THE STATE AND LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES
IN A
PLANNED INDUSTRIAL CITY:
TWO CASE-STUDIES FROM THE
CIUDAD GUAYANA EXPERIENCE
by
Marisela Montoliu Mufnoz
Urbanist, U.S.B., Caracas, July 1979
Submitted
to the
Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the
Degree of
MASTER OF CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June
1983
Marisela Montoliu Munoz
The
author
hereby
grants
to
M.I.T.
permission
reproduce and to distribute copies of this thesis document
whole or in part.
to
in
Signature of Author
De artment of Urban Studies and Planning
Certified by
Profedsor Lisa Peattie
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Professor Donald Schon
Chairman, MCP Committee
MASSA211
JUL 2 1 1983
URRARIES
THE STATE AND LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES
IN A PLANNED INDUSTRIAL CITY:
TWO CASE-STUDIES FROM THE
CIUDAD GUAYANA EXPERIENCE
by
Marisela Montoliu Mufioz
The thesis
presents two case-studies that illustrate
how a development corporation (the CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE
GUAYANA,
CVG,
from Ciudad Guayana,
Venezuela) approaches, and
intervenes in low-income communities in Ciudad Guayana.
The
thesis addresses issues such as:
(a) The way the ideology
imbedded
in
the Guayana Program,
started in
the early sixties,
still
keeps shaping the types of decisions assumed by the CVG;
(b) how CVG's organizational
structure
and administrative
style
are reflected
in,
and affect
CVG interventions
in
lowincome communities,
and (c)
how CVG conceives
the role
of
community organization and participation within the process of
design and implementation of its
programs.
the
critical
The first case-study is the process of relocation of
barrio "Colinas de Unare," located in
a supposedly
area
close
to
the
"modern"
center
of
Ciudad
Guayana;
the process began to take place in April, 1981.
The second
case-study is an on-going program of training on artisan
production
given by a CVG
team
to
women
in
the barrios of
Ciudad Guayana since the early sixties.
Research on the
affected communities' views of the programs ought to be
pursued in the future, to complement this study, which is
mostly based on
institutional
reports and interviews.
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements.................................
Introduction............... .....................................
I.
Page
4
6
The History of the Guayana Program:
Implications for Current Interventions......
9
II.
The Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana.......
23
III.
The Process of Relocation of
"Colinas de Unare"..........................31
IV.
The Program of Training in Artisan
Production of the "Demostradoras del
Hogar"........................................... 73
Final Observations................................
87
Appendices.....
93
Footnotes..........
Bibliography.....
........................
.
..
............... ......... 108
.............................. 114
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
to the realization of
way or another,
parents and brother, who,
from Venezuela, always encouraged me
in whatever was necessary.
De
my
Second, Maria Nuria
friend and colleague from
Bolivar, who shared with me her experience
home,
while
adversities
I was
of
thankful
Pilar
to
in Ciudad Guayana),
international
information that
University
in the CVG
whose
(and her
communications to pass
I could not collect personally.
on
Sim6n
and who overcame
my former Professor and good
Garcia,
First, my
this thesis.
and helped me
C6saris,
in one
those who contributed,
like to thank all
I would
ideas and
me
Also,
friend
on
I am
Maria
consistent work on
the
del
Ciudad
Guayana is this paper partly based.
My advisor,
Professor Lisa
Peattie,
acknowledgement.
Besides her useful
of
she
the
thesis,
Profesor at DUSP-MIT, also raised
me
the
Lawrence,
topic,
the
visiting
I wish to thank,
Folco Riccio and
for giving me access to
and Jackie Leblanc,
into
important questions that led
Cathy Rakowsky for her guidance;
Marcos
research
Remmy Prud'Homme,
to revise or strengthen my assumptions.
too,
special
comments on earlier drafts
helped me put this
perspective of my future career.
deserves
Juan
some literature
on
who helped me put the thesis
together.
This
has
implied
thesis is just the culmination of a process
the
adjustment to
unusual
special gratitude to Oscar Fernandez,
4
conditions.
that
I
owe
who made such a process
even more challenging. Finally, I wish to express my appreciation
to those who eased it:
Masood,
and
Paul Smoke,
Vergetis,
Crespo,
and
John;
Claudia,
Adolfo,
my friends and coursemates--among
Jim Murphy,
Yuk Shiu Lee,
Ting Fun Yeh,
Oscar
Rieko Hayashi,
them,
Ruiz, Alexandra
Melvyn
Col6n,
Elba
Lorris Mizrahi, Marta Baillet, Leticia Rivera-Torres,
Ruben Morfin--;
lenske,
My roommates,
Martin Diskin,
the Professors,
particularly Karen Po-
and Raci Bademli,
the DUSP administrative staff, among
them, Rolph Engler, Carol
Escrich, Mary Grenham, and Jeanne Winbush.
5
and the members of
INTRODUCTION
The
present
case-studies,
the
current
main assumptions,
identify,
through
objectives
and
underlie or are utilized by the State
that
dologies
paper attempts to
interventions
in
two
methoin
its
in Ciudad Guaya-
income communities
na, Venezuela.
The
and
city,
the agency that represents
the affected communities present particular
tics that have shaped
given.
a
the State
characteris-
the way in which those interventions are
In the first place, the city, Ciudad Guayana, arose as
planned
during
in it,
a
center
growth
in a remote
region
period in which "developmentalism",
economic growth,
government
of
Venezuela,
the
ideal
of
and modernization, were the concepts leading
actions.
In the
second
place,
the
institution
representing the State, the Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana,
is a corporate entity, practically omnipotent
na,
whose
main
in Ciudad Guaya-
goal was to realize the developmentalist
deals, partly through the creation of a "city-beauty".
there were the low income
third place,
existing
an
effect
idea in
and rapidly growing afterwards, as
of the Guayana Program itself.
into the planners expectations,
conflict with
In the
already
communities,
in "the site" when Ciudad Guayana was just an
the minds of the planners,
i-
the latter's goals.
6
They did not
and were considered
to be
fit
in
Though this combination of
actors and setting, as we have said, generated state
interven-
tions with very characteristic assumptions and objectives,
might
be
said
that the conclusions related to
studies could be applied to State
interventions
these
it
case-
in low
income
communities in other dependent-capitalist urban settings, were
ideologies and assumptions could exist,
simmilar
possibly in
more subtile ways.
their
The two selected case-studies differ from each other
in
time
is
scope and circumstances.
the case of a quick process of
in
The first of
relocation of a barrio
a supposedly critical area of the "modern" city
April,
1981);
production
for
of
housewives
institution
(starting
which
in the barrios,
artisan
has
been
as a part
tasks of the Division of Social and Cultural
the CVG.
growing
the second is an on-going program in
carried on continuously since the early 1960's,
the
them
Development
This contrast will allow us to observe how
realize
of
its goals under diverse types
of
the
pres-
sures.
All
comes
of
sent
the
information used to develop
from the CVG itself.
the barrio
relocation,
Part of it,
consisted of
by the CVG people working
the
case-studies
specially in the case
internal CVG
in the barrio,
and by
coordinating the program to higher level officials.
was
collected
through interviews
7
to CVG officials in
reports
people
The rest
Ciudad
Guayana, done
in February of
1983.
Due to the fact of
on a single--and particularly involved--source of
and
though
even
to
isolate
the
information,
underlying
this analysis might
be
issues and data that would have been perceivable
or
biases
assumptions,
ignoring
we have tried
relying
and
ommisions,
only through direct contact with
collectable
Additional
research
comprehensive
would
be necessary to
the
community.
develop
a
more
picture of the actual circumstances under which
the programs are taking
place.
The paper begins by providing a brief background on the
history of the Guayana Program,
part,
and
the
Secondly,
it
structure
and
agency,
to
it
the
assumptions
goals,
planning/administrative
the
style
the ways in which these
assumptions
as a whole.
described;
and
goes on to describe the
highlighting
adjusted
program
ideology
of which Ciudad Guayana was a
and
Followingly,
ideology
underlying
it.
organizational
of
the
elements
State
were
underlying
the
the two case-studies
are
story-approach was chosen, since
a "dramatistic",
would help visualize the actual sequence and complexity of
events
involved
in
the
real
process.
Finally,
some
about the implications of CVG interventions
are
drawn up, and some considerations are made about the need
for
conclussions
further research.
8
I.-
IMPLICATIONS
THE HISTORY OF THE GUAYANA PROGRAM:
FOR CURRENT INTERVENTIONS
The
cal
is to present a histori-
objective of this chapter
framework for the understanding of the two
Emphasis will be given to
lying
the
development
generated
the
and
of
(b) the failures
initial planning process,
both the problems that the Corporation has
today, and a set of constraints
1.1. The
under-
(a) the ideological factors
program of Guayana,
strategy and
case-studies.
the
which
to
face
for its current actions.
ideal of "growth" and
"modernization" and the
new city
still under the period
It was during the early 1950's,
of dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jim6nez,
when the first moves
towards the development of the area of Guayana were done.
American companies, Bethlehem and U.S.Steel,
by
given
important
the Venezuelan government,
ment
the government,
corporation
started
under concessions
to
began
iron ore deposits--El Pao and Cerro
the same time,
planning
hydroelectric
exploit
Bolivar--.
two
At
through its national develop-
(Corporacidn Venezolana
the
Two
de
development of a steel
Fomento,
mill
and
CVF)
two
dams near the confluence of the Orinoco and the
9
These projects were not,
rivers.
Caroni
wholly regional development attempt.
part of
then,
any
They were just means for
the exploitation of the extraordinary natural resources of the
area,
any possible profit
reverting
and
enclave,
national and
international economic centers.
of
a job in the
finding
in the mines,
and
an
functioning as
a relatively disintegrated way,
in
the
into
back
The possibility
initial stages of the
construction,
the
from
began to attract the population
surrounding, depressed areas into the small towns of San Fdlix
and
Matanzas
(1).
the begining of the
At
after
1960's,
the overthrow of
Junta,
Jim~nez and a short ruling of a transitional
Perez
a
new democratic-populist government came into power after elecbringing a consequent change in the approach
tions,
nal
development,
vernment
viewed
and to
economic growth and general
of the population.
redistributive
measures
Thus,
go-
new
"modernization"
improvement of the
as a basic condition for the
situation
The
the case of Guayana.
to natio-
socioeconomic
together with some
as the agrarian
reform
shy
(1960),
it
decided to undertake major economic programs.
The program of Guayana consisted,
the
existing
projects
the country.
integrating
into a complex development that
not only generate positive effects at the
primarily,
then, of
that was going to push
It would mean
would
regional level,
forward the development
but,
of
its economic diversification, the
10
possibility of exporting
industrial products, a decline
in the
region
(where
trend of population concentration in the central
national
incorporation of a backward
and the
Caracas is),
would
All of this
aluminium industries,
chemical complexes,
of
it
heavy machinery, electro-
steel mills,
and plants for pulp and paper production,
in the area of confluence of the
Caroni rivers,
near the sources of
xically enough,
the national and
agencies
industry
[that]
to
export
import
accentuated
demand
without
activities that would
underemployment,
contributing
by directly promoting capital-
of foreign exchange",
increase problems of
would create technological
tional prices and markets
and
would
(4).
un- and
subordination
developed countries, and would be highly dependent on
neurship
Parado-
indus-
base characterized by "final assembly
poles,
the
solve the Venezuelan economic problem of an
trial
intensive
(3).
regional planning
to
earning
and
Orinoco
raw materials
tried
that
be
through the diffusion effects of the concentration of
reached
all
(2).
of development
process
region to the
to
interna-
Following the concept of growth
relying on market forces and on private entrepre-
(national as well as international),
such a public
attract
investment and natural
it was expected
resources
the private investment needed
to
scenario
propel
the
process of economic development.
Social
needs
of
infrastructure was necessary both to satisfy the
the growing population,
11
and
to
attract
economic
closed camps assumed
a
the traditional
Instead of following
activities.
approach of
it was decided to plan
in the oil areas,
new city.
A team of foreign planners
In
vernment.
professionals
Venezuelan
it might be thought
resources to a foreign team was also due to
the
superiority
the belief in
and adequacy of foreign knowledge
and
pat-
ideological dependence.
new city would be located precisely in
The
the confluence
around
in the program
that the decision to allo-
cate
terns, a sort of
most
and some of the
in the field of planning,
However,
between
the
Orinoco
lands
the
and the Caroni
Seventy percent of the "developable" lands were
rivers.
go-
Venezuela did not have many
the early 1960's,
ones actually refused to participate
competent
(5).
was hired to advise the
University)
Harvard
(the Joint Center of MIT and
bal-
dios
(vacant lands without a known owner) which were declared
under
CVG's control
(6).
into
Caroni river divided the "site" for the city
The
two sectors:
The East side, with the town of San FMlix
(40 to
50 thousand inhabitants by 1963), with a growing proportion of
squatter
settlements,
1).
the West side,
with a
very
low
industrial sites
(See
The population of the new city would grow
from
population density,
Appendix
and
closer to the main
12
50,000
people in 1962,
estimates
be
to 600,000 in 1980 according to
From 60 to 75 percent of this population would
(7).
in the West side of
residing
the city
The
(Puerto Ordaz).
In the first place, to
then, have two functions:
city would,
1963
as a site for adequate reproduction of the low and
work
inhabitants'
dle-income
labor force--in the
plans "human resources" were just another
first
mid-
economic
input to optimize--:
Iron mines, hydroelectric plants, and steel mills
become useful only when combined with skillful hands and
constructive human attitudes, and approtrained minds,
(8).
(Emphasis added).
priate
social institutions...
In
it would work as an
second place,
the
set
social,
for the city was to reach a balanced
infrastructural development
economic and
the
Given that one of
focus for top officials and investors.
guidelines
attraction
(9),
some sectors of
the planning team proposed a mixed, integrated distribution of
social groups
professionals
mixture
and top officials led them to think that such a
create social
conflicts
of "modern city" thus lowering
image
of
would
investment
(10).
deteriorate
its power of
However,
sector of the city
West
needs
in practice, the areas
directed--and,
Furthermore,
as
squatter
much as possible,
13
"mo-
(Puerto Ordaz) did hardly fit
and financial possibilities
immigrants.
the
attraction
lower-income residents included in the plan for the
dern",
the
and
Both positions, theoretically, influenced
the final plan for the city.
for
some
the class-bias of
However,
in the city.
of
the
lower-income
settling
channeled by
to
be
means
of
was
"reception
areas"--towards
the
The West side became,
FClix).
East side of
then,
the
city
(San
the materialization of
under-
the ideology of economic growth and modernization that
lied the program of Guayana.
The
early history of the program and the city reflects
a predominant ideology that, as we will show through the caseremains basically unchanged,
studies,
ning and
and still guides plan-
implementation decisions. As Dinkelspiel
points out,
saw
the
time]
[the
President at the
...
Betancourt
Guayana as a way to a new Venezuela--a modern industriano longer the
lized
nation freed from colonial status,
tresure lode of foreign oil companies...
In
the base of this ideology,
we find the
that socioeconomic development, or "the goal",
high rate of economic growth,
social
pace
penetrate
whole
Somehow,
this official
down into the socioeconomic
"an
important
(13).
It
would
the required
ideology seemed
structure,
economic growth through these major projects
goal
is to achieve a
to adjust them to
of population got convinced about the
The
assumption
and to modernize the habits and
uses of the population,
of growth.
