PARTICIPATION AND WORKER
SATIlSF ACT ION
by
Anna Margaret
B.A.,
Hardman
Oxford University,
England
1966
Submitted
in
Partial
Requi rements
Master
Fulfillment
for the
in City
of
the
Degree of
Planning
at the
Massachusetts
Institute
of Technology
January,
1971
A
Signature of
r
Ii
Author
(1art men t oF Urban
Studies and Planning
January 22, 1971
i -'!
Certified
by
The
s Supervisor
C
Accepted by
Chaihrr",
Departime
Rotch
~pss. MSrc.
APR 22 1971
' I3R A R Ib
Ia I Committee on Graduate
Students
Abstract
Title:
Participation and Worker Satisfaction
Author:
Anna Margaret Hardman
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Master in City Planning at the Massachussetts institute of Technology
This thesis explores the effectiveness of worker participation
in reducing job alienation, and the implications of participation
The study uses data from
by workers for the behavior of the firm.
in which participation
workers
experiments with industrial and office
was a variable, and data from other studies of participation in work
The evidence shows that participation increases job
environments.
satisfaction, and that direct participation and participation at
shopfloor level are both more effective in raising morale than indirect
participation and participation at the level of the firm.
Economic models of the firm were used to compare the behavior of
worker controlled firms with that of entrepreneurial capitalist firms.
Only models of firms completely controlled by workers have so far been
developed, but this chapter outlines some tentative hypotheses about
firms with intermediate amounts of participation are developed. The
assumptions made in existing theoretical models of the worker controlled
firm are questioned, and alternative assumptions developed which
correspond better to what we know of the effects of oarticipation within
Implications of the new assump ti ons for the firm's policies
the firm.
for quality of the work environment, location policy, and pollution
policy are outlined.
On the basis of this study, some tentative suggestions are made as
to how worker participation can be a useful strategy for planners of
economic development in poverty areas and new communities.
Contents
5
Introduction
Chapter 1: The Quality of Work,
Job Satisfaction, and Alienation
15
Chapter 2: Influences on the Impact
of Participation on Job Satisfaction
Chapter 3: The Behavior of
with Worker Participation
Chapter 4:
the
Firm
39
77
108
Conclusions
Appendices:
to Chapter 2:Experiments with Worker
Participation: Summary of the Evidence
116
to Chapter 3: Examples
Worker Participation
117
of
firms
with
Footnotes
131
Bibliography
141
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My Thanks
To:
--
all the- peop le who helped
with the typ ing and assembly
of the final copy.
--
fellow membe rs of the MIT
New Communit ies Project,
1969-70, and of the Cambridge
Institute Wo rkers Control
Task Force.
--
Jerome
Rothenberg, my
advisor.
5
INTRODUCTION
The implicit
valued
for
the
production process
The effect on
those
market,
so
who create
most adults
than
costs or
a worker*
which
of
them.
is
such as
revenues
job
the
at work,
commuting.
decreased
are
The
thus
De
and
one
by those
of
i n work-linked actial
has
shown
that
i
little
surprising y
potentially
borne
the
in
the waking hours
Graz
attributes
of
i n the system of pro-
of
and
the
firm
the
to
he 'does is
are not
large share
A
up in
adequate l y dealt with
true costs
spent
years or so.
the wage,
are not
the
that
the share h as
fifty
do n ot show
socia I products which occur
duction and
vities
as
those
genera te costs
e conomy
production sector of the
to soc:iety which
But
Th e enterprises wh i ch
the market.
money by
and benefits
exchanged
services which are
and
goods
in
besides
include s also other ou tputs
the economy
materi.al
used as a unit of
is
productivity.
for measuri ng such social
account
an eco-
the contribut ion it
-
Money
cons umption.
to human
makes
us e to evaluate
criterion we
its social productivity
nomy is
Firms
Productivity of
Social
The
of
in
the job,
a significant
the
last
other
com-
*worker is generally used in this paper to refer to all
rich, poor,
employed individuals in the labor force,
unless
etc.,
professional,
white collar,
blue collar,
made.
is
meaning
reference to some other
explicit
6
ponent of
the worker's
difference
these
illustrated
by
comments
utility.
characteristics
the
as , on
total
comparison
the one
The
of
a job
kind of
can make
is
of such autobiographical
hand:
"I do... find enormous enjoyment in research and in the
of h istory.
I am happy in it, and that is the
writing
main thing".
And
the other hand:
on
of
We spend a third
"The time passes, but that's all.
our lives in the factory, but there's no overall purpose
Back from the
other than the money.
or meaning to it
holiday, we start counting up the weeks to the next: no
other dates qualify for significance except the date
There's no sense of achievement about
when we are free.
the work, no feeling that we are creating or building
Producing the umpteenth chemical toilet
something.
than producing
bucket will give us no more satisfaction
the
3
first".
These extreme examples
and
condi tions
person's
the
or of
the workers.
method of solving this
participation
a
are
effectiveness
feasibility,
making:
jobs
not
so that additional
market
borne by
that many of
argues
of work
tion are
is
the
the kind
much
quali ty of a
life.
attributes
the
vividly how
of work can affect
This paper
with by
show
problem.
by workers
number of
recent
in
I t
and
is
the
non-wage
dealt
adequately
costs
of produc-
concerned wi th
implications
The strategy
enterprise
a
of
studied
decision-
studies have suggested
that:
"satisfaction
in work is significantly
enhanced by
decision-making powers on the job.
increasing workers'
Under a great variety of work situations and among
7
work
levels of skill,
of vastly different
workers
satisfaction has been shown to increase even though
the technical processes of production and the workers'
tasks themselves remained unchanged".,
literature
participation
And another paper on the
concludes:
"Men will
when they
take greater pleasure and pride in their
can participate in the shaping of the
decisions
that affect their work".
work
5
The Problem of Social Products
(costs and
community,
Both of
of production processes,
borne by
benefits not
as some
as well
the producing
on
effects of work
the
the effects of production processes on
workers,
as
sometimes
include,
firm),
products
social
The
such
as pollution
these more
air
public conce rn.
pollutes
doing
the environment of
effects.
recognised
An enterprise
by so
around
it
affects
residents
in
the community and
or water
which
locational
have been
familiar examples
topics for
legitimate
and some
elsewhere who breathe the polluted air or drink polluted
the
absence
water.
In
lation,
the costs
firm which
or
the
creates
of that
it
pollution
but by
community which must
purification
processes
find
it appropriate
we
of some form of effective
regulation by
to
the
use,
restore
are borne
individuals
for example,
taxes,
by
the
affected,
water
the status quo.
for government
law, or with
not
regu-
Hence
to intervene, with
to make
the
enterprise
8
whi ch creates
the problem
to pay subsidies
also
them
tive ex ternal effects
in the community.
fo r the community or other
government subsidizes
or refrain
to encourage
to firms
to locate where they create
And
cost,
Government will
on others.
fro m imposing it
Int ervene
t o pay the
renewal projects beca use
u
is
positive,
of their supposed social pr
ductivity, which
whe reas the private product
vity of such a project would
not
it to be
alone be enough to caus
of work
wit h the effect
con
injury and
public intervention al ready
occurs:
provides
because
'
power of
some
legislation
This
is done
market a 0 ne doe s not supply what are con-
sidered by t he society
of failures
illness,
the
some min im um wor k conditions standards and
for workmen s cc mpe nsation.
the
In
on workers.
itions
ext reme cases of industrial
establishes
A
should jus ify public policy concern
argument
sim ilar
undertaken.
the
in
adequ ate standards,
as
a
result
labo r mar ket: the uneven bargaining
and worke rs given th e competi tive bind in
fir m
which each f i rm finds i tself which prevents each from
investing in expen sive
sa fety meas ures unle ss all
others do so also, as wel l as
tions in
the
problem,
which
As
labor market
in
the weakness of
on non-essentials
institu-
dealing with this kind
is discussed i n more detail
incomes rise,
the
of
be l ow.
the share of income people spend
increases,
and
their spending on
9
People
necessities such as food and housing decreases.
then
afford
can
to concern
items
other
consumer goods and services
Material
of consumption.
themselves with
Another is the social goods which
are one such item.
life,
affect the quality of
such as environmental
quality, the availability of public leisure goods such
and perhaps,
as parks and open spaces,
here,
the quality of work
argued
is
as
conditions.
In addition, the U.S. economy now is further than
ever from the paradigm of free competition in which the
market forc es lead to attainmen t of a soci al opti mum
the economy is run by 1arge fi rms
Mu c h of
position.
oligopolist ic or monopolistic ma rke ts
the
labor
g rowth of scale of f i rms is paral l eled by
market, the
large
In
union s,
in
and
di s tanc e between
them the
line
workers and
t he negotiators make it less and less
likely that
l ocal work condition issues,
extreme
cas
es ,will
be
the natu
In industry,
determined
by applying the most
the product
ion processes.
may rebel
occur.
It
except
f or
in contract
iego-
re o f the job is often
adva nced technolo gy to
is
the n assumed tha t the
adjust to the job th us c reated.
The
worker
i nformally, occasional ly a wildcat stri ke may
But
in general the insti tut ions surroundi ng the
labor contr act
workers
issue
a major
tiations.
worker will
in
are
to avoid
such that
it
paying many of
is
impossible for
the costs of
the
10
external effects of work conditions.
There is thus no reason to suppose that the
problem of costs of
production which
the producer but by the worker,
are
not
borne
and of possible
inefficient distribu tion of rewards to workers
money wages and work conditions, will
spontaneously throug h "market
a result of institut ional
failure,
by
ween
bet
be resolved
since it
processes",
is
imperfections and of mar ket
rather than a 'frictional effect' in the
market which will wo rk itself out.
Some
form of
p ublic
intervention is thus necessary to bring about a be tter
(more
efficient and more equitable)
distribution o f
costs and benefits o f this kind.
But we must
what kind of changes are needed.
Moreover,
dete
rmi ne
the ot her
change must be considered: the e ffects
effects of such a
a ch
other
than
on
the
impact of work on workers.
Urban planning and the
problem of work
conditions
Planners' concern with work, jobs, and
the
labor
market, has traditionally focussed on the need to
provide employment
is planning.
for the
community
in which
planner
They often plan for the provision of jobs
where a labor force exists and needs jobs,
ning for undeveloped rural
traditional
the
as
in
plan-
areas or areas where
industries are declining,
and more
recently,
11
unemployment
for ghetto areas where
for jobs
they plan
in
planning new communities
be
This
of sub-
existing economic
limited viewpoint must necessarily
the comparison of
exclude
the
structure of
made within the
system.
growth
the
for
or
Both strategies assume that policy must
towns.
urban
to attract population,
a way
as
Or
are high.
rates
alternatives which may have
A program which has been
a much greater social value.
and
used for the economic development of ghetto areas,
retains as
community
for
the economy developed
through which
workers
as
jobs
given
can-be run
and
owners
interests of
located elsewhere.
view of
traditional
The
the
in
the
consumers
local
of
interests
the
instead of entirely
who may be
the
in
least partly
(CDC)
the wages and
possible of
much as
profits within the community and the firms
at
institu-
Development Corporation
the Community
is
tions,
idea,
to explore alternative economic
begins
which
they
that
are relevant
planners are
non-work time of
they develop
development
in
terms
they
facilities
of the
'attractive' physical
value
of
an
paper
is
concerned with
for non-material
is paradoxical,
to planners
the people
the
or non-market
that
is,
and evaluate
not
environment.
value
of
quality
plan for,
social,
the extension
and
of work
nature
concerned with
recreational
plans
the
of
to
private
This
that concern
institutions
in
12
value
labor market with whose material
the
planners
al ready are concerned.
Structure of the Paper
The following chapter defines more
rigorously the
problem of work conditions and the satisfying or
alienating character of the job.
It pursues the ques-
tions of the nature and causes of work satisfaction and
analyses the labor market imperfections which make
quality of work an effect of
production
cost is
largely borne by the worker.
tion as
a solution
is
worker
its
in
of other
in
are
structure of
the
described.
factors
(the
level
for example)
in modifying
satisfaction
is
The
pursued.
circumstances
and
the
share control,
or
and
and examples
of partici-
impact on work
is
to determine
affects worker
The effects on work satis-
fact ion of models of participat ion in
the firm,
firm
is a factor, the
amount
problem
participation
satisfaction, and how much.
the
Using studies
pation,
what
strategies.
worker participation,
in which worker participation
of cases
in
alternative
is
more detail: alternative models of
participation
decisions
role
some
chapter 2 that solution,
described
Worker participa-
for further investigation
discussed and compared with
In
processes whose
which workers
run
are hired employees without
part icipation are compared as f ar as possible.
13
the meaning of worker
Chapter 3 examines
it affects
participation as
the behavior of the firm.
the issue of other effects of worker parti-
It pursues
cipation, when
the
behavior of
the
such a change on other
of
The effect
it changes
firm.
parameters
the
of
firm's behavior is studied particularly with respect
to external
The
effects.
last
previous chapters,
the conclus ions of
pu rsues
chapter
on the
effectiveness
an
the
d the ot her
effects, and on the conditions for success of such a
discusses the polic y implications and
strategy:
it
political
implications given
ness which chapter 2 suggests.
part icipation,
end)
be
(if it is
introduce d (by
for effective-
the criteria
That
is,
how could
an eff e ctive means
to a desired
industr i al management,
by
gove rnment, or as a result of w 0 rker pressure on firms
and workplaces)7
nati ve to alter
What
How
th e character
side-effects does chapter
I t Compares
these
workers'
control
we expect each
alter-
o f jobs and their effects?
3
suggest would result?
findings with some of the arguments
which have been and
firm.
far could
are being used for and against
and worker participation models
of
the
the
14
This paper does not pretend to present new first
hand research on the problem of participation and work
satisfaction.
of
It
is,
rather,
the many studies which
have
(by sociologists, economists,
manpower experts,
way:
to analyse
in
the
this
to use
been made of
issues
some
this
topic
social psychologists,
and management experts)
and extract
Some
implications for planners.
interest
an attempt
in
the possible
reasons why
issue can and should
a novel
be
their
expected
to
increase are proposed above.
The
information which
effectiveness and
may,
in
also,
the
be of
is
presented
conditions of workers'
interest
citizen
This field has been less
the
participation
to those who are
development of models of
in planning.
here cn
interested
participation
studied than that
of worker participation, and some of the facts presented
here may
be
relevant:
some of
the
same questions
raised such as the effect of different
participation,
decisions,
pants.
from observation to full
on the
are
levels of
control
awareness or alienation of
of
partici-
15
Chapter I
THE
QUALITY
OF
as
work
is
the worker
introduction asserted,
for many workers
because
it
the
SATISFACTION,
ALIENATION
of work on
Effects
If ,
JOB
WORK,
AND
it could
lower than
imperfections
the existence of market
of
quality
the
be,
causes
to be underproduced, then it is a legitimate and
necessary concern of policy to conside r ways of
quality of wo rk,
making
vi ng
the
Th is
chapter first con siders
the
labor market with respect
than wages,
othe r
and
worl d working of that
exac tly
than
the
then
theory of
at t ri butes of jobs
to
compar es
th at with
real
the
then defines more
It
duction wha t
intro
mo re satisfying.
it
the cl ass ical
market.
impro-
are the effects of
work on workers which make the qu al i ty of the job
envi ronment
for
labor.
it would b e
lower
than
Given
the nature of
sati sfaction and alienation)
have
been suggested
as
t hose
the
is
explained.
a perfect
effects
market
(work
alter natives which
solutions are
choice of worker parti cipation as
examination
in
described and
a solution
for
the
further
16
quality of the work environment and
The
the
Labor Market
account of the working
in his
Smith wrote:
Adam
market,
labor
of the
"the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the
in the
employments of labor and stock must,
different
or
equal
perfectly
either
be
same neighborhood,
this at least would
continually tending to equality...
were left to
things
where
be the case in a society
was perfect
there
where
natural course,
follow their
free both
perfectly
was
man
and where every
liberty,
and to
propIr,
thought
he
to choose what occupation
proper".
thought
as often as he
change it
In
run,
the short
in
l
They may al so occur when things are not
liberty
are
men
and
Smith
employments .
itse lf out.
of adjustment work s
the process
while
occur
inequalities
system,
Smith's
not
choose
to
free
enumerated
the
eft at perfect
am ong
causes
al ternative
of di fference
in wages be tween different employments: h e did
are
"the whole
of
listed the
"ease
dirtiness",
in
equal
that wages
all
or hardship",
"the
its
other
but occupations
in
cheapness
small
learning",
He
or
respects would
price.
its "constancy
probability or impro-
in the employment".
unequal
or the
or great trust which is
in the worker", and "the
bability of success
unequal
tages"
the "clean l iness
the "easiness and
or inconstancy",
in
but ra ther
the "honorableness or dishonorableness" of
difficulty and expense of
equal
and disadvan
the advantages
the employment,
reposed
employments,
say
not
tend
in other
Occupations
to be equal
in
respects would be
price,
17
A
further
situation be
factor which would
included in
if we
abandon
the
are
undertaken
to secure an
take
competition
the
the
theory,
way of
job.
of
improving
Improvements
In
the
the
in
in
and,
long
then
labor market should
a job as
is
this
of
the
as
in
as
drudgery,
attribute
job.
the
that
process would
acti-
must
classical
is
conditions
the
relative attractiveness
take
resulting
cheaper
of the
into account
from
the quality of work.
real world,
at
however,
Workers
by so doing,
jobs
as
creative
improve work
productivity
from perfect.
satisfying
It
That
drudgery
activities,
the
the quality
raising wages
increases
there
model
labor market worked
Moreover, this
jobs
leisure
then entrepreneurs will
instead of
that
character of
mean here by
If
far
or
and
job.
labor or work
development
creative or satisfying.
which we
any
non-work
into account
or as
income,
to individual
necessarily be
the perfect
that
market
attributes
the
necessarily non-fulfilling
leading
vities
quality of
assumption
activities
a perfect
the bundle of job
to be equalised would be the
is,
in
not
to express
less
are significant
are
pay,
the
free
to move
preferences
because
constraints
labor market
in
the
between
for more
job
to mobility
is
market
in the
18
form of costs of entry,
Alienation is not,
of moving.
to entry,
barriers
and costs
reason,
for this
a cost
to many workers which can be recouped through a. higher
price of
supply
labor.
