Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Filed 01/30/12 Page 1 of 14 Page ID #:3717
JAMES J. BROSNAHAN (CA SBN 34555)
GEORGE C. HARRIS (CA SBN 111074)
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
425 Market Street
San Francisco, California 94105-2482
Telephone: (415) 268-7000
Facsimile: (415) 268-7522
JBrosnahan@mofo.com
GHarris@mofo.com
BENJAMIN J. FOX (CA SBN 193374)
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3500
Los Angeles, California 90013-1024
Telephone: (213) 892-5200
Facsimile: (213) 892-5454
BFox@mofo.com
Attorneys for Defendant
CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION
12
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
13
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
14
15
16
17
GEORGE RADANOVICH, CHARLES
PATRICK, GWEN PATRIC, OMAR
NARARRO, TRUNG PHAN,
Plaintiffs,
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
v.
DEBRA BOWEN, in her official
capacity as SECRETARY OF STATE
OF CALIFORNIA; THE CITIZENS
REDISTRICTING COMMISSION,
Defendants.
No. 2:11-cv-09786-SVW (PJW)
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
Date:
Time:
Ctrm.:
February 13, 2012
1:30 p.m.
6
[Honorable Stephen V. Wilson]
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11
1
Filed 01/30/12 Page 2 of 14 Page ID #:3718
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2
Page
3
4
5
6
I.
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................1
II.
ALL CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA .........................2
A.
Applicable Legal Standards: This Court Applies
California Law to Decide the Preclusive Effect of the
California Supreme Court’s Decision in Radanovich I ..............2
B.
Under Controlling Federal and State Precedent,
Radanovich I Resulted in a “Final Decision on
the Merits.”..................................................................................3
C.
Plaintiffs Do Not Dispute That All Other Elements
Needed for Res Judicata to Apply Are Satisfied ........................8
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
III.
14
15
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT FAILS FOR MULTIPLE
ADDITIONAL REASONS...................................................................8
A.
Plaintiffs Have Not Pleaded Facts Sufficient to Satisfy
the Twombly and Iqbal Pleading Standard .................................8
B.
Plaintiffs Acknowledge That Section 5 Does Not
Apply to the Los Angeles-Area Districts at Issue Here in
Any Event ...................................................................................8
C.
The Commission’s Certified Maps Have Now Been
Precleared by the U.S. Department of Justice ............................8
16
17
18
19
20
21
IV.
CONCLUSION .....................................................................................9
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
i
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11
1
Filed 01/30/12 Page 3 of 14 Page ID #:3719
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
Page(s)
3
CASES
4
Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett,
494 U.S. 638, 110 S. Ct. 1384 (1990) ..................................................................7
5
6
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) ..................................................................8
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Bartlett v. Stephenson,
535 U.S. 1301, 122 S. Ct. 1751 (2002) ................................................................6
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) ..................................................................8
Beverly Hills National Bank v. Glynn,
16 Cal. App. 3d 274 (1971) ..................................................................................6
Donovan v. City of Dallas,
377 U.S. 408, 84 S. Ct. 1579 (1964).....................................................................6
Eichman v. Fotomat Corp.,
759 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1985) ..............................................................................2
England v. La. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs,
375 U.S. 411, 84 S. Ct. 461 (1964).......................................................................6
Geibel v. State Bar of Cal.,
14 Cal. 2d 144 (1939) ...........................................................................................5
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Hathorn v. Lovorn,
457 U.S. 255, 102 S. Ct. 2421 (1982) ..................................................................6
Heine Piano Co. v. Bloomer,
183 Cal. 398 (1920) ..............................................................................................6
Henrichs v. Valley View Dev.,
474 F.3d 609 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................................2
In re Iannochino,
242 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2001)...................................................................................3
28
ii
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Filed 01/30/12 Page 4 of 14 Page ID #:3720
In re Rose,
22 Cal. 4th 430 (2000) ..............................................................................1, 3, 4, 5
Jackson v. Waller Indep. Sch. Dist.,
No. H-07-3086, 2008 WL 818330,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22923 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2008) ...................................7
Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola,
583 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................7
Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. v. City of San Jose,
420 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) ..........................................................................2, 7
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co.,
292 U.S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 690 (1934).......................................................................6
Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co.,
28 Cal. 4th 888 (2002) ..........................................................................................6
Napa Valley Elec. Co. v. Railroad Com.,
251 U.S. 366, 40 S. Ct. 174 (1920).......................................................1, 3, 4, 5, 6
Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n,
600 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1979) ..............................................................................5
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Palomar Mobilehome Park Assn. v. City of San Marcos,
989 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................2
People v. Medina,
6 Cal. 3d 484 (1972) .............................................................................................5
Perry v. Perez,
565 U.S. __, __ S. Ct. __,
2012 WL 162610, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 908 (Jan. 20, 2012) ...................................8
Radanovich v. Bowen,
No. S196852,
2011 Cal. LEXIS 10999 (Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) .............................................passim
Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc. v. El Dia, Inc.,
490 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 2007)...................................................................................3
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana,
936 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1990) ......................................................................2, 3, 6
iii
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Filed 01/30/12 Page 5 of 14 Page ID #:3721
Sandoval v. Los Angeles Cty. Dept. of Public Social Srvcs.,
169 Cal. App. 4th 1167 (2008) .............................................................................6
Scoggin v. Schrunk,
522 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1975) ........................................................................2, 3, 7
Takahashi v. Bd. of Trustees,
783 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................................................................2
Trujillo v. Cty. of Santa Clara,
775 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1985) ......................................................................2, 3, 7
Vandermost v. Bowen,
No. S198387, __ Cal. 4th __,
2012 WL 246627, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 572 (Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) ........................1, 4
11
12
13
CONSTITUTIONS
U.S. Const. 14th Amend. ...........................................................................................6
14
15
Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2 ............................................................................................5
16
STATUTES AND RULES
17
28 U.S.C. § 1738........................................................................................................2
18
42 U.S.C. § 1973b......................................................................................................9
19
42 U.S.C. § 1973L ......................................................................................................9
20
42 U.S.C. § 1988........................................................................................................9
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
iv
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11
1
I.
Filed 01/30/12 Page 6 of 14 Page ID #:3722
INTRODUCTION
2
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Commission’s motion presents pure issues
3
of law that are properly resolved on the pleadings. Their opposition presents only
4
one real contested issue—whether the California Supreme Court’s decision in
5
Radanovich I constituted a “final ruling on the merits” for purposes of res judicata.
6
On January 27, the California Supreme Court issued a published opinion in
7
the last remaining state-court challenge to the Commission’s certified maps, and
8
confirmed that the rule articulated in In re Rose, 22 Cal. 4th 430, 446 (2000) applies
9
to redistricting: Where the state Supreme Court sits as a trial court, entertaining
10
petitions pursuant to “original and exclusive jurisdiction” in the state-court system,
11
its denial of a petition even without a written opinion is a final ruling on the merits.
12
Vandermost v. Bowen, __ Cal. 4th __, 2012 Cal. Lexis 572, at *132 (Jan. 27, 2012).
13
Plaintiffs’ arguments for avoiding this legal principle and the result that
14
necessarily follows are flatly wrong. Contrary to Plaintiffs, federal courts apply
15
state-law principles to evaluate the res judicata effect of a prior decision by a state
16
court, independent of whether the present action or the prior one involved federal
17
claims. Application of federal res judicata principles would not assist Plaintiffs in
18
any event—Napa Valley Elec. Co. v. Railroad Com., 251 U.S. 366, 373 (1920) and
19
Ninth Circuit authority following it are equally supportive of the rule confirmed
20
recently by the California Supreme Court in Vandermost, supra.