(11).
so
be
ideology of the
seen as a way of
that the
desirability
new
was
redistribution
economically and spatially diversifying
14
the
also
government"
resources generated by the oil boom across the country,
of
of
(12).
of regional integrated development
piece of the
to
of
the
a way
country,
by
"sowing
the
oil"
("Sembrando
President at the moment,
an attractive
officials
saying
of
the
R6mulo Betancourt).
and thus, the need for
investment,
petr5leo",
the reliance on market mechanisms and private
Finally,
the
el
reflecting
in the new city
image of progress and modernization, was seen by
and professionals in charge of the program
as
necessarily leading to a class- and sectoral-seggregated solution.
1.2. The new city: 1960-1980
The
evolution of Ciudad Guayana has
The
documented.
been
extensively
general--and obvious-- conclussion is
that
its economic and sociodemographic development has not followed
the
to
expected
trends.
These results can be partly attributed
the strategy of development itself;
to some extent,
can also be attributed to the failures and
misinterpretations
of the reality during the initial planning process.
they
are
also due to the type of
they
Thirdly,
intervention carried on
by
the State--undoubtedly related with the two former elements--,
represented by the CVG.
In this section, we will
(a) briefly
summarize the general characteristics and problems of the city
15
process
planning
and
(b)explain how the development strategy
and
today,
problems,
are partly responsible for those
CVG.
how they pose constraints to current actions of the
and
This
the
will constitute a framework for the analysis of CVG
and
its current interventions upon low income communities.
Current characteristics and problems of the city
sum,
In
the plan developed
to
respect
following
the
the main characteristics of
city,
with
are
in the early 1960's,
the
(figures supporting these conclussions are presented
in Appendix 2):
city
1. The
(initial)
1963
considered
in
its total population
has not grown at the speed
By April 1980,
estimates.
was 339,820 inhabitants, slightly above half of the estimate
for 1980 made in 1963.
sectors
2. The distribution of the population between the two
San FMlix is now
of the city is the opposite as expected;
sectors,
the
more--and more densely--populated of the two
while it was supposed to receive only from 25 to 30% of the
total
population.
did
not
economic linkages which were expected
3. Since
the
and since the attraction generated by the city
take place,
the
upon
neighboring,
depressed
areas
intro-
was not
the socioeconomic profile of
duced
into the calculations,
what
the
current population looks completely different to
being
population
the
a majority of
with
was
expected,
to get access to the housing opportunities provided
unable
by the State or the private enterprises.
4. The
of
rate of unemployment of San FMlix is higher than
Puerto
1980).
Ordaz
(8.6% and 3.3%
Unemployment
in
respectively,
the city as a whole
critical levels during certain periods.
has
16
reached
In July 1968,
example, 18.4% of the labor force was unemployed.
upon
dependence
extreme
to
the
is
related
that
April
by
for
This fact
unstable
activities, such as construction.
a high percentage of
San Fslix and Puerto Ordaz have
5. Both
of
their population dedicated to service activities (50.0%
and 48.3%
of
the
total employed population in San Fdlix,
Informal activithe employed population in Puerto Ordaz) .
ties are an important source of income for poor population,
specially in the case of San FMlix, where regulations about
and
enforce,
of the structures are more difficult to
use
formal
the
where
most
of the population not absorbed by
economy is living.
6. A big percentage of San FMlix's housing units are "ranchos"
(33.7% of its housing units:
89.9% of the total number of
ranchos
in
the whole city).
Puerto Ordaz,
on the
other
hand, has 10.1% of the total number of ranchos in the city,
which comprise 7.1% of the sector's total number of housing
units (14).
The failures of the development strategy
The
program
of Guayana was explicitly conceived as
"growth pole", with its growth center located
na.
On
the basis of mixed
area
was
in Ciudad Guaya-
(public-private) investment on
few "motorizing" projects that would generate
supposed to attract
"linkages",
complementary
diffuse economic development to the neighboring
to
impel overall national economic growth
John
Friedmann
growth for the
a
activities,
regions,
a
the
to
and
(15).
justified this strategy of
imbalanced
region partly on the base of Venezuela's histo-
17
which he viewed as a result
experience,
rical
as a positive
of
"choice"--and
one:
...
Venezuela
has
adopted an
implicit
'core-region'
strategy.
This means that over a sustained period Venezuela is investing large sums in the expansion of a
few
metropolitan
regions that have great potentialities for
and is guiding the spread effects
growth,
economic
with the core region...
Such
dependent-capitalist
port-oriented,
economy,
which tended
the North-central
cities,
and
(16).
concentration was rather an effect of the
a
a
of
linked
investments to areas that are functionally
these
character of
ex-
Venezuelan
to generate accelerated urbanization in
region,
increasing social conflicts in
center-periphery relation between the
regions" and the depressed areas.
the
"core-
The same effects could
be
expected as a result of an "explicit" strategy, given that the
general
nature of the economy and the system of
remained
unchanged.
In
attracted
expected
or
practice,
did
though
system of economic linkages, and
industries
it became an
an economic enclave within the region
(17).
this growing population by the urban "formal"
the
of
economy, genera-
the high unemployment and underemployment rates we
talked about.
The
The capital-intensive character
the industries in Ciudad Guayana impeded the absorption
ting
were
island,
attract thousands of unskilled immigrants from
neighboring, depressed areas.
of
certain
to the area, Ciudad Guayana never could generate the
rather,
city
even
distribution
have
The spread effects over the space did not take
18
place
as
expected.
Friedmann
problems
and
strategies
these failures to
attributes
lack of national
integration
institutional
of
the
regional
Other authors argue that they are due to the
(18).
fact that the heavy industries--e.g., steel mills--do not tend
to
contrarily to the general belief
create linkages,
in
the
On the one hand, they pay high salaries that tend to
1950's:
discourage other enterprises to establish their branches close
to
these
on the other hand,
heavy industries;
their
scale
them to self-provide many of the services and
comple-
mentary activities, that would not be demanded, then,
from the
allows
surroundings
(19).
However, it has been generally proved that
this kind of consequences are mostly due to
ty
the inapplicabili-
of growth pole theories under capitalist-dependent
tions:
In the
first place,
condi-
because the growth pole theory,
as originally conceived by Perroux, was actually divorced
spatial
considerations,
and
thus,
its
applications
spatial, regional setting might involve weak assumptions
In
the
second
place
because the conditions
growth
(and supposing the above
in developed countries,
pole theory was derived, do not
in an underdeveloped country like
cal,
primate-city-size
discouragement
tariff
to
intermediate
19
a
(20).
ignored),
from which the
of the
Non-hierarchi-
urban
of vertical integration through the
treatment
to
resemble the conditions
Venezuela:
distribution
is
from
inputs
(a
centers,
favorable
consequence
of
import-substituting,
highly
protected
industrialization).
(21).
Thus,
sumed
in brief,
the type of development strategy
attracted immigrants and activities
as-
("informal" activi-
ties) whose socioeconomic profile diverged from the one consi-
dered
the economic strategy applied.
by
This effect was a
"given" for the planners of the city, and for the implementing
institution;
the
the city,
later on,
and
issue was,
then, how would the planners of
the implementing
institution respond
to the demands they faced.
The failures of the planning process
The
the
changing
follow,
tegy,
needs
of the
real city.
blindly, the guidelines
that is:
planning
rent
planning process for the city was not
It rather
adapted
to
tried
to
imposed by the economic stra-
(a) creating an attractive, modern city;
for a population with a socioeconomic profile
with the modern industrial structure that
(b)
cohe-
derived
from
the economic model.
The
class-bias of some of the Venezuelan professionals
and top officials,
and the
"evolutionist-modernizing" notion
held by part of the Joint Center team,
are considered two
the causes for this divorce between planning and
20
reality
of
(22).
Some members of the Joint center
inadequacies of the process,
organizational
pointed to the
team have also
primarily to the
fact that most of the team was based on Caracas,
it was convenient for
Even though
Ciudad Guayana.
to be connected to the evolution
place
big
in Caracas,
instead of on
part of it
in national guidelines taking
this centralization of the team implied
a
gap between the image held by the planners and the actual
situation. Guided by different concerns, and from their diverse view-points,
the consultants expressed:
the
prephysically from the real city of
... Isolated
sent,
and
isolated
organizationally and
conceptually
from the political and economic interest groups in which
their
enterprise had its being,
[the designers of
the
city]
tended to leave these out of
their
calculations
and to develop their own lines of work... (23).
... (The
mic
interaction between urban development and econo-
programs]
was more visible in Guayana than in Cara-
cas,
where
the
economic
development
function
was
obscured
by the urgency to find solutions to the
urban
problems of this rapidly expanding metropolis.
Housing
and physical planning in Caracas were typically handled
in
gross
(24).
ignorance of
underlying
economic
forces...
In sum, this divorce of the planners and designers from
reality,
together with the idealism
involved
generated a very unequal distribution of
two
sectors
of
the city
groups of the city.
dern" one,
housing,
of
and
among the
The West side
the low-income immigrants.
21
process,
resources between the
different
(Puerto Ordaz),
held certain social mixture, but
as we have already said,
in the
interest
the
"mo-
its lowest income
was not affordable by most
On the other
hand,
squatter
settling
was
prohibited and physically rejected
side.
Reception
in the
East side-- were
showed above,
areas
from
this
for the poorer
immigrants--all of them
insufficient,
and
this sector,
as we
became the one with poorest supply of services,
highest level of un- and underemployment, and lowest standards
of housing
(25).
22
II.-
THE CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA
(CVG)
This chapter briefly describes CVG's history,
original
internal structure, planning style (including the lea-
goals,
ding ideology),
ments,
and main functional problems.
understood within the historical
All these ele-
framework exposed
will help to interpret CVG's
in
motivations
the
first chapter,
and
problems in dealing with low income communities
in Ciudad
Guayana.
4.1. Definition, objectives, area of action
The
"Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana"
development
the
agency especially created to
projects
status
from
and
President's office"
(26).
it
implement
Its
legal
institute, with its own legal
with patrimony
the National Treasury;
regional
and
considered by the Guayana program.
is that of "...autonomous
personality,
plan
is a
different and
independent
is directly attached
to
It was created on December 29,
through the President's decree #430,
the
1960,
which defines CVG's cha-
racter, scope, goals, and patrimony.
Its
available
objectives
in
were,
sum:
resources in the Guayana region;
23
To
study
the
(b) to study
the
(a)
potential of the CaronI river;
hydroelectric
the
integrated development of the region,
National
Plan;
the region,
(e)
to
(d) to promote the
to
according
the
industrial development
of
both through public and private sector's actions;
coordinate
public
(c) to plan for
social and economic
institutions;
functions
(f) to contribute to the
of
other
organization,
development and operation of the needed public services in the
region,
and
(g) to carry on other functions without its area
of action, when it is required (27).
The area of action of the CVG--the "Development Zone"--
was defined by the presidential decree # 28
(3/4/1960),
much smaller than the natural region of Guayana,
Orinoco river.
lands
South of the
The development zone comprised, roughly,
that would be occupied by Ciudad Guayana and
dam on the Caroni river,
dedicated
to
program.
Later,
lopment
the
that is,
below),
of
the
the
the
Guri
it just included the areas
main development projects of
the
Guayana
as the interest for a wholly regional deve-
of the nation grew,
emphasis
being
its
and as CVG began to
function (change which
area
of action of CVG
was
will
change
be
gradually
the
discussed
growing.
Currently, it embraces more than 50% of the national territory
(28).(See
The
ordinating
Appendix
CVG
3).
was created as a corporate rather than a
entity, after what Dinkelspiel
24
(29)
co-
called "unsuc-
cessful experiences" of the National Development Agency
1948),
the
Institute
Office
of Iron and Steel
solution was
would
for Special Studies
(1958-1960).
selected, according to
mobilize
the
because
(30),
achieve
a
it
decisive
hold a more global view of all
diverse elements involved in the
over
and
A corporate kind of
Friedmann
resources more readily,
coordinate action more easily,
the
(1953-1958),
(1945-
Guayana
program,
and,
"underscore the determination of the government to
all,
assign top priority to the Guayana program" more easily than a
system of coordinated institutions.
4.2. Organizational structure
In
undergone
terms of organizational structure,
many
transformations,
changing functions,
action,
and
also
Ciudad Guayana.
1963,
1970,
(31),
argue
to
to
the CVG has also
supposedly related
the growth and changes
to
in its area
the gradual moving of the
offices
its
of
to
Such transformations took place in the years
1971,
1979, and 1981.
Authors like M.P. Garcia
that the changes have been rather
formal, and not
in the contents and objectives originally established.
Its hierarchical organization included in 1981 a Directory,
a Presidency, eleven management offices
three divisions
(it has not been possible to
25
(gerencias) and
find information
about the differences between a "gerencia" and a
It
difficult
is
overall
charts
(Appendix 4).
changes
in
of
organizational
its
it can be noticed that the
However,
included the following
The
facts:
enterprises were not a functional part of
economic
and
more,
1970
only by looking at
Social
studies )
CVG's
about
conclussions
to reach better
organization
"divisidn").
the Division of Human Resources
and Cultural Development,
major
CVG
any-
(today's Division
important for
our
case
appeared in that year.
4.3.
Implications of CVG's administrative and planning
style
style
In
the
first place,
the administrative and
of
the CVG reflects the character of the
whose management it was created.
especially
created to run a program
objectives,
interest"
As we have said,
assumed
that was
program
for
the CVG was
with primarily
to be responding to a notion of
represented by the goal of
planning
national
"public
increasing
the
national
rate
authors,
an image of political neutrality and nonpartisanship
of
economic
growth.
According
to
certain
would provide the Corporation with the general popular support
needed to carry on its tasks;
image
in fact,
this was the type
and administrative style--a technocratic one--that
assumed.
26
of
CVG
the concrete expressions of
Among
tive and planning style we find
tion
such an
administra(a) utiliza-
the following:
of noncontroversial figures
in the institution--that is,
officials not explicitly involved with any party--;
tification
felt
of the CVG and its projects with the
nationalist
sentiments of
Venezuela";
projects that only had regional or local
it
with particular ministries and
were
generally related to political parties,
consultants
Dinkelspiel
to give
deeply
rejecting
(c)
since
would
interests
(d) avoiding being identi-
fied
foreing
"most
significance,
was thought that identification with such
have broken its nonpartisan image;
(b) iden-
its projects,
"confiability"
since they
and
to
(e)
the
hiring
result.
conclusions on CVG's administrative style reflect
the prevailing ideology within the decision-making bodies:
[The
technocratic
administrative
style]
permits
the
Corporation to reap the benefits that the great
popular
appeal
of modern technology can bestow in a
developing
country... (32).
its
decisions
...
If
a
public
agency can show that
simply
reflect
the
technologically
best
choice,
it
stands a good chance of sustaining public belief in
its
nonpartisanship...
The
(33).
technocratic
style christallized in a
location of the CVG that has in turn shaped its
and reinforced the
offices
were
technocratic style:
in Caracas,
By
the capital of
Kilometers away from Ciudad Guayana.
27
1963,
the
geographic
interventions
most of its
country,
A few operational
700
units
were on the site, and the
in
Ciudad Bolivar,
proximately
planning
unit of Urban
Planning had an office
the main city in the Guayana
100 kms far from Ciudad Guayana,
was
done
region,
ap-
but most of
the
and most of the decisions were
taken
in
Caracas.
Some
of
the
effects of such
a distribution
personnel
have been briefly commented on
ter,
talking about the
when
process,
in which,
interesting
to
some
have
in the former
failures of the
as we know,
since it
of the problems occurring nowadays.
out
that
approaches
between
people
"the site"
in
the
the
separation
the
product
offices of CVG
in
power",
and
to
an
This divergen-
where
it was seen
while it was seen
in
inte-
(35).