These workers
are
not
able
to
the
extract h igher wages as "'compensation" because of
lack of meaningful satisfying alternatives available
to them.
the stratification of
exists,
mobility
labor markets ,through
in
that persons
constraintsinsures
alienating
have only similar environments as
work environments
alternatives.
conditions
a variety of work
Insofar as
(For example, a factory worker does not
This
typically have the option of becoming a doctor).
labor markets means
of
stratification
access to jobs.
do not have equal
function of access
educational
Access
to education and
standards
that
individuals
to jobs
training,
now set minimum
is a
since
admission criteria
for many jobs.
human
In a perfect market economy,
serve as collateral
to
so that the
increase his human
removing
human
any budget
capital
is
vidual with few
budget
capital
inadequate
resources
This
In
the
collateral.
is unable
constraint and acquire
for education.2
individual can borrow
investment,
constraint.
capital would
thereby
real world,
Thus
an
indi-
to overcome his
the necessary
resources
is one of the factors which
In a skewed distribution of education in which the
result
19
income group
higher
The
greater
individuals
to
forego
receive more education
value of an extro dollar of
immediate
involved
in
investment
That
groups.
income
poor are
market .
in the
imperfection
This
not
equal
between
work conditions,
itself.
market
deliberate union
ledge
concerning
a-
on
l abor
for education
market
to jobs
access
firms,
the
limit
that
so
of workers
ability
they will
improve
their
the
labor
in
imperfections
are marke t
Costs of m oving,
exclusion ary efforts,
al te rnati ve
provision,
seniority
inadequate know-
employment
opportunities,
and an incomplet e vesting of pension plans
bor mobility and
thus make
labo r market
it
less easy
to put pressure
through
the
improve
the qual ity of wor k through
to mobili ty
a bout
or free.
Other factors which
to move
in education
a career
of
means that even at the start
is
has been
at the bottom end of the
the part of those already
the
from
benefits
i nvestment
factor discouraging
further
to information
Di scrimination
investment.
capital
access
the p otential
and about
labor markets
human
less
likely to have
owe r
l
because
also,
greater,
is
risk
a
to
costly
edu cation more
in
der
risk
the
Thi s also makes
higher paying job later.
it har
for education and
consumpti on
For
consumptio ni
lower income g roups also makes
in
others.
than
the
all
limit
la-
for workers
on employers
market.
give firms oligopsonistic powers,
to
Barriers
thus
permit-
20
ting
them
work
environment
to offer
Even where
workers'
than
workers
a
they would
in
improved work
on each
firm
may make
risk unless
all
explains why
legislation
is
preferred
of
a perfect market.
might
industry
that
socially
lower quality
conditions
productivity, the
constraint
to take
their
increase
competitive
any one
do so.
firm unwilling
This
factor
necessary to ensure that
safety standards
are provided
in
industry.
In the
introduction,
mentioned:
the
bargaining
between workers
institutions which govern
negotiation
is
Issues such
as wages
in
money
or
locals.
place
the basis
nature
less
large
issues of work
scale,
than
and which
are
specific,
are
same
to
easily priced
The
market
cause most of
institutions
that
cver
be valued
plants
negotiations
and
set
the
thei r
terms
are by
will
similar
for
receive
all
compared by
surrounding the
the non-wage
on
effectively
issues,
and
take
tendency
condi tions whi ch
are
such
for many
institutions,
local
of the
take place
at which
those which
employers.
thus
the
and employers
set by these
small
to
much
or benefi ts whi ch can
large scale
unions
that
likely
unions and employers ,
attention
plants
more
and employers
and which are
The
of smaller
ensures
much
terms
between
a further factor was
the
labor
and non-monetiz-
able attributes of the job to be imperfectly
adjusted
21
between emp oye r and employee preferences.
attributes,
and
faction
one
the
on
itself
the effect of the work
these
satis-
work
is
study
to this
central
Of
worker.3
labor market
The working of the
provide
months
reported
ago was
the
into account
York Times
the New
in
that
Patrick Moynihan
Daniel
choosing jobs.
by people
taken
is
work
in
inherent
job satisfaction
however,
contention
for the
supporting evidence
can,
a
few
to have
the work incentive
exploded when asked if
would force
provisions in the (welfare reform) bill
people into jobs that were not "meaningful":
"Middle class aesthetes are going around saying
what is meaningful employment?"
what is meaningful,
to earn
he declared, "Most people work for a living
They don't
families.
money for themselves and their
When
is meaningful.
ask whether what they are doi.n
does he
a farmer gets up at 6.30 to milk the cows,
stop and ask himself whether what he does is meaning-
ful?"
Moyni han's example supports
attacking:
butes
that
involvement
example:
the
farmer
not
tend
than
to offer
his
fa rm work
meaningful
is
farming has
makes
the
varied;
decisions
its
position he
(non-material)
farmer
industrial
is
to him as
to t he
non-wage
the
a more
for
for himself;
not
is
it
attri-
meaningful
counterpart,
pace
is
constant;
can be as
much blue collar industrial work
laborer.
22
Work
Satisfaction and Alienation
While what we call
drudgery,
in
"work" includes much that is
or non-fulfilling
activity
order to secure an income,
it
creative
not
in
and
reality
activities
individual
from work.
is
The
development.
Schoolteacher"
undertaken
his
These
cactors
("leisure")
historian quoted
one who enjoys
is
may also be fulfilling,
distinguish non-work
introduction
"the
lead to
which
"work".
in
the
Another
is
who writes:
so for me teaching is important and valuable work
which I enjoy doing most of the time.
It is a job
concerned with growing and developing individuals who
are never predictable and so provides a variety of
experience which is always stimulating.
Teaching is a
two-way process with a feedback from the pupils which
constantly modifies a teacher's own approach; if the
danger of appearing an infallible
oracle is avoided,
and a certain respect for the children one deals with
is cultivated, the job can be rewarding and sometimes
creative.5
The
teacher attributes
the
interest of his
changing content and the way
teacher's
own approach":
it
it "constantly
leads
job to
its
modifies
a
to individual
development.
Another writer attributes his
to the
fact
that
it
is
liking for his job
"interesting":
My trade was a good trade and I left plenty of
fellows on the melting shop who think the same as I do.
The same fellows are hoping that the vast change in
steel production will
not be cataclysmic for them, that
the trade will still be interesting because it still
the open hearth
As for me,
will need their skill...
furnaces served me well and I served them well and I'm
They gave me a chance of a worthnot sorry we met.
do
23
while working life
in a tremendously interesting
industry.
That doesn't always happen to working men.
inherently satisfying as well
Work can be
is
This
income.
source of
not
the
than others.
selves,
the
to the
attitudes
effects
of
not
expressed by
be,
the
a worker
the worker which
job on
the worker.
This
and to
reports,
may be,
but
of
aspect
need
the
Blumberg
close to the concept of alienation.
concept is
writes
job which
to
refers both
satisfaction'
'Job
alone:
needs , of them-
jobs are more satisfying to human
some
as a
of work
result
6
that:
about
there are objective alienating qualities
as such by the
much labor and these are seen and felt
them
worker, although he perhaps does not articulate
explicitly... an underlying strain of work alienation,
here greater, there lesser, seems to be endemic to the
7
world of work.
There
are
good
reasons
'alienation'
to describe the
here.
are
There
will make it
non-money
more
or
less
sources of alienation in
issues which
wrote.
But
of
a more
us
but which are not
satisfying
the worker.
the employment
concern
of the job which
dimensions
An example
physica l conditions of the workplace or di rt iness'
using
to hesitate before
the
of wh ich
is
the
'cleanliness
Adam Smith
detailed examinati on of
the
factors
which a re reported as sources of job satisfaction
suggest s
closely
attributes
that the problem of worker
linked with
a lienation
that of job satis faction.
of jobs which
are
most
frequently
is
The
reported
24
surveys of workers
interview
in
sources of job
(other than financial
satisfaction
hours
rewards,
of
are: 8
condi tions)
and work
work
as
supervision
content, and
job
group
(or
relations with
Supervision on
the
job
the work
to
in
decision-making
of this factor.
treated
or being
A
It is
th e
two most
re lated to the problem of
the
feeling of objectification,
a thi ng,not
as
components
important
a person,,which
the job itself.
job content is the character of
job can be monotonous or varied, depending on the
extent
of specialization
level
the
such
as
to
neglect
the
in
the
production
the job;
responsibility of
and
include a
work methods
in
to production
the alienated worker.
characterize
The
are
at work and
powerlessness
attaches
influence a supervisor allows to workers
and the
goals,
importanc e he
the
The consider-
shows of workers under him,
ation which a supervisor
relative
ranges from specific and
and permissive.
to general
authoritarian
fellow workers)
high or
and work pace;
skills
the worker.
and abilities of
Alvin
non-fulfilling jobs as
the job may
low degree of
finally,
Gouldner
it
the
describes
process; on
control
may
be
over
use or
unemployed self
the
'the unemployed self'.
effect
He
of
25
explains
its
effect:
The useless qualities of persons are, at first,
either unrewarded or actively punished should they
intrude upon the employment of a useful skill.
In other
words the system rewards and fosters those skills deemed
useful and suppresses the expression of talents and
faculties deemed useless, and thereby structures and
imprints itself
upon the individual personality and self.
Correspondingly, the individual learns what the
system requires; he learns which parts of hi-mself e-re
are unwanted and unworthy; he comes to organize his self
and personality in conform ity with the operating
standards of utility,
and thereby minimizes his costs
of participating
in such a system.
In short, vast parts
of any personality must be suppressed or repressed in
the course of playing a ro le in industrial society. 9
The Work
Group and
the worker's
relations with
his colleagues can be a source of satisfaction
that
the
is,
the
acceptance
The
been
it
involved at
the workplace,
'alienation'
is
far
not concerned here with all
given.
and
offers.
meaning of
and we are
has
interaction
at work,
As
Blauner
puts
from clear,
the meanings
it
i t:
the term, now very f ash io nable, is bandied about.
Modern man is said to be al iena ted from himself, from
other human beings, from politi cal life, from work,
from his intellectual
and art i s tic
productions, from
religion, belief and culture... the alienation thesis
has become the i ntellectual's s horthand interpretation
of the impact of the industrial revolution on the manual
worker.10
We
are
concerned not
but with
we
all workers
are concerned with
only with
manual,
or employees.
as job satisfaction
But
industrial
workers,
the phenomenon
or as
the
26
social
productivity of work itself,
refers
to the
alienating or non-alienating character of work,
as
to the narrower
in
industrial
as well
conception of job satisfaction use.d
psychology:
the terms job satisfaction and job attitudes are
Both refer to affective
typically
used interchangeably.
orientations on the part of individuals toward work
Positive
roles which they are presently occupying.
attitudes toward the job are conceptually equivalent tojob satisfaction and negative attitudes toward the job
11
are equivalent to job dissatisfaction.
Our concept of job satisfaction differs
it
the objective effects
includes
worker, as well
tion
the subjective
only available measure
concept also
the job on
the job on
attitudes
refers
the worker.
to
of
the
of the
but not always,
which are sometimes,
to the job,
worker
the
as
of
from this because
the former.
The
aliena-
the objective effects
Blauner
defines
it
as
of
follows:
alienation exists when workers are unable to
control their immediate work processes, to develop a
sense of purpose and function which connects their jobs
to the overall organization of production, to belong to
integrated industrial communities, and when they fail
ty of work as a mode of
to become involved in the 1 ctivi
personal self-expression.
The four
points he mentions
We
i t
basic elements
of job
which concern us here.
satisfaction
how
are
can
comes
compare
this with
Marx's
description of
about:
What then constitutes the alienation of labor?
First,
the fact that labor is external to the worker,
i.e.
It does not belong to his essential being; that
in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but
denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does
27
not develop freely his physical and mental energy but
The worke-r
mortifies his body and ruins his mind.
therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in
feels outside himself...
his work
His
is there-
labor
is forced .labor.
fore not voluntary, but coerced; it
is
of a need; it
therefore not the satisfaction
It is
needs external to it...
merely a means to satisfy
Lastly, the external character of labor for the worker
appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone
else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he
belongs, not to himself, but to another. 1 3
al enat ion whi ch are
The dimensions of
distinguished by these two writers are
Blauner
to
refers
es "his
but coerced; t it
voluntary,
labor)
i nabi 1 i ty to control
the
Marx wri
work purposes;
does
very similar:
labor is
is forced
o him".
not belong
immediate
therefore not
labor...
(his
Powerlessness
the
in
t
he worker
workplace exists where
job or his working cond t tions.
he cannot
influence fir
to decide
how
work
is
income
the firm':
alienating if
cannot control
the worker
own movement,
extent
policies,
y
that
or
choose
the opposite
the
the
among
is
in jobs whi ch
in what
to be
pro duced,
of the
divided.
is
hold,
he 1p
A
such that
job,
or hi s
To the
techniques.
condi tions
is
and he does not
technology
pace
h is
contrul
The worker
typicall rn has no say
are alienating
task
cannot
a job will
be
less alienating.
The
Blauner
of
sense
of purpose or meaningfulness which
talks about
the worker to the
corresponds
to Marx's
product of labor
object exercising power over him".
as
This
"the
an
relation
alien
arises
because
28
have
may
the worker
the worker
which
product,
no visible
task,
if
the product of his work
or
if
the
task
is
or
monotonous
is
with
the pro-
understand
duction process;
standardised;
nature
the
does one small
doesn't
he
if
from
result
can
Meaninglessness
of a job in
isolated from other
or he may be
the product produced,
workers.
valuelessness of
of the
a sense
unchanging.
an
impersonality of bureaucracires
form is
processes whose
Work which is
in
and
criteria,
which
mention
Marx's
technologically
to work
commitment
the
(e.g.)
of alienation
wage
needs external
to satisfy
to
Self estrangement, or
the
in
involved
in
being;...
himself
in
belong to...
his work,
but denies
there-
merely a means
it".)
the
inability to "become
of work as
activity
is
incentives
work which "is
a mode
self expression", 4e) results from jobs
does not
deter-
from of alienation (c.f.
the satisfaction of a need...
fore not
the
organized only around efficiency
likely to produce this
most
from
production
and
purely
purely derived from extrinsic
is
results
community
industrial
intergrated
mined.
inability to belong to
isolation, or the
Social
in
of personal
which "labor
(the worker's) essential
therefore,
he does not affirm
himself, does not
feel
content but
29
unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental
energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind".
any personal
needs,
the worker's
life.
or
and
analysis
is
tion.
A second stream of
thought on alienation
attributes
it
the
to
revolution
introduced.
Machines set
and division of labor while
the scope
explanations
are
industrial
technology which the
attributed
reduces
to technical
of
Alienation
economic causes.
large
scale
the worker
Job
as:
content
than
workers
is
industrial
the
not mutually exclusive:
and the
pace of work
The
to the
development
resulted.
a similar view of how the
affected workers:
two
develop-
the
growing distance
and his product which
explanations have
rather
and content of each job.
firms
has
increasing efficiency.
ment of a new technology was basic
of
produc-
of
the means
who owns
capitalist
of the
to the
by, and goes
controlled
profit
developed which
of
fact that in capitalist society a
capitalism and the
worker's product
alien-
produces
from the growth
results
Alienation
ation.
from ownership
of production
the means
of
industrial
in
that
is
the worker
separation of
control
rest of
separated from the
is
The basis of Marx's
society the
does not sati-sfy
exist where work
Self estrangement will
between
The
two
change
Blauner summarised
in
them
30
have)
fragmentations in man's experience...
resulted from basic changes in social
(which
organization brought about by the industrial revolution.
Mar xian theory of work alienation differs
The
1ibe ral analysis more
from the
it
is
attr ibu ted than
identified
ownership
output:
For
in
Marx,
in
the origin to which
which
the symptoms
the origin
is
are
the capitalist
of the means of production and control of
th e
worker is
alienated because his
labor
is n ot his own, but someone else's.... it does
not belong to him.... in it he belongs, not to himself,
but to ano the r.... the worker's activity (is) not his
spontaneou s
the loss o f
activity.
h is self.
