JOHN RAWLS: JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS [Clark Wolf]
"Justice is the first virtue of social institutions." (A Theory of Justice, p. 1)
Original Position: a morally credentialled choosing position, from which we decide on principles for the basic
structure of society. Circumstances of the OP insure that the agreement reached will be fair.
Elements of the original position:
1) Description of Parties: rational, not altruistic
2) they must choose among different conceptions of justice.
3) their choice is rendered impartial by the mental constraints of a "veil of ignorance."
4) reasoning type: maximin [Supposed to follow from previous elements.]
CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE: Distribute burdens and blessings according to what?
possibilities: 1)Equal distribution, 2)need, 3)ability, merit, achievement, 4)effort and sacrifice, 5)productive
contribution, 6)greater good of greater number, 7)?
VEIL OF IGNORANCE: Intended to insure that parties to the OP don't choose a set of principles on the basis of
personal advantage. Parties to the original position know facts about society: they know that people have religious
beliefs, that they have different conceptions of the good, different wants, different needs. They don't know their own
condition in life: they are ignorant of their specific economic situation, sex, religion, race, time, class, ... anything
that could prejudice them in their choice of principle. They don't know who they are in society.
REASONING TYPE: MAXIMIN REASONING: make sure the worst possible outcome of your choice is as
good as you can make it.
d1
d2
d3
d4
-10
2
3
2
5
2
4
7
20
2
5
7
d1- Gambler's choice.
d2- Egalitarian choice.
d3- Maximin choice.
d4- Utilitarian choice.
CONDITIONS FOR RATIONALITY OF MAXIMIN:
1) No knowledge of likelihoods or probabilities of alternative outcomes.
2) Best outcomes aren’t overwhelmingly good. (Upside incentive)
3) Worst outcomes are overwhelmingly bad. (Downside risk)
Q: Are these conditions really achieved in the original position? Are they sufficient for the rationality of maximin?
JUSTIFICATION: Why should we care that CJF would be chosen from OP? How does this serve as justification?
RAWLSIAN RESPONSES:
1) The restrictions of OP are designed to eliminate inappropriate partiality. The constraints to which the parties are
subject remove only those choice factors that would cloud judgement or contribute to bias.
2) We arrive at the conditions of the OP through the process of reflective equilibrium, in which we balance
principles with considered judgements. This shows that it embodies conditions of fairness which we actually accept.
Justification, in this sort of endeavor, "is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting
together into one coherent view." [One way to 'tinker' with Rawls's view is to argue for alternate elements of the
original position. The most common moves are removal of maximin (Harsanyi), altering the constitution or
'thickness' of the veil (Young, Tamir), or extend the motives of the parties to include altruism and care (Walker).]
CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:
FIRST PRINCIPLE: (Equal Liberty Principle) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive system
of basic liberties compatible with similar liberty for others.
SECOND PRINCIPLE: (Principle of Tolerable Inequality) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both: a) (Difference Principle): ...to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (consistent with the just
saving s principle), and b) (Fair Equality of Opportunity/”Open Offices” Requirement): attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
LEXICAL ORDERING OF THE PRINCIPLES: (TJ 1971 p. 302-3)
First Priority Rule: The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order, such that liberty can be restricted only
for the sake of liberty. Two cases:
a) Less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all;
b) Less than equal liberty must be (rationally) acceptable to those with the lesser liberty.
Second Priority Rule: (Justice over efficiency and welfare)
The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency, and to that of maximizing the sum of
advantages, and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle. Two cases:
a) An inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity, and
b) An excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship.
GENERAL CONCEPTION: (1j 1971 p. 303) All social primary goods- liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth, and the bases of self respect, are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these
goods is to the advantage of the least favored.
THEORY OF PRIMARY GOODS: Primary goods are the things every rational person must be presumed to want,
necessary for the pursuit of any conception of the good. They are necessary to insure that all have equality of
opportunity. In a society guided by the CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, every individual will be
provided with the primary goods. According to Rawls, the following are primary goods:
(i) Basic rights and liberties (political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of
thought, freedom of the person, along with the right to hold personal property, freedom from arbitrary arrest and
seizure as defined by the Rule of Law.)
(ii) Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities.
(iii) powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and economic institutions of
the basic structure.
(Is Rawls right to think that everyone wants these goods, regardless
(iv) income and wealth
of the conception of the Good she or he accepts? Has Rawls left
(v) the social bases of self-respect
important items off this list?)
Contrast between Rawls and Utilitarianism: CJF is not intended to guarantee that people will be well off or
happiness, or to maximize human well being. Rather it's designed to insure that the background conditions are in
place which make it possible for different individuals to achieve their separate goods. Social justice can't guarantee
that people will achieve their ends, but it can insure that they have a fair shot, a chance of doing so. This is
associated with Rawls's principle of legitimacy: "our exercise of political power is proper and justifiable only when it
is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to
endorce in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational."[PL 217] Rawls argues
that social institutions cannot be justifiable to each of their members unless the principles of justice are satisfied.
Some Questions/Possible Objections: Does (iv) prematurely rule out some plausible forms of socialism?
(Schwartz) Does Rawls's conception of justice misrepresent the value of community ties? (Sandel, Walzer, Taylor,
Kymlicka) Does Rawls conception of justice misrepresent the value of particular attachments and personal
relationships? (Blum, Williams) Should Rawls focus on cababilities rather than on "goods?" (Sen, Nussbaum) Is
Rawls's view associated with an impossible goal of impartiality? (Young) Is the Rawlsian effort to attain impartial
choice likely to mask prejudice and sexism? (Okin) Is Rawls's account tied to a false and misleading rationalism?
(Plumwood, Walzer) Does Rawls inappropriately assume that goods are available in an un-owned pie, waiting to be
distributed? (Nozick, Lomasky, Narveson) Is Rawls's individualism a form of social atomism? (Taylor)
There’s a story about Sydney Morganbesser that’s sometimes used to raise an objection to Rawls’s view.
Morganbesser had been out in a Vietnam war protest, and came back with a bloody head and said that the police had
broken up the protest and beaten the protesters. Someone said “How unfair!” and Morganbesser said “Well the
police hit me on the head, which was unjust. But they hit everyone else on the head too, so they weren’t unfair.”
It seems right, in this example, to separate the injustice (violation of a right, I think) from unfairness (equal
treatment). Doesn’t this suggest that injustice and unfairness aren’t exactly the same thing?
We have a present conception of what is valuable in life, and a (second order) interest in maintaining the
circumstances in which we can pursue the interests that conception gives us. But we also have an interest in
maintaining our ability to rationally revise our conception of what is valuable.