Currently,
over
the
being
Caracas as "exasperating tendencies of particular local
rests"
of
have hin-
from
(34).
authors
feedback
and thus,
ce was felt much more strongly in the site,
inaccessibility to
is related
Caracas
of the planning process
It is
divergence
have hindered the flow of
adequated support for actions in the site
as a "painful
planning
Many
and
improve the planning product in Caracas,
dered
initial
the
chap-
CVG was a main actor.
to extend this point further,
pointed
of
the
CVG has been losing financial
the subsidiary enterprises--that is,
economic
projects--which
were the
28
control
the major national
concrete
expressions
of
CVG's
national
So,
style.
until
creasing
social
growing,
by
Guayana
(37).
generated
pressures
1982
(and
face),
have
been
generated as Ciudad
these changes have
Guayana
to
not
There
necessarily
and
is a clear class gap between the planin the city, and there
different perception of the
the CVG.
was
Ciudad
a more participatory pattern in CVG's approach
ners and the people living
within
role
most of CVG offices were moved
However,
interventions:
tely
it had to
seen
Besides that, and probably because of the in-
(36).
reinforced
technocratic
its
as the "political" side of
even though unwillingly,
which,
its
urban and regional development tasks,
the
1970's
the
and "justified"
importance,
Now,
is a comple-
reality at different
the dichotomy Caracas-site
levels
has
been
reproduced in a dichotomy top planners-field workers.
It
could be said,
literature,
that
from the analysis of the
the popular and local
available
interests have always
been subordinated to what was conceived by a planning elite as
the national
interests.
implicit
way.
regional
development
explicit
national
Now,
It was done,
the
shift
however,
of emphasis
in a
to
urban
tasks has taken place parallel
policy of creation of formal
doctrine,
and
which we would say
making the above mentioned subordination explicit.
hypotheses pointed out,
to
linkages
tween the State and the grass-roots, a policy derived
Christian-democrat
rather
and
an
be-
from the
to
be
One of the
though not deeply worked, through the
29
following case-studies, is that CVG,
low income communities,
democrat notion of
the
its
interventions upon
is directly reflecting the Christian-
"popular promotion" which has become one of
guidelines of the Sixth National Develoment
1985),
tion.
by
in
Plan
released by the current Christian-democrat administraThis would mean that the formal
Dinkelspiel
Venezuela,
nonpartisanship alleged
is not being held by the CVG
respect to CVG's actual
some
relationships to
anymore.
authors have commented that they were
on a personal basis
tors
were relatd with,and actually acting according
(38);
correlation
party in
(39),
between
power
at the
and some others definitely
(40).
30
given
to,
that
due to particular politi-
CVG approaches and the ideology
time
in
others view that certain sec-
relationship to particular parties,
conjunctures
With
political parties
only
cal
(1981-
find
of
a
the
III.-
The
analysis
THE PROCESS OF RELOCATION OF "COLINAS DE UNARE"
following pages present the story and
of a particular
to the "urban poor"
of
demolition
mented
by the
intervention of the CVG with respect
in Ciudad Guayana.
CVG.
Demolition was followed,
have
the
in
this
There was a
dition,
well-
population in the area of study, and CVG seemed to
documents call Colinas de Unare's housing units.
might,
assumptions
imple-
particular
already decided to demolish the "barracks"--as
decision
area
affected population.
account begins in April 1981.
established
located in
in Puerto Ordaz, ordered and
case, by the relocation of the
The
The study is on a case
of a squatter settlement
known as Colinas de Unare,
preliminary
and
by
itself,
tell a lot about
values guiding
it will be shown
the actions of
the
This
In
of
ad-
how such a decision was implemented,
by integrating and controlling a process of community
zation that began to
initial
the kinds
CVG.
CVG
mobili-
take place under the threat of the dislo-
cation.
All
by
CVG
the information comes either from reports
members involved
in the process,
interviews to CVG officials,
information
could
from
personal
made in February 1983.
Since no
directly be collected
31
or
written
from the
community,
many important points
in the
interpretation of facts had to be
left as hypotheses, until such a direct contact could be made.
3.1. The History of CVG interventions towards squatter
settlements
Colinas de Unare
"invasion"
and
is just one case,
squatter settlement
in
Ciudad
involved the
Guayana.
land
For
the city's growth has
reasons that we have already explained,
mainly
among many, of
immigration of thousands
of
inhabitants
from depressed, surrounding areas. The controls established by
CVG and other governmental
that
unexpected
institutions have physically shaped
demographic growth,
creating
between the two main sectors of the city
Ordaz),
by
and reinforcing even more
an
imbalance
(San Felix and Puerto
the contradictions
created
the aplication of the concept of "growth pole" within
the
economic conditions of a country like Venezuela.
The
not
including
being subjected to as much control
ceived
came
dings.
land
sector of San FMlix,
the old
as Puerto
most of the immigrants since 1960.
town,
and
Ordaz,
re-
These
immigrants
from declining oil areas or from the depressed
The growth of the sector of San Felix took the
"invasions",
institutions
squatting,
sometimes
channelled
through the creation of "reception
32
surrounform of
by
the
areas",
and
some
times
other
as
1979,
chos".
(most of them) without
settlements
percentage does not
that
of the magnitude
old
include those
undergone
have
All
improvement.
provision.
By
33.7% of San FMlix housing was "ran-
we have said,
That
any
a
squatter
significant
of these cases added
physical
together give an idea
since
of the squatting process in San FMlix
the sixties.
The
been
section of Puerto Ordaz,
strongly controlled
apparatus.
It
vernment
wanted
took place
them;
they
to build.
nal
and
hand,
that
administrative
Betancourt's
settlements
it
in areas
or
impeding
like
Los Oli-
(whose growth was dissimulated
show it.
(INAVI),
given the delays
the existence of
irregular
the
worse-off
access
of
by
There have also been inva-
in vacant apartment buildings constructed by the
Institute
where
Examples
(close to the bank of the Caroni river),
Housing
go-
the open repression against
they mostly did
Colinas de Unare
has
it is the "image" of
were protected by difficult visibility.
allocation,
ments
and
Much fewer squatter
when they appeared,
dense vegetation around),
sions
and progress
in this section, due to
Castillito
vos,
by the planning
is the "planned" city,
development
industrial
on the other
Natio-
in
(or regular)
sectors
to
their
elethe
apartments in those buildings.
The
main characteristics of land "invasions"
33
in
Ciudad
Guayana have been
a) They
are
(41):
collective:
Groups
of
families,
rather
than
this
individual
families,
carry on the invasion process;
guarantees
having
stronger bargaining
a
position
or
a
stronger physical resistance in case of facing negotiations
with the
institutions or actual repression.
b) They are very well organized:
advance the process of land
The squatting groups plan in
invasion and
redistribution, in
most cases with a strong egalitarian sense.
there exist maps that guide the invasion,
sectors lead the process.
note
below,
economic
of
take
cally
widespread
and
politicized
The squatting groups, as we will
advantage
of
conjunctures that ease
the invasion.
In many cases,
These points
particular
political-
or guarantee the
help
success
contradict the
lo-
idea that squatter settlements are neces-
sarily disorganized social settings.
c)
They are not a constant process,
but present
certain economic and political conditions are
historical moments when
"peaks", when
given.
The
invasions have become more frequent
and massive are:
--
At
the
(1960's),
labor
--
In
beginning
when
of
the
big
development
attraction
for
of
the
city
construction
took place.
the period 1974-1978,
Social-democratic
heavy
the
leader
under the presidency
Carlos
Andres
of
Perez,
investment was allocated for the construction
34
the
when
of
the "Plan
--
In
IV" of the Orinoco Siderurgical
electoral years,
government,
power,
any
because the political party
trying
avoids
to
any
guarantee
kind
of
sector of the population.
political
struggle
instruments
its
the
can
be
Land invasions
that accompanies them
The
have
in
"reception
Puerto
re-took
Ordaz,
have
its
lands later;
was
increase
Guayana
in
these
seven
movements
insufficient
the
most
They have been much stronger in
been pressured to
the oldest
dislodge
without
("the Unity") was dislodged and
relatively recently,
families occupying an area destined to industrial
FMlix
to
1983.
Barrios like Castillito,
the barrio La Unidad
the
typical
Ciudad
attempts to dislodge have been
type of intervention.
success;
in
with
According
Besides the establishment of
areas",
are
Elections will be held
December
the area of Puerto Ordaz.
in
invasions
in
and
a relative
types of responses of the CVG to
been diverse.
common
of
noticed now.
more months,
conflict
for political manipulation.
number
in the
persistence
severe
information given by CVG officials,
in
Plant.
a
group
of
uses in
San
dislodged without being given any alternative
for
followed.
In other cases, a process of
Most of
the families in these conditions have been sent to the
area of Vista Al Sol
section of
un-aided
San FMlix,
self-help
relocation
has
living.
(UD-134, UD-135, and UD-136) a peripheral
where they were to be housed either
construction or by finished housing
35
by
pro-
vided
by the National Housing
Institute
(Foundation for Housing "Caroni")
so succesful.
hensive
receiving
rent arrangement with FUNVICA
lots through a special
the land
(INAVI),
which seems to have been not
In terms of barrio consolidation as a
intervention
(that
is,
systematic,
compre-
nonincremental
improvements in services networks, communal areas, housing, on
the basis of the existing settlement),
the one proposed
and
it
for lower Colinas de Unare,
also been very recently
has
only one case, besides
barrio Guaicaipuro,
(1982):
a small settlement
has
taken place,
The case of
in San FMlix.
is a very unique experience
In summary, Colinas de Unare
in terms of the kind of consolidation and
ses to which it has been subjected,
relocation
while it
proces-
is one among the
many
barrios
of Ciudad Guayana generated through land
sion.
The
accounts gathered by means of CVG officials'
ports and
interviews,
a comprehensive one!)
build
a
"poor"
population
located
will help to have
an insight
invare-
(maybe not
into the reasons for that, as well as to
perspective on how CVG is facing conflict
in
the
with
the
Ciudad Guayana.
3.2.
The squatting process
The
area
of Colinas de
and the first demolitions
Unare
(or
South of Ciudad Guayana Airport,
36
Cerro
Roberto)
is
in the South-Eastern
area
of
Puerto
Ordaz,
Development Units #245,
It
with
the
"planned",
West-bank section
#246
and #267
UD-246,
(UD-247,
UD-
is characterized by its relatively higher situation
respect
main
to the lands surrounding
water tanks for supplying
it;
for that
Puerto
reason,
Ordaz,
and
the
sub-station serving the acueduct were located on top
electric
According to CVG,
of the Colinas.
the fact that Colinas
de
was assigned such an important service nucleus required
Unare
that the surrounding area was not given any residential
the
of
it occupies the
According to the city's plan,
Ciudad Guayana.
267).
the
then,
also
However,
Ciudad Guayana,
and
"client"
natural
was supposed to stay as a piece of vacant land
within the planned section of Ciudad Guayana
cator
Unare,
characterized by the presence of a small
on it,
forest
de
The area of Colinas
plan of Ciudad Guayana.
use by
we
have
seen how the
(42).
planning
process
of
in its underlying character of resources allo-
distributor,
ignored and left aside
group of the city,
which,
the
paradoxically,
biggest
the city
itself generated: The urban poor.
Since
became
the beginning of the 1970's,
Colinas
a sort of "natural" reception area for
rural
towns or smaller cities,
tries
(Colombia,
Ecuador...).
37
de
immigrants from
from Venezuela or other
These
families,
Unare
coun-
searching for
work opportunities that in many cases the city could not offer
through
"formal" mechanisms,
and being absolutely unable
qualify for obtaining housing from the "formal"
a growing squatter area
to
constitute
As
we have said,
ted,
center of
Puerto Ordaz,
access
the area:
de
Unare.
by vegetation that hid
the
schools and to
the
relatively near to work places,
houses,
the
in Colinas
began
Colinas de Unare was a vacant space protec-
least at the beginning,
at
supply,
to
and even though it was not
to two main service
As well as the
urbanized,
sources was fairly easy
from
immigrants served their own selves
in
terms
of housing,
pipes
and electricity lines related to the water tanks on top
they improvised connections to
the
water
of the Colinas.
The
unexpected
assumption of their "right to the city"
inhabitants
brought an imbalance to
by
the
those
planned
According to CVG officials,
system.
of
big
This situation began to create problems to the flux
due to the
water through the Puerto Ordaz acueduct,
number
of perforations made in
the
tubing;
the
contributes
to
area that protects the soil and
forest
also started
sufthe
improvement of the environment,
On the other hand,
fering
a significant deterioration.
hight
proximity of the
inhabited barracks to the
the
serelectricity lines,
the lack of adequate
tension
vices
-due to the fact that the sector was not destined
to residential use-,
and the way they provided themselves with water and electricity, constitute a big risk to
the 'invaders'... (43).
It
only
ones
seems that these functional problems were
that the officials
38
from CVG viewed
in
not
this
the
case.
The ideology of "progress" and "modernization" imbedded in the
Project arises
Guayana
in other arguments:
area
of
that have been occupying the
families
... The
of
mainly come from rural areas
de Unare (...)
Colinas
behavior
present
They
and other countries.
Venezuela
sectors,
patterns which are characteristic of marginal
inadequate habits with
with low educational levels,
respect to the use of public services, and to the social
'conuIt is common to find
(...)
coexistence
urban
cos'(subsistence cultivations)
and animal
raising
(...)
This socio-cultural problematic, which does not fit into
profile,
industrial
physonomy of a city with an
the
to
requires the application of certain measures leading
the achievement of social
added).
the
by
(Emphasis
(44)
conditions
immigrants' adaptation to the economic
The
imposed
integration...
of
kind of seggregating development
Ciudad
Guayana was seen by CVG as having negative effects both on the
functioning and on the
image of the city.
indirect
it seems that CVG began to order the demolition of
references,
barracks in Colinas de Unare;
certain
From some
the rumor of a process
of elimination of the barrio grew among the population.
3.3. The reaction of the community
According to
it
seems
that
the declarations of some officials of CVG,
people in the area were believed
respect to
have
a
"its
indif-
the solution of the problems of
basic
negative attitude against the
ference with
to
services" of Colinas de Unare
39
institution,
(45).
due to
Once the threat of dislo-
cation
elimination of the barracks began to
and
the community started organizing
communities and political organizations
the
did
community
seem
leaders
(46).
its
but
were
on
later
associa-
neighborhood
Though this shift in the attitude of the leaders
(47).
seems less likely to have happened than a shift
in the
actual
available information supports the former hypo-
the
leaders,
formal
the
considered by the law,
have been the persons that
to
other
At that moment,
around
itself
as directors of the formal
recognized
tions
not organize
associations"
"neighborhood
in a "solidarity move-
gaining the support of
against the dislocation",
ment
itself
concretize,
thesis.
Again,
around
capacity
the
resistence
the above mentioned image of
Colinas de Unare.
of
to
particular
threatening
tion
the
people
to
involved,
a
disintegra-
and marginality that the officials of CVG had about
community
this
of
defense of their community could be assumed as
the
counter-argument to
tion
of organization
Even though other
cases
the
of
dislocation had been faced by the institution,
case
it,
seems
to
have
looked
particularly
probably because of the amount of popula-
because
of the political
potential
of
the
movement, or because of the critical location of the community
within the city.
... [The invaders], facing the threat of being dislodged,
cases,
theses
aware of usual procedures in
being
and
These
own organizations (...)
to
create their
decided
40
created an explosive social situation of
circumstances
it required the application
impredictible consequences;
strategy that could
a
of
approach the
in
problem
a
in order to achieve a satisand precise way,
delicate
without
parties,
tory soTution for aTlthe involved
conflicts or violence,
creating
bring
which generally
(48)
about unnecessary and regretable actions...