It
belongs to another;
it
is
The analys is presented by Blauner and others explains
alienation
as the result of technolo gic.al
produces h #ierarchy,
change which
specialization, and the nature of
the decisi on-making process which ne cessarily follows
from
that
efficiency which it
makes
Marxian an alysis also
making:
the benefits of increased
technology if
possible a re
refers
to be enjoyed.
to the locus of decision-
in the nationalized industri es of Great Britain,
for exampl e, ownership is vested in the state,
decision-m aking is
when
those
ownership
ated
15
from
the
as far from the workers as it was
industries were privately
has
but
not made workers
in
owned:
th em
any
state
less
alien-
their work.
Thus we have
three
independently variable factors:
31
ownership and decision-making.
technology,
decision-making
is
usually vested
in
While
the owners
of an
enterprise,
that connection
is
not
necessary.
In
Yugoslavia,
for example,
is
the
state which
owns
the means 'of
production,
consequence of
and
possible
three
industrialization,
possible,
or else
Another
decision-making
in
decision-making and
lives,
is
locus
changing the
the
both changing
of ownership,
of
that
if
is
locus of
if private
the
is
if
be made
industrialization,
private decision-making
as
developed
production process,
the
A third is
feasible.
is
case either
of many people's
of
the beneiits
one alternative.
in which
choice must
the
a part
alienation as
foregoing
the necessary
is
technology must be
non-alienating
as well
the power of
of
much
technology, if alienation
changing
between
are
or their
to solving the problem of alienation:
approaches
is
the workers
there
Thus
decision-making.
that
and
representatives who have
elected
a new,
it
ownership
root
of work
alienation.
Solutions
to
only
in
the
'solution'
of work
firm,
or worker participation,
has
which
alienation.
in
share of workers
Increasing the
making
the problem
It
been
is,
proposed
however,
decisionis
to the
not the
problem
the only one
which derives' principally from the view of alienation
32
which
sees
technology
been
can
it
as derived
of production.
proposed
only
nology.
from factors besides
most
The alternatives
frequently
assume
be overcome within work
These
alternatives
alienation
by altering
the
are:16
the
which have
that
anti-industrialism, automation and
enlargement would reverse
the
trend
job
tech-
enlargement,
leisure.
Job
towards
increasing
division of labor by creating a technology in
which
each worker
is
in
theory which
bureaucracy
duction,
This
is
make his
industry
is
-
-
and presumably
applicable
is
intended
product
also to workers
responsible
and performs more
for more
tasks
to make work
more
this
stages
rather
less
in
than
a
a
in
pro-
less.
monotonous
and
to
identifiable.
Job enlargement counteracts the minuteness and
repetitiveness of industrial occupations by giving the
worker a more extended and elaborate series of operations to perform which enhance his skill
and
versatility,
and enable him to make a more significant
contribution to the entire manufacturing process.
Successfully introduced, it
lengthens the work cycle,
introduces variety, allows the worker to set his own
work pace, offers him greater independence in deciding
on work methods, and gives him responsibility
and
recognition for the quality of his work. 1 7
Georges
ment, at an
the
Friedmann has
described one such
IBM plant during world war
jobs of semi-skilled workers
include
new skills
the success
movement has
and more
of several
not spread
were
II,
such experimental
in
U.S.
in which
enlarged
operations.18
industry;
experi-
to
In spite of
programs,
moreover,
the
it
33
is
some
kind s of work.
that
fact
The
and to
jobs
a limited number of
to
applicable only
have
such programs
not sprea d, although studies suggest that the new jobs
and often
found more satisfying than the old,
are
productiv ity
not
does
least
at
a supporting
is
fall,
that
piece of evidence for the assertion that companies on
their own will
not
this
their
the
on
is
n ot in
demand
of their
level
the ma rket,
profits.
and
for better
and improving
it will
is
internal
realistically expected
to
alter their
not
the
to be appli'ed
of work
quality
job enlargement
not external,
cannot express
to
cost of
the
which
a context in
in
However,
bad work conditions
sions
workers
interest:
of work:
quality
the
improve
to
try
deci-
firms'
might
be more
improve
work
satisfaction.
Automation
is seen
it
as
is
a solution
argued,
tion by some,
because,
nature of the
most
the worker is
tied to a machine,
performs a
performed
alienating manual
few motions with
by new,
automated
it.
it
to work aliena-
work,
paced by
These
alter
can
in
it,
tasks
the
which
and
can be
machines.
Blumberg describes this alternative
as follows:
In the automated factories of the future, workers
will not be tied to their machines but will have much
greater freedom than operatives of today - freedom to
control work pace, freedom of physical movement, etc.
34
The rhythm of the automated factory - what has been
called a calm and crisis
rhythm - will
be much more
conduci-ve to work interest than the unrelieved tedi um
of the unending unvarying assembly-line. 1 9
Blauner
and
found
automated
compared
less
alienation
industry,
mechanized plants
He argues
the workers
in
four
industries
among the workers
chemical
the
in
processing,
textile
and
itn
than
auto
the
in
most
the
industries.
that
with automated industry there is a counter trend,
one that we can fortunately expect to become even more
important in the future... the alienation curve begins
previous height as employees in
to decline from its
from responsiautomated industries gain a new dignity
0
bility and a sense of individual function. 2
one discussed,
like the first
This solution,
by the number of jobs to which
applicable.
most
industries,
is
bility
Labor is still
in
many
immediately
is
it
cheaper than automation in
its
Moreover
jobs.
automated to
near
future.
And automation will
several
studies of
reducing the skill
not
it
jobs,
Blumberg
arrives:
not
production methods.
If
the
return
resulted in
increasing
A third solution somet imes proposed
rejection of technology and
in the
necessarily
automation which
content of
likely to
in mind
the extent Blauner has
increase work satisfaction when
cites
applica-
limited primarily to blue-collar jobs;
relatively few clerical and service jobs are
be
limited
is
is
it. 21
the
to pre-industrial
industrial
revolution
35
resulted in alienation and meant that work is
no
longer
satisfying, we could solve those problems by returning
to the status quo ante and
rejecting
The main problem with
this
is
technology.
feasibility:
the
incentives are so heavily loaded against it
that other
criticisms,
such
policy
in
such as analysis of
terms
which would have
The
of
improvements
in
to be foregone,
minimization
of work
living standards
are
ti
a
irrelevant.
me and maximization
leisure which can be a source of satisfaction is
fourth
is
of
the cost of
alternati ve.
as a
rejected
least
spend at work
shown how
little
decreased
in
is
But
the
at
De Grazia has
the time peop le spe nd at work has
thi s cen tury.22
a rapid
It
is
not
rate,
as
likely to st art
it must
if
th is
is to be meaningful for people alive toda y.
Moreover, if wor k can have posi ti ve
people's
itself
amount of time men now
far from negl igible
suddenly declini ng at
"solution"
Th is is the on l y solution, -if w ork
source of satisfact ion in
for many j obs.
the
lives,
to abandon
functions
it would
be
in
costly and
risky.
A much fuller analysis of each
tives and of the
is
advocates
given by Blumberg,
of each
of
these
and their
alternaarguments
who deserves credit for many of
36
His analysis of the effects
given above.
the arguments
2 3
of participation
to the
as a solution
problems
F.J.
with
manpower
the
policy,
the
can affect worker
factors which
affect it.
that
discussion
the evito show
operation of their
the
in
the
and
satisfaction
alienation and worker participation
share
in
under which
Blumberg analyzes
increasing workers'
increase their work satisfaction and
workplace will
reduce
their alienation.
within
a given
He manages
technology worker
alienation
the extent of worker
from his
the
conditions
participation
and
participation
for
point
a starting
following chapter of
dence on
on
paper24
Stendenbach's
together
is,
work satisfaction and conditions of work
of
review of the
to show that
can
participation
to
vary.
He
cause
ccncludes
that
literature
there is hardly a study in the entire literature
in work is
to demonstrate that satisfaction
which fails
benefiacknowledged
generally
other
enhanced or that
in
increase
genuine
a
from
cial consequences accrue
of
consistenc
Such
power.
workers' decision-making
findings,
is
I submit,
in
Stendenbach,
which
and b)
his
a)
to
the objective of an
productive ut ilisation
of
labor
the
to the objective of increasing satisfac-
tion of basic homan needs
and actualisation
contributes
socialrresearch.
study of the contributions
can make
participation
economically more
force;
rare in
and o f personal
through work,
effectively
concludes
to both goals.26
development
that
it
37
Participation
produces
Participation
also can
is
in
will
make
objective
it
conditions
influence decisions,
those
in
and
thus
in
areas
to
usually
participation
their
to alter
for the workers
possible
from
satisfaction
and not
worker
the firm,
account by
into
taken
result
If work
decisions.
borne by workers
an externality
can
which
work situation
influence on
workers'
at work
decisions
in
of workers
situation.
work
their
influence job satisfaction through the objec-
changes
tive
in
about no other changes
bring
by workers
decisions made
the
increase even where
may
participation
job satisfaction
role at work:
workers'
in
that
change
the
through
satisfaction
job
affect-
may
participation
Worker
two ways.
in
an
the job satisfaction of
enterprise potentially affects
workers
in
decisions
in
of workers
which
improve work
they
condi-
t ions.
In
of participation
situation
which
be
can
are considered.
a positive effect on
how much
introduced
needed
to
is
the work
words,
how strong is
produce
the
in
the kind
into
a work
Stendenbach,
that participation
influence on decisions,
pation
variables
Blumberg,
and others 2 7 have shown
Verba
have
some
the next chapter,
will
situation.
or how much
such an effect?
relationship
between
Vroom,
But,
particiIn
other
parti-
38
cipation and job satisfaction?
it
scale
in
level
at what
make
the boardroom,
can occur
chapter
the next
on
the
relevance of
If
necessary,
the
form will
it
implications
the
from
the focus
social
how will
does
it
have.
the
it
pursued
of
in
this
satisfaction
innovation seems
next questions which
take;
the
in
behavior of
which are
the problem of work
form of
some
planners.
arise
level
any
least,
are examined.
two sets of questions
two chapters
at
theory,
In
3 the effects on
firm of worker participation
The
the shopfloor or
(on
at
does
at what
enterprise or
for example?).
worker participation
In
the
occurs
participation
the
fi rm.
in
difference
What
work;
arise
are what
and what
ether
paper
to
39
ON
INFLUENCES
THE
IMPACT
OF
JOB SATISFACTION
ON
PARTICIPATION
Introduction
Severa 1 mediating factors will
of
impact of workers'
satisfaction
Some
affect
participation
are
on
individual,
1
which do not concern us here.
the extent
their
job
personal
Situational
factors,
factors are
discussed here which might be expected t o play a role
in
determi ning
the
participati on on
impact of
satisfacti on and work alienat ion.
from
the
d escriptions
and worker
alienation.
their effe cts
the
given
a bove
They der i ve
job
genera I ly
of job sati s faction
The v ariables we exami ne for
are:
amount of
control w orkers
mane gement sit
the scale or
have
in
a self-
ation;
level
of
t he
firm
at
which workers
participate in management;
the
that
directness or
is,
elected
immediacy of
whether workers
representatives
participation
participate
through
or directly;
how and by whom participation is
introduced.
-
40
Evidence
the
to examine
available
is
The evidence which
effects of participation on worker satisfaction and
it
on
influences
data
first
step,
study
can be
is
from a number
from
other
from
non-work environments
in
participation
these
presented
be
relevant evidence
research;
work-related
studies of
some bearing on
data will
of
types
of different
assembled which has
The most detailed
issues.
a
as
But,
far from abundant.
will
also be used.
of work environments
effects
introduced on
been
rare.
ments
available from studies of the
evidence is
Some
A second
in
which
a long
is
source
a factor, either
though not planned
an experimental
by
experiment.
procedures;
of normal
in
the work
procedures
exist
of
spontaneously
or
situation or
were unable
instances
in
as
in
a
the ex p erimenters,
Other
result
of
the
cases
disruption
to other
to demands w i th which
changes
normal
A goo d many examples
whi ch workers
thei r workplaces: Spain,
are
sources
as
d eci si on-making
in
response
to cope.
in
or occurring
Variable,
in which participation by workers
emerged
are
has been
practice
has
these
in work envi ron-
participation
Hawthorne
but
experiments
as
the
-
term basis
designed
with
where pa rticipation has
ha ve
for a while,
in
taken
over
the 1930's;
41
Russia in 1918; Algeria in 1962; and Italy in 1969 and
however,
These documented examples,
for example.
1970,
are of smaller scale spontaneous worker control.
Other-
sources which attempt to explain the way different kinds
satisfaction
of participation affect participants'
include surveys of workers and studies of job satisfacand comparisons of different forms of work
tion,
situation.
Studies
of
participation or control will
worker
mation on
and are
the
for
and
planned economies
foreign examples
small
include
amounts of control
of which exist
all
in
of Western
and
the
the
Europe.
instances of both
at many
of economy
of Yugoslavia,
economy
the self-management
impact on
the
forms
the state managed economy of Poland;
partially
not
alternative
in
effects
individual,
the
information on
the only source of
example
used for infor-
be
impact of participation on
participation's
-
experience with
(non-american)
foreign
The
great
and
levels of the firm,
or have been docu-
U.S.
mented.
Measures
of work satisfaction
This study is concerned with the
control
on workers'
section some of
attttudes
the measures
to
their
which
can
impact of worker
jobs.
In
this
be identified as
42
These
indicators of those attitudes are described.
-
relate
of participation
indicators of the impacts
variables -
amount of sati sfaction or
to the
experience.
which workers
These
thei r measurement
fac ility with which
include:
The more objectively measured va riables
the
regulari ty with which workers
the
as
measured
to work,
they
or work satisfaction.
can be connected with alienation
Absenteeism -
in
both
or subjectivity:
the
in
and
by
are characterized
behavior variables
varying deg rees of objectivity
come
alienation-
proportion
of work-
days missed.
turnover
Labor
employees
the
the propo rtion
firm over
of job slots.
number
the
in
-
a high
result of
number of workers
High
quit
the
labor turno ver may
rate, or of
be
a large
low labor satisfaction
or
directly,
job,
the
to
being di scharged by management.
Either one can indicate
with
rela tive
a year
of
number
of the
as
reflected
in
poor
job performance.
Productivity to each
well
Itself
input.
labor
below norms
be an
(for
Workers
example,
producing output
the
industry)
dissatiefied
less efficient
with
than others,
may
workers.
indicator of dissatisfied
People who are
to be
attributable
the amount of output
their
and
work
thus
appear
to have
43
lower productivi ty.
One reason may be that where work
is not an intrinsic source of satisfaction, the need
is
to spend
greater
include hostility
They
reported satisfaction
from work,
"ego
cooperativeness,
and interviews
for example:
intefgration and
ability;
next section
The
to
-
the
clarify
relates
evidence on
tion where
variable
are
indicators
describes
the most
development.
a model
of
participain
Each of the
relevant
of the
of one variable
participation
scale,
has been
learning
and
creativity,
the
of
testing
from
meaning of participation
the impact
(amount,
satisfaction with the job,
individual
context of work environments.
sections
these are
All
usually derived
health,
mental
worker's
to work,
commitment
can be estimated.
from work,
last set of measures
The
identifi-
happiness,
involvement".
variables with which workers'
or alienation
to management,
morale,
the enterprise,
cation with
psychological
or
questionnaires,
derived
be
may
variables
'subjective'
interviews,
testing.
tion
interaction
such as
other workers.
The more
from
alternative
on
activities
satisfaction-producing
with
at work
time
the
subsequent
available
on job
introduced.
satisfacEach
and directness of participa-
44
tion)
is
evidence is
this
refer
to
used
and then
detail
situ ation in
to any
has been
participation"
which worke rs
any situat ion
Participation then
i n which some of the
exists
in
tional
concerns of o wners and management,
tradi -
tha t
responsibility for t he wa y in which the firm
and
workers.
in
no share
ex ists,
boardroom) , to that
run
and
It
controlled
is
in
by
combination,
practice more
small
opera-
shared with
decisions which
o f power
a re made,
wh ich workers exercise
its
workers.
are
listed
although
some
frequently
amount of participation
all the
completely
is
and the firm
conceivable that any of
are considering which
any
is
fi rm (from shopfloor or o ffice to
of ownership,
prerogatives
are
is,
from that in which workers
of t he
any
of the
level
at any
in
it,
poss ible distributions
A range of
the enterprise
have
t o ope rate
the power
have
inf 1uence any decisions in the
which they work.
in
enterprise
ted,
Co-
participation
paper "worker
power to make or
the
more
The final section draws
introduced.
Definition of
In
in
conclusions to be drawn from the chapter.
the
gether
described
first
the
above
variables we
could appear
combinations
than others:
occur in
for example,
introduced
at
in
a
shopfloor
45
level by workers'
through
power
participative
high level policy making,
government
action
or a moderate
initiative,
(like
amount of
representatives
elected
in
ittroduced by
which is
Mitbestimmung
in
2
Germany),
are both examples which exist.
