EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS IN THE PHILIPPINES
STRATEGIES TO END THE VIOLENCE
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and
Pacific Affairs
Statement
By
G. Eugene Martin
Executive Director
Philippine Facilitation Project
United States Institute of Peace
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing on the tragic
extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. Having lived in the Philippines for six
years and now working to facilitate the peace process in Mindanao between the
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), I am well aware of
the many political, economic and social issues underlying these violent acts.
The Philippine Facilitation Project of the Institute of Peace is an excellent
model for active U.S. engagement in conflict situations. At the request of the
State Department, the Institute has been working for nearly four years to end
conflict between the central government in Manila and the Islamic Moro people
of Mindanao. The centuries long conflict has made the southern Philippines one
of the most violent areas of the country. The Institute is actively exploring with
negotiators from the Philippine government and the MILF alternatives for
resolving the long conflict. As an independent, non-partisan federal institution,
the USIP is able to promote U.S. interests unofficially. Our work gives us
insights into the causes of violence in society, not only in Mindanao but
nationwide. That said, my remarks represent my opinion based upon my
experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute
of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.
Root Causes of Violence
I believe there are two underlying causes of the violence. First, weak
political and social institutions, particularly a corrupt and ineffective justice
system, prompt citizens to resolve conflicts on their own. When one cannot
obtain justice through the police or courts, alternative means are found. This can
be through direct personal action, drawing upon family or clan support, or
arranging for criminal or revolutionary organizations to settle matters.
In Philippine society, family is primary. Nearly any action can be justified
if it is to support the family. Kinship ties extend well beyond the nuclear family,
into clans and tribal or community groups. Identities often are based on familial
or, being an island nation, geographical relationships rather than broader
nationalism. In Mindanao, much of the violence is caused by clan conflicts,
known as “rido,” which can continue for generations. Absent access to, or
confidence in, justice through legal mechanisms and institutions, the aggrieved
party often takes direct action against the perceived offender to obtain
satisfaction.
The fractious nature of society leads to weak political institutions. Elite
families who hold political and economic power in much of the country often
seek to maintain their power in any way possible. Elections tend to be corrupt,
candidates running against incumbents are often the targets of harassment if not
violence, and voters are threatened with retribution for opposition to power
holders. Prime targets also for threats and violence, including killings, are media
or civil society investigators into political and economic corruption.
The second underlying cause of violence is the legacy of the Marco
dictatorship. Martial law politicized the institutions of government and violence
against anyone perceived to be opposed to government policies was tolerated if
not authorized. Soldiers, police, judges and prosecutors became perpetrators of
violent actions against broad segments of the population. Extralegal arrest,
detention, incarceration, disappearances and killings (known as salvaging) were
condoned and used to advance the regime’s power and reduce political
opposition.
Many of those who opposed the Marcos regime responded in similar
fashion. Lacking legal of safe alternatives, many allied themselves with
revolutionary organizations for protection and influence. These included the
National Democratic Front (NDF) of the Communist Party of the Philippine
(CPP) and, in Muslim areas, the Moro National Liberation Front and
subsequently the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. While many if not most of
those who affiliated with the NDF during martial law years were not communist,
the NDF provided the only available support network against Marcos. Marcos’
militarized response to the historical struggle of the Moros against Manila’s
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colonial policies enhanced the appeal of those who advocated armed violence to
counter military and militia pogroms against Muslim civilians. The violence of
the Marcos regime abetted the communist insurgency and Moro decisions that
safety was possible only through independence from the Philippines rather than
by working within the political system.
Current Situation in the Philippines
I believe the present rash of violence and killings is the result of political
instability and weakness. President Arroyo has expressed her determination to
address and resolve the killings. She established the Independent Commission
to Address Media and Activist Killings, headed by former Supreme Court
Associate Justice Jose Melo. She also welcomed the investigation of Professor
Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council.
However, I question her capability to take the necessary steps to end the killings.