(Empha-
sis added).
CVG
decided,
into the community,
strategy and go
to change its
as Pinelly states,
then,
solution.
to negotiate a
Direct
contact was established with the neighborhood associa-
tions.
Two
neighborhood
Unare:
One
was representing the oldest,
barrio;
members
of
arose
in
Colinas
de
the
lowest part of
represented the higher, most recently in-
the other,
vaded lands.
associations
other
The party-affiliation of the leaders and
the associations implied a
political
particular
influence in the two different organizations. The neighborhood
organization
sically
the
in
the oldest area of Colinas de Unare was
influenced by the Christian Democratic party
party in power),
and the more
recent,
less
(COPEI,
stabilized
section of Colinas de Unare received the influence of
groups,
ba-
leftist
and was particularly mobilized around the defense and
unity of the community.
The
differential
barrio. The
in
its
first
outcome of the discussions with CVG
treatment
to
each of the two sections
relatively flat, lower
same location;
of
a
the
area was to be consolidated
the higher area was to be
41
was
relocated.
Evidently,
mic
the second type of treatment implied higher econo-
and social costs for
the affected
more, the affected community was supposed to be
zation in Colinas de Unare.
In addition to that, this was the
population related to the leftist groups.
It seems impossible
the relative causal weights of
determine
the weakest in
since it was still in the process of stabili-
the whole area,
to
Further-
community.
those
factors,
though evidently there is correlation.
by this first decision has been found.
blished
generated
no information about conflicts
In any case,
The
institution esta-
as a first priority the relocation of the higher area
consolidation of the lower area
the
population;
take
would
place only if there were resources available after taking care
This agreement might explain the peaceful
of the higher area.
acceptance
see
of the differential
it just meant that the
it in detail,
lower-Colinas group,
if
it
that,
intervention
former
case,
if we
Though,
"COPEI"-group,
the
was not touched by the intervention, and
going to be,
was
interventions.
it would have been for
instead of
a
sort
involving high costs as
would bring about relatively "cheap"
of
in the
benefits.
CVG began, then, to analyze the conditions for the implementation of
focus.
the relocation process,
will
The first objective was to develop a diagnosis of the
situation,
tions.
the subject on which we
with
the input of the formal community
organiza-
From this point on, the accounts given by the available
CVG documents,
instead of talking about the original
42
"solida-
movement against dislocation",
rity
The
attitude
of
neighborhood
associations.
furthermore,
appears to be much more possitive
the
about
start talking
the
latter,
towards colla-
boration with the institution's plans than the above mentioned
We could establish a hypothesis: The CVG, in trying
movement.
to dissolve the threat of conflict generated by a spontaneous,
self-generated community organization, began to support alternative, less radical organizations that could ease the process
for
the
zation)
institution,
willing
and
both because of being
able to get down
(since they were part of the community,
of
having the organizational
the
(such an
possible
anyway),
organiunrest
and because
structure considered in the
law
for articulation of neighborhood demands.
In any case,
CVG established a commission to take care
of the process of relocation.
tacts
Once being set up, it made con-
with the neighborhood organization and decided to carry
on a socio-economic survey of the affected
whose
population,
objective would be to provide the information needed about the
community
in order to proceed with the relocation.
3.4. The
socio-economic
survey and the definition
of
concrete goals
The
survey
was
implemented by the
43
members
of
the
under the responsibility
neighborhood association themselves,
of two directors of the neighborhood association of the higher
of
portion
relocated,
the sector of Colinas de Unare to be
one director of the association of the lower portion
and
the sector to be
relocated,
of
and under the advice of a member
of the Division of Social and Cultural Development of the CVG,
Fifteen
which had just established an "office" near the area.
To organize the process,
the interviews.
made
Los Tanques
in three sectors:
divided
ladora
(UD-246),
on in the month of June of
1981.
the head of family,
educational level,
sex,
and La Conge-
Name,
I.D.number,
(before Colinas),
kinship relation to
conjugal status,
age,
internal distribution,
city,
the
place where worked,
in-
time of being
occupation,
(2) For each housing unit:
electricity,
The survey was carried
place of birth, nationality, last place of
region and the country,
come.
was
It contained questions about:
(1) For each member of the family:
residence
(UD-245),
the area
from the higher part of the Colinas, and Los
(UD-267), from the lower part.
Canales
rage,
association,
all of them members of the neighborhood
people,
type,
in the
building materials,
type of system of water supply,
sewe-
tenure of the housing unit, area of cons-
truction, area of lot, estimated cost of the unit.
The questionaire was designed and produced by the Division
of
of
its
Social and Cultural Development of the CVG.
results,
nothing was possible to
44
find
In terms
through
the
except for the number of occupied and
interviews and
reports,
vacant housing
units, the distribution of the
to the nationality of
according
total population
the head of the household, and
latter was parti-
The
the estimated cost of the housing unit.
cularly important, given the fact that Venezuelan Law obligues
made
the government to pay for any improvement (bienhechurla)
Those
relocated.
to a lot by any settler on it who has to be
the only data published in the two main reports by
were
the
coordinator of the project (49).
that
showed
results
The
there
houses, and 60 vacant houses (total:
76.4%
families,
877
were
inhabited
From the 877
937 units).
had Venezuelan head of household
(50).
The
mean value of the cost of the units estimated by the residents
was
Bs.
15,975
inhabitants
of the units,
was compared later to an
professional calculation of the cost.
in the month of August,
inhabited houses.
The
(52).
estimated
from
the
Devices
difference
exist
valuation
prove
is not
cost
explained
any hypothesis on why
are not available at the
formulated:
hypotheses could at least be
moment,
mean
resulting
by
pure
does
that
but
the
(a) The difference
is partly due to a bias in the selection of the
45
7,777.50
between the
by the families and the mean
to
actually
1981, over a sample of 568 of the 877
It resulted on a mean cost of Bs.
professional
the
This valuation was made
difference of approximately 100%
cost
chance.
declared by
This estimated cost,
(51).
samples;
(b)
the
difference
(e.g.,
paid
the
is due to differing ways to
imputed extra cost for
residents
the
or
evaluations,
transportation,
received--, or
other
evaluators used wholesaler costs in
their
labor-aid--which is not unusually
concepts,
evaluate the units
while the materials were got by the residents in
a way that could have made
on
it more expensive to them--data
the
costs of building and buying materials within and without
the
"formal" housing market would be necessary
make
better hypotheses);
units
housing
to
(c) the residents declared a higher
if an expropriation occured,
so
cost,
have,
to
their
the payment for
with
in Colinas would allow them to cope
increasing costs of building or renting a "rancho",
the
or getting
housing from the formal supply.
The
were
costs assumed for the continuation of the
those resulting from the
would
be the amount of money to
exchange
professional
for their housing units,
mid-1981,
section
relocation area.
CVG had already decided on one
land for the
relocation
possible
The insufficiency of
(though the
of the city appears to be quite empty)
very fragmented process,
in
either in the form of cash
destination of the dislodged population.
available
That
valuation.
be given to the residents
or of materials to build a new house in the
By
process
Puerto
Ordaz
made of it
as CVG officials recognize
(53).
a
The
CVG ordered the preparation of the UD-293 for residential-use.
46
The
UD-293 is a piece of flat land,
UD-247 and UD-267 together
the UD-246,
is,
farther
2 kilometers West--
from the "center" of the city--of Colinas de
the reasons that were given in the
Among
Unare.
for the selection of this Development Unit, are:
interviews
(a)
area
that was not already commited to any other use;
long
been
the
or
grants
(c)
"poor" population;
in Puerto
the main road
(b) had
for the reception of
immi-
it is not easily seen
for
from
and
(d)
low income residents,
as
(the "Avenida Guayana");
Ordaz
was surrounded by INAVI projects
that was neighboring the area of
opposed to Colinas de Unare,
"Jardin Levante",
it was an
by the Planning and Budget Office of
considered,
(OPPU) as a possible area
CVG
than
(area of origin of the
it is located about
dislodged population);
that
four times smaller
a residential area for medium class, mainly
occupied by CVG personnel.
The socioeconomic survey helped to establish the magniof
tude
needed a new housing unit.
of
560 parcels,
the National
families
given
they
families
The UD-293 had a maximal
capacity
relocation:
from which 45 had already been given through
Housing Institute,
areas.
ferent
877
requirements for the
the
So,
a place to live.
that they would rather
to families from dif-
in the UD-293 only 515 of the
could be relocated.
did not want to
INAVI,
362 families were still
Of those,
to
51 families decided
be relocated by CVG
in the UD-293,
receive the cost of their
47
dislodged
be
that
and
expropriated
in
materials
cash
CVG asked for the collaboration
(54).
in order to find
other neighborhood associations of the city,
vacant lots to
relocate other
in
situation
"irregular"
lots
A total of 200
(unknown owners,
lack of
in the area of
were identified
document...)
families.
of
ownership
from
FMlix;
San
them,
it was known that at least 98 would be ready for occupa-
tion
by
be relocated
families to
agree on moving to San
20
(the figures diverge
but that would be in case 98
ment to another),
FMlix.
In
families had agreed on that.
studied,
worked,
Puerto Ordaz,
liar advantages
form one
docu-
families would
fact, by December 1982, only
Residents of Colinas de
Unare
had already built a social network
not being willing to move from all
in
those fami-
(55).
July 1981,
On
CVG had,
and
213
That would reduce the deficit to
January 1983.
after having the results of the survey,
at least, two main tasks
solve the deficit of land
to achieve:
for the relocation,
To find ways to
and to,
some-
how, convince 515 families to accept the actual opportunity of
relocation
in the UD-293, without using any violent method.
48
3.4.
A
The
first training course and the assignment
lots
in the UD-293
good way to convince
of
the population about the possi-
ble advantages of relocation was to set an example of what
an
alternative to the housing solutions in Colinas de Unare could
look
like.
CVG decided to select 15 unemployed young people
of the barrio
who
(the selection criteria are not explained),
would be trained
in construction techniques through the actual
construction of 12 housing units in
the UD-293.
The
of those 15 people would have the priority for being
the finished units.
families
assigned
The process of training and construction
would last 60 days, and would include the participation of the
families
"living
(56).
of the trained youngsters,
under the motivation
in a better home than the one they had at the Colinas"
Some
instructors
skilled residents of the Colinas participated
as
under the advice of a member
of
for the course,
the INCE (National Institute for Worker's Training and
tion)
for
Educa-
(57).
The
training process took the expected time,
but
the
weather and some financial and administrative problems delayed
the finishing of the housing units. Another 12 youngsters were
introduced to the training
construction
process,
trying to accelerate the
of the first twelve units and to build an
tional group of five housing units.
49
addi-
There were also budgetary
in
achieving
this
second goal;
and
administrative problems
at
the end of the period for the second course
1981),
-
the situation was as follows
Registered participants:
01
- Finishing participants:
25
- Hours of training:
08
- Partially finished houses:
08
-
Inhabited houses:
16
-
Eliminated barracks:
16
even
(58):
776
- Finished houses:
can be seen,
it
the families moved to the
they were completely ready.
before
31,
26
- Retired participants:
As
(December
so,
One of
houses
the
twelve
first units, which is missing in the account above, was assigned to a member of the community who wanted to experiment with
pre-fabricated systems (59).
Through
exploiting
the
this kind of strategy,
value
the CVG
was
actually
of individual entrepreneurship
chieving the goal of "having a better housing unit"
according to the institution's criteria).
We will
in
a-
("better",
see
that,
while the community organizations seemed to have supported the
idea
of collective solutions,
institution
through
seems
according to CVG documents the
to have looked
for the
community
undermining its collective process--which might
implied a more politicized position against CVG--
50
action
have
by promoting
Re-taking the first statement of this
initiative.
individual
an example",
CVG was not only "setting
section,
would argue:
manner,
the community organization.
ciation
is
(60).
to be assumed as a good representative of it
1981, the Directors of the neighborhood asso-
On December 23,
ciation
asso-
if the neighborhood
expected effects on the community,
the
had
project seems to have
course
trainning
instisubtle
a
in
It was also penetrating,
tution
The
as the
presented to
residents'
the CVG officials the
of
the
in the
UD-
statement
interest in being assigned vacant lots
residents expres-
293,
in order to build their own houses. The
sed
their willingness to design and construct their own
type
of units, since they did not like very much the models made by
the
institution
families under
(61).
were to
lots
The
certain conditions.
be bought
In principle,
by
the cost of
the barracks in Colinas de Unare would be somehow paid to
relocated residents.
ce
the
units,
and the residents' valuations of
there were conflicts in the
definition of the amount to be paid.
say
at
process
details
end their acceptance was obtained
are
given on the
by
(62).
CVG
bargaining process or the
for
the community to accept, but
the
lack of bargaining
51
due
but
No
reasons
it could be hypothesized
power of the community,
of
documents
The available
that very few residents agreed with the institution,
the
the
As we can guess from the broad differen-
between the institution's
housing
the
that
to the lack
cohesive,
of stronger,
the manipulation through
with
gether
to accept the deal.
residents
lead
the
The cost of the land was
set
expeled from their original
when
barracks,
(1 1982-bolIvar=
between 60 and 100 Bolivares per square meter
1 1983-bolivar = 8 to 10 dollars) (63).
4.3 dollars;
CVG
documents
state that the lots
those people "who were interested
to reach the
order
were
in receiving
to
assigned
Should
them".
interpreted as "who could articulate their demands in
be
that
community
formal
the
or the community's fear of losing any possible
organizations,
return
to-
politically clear organizations,
convenient
relation
institution",
or "who could
with the neighborhood
establish
a
associations"...?
We have seen that only 51 families rejected being relocated by
so there were 826 families that supposedly would need
CVG,
Being aware that they would be dislodged
be relocated.
to
any-
which family would not be interested in receiving a lot?
way,
Possibly,
those
sectors of the community that still did
the dislocation or those that noticed that they
accept
not
be able to afford the costs involved in the
Not
much on this aspect can be extracted from the
not
would
relocation.
documents.
CVG established certain requirements of elegibility to provide
the
lots
through
ties
to
them,
the families that
manifested
their
interest;
the CVG attempted to avoid certain irregulari-
in the process of of lot
were:
52
allocation.
The
requirements
surveyed by the association and the
a) having been
to
b) having neighborhood relations
in June 1981;
CVG
resident,
permanent
being a
c)
beneficiaries;
other
Unare...
in Colinas de
his/her family,
with
together
(64).
costs
The
fact,
in
in
by themselves,
constituted,
and
involved
the
of
process
relocation
another constraint to
overcome,
the
worse-off
they restricted
the ability of
families.
Each beneficiary was given a written certificate of the
of the lot,
receipt
and was
required to
the design of the house to be built, in order to be
terms of the standards and rules to
was
follow.
of
present a draft
A
revised
in
formal contract
signed by the CVG and the National Institute for Worker's
and Education,
Trainning
provide
train
interested in
INCE,
in February 1982,
in order
to
ing in construction to the residents that
were
implications of the
con-
it.
The contents and
tract will be presented later on.
3.6. Different alternatives provided to the families to
be relocated in the UD-293
The
neighborhood associations,
as we have said,
interested in a solution as "uniform" (unless it were
equity)
as possible for all
against
the members of the community.
53
were
In
the alternative pro-
the beginning of the bargaining process,
to
the people to be
worth
of
their housing unit
cons-
UD-293.
Some
in the
thinking that this alternative would have adminis-
residents,
difficulties that would delay the process,
trative
receive the worth of their barracks in cash,
lot assigned to them in the UD-293.
in other
or,
the
to
better-off
the
a
mean
families
initiative,
members of the community.