Table 2.1 presents one possibl e typology of forms
of participative organization for th e enterprise:
level
it
it should
the meaning of participation in the context of
clarify
may exist at more
firm participation
amount
King
and Van de Va11
which
one
level and
an analysis of
provide
relate
existing
to
levels
distinguish three
they
tions:
they
3
than one
in
level.
at each
different
participation
mutuall y exclusive:
are not
The types
the firm.
in a
ar e varied:
amount of participation
and
in
institu-
of managerial
decision-making:
direction or initiation
of policy
administration or preparation
execution or
At each
level
decision.
they
implementation
of
They also examine
the
policy
find two steps: exploration
ticipation in each system.
model
of
of policy
timing of worker
the
Table
timing of workers'
and
2.2 presents
participation.
par-
their
Table 2.1Workers' Power
Level of Participation:
and the Level of Participation
Shopfioor
Firm
Amount of Power
Control
(most)
Workers set their own
pace, control work
environment with
little
or no direct
supervision
Workers run the firm,
make al 1 decisions,
own all profits,
control choice of technology
Workers are free to
run the firm, make
most decisions; all
or most profits go to
owners who retain
ultimate control
Complete control of
work physical environment
some control of timing
some freedom from
supervision; standards set
by work group
Codetermination
As above; production
norms set by
management
Control of some aspedts
of work speed, and
of environment
Close supervision
Minimal
Participation
No Participation:
Piecework: timing of
jobs done by management
butsome control of work
speed and method by
workers
Close supervision, pace
set by machines or
supervisors and enforced.
Equal responsibility:
Workers have equal representation on boards with
managementand owners
Shared responsibility:
worker have a veto or a
say in some decisions and
have representatives on
boards of management
Routes open for ideas from
workers: they get compensated
for them
Workers are entitled to
information on the firm's
operations
Workers work for a wage
and work conditions bundle
set by management unilaterally
Table 2.2
The Timing of Worker Participation
Systems of Participation
Britain
(Joint
Consultation)
Explore
Level of
Direction Choose
Yugoslavia
(Workers'
Management)
Germany
(Mitbestimmung)
NO
Qualified YES
Qualified YES
NO
YES
YES
Explore Qualified YES
Level of
Administration
Choose NO
Level of
Execution
YES
Qualified YES
YES
YES
ExploreQualified YES -NO
Choose
Qualified YES
NO
3
Source: King and Van de Vall
Qualified YES
YES
48
Amount of participation
The
amount of participation means
the power which workers
The
the firm.
cipants
in
can play
participants
may
passive
in
While
role
passive
role
at
in
a given
influence
positive,
decisions
is
level
at
any
positive
role potentially
negative
role
as
have
of
on
as
the firm.
can vary,
a
the three,
less
the
or
most powerful;
could be powerful,
in
parti-
Workers
level of
limiting
the
have
negative,
power workers
the most
decisions
depends
decision-making.
play a
amount of
the
to
amount of power workers
decisions
role they
have
the extent of
can be
and
a
while a
done with
it.
in
Schuchman
Germany
based
has
on
his study of
developed a typology
these modes ,
given
as
table
2.3.
It
least and classes workers'
positive,
negative or passive.
role:
and cause
have
to
one
in
role
in
the
firm
which workers
delays or
relatively
power of workers
the power of workers
ranks
to
veto
of participation
ranking the
from most
A negative
in
A modified version of his table
from most to least.
is
Mitbestimmung
is
can
role
a blocking or
protest
veto them permanently.
little
influence decisions,
power,
they
as
can use
but ultimately
decisions
If
workers
their
they have
role
no
Table 2.3
Workers' Role and Amount of Control.
Workers' Role
Passive
Positive
Negative
Amount of
Control
Most
Workers have the
right of decision
on all issues,
exclusively
Workers have the
right of
co-decision
Workers have a
veto over
decisions
Temporary
Veto
Workers can
protest
decisions
Workers have access
to information on
the firm's decisions
and plans
Least
Workers have a
temporaty veto
after which
management has
to negotiate
Workers must be
consulted but
their suggestions
do not bind the
management
Workers can make
suggestions
5
Source:
Adapted from A. Schuchman and P' Blumberg
50
responsibility
gerial
decisions
to be
the ultimate
determine
veto on
the other hand
for the
decisions
and
but
cannot
form of
decisions.
those
gives workers
certain
A positive
role
suggestions ,
introduce
alternatives
in
right of
the ope
example
unsafe
it has
which workers
been
make
innovat io ns , and evaluate
ration of
consultation wi thout
then the power
making bodies,
total
for
the fi rm.
If this
is
bi ndi ng the final
or of minorit y represe ntati on on decision-
decision,
minate.
The power
conditions.
in
one
is
-
conditions
refuse either permanently or until
to operate with those
They can
forms.
largely negative
is
A
responsibility
concerned with.
declare certain working
can
checked
a
reconsidered,
not take
exercised by unions
they
cause mana-
they
them:
they are
it does
that
ensure
can
for
direct
it
However, where workers
in
share'
role implies
are made.
responsibi lity for
then have
operation of the enterp rise
some or all of the
of
the
and
or
the positive
the dec isions which
power
to control
the
to exercise in practice
rights which conventionally belong
of a firm.
A passive
recipients
have an 'equal
operati ng the en te rp ris e,
Workers
to the owners
impl ie s is indeter-
role
is
one
information
In which workers
about
the
are
operation of
the
51
enterprise,
made,
what
and able
the
true
the firm would be,
role,
to know what
costs
of alternative
for example.
workers have no direct
However,
very
information
useful
small
role in
in
are being
policies
But with
to
a passive
influence on decisions.
about a firm's
to workers
formal
decisions
operations
conjunction with
decision'making:
a
can be
relatively
hence the union
in England to 'open the books'. 6
pressure on firms
The si-gnificance of the variable "amount"
participation
is
mostly de ri ved
of
from the "powerlessness"
aspect of alienat ion and f ro m supervis ion as a source
of job satisfacti on or dis sa tisfaction .
partici pation al so can
amount of
relations within the work group,
to make deci sions
need
i
I
Vrve
j
bk
decision-making in
activities)
production
workers
job
it
r
Jn
the
en
in charging
in the
results
unning the prothe social
Influence ov er decisions also
isolation of the worker.
l d
if
thus perh aps reducing
duction process,
oU
resul t
a group in
as
Increasing the
,
firm
k oth direct ly
widens
the
( through
ch
techniques brough t about
as
and indirectly
(because
scope of workanges in
a result of
participation which are made i n order to make
conten't
less
monotonous or to use
more
of
the
worker's skills).
As worker participation is
increased,
the
52
alienating content of
mission to external
labor which derives from sub-
control
is
reduced.
amount of decision-making which
comparisons
in morale,
of
supervisory
with more
cing higher morale.
pursuing
other
is
it
powerlessness
is
possible
could
as
a further
as
that
result
the worker
is
reason
in
then
subject
of his
the effects of various
amounts
of participation
of
individual
to even
to see what
are
on
satisfaction.
The
experiments
and studies which
to have most
bearing on
are
which the
those
in
this
aspect of
amount
varied while other conditions
Typically,
in experimental
matched work
units
participatory
instituting
they
the
fellow-
the evidence
first
On
amount
greater
examine
worker
for
a variable.
therefore
workers.
a component
a very great
closer control by the collectivity
We
to be
sharing of decision-making produThis
participation
shared appears from
techniques
amount of participation
hand,
worker
is
Moreover, the
to come
reported
efficiency
portional
(in
change.
of participation
studies of this kind,
in
performing
The
the
rate
of
a
is
Coch
recovery of
"is
amount of participation",
or non-
task or
study which
learning new tasks)
to the
is
remain the same.
closest to our need
that
participation
receive either participatory
leadership
some
can be expected
appears
at
and French's:
job
directly proand
that
7
53
of turnover and
rates
"...
directive
group with
how a change was
to be
results
The
of
was
told what
merely
In
be.
in
the participatory
The
of
(or
Although
the plans".
in
differed,
group
both
the
groups
participation
presented and dis-
mode of
then
"approved
communication
the workers
techniques
would
the new work
representatives)
the
changes
arrangements
new work
arrangements were "dramatically"
cussed.
Coch and French's
the group without
the
no
'participation'
the
already decided on
to be made;
(at
variables
However,
which were
consistent
show
the experiment
relatively trivial:
management had
study
deci ding
carried out.
productivity).
by workers was
two
and
representatives,
a
parti-
a group which
the work satisfaction
in
increases
cost in
compared
whi ch all membe rs parti cipated in
in
groups
inversely
The i r
factory,
leadership,
elected
cipated through
are
of participation".
a garment
in
of workers
study,
amount
to the
proportional
aggression
were
informed
a decision made by management.
It
is
not known whether
have continued
things
belongs
in
the
the
the
extreme
real
absence of any
contained in participation.
at
good effects would
low end of
scale of power or control.
It
power
This example
the participation
is not
a strongly
to alter
54
persuasive
of power
another experiment
real
in
meant
participation
which
Bavelas 8 found that a group
control,
workers
in
a garment
factory)
discuss and set production
In
with work.
satisfaction
on participants'
of amount
for the effect
piece of evidence
some
(also of
which was allowed to
norms was
more
productive
than another which discussed but had no power to set
the norm S.
An d in
a repI ication of Bavelas'
stu dy,
that morale rose both in a
Lawrence and Smith 9 found
group di s cussi ng work-rel ated issues and in anot her
which bo th dis cussed simi lar issues and also set
Efficienc y rose in
duction goals.
signific antly more in
former.
Both
studies sug
discussing work-related
made the
parti cipant
t he
gest that the greater amou nt
of parti ci pati on involved in
as
both groups, but
latter group than in
the
pr 0-
group
deciding on goals as w elI
issues or production
goals,
more satisfied and produc-
tive.
The results of the research on work incentives
done in the 1930s at the Hawthorne factory by
Roethlisberger an d Dickson 1 0 have more recently been
reinterpreted by a number of writers.
They have shown
that the changes in both work satisfaction and productivity of workers in
the Relay Assembly Test Room
experiment corres pond to changes made by the
experimenters
in
the amount of
freedom and of parti-
55
job conditions.
cipation characterizing the workers'
as
This explanation emerges
the experimenters'
changes
in
explanations which
productivity
to:
(a)
the
aims
to the
and "regard
with which
of management"
actual
out
rose
that productivity and
as
long
as
their
setting experiments
experimenters
reduced
lost
freedom to
faction fell.
as a
develop-
harmony
the
care
of the workers"
introduced.
experiments
the workers'
continued and
in
participate,
in
increased; when
the experiment
productivity
The amount of participation
point
satisfaction
to participate
ability
interest
in
result of
of the Hawthorne
Later students
effect"
to the
(b)
sentiments
innovations were
attributed
(perform)
ment of a group which "will...
with
convincing than
the "Hawthorne
an experiment;
in
of participating
far more
the
and
and
which
satisthe
girls were allowed is described as follows by the
experimenters:
concerned with
the test room observer was chiefly
creating a friendly relation with the operators which
would ensure their
cooperation and he discussed their
work and attitudes to the test with them.11
as they applied to the
The 'rules of the game',
were allowed to talk
shop, were changed... The girls
more freely in the test room than in the regular
department. 12
in order that the experiment would not be spoiled
by varying attitudes on the part of the operators
was
toward the experimental changes introduced, it
thought necessary to make certain that to every change
gave wholehearted cooperation... the
each girl
56
operators were advised of and consulted about changes
to be made, and several plans suggested by the
experimenters were not introduced because they met with
1 3
the disapproval of the operators.
frequently commented on the freedom
(the girls)
In their
from constraint and excessive supervision.
supervisor ceased to be one who
first-line
eyes their
in case things went wrong; instead
'bawled them out'
representative of
he came to be regarded as a friendly
This was what Operator 2 meant when she
management.
he's no boss.
'say,
said, referring to the observer,
We don't have any boss.
r
Relay Assembly Test Room
The progess of the Hawthorne
experiment
ship between
faction is
amount
whose
involves
again
their
in
participation
cipation was
used,
for
satisfaction
possible;
with
satisfaction
was
increased
whose
the
in
found
that
jobs was
a group
increased
measures
Several
attitudes
study:
measures
the group whose
and reduced
amount of participation
was
of morale
available
"self-
job
showed
amount
satisfaction
parti-
to supervisors;
company and "intrinsic
All these
satisfaction".
and
of the Hawthorne
reevaluation
Reimer's
Morse
sophisticated than those
more
higher
a slightly
than a group whose
decreased.
actualization"
is
They
workers.
clerical
showed greater satisfaction
were
satis-
a positive one.
of participation
study of
relation-
and job
of participation
An experiment which
amount
the
that
evidence
thus provides
increased
of
parti ci pation
in
the group
reduced
Again,
this
is a more convincing linking of amount of sat i sfaction
57
and
than Coch
participation
All
level of
the experiments
decisions,
and
cited
although
addressed to changes
in
French.
above are
the
at
a
low
lat er examples
amount of
we re
pa rticipation wh ich
gave work ers more additional power t han did the ea rl ier
examples.
But
the power was
organizat ion level in
all
at
shopfloor or o ffi ce.
the
cases.
Fr om the
studies
which wer e found of effects of varyi ng the amount of
parti ci pa tion,
holding other variabl es constant as far
as possib le, we can conclude that in creasing the
amount of participation,
related t o the job,
at
appears
least
to
in
raise
issues
job
immedi ate 1y
satisfact ion
and reduc e alienation consistently.
No studies we re
found at
in which the
this
level
reverse effect
There
groups
with
occurred.
is
with
a lack of studies
differing
respect
experiment
to job
amounts
are compared
The Hawthorne
that successive
increases
over the
years
in
of
could be explained by successive
in the participation
but
the
The
experiments
data are qualitative
of
which participant
of power
and productiiity
the experiment
magnitudes
in
satisfaction.
cited suggests
worker satisfaction
increases
of participation
and
with more
change
in
allowed
far from
rigorous
amount
to the workers,
data
rigorous.
concern
of participation,
smaller
over
58
period,
a shorter
but point
in
the
direction.
same
Level of participation
Worker participation will
amount, but also in
which
it oc curs:
vary not only in
the level of
a high level
in overall policy-making in
p articipation
of worker
a firm may,
b ut need not,
coincide wi th a high level of participati
shopfloor o r individual job level.
overall
pol icy-making means
decisions s uch as
th e firm is
how much
work
levels
on on
is
the
Parti cipation in
that workers
a say
have
in
an d employment;
of production
prepared to spend on
condit ions; what
at
the enterprise
and
wages
Participation
to be produced.
on the shop floor or individual job level
means
individual workers or groups or teams of
workers have
power to ma ke decisions
conditions:
tion of
the
affecting their
pace at which
the environment
that
i mmediate work
they work,
and distribution
the organizaof work
in
an office, for example.
There
are
levels of control
these
to be adopted
for production,
shopfloor:
performed
individual
for example,
by each
a scale
decisions on
diate between
implications for
two:
at
interme-
technology
the
for example, have
work
how many
at
conditions
tasks
are
person on a production
the
to be
line;
or
59
whether highly or
are
to be
sometimes
only
moderately
Decisions on work conditions
also fa 11
in
this
intermediate
cannot be
or by work groups imdependently:
sions for the res t
King and Van
of the
firm
de
15
participation
VaIl
occurs
-
made
level,
and
range.
by
they have
compare
the
that of the
These
individuals
repercus-
levels
they distinguish
level of the worker or shopfloor level
the plant
techniques
adopted .
are decisions whi ch often
which
automated
at
the
participation,
industry and
government:
workers participation may occur... as consultation in a shop or department,
in a plant, in a
multiplant corporaticn, in a committee of steel or
mining industries or in a National Economic Council.
Although the primary focus of workers participation
traditionally has been the plant, it can be extended
from that level in upward and downward directions.
They
level
argue
is
that
extension upwards
'more important'
to plant and industry
because
crucial decisions are Increasingly being made by
managing boards of large holding companies, e.g. on
automation, relocation, agglomeration, integration and
discontinuance; by employers'
associations, e.g. on
eliminating labor costs from competition between firms
in the industrial sector and by government agencies,
e.g. on safety and quality standards, antitrust
legislation,
taxation and investment regulations.
If we
argue that
pation on workers'
concrete
and
the
effects-of
job satisfaction
large ly material
worker
partici-
arise mainly from
changes
in
work
condi-
60
this conclusion fol lows.
tions,
that participation
largely through
between
true:
inherent c hanges
the worker
will
and his
at
lower
the shop or
levels,
more.
That
respect
above:
reported
to
partici-
conditions not at all,
increase i n job satisfaction.
leve 1 is
or worksho p
Part i ci pa tion at the office
likely to affect the nature of supervis ion an d
most
the job content , and hence job satisfaction:
changes
which
could eventually
with
participation
run
is
sugges ted by the results of the
changed mater ial
caused an
still
then the opposite
job,
important with
experiment
and French
pation which
is
itself
job satisfaction is
Coch
the
relationship
in
affect job sa tisfaction
participation in
we conclude
affects job satisfaction also or
participation
office,
if
But
alternatives,
Hence
in
the
power
if
short
to
result
change
run,
again seems most
satisfaction.