She has been politically weak since her controversial election in 2004, depending
upon support from military and provincial leaders to counter impeachment
measures by her opponents in Congress. She has promoted military officers who
support her and placed retired military and police officers in high-level civilian
offices. Her challenge to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to eliminate
the decades old communist New Peoples Army (NPA) insurgency within two
years has given the AFP a green light to take any action it wishes against the
NPA and their allies. Faced with a persistent low-level NPA insurgency, the
military resorts to stretching counterinsurgency strategies to branding leftist
organizations as enemies of the state that can be intimidated or eliminated by
any means.
The communist insurgency is a serious threat to the Philippine
government and democracy. The world’s last remaining Maoist insurgency, the
NDF, uses violence and abuses democratic privileges to advance its power. As a
legal political movement, NDF leaders are elected to Congress where they
continue to oppose the administration and seek to block or destabilize
government policies. During election campaigns, the NDF uses kidnappings,
“revolutionary” taxes, threats and violence to support its candidates and harass
opponents. The Party’s political goals are to weaken the government, gain
power through coalitions and eventually replace the democratic system with an
ideological communist dictatorship.
One of the legacies of the Marcos regime is the continued alienation of
many civil society elements from the government and especially the military.
NGOs, religious bodies, academics, small farmers, and indigenous peoples
remain suspicious of government officials and military personnel because of the
oppression and violence used against them during martial law. Many
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government officials, particularly in the armed forces and police, reciprocate the
mistrust, seeing a communist hand behind civil society protests against
administration policies and actions. Powerful elites influence local police or
military commanders to use force against farmers’ complaints over land grabs or
workers’ demonstrations over working conditions. Murders of activist farmers
and labor leaders in rural provinces are covered up. Journalists investigating
the crimes become targets. Similarly, prosecutors and judges are intimidated.
Tragically, the result is further alienation from and resistance to the government.
The killings have become a major issue within the Philippines, yet there is
little public outrage despite the release of the Melo Commission report and the
initial criticisms of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council.
Public perceptions are influenced by military and official attributions that most
of the killings are internal CPP-NPA purges. Most civil society reaction has been
from leftist oriented NGOs rather than mainstream organizations, further
limiting public concern.
Short-Term Prospects in the Philippines
While we all hope the killings will stop immediately, I am not optimistic
in the short run. I am confident, however, that through conscientious efforts by
Philippine political and civil society leaders, as well as international partners
such as the United States, this cycle of violence can be halted.
My pessimism over short-term remedial action by the government is
based upon the following:
--
It is election time again. Campaigning for national elections on May 14 is
well underway. Little if any serious effort will be exerted to investigate
killings of political significance. In fact, as contesting parties struggle to
win by any means, there will likely be an upsurge of campaign related
violence.
--
Candidates from left-wing political parties will be particular targets.
National Security Advisor Norberto Gonzales stated on March 8 that such
candidates must not be allowed to win seats in the Congress. The
Gonzales view that party-list candidates “are under the direct influence of
the communist party” gives a potential hunting license to military and
local officials who agree with him.
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--
The new anti terrorism law, which President Arroyo signed on March 6,
gives new “legal teeth” to the government’s war on terrorism. The Arroyo
administration describes the law, titled the “Human Security Act of 2007,”
as being “very concerned on human rights.” Many observers fear the law
may increase unfettered military operations against opponents deemed to
be terrorists. National Security Advisor Gonzales has already stated that
the NPA will be labeled a terrorist organization when the new law is
promulgated. Legal leftist organizations and elected individuals may be
designated.
--
The new Defense Secretary, Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr., is a retired police
officer. He succeeds a civilian. Senior Department of National Defense
officials are now mostly former military officers rather than civilians.
Secretary Ebdane likely will promote military perceptions of security
threats. UN Rapporteur Alston stated “the AFP is in a state of almost total
denial…of its need to respond effectively and authentically to
the…killings…attributed to them.”