However,
other alternatives already began to function
location
of
the
families that
construction training
ciations
to
participated
course by CVG...),
since
for
solution
differential timing in the
The
community.
the
in
association rejected this
neighborhood
different
This second alternative,
to the available documents, seemed to be attractive
according
would
preferred
to subtract that amount of money from the cost of
words,
only
the
them
in Colinas in the form of
truction materials for their new houses
to
give
relocated was to
posed
it
the
the fact that
the
(e.g.,
in
the
refirst
persuaded the asso-
allow for the other alternatives to be
implemen-
ted.
The
(65),
resulting
alternatives are summarized by
Vasquez
as follows:
Alternative 1: The cost of the barrack is subtracted from the
the
and
UD-293,
in the
for the lot
to be paid
cost
families.
164
means:
own
his/her
by
builds
beneficiary
Alternative 2: The cost of the barrack is paid in the form of
construction materials; the beneficiary builds by him/herself
54
and adds the rest of the materials needed:
the
INAVI offers a "popular credit" through
construction
or
unit
housing
State-built
3:
Alternative
delivery of ~a
materials:
103 families.
118 families.
in
participate
family
members of the
The
4:
Alternative
resultthe
given
then
being
INCE,
the
by
courses implemented
ing housing units to those participants: 88 families.
The cost of the barrack is paid to the residAlternative 5:
families.
40
cash:
in
ent
eventhough the family is supposed
In any of the cases,
the possibility to build
to receive or have
think of while living
they did not have to
that
Besides that,
take
in Colinas de Unare;
if it
to the owners
the one
about
unclear point is
Another
were being provided with as property.
said in the available documents.
sources
cular
convenient
to the relocated families to pay the land lot they
conditions
for
difficult
of
State
additional
also
resi-
It is expectable that CVG would provide
finance.
it is
(under the condition that they were
course).
of
dents,
is
if not,
clear whether the locals for the "bodegas" would be
paid
at
unit,
housing
in the valuation;
it would be included
least
not
within the structure of the
included
in the Colinas.
the solution given by CVG did not seem to
care of the petty-commerce existing
was
cost
a
the family has to afford
than they had before,
unit
a better housing
a
family with scarce
to
income
program
costs
to
is
be
granted
Nothing on that respect
Anyway,
resources
or
unstable
parti-
a loan--unless a
specially created for
rebuild the house and move
significant economic problem for the families.
55
since it is so
that
end--the
would
be
a
3.7. The elimination of barracks
By March 1982, seventy "barracks" had been dismantled,
residents were relocated to
twenty of them because their
only
rest were dismantled for reasons different from
The
program.
Thirty six units were moved
the "regular" relocation process:
to
by
the UD-293 during an emergency situation caused
1981.
rain in July,
already lived
were
else
Six units
another unit in Colinas de Unare.
it was proved that their owners lived
in the city.
also
was
One additional unit
CVG
because it was built after the survey made by
eliminated
and
in
heavy
Two were eliminated because their owners
eliminated because
somewhere
the
through the regular procedures considered in
the UD-293,
the neighborhood association;
same
two more were in the
situation, but it is clearly stated in the documents that they
were
Another three
built by "non-Venezuelans".
when
eliminated
that
Venezuelans
twenty four barracks in "irregular"
that
at
renting.
that
called
least eight,
country".
one third of them,
market plays an important role
"marginal" communities.
From
these
were dedicated
(66).
56
to
it is known
within
CVG did not provide
of solutions to those families, according to
vised
"non-
situation, one could think
Though there is not data on this issue,
rental
to
CVG discovered that they belonged
had left for their
were
units
the
so-
any kind
the documents re-
In the second
place, the
importance given by CVG to the
nationality of the members of the family must be
it
though
even
differential
seems that no
highlighted,
are
treatments
the "non-Venezuelans".
applied to
In the third place, it is interesting that, besides the
restrictions to the elegibility for relocation at the UD-
few
the
section 3.5) this is
quote on page 53,
(see
293,
only
of the process where the criteria for selection of
stage
"affected" or "benefited" families is clearly expressed.
written
of
lack
policy
throughout the accounts and documents revised
arbitrary
of
decisions,
and
affected
of
consti-
particular
by
the possible lack of
circumstances and interests,
ness
The
It might mean both the possibi-
tutes a very critical point.
lity
subjects
criteria for the selection of
the
objectives of CVG,
conscious-
in relation to non-creation
of
inequality or unfair results through the process, and the lack
of
a concrete ground for the discussion with
on the other hand,
the
having written criteria does
(Of
course,
not
guarantee at all that the process will not be
or
that
the community will have the chance to
criteria).
57
community.
arbitrary,
discuss
such
The
3.8.
Institutional Frame
The participation of the CVG:
The Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana,
ponsibility
over
assumed
Guayana,
(in other
involved
the task of coordinating the relocation
sources,
in the process
mentation procedures.
Many of
were
which meant a
in one way or another,
imple-
decision making and
As we mentioned at some points during
administrative and financial problems, generally
caused by delays in the process,
of certain steps,
affected the implementation
while creating confusion and distrust among
the affected population.
According
to the documents recently
published by members of CVG involved in the process,
of
problems
institutional coordination have appeared also in the
months
of
"divi-
its
called "management offices")
certain level of complexity in the
the account,
Ciudad
the process of urban development of
the community of upper-Colinas de Unare.
sions"
res-
given its
last
(67).
The divisions involved in the program were:
1.-
Division of Engineering and Construction
the
293,
the
(DIC):
Provided
economic resources for physically developing the
for paying for the houses to be demolished,
implementation of the demolition itself.
58
UD-
and for
2.-
of Finance and Control
Division
port and control
3.-
"physical"
the
Provided
the sup-
issues.
in administrative
(DPU): Together with DIC, plan-
Division of Urban Planning
ned
(DFC):
aspects in
(i.e.,
UD-293
the
lot
distribution, services and infrastructure).
4.-
of
Division
responsibility
its
Has under
Real Estate:
the administration of the land and infrastructure owned by
the
thus,
in Ciudad Guayana;
CVG
the
selling
lots at the UD-293
land
charge
it was in
relocated
the
to
of
families.
5.-
Social
of Cultural and
Division
(DDSC):
Development
the responsibility over all the "social
assumed
such as land lots' allocation,
of the project,
construction
processes,
community
of the population.
training
aspects"
self-help
organization
According to
the
It
and
documents
revised, an inter-divisions committee was created in March
3,
1982,
including representatives for all
mentioned divisions,
Unare and the UD-293 were
Since
sented
and being coordinated by the "chief"
project "South Airport", within whose limits Coli-
of the
nas de
of the above
(68).
in all the available documents the DDSC is
as having a leading role in the program,
the rest
the divisions acting as "providers" of the support needed
the
implementation,
it would be interesting
on the DDSC goals and functions.
59
preof
for
to add some data
former Division of Human Development, has as
The DDSC,
its primary goal
the promotion of social and cultural development of
through
region,
the inhabitants and communities of the
the
to
of a general and broader access
provision
the
order
in
information,
and
benefits of education, culture
to strengthen human solidarity, to improve social, culand political conditions of marginality, and to
tural
In achieestablish the base for a fairer social order.
people
the
incentivated
has
DDSC
the
those goals,
ving
to actively participate in the decision-making processes
related to community issues, according to the guidelines
(Emphasis
(69).
established in the VI National Plan...
added).
We could describe the DDSC organizational structure
Vertically (hierarchically), it is divided into two
follows.
units:
The Management Unit
administrative
into
(Unidad de Gerencia),
and planning issues,
defined by the Management
Unit
and the Assistance
Each unit
Unit.
is
divided
The Management Unit has two sub-units: Admi-
sub-units.
nistration
dealing with
with the implementation of the prog-
dealing
(Sub-gerencia),
rams
as
and Planning.
sub-
The Assistance Unit has five
units in charge of implementation of programs developed at the
Planning Sub-unit of the Management Unit
ment,
Communication
Promotion,
Sports
and Cultural
and
(Educational Develop-
Recreation,
and
Urban
Social
Development,
Documentation
and
Libraries).
The Social
responsible
organizations
for
Urban
Promotion Sub-unit,
the "promotion and creation
in the marginal communities,
60
in
particular,
of
with
is
grass-roots
the
active
body,
implementation
de
CVG
(Divisi6n
Sub-unit
Planning
the
and
This sub-unit, as the
(70).
the inhabitants"
participation of
areas
of
in the two programs considered
in
Formulaci6n y Control de Proyectos) are the two
closely involved
more
and
paper,
this
is
in
closer
all of CVG's offices are
in
Ciudad
include the personnel which
relation to the community organizations.
Guayana,
conflicts
of
first
almost
that
Now
we
could find within this
in
Each of the divisions,
divisions.
between
conflict
The
reality.
of
the approach and perception
them is the potential
of
institution two kinds
view
as their names suggest,
reality
from different professional backgrounds, and thus, are "defen-
and
action,
example,
ment,
it would not be strange to find
between the Division of Social
conflicts,
for
and Cultural Develop-
that has to directly face the communities' demands, and
the Division of Real Estate,
that has
to optimize the economic
of the land and the infrastructure according to the ideal
use
of
of
the interests of the institution in different areas
ding"
"new
industrial
city" under which
institution
the
was
created.
The second kind of potential
the
those
levels of decision-making,
different
officials
decisions" and
conflict
who are "in the
office",
is the one among
that
making
and those who are
the planning,
61
between
is,
in
the
the
"big
field,
and
day,
every
the
to be facing
have
who
immediate
decisions
operational
is what we
In brief, this type of potential conflict
former.
in the previous chapter "the
called
the
who depend upon the "big decisions" of
reproduction of
old
the
'Caracas-site' dichotomy".
(that
When such conflicts acquired a critical character
solution
was
"technical"
to
involved
implementation
representative of the
Other
Two
of
process
The
Unare:
National
was
for
device
"rational",
supposedly politically neutral),
prise,
As
substitute a more
other
"objective",
enter-
private
for the possibly too-
institution.
institutions:
implementation of the relocation
National
Institute of Housing
of
Colinas
(INAVI),
conditions,
the role of the
giving easy
de
the
and
Institute for Workers Training and Education
build certain number of houses,
the
in
institutions are directly involved
we have said in previous sections,
to
(as a
the
Colinas),
is what we might think happened in the case of
(INCE).
INAVI
payment
and to give "popular credits" for the payment
of
construction materials by the relocated families.
INCE,
as we have also briefly commented, advised CVG in
62
the
implementation of the first training course at the UD-293,
itself to
commiting
signed a contract with CVG,
later,
and,
provide training to a bigger group of the relocated families.
1982.
The contract INCE-CVG was signed in February 24,
coordinate
INCE took the responsibility to plan,
Through it,
implement the training courses for the future inhabitants
and
would
be
three types of courses:
storing
transporting,
care of buying,
necessary materials.
floors",
"cement
and on "plaster application".
"brick walls",
actual
On
and
There
houses.
of the UD-293 who wanted to self-build their
on
INCE would take
distributing the
On the other hand, CVG would pay for the
cost of the course,
would decide the lots that would
be subject to self-help construction,
would provide for vigi-
lance and the needed emergency costs,
and would pay a subsidy
of
cour-
30 Bolivares/day to each of the participants in the
ses, who would also be selected by the CVG, after a process of
promotion
of
the program.
touch
The contract did not
the
point of the criteria for the selection of the participants.
As
we can see,
participants
to
build
this program worked as a way
their own houses,
way
as a
construction skills, and also as a temporary source of
However,
(a)
the lack of explicit criteria for
of the beneficiaries of the program could,
control
over irregularities
for
the
to
get
income.
the selection
again,
mean
less
in the distribution of such bene-
63
beyond the possibility of constructing their
(b)
fits;
house--which,
of course,
is an
important achievement--, there
is not any predictible way in which such skills can be
tably applied, except in the
The
informal
agency,
Municipal Council and its special housing
Caron!),
are
they are supposed
conspicuously absent in the whole process;
to
profi-
sector.
(Fundacion de la Vivienda del Distrito
FUNVICA
own
issues, and, especially, to have a
have competence on these
direct relation with the functioning of the neighborhood associations.
This
absence reinforces
the idea
creasing its emphasis upon urban issues,
ful
that CVG
is
in-
while, as its power-
and "paternalistic" role has always
implied,
excluding
other important actors (potentially conflictive ones) from the
management of
the problems of the city.
The neighborhood associations:
The Law of Municipal Regime of
Venezuela,
promulgated
in 1978, considered one form of community organization through
which
different neighborhoods can formally discuss their pro-
blems and articulate their demands to the
organizations,
de vecinos),
the
came to
Those
"neighborhood associations" (asociaciones
institutionalize the role fulfilled
fore by the asociaciones,
and
government.
in the middle class
be-
"urbanizaciones"
the comitss de barrios in low income and squatter-settle-
64
communities.
ments'
of
Their creation
also
as well as
government guidelines to the grass-roots,
control over the latter,
the end,
in
are,
access
the
eases
its
associations
since the neighborhood
organizations conceived by the government
and acting within the frame of government institutions.
could
vernment
fit into what Castells
mobilization",
popular
the
of organization model promoted by
kind
This
(71)
go-
"controlled
calls
commented
whose implications will be
later.
this
In
we
documents,
community
have noted the sudden transformation
organizations
conflict with the State,
it
with
Two
latter.
(a)
The
vailing
in
in
the
of
the
as described
particular case-study,
a form that evidenced an
from
to one
collaborated
that apparently
by
the achievement of goals mainly defined
interconnected
factors might have caused
strategy followed by the State,
party-affiliation
in the two
and
open
the
(b)
neighborhood
the
that:
pre-
associa-
tions.
With respect to the first
totally
dislodge
issue,
the
former attempt to
the population generated an
open
conflict
between CVG and the community, which could overcome the divergence
among member's particular
65
interests,
and
generate
a
strong movement.
gy,
approaching the population,
of
members
of
in
party
the community clearly tied to the
Colinas de Unare community,
being the more physically-stable,
to the party in government,
untouched
in the site.
contrary,
was
lower-
the
coincidence in that
saw that there existed a
tied
(party-affiliation),
respect to the second issue
With
was
and very probably making use
to achieve a collaborative attitude.
power,
we
its strate-
Following this, the CVG changed
How much the decision of dislocation was
much
and how
related
to
purely technical factors,
related
to
the political ties of the two communities,
issue.
higher
risk
the
on
The upper-Colinas de Unare,
related to leftist groups and was the one sub-
ject to dislocation.
first
left
one
and was the
Whether the physical
to dislocation,
instability,
it
is
a
thus,
and
more
made it easy for
was
radical
is a
groups to establish roots in the upper-Colinas de Unare,
with respect to this,a CVG
However,
second
issue.
stated
that
Popular
Formation" (CFP),
CVG had contracted a group
constituted by
official
called "Center
community
for
leaders
advised by an autonomous institution with progressive orientation called "Centro al Servicio de la Acci6n Popular"
and
that
this group was in charge of creating the
community
organization
possibly
noticing
out
of hand,
in upper-Colinas
de
Unare.
(CESAP),
base
Later,
that this kind of organization could
CVG stopped the process by ending
66
its
for
get
contract
with
the CFP.
supposed
This last element shows a a case
process of "controlled popular
in
which
mobilization"
a
can--
against
government will-- be generating an autonomous mobili-
zation;
this can be due to government's inability to fulfill
by itself
that,
the organization process, having
to rely on groups
unexpectedly, might have different aims (like the CFP).
Mobilization through the COPEI-affiliates,
on the other hand,
seems to have been more fruitful to the CVG.