Moreover,
fellow workers,
affect
to be
content
participation
at
involved in
of alienation.
longer
far-reaching.
at
intermediate
to increase job
likely
and
relations with
lower
the meaningfulness of the job,
the worker
level
in
are
level
by bringing about more
job
changes
things,
participation
or shop levels
immediate
from higher
more
potentially
the
his work,
levels will
the ability
of
and hence his
61
There
is
participating
work
no one study comparing groups of workers
(with similar amounts of power
situation)
nization.
at
(Some
the workers
low
level
involved were
the same
the
orga-
similar
made with supervisors 1
participation
in
higher
the
7
although
job heierarchy:
situations where
in
participation
involved their
level policy was
content and not higher
their job
in
participation experiments,
these were of
it
levels
described above, were
to ones
but
different
in
involved).
ses
and compare
floor,
the
results
all
cited earlier,
at
participation
the
levels
in
of participation
of which
effects
than
on work
the effect
of
the
increashop-
satisfaction
the experiments
dealt with
very
low
level
the workplace.
The Yugoslav system
is
on
report
at other
participation
in
with
can
we
However,
of worker self m anagement
worker participation at the firm level: i n all but
the smallest enterprises
workers
council.
the firm is
run by an elected
It should thus be a fruitf ul source
of data on the effects of participation at a high level
in the firm.
universal
control
-
But because worker self manage ment is
and has existed for some time, no obvious
group for comparisons exists.
economic,
social and so on -
is
(The environment
too differ ent from
62
the U.S.,
of
course,
in
job satisfaction
Kavci c,
made
Rus and Tannenbaum1
They
who are elected
9
and Ob radovi c 2 0
representatives
in
those workers
however,
have compared,
have
and satisfaction
attitudes
studies of workers'
Yugoslavia.
meaningful).
two countries
the
comparison of
direct
to make any
and manage-
on workers'
ment counci l s , with 'non-parti ci pa nts ' - i .e. those
workers who
in
are col aective members
participate mainly a s voters.
Thu
th e firm, but who
s the evidence from
Yugoslavia confuses our "di rectnes s" var iable with the
variable "le vel"
Keep ing that in
of participation.
mind, we fin d that the "parti cipan ts"
(Obradovic).
non-pa rti
i n a b ureaucracy.
level
cipants
that
While
is
the results of this study
a plausible e xplanation
suggest that the value
firm
this to frustration
Obradovi c attributes
from attempt i ng to act
the
job s atisfaction"
in Yugoslav industry show "greater
but also mor e alienation than the
at
f par ticipation
in
improving
the quality o f job cond i t ions is more vulnerable to
other
factors at higher
level s in
the
only fifth on their
'par
firm.
ti ci p ants'
is
ranked participation
list of desired job characteristics.
The difference from the resul ts of American
so striking that it sugg est a t
participation, when
That
furt her findiing that in
confirmed by Obrado vic's
Yugoslavia even
the
it is
studies
least that firm
indirect,
is
greatly
is
level
di l uted
63
workers
in
perceptions of
aspects
of
the
these organizations with
control
that
councils
they also
However,
that workers
at
participation
from
reorganization
study of
some
was
the
plant and
textile factory.
in
immediately
resulted
in
but
Thus the
of
control
of
22
Rice's
plant
throw
does
at
participation
level
a
The "level"
large workspace
When workers
"the
different
A.K.
individual workplace.
the event,
took
members
the effect
more
in a textile
reorganization of a
consulted
still
Europe,
on the effects of
light
between
clearcut about
1
level.
or Western
U.S.
the
this
not
an environment
is
India
is
council
their work.
in
in
a
and supervisors were
supervisors
and workers
the system" 2 3 and
rising productivity
and satisfaction.
It
produced a "flood of technological suggestions...
collaborative
permissive and
established".2
making,
4
which were found
as
relationships were
At this intermediate
direct participation
the results
in
sense of
to provide. 2
are designed
found
(control,
the workers
the substantial
were more "highly involved"
Yugoslav evidence
provide
do not
councils
firm"
from other workers
communication, and decision-making)
and that "the
not differ
Yugoslavia "do
in
council members
their
finding that
Kavcic, Rus and Tannenbaum's
in value.
came
in
level of decision-
close
to
repeating
low level U.S.
614
experiments.
by workers
The production of suggestions
imply
i n the
participation
not necessar i
niques,
can
leve 1 of choice of tech-
ly onl y at shopfloor 1eve l.
The
Scanlon Plan 2 5 makes sugges tion s from work e rs a
central
representati ves
of workers'
ci pa tion: the p a rt ci pati on
the
in
and select s ugg estions
evaluate
is
in thei r parti
part
intermed
a further
committees
for
use
in
which
the
iate level whi ch operates
The Sc ani on Plan has had a somewhat
concurrently.
different experience,
in those firms which have
from othe
r bonus and profit sharing
adopted
it,
Its effects
schemes.
claimed to
are
on productivity
be significantly bett er, as are
morale.
firm
effects
its
The role of sug gestion schemes
on workers'
important
is
enough in
the plan th at it may explain its
success.
A study whi ch investigated this would be of
great value:
shoul d a lso distinguish the signifi-
it
int roduction, since Scanlon and
cance of the mode of
his
greater
followers put gre at emphasis on this.
taken
in
the Scanlon Plan,
introducing
at
participation
suggestions,
ses which are
From
an
i
appears
to deserve
claimed for the
the jumble
as well
level
nte rmediate
The
credit
care
as the
through
for
the
succes-
plan.
of evidence
on
the
level
of
65
apparently
a factor-
since Coch and French's
low level
participation we find that
importance,
of some
are no such effects at
possibly there
are
they
is
participation
is,
level of the
the
least where
of participation
section on
the
partici-
level of
issue of the immediacy of partici-
pation raised the
that
at
major,
that
representatives.
through
The previous
pation:
not
or directness
Immediacy
changes
showed some
the Yugoslav evidence suggests
alienation, but
firm or that
is
representation
participants with
in
it
whether
the worker
decisions
makes
himself, or in conjunction with groups of his fellow
representatives
to cecall
in
participation:
there
&lectors'
The
a
something
a
at any
between
time
direct
is
subject
may,
and
but need
indirect
because the delegate is subject to
are stronger pressures
to
represent
his
interests.
studies of
of satisfaction in
The
behalf.
representative who
Yugoslavia by Kavcic,
Tannenbaum and by Obradovic do not show
tion.
or
representative
decisions on his
by his constituency
result
recall,
to make
through
Participation
not,
he elects
or whether
workers,
the firms with
fact that
in
Rus
a high
and
degree
indirect participa-
Yugoslavia the smallest
firms,
66
are runjby a scheme of direct
with under 30 workers,
participation,
s uggests the po ss i b il ity of
all workers,
determine
and
that
the
one is
indi rect
matrhed
just
ai
larger
work ers council.2 6
the
just smaller
of such a study,
a b sence
French's study find i ngs again are
Coch and
all
other is
and has
by workers as its
at ion
In the
a bove,
criticisms made
the
al ienatio n
firms differing only i n
30 workers
than
participation, and
and has direct particip
but
0f
rs
p,
td
a study
satisfaction,
jo b
comparative
i n
0n ,
so
coun ci l1 being made up of
the workers'
relevant,
of the study, still
hold , an d not too much can b e built on its finding
the direct partici pants were more satisfied than
that
the others, who
Coch
The
correspond
of
self
the elements
direct
and French
of alienation)
in
decisions
indirect involvement.
to
attempted
in
cipation
compare
of
describes
are
at
employment with
the shortage of
representatives.
does
however,
that
work
(to
more
powerlessness,
two
just
take
reduced by
and
the workplace,
Stendenbach 2
representative
failed to draw conclusions
because
in
involvement
involvement
less by
finding,
to what we would expect:
loss of
and
through
participated
7
has
parti-
systems of
he
direct participation;
from the
two,
mainly
adequate studies.
the wholesale failure of works
But
councils,
form of indirect worker participation at higher
he
a
levels
67
of the
power
firm,
and
to unrepresentativity
they were
in
The
which
is
and attributes their failure
general
so
powerlessness
typifies
contrast
delegates,
indirectly
chosen.
councils
to
movement
in
Europe
the outbursting of energy
to acquire more powers which are
and will
because
and failure to acquire power
the works
in marked
of
to lack of
typical of
accounts of participation by people, directly and at
lower
levels:
for example,
visors and workers
system...
is
comment
"the
super-
immediately took possession of the
spontaneously
such energy
Rice's
chosen work
as obviously
groups..."
rdleased
in
,28
No
a more
representative system.
How
and by whom participation
The way in
the
last
extreme
is
meant who
control
control
is
introduces
the
introduced
By "way
with
the workers;
no prior
a scheme
participation
without
the prior consent or encouragement
We
could
refer
The
from workers'
to one extreme
or informing
or worker
which
results
is
introduced by
consultation with
and worker
is
element of
control
ment.
it
into the work situation, and how.
alternatives are
management
of
introduced
of the variables we consider.
introduced"
worker
which worker
is
choice and
as
planning,
of manage-
participation
68
from above and the other as participation from below.
Either such change could occur suddenly or gradually,
as a result of a de cision or an unhalted trend.
permanence of a par ticipation
impermanenc e,
could
underlying the intr
scheme,
or its
affect success.
oduction of
The
The
motives
a participation scheme
may cause a ttitudes or expectations
in
the other
participant s which bring about success or produce
failure.
T he succe ss of a profit sharing plan in a
firm in whi ch the a Ilternative was closing the plant,
if producti vity did not rise, is not surprising:
Whyte 2 9 des cribes o ne such case and contrasts
another in which wo rkers were ill-informed
it
with
about
the
working of a plan and had no reason for commitment
The
it.
former
prospered and the
failed,
latter
to
not
surprisingly.
scheme
A participation
and organized
initiative
more satisfying
Trist's
this
30
than one
studies of
they organized
more
ran
ism, sickness
and accident
that
gave
the work
more
the
it,
be
introduced by management.
mining
in
Durham bears
a teamwork system,
themselves,
and the workers
efficient
described
as we have
longwall
and
given
should,
out: wbere miners had developed
which
was
by them
of job satisfaction
nature
at workers'
introduced
rates.
variety
had
their
lower
Miners
and meant
work
absentee-
reported
that
69
difficulties
were shared ;
alternative mining
team was
was
preferred
techn iques available.
put together by
same way,
it
the effect
was
management
to the
But when
to work
in
The
the opposite.
a
the
-
management
established group quickl y broke up and miners preto
ferred
to the old,
return
work-style,
less
'participative'
rather than have the participative
one
imposed on them.
The examples which
spontaneous
participative
for salesmen's
competition
it
and
also
versus
between
appear to
they may
energy which we found in
workers
in
rept rt
a to
only
for
raised
the men;
and more management
have
a greater effect
outside on workers'
but spontaneous
3 2
cooperation
Spontaneous
schemes
threaten
system too much , because of
Strauss's
same
discussion above of direct
participation).
reason:
the
as expressed by
introduced from
satisfaction;
another
the
in
of
found a polling system
salesmen which not
schemes
ones
point
to take over more
(compare
indirect
documented
substituted
job satisfaction,
participation
than
schemes
pay which
led them
functions
been
Babchuk and Goode 3 1
direction:
morale
have
the
many
great
such
of spontaneous
factory who
the
got
of their produc- ion line and of
may
job
fail
for
rest of
t he
release o f
instances.
(by
participation
control
their
of
the speed
physical
70
tivity,
and hence
a group
bonus,
pation
their
resulted
in
abolition
to other
parts
it
they were paid
since
incomes
scheme very quickly:
threats
they raised their produc-
this out:
bears
environment)
of
the
resulted
of the
in
system which
undergone
any such
organizational
The
inherent
greater effectiveness
participation
these
from
in
rai sing
studies.
than workers
many
had
not
change.
of
spontaneous
introduced by others
schemes
successful;
the Scanlon Plan sho ws
too
job sat isfaction seems obvious
But
can be
partici-
this.
the effectiveness
introduced
An d worker
schemes which raise sat isf acti on effectively,
to a
it
return
they
come
they
are
le ve 1 than ever if
lower
into confl ict
wi th
Wh en
generated.
the workers
to control
their
work then
since
that o ccurs
it,
as
line
the supervisor did
returned
to a constant
and more
his
workers'
so vulnerable
toy firm when he
role.
unpleasant
speed,
for
and
indeed
as ephemeral
appears
was
it
lives;
are
to
in
will
they
fail when
the system within which
feelings of job diss ati s fa ct ion
confirmed:
of
the
fundamental
alienation
powerless
and
involvement
in
and perhaps
the
a
example
their
can end
of the
the production
the speed
of
which was
less
the workers,
unable
sham,
forces which
Strauss's
are
productive,
but which
restored
71
Conclusions
Surveying the results of studies of the effect
job satisfaction suggests
of participation on workers'
some tentative hypotheses about the conditions which
will affect job satisfaction most.
amount of participation is
We find that the
a significant variable:
share in decisions is
where workers'
they
increased,
report more satisfaction, or behave in ways that
Where some workers'
suggest that conclusion.
decisions is
reports
more,
less,
and others'
or
greater job satisfaction,
job environment.
This
the
is
finding
in
alienation
di fferent
more alienated,
restricted most
technology which
on
the job,
workers
the
than
the
choices
those
chemical
assembly
line
open
to workers)
in pr inting
factory
technologies
these
and
in
last
of
work
the wo rke rs were
less
the
two
bot h gave workers
the
in
decis ion-making
their
(which again
were
The
r estricted
also more
alienated
continuous process
very different
more
freedom
and more
that
it
is
real
decisions to make.
The
amount of
studies
also suggest
power or participation
of
by
auto building.
texti le production
in
work
group
quality
supported
technologies:
and enjoyed their
first
better
Blauner's 3 3 find ings from his comparison
share in
the
which workers
have
72
which affects job satisfaction: a scheme which
apparently
no
workers
work,will
of the firm
industry
described by one of
the
contributors
which a
in
to
for
to the
relation
one example.
is
that week
their
of
bonuses
the
paid out had no apparent
wockers'
gives
circumstances
because
failed
scheme
productivity
is
Whyte's example
fail.
profit-sharing
the
to affect
ability
but which
participation,
increases
Another
'Vork'
faced with a sullen uncooperative work-staff,
The details
the management decided on a bonus scheme.
were explained to representatives from each department
there was to be a bonus on all production above a.
...
certain norm... After the representatives had reported
back, workmen stood about in groups discussing what to
do about the laggards, how to eliminate the bottlenecks... resentment, tension vanished overnight...
(but) the bonus never seemed to have much relation to
what one's particular section or department had
produced... the men looked for an explanation... the
manager explained that the scheme was an informal one
granted by the management and he did not wish
freely
it
by posting explanatory notices... he
to 'formalize'
said that the scheme could be revised or wound up at
any time, without notice.
'the bonus had been fixed by the
We told the men,
It could be so fixed, or ended,
'Yes'.
manager?
The whole thing, they judged,
again by the manager.
was
a 'fiddle'.
From that time
incentive, was dead.
And
goes on
he
the bonus
to describe
environment which
returned.
The effect of
appears
on,
the
the
levels
the most effective.
an
of work
lower quality
level
of
participation
Participation
of decision-making
But
as
35
to be significant.
intermediate
scheme,
the
meaning
of
also
at
low and
appeared
this
to be
finding
73
is
in
examples
were
levels.
If
important
very
much
above
increase
job
individual
can
at
if
job satisfaction much
native explanations
alone will
level
be found:
all.
that
lower
tion of high with
then suggests
policy-making of
does
for
little
exclude
the
level
by
job
tion
satisfac
is
alone
in
not.
the
it
,
but
that
not
does
could increase
job
c onjunction with lower level par ti ci
increa sing the
Plan with
supports
to the
woul d be
the fi rm by rep resentatives alo ne
nu mbe r
of
t his
its
fact
changes whic h
The success
-
low
of
tion at several
participa
contention.
The evidence on d irectness of
points
of
case a co mbina-
participation
participant s can bring abo ut.
the Scanlon
levels
t hat
alter-
But
the success
part icipation
possi bility that
satisfaction in
pation,
not
leve 1 pa rticipation
level
successful where high
The evidence
in which
for example
results,
decisions
to produce
participation depends on the ability
visible
level
the
in
participation
and that
direct parti-
that
evidence suggests
then that
cipants,
or workers
level
higher
seen as
are
No
at high -
the Yugoslav "participants"
me-mbers
council
level.
participation
of direct
found
is
directness
factor of
available sources with
the
combined
is
the
clear, because
not
that
less significant in its
participation
indirect
impact
participation
on
individual
all
is
much
workers
74
than direct
of what
participation.
meaningful
scale is
direct
in
participation
small
Is
suggests
as
at
in
If
reduces
where
in
a
time.
