPABILITY FROM CRAF STAGE
III ASSETS. REGARDING SEALIFT, CLEAN PRODUCT TANKERS LIMITATION;
THE JTB DEFERS BY-TYPE ALLOCATIONS OF THESE ASSETS PENDING
CLEARER DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF NUMBER AND LOCATION OF
TANKERS
BY TYPE AND CAPACITY. USCINCTRANS AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING
COMMANDERS, IN COORDINATION WITH CINCS, WILL APPLY THE
APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT AND SHIP TYPES AND CONFIGURATIONS NEEDED TO
MEET CARGO AND PAX MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITHIN EACH FLOW. IF
JTB MUST ADDRESS ALLOCATIONS BY TYPE (E.G., C-5 AIRCRAFT OR
RO/RO SHIPS), INCLUDE ALL NECESSARY DATA AND RATIONALE TO
SUPPORT JTB ACTION IN TIME FOR ALERT ORDER.
(C)( ) USE JSCP, ANNEX J, TO DETERMINE LOAD PLANNING FACTORS,
WITH DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED BETWEEN ALCON IF SPECIFIC
QUESTIONS ARISE.
(D)( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY
THE JOINT STAFF. ALL REQUESTS FOR TRANSPORTATION WILL BE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH DOD 4500.32R, MILSTAMP. PARENT SERVICE(S) OF
DEPLOYING UNIT(S) MUST PROVIDE FUND CITES FOR MOVEMENTS.
USTRANSCOM MAY PLAN ON NCA DECISION RESPONSE TO STRATEGIC
WARNING WITH SUFFICIENT LEAD-TIME TO RESPOND TO CINCS PRE-C-DAY
MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS BEGINNING AT C-2 WITH PARTIALLY MOBILIZED
LIFT ASSETS AND PERSONNEL. PRE-C-DAY MOVES PRIOR TO C-2 MUST BE
ACCOMPLISHED WITH ORGANIC AND NONMOBILIZED CAPABILITY AND
EQUIVALENT CIVIL AUGMENTATION. SERVICES WILL PROVIDE FUNDING
GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE
ORDER(S). IF SUPPORTED CINCS OR PROVIDING ORGANIZATIONS REQUIRE
NON-OPORD INTRATHEATER LIFT SUPPORT PRIOR TO EXECUTE AND
DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, THE PARENT SERVICE(S) OF UNITS BEING
SUPPORTED WILL FUND USTRANSCOM TARIFF CHARGES AS APPLICABLE.
12.( ) JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH THE
JNOCC FUNCTIONAL MANAGER TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES
(TO INCLUDE NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.
13.( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE
APPROPRIATE SERVICES.
14.( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.
A. ( ) STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ARE INADEQUATE TO PROVIDE
TIMELY SUPPORT TO DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR
SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIPLE REGIONAL PLANS. CINC(S)
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-C-5
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
DESIGNATED FOR LESS THAN TOP PRIORITY FOR LIFT ALLOCATION MUST
CONSIDER EXTENDING FORCE ARRIVAL DATES AND/OR CHANGING MODES OF
LIFT. LESS THAN FULL MOBILIZATION AGGRAVATES THE SITUATION.
B. ( ) SOME SUSTAINMENT COMMODITIES, ESPECIALLY HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
WEAPONS, ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.
C. ( ) EXPANSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS NOT VIABLE IN THE
SHORT TERM, ESPECIALLY ON PARTIALLY MOBILIZED FOOTING.
15.( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. ESSENTIAL UNIT MESSING IS
AUTHORIZED FOR PERSONNEL ATTACHED, ASSIGNED, OR SERVING IN A
TEMPORARY DUTY OR TRAVEL STATUS.
16.( ) CODE WORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BLUENOSE.
17.( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. USCINCCENT IS AUTHORIZED TO USE
OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES, AS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION,
SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS TO CJCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
JOINT PUB 1-03.30 AND CJCS MOP 53.
18.( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT
OPLAN XXXX.
19.( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.
A. ( ) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT
AUTHORIZED UNTIL FINAL APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN BY OASD (PA).
PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATION SHOULD
BE TAKEN AND REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION,
OASD(PA). DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 227-5131, OR
COMMERCIAL (703) 697-5131. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE DOD
PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTY OFFICER AT THE SAME NUMBER (RECORDED MESSAGE
WILL PROVIDE CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER OF DUTY OFFICER) OR CONTACT
THE NMCC, DSN 227-8322 OR 225-1858 (COMMERCIAL IS 697 AND 695,
RESPECTIVELY).