3.9.
Some opinions of CVG officials about the development of the program of Colinas de Unare
Besides the way the institution approached the
and
bers
implemented "the
solution",
about achievements,
problem
the opinions of the CVG mem-
failures,
and perspectives of
the
program of Colinas de Unare might help to identify the values,
criteria and assumptions that underlie CVG's approach
the
low income communities in Ciudad Guayana.
towards
In the follo-
wing paragraphs, the "good" aspects, "bad" aspects, and recommendations
of some CVG officials related to the
program
are
of
the
summarized.
"Positive" aspects of the program:
CVG
officials
place the most
67
important value
to
initial conflict was channeled and turned
political
loped
its ability
through community participation.
integration
the
program on
Unare
de
Colinas
"success"
social
that
The fact
the
of
into a sort
deve-
the process was
for the CVG--since
need of violence--is
no
with
create
major
achievement
highlighted by CVG officials.
Values
such as private property as a base
social
to acquire the right
security, and "hard" work as the means
live
for
to
in the city, charged with a sense of conventional morali-
ty, were supported as motivations for
the participation of the
community.
The
considered
person
that
in
charge of the CVG office at the
UD-293
of
upper-
the relocation of the
community
Colinas
... Constituted,
for
those
families,
one of the
most
security,
social
events in relation to
transcendental
social
with
provided
lots,
land
own
since having their
effort
own
their
by
build
to
them
stimulates
services,
that
feel
and only then they could
a hygienic house,
(72).
their long period of instability has finished...
initially was a problem became an interesting
...What
experience of urban upgrading [?] through a participatory process of community self-management... (73).
... [This process prooves that] applying with good
sense
(e.g.,
concept of Community Development
political
the
social
a
constitute
convergence of the needs that
the
problematic and the genuine attempt of the State to tend
and
solutions to real
adequate
popular~mands),
te
(74).
reached...
be
could
needs
felt
(Emphasis added).
68
as
"negative" aspects of the program,
The
viewed
by the CVG:
of
One
the critiques of the program was that it
was
continuous process.
The
never a consistent,
well-organized,
in one of its
chief of the local office of CVG at the UD-293,
the
program;
fluent
emergency- character
stresses this incremental,
reports,
indirectly,
communication
he attributes it to the lack of
and
between levels at the CVG,
sudden change of policy of the CVG with respect to
which
also
generated unexpected demands to
the
to
of
a
the
the barrio,
institution.
He
indicated that this character makes it very difficult to
carry on a
full,
of
comprehensive
evaluation
critique is
related to the
achievements
(75).
The
second
Pinelly talks about
inefficiency in running the program.
administrative
quick
rigidity
administrative
that hinders the
solutions in case of emergency;
implementation
(b) lack of
(a)
of
"clever"
and on-time decision-making at the adequate levels in the CVG,
which had required that many decisions were finally taken
"in
the field", creating confusion and lack of coordination in the
decision-making
participation
tween
process;
of INAVI,
(c)
the unexpected
and
informal
which ignored all the agreements be-
the community and the CVG;
(d) the bureaucratism
and
"emotional-bias" of administrative processes at CVG which also
damaged the decision-making process;
69
and
(e) the
irregular
Pinelly,
person
the
In sum,
inter-divisional committee of CVG.
functioning of the
field,
in charge of the program in the
complains about the absolute divorce from, and lack of support
demands.
of
institution, to his actions and
"higher" levels of the
of the
problems
His complaints are mostly oriented towards
a reproduction
efficiency of the system above him (again,
was
of the feeling of "painful inaccessibility to power" that
in the case of the dichotomy Caracas-site).
mentioned
we
also
could
information--official
decision.
other
hide
complaints
of
the approach and assumptions of higher levels
to
related
reports--might
of
sources
the
consider that the nature of
However,
Pinelly
families
also notes that the lower-income
living at Colinas de Unare
in August
were
still
they
were being heavily affected by the changes in
1982,
and
the
area
caused by the relocation of their neighbors.
Pinelly sugges-
ted quick solutions that would be difficult to
implement,
to the financial
The
due
inability of these families.
director of the DDSC,
on the other
talked
hand,
very generally about "political factors involved in the
pro-
gram" as causes of problems.
What
was
never questioned
in the documents or
inter-
views was the base of the concept of participation utilized by
the
institution:
As
long as
it
implied
a
smooth
flow
of
information on community demands and a certain level of commu-
70
nity mobilization around specific goals,
it was considered an
ideal one.
Recommendations:
main recommendations made by the CVG officials for
The
the future actions of the
institution with respect to
Colinas
de Unare are summarized as follows:
and
reinforce the team dealing with technical
... [To]
in order to strengthen the activities of
social issues,
to
stimuand
training and socio-cultural promotion,
the
to
adapted
are
new coexistence habits which
late
requirements of the planned city..." (76).
1.-
Again, adjustment of the people to the planning process
is the goal.
as
In addition to that, "dis-adjustment" is viewed
an educational issue rather than an issue relative to
segregating,
exclussive
ment of Ciudad Guayana
2.-
To
avoid,
by
the
character of the industrial develop-
(and the country).
means of physical elimination
and
pre-
vention, the settlement of new families in the vacant barracks
or
lots whose former occupants have been relocated
3.-
The local official of CVG at the UD-293 showed
preoccupation
in
1982,
(77).
about the contracting of a private
his
enterprise,
to manage the technical and social problems that he
had been managing until that moment.
71
He recommended to higher
allow him to advise the private
levels of decision at CVG, to
enterprise,
idea
at
least until
its members could get a
It
is
responsibility
on
of the history and implications of the program.
curious
how CVG attempted to delegate
its
complete
the program to a private entity, generally viewed in Venezuela
as
more
"objective" and efficient than a
institution as CVG.
72
government-related
THE PROGRAM OF TRAINING IN ARTISAN PRODUCTION
IV.-
OF THE
In
"DEMOSTRADORAS DEL HOGAR"
contrast to the program of
relocation of Colinas de
Unare, which was a quick intervention upon what CVG considered
as an emergency situation,
del
Hogar"
term goals;
Social
and
Development)
its goals,
will
the program of the
(DH) has been a continuous
"Demostradoras
intervention with long-
it has been part of the actions of the Division of
Cultural
Development
(former
Division
almost since CVG was founded.
methodologies,
that
move
Human
The analysis
of
achievements and changes over time
also help us build an image of the values,
motivations
of
the CVG in
dealing
criteria and
with
the
low
income population of Ciudad Guayana.
The
information mainly
the "Demostradoras" themselves,
tion
of the paper,
comes
from
interviews
in February, 1983.
like the one on Colinas de
only based on institutional data and opinions,
tend to be a comprehensive one.
only
hypothetical,
with
This sec-
Unare,
being
does not
pre-
Certain "conclusions" will be
their proof depending on further research
about people's perceptions of the program.
73
General definition of the program
4.1.
Through
income
of
the
program of the DH,
the
of
residents
low
communities in Ciudad Guayana are approached by a team
Social Workers
("Demostradoras del Hogar"),
who
help
in
organizing such communities around the search for the solution
certain community problems (which are the ones defined
to
CVG,
or around the
sometimes after community request),
mentation of certain educational
by
imple-
and health programs of CVG.
The program has, currently, four areas:
a) Health, through which the participants from the communities
receive
about current health
information
being
programs
diffused in the region or the country;
b)
"Comunidad
through
school
to
Educativa"
which
(Educational Community),
the community of the
barrio
a program
receives
the
building to be managed, mantained and used according
the community's criteria and needs
the same
(guaranteeing,
time, lower costs for the CVG);
c) "Asociaci6n
de Vecinos"
(Neighborhood
Associations) ,
through which the neighbors from a certain
program
at
the
barrio
receive all the information and training needed in order to
establish the kind of neighborhood organizations that allow
them,
through
different
tensively
the
law,
to articulate their
levels of government
demands
(we talked about
them
to
ex-
in relation to the program of Colinas de Unare);
74
and
d) Artisan Production and Handcr
of
above,
the
which is,
that
the program of the DH
out of all
and
directly
explicitly
attempts to affect the economic patterns of the
families.
This program that trains
in the barrios,
housewives,
of goods,
kinds
tain
women,
predominantly
enabling them to produce cerin
the
how
CVG
is the one to be considered
present paper.
4.2.
Objectives
We have seen,
at
officials
in the case of Colinas de Unare,
different levels could hold conflicting
views,
and closeness to the
actual
due to their different roles in,
implementation
the
during
of
the programs.
Since it was not
visit to Ciudad Guayana to find
which
documents
explained the goals of the program in a "formal" way,
to find out about that matter through the
necessary
possible
it
was
personal
interviews.
For
Social
the Director
and Cultural Development of CVG,
of the Division
a person who is
of
re-
to the definition of the general goals of the Division,
lated
and
the Assistant to
thus,
program
who could have a clear
within
the
idea of the role
general process of social
75
and
of
this
economic
of
of the city--as viewed by CVG--the objective
development
this program was
... to
generate additional income for the poor families
in Ciudad Guayana, in a direct way (by the production of
goods
that could be sold),
and
in an indirect way
(by
consumption
and
family organization that would imply economies for
(78).
family)...
the
helping
When
building new patterns
in
asked
of
program
actually dealing with the daily implementation of the
that the main goal of
answered
the community",
of
zation
team
the
about the goals of the program,
it was related to the "organi-
and that
it was a "point of
for other programs into the community"
(79).
entry
important
It is
either because of different kinds of professio-
to note that,
nal formation, or because of the different perspectives on the
program, acquired through a different kind of participation in
it,
these
two
different
interviewees
expressed
They show that, at the "planning" level,
goals.
benefits
are
stressed and publicized,
being
different
the economic
while
the
"implementation" level the primary goal would be
of an organizational base to introduce other programs.
goals
are not necessarily opposed or mutually
fact,
both
However,
at
the
creation
These
exclusive;
in
a
program.
if the "Demostradoras" do not consider the
economic
could
be
valid objectives for such
goal as an important one, due to their particular professional
reasons,
it means that possibly it is
formation,
or to other
not
pushed for or achieved.
being
conflict--one more--between
That does
constitute
a
what is planned in the offices of
76
and what is happening in the city.
CVG
With respect to
the
expressed goals themselves, we could say that
"Generating
a)
income for
additional
not only training,
require
would
families"
the
ne-
the
but the creation of
cessary production and marketing structure that enabled the
participants to actually generate some surplus;
b)
institution seemed to be,
The
organization
trying to
again,
patterns",
modify
supposedly
"consumption
and
accordance to
implicit values and concepts of what a
Statements
cal Ciudad Guayana's family should be.
were observed in the documents about
this
to
in
typi-
simmilar
Colinas
de
Unare;
c) Also
as
in
the
previous
case-study,
building the base
for a community organization that complements the action of
the
the
institution at the grass-roots,
CVG.
This
supports the model
reinforces
is a central goal
the idea that the
of
institution
of "controlled popular mobilization" as
a way to deal with low income communities and to
implement
programs at that level.
4.3. Outreach method
The
first
outreach method has changed since the program
implemented.
While
at the beginning
was
the social workers
-- then called "promotoras", promoters--entered the communities
77
through their already established organizations, the neighborhood
associations,
for example,
the method now is to
reach
the potential participants through direct diffusion, "house by
shift from the "collective" approach to the "indi-
house". The
When
study.
vidual" approach is interesting for the present
compared to the Colinas, it reflects the fact that CVG "utilithe mass organizations does not follow a
of
zation"
It seems to depend highly on the particular level of
pattern:
politicization,
in
party-affiliation and type of problem present
Even though
community.
each
community
and
general
it is
that
known
certain
organizations keep collaborating with the difussion
implementation of the program,
one of
the
interviewees
about the existence of certain "political" problems in
talked
the implementation of the program:
A neighborhood association
has been in conflict with the promoters of the program (in the
UD-123).
Another
curious
point
of
the
the
same barrios since
infrastructure
justify
not leaving
scarcity
other barrios.
criteria
it was first
possible reasons is that the program
certain
resource
general
for
and demand in
them;
impedes
diffussion
The program has been applied to
campaign has been carried on.
roughly
is that no
those
on the other
has
created
barrios,
hand,
the expansion of the
the
the selection of the barrios to be
a
which
evident
program
This could also explain the lack of
78
One
implemented.
to
explicit
subject
to
this
determine
"reality"
both
an inertial and
a
by
imposed
the constraints
some sense,
In
program.
non-systematic
functioning of the program.
Demostradoras
del Hogar present
to the women of the barrio
list of all the available courses;
in
of
a mass organization,
in the school of the barrio, or
the house of one of the participants.
4.4.
Incidence upon social and economic organizations
Since the end of
in
sche-
and the
the courses are usually given either at the headquar-
dules;
ters
a
the participants decide on
type of course they would like to attend,
the
the
program,
In the "house by house" promotion of the
three
1982, the program has been implemented
manners,
different
to three
kinds
different
of
groups:
- Group
A: This
group
those
time;
ras
who
is
formed by the "new"
are taking the courses
participants,
for
the
first
they can be guided either by the Demostrado-
themselves or by the
agents"
(MA),
so-called
"multiplying
who are those participants of
vious
courses that have acquired certain
and
are
willing
79
to
dictate
pre-
skills,
courses
to
their neighbors.
-
Group B:
This type of group is
formed by the MA themselves;
they receive special preparation that enables them
to give courses to other beginning groups.
-
Group
C:
by
Formed
schools
cases,
rectly,
their
where
In
some
di-
through the "house by house" method,
the
contact
given
in
and prepare courses
buildings
the schools
mothers of the children
From the above paragraphs,
organizations,
the school
the "educational communities",
be
study.
children
the
instead of reaching the beneficiaries
Demostradoras
to
through
reached
that are
women
in those
to
the
schools.
we have seen that the
pro-
gram has begun to change its own structure by incorporating in
its team
(under different conditions than those
Demostradoras,
able
however)
enjoyed by the
those outstanding and economicallypromoting
participants who manifested their interest in
and implementing the courses.
generate
certain
transcend
the
consistent
Since
attempt
to
would
be
organization
the goals expressed by
with
February 1982,
men's Committees);
These
of
to
that
scope of the training courses
under CVG advise,
barrio.
forms
The program has also begun
the MA started
the
(this
Demostradoras).
organizing
themselves,
into the so-called "Comitss Femeninos"
they are composed of eight
to ten women by
"women's committees" organize courses
80
(Wo-
for
the
MA,
promote the program among the community, establish inter-
relations
with other committees from other barrios,
port other kinds of organizations,
as
well
(e.g.,
committees).
the educational
We
can see,
and sup-
generally promoted by CVG,
committees
then,
and
the
how the training
health
programs
become a device for organizing the community "from above".
In terms of the economic organization generated by this
program,
it was only in mid-1982 that an initiative was taken
to
some
give
developed
formal structure to
production
by the participants in the courses.
individual participants,
only
the
processes
Before
that,
supported by their own "entre-
preneurial" skills and their relatively better economic situation within the community, could start production enterprises.
In
mid-1982,
attempt was made to create what
an
"pre-units" of production:
do
it
help
being
production
that
given to those pre-units
groups,
place
unit,
with
pockets.
since no
yet)
and began to produce these kindsof
goods
courses.
The
materials and resources available
Each one of these groups
women;
there
economic
small
in the house of one of the members of
the
to
joined
they learnt to produce in the
takes
five
Those women that could afford
(and that was actually a condition,
is
called
is
production
the
in
pre-
their
is formed by an average of
are already eight groups of this sort
Ciudad Guayana.
81
in
In
are
addition to the fact that the production
not
lack
given
any economic support by CVG,
there
of preparation in terms of marketing and
of the production.