Italian
the
direct
longwall
is
is
the effect of
subject
Gorz3 6
Andre
has
the workers'
distance between
present
or which
is
is
by management
mining
our terms
of
to immedi-
described
representa1969
and
1970.
representatives
a way
out of
techniques)
a
result
suggested
(e.g.
if
than participation
best much
much
which
above
is
less successful.
desci-bes such
revocable
by
the
and
dilemma
commitment
These factors
case of
more effective
is
int
the
worke rs , is
from
'Work'
A scheme
again
is
likely to be
management shows
can be
in
roduced by
The exampl e
by management
than one which
spontaneous
t he workers
a situation.
less successful
to.
of
the Tris t
management without consultation with
which
scale
participation
wildcat strikes
it might
action,
approved
quoted
kind of
otherwise exists.
worker
at
large
large
if
only possible
representatives
Participation which
and
and what
a possible direction
any
some
represented,
which
can be
participation
the organization of
tives
it
the question
A factor which has not been studied but
recall
this
necessity:
worker
representation with
ate
raises
there
could exist
organizations
possible.
which
participation
a technological
organization.
This
inte
rpreted
more
as
75
proxies,
for the
amount
brings:
which participation
in
erticipate
paribus,
power
more
the
than
by management;
unilaterally
can be revoked at any
severely
in
a scheme
introductory stages
give workers
introduced
which
the
or
of participation,
time by
scope of workers
power
the
which workers
ceteris
does,
the
and
scheme
same
a scheme
limits
management
at whatever
it
level
is
introduced.
in
participation schemes,
The most effective
terms of reducing workers'
alienation and
quali ty of the work environment,
thus
improving the
appear
to be
those wh i ch
a)
give workers. more power,
that
to bring
about
possible for
changes
b)
are
in
them
the work
direct,
environment
or incorporate
an
direct participation by workers',
being exclusively
indirect,
is
it
make
concrete
and process;
element
of
rather
than
through
delegates
elected for a term of office;
c)
are at the level of the firm closest to the
individual job,
the shopfloor or office,
or at
least incl ude this as a factor; and
d)
are
introduced
for
reasons
which
are
clear and
76
not
suspect: either because
goals and
they
management's
introduce
reasons
they
are
the scheme,
are known.
the workers'
or
because
77
Chapter 3
THE
WITH
FIRM
OF THE
PARTICIPATION
BEHAVIOR
WORKER
Introduction
Introducing a greater
workers
changing the
firm to one which operates with
a mixed form of jo int
control,
the structure o f
Suc h a change
ne ss
A bus
by workers
Jointly
alone, will
decision-m aking of the
As
the firm will not be
the
it
is
job environmen t
in
participation
certain
some
that
a
result
possible
and
implications for the
increasing the participation
aspects of the
the
qua-lity of
a t least when
chapter
behavior of
chapter
worker
that
do that,
T his
criteria in
previ ous
to raise
c an
run
decisi ons made by
The
for worke r s,
management
the same
the
identical .
conditions are met..
The
,
is
firm
wo rke rs
or by
mana gers,
( necessari ly)
not us e
making decisions.
suggested
organi zation which
an d by
firm could
of the
ch anc ing from one 'model'
be described as
to another.
extreme
the
in
or,
case, one which is wo rker cont rolled.
in
or
firm from an entrepreneurial
capital
managerial
impl i es
enterp.rise
an
of
into the operation
i on by
participat
amount of
inves t igates
the firm of
of workers
in
management.
behavior of participative
78
firms which are considered most
full y are:
the
of the
qual ity of
the work
firm with
respect
to the
locati-onal
environment, or working conditions; the
policy of the
and the
firm;
'polluti
firm, or the decisions which
on
its
the
the
impo-
environment.
latter tw o aspects of the behavi or of the firm will
The
living
indivi duals
affect
enterprise, i ts
is
cost
of
policy
on'
it make s about
sition of one kind of external
behavior
the
in
vic inity
of
the
If wor ker participation
'community'.
to be cons idered as a component cif community
development p lanning, such possible
impact on
firm's
its
community,
changes
whic :h
in
the
participation
would bring, need to be examined and I evaluated.
Although we
of
models
intermediate
management
extreme
ment,
found no examples
the
largely on
The
in
assumptions made
some
assumptions
based
substitutes
implications
on
are
and
for some of
of the
adoption of
described.
the extreme
case
at
looks
some of
the
conclusions
the
assumptions
used,
those
those
Implications
of worker
the
of self-
chapter
reports
Alternative
from those assumptions.
proposed as
this
and
self-manage-
or worker
and questions
them,
on
Yugoslav model
next part of
models, examines
exists
literature
control
case of workers
(based
of theoretical
cases of shared worker
some
control,
management).
these
have
are
and
alternative
of models
control
f or f irms
79
mixed control
with
are
that they
more
the
the more
In
conventional
implications
of worker
the final sections the
the
implications of
mod els
behavior of
the
fir m
and
loc ah
respect to work condit ions,
tion are
discussed; and fin ally
and
viability
participation
in
different
of the
Much of
forms
the
control
is
mately many
about t h e
models'
are presented.
in
which
decisions with
behavior of such
the
behavior of the polar cases
management.
in
and workers.
which can
intermediate
the
of
the workers
of firms
are models
conclusions
two was
chapter
in
shared by management
of the
a nd
firm
participative
of
environments,
strategy,
the discussion
control
'intermediate
conclusions
economic
of worker participation
shared
pollution,
implicz.tions of firms with worker
as a community development
Models
of
community)
the
assumptions.
of worker participation for
with
presented to show
substituting
and for
(for workers,
alternative
the
to justify
plausible and
our discussion of
participation
is
Evidence
suggested.
assumptions
in
pursues
following section
The
them
are discussed.
forms
tn which
which
Ulti-
be drawn
are
all
about
based on
decisions
80
are
made
by workers.
economic
models:
it
is
of a pure monopoly
any
intermediate
profits
describe how
a
combination of
chapter will
is
two
analogous
to
pursue
the
make
the
how
than
it
is
results
their
that of worker-
or
to
a
What
this
the extreme
behavior can
of
from
cases will
intermediate,
firm of
the extreme
reality.
logical
and the
decisions.
usefulness
the
give definitive
even
in
the
firm
the
do not
work
of
firm than
shared
be expected
to management-
firms.
Models of
will
to types
behavior
easier to
goals would act.
describe how
suggesting how
refer
is
of
the maximization
behavior
control
predict
from
firm whose
and
sed here
it
incomes,
those
the
competitive
Similarly
resulting
the nature
describe
or workers'
do
controlled
to
or of a purely
behave,
to be
reflects
easier
case.
describe behavior
either
This
At
best
sort which
answers
c ase
,
th ey enable
wh i c h wi 11
Benjamin
Ward has
be
us
us
used
argued
to
management
to
assumptions
criteria
as
discus-
enabling
of worker
implica t i on s of
of such mod els
are
the
about
in
it
case
to
for
f ol lows
Models of socialist econ omi c organization are
likely to play a role in u nder s tan ding economic activity
similar
to that which the mod els of competition
and monopoly have played.
The us u al level of abstraction at which such models are constructed generally
precludes serious testing of the hypotheses which are
Rather they serve
formally generated by the models.
as sensitizers, in that they make economists aware in
some systematic way of the problems that alternative
81
Out of
to face.
organizations are likely
lower
generate
to
possible
be
may
ness it
1
content.
empirical
s-ome
hypotheses with
behavior of
the
management
Robinson,
up
make
detail
more
questions,
the
about
2
and Charles
and output
not
firm
are concerned
They
below.
of whi ch
all
are
a number
above
with
all
relevant here,
directly
with
under work er management;
the price
aspects
t he firm,"microeconomic
decisions of
in
consider
section will
thi s
which
Rockwell which
subject share
this
on
Joan
Evsey Domar,
by Benj amin Ward,
literature
of assumptions,
in
articles,
The
are made by workers.
Jaroslav Vanek
the
in
deal with cases of worker control
and books
papers,
developed of
firms wit h worker participation
decisions
all
which
all
been
hitherto
which have
The models
this awarelevel
of
resource allocation which are derived from a model
of
the enterprise".3
Soviet
Domar
or
agriculture,
sector so organized,
Vanek
5
Market
has
with
specifically
the
firm's
for that matter
fare
in
Rockwell
and
growth
behavior:
on
the
firm.
First,
however,
described below -
the
specific
aspects
the worker-controlled
of
of work
the quality
and pollution behavior of
assumptions
Managed
Here we,-are
and efficiency.
the effect
Labor
4
concerned more
is
more
locational
and on
6
would
"how
any economic
Theory of
some
in
interested
in
such a wonderland?"
developed a "General
Economies"
ultimately
interested
is
the
firm
which define
its
is
82
behavior
are presented.
and some
contested.
Ownership
workers
and control:
control
government
assets
Then
they will
all
ownership
and charges
discussed
the models
decision-making,
retains
be
a fixed
but
assume
that
that the
of the productive
rate
for its
use.
"The means of production are nationalized and the
factories turned over to the general management
of elected committees of workers who are free to
set price and output policy in their
own
interest".7
The environment
in
the
more
and Vanek
control
The
fully
under
co-op
number of
dividend
that it
rate
is
competitive
developed models,
the
implications
is
assumed
is
actually
labor units
a complication
that
to employ
maximizing
(Ward, 1958 and Domar,
faced with
of worker
conditions.
to be such
able
Domar
1966)
in
the
the
a supply schedule of
introduced by
market
although Ward
competitive
imperfectly
labor supply
optimum
a perfectly
also examine
either the
-
is
or
labor
his
1966
arti cle.
The
decision-rule
by which
that worker-managers
their
time.
individual
The
income
share of the
incomes
firm
interested
operates
in
of the
paid for.
is
his
firm after
Profits
is
maximizing
over a given period
of each worker
income
inputs have been
are
the
(or
of
her)
other
of
the
firm
83
are
distributed
the maximiz ation of
per worker
of the
The object ive
income of l abor.
of the
part
as
to the workers
firm is
Wages-
income p er worker.*
if
are maximized
the compe t i t i v e
worke r-cont rolled firm choos es the output and
employment
at which ma rgi nal
level
pe r worker.
cost
worker equa ls marginal
revenue per
The product ion function of the worker-cont rolled
is
fi rm
ass umed to be the sa me as that of what
Domar calls
the "capitalist
and
same market environment
and a wage
controlled fi rm,
wage
rate of
or di vi dent
firm, but which
Pri ces
of
maximizes
inputs
worker-controlled
tw i n".
What
also assumed
twi nl,
(which has
pri ces
as
as
firm
consi ti tutes
the same
as
the worker-
rate equal
to the
the worker-control led
profits).
product
and
th e
for
are
its
inputs
for
the
same
for the
"capitalist
and product
is
the "capitalist
twin".
The
assumptions , as
Vanek
says:
can be summed up as implying a perfect, competiand smooth neoclassical work in which tbe moving
tive
is
shtuation,
force, contrary to the capitalist
laborer.
per
maximization of income
*income per unit of labor input can be substituted for
the assumption that labor inputs
"income per worker" if
it
if
are homogeneous is abandoned, or, in other words,
and contriis not assumed that workers are identical
bute necessarily identical amounts of work or time to
the fi rm.
84
Using
these
assumptions,
it
is
possible to show that
When all
firms of an industry use the same technology and free entry is guaranteed, the labormanaged economy will
be Pareto-optimal.
In other
words, just
like it
ideal capitalistic
counterpart,
be producing the maximum
the labor-managed economy will
producible output from given resources and the maximum
social satisfaction
for a prescribed distribution
of
income.
These conslusions follow from the fact that
competitive labor-managed firms equalize factor
margnial products to factor returns for all factors
including labor, from competition in non-labor factor
markets
free entry of firms and identical techno-
log ies.
If
the
assumptions
are
controlled f rm no longer
its "capital ist
pursued
employment, output,
suggest
that
such
behaves
in
T he writers
twi n".
impl ica t ions
the
relaxed,
of worker
g rowt h,
a firm
the workerthe
cited above
management
stability, etc.
can
be
viable,
it
is
subject
vailing gove rnment policy .
If
we
tions about the firm (i.e .
that
conditions
a re
met or
if
same way
if
have
for
They
certain
to counter-
accept
there
as
is
the
assump-
no major
difference I n kind betwee n the two types of firm)
under worker
of
is
it
then
p lausible to p ursie
firms wit h
in which
management which were
less
the y share
par al le ls be tween
and
than
f ull
as
reported
a
source
participation
contr ol with
above,
for models
by workers,
managers,
the
the wor ker-controlled extreme
i ts capi talist twin.
We
can then
pursue
case
the
possibility that there is a spectrum of participative
firms
in
wh ich the share of workers
gradually
increases.
85
The behavior of such
a
firm would
lie
between
the worker-controlled firm and that of
twin,
the
its
position depending on
shares
The
of workers
indicates
that
plausible.
ones which
of
of
complete worker
electing
chapter
of
pation;
moreover,
particpate
are much
and
the
other
most effective
all
of their
workers
of
participate
and
section,
are
assumptions
are
feasibility and method
firms with
i.e.
on whether
less
the
to
council.
a workers
form
in
in
in
through
two
by
But
elected
of wo rker particiwhich
the workers
the operat ion of
the
firm
reducing wo rk alienation
The
which
most
Yugoslav system
o fl 0
assumptions,
form of worker
possible.
next
parti cipate
forms
management
basis
the
chapter,
that workers
only one
more effective
only possible
that
the
increasing job satisfaction.
use as
in
participation
more directly
of worker self
sizes
kind.
assume
is
cite
control ,
showed that
representatives
previous
participative
representatives
two
the
the questionable
types of firm differ in
The studies
relative
the assumptions
have bearing on
developing models
than
in
I will
not all
Moreover,
capitalist
and management.
data presented
other evidence which
the
the
that of
parttcipa
An alternati
is
the
studies
not
the
tion,
nor
the
assumption
di-rectly, (i.e.
not only
is
86
through election of
representatives)
of
make
the
firm.
If
we
consequences which
also be
increase,
same
but
factor
in
which
raises
output will
"capitalist
twin".
can be
set of
produced with
The
models
participation
what
are
defined
are
to the
Similarly,
be defined,
participative
not
all
pays
words what
costs
inputs
clear,
the
the same
as
inputs
to
it
is
assumed,
firm and by
however,
that
the
that of
t he
th is
the
avail able with
are
same.
is
a
More
as
before.
firm with worker
inputs
and
In
vice
that
other
are
also
versa.
and
same way
capitalist
its
increases worke rs'
firm
'products'
in
below.
questionable
the same.
firm, and
constitutes
increase
set of inputs
the capitalist
participative
is
as
price for
are
to
a participative
s ame
that
the
studies
presented
longer the
same
assume
costs
what
whi ch
participation
are no
The
is
the outputs which
then
productivity,
a given
If
given
firm,
tends
functi-on of
fi rm should be taken to be the
should
that participation
this
therefore,
production
the
show
the
will
rise.
for
The evidence
ass umption,
the
then
job satisfaction
job satisfaction also
productivity.
is that
is,
two and others
chapter
An
assumption,
productivity of
also,
inputs,
cited
the operation
follow from participation,
That
assumed.
that
in
'wages'
by
firm.
will
the
It
is
reasonable supposi-
87
tion.
Even
which all
that
one
is
if
it is
markets
no
longer
described the
by workers
are perf ect,
when
tie s which
as
a p art
not
of
the capita list
dec isions will
not
fir,
cap italist firm.
whe n
not
it
be
workers
into
of
are
market
th e
firm' s
by
into ac count
they wo uld not
The
twi n".
the
quality of
but
the
the
sold, but
consumed
Exte rnali-
income.
in makin g
not
always
Pol 1ution of the
community
effects.
not external to the fi rm.
The
to
to the
air outside,
to the extent
a decision to
a c ost
workers will be
a 1lthough
suffer the
rather
Pol luted air in the wo rkp lace
m.
an ex ternality,
of
c osts
ca ses be externalitie s for
affects worke rs as
workers who
the
products,
their
whi ch causes sickness among
the worker-run
p erfect.
labor
fi rm ignores
in all
fir
the participative
borne
logi ca lly be expected to do so.
firm might
by the workers
include
m e as u r in g its
a product which is
is
Chapter
not
i ts "capitalist
wi l 1 not
wor k environment in
It
imperfect
in clude s workers;
it
twin"
wor ker-run
an
the firm,
The y wil 1 be taken
be taken into account by
"ca pitalist
in
'int ernalized'
bor ne by them will be
dec ision-making.
so when
not be
the lab or market is
because
wor k conditions which in
firm'
may
production which are
If workers make decisions
'th e
it
the econ omic environment.
costs of
in
the hypothetica I world
true in
at
least
res ide nts , will
that
costs
relocate wi 11
i t
is
to the
be i nternal
and
88
for
The Evidence
Productivity and
Alternative
Assumptions
participation:
Several of the experiments which were
used in
on
chapter 2 to d is cove r the effects of participation
job satisfact
on als o supply evidence on
productivity.
of participat on on
In
the effects
many cases
the
studies were d esi gne d and carried out primarily to
discover ways of inc reasing productivity.
experiments a n d what
Other
we know of existing
tive enterpri s es sup ply additional
participa-
evidence.
all of them i n di cate that participation
productivity, or in
not
does
least
Bavelasll
that
the
a minority
Lawrence
and Smith
groups which set production
discussed
production or work-related
efficient
than
had no power to
that
job
of
the
the
control
"is
make decisions.
production".
directly
13
to adapt
to a change
increase
efficiency
relatively
be
used
both
found
in
in
in
in
and
where
others
French
after
to
found
the
in
amount
ability
significantly
such
affect efficiency
more
a change
workers'
that
as
discussed but
and
job content will
firms
as well
issues were
Coch
improvement
frequently;
infrequently
it
goals
proportional
An
1 2
groups which
recovery of job efficiency
content
at
that
it.
reduce
and
increases
cases,
of
Almost
changes
ability
occur
would
less.