21
No dispute exists that all other elements of res judicata are satisfied here:
22
the same “primary right” was advanced in Radanovich I as here (indeed, the claims
23
are virtually identical), and the parties are the same. The bottom line is that
24
Plaintiffs chose the California Supreme Court as their first-selected forum, received
25
that court’s careful consideration, and—having lost in that forum—are precluded by
26
res judicata from re-litigating their claims here.
27
For the reasons discussed further herein, the complaint should be dismissed
28
without leave to amend, and the Commission should be awarded its fees incurred.
1
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11
1
2
II.
ALL CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
A.
3
4
Filed 01/30/12 Page 7 of 14 Page ID #:3723
Applicable Legal Standards: This Court Applies
California Law to Decide the Preclusive Effect of the
California Supreme Court’s Decision in Radanovich I.
The Commission’s moving papers explained—citing four on-point Ninth
5
Circuit decisions—that this Court must apply California law to determine the
6
preclusive effect of Radanovich I. (Mtn. at 11-12.) This legal principle is well-
7
settled:
8
Federal courts are required to give full faith and credit to
state court judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See San
Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545
U.S. 323, 162 L. Ed. 2d 315, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005)….
To determine the preclusive effect of a state court
judgment federal courts look to state law.
9
10
11
12
13
Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir.
14
2005) (applying California law and holding that prior state-court mandamus action
15
barred later federal action for alleged U.S. constitutional violations).1
16
In response, Plaintiffs address only one of the Commission’s cited cases
17
(Henrichs, 474 F.3d at 615), and argue erroneously that the standards the Ninth
18
Circuit articulated there apply only in diversity cases. (Opp. at 6-7.) For support,
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
1
See also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 2007);
Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th
Cir. 1993) (applying California law to determine the res judicata effect of a state
court judgment on later-filed federal claims); Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936
F.2d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying California law to determine the res
judicata effect of a state court judgment on subsequent federal due process claims);
Takahashi v. Bd. of Trustees, 783 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
California law and holding that plaintiff’s mandamus proceeding in state court
barred later-filed constitutional claims in federal court because both actions
stemmed from a single primary right); Trujillo v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d
1359, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying “applicable state law principles” to
determine the preclusive effect of a state court decision that addressed federal
claims); Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying
state law to evaluate the res judicata effect of state-court litigation on later-filed
federal claims); Scoggin v. Schrunk, 522 F.2d 436, 437 (9th Cir. 1975) (same).
28
2
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11
Filed 01/30/12 Page 8 of 14 Page ID #:3724
1
Plaintiffs rely solely on two out-of-circuit decisions—which stand only for the
2
general point that in evaluating the res judicata effect of successive federal court
3
actions, federal law applies. In re Iannochino, 242 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2001)
4
(“Federal res judicata principles govern the res judicata effect of a judgment entered
5
in a prior federal suit, including judgments of the bankruptcy court.”); Ramallo
6
Bros. Printing, Inc. v. El Dia, Inc., 490 F.3d 86, 89 (1st Cir. 2007) (considering the
7
res judicata effect of successive federal actions before the same district judge).
8
Plaintiffs’ statement of the law simply is wrong: Federal courts apply the
9
law of the state in which the prior state-court action was decided, independent of
10
whether federal claims were alleged in the prior action or the present one. Trujillo
11
v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying
12
“applicable state law principles” to determine the preclusive effect of a state court
13
decision that addressed federal Title VII claims); see also cases cited in fn.1, supra.
14
Accordingly, California principles of res judicata must be applied. And, as
15
the Ninth Circuit has explained: “It is well-established that where a federal
16
constitutional claim is based on the same asserted wrong as a state action and the
17
parties are the same, res judicata will bar the federal constitutional claim, whether
18
or not it was asserted specifically in state court.” Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1035
19
(applying the rule “[i]n California, to whose law we must look for the applicable res
20
judicata and collateral estoppel principles”); Scoggin, 522 F.2d at 437 (same).