The first element
pre-units
is also
a
administration
implies that only those
women whose families' economic situation is relatively betteroff
be able to participate
would
and,
the family,
also,
that
bargaining
the
market,
as
receive
from
though,
of
pro-
of
are absorbing the labor of the women
are participating in them.
who
pre-units
investment taken from the consumption resources
of
amount
the
these production activities require a certain
since
duction,
in
this process,
recently,
"economic appeal"
the
quite
are
efforts
have
implies
in
the
participants
can
small.
Thus,
been made to
even
give
an
to the program through the creation of these
could conclude that the program is not
we
pre-units,
power of such production units
as the surplus that
well
element
The second
really
providing the necessary channels for the participants to genea significant income for their families.
rate
This fact
is
opposed to the goal expressed by the Assistant to the Director
of
From what we have said until
DDSC of CVG.
the
that
the program of
the
now,
Demostradoras
we
could
conclude
Hogar,
while attempting to affect the patterns of organization
of the community in order to adapt them to the fulfillment
the
goals
that
participants
situation
the
with
(or
it
institution has,
instruments to
is
providing
82
is not
reinforce
those
providing
their
instruments
del
of
the
economic
in
a
differential and selective way, meaning that the program could
be reinforcing economic differentiations in the barrios).
4.5. Subjects
The
goods
that the participants of these courses
taught to produce are:
dolls,
christmas ornaments,
shoes,
ceramics,
tas",
cards, "guajiro"-style tapestry,
flower ornaments, Venezuelan dishes, "pina-
total number of participants for 1980
and San Felix.
In
1057,
1982, the figures grew to 69 courses given
total of 1458 persons.
approximately
was
given in barrios of Puerto Ordaz
distributed into 51 courses,
a
design on material,
decorated cushions.
The
to
cakes,
Clothes,
are
In 1982,
2300 persons and 93 groups.
the
were:
figures
During this
last
year, there was a significant increase in the number of participants--even though,
pants
per
course decreased;
introduction of the MA,
of
courses.
involving
to
knitting
this fact might be due
approximately 40 women.
on cloth
(one),
to
the
which made possible the proliferation
The number of production pre-units
the production of:
design
as it can be seen, the rate of partici-
Cakes
(two
83
eight,
The groups were dedicated
pre-units),
"pifiatas"(one) ,
(one).
was
dolls
ceramics
(one),
(two),
and
The Director of the DDSC of CVG declared that he considered
the
that the courses were not collaborating on the change of
"inadequate
emphasis
food habits" of the families,
in the cooking courses was
put
since the main
on foods
rich
in
carbo-hidrates, a typical problem in Venezuelan diet, and also
since
the majority of the other products were not basic
ones
(80).
On
ones
the other hand,
these courses seem to be the
which the inhabitants of the barrios demand the most, possibly
because of
it
can
lack of knowledge about alternatives.
In any case,
be observed that most of the goods produced
are
not
income-inelastic or basic ones, so its marketing possibilities
within
the barrios are dubious.
posed
to be advantageously produced at such an
however,
of
Only some of them are
the
small
supscale;
the lack of adequate connections for the acquisition
raw materials at lower prices makes it difficult
these potential producers to offer goods at attractive
Their only advantage,
of being "unique",
that is,
for
costs.
the particular characteristic
hand-made, is affected by the stereo-typed
methods that the participants are taught.
4.6. Personnel
The
tion
Rey),
group implementing the program of artisan
of the DH,
is formed by one coordinator
a Social Worker,
and four
84
(Ms.
producElina
de
"Demostradoras". The prepara-
tion of the latter consist on a special training at the
of high-school
this
in one of the
type of professional
significantly
two vocational schools that train
in Venezuela,
far from Ciudad Guayana.
and that are located
In addition to
team, we have noted already the presence of
approximately
The
five by each Demostradora,
Demostradoras,
as
level
this
the MA, which were
by
it has seen already
February
said,
1983.
are
not
subjected to any kind of training on marketing and administration.
CVG made an experimental attempt, contracting a private
institution
Acci6n
from
Popular),
Caracas
Centro al
Servicio
de
la
in order to train them on organizational and
administrative matters.
besides
(CESAP,
However,
the contract was terminated;
the recent creation of the pre-units for
production,
no further advance has been experienced on that line.
4.7.
Achievements
The main achievement
the Demostradoras think they have
reached, besides the training of several thousand women in the
areas
the program considers,
tion of the community,
for its
own problems"
In fact,
of
is "a better level of organiza-
that enables it to generate
solutions
(81).
in a country characterized by the general
lack
identification of the communities with the decision-making,
85
this
type of programs at least help the community on
some
channels through which they might reach such
It does not act effectively,
tion,
is,
that
actions
view
of
in the opposite direc-
the communities needs,
is under risk.
their
unless political
This last assertion can be made
the lack of communication existing even between
ferent levels within the same
the
officials.
leading the decision-makers to modify
according to
stability
however,
knowing
institution.
in
dif-
Furthermore,
if
above possibility of contact of the people with the deci-
sion-making mechanisms is only utilized by the latter in order
to
easen the
institution
implementation of pre-established goals
and the system in general--which we have
actually
what
attaching
any
types
programs will hardly have any possitive
of
the
institution
negative
value to
is
seeking
such
an
for,
searched for
seen
the
is
without
intention--these
terms of generating autonomous social mobilization.
goal must be
of
result
in
This last
from without the government institu-
tions.
86
FINAL OBSERVATIONS
The
relationship
between
sectors--the low-income,
munities
and
the
popular
in many cases squatter-settling com-
in dependent-capitalist urban centers--has become
critical one,
their
the state
given the increasing size of those sectors
increasing
ability
to articulate their demands
concrete political form.
The state's conception of,
a
and
in
a
and ap-
proach to, such a relationship has assumed several forms, from
one
guided by "humanitarian" motivations,
the living
trying to
improve
standards of the population without looking at
deeper causes,
to one which
recognizes the
its
revolutionary--or,
at least, conflictual--potential of such groups, attempting to
channel
and coopt popular experiences
organization.
trate
how
in terms of
autonomous
This paper has presented two cases that illus-
the relationship
state-low-income-communities
is
taking place in a new industrial city: Ciudad Guayana.
The
Venezolana
de
which
growth
the
determined
towards
its
lack
increasing
a
Guayana
shift
of control
of
over the major economic
center of Ciudad
in
Guayana
the emphasis
second area of action:
of
its
from dealing
with
supposedly
87
based
on
has
interventions
The management
the Guayana Region and Ciudad Guayana.
moving
programs
was
regional and urban settings related to the growth
is,
Corporaci6n
the
of
pole,
the
that
This change means
nationally-oriented
interests, which by the
ideal
of
1960's were tied to
a developmentalist
economic growth and modernization
(technocratically
to be on the "public
considered
and--specially--local levels,
social issues.
e.g.,
to
the
regional
basically dealing
with
issues" in
For the state, "dealing with social
as a very important component of its
Ciudad Guayana involves,
interventions,
interest"),
dealing with the
growing low income, squatter
settlers' sector.
What has the shift
in
income communities?
it seems that it has meant very little
case-studies
The
as
settlers
squatter
immigrants
whose
show
how CVG keeps
traditional,
behavior
interven-
such
terms of changing the ideology underlying
tions.
implied
emphasis of CVG functions
its interventions towards low
terms of
From the case-studies,
in
in
thinking
rural
disintegrated
patterns ought to be
of
changed
in
order for them to match the dynamics of the modern, industrial
approach that has been extensively documented
city,
and whose main counter-argument arises
in Ciudad Guayana (82).
barrios
respect
to
subordination
social
development
against,
from the observation of
The institutions goals
are
supported
on
with
that
of human issues to the requirements of economic
growth.
In a system where the state cannot support
any
more
(or solely...)
by means of force,
88
the
its
actions
manipulation
of
popular organization through
the
case
result,
of
the Demostradoras)
means
being
becomes
to
important.
in
As
action has coincided with a slight change
concretize such an
ideology:
structure in Ciudad Guayana,
clientelistic
a
While CVG
its
relationship to low income communities for
one
to
in other words, changing
goals.
This kind of strategy
plified in the story about Colinas de Unare.
tablishing
dependent
being an active part in the implementation
Corporation's
promulgation
keeps
institu-
role of the community from being a passive and
soliciter,
in
it tended to change
of "controlled popular mobilization",
the
shown
a dominant and paternalistic piece within the
tional
the
(as
it also seems that that shift towards a more explicit
socio-political
the
its key points
of
the
the
exem-
Two factors, the
Law of Municipal Regime
channels for the
was
communities
in
1978,
to
articulate
their demands at the local
level, and
tian-democrat
(1979-1984) flagging the policy
government
of
es-
the presence of a Chris-
popular "participation" in the decision-making,
might be
of
re-
lated to this new approach.
Castells says about the strategy of controlled
popular
mobilization that
dominant
class
hegemony of the
expands
the
... [It]
[represented
by
the state] over the
popular
sectors,
which
are
organized
under the label
of
"urban
mar-
ginals".
However,
the
crisis of this hegemony--if
it
takes place--has much more serious consequences over the
prevailing social order than the rupture of the paternalistic
linkages of a traditional
political machine-
89
ry...(83).
What
the
interventions
(Emphasis added).
perspectives
and
effects
would be in the case of Guayana,
such an "hegemony" taking,
of
State
which
form is
and the likelihood of its
crisis,
are issues that go beyond the scope of the present paper,
and
which would be very interesting topics for further research.
After
consistent
the
observing
CVG
actions
and
criticizing
realization of an ideology that tends to
inequality in the allocation of resources,
arises:
have
implied the achievement of a "better"
question
arises:
What
can
we consider to
reinforce
one
What could we have expected the CVG to do,
question
that would
result?
-be
the
Another
a
"better"
result?
According
two
some technical failures.
shows
absorb
community
The case of Colinas de
goals.
In
channeling
demands
and
integrate
into the attempt of achieving the
the
case
of
the
Demostradoras,
Venezuelan,
of housing,
social
90
services and home
needed
institution's
CVG
those who,
have to deal directly with
Unare
community
is
the energies of a potentially conflicting
of the population--the "housewives",
problems
to
the
successes
that CVG structure has the level of flexibility
organizations
like
reports,
studied programs might be considered political
with
to
to CVG own objectives and CVG
also
sector
in a culture
the
increasing
economy--into
creation of social
the
of
government
networks that easen the implementation
according
Improvements,
campaigns.
to
CVG
and in
members, should take place at the administrative level,
the relations between different spheres of decision within the
CVG
the case of Colinas de Unare),
(in
and
in the
mechanisms
to insure economic efficiency (in the case of the pre-units of
production created by the Demostradoras).
if
However,
organizations
that
interests
within
that
able
are
the
is
goal
them
provide
with
two
diverse
institutions
and that are also
interests,
presented here show that CVG
stories
the
reaching--even from considering--that goal.
to
instruments
the
reach a balance between national and local
the
community
and to have
prioritizeand realize such interests,
to
express
really reflect and
the communities,
to
reach
to
is
able
then
far
from
Now, the solution
may not even be possible within the general social, political,
economic conditions present in Venezuela.
a
system like Venezuela's are,
through
plain
reforms,
What the limits of
and how much can be
are other "big"
achieved
issues underlying
a
study like this.
Finally,
with respect to
the case-studies,
some lines of research that should be followed,
whose
answer
can
help build a more
91
there
are
some questions
comprehensive
view
of
actual
CVG
interventions and their impacts.
have been saying along the paper,
place, as we
necessary
within
to
make
how
field research on
it
the
first
would
different
different
From
such a research,
both
we might have a completely
image of what the programs have meant in
the second place,
be
actors
the affected communities view the development of
programs.
In
In
practice.
it would be interesting to evaluate the
real
impacts of the programs both in terms of the goals set by
the
CVG,
and
in terms of the goals assumed
in this paper
as
desirable (this latter criteria point might need more elaboration).
In the third place--at a lower,
it would also be
implementation level--
interesting to observe the performance of the
private enterprise contracted by the CVG to deal with the case
of Colinas de Unare,
and to evaluate
political costs.
92
its economic, social
and
APPENDIX 1:
Graph 1:
Ciudad Guayana:
Location
Graph 2:
Ciudad Guayana:
Sectors of the City and Activites
93
Carib bean
Sea
CARACAS
Colombia
I
Brazil
CIUDAD GUAYANA:
LOCATION
APR-o.1 cm =00
Kns.
SAN
PUERTO
2 CIUDAD
ORDAZ
GUAYANA
SECTORS OF THE CITY AND ACTIVITIES
\
H ous ing
99esLight Industry
::'<- 5-Heavy Industry
Avaov..:
i em
o.5
Km
APPENDIX 2:
Table 1:
Table
2:
Total Population Classified by AgeCiudad Guayana:
Groups and Sector (April 1980)
Ciudad
Guayana:
Percentage
of the
Population
Years or Older who are Unemployed
Working in Construction (1968-1980)
Table 3:
Ciudad Guayana:
City
15
and who are
Type of Buildings by Sectors of the
(October 1979)
96
TABLE No.1:
Ciudad Guayana: Total Population Classified
and Sector (AprilT1980)
TOTAL*
C.G.
Abs.
%
Puerto
Ordaz
Matanzas
Abs.
San
FGlix
Abs.
4
5 -
14
15 -
24
25 -
65 +
58,177
96,611
67,182
112,311
5,539
100.0
17.12
28.43
19.77
33.05
1.63
15,764
23,733
18,312
39,367
1,431
15.99
24.07
18.57
39.92
1.45
42,413
72.878
48,870
72,944
4,108
17.59
30.21
20.26
30.24
1.7
98,607
241,213
1
lW
*
Percentage of each sector relative to the total of the city.
**
Percentage of each age-group relative to the total
Source:
64
339,800
%
%
Age-Groups
AGE GROUPS**
0 -
TOTAL
bi
Survey of Employment and Unemployment
97
in the sector.
(Households), CVG, DEPI.
TABLE No.
2:
Month/Year
Percentage of the Population
Ciudad Guayana.
(15 Years or Older) Unemployed and of the
Populat~ion i~Years or Older in the Constructifon
Sector (1968-1980)
% Unemployed
Population
% Population Working In
Construction Industry
18.4
10.3
14.0
9.6
12.7
11.1
9.2
13.0
13.5
12.1
10.7
11.5
March 1974
July 1975
13.1
10.3
9.5
11.9
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
6.9
3.3
4.4
5.2
6.8
17.7
24.7
24.1
24.1
16.1
July
July
July
July
July
July
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
April
April
April
April
April
Source:
La Guayana V enezolana como Polo
Maria Pilar Garcia:
de Desarrollo, Caracas, USB, 1983.
98
TABLE No.
3:
Buildings and
CIUDAD GUAYANA:
Sector of the City (October 1979)
Total
#
Buildings
Ciudad
Guayana
Abs.
%
San
FMlix
Abs.
%
Puerto
Ordaz
Abs.
%
Source:
74,088
100.0
# of
Ranchos
18,086
24.4
48,273
16,252
65.2
89.9
25,815
34.8
Buildings and Services
May 1982.
99
"Ranchos" by
1,834
10.1
Survey,
CVG -
DEPI.
APPENDIX 3:
Graph
3:
Graph 4:
Area of Action of CVG:
1960-1969
Area of Action of CVG:
1969-1983
100
I-i
0
Ci dad ia:
3 C.V.G.:
AREA OF ACTION
1960-1969
(Development
Zone)
APMMJ.
lfl
~
El Cal
According to
Decrees #72, #92,
1969.
According to
Decree 1331,
1975.