89
found
Kurt LewinI
and
tarian
in
production
absent,
in
the
when
in
authori-
group was
fell
dropped
groups
(the
52% to
from
74%
were
leaders
the
democratic groups
the
group and from
in one authoritarian
other;
that
spent working
of time
of
authoritarian
the
than
significantly more
proportion
but
of
leadership
two types
of the
the same,
superficially
a comparison
('participative')
democratic
the production
that
in
in
to 29%
democratic
group
it
dropped only
15
found
in
their
16%
the
from
50% to 46%).
Morse
office
and Reimer
workers
group
in which
reduced
than
that
productivity
th e level
d d in
it
rose
in
which
raised.
In the d rective section s of
increase
in
by
theisupervisor
cular job.
increase
In
to assign
parti-
a
fi
ll
productiv ity
as
a
in
the participat ive division.
in
the
grou p decision
remaining w orkers would
some cases be
d ivisions
Th is
the
other
The
It was
more slowly
suggests
things
more than output of materia I goods .
jobs.
rose
the worker-contr oiled
lower because
th at when
rep laced
di vision they wou ld not be
th is that
the
to a
but
"productivity"
the company
fewer workers
left
result of
was
decision
workers
the
it
to a
in
th e participative
the
the
in
response
came
abo ut through
came
fast
less
of decis ion-making was
the group
produ c tivity
study of
that
firm wi 11
are
in
va lued
job sa ti S-
90
the workers
faction of
higher
significan tly
If
job
satisfaction
in
th an
the
members,
but
them may
have been
the
deci sion
to wait
ti 11
one
satisfaction which was
not
some
qroup was
authoritarian
grouo.
a product,
the participative
of
longer proven:
in
participative
counted as
is
lower efficiency
the
the
group
is
no
to exclude group
left
and not
replace
reason
for "the greater
felt.
Verbal
6
job
summarises
the
point:
the fact that productivity can be raised without
a concomitant rise in satisfaction
ought not to
obscure the fact that productivity and satisf.action
are mutually dependdnt.
and we
related
now
and productivity.
which
raise
times
at
The
ly
to
the
the
expense of
studies of
is
the
to
link
make
re a I wo rk
of
the
plan t
situa
a plan for
have seen,
participation.
weaker
because
ways
in
environment, somematerial
ti ons
outputs.
do not
th at where wo rke r part ici
of
of
f irm
parti ci pat i on
i n
prod uct i vi ty
di srupted.
longwall
the
studyl 7 of t he
raise d i ts
was
we
decisions
the work
In Straus s'I s
alone
is
their other,
introdu ct ion
factory
describes
between
increased,, produ ct ivity
increase..
rest
link
latter
The
the concl us i on
fac tory,
of
a
the quality of
the
con tradict
pat ion
find
their power
use
workers
are,
and job satisfaction
Participation
-
like-
is
toy
on e
so
part
mu ch
Tris tl18
mining which
increased
91
decision-making
by workers
at
thereby
raised productivity.
textile
mill
long
damage
period
the
rose sharply ,
levels
the
in
firm.
ter effici ency of
in
shopfloor
a
This
while
at
Seymou r
efficiency of managerial
coopeth an
hi ghe r
fi rm-
in
lesser efficiency
th e
to outweigh
grea-
decision-making by
p articipation
firm with
that
efficient
particularly
f l oor-l evel
levels.
suggests
less
cou ld be enough
deci s ions
workers ,
be
decision -maki n g,
managerial
initial
fell,
late r
it
s tudy
dec isi on-mak ing wi 11
rative
level
in Rice' s
result
b ut
a
remained.
increased output
The
to
an
During
b efore.
than
higher
Indian
ra ised productivity
participation
level
term
19
Rice's
In
and
face
coal
the
at both
Melman
20
has
fi rm and
comnar ed
the
decis ion-
and cooperative
making,
us ing a paired sa mple
of enterprises
i n
half
th em under manage rial
control
p ri vate
of
sector of
enterprise
cooperative
control
cooperative
firms
the
them was
capital
investment was
the
managerial
firms
or
equal
and
H 1
greate r efficiency.
however:
I I 1,847
under
The
of Kibbutzim.
la rge,
very
None of
the
and half
economy
as p art
showed
in
the
(Is raeli
median
pounds)
,866 for the
Kibbutz
factories.
One
explanation
for
the
Israel,
increased
productivity
for
92
accompanies
which
satisfaction
which
accompanies
motivating
factor producing
is
participating,
that
neurial
in
functions.
do,
management
can
An
example
of this
of
a
is
participation
They
it:
in
as
a
Another
entreprethan
efficiently
productivity.
increase
the
early stages
eventually failed:
sharing scheme which
profit
effort.
so more
described
acts
exercise
workers
and hence
is
this
greater
do
greater job
the
... workmen stood about in groups - discussing
what to do about the laggards, howi to eliminate the
bottlenecks , ways in which production might be
speeded up...
The loading gang, between lorries,
would move back into production.
Men sent to another
department for material and finding none ready, would
ready.
If
there was a
join
in and help to get it
bottleneck in assembly, someone would temporarily
I f a man
transfer himseIf to the section concerned.
was late o're absent through sickness , the situation
often before the foreman could do
would be 'remedied'
The division between sections and between
so himself.
departments began to blur... Decisions formerly
referred to foremen would be taken by chargehands;
decisions normally taken by chargehands would be taken
by workers, or, more often, taken by workers in
the pattern of authoconsultation with chargehands...
Here and there in the new
rity had begun to change.
atmosphere a man would make a decision and take some
was not
action he would not have done before; and it
simply that they worked harder; they began cut jng
out unnecessary movement and unnecessary work.
in
they
possessed;
no
always
incentive
skill;
to
firm,
system.
to
use
but
in
the
to using them
past
they
had had
managerial
Previously,
there were
to
production
increase
incentives
to
using
By opening ways
to
use
and
a skill
using
that entrepreneurial,
increase output.
disincentives
the
this
description were
The workers
them
to beat
these skills,
the
wihich
for
93
are
part of
the
22
which Gouldner
seIf
di s cusses,
part icipation
of
changes
the
A managerial
firm
the
of
and producitivity
inputs
the world of work
une mp loyed
fi rm ca nn ot do that, bec ause substituting manage ri al
ge rs
fo reman Is
rep eal
of
model ling
level
and
the
faction)
account
The
amount
a Iso
for
by Ward,
and
input s
0
those
s tudies
d0
Reimer's2
f
its
not
ways when
the
of
models
on
satis-
models must
'capitalist
support this
the
participative
firm
assume
that
all
the
firm
are
the same
twin'.
But
the
empirical
hypothesis.
In
of
the workers
their work
gained more
a
in
Vanek
and
products
reorganized
they
job
does
in termed i ate
Domar,
3 experiment,
tive sect i on
control:
this.
theoretical
developed
as
typology of
(as
Definition of Costs and Returns
Participative Firm
The
the
of parti cipation
mixed
de pend both
increases
moreover, if productivity
of
an
comp l i cates
further
models
intermed iate
as
p roductivi ty
firms
attribute of participati ve
scheme
made him unn ecessar y.
inclusion of g reater
The
the
the partic ipat ion
of
had
to y factory wh ich
the
in
demand for
of man a-
the
Hence
redundant.
manage rs
ma ke s the
ski I Is
fo r managerial
the workers
sk i Ils of
in
in
power over
the
Morse
and
participat
more
efficient
their work.
But
94
they
the
refrained
section,
allowed
to
irm i ted
that
sec tion.
at
as
a
the
the
to shrink
of
rate
through
e xpense of
rate
pative
firm
workers
in
for workers
type of
with
i t.
make
the job
returns
b
j
a ll
t 0 wo rk ers.
and
improvements
the
tend
'income'
of the ir
in
the
bs
0
in come
of
the
,t
to
cause
in
w
to consume
of
that
argued
associated wi th
those
would
the
partici-
associated
non-wage
be
be tween
into
taken
jobs,
same.
B ut
in
not
hap p en.
would
an
I ns tea d
l abor ma rket wi 1 l te n d to
cos t s
Moreover
ma rke t will
mark et
movi ng
1
the
the
the wage
ti h is will
labor marke t.
in
by
of
returns
and wages,
wh o
to
in s ome of
for wages,
av erage
perfec t lab or
i mpe r fe ctions
1a b or
more
of
the
to
interpre-
members.
models
add i t ion
in
of pr oductivity,
the
cos ts and
they
job sa tisfaction
increased
group
in
attrition.
be
Ch a p te r 1 it was
In
in
by workers
the
res u 1t
ted
job,
In a
imperfect
the
firm.
there are
each
attributes
max i mi ze
is to
the
in
Instcad
can
of growth
any
decis io n- ru l e
The
account
lay off
to
not
decision
staff
product ivi ty
more
provided job satisfaction was
the
normal
decision
'produce'
the
of
growth
The workers'
decision to
si ze of
the
productivi ty.
increase
group
the
This
ted
f rom reducing
pr oduction bei ng
shif-
imperfectio ns
the
workers
to
in
cons ume
a ge s or close s ubs ti t utes
less
the quality of
of their
in come
the work
environment
in
95
market.
pe rfect
are
that
choose
in
a
a worker-controlled
there
where
and
cos ts
define
the
in
firm
a capitalist
from
differently
to
in a situation
operating
impe rfections , wi 11
marke t
products
I t Follows
is
it
if
firm,
free
they were
if
would
they
than
same market.
not
ork ers would
market.
cos ts
ferred
of
p rod uction,
s ha re
income
of
environm e n t.
The
consuming
and
costs
co
twin ' s
the
s
mode Is
identical
With
ts and output.
of
the
s umab 1 y also all
behave
in
thei r
pre-
the work ercapi tal ist
its
pe rfect
shared
firm with
to
th e
the work
and output s of
controll e d fi rm would be
of
none
exactly
of
quality
as
labo r
ideal
be bea ring
then
labor marke t
the
marke ts,
like Adam Smith 's
th en op erate
of
an economic environment
of
in all
mpe t i t ion
perfect
would
case
the
In
hold
will
argument
this
system,
socialist
perfect
of
type
a Lange-Lerner2 4
in
competitive system, or
perfectly
a
in
firm operating
a worker-controlled
For
competi ti on,
control
the same way
as
woul d prethe
polar
cases.
In
the
from bei ng
the
real
real
perfect.
world
costs wh ich
world,
make
include
the
is
labor market
A worker-controlled
its
decisions
the
cos t
on
burdens
the
very far
firm will
basis
of
for
a
which
in
96
will
maximize
both
the
quality
of
the workplace
a firm which
of
income
worker
as
that which
imperfect
firm,
twin'
is
consumed
should be
an
money
or
'wage'
the
from
part
in
their
quali ty of
imperfections
in
the
their
optimal
consumption
ar'd
the
Moreover,
proportion
the work environment
workers'
In
the
the
even
utility,
'capitalist
market will
labor
less
real-world consequence:
produce
income
decisions.
controlled,
labor market.
including
firm,
thei r
of
maximizes
Workers
by workers.
borne
their income
in
in
would be
'twin'
capitalist
than
of quality-of-the-work-environment
by workers.
With
imperfect
the models
ty how
of
intermediate
cases,
of workers will
an
paid
managers
and owners.
share will
the
be
increase
imperfection
of
in
in
the
of power
the share
in
an
increased share of
At
as
worker
the
control will
in
to workers,
paid out
that
is
no certain-
increase
be reflected
revenues
shared
firm with
One plausible hypothesis
behave.
if
the
is
there
competition,
relative
least some
to
that paid
of
that
to
increased
improved work
conditions,
participation
reduces
labor market
for workers
in
the
that
firm.
In Yugoslavia,
and
the
the
quality
provision of welfare
of work
facilities
conditions,
for workers,
97
is
a
function
2 5
report on
(I.1.0.
The
in Yugoslavia).
Workers Management
tending
"is
undertaking which
the
to be emphasised"
more
and
more
of
source
same
continues:
Although this is not formally laid down in an y
can be said that the welfare functi on
it
legislation,
of the undertaking has come to be one of its
features... a decision on the amount to be allocate d
to welfare activities
indeed often causes the m2t
proctracted discussions within the undertaking.
to
development of an elaborate system of safety
the
committees
In
managed
a worker
redefined, a nd the
to consumers of
of
will
be
in
i ts
paid by
worker-control 1ed
product
worker
to
itself
out
of
in
firm,
controll ed, will
consumers in
of
with
market.
if
-
shifted
be
it
a pure
is
true
or near
p roduct.
costs
A
o r near perfect
firms w hich
ab le
be
increased
the
the
form of
the
same will
a perfect
not be
this way:
the
market:
consumers
competing
market,
The
firm which
product
the
in
a hidden subsidy,
a worker-con trolled
monopolist
will
be similar
(The con su me rs
the workers).
borne by
costs
increased costs
the product.
rece ived
other worker
firms will
all
of
costs
wi th
only
competes
product
a
in
operating
firm,
managed
the
firms,
previously
2 7
representatives.
and
in which it
market
ly
le d
has
management
in
participation
workers
In Sweden,
to s hift
d id so
are
not
the
cost
i t would price
98
has
It
been
assumptio n
the
fi
controlled
the
same
labor market,
ass ume
and outputs ,
then
an d a
to
outputs , even where
the
cost
ca nnot
flexibility
i t has
in
firm would be
a
of other
inpu ts,
receive
the
in
imp rovemen ts in
The
areas
for
in
work
and
for
The
next section examines
the worker-controlled
the
are
three
firm may
assumptions
and
of
to pay
improvements
i t
the
operated
the
for
income
the
' wage'
conditions
it
the
use
they
an d entrepreneurial
firm be tween
enable
if
had paid
they
redistribut e
w ork
Without
It would only be
g rea t er efficiency
led firm will
when
twin',
for e xercising labor
functions
cos ts.
to
once
to
substantially
not
'capitalist
workers,
for
shifted
and
gre ater efficiency,
its
competit ive output market.
possible
costs
from
be
materia 1 outputs.
a position
from its
different
in
firm's
the
of
costs
redefine
firm
perfect
of worker
efficiency
the greater
redefi-
the
than
less
the
will
consumers
capi talist
the greater
enable
control
of the
that
as
relax
the worker-
ncy of
the efficie
to
realistic
the worker-contro lled firm,
of cos ts
nition
to be
above
simultaneously
of
efficiency
that
rm is
we
If
firm.
shown
lis
the quality of work,
the
redefined
the worker-controlredefined
the
conditions.
three
behave
ted
and
income,
a reas
in
which
d ifferently,
above
are made.
location policy
and
The
99
'pollution'
policy.
The
quality
of
result
from
reallocation of
the
the work
in
partially
eedefinition of
rkers
by
in
the
firm
the
'wages'
Some
prot ection
is
compensat ion
and
and
Worke rs
states.
arising
f actor of production.28
give n to wo rke rs by
workmen's
but
are
not
suffer
impai rment of
all
worke rs
o ss e s
thei r human
illness
c aused by w orki ng
used
s ome
in
addi tion
nesses
are borne
covered
c ompensat ion pa id diff ers widel y between
the
'
laws
cos ts
rm are
fi
of the human
to
dete rgents 29
the
1 is t
firm
these
lead,
can
materials
processes which no
a
result of
cond itions.
The
are
recent
the most
enzymes
control
it
can
longer use
discontinue a harmful
ill-
include a sbestos,
many me tals
in
or
as
capi tal
others
among
inve s t
ca n be described
which
materi als which caus-e
of
in workers ; the
s i l icones
can
and
be tween
the
in
production which
cos ts of
the
impairment
to
cos ts
to workers
income
from
The
condi t ions
quality of work.
Many of
as
firm
the
the work environment:
Improvements
will
of
the behavior
for
Implications
and
chemi cal s.
of worke rs'
adopt
them.
product.
exposure
other production
If
necessary
Industrial
it
100
In
remote
for
wi 11
also provi'de
who are
predicted
government
Yugoslavia
the
responsibility for operating
worke rs
management
I t
products.
for
sick.
or become
like
to be
appears
the
firm:
standards,
and health
basic safety
gad-
equipment,
a participative
behavior of
sets
guards
injured
nevertheless
in
safety
in
securi ty benefits
social
What happens
reduce
dangerous
handling of
gets
firm wi 11
and
protective clothing
on machines,
the
investment
by making greater
workers
the
firm,
the worker-controlled
risks
partly by workers.
borne
cost
another
are
injuries
but
with
system lies
bodies:
is considered that the workers have a sufclose interest in safety and health measures
ficiently
30
to be able to take the necessary action themselves..
it
in practice, occupational health and safe ty
occupy quite an important place among the sub ects
dealt with by the workers management bodies.3
Roethlisberger and
interviewing
that
"safety
mentioned
32
important
ment
in
the Hawthorne
program at
and health"
among
was
to the
company;
it
Safety and health
area of work
conditions
schemes will
of workers.
cause
the firm
in
in
are
which
preventional
to bear
3 3
the
found
very
they were
standards
their
frequently
most
the
in
they
plant
ranked high
conditions,
through
that
reported
topics , and one on which
unfavorable
urgency.