The killings and the state of democracy in the Philippines have
implications for U.S. interests. Prolonged United States support for the Marcos
regime in order to save our military bases alienated many in the Philippines. U.S.
Ambassador Kenny has rightly expressed official U.S. concern over the
extrajudicial killings. However, other U.S. interests -- counter terrorism
cooperation and training opportunities the AFP provide U.S. forces – may limit
pressure on the Arroyo administration.
The U.S. Institute of Peace involvement in the Mindanao peace process
provides insights into many of these issues. It is readily apparent that there are
multiple, often uncoordinated, policymakers in the Arroyo administration with
diverse agendas. The President has authorized her negotiators to propose a
forward-looking self-determination package to the MILF. Yet, military officers in
central Mindanao continue to support local political leaders who use their militia
as private armies to contest MILF influence. The Arroyo administration avoids
exercising national authority over local political and economic interests opposed
to a peace agreement with the Moros so as to retain their support against
administration opponents. It expends little effort to counter biased or incorrect
media reports on Mindanao events.
Recommendations
The U.S. and other nations are not without influence to help end the
violence of extrajudicial killings. The Philippines is sensitive to and dependent
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on the goodwill and support of its neighbors and international donors. Some
useful tools include:
•
Donor nations and international financial institutions already have strong
anti-corruption requirements for economic assistance. Linking assistance
to forceful judicial reform and independent investigations of the killings
would enhance the resolution of the cases.
•
Philippine desires to qualify for the Millennium Challenge Corporation
assistance gives the U.S. influence to demand rigorous action against the
killings.
•
The sizeable defense relationship the U.S. has with the Philippines
provides a mechanism to encourage civilian control over the armed forces.
•
Forceful public U.S. official support for human rights reforms and
protections would counter some Filipino perceptions that U.S. concern
over the killings is tempered by our efforts to counter terrorism.
Model for Success
The U.S. Institute of Peace has established a unique relationship with key
players in the peace process in Mindanao. Working with minimal publicity, the
Institute has made a significant contribution to the progress in the talks over the
past four years. The Institute has worked closely with civil society to foster open
debate to mitigate Filipino public prejudice and discrimination against the Moro
minority. Engaging NGOs, church leaders, educators, and media
representatives, the Institute seeks to change public perceptions of the conflict
and the benefits a durable peace agreement would bring the nation. Similar
programs focused on highlighting a need to end the extrajudicial killings and to
bring perpetrators to justice could help strengthen judicial institutions and public
demands for resolution of the killings.
The Institute’s peace efforts supplement Embassy, USAID and the Pacific
Command’s counterterrorism and developmental programs and priorities.
Working independently but cooperatively with these official U.S. agencies, the
Institute addresses the political, religious, historical and social issues underlying
the conflict. Parallel programs dealing with judicial reform, civilian control over
security forces, and amelioration of the communist insurgency could begin to
address the causes of the killings. Institute efforts to reduce intra-Moro clan and
tribal conflict through support for dialogue and cooperation among the next
generation of Moro leaders could be duplicated in other conflict situations,
which now end in political killings.
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Regrettably, the State Department’s support for the Institute’s facilitation
project is ending just as the peace process is at a critical juncture. Once the
negotiators reach agreement on outstanding issues, a politically contentious,
long-term transition period to implement the agreement will require close
monitoring and engagement. Granting the Moros self-determination will alter
power relationships in Mindanao. The potential for extralegal violence is real.
Continued Institute presence is critical to help both Muslim and Christian
communities through this difficult period. Without renewed funding, however,
the Institute’s unique investment of trust and credibility with key players will be
lost prematurely.
The coordinated approach U.S. agencies, the Institute of Peace,
neighboring countries and international donors have used to advance the
Mindanao peace process can be replicated to resolve the extrajudicial killings.
U.S. interests would be served and the Philippines would benefit.
Thank you Madam Chairman. I welcome your questions and those of
your colleagues.
The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author, not the U.S. Institute of
Peace, which does not take positions on policy.
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