According to
Decree 478,
1980.
0
W
4
C.V.G.:
AREA OF ACTION
1969-1983
(REGION GUAYANA)
APRox.
im
100 vs.
APPENDIX 4:
Organizational
Charts of the CVG
103
ORGANIGRAMA
ANO 1963
DIRECTORIO
ANO 1970
ORGANIGRAMA
EMPRESAS MIXTAS
*----*---------
--
II
DIVISION DE
REVSIO
EON
DEC TERRASI
y(SjTUDIOS
PLA
NY FICACIONN
ERRL
DISE
ABROFORESTAL
IINVESTIGACION
I
DIVISION
.
E
SSDAS
- - DIVISION DE
DESARROLLO
RAOHMN
DIVISION DE
DESARROLLO
IDIITAIN
Chart No. 1. C.V.G. Organizational Structure, 1963 and 1970.
Source: C.V.G. Annual Reports, 1963 and 1970.
Taken from: Garcia, M.P.: La Experiencia de la
Guayana Venezolana ..., Caracas,
U.S.B., 1983.
0
VENEZOLANADE
FUENTE CORPORACION
TOMADOOE
GUAYANA.
LSALAS Y JOSE R. VELASQUEZ. "LA SEPARACION ENT RE FORMULACION Y EJECUCION DE
1961.
UNIVENSDAD SIMON BOLIVAR.
PARA OPTAR AL TITULO DE URSANI3TA.
ROBERTO
TE16
Chart No. 2.
PLANES URBANOS".
C.V.G. Organizational Structure
1971.
Source: C.V.G.
Taken from: Garcia, M.P.: La Experiencia de la Guayana Venezolana...
Caracas, U.S.B., 1983.
ON
FUENTIE. COMPORACION VEZOLAkA OE
TOMADO Es
GUAYANA.
ROSERTOL.
SALAS
VEMS
V JOSE I. VELASQUEZ. "LA SEPARACION ENTRE FONMULACION
Y EJECUCION DE PLANES UNDANOS"
PARA OPTAR AL TITULO 0E URBANISTA. UNIVERSIDAD SIMON BOLIVAR.
194).
Chart No.3.
I
C.V.G. Organizational Structure. 1969.
Source: C.V.G.
Taken from: Garcia, M.P.: La Experiencia de la Guayana Venezolana...
Caracas, U.S.B., 1983.
EMP8E8AS
"
MIXTA
---
-
-
ILANIFI;ACIO'N"'''GERENCIA
""
DE
ORGANIZACION Y SI5TEMAS
INVESTIGACION
DivisioN 09
PMOEGT0 EUMGLE
DIVISION
DIVISION E
aE
DESAMUL.INDUSTRIALSOCIAL V
BENENOA
GtNERAL
CULTURAL
GE
DESARROLLOURSANO
DESARROLLOAORICOLA
GERENCIA
DE
FINANZAI
OFICINA
PLANIFiCACION
Y
PROGRAMAC"0 UW8ANA
(1) DESAPARECEEN 1961.
(a)NO ES CLARG SU NIVEL DE USICACION
OERENCaA
DE
INGENIERA
dC4tMON
FuENTEa CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE
GERENCIA
DE
SIENES
INMUEBLES
GUAVANA.
Chart No. 4.
C.V.G. Organizational Structure
TOMADO DE ROBERTOL. SALA$ Y JOSE R. VELASQUEZ
"LA SEPARACION ENTRE FORMULACION Y EJECUCION DE
PLANES URBANOS!
TESIS PARA OPTAR AL TITULO DE
URBANISTA. UNIVERSIDAC SIMON BOLIVAR. 1981.
1981.
Source: C.V.G.
Taken from: Garcia, MP.: La Experiencia de la Guayana Venezolana..
Caracas, U.S.B., 1983.
FOOTNOTES
Fernando:
1. TRAVIESO,
Ciudad, Region y Desarrollo.
Caracas,
Fondo Editorial Comdn, 1972, pp. 140-141.
la
Guayana
2. GARCIA,
Maria
del
Pilar:
La Experiencia de
Un Fracaso del
como un Polo de~Desarrollo:
Venezolana
Estilo
o del
di la Instituci6n Planificadora,
Modelo Te6rico,
de Planificaci6n?, Caracas,
Departamento de Dise-
Universidad Sim6n Bolfvar,
fto y Estudios Urbanos,
(Unpublished), p.8.
1983
Guayana, Cornerstone of
3. CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA:
The Development of Venezuela, Caracas, CVG, 1963, pp.1527.
4. Ibid, p.7.
Lloyd: "Reflections on Collaborative Planning", in
5. RODWIN,
Rodwin and Assoc.(Ed.): Planning Urban Growth and RegioThe experience of The Guayana Program
nal
Development:
1969, Chapter 25,
MIT Press,
Cambridge,
in Venezuela,
p.470.
6.
INSTITUTO DE RECURSOS NATURALES RENOVABLES, USB: Investigaciones Bgsicas Sobre Sistemas Sociales y Econ6micos y el
S.A.),
7.
Desarrollo Urbano
del
Fen6meno
(Report
Lagoven
for
VOL.I, Caracas, USB, 1980, p.III-13.
CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA:
Op.cit, p.36.
8. Ibid., p.7.
9.
FRIEDMANN,
John:
"The
Guayana
Program
in
a
Regional
in Rodwin and Assoc.(Ed.), op.cit., ChapPerspective",
ter 7, p.155.
10.
DOWNS,
Anthony: "Creating a Land Development Strategy for
(Ed.),
op.cit.,
in Rodwin and Assoc.
Ciudad Guayana",
Chapter 10, pp.212-213.
11.
DINKELSPIEL,
John R.:
and Assoc.(Ed.),
"Administrative Style",
in Rodwin
op.cit., Chapter 16, p.308.
12.
PEATTIE, Lisa, and William PORTER: Social Issues in Designing a City, Cambridge, MIT (mimeo), p.7.
13.
TRAVIESO, Fernando: Op.cit., p.141.
14. Definition
generally
of
made
"Ranchos" given by
the
from residual materials,
108
CVG:
"Structures
built by
their
residents,
and
without
'habitability'
conditions".
In:
Inventario
de
DEPI:
VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA,
CORPORACION
F@lix
San
Edificaciones y Servicios-Ciudad Guayana-Zona
1979, Caracas, CVG, Mayo 1982.
15.
FRIEDMANN,
Program
Guayana
"The
John:
in
a
Regional
Perspective", op.cit., p.152.
16.
"The Changing Pattern of Urbanization in
FRIEDMANN, John:
in Rodwin and Assoc.(Ed.), op.cit., Chapter
Venezuela",
2, p.40.
17.
Op.cit., p.143.
TRAVIESO, Fernando:
18. FRIEDMANN,
John:
Program
Guayana
"The
in
a
regional
Perspective", op.cit., p.154.
19.
From conversation with
Prof.
DUSP-MIT,
Remmy Prud'Homme,
May 1983.
20.
From Presentation on "Growth Poles", Prof. Karen Polenske,
unDUSP-MIT (Based on her
Spring 1983,
11.483,
Course
published article on the topic).
21.
CONROY,
Michael E.:
"Rejection of Growth Center Strategy
in
Latin American Regional Development Planning",
pp.371-380.
Economics, Vol.XLIX, No. 4.
Land
22. GARCIA, Maria del Pilar: Op.cit., p.27.
23.
PEATTIE, Lisa, and William PORTER:
24.
FRIEDMANN,
John:
"The
Guayana
Op.cit.,
p.10.
a
Regional
RENOVABLES-USB:
Op.cit.,
Program
in
Perspective", op.cit., pp.152-153.
25. GARCIA, Marfa del Pilar:
26.
INSTITUTO DE RECURSOS NATURALES
p.III-11.
27. GARCIA, Maria del Pilar:
28.
Op.cit., p.33.
Op.cit., p.4.
CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA-DEPI: Estadisticas de la
Regi
1.
Guayana 1980, Caracas, CVG, Diciembre
29.
DINKELSPIEL,
30.
FRIEDMANN,
John
John:
R.:
Op.cit.,
"The
pp.301-305.
Guayana
Program
Perspective", op.cit., pp.150-151.
31. GARCIA, Maria del Pilar:
Op.cit., pp.43-52.
109
1981, p.II-
in
a
Regional
32.
DINKELSPIEL, John R.:
33.
Ibid.,
34.
Op.cit.,
p.312.
p.313.
PEATTIE,
versus
Lisa: "Conflicting Views of The Project: Caracas
op.cit.,
in Rodwin and Assoc.(Ed.),
the Site",
Chapter 24, pp.453-464.
35.
Ibid., p.460.
36. GARCIA, Maria del Pilar: Op.cit., p.65.
37.
The
movement
of
CVG's offices from
Caracas
to
Ciudad
Guayana has been a slow and incremental process. Since the
an office of the Division of
of the process,
beginning
Capital of
Planning was located in Ciudad Bolivar,
Urban
Bolivar State, and some engineering offices were in Ciudad
that all
the Decree #929 required
1972,
By
Guayana.
regional corporations had an office in charge of coordinaesCVG
and planning regional development aspects;
ting
Coorfor
Office
tablished, then, its "ORCOPLAN" (Regional
dination and Planning) in Ciudad Bolivar (GARCIA, op.cit.,
the Unit of Urban Planning was finally
In 1977,
p.12).
its
in
but ther was a vacuum
Guayana,
to
Ciudad
moved
esthe personnel of Urban Planning
functioning until
tablished in Ciudad Bolivar was moved to Ciudad Guayana, a
By
p.III-14).
year and a half later (IRNR-USB, op.cit.,
mid-1982, most of the offices were in Ciudad Guayana.
38.
DINKELSPIEL, John R.:
39.
From
Op.cit., p.314.
conversation with Prof.
Lisa Peattie,
member of the Joint Center team in 1963, April
DUSP-MIT and
1983.
40. GARCIA, Maria del Pilar: Op.cit., p.13.
41.
Marla Nuria De Cosaris, planFrom conversation with Urb.
Development,
Cultural
ner
at the Division of Social and
CVG, Ciudad Guayana, February 1983.
Reubicaci6n
Proceso de
Sobre
Informe
Carlos:
42. PINELLY,
Colinas de Unare, Ciudad Guayana, CVG-DDSC, Agosto 1982,
Internal Report).
p.1 (CVG'r
43. Ibid., p.l.
44.
Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicaci6n de
Carlos:
PINELLY,
CVGGuayana,
Ciudad
de Colinas de Unare,
Habitantes
DDSC,
45.
Diciembre 1982, p.3.
VASQUEZ, HernAn: Internal report on the process of relocaGuayana,
Ciudad
(Untitled),
of Colinas de Unare
tion
110
CVG,
1982?,
46.
PINELLY,
Colinas
47.
From
p.l.
Reubicaci6n de
Informe Sobre Proceso de
Carlos:
p.2.
de Unare, op.cit.,
conversation with Marfa Nuria De
C6saris,
February
1983.
48.
PINELLY,
Carlos:
Sobre
Informe
proceso de
Reubicaci6n
Colinas de Unare, op.cit., p.2.
49. VASQUEZ,
Hernan:
Proyecto Especial de Reubicaci6n de Coli-
DesarroInforme Resumido de~Atividades
nas de Unare.
lladas en el Lapso Abril 1981-Mayo 1982, Ciudad Guayana,
CVG, Mayo 1982, (internal report), and see also:
VASQUEZ,
Hern~n:
Internal Report..., op.cit.
50.
VASQUEZ, Hernan:
Proyecto
Especial..., op.cit., p.4.
51.
Raw data from:
VASQUEZ, HernAn:
Internal
Report...,
op.cit., p.5.
52. Ibid., p.4.
53.
PINELLY,
Carlos:
Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicaci6n de
Colinas de Unare, op.cit.,
54.
Ibid., p.7.
55.
PINELLY,
Carlos:
p.2.
Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicaci6n de
Habitantes de Colinas de Unare, op.cit., p.2.
56.
VASQUEZ, Hern~n:
57.
VASQUEZ,
Hernan:
Internal Report...,
Proyecto
op.cit., p.7.
de
Especial
Reubicaci6n...,
op.cit., p.6.
58.
VASQUEZ, Hern~n:
59. Ibid.,
60. The
Internal
Report...,
op.cit., p.11.
p.8.
neighborhood
ceived
associations are the
instruments
by the Venezuelan Law of Municipal
Regime
con-
(1978),
for
the urban communities to organize themselves and exof their
press their demands to the Municipal Council
directly
They are
respective city or urban district.
selected by the community, and formalized through an application to the Municipality, supported by a minimum
number
of signatures from voters of the particular commu-
nity.
61.
VASQUEZ,
Hernsn:
Internal
report...,
111
op.cit.,
p.13.
62.
Ibid.,
p.12.
63.
Ibid., p.12.
64.
Ibid.,
65.
VASQUEZ,
p.12.
Proyecto
HernAn:
Especial
de
Reubicaci6n...,
op.cit., pp.10-ll.
66.
VASQUEZ,
67.
PINELLY,
Hern~n:
Internal Report...,
Informe Sobre
Carlos:
op.cit.,
p.13.
Proceso de Reubicaci6n de
Colinas de Unare, op.cit., pp.10-ll.
68. Ibid, p.6.
GUAYANA-DDSC:
VENEZOLANA DE
69. CORPORACION
Ciudad Guayana,
Gesti6n de la Divisi6n,
y
Presentaci6n
NoCVG-DDSC,
viembre 1982.
70.
Ibid., p.2.
71.
CASTELLS,
Manuel:
Capital
Internacional,
nales y Comunidades Locales,
1981, p.85.
72.
Mexico,
Estados Nacio-
Eds.,
Siglo XXI
Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicaci6n de
PINELLY,
Carlos:
p.4.
Colinas de Unare, op.cit.,
73. Ibid.,
p.10.
74.
p.13.
Ibid.,
75. Ibid., p.2.
76.
PINELLY,
Carlos:
Informe Sobre
Proceso de Reubicaci6n de
Habitantes de Colinas de Unare, op.cit., p.4.
77.
VASQUEZ,
Hernan:
Proyecto
Especial
de
Reubicaci6n...,
op.cit., p.12.
78.
From
conversation with Gilberto Rojas,
Assistant to
the
Manager of the Division of Social and Cultural Development
of the CVG. Ciudad Guayana,.February, 1983.
79. From
interview
to the Demostradoras
del
Hogar,
Ciudad
Guayana, February 1983.
80.
Manager of
Eduardo Castageda,
From conversation with Dr.
of
the
Division
of Social and Cultural Development
the
CVG, Ciudad Guayana, February 1983.
112
81.
From interview to the Demostradoras, February 1983.
82.
See, for example:
de
"Movimientos de Pobladores y Lucha
Manuel:
CASTELLS,
Estudios
Revista Latinoamericana de
en Chile",
Clases
Urbanos y Reinales, No. 7,
Abril 1973.
America"
"Squatter Settlements in Latin
Anthony:
LEEDS,
America Latina, No. 2, 1969.
American Squatter Settlements",
"Latin
William:
MANGIN,
Latin American Research Review, No.2, 1967.
Urban Poverty
The Mith of Marginality:
Janice:
PERLMAN,
of
Univ.
Berkeley,
Janeiro",
Politics in Rio de
and
California
83.
Press, c976.
CASTELLS, Manuel:
Op.cit., p.85.
113
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APPLEYARD, Donald
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Planninj
a
Pluralist City:
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CASTELLS, Manuel:
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1976.
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CONROY, Michael E.:
Latin American Regional
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Vol.
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of Growth Center Strategy
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1973),
in
Land
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