21
22
23
B.
Under Controlling Federal and State Precedent,
Radanovich I Resulted in a “Final Decision on the Merits.”
Plaintiffs have no meaningful answer for the controlling authority cited in the
24
moving papers—and they cite no other authority that addresses the specific
25
circumstances of this case: Prior litigation before the California Supreme Court,
26
where that court had “original and exclusive jurisdiction” over all cases filed in the
27
state-court system. (Mtn. at 12-13, citing, inter alia, Napa Valley, 251 U.S. at 373;
28
In re Rose, 22 Cal. 4th at 445-46.)
3
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11
1
Filed 01/30/12 Page 9 of 14 Page ID #:3725
On January 27, 2012, the California Supreme Court confirmed that the rule
2
articulated in Rose, 22 Cal. 4th at 445 applies and that the court’s rejection of prior
3
challenges to the Commission’s maps was final and on the merits:
4
[P]etitioner’s 126-page petition, Vandermost v. Bowen
(Sept. 11, 2011, S196493), presented myriad federal and
state statutory and constitutional challenges to the
Commission’s certified state Senate map…. On October
26, 2011, after thorough consideration of all the issues
raised by petitioner, we determined that the petition
lacked merit and denied the requested writ. (See In re
Rose (2000) 22 Cal.4th 430, 445 [“When the sole means
of review is a petition in this court… our denial of the
petition -- with or without opinion -- reflects a judicial
determination on the merits.”].) We are aware of no basis
upon which to reasonably question the legality of the
Commission’s certified state Senate map.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Vandermost, __ Cal. 4th __, 2012 Cal. Lexis 572, at *132.2
14
United States Supreme Court authority is squarely in accord. In Napa Valley,
15
251 U.S. 366, the plaintiff-electric company filed a petition for writ of review in the
16
California Supreme Court, challenging a decision issued by the Railroad
17
Commission, which at that time reviewed public electricity contracts subject to the
18
Public Utilities Act. The petition was filed in the state Supreme Court pursuant to
19
Section 67 of the Public Utilities Act, which provided that “no court of the state
20
except the Supreme Court to the extent specified shall have jurisdiction over any
21
order or decision of the Commission,” and that review by the California Supreme
22
Court shall be by writ petition. Id. at 371.
23
The California Supreme Court denied the electric company’s petition without
24
ordering argument and without a written opinion. The electric company filed
25
essentially the same claims in federal court, and the commission argued that the
26
27
2
Vandermost v. Bowen (Sept. 11, 2011, S196493) was consolidated with
Radanovich I—both cases were decided by the same written order. (RJN Ex. J.)
28
4
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11 Filed 01/30/12 Page 10 of 14 Page ID
#:3726
1
state Supreme Court’s denial of the petition was res judicata. Id. at 372. The
2
district court dismissed the case based on res judicata and the U.S. Supreme Court
3
affirmed, holding that in these circumstances “‘the denial of the petition was
4
necessarily a final judicial determination, … based on the identical rights’ asserted
5
in that court and repeated here…. ‘Such a determination is as effectual as an
6
estoppel as would have been a formal judgment upon issues of fact.’” Napa Valley,
7
251 U.S. at 373 (citations omitted).
8
9
10
11
Subsequent authority confirms that Napa Valley remains good law in the
Ninth Circuit, a conclusion that Plaintiffs do not dispute. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Public Utilities Comm’n, 600 F.2d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1979).