B. ( ) PROVIDE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG)
VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE TO OASD(PA): DPL, WITH INFORMATION TO
CJCS/PA. REFER TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF DOD INSTRUCTION 5405.3,
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE, FOR DETAILED
GUIDANCE. UPON APPROVAL BY OASD(PA), SUCH INTERIM GUIDANCE MAY
BE USED IN THE EVENT OF AN INQUIRY REGARDING ANY PART OF THE
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THIS OPERATION, WHICH MAY HAVE
BECOME OBVIOUS TO THE PUBLIC OR PRESS. IN GENERAL, THE
INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL INCLUDE THE
FOLLOWING:
(1)( ) A PROPOSED SHORT STATEMENT (GENERAL IN NATURE) WITH
RELATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, AS APPROPRIATE.
(2)( ) A PUBLIC AFFAIRS SITUATION AND ANALYSIS REPORT.
THIS SECTION OF THE INTERIM PPAG SHOULD PROVIDE THE PUBLIC
AFFAIRS OFFICERS ASSESSMENT REGARDING:
(A)( ) ANTICIPATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH (ACTIVE VERSUS
PASSIVE).
(B)( ) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNITY
RELATIONS ACTIVITIES.
(C)( ) ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT INFORMATION BUREAUS.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-C-6
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
(D)( ) REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS FIELD COMMUNICATIONS AND
INTERTHEATER AND INTRATHEATER TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT.
(E)( ) RECOMMENDATION FOR MEDIA ACCESS TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
(OPEN ACCESS VERSUS POOLING).
(F)( ) ESTIMATES REGARDING THE NUMBER OF MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES
THAT MAY BE ACCOMMODATED.
(G)( ) ANTICIPATED GROUND RULES, GUIDELINES, AND ACCREDITATION
FOR MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.
(H) ( ) ANTICIPATED SECURITY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS.
(I) ( ) ESTIMATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS.
20. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE
MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND
PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT
CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE, AND
BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND
MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION
OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE
DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NCA, CJCS, AND DOD REQUIREMENTS.
NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, NOR
SUBJECT
SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION. COMBAT
CAMERA IMAGERY WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED.
EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO THE JOINT
COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, THE PENTAGON, THROUGH THE DEFENSE COURIER
SERVICE (CODEWORD ELIGIBLE ARTIST) OR OTHER APPROPRIATE
TRANSPORTATION MEANS COMMENSURATE WITH THE SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY. PRECOORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF
EXPEDITED COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL WITH THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA
CENTER (JCCC). IT CAN RECEIVE MATERIAL FROM ANY OF THE
WASHINGTON DC AREA AIRPORTS
(NATIONAL, DULLES, OR BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL) AND
FROM ANDREWS AFB. IT CAN ALSO RECEIVE MATERIAL THROUGH OVERNIGHT
DELIVERY SERVICES AND SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS. ADDRESS COMBAT
CAMERA MATERIAL GOING TO THE JCCC AS FOLLOWS: ATTENTION: JCCC
ROOM 5A518 PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1000 (RACK 2)
TELEPHONE: DUTY HOURS:
DSN: 227-2900
COMM: (703) 697-2900
PAGER: NONDUTY HOURS:
COMM: (202) 542-2579/2533 (LEAVE NUMBER AND CALL WILL BE
RETURNED.)
FAX: DSN 223-4775 (703) 693-4775.//
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
21.( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS
RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS,
USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-C-7
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE
CAPACITY, USCINCCENT WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE
PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.
22.( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS THE SUPPORTED
COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCLANT, USCINCSPACE,
USCINCTRANS, CINCFOR, USCINCSO, USCINCSOC, AND USCINCSTRAT ARE
SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER.
NSA, DMA, DISA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES. THE NCAAPPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WILL BE DETAILED IN SUBSEQUENT
MESSAGES.//
AKNLDG/Y//
DECL/OADR//
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-C-8
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
SAMPLE OPREP-1 COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE
IMMEDIATE {OR FLASH AS APPROPRIATE}
FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
TO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO: CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
{OTHER ADDRESSES AS REQUIRED}
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCCENT//
SUBJ/COMMANDERS ESTIMATE ( )//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ___/__/NOTAL//
AMPN/CJCS WARNING ORDER//
REF/B/DOC/USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//
RMKS/1. ( ) MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL
CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
BLUELAND (GOB) TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND
LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS).
2. ( ) SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.
A. ( ) THE INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY OF BLUELAND AND
ORANGELAND HAVE DETERIORATED BECAUSE OF CONTINUED YELLOWLAND
SUPPORT OF THE REBEL FORCES SEEKING THE OVERTHROW OF THE
GOVERNMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN YELLOWLAND, BLUELAND, AND
ORANGELAND HAVE BEEN HIGH BECAUSE OF OVERT YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF
THE COUP ATTEMPT, YELLOWLAND ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE REBELS, AND A
RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE ANTAGONISTIC REBEL FORCES. ALL OF
THESE ACTIONS AGAINST BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND BY YELLOWLAND
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-D-1
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
REQUIRE PRUDENT CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.