Plaintiffs argue, however, that Napa Valley should be limited to its facts—
12
i.e., applied only to cases that reviewed acts by a utilities commission (Opp. at 10),
13
not to challenges to decisions by the Citizens Redistricting Commission, which is
14
vested with state constitutional authority to solicit broad public participation, hear
15
testimony, and draw district lines. Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2. Plaintiffs’ argument is
16
refuted by controlling California Supreme Court decisions—cited in the moving
17
papers, but ignored by Radanovich—that apply Napa Valley in other contexts in
18
which the state Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction. In re Rose,
19
22 Cal. 4th at 445 (“When the sole means of review is a petition in this court,
20
however, our denial of the petition -- with or without an opinion -- reflects a
21
judicial determination on the merits.”; citing Napa Valley); Geibel v. State Bar of
22
Cal., 14 Cal. 2d 144, 148 (1939) (in an original proceeding in the California
23
Supreme Court, “[t]he action of this court taken by means of an order of denial is
24
res judicata although no written opinion is filed”; citing Napa Valley).3
25
26
27
28
3
Plaintiffs, by contrast, cite no authority that supports their argument that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Radanovich I was not final and on the merits. (Opp.
at 9-10.) Their cited cases are uninstructive: People v. Medina, 6 Cal. 3d 484, 491
(1972) does not cite or address Napa Valley, and merely states the general rule that
the discretional denial of a pre-trial petition for extraordinary relief in a criminal
(Footnote continues on next page.)
5
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11 Filed 01/30/12 Page 11 of 14 Page ID
#:3727
1
Plaintiffs’ assertion that application of the Napa Valley rule and res judicata
2
principles would somehow “preclude federal remedies” is also wrong. (Opp. at 11-
3
12.) The California Supreme Court’s “original and exclusive jurisdiction” over
4
challenges to the Commission’s maps means only that if registered voters elect to
5
pursue their claims in state court, they must do so in the California Supreme Court.
6
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934) (“The power of a
7
State to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the
8
controversies which shall be heard in them is, of course, subject to the restrictions
9
imposed by the Federal Constitution.”); see also Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,
10
269 (1982) (explaining that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction
11
over issues involving Section 5 Voting Rights Act claims); Donovan v. City of
12
Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964) (where state and federal courts have concurrent
13
jurisdiction, each “may proceed with the litigation at least until judgment is
14
obtained in one of them which may be set up as res judicata in the other”).4
15
Moreover, Plaintiffs pursued their claims in the California court “freely and
16
without reservation” (including a claim directly under the 14th Amendment) yet
17
their voluminous filings in the California Supreme Court said nothing about
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
case is not a final judgment on the merits. Heine Piano Co. v. Bloomer, 183 Cal.
398, 404 (1920) and Beverly Hills National Bank v. Glynn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 274,
283 (1971) merely state general res judicata principles—prior to the state Supreme
Court’s ruling in Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888 (2002).
4
Article XXI of the California Constitution must be construed consistent
with federal law to permit—but not require—Plaintiffs who allege federal Voting
Rights Act claims to pursue them either in the California Supreme Court or a
federal district court. Bartlett v. Stephenson, 535 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2002) (state
constitutional provisions are properly “harmonized” with federal law to preserve
their constitutionality); Sandoval v. Los Angeles Cty. Dept. of Public Social Srvcs.,
169 Cal. App. 4th 1167, 1180 (2008) (state law should be construed to preserve its
constitutionality, “with an eye to harmonizing it with surrounding provisions and
the state and federal Constitutions”). Res judicata is implicated only where a
plaintiff files first in state court, loses, and then re-files in federal court.
28
6
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11 Filed 01/30/12 Page 12 of 14 Page ID
#:3728
1
reserving federal claims for another day. England v. La. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375
2
U.S. 411, 419 (1964) (noting that plaintiffs can file simultaneously in two forums
3
but must expressly reserve in state court any right to pursue federal claims in
4
federal court).5 Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “we see no reason
5
why a party, after unreservedly litigating his federal claims in the state courts
6
although not required to do so, should be allowed to ignore the adverse state
7
decision and start all over again in the District Court.” England, 375 U.S. at 419.