B. ( ) ASSIGNED AND SUPPORTING FORCES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
CURRENT USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.
C. ( ) USCINCCENT HAS DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTIONS
(COAS):
(1) ( ) COA 1. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX TPFDD. TACTICAL FIGHTER AND RECONNAISSANCE
WING TO USE BABA AFB AS MAIN OPERATING BASE. 15TH MEB TO DEPLOY
VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH MPS EQUIPMENT. CVBG TO OPERATE
MODLOC VIA SOUTHEASTERN SEA. TWO ARMY BDES DEPLOY TO PORT WASI
VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH EQUIPMENT SHIPPED BY SEA.
SUBSEQUENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS
REQUESTED BY GOB TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, NONCOMBATANT
EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO), SHOW OF FORCE, AND PROTECTION AND
DEFENSE OF BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS.
(2) ( ) COA 2. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX TPFDD. HOLD MEB AND ARMY
BDES ON CALL. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS
REQUESTED BY GOB.
3. ( ) ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COA. ENEMY CAPABILITIES CANNOT
SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF US MILITARY
OPERATIONS UNDER EITHER COA. UNDER COA 2, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN
INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE AGAINST ISOLATED
AMERICANS IN RETALIATION FOR US FORCE ARRIVAL. ARRIVAL OF SMALL
AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCE PACKAGES FOR SHOW OF FORCE RESTRICTS
COMMANDERS POTENTIAL TO CONDUCT NEOS OR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
WITHOUT GROUND FORCES.
4. ( ) COMPARISON OF OWN COAS.
A. ( ) COA 1 PROVIDES FOR SIMULTANEOUS EMPLOYMENT OF THE ENTIRE
TASK FORCE AND IS THE MOST DESIRABLE FOR TACTICAL EXECUTION. THE
INITIAL PRESENCE OF AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES, COUPLED WITH THE
ARRIVAL OF THE 15TH MEB AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ABOARD MPS,
PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY FOR RAPID INSERTION OF
SECURITY FORCES AS REQUIRED BY GOB. THIS COA REQUIRES THE
LONGEST RESPONSE TIME (___DAYS AIRLIFT AND ___DAYS SEALIFT
(DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE)) FOR CLOSURE OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE.
EMPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY.
B. ( ) COA 2 HAS ADVANTAGE OF MOST RAPID RESPONSE (___DAYS
AIRLIFT AND ___DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE)) FOR AIR FORCE
AND NAVAL FORCES. IT PROVIDES FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FORCE TO BE
ABLE TO RESPOND TO GOB AND DEMONSTRATE US RESOLVE IN AREA. ITS
PRIMARY DISADVANTAGE IS THAT ALL GROUND FORCES ARE ON CALL.
HOWEVER, RESPONSE TIME FOR MEB AND ARMY BDES COULD BE MINIMAL AS
MPS AND MSC SHIPS COULD BE IN MODLOC POSITION OFF COAST OF PORT
WASI PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL.
5. ( ) DECISION. RECOMMEND COA 1.
6. ( ) REMARKS. FORCE, LOGISTIC, AND TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT
DETAILS HAVE BEEN LOADED INTO THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND
EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) AND ARE AVAILABLE UNDER PLAN
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-D-2
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (PID) XXXXT (COA 1) AND PID XXXXU (COA
2).//
DECL/OADR//
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-D-3
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
SAMPLE CJCS ALERT ORDER
{PRECEDENCE}
FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-E-1
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/DOC/USCINCCENT/-//
NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION,
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//
ORDTYP/ALORD/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//
NARR/( ) THIS IS AN ALERT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS
AUTHORIZED EXECUTION PLANNING FOR USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.
SUPPORTED CINC OPORD OR IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY
301000Z NOV ___.//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//
GENTEXT/MISSION/
2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
3. ( ) COURSE OF ACTION. THE NCA APPROVED COA NUMBER 1 AS
CONTAINED IN REF B.
4. ( ) MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. APPROVED AS PER REF A.
5. ( ) ___________. USCINCTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT
AND STAGE CREWS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.
6. ( ) OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
7. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
8. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING
ORDER.
9. ( ) CI GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
10. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
A. ( ) PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR IS 290001Z OCT __. REQUEST
USTRANSCOM COORDINATE WITH SUPPORTING CINCS AND RECOMMEND FIRM
C-DAY, L-HOUR TO CJCS.
B. ( ) TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION IS 1 DEC __.
C. ( ) SUPPORTING COMMANDS DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE
REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 280400Z NOV __. MOVEMENT SCHEDULES
REQUIRED BY 290400Z NOV __.
D. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS
REQUIRED BY USCINCCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.
E. ( ) OTHER COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS AS PER WARNING ORDER OR
PLANNING ORDER.
F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/
11. ( ) TRANSPORT. ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT FOR REVISED
PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AUTHORIZED 17 NOV __. AIRLIFT
PLANNING IS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAF STAGE III (EFFECTIVE
PROPOSED C-DAY MINUS 4). SEALIFT PLANNING IS BASED ON
USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE
REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE
RRF.
A. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.
B. ( ) ACTIVATING CRAF STAGE III IS PRUDENT GIVEN THE LIFT
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-E-2
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. ACCORDINGLY,
STRATEGIC ASSETS FROM CRAF STAGE III ARE MADE AVAILABLE AS
OUTLINED ABOVE. IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE
ADDRESSED IN THE CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. AS NOTED IN THE WARNING OR
PLANNING ORDER, USTRANSCOM AIRCRAFT FROM USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX
SUPPORT WILL BE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE EXCHANGE FOR COMMERCIAL
CAPABILITY FROM CRAF III ASSETS. THIS ACTION WILL ENSURE THAT
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX FLOW.
12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD). SEE CJCS WARNING AND
PLANNING ORDER.
13. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.
14. ( ) FUND CITATIONS WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.
15. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.
16. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING OR
PLANNING ORDER.
17. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 103.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTS--IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT
PUB 1-03.30.
18. ( ) CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS
WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
19. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING
ORDER.
20. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION
REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING
ORDER.//
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
21. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING
ORDER.
22. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. THE NCA HAVE APPROVED USCINCCENT
EXERCISE OF OPCON OVER USCINCPAC AND COMACC FORCES TRANSFERRED
FOR THIS OPERATION. FOR COMACC FORCES, TRANSFER WILL OCCUR ON
THEIR ENTRY INTO USCINCCENT AOR. FOR USCINCPAC FORCES, TRANSFER
WILL OCCUR ON EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION.
AKNLDG/Y//
DECL/OADR//
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-E-3
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
SAMPLE CJCS EXECUTE ORDER
(WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, OR ALERT ORDER PREVIOUSLY
ISSUED)
(PRECEDENCE)
FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SEC WASHINGTON DC
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-F-1
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
AMPN/EXECUTE ORDER--USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/261000ZNOV__//
REF/D/ORDER/CJCS/261001ZNOV__//
REF/E/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV__//
REF/F/ORDER/USCINCCENT/301000ZONOV__//
NARR/REFS A THROUGH F: CJCS WARNING ORDER, USCINCCENT COMMANDERS
ESTIMATE, CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER, CJCS PLANNING
ORDER, CJCS ALERT ORDER, USCINCCENT ALERT ORDER//
ORDTYP/EXORD/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//
NARR/( ) THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES HAS DIRECTED EXECUTION OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. ( ) IN RESPONSE TO YELLOWLAND INCURSIONS IN ORANGELAND, THE
GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND HAS FORMALLY REQUESTED SUBSTANTIAL US
MILITARY ASSISTANCE BE DEPLOYED TO BLUELAND. THE NCA HAS
AUTHORIZED THE EXECUTION OF USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.//
GENTEXT/MISSION/
2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.//
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
3. ( ) COURSE OF ACTION. COA NUMBER 1 CONTAINED IN REF B IS
APPROVED.
4. ( ) MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. USE FORCES AS STATED IN REF A.
5. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING,
OR ALERT ORDER.
6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT
ORDER.
7. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR
ALERT ORDER.
8. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR
ALERT ORDER.
9. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
A. ( ) AS STATED IN CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDERS.
B. ( ) EXECUTE BY 1 DEC ___.
C. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
TERMINATE OPERATIONS WHEN DIRECTED.
D. ( ) ROE AS CONTAINED IN USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.
E. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS
REQUIRED BY USCINCCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.
F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/
10. ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ISSUED SEPARATELY.
11. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE WARNING, PLANNING, OR
ALERT ORDER.
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-F-2
UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE
12. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.
13. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS
PRESCRIBED IN JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING
IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.
14. ( ) MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES.
15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS
WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.
16. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.
17. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT
ORDER.
18. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION
REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
19. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED
COMMANDER) WILL ASSIST DEPLOYING UNITS WITH FREQUENCY
ALLOCATIONS AS REQUIRED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND
RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE SATELLITE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEPLOYING
UNITS. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL PUBLISH COMSEC
GUIDANCE TO ALCON.//
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
20. ( ) STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS,
AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCAAPPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL
EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE
TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//
ANKLDG/Y//
DECL/OADR//
***USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY***
Ref 10-F-3