8
Plaintiffs’ assertion that res judicata principles are somehow “preempted”
9
(Opp. at 11) also runs contrary to the long line of cases holding that res judicata
10
bars subsequent constitutional and civil rights claims where, as here, the “primary
11
right” at issue was advanced unsuccessfully in a state-court action. Manufactured
12
Home, 420 F.3d at 1031 & n.13 (state court mandamus proceeding barred
13
subsequent federal due process, equal protection and takings claims); Trujillo,
14
775 F.2d at 1363-64 (state resolution of Title VII claims precluded re-litigation of
15
those claims in federal court); Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1036 (state court decision was
16
res judicata as to later-filed civil rights claims); Scoggin, 522 F.2d at 437 (same);
17
see also Jackson v. Waller Indep. Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22923, at *34-
18
35 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2008) (Voting Rights Act claims barred by res judicata
19
where first pursued unsuccessfully in state court).6
20
21
Accordingly, Radanovich I resulted in a final ruling on the merits and is
binding for purposes of res judicata.
22
23
24
25
26
27
5
See also Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola, 583 F.3d 674,
686 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that plaintiffs can make an England reservation in state
court even where no federal action is at that time pending).
6
Again, Plaintiffs cite no authority that supports their position. Their sole
cited case, Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 640 (1990), does not
involve res judicata and considered only whether a state workers’ compensation
statute was preempted by the federal Migrant Agricultural Protection Act, pursuant
to which plaintiffs sought remedies in a single action filed in federal court.
28
7
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11 Filed 01/30/12 Page 13 of 14 Page ID
#:3729
1
C.
2
Plaintiffs Do Not Dispute That All Other Elements
Needed for Res Judicata to Apply Are Satisfied.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Radanovich I involved virtually identical
3
4
claims, the same “primary right” to vote in constitutional Congressional districts,
5
and the same parties as in this case. (Compare Mtn. at 13-15; Opp. at 5.)
6
Accordingly, all elements needed for res judicata to apply are satisfied.
7
III.
8
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT FAILS FOR MULTIPLE ADDITIONAL REASONS.
A.
9
10
Plaintiffs Have Not Pleaded Facts Sufficient to Satisfy the
Twombly and Iqbal Pleading Standard.
Plaintiffs do not cite or refer the Court to any allegations other than their
11
singular, factually unsupported statement in Paragraph 50 of the complaint that the
12
Commission’s certified maps are “retrogressive” and “unlikely to be approved” by
13
the Attorney General pursuant Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. (Opp. at 13
14
citing Compl. ¶ 50.) These “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
15
enhancement’” are woefully inadequate. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
16
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).
17
B.
18
19
Plaintiffs Acknowledge That Section 5 Does Not Apply to the
Los Angeles-Area Districts at Issue Here in Any Event.
Plaintiffs’ allegations are meaningless in context because Plaintiffs concede
20
“that Los Angeles is not subject to preclearance” under Section 5. (Opp. at 13.)
21
Accordingly, their claim that the Commission’s Los Angeles-area districts are
22
“unlikely to be approved pursuant to § 5” (Compl. ¶ 50) lacks “facial plausibility.”
23
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; see also Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. __, 2012 WL 162610
24
(2012) (explaining the preclearance requirement for “covered jurisdictions”).
25
26
27
28
C.
The Commission’s Certified Maps Have Now Been
Precleared by the U.S. Department of Justice.
Plaintiffs’ Section 5 claim is moot in any event because on January 17, 2012
the Attorney General precleared the Commission’s maps pursuant to Section 5.
8
Case 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW Document 11 Filed 01/30/12 Page 14 of 14 Page ID
#:3730
1
(See concurrently filed Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice Ex. A.) This
2
development provides yet another basis for dismissing the claim without leave.
3
IV.
4
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit should be dismissed without leave to
5
amend. The Commission should recover its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred
6
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973L(e) and 1988(b).
7
8
Dated: January 30, 2012
Respectfully submitted,
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
9
10
By:
11
12
Attorneys for Defendant
CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION
13
14
15
/s/ James J. Brosnahan
James J. Brosnahan
la-1156302
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
9