Dickson have
an
improver
insurance
cost
instead
101
Other
better seen
are
worke rs
firm,
condit ions
I:heir work
improve
interest ing,
a worke r-con trol led
In
consumot ion.
as
can
or
satisfying
many which make work more
t radi n g off , where
necessai y,
improvements
condi t i ons
agains t
reducti ons
in
sati sf y ing
production
u til i ty from job
wh i ch
are equated.
income
t i ons
wh i ch workers
produc t
,
Some
i n dus t ri es
more
less
or
use
lit tle
substitution
will
not
able to
but
only
ot her
a re
producti on
development
capi tal
int
at
of
in
the
which
In
'intermed iate
other
In
industries
then
Work ers
their jobs,
B ut
prod u ce
re flection
of
has been
done
technology'
p ar tic ipat ion might
of le ss s terile
could be
in
allo w choices
the
a gi ven
exi s t i ng
on
which
the
is
less
for i nde r developed countries.
ensive,
firms
a
Som e wo rk
development
jobs
satisf yi ng. 314
less
to
indus tries
Some
g to them.
r ela tin
condi-
firm, its
the
on
content of
the
work
choice of
i s possible.
least par tly
Widespre ad worker
some
at
'wage '
from
uses.
are a vai lab le
systems.
and
depends
work.
chan ge
wo rk
the po int
to
tech no logies which
factors
technolo gie s which
product
and
s ati sfyi ng
ve ry
be
k!ind of
can malke
ni tially more
be
con ditions
The
in
,
efficiency wi th more
up
technolog y it
an d the
will
of
meth( )ds ,
including
conditions,
work
in
improvements
more
result
similarly
technologies,
in
satisfying.
which workers
participate
onjy
at
102
some
levels
in
work
on
the
of decision-making,
conditions which
level
at which
participation
they
is
timing
plans.
important
in
Firm
change
the
changing
quality of work
technology
and
level
the
rates.
level
Firm
to have job
participation
the quality
it makes
the
of
it possible
at shopfloor
and altering
depend
to control
improving
the work environment because
changes
Floor
alone enables workers
and welfare
ultimately
of
produce will
participate.
job organization,
participation
security
they can
kinds
alone enables workers
immediate
level
the
level
to
by
method of pro-
duct ion.
Location Pol icy:
make
Fi rms
and
up
an
the scale
of
Another kind
firm
of expansion
indepe nden t ly sited
relocat es
cularly
are made
in a new
Loca tional
profitable.
deci s ions
imp ose
but also on
Relocation
plant
1ocational
is
who must
(now)
of wh ich
little
se tting
that
ty.
possib i
is
when
made
place whe re product ion
decisions of
not only
costs
on
relocate with
if
a
is expand-
firm
is such
or
any will
firms,
around
the workers
it
be
and
and
pay
paid by
i n
th e
in
more
parti-
the
they
firm
plant.
the plant
movinq
the
a
is
relocate, when
on workers
a com munity of people
i mpose s
the
decisi on
to move out,
c osts
relatively
decisions
Th ey are made when
infrequently .
ing
locational
firm
costs,
for
103
most workers;
or they will
unemployment,
wich
and hence
beneficial
be
the workers
the number
he often
case will
loses
changing jobs.
into account by
will
firm
to
deciding whether
of
cases where
is
This
firm who
g reater
have
i t
smaller.
the
in
the workers
to
control
long,
to be much
likely
is
At
by
in
to
even
best,
job.
are taken
to wo'rkers
costs
the
economic to move
wi 11
a new
they
or having
a job,
find
to
The worker-controlled
firm.
capitalist
relocate
firm,
costs
these
of
None
include
the
and other advantages
seniority
the
relocate with
unemployed
not
is
the worker
psychological
to
long distances
commute
and
later
to move
risk having
if
do not
they
If
costs.
material
both
has
risk
behind and
stay
in
secu-
job
ri ty.
is an example
Location po licy
which will
costs
in some ways bene fit
That
located.
extreme
towns,
as
'the
'commun i t y'
to wn'.
will
towns.
is
in
comm unity
which
easily defined,
a small
c onsist
decision will
locational
town
n other cases
often
T he
a
into account
takes
'community'
the
case of a firm i n
'community'
several
of
i ts wo rke rs
to
firm.
the worker-controlled
be dif ferent in
The worker-contro lled fi rm which
the
decision
of a
of
all
gains
far
the
it
is
for
the
from other
firm's
or part of
income
from
taxes
104
of
it
employment
the
relocation which
may
create new
of
and
imperfections
in
which
thus
be
of worke r-run
firms
i ncome
to be
cause
trying
from towns
the
the costs of
wi 11
by workers
borne
left
the
communi ty
of
lower mobility
away
redistributed
firm af fects
internalization
are
The
beneficial.
the
For
supplies.
located,
is
firm
The
m ight have
which
multiple effects
the
through
community
area,
the
firms.
capitalist
they
were
in
which stay
firms
to
attract
new
firms.
Pollution Policy
made by
the
fvinq
its
effluents.
aes the t ic poll ution.
then wi
resources
to
pui
Produ ction
processes
at
t imes
ai r, with
be remedied
to force
ment
in te rvent ion
When
manaqers make
costs- are
usually
enough
away
in
and
to
the absence of govern-
the firm to bear the costs.
in
them,
the fi-rm,
pollution
because they can
bearing any of the costs,
fr om
fumes
Pollution
to the firm.
decisions
exte rnalities
avoid
and
smoke
-
no public regulation exists
Where
o ften external
11 not
the
and also noise and occasionally
smells ;1 01f wat er,
is
effluents of
or to d evote
produce p ollution of the
pol luti on
decisions
product of
noxious
firm to emit
productio n process,
the
is
Pollution policy
by
the source of pollution,
living far
or upstream
105
of
In
it.
a worker-contro lied
that workers
be
wil.1
the
suffering any ,of
shar e of
workers'
pollution
for exan1ple.
this
situatic n,
preventinc
firm,
the
prevent
res i den ts
case of
control s,
over and
cos t
twin would
thw
in
of
twin'
'capitalist
in
necessarily
the
which al l
of pollu tion
in
pollution
above
re solved in
the
ins ide
is
on the
relative
to
borne
cos t
the
abse nce
the meas ures whi ch
of
take
and on
by w orkers
of
cos t
the
of
capi-
its
me as u res
dep end on
t he
in
pol luti on
preventi ng
share
prevention
of pollution
by
to
of
the
the
industry
the
firm;
t he
t ion.
The
plant.
of
th ose
fi rm will
the emissions
pol lution which
the
The exte nt
take.
preventing
workers ,
in
possible.
town
the worker-controlled
othe r words
firm,
would presu mably be
case
harmful
any economic means
the
in
far as
-
is
one
that *a worker-contr oIled fi rm will
to prevent
taken b y
is
but would not
a company
measure s
tal ist
might
as
the
though,
the plant
adopt
polluti on;
are workers
su gges ts
wi 11
workers
maniagement
firm
a wo rker-controlled
In
this
sam e way as
That
inside
the
their
emitted by
case,
likely
avoid
general,
In
The lim iting
the pollution
T he
the
n
emitted only
dust
of
pollu tion.
less
is
to
that way
in
pollutio
relatively smrall.
of
able
firm it
is
pollu-
106
obviously
control
not
of
decisions:
differ
from
approaches
created
problem which will
decisions
pollution
not
a
except
of
by
a
capitalist
the
problems
affect
firms which
taxation of
which has
form
of
the
firm will
been suggested
The
adversely
regulation
through
Another solution
firm.
establishment of some
the
is
usual
of externalities
a community
the polluting
community
cases,
firms.
are prevention or discouragement
or
few
by worker
the worker-controlled
those of
to solving
in
be solved
in
participation
decisions.35
firms'
Conclusions
The
participation
in
developed
models
theoretical
deal
management
o nly with
of
elected) .
kind
of
implicat ion
been
discussed b y mos t w riters.
to show
to conceive of
and
that
But some of
tioned,
and
the
is
it
the
worker-controlle d firm
the
represenlimited
firm has
existing
logically
assumpti ons made
that
a
-
models
impossible
firm or economy,
fl aw would make one impossible.
in
proposed.
alte rnatives
questioned was
not
of
The
a wo rke r- controliled
no esse ntial
only
the behavior
for
that
through
Moreover,
who are
p art ici
of worker
by workers,
tatiVes
so far been
have
which
one form
pation,(complete control
suffice
firm with worker
the
production
is
the same
them were quesOne
assumption
function
as
for
of
its
the
107
twin'.
'capitalist
worke r
participation
appears
literature
on worker
is
assumption which
of
products
as
a
in
questioned
more
appears
imperfect
labor market
of work
in
assumptions
the
inputs
and
the same way
in
some
for
with
the quality
become
More
briefly,
the
not
quality
the firm,
of
of
of these
the
firm
conditions was
implications
in
and
product.
the behavior
policy were
by workers
products
an
in
ones.which
implications
of work
the worker-controlled
improvements
mate rial
its
to
that
are borne
conditions will
Finally,
pollution
l ikely
Moreove r,
now.
addition
that
defined
it s cos ts
in
include
firm,
is
it
second
The
firm.
that
shows
twin firm.
firm will
the
be
firm will
the
capitalist
It
the
identical
a considerable
which
participation
productivity of
the
raises
of
is
there
unrealistic:
efficiency
con-
and also
level
assumption
the
direct
firm with
a
assume
at shopfloor
then
firm level,
at
trol
we
If
for
location
also summarised.
alternative
in
dealing
considered.
policy and
108
Chapter 4
CONCLUSIONS
which were posed
The questions
can be
paper
worde r
is not
i ntroduction
ra ise
duce
the
level
their
It
ing
in
participation
work which
the
rephrased as:
has been
alien ating
and
techn ology;
the
argued that
in
people
jobs
the
dev-
are frequently
of work alien-
If the causes
unrewarding.
is a miss-
job satisfaction
Instead,
today.
content of jobs
lay
in
the
solutions which
production alone, then
the
changes
return
and
of job satisfaction
participation
ternative st rategy which
might
techno-
pre-industrial
to
as
possible
would reduce or solve
in work which
introduction of worker
increased
alienating
today!s
for
for
increased automation;
and for
p roblems
the arguments
retention of
for job enlargement;
ce rtain
or -re-
technology of production would be appropriate.
Sei s u re with
or
a firm
satisfaction of workers,
co nsideredaand-_ejected
logy;
of
conditions will
into
participation
the unsatisfying
and of
techn ology of
We
of
the problem
Under what
the work done by many
in
elope d countries
dea I with
relevance
this
alienation?
e lement
at ion
of worker
the
to
management
satisfying?
of job
is
What
start of
at the
alienation.
remained
at
as
least alleviate
The
an althe
problems.
evidence derived
Empiical
workers
of
in which the
introduction
icipation
does
improved when
amount,
from experimen ts with
level,
directness
of worker participation
affect workers'
morale.
showed
Job
and method
that
part-
sa tisfaction
the amount of participation was
greatest.
109
participation affected
Direct
elected
participation through
It
increase effi-
to
introduced by management
sharing schemes
intro-
than profit
were more effective
interests,
in workers'
to
obvious-
or ones which were
by workers
duced spontaneous
ly
participation schemes,
also found that
was
seemed
to morale.
respect
strategy with
be a promising
participation at
Participation
the firm alone.
of
level
to be
appeared
level
raising morale than
in
more effective
Partic-
representatives.
the shopfloor or office
ipation at
the
satisfaction more than
job
ciency.
The
job
satisfa ction justified
for
the behavior
1ess
above gave workers
But
economic
the
consequences of
the
firm,
extreme
pf
The
ensue?
results would
If Parti cipat ion we re
f irm.
Failing a
or
firm
and
empirical
mines
firms with
trol
evi dence of
some of
oned .
cases ques t
firm s
for the behav ior of
'capitalist
its
lies
between
the e ffects
control.
used
The
and of the
in
which
the worker
of p arti
were
We discussed
the work-
controlled
It wa s found that
tw in'.
the assumptio ns
worker
of cases
models
The ir assumptions
the standar d assumptio ns
con
involving
pa rticipation, polar models of the
in some
share of
firms.
behavior of-
the
model
discribed and
ers
thei r
here to s tudy
too 1 used
cases
firm were exa mined.
-alternatives
disc ussed
of
polar
participation
impl ications of
plans
cont rol
for
participation
assumptions.
lpssl-than, full
principal
easily with
most
deal
t han tota l
the
models,
partici pat ion
in-
what other
intr oduct ion were encou raged,
its
or
troduced
increasing
impl ications
of
examination
the
of
in
of participation
ap parent success
ci pation
the
under-
in economic theory of
'extreme' case
of worker
110
wh ich
at
lit-
the
in
models
the
as
of the firm only,
level
the
representatives
through elected
participate
they
in
one
to be
assumed
if
plausible
more
is
pa rticipation
er ature assume.
If
'capitalist
the
with
twin'
longer approcontrolled
the worker
in
iden-
function
no
is
firm
productive
more
is
labor
p r iate:
satisfac-
twin' but
alist
a production
the assumption of
Hence
'capit
it
producti ve.
be more
a s o that workers will
tical
the
in
than
work
from their
t ion
from
find
that
greater
get
that workers will
not only
impl ies
partici pation
literature on
psychological
the
case, we
'extreme'
the more
consider
we
f irm,
The
third assumption questioned
p rod u cts
of the firm will
t ro 1 and
with
is
managerial
s u bs t ituted
come
These
ers.
the
costs
re sul t fr om
If perfe ct
ass umed,
costs
en t and the worker
as
a result
differ
co mp et
tr ans fe rr ed
The
case,
f i rm may
as
a
cont rolled
the
level
then the b eh av
the ne
firm will
preferred
con-
wh ich
ass umpt ion
in-
costs
to
p resent are borne by workimperfections
in all
tion
to workers
in
the
markets
lais.
are nonexist-
co ntrol le d f irms ' behavior will not
fr om it s 'ca pitalist tiwn's' behavior.
differ subst
result of
worker s
include as
will
If i mperfect *lnbor ma rkets a re assumed,
real istic
and
input-s
( also maximize "the
_)
costs wh i ch a t
bor market.
the
cont r0 l.
f i rm
that
t h e same with
be
that wo rke r 5
per -worker" of
firm those
the
is
is
ntual 1y
or of
f rom
as sum pti on.
is
the worker
its
behavior
the more
controlled
'capitalist twin's'
Similarly
create bet ter work
by workers
which
the worker
conditions
is
until
reached which
111
identical
would
be
would
reach
relocate
spend more on work conditions-, to
and possibly
in
did not
seem
in
pure model..
the
to workers,
from management
con sumers.
It also would
mob ile
lab or
wit h
and much
less
This
costs.
likely
models
able models
have complete
level.
Not
all' types
is
at
of firms
level,
th e
at
control
raise job
floor
can
We
them.
which
have
devise workwill
increase
concl usive and complete models
make extreme assumptions about
cipation
lo we r
and theoreti-
partici pation which
The most
workers
had
the sources
firms ).
of firms with
participation will
1es s
firm
the supply of jobs woul d
part icipation
with
of participative
job satisfaction.
the
response to
to those who already
restricted
( experiments
been used
fir ms
redistributive effect would disapp ear
conclusions emerge from
Some
in
income
controlled
by making
to move
freeentry of neW firms,
ten d to be
cal
eg,
from other workers,
away
to redistribute
in existing worker
employed
to workers
tend
from
markets
imperfect
in
and
(with our
resource s
redistribute
to
to tend
are
new assumptions)
the firm
on
control
of worker
The effects
and
The
viable than
to be
likely
less
frequently
less
the new assumptions
firm with
any
it
make
to
the firm to
controls.
pollution
to spend more on
behavior of the
changes
cause
new assumptions
The
pollution.
and
location,
of work,
relating to conditions
policy
firm"s
for the
were examined;
new assumptions
these
frim with
the worker controlled
of
model
of the
implications
The
markets.
perfect
only with
firm
twin'
'capitalist
the
to what
level
participation:
and at
floor
wi th
of
less
than
at
complete
sati sfaction. Where
or di rect,
this
is
firm
parti-
likely.
1 12
Imp 1 icat ions
The
ion
is
ment
areas of
most
immediately
new
in which
or
rural
communities
is
another
participation would be applied
In
development
for
programs
in those
goal
of policy.
for
development
of capital
the
areas
plan-
place where worker
planners
to
the
poverty areas,
economy.
the most
firms would be
is
not
undesirable,
Public subsidies which
in
The
areas.
Redistribution of resources
than elsewhers.
harmful
to workers
for
poverty
by
participat-
those of develop-
disadvantages of participative
obvious
less
workers'
applicable are
for urban
programs
ning of
planning
those areas
for the creation of
could
firms
is
a
are already
serve as
participative
conversion of existing
it
paid
a source
firms,
or
to some form of
worker management.
Communi ty
for
areas
pation
by
su ch as
be the basis
could
for de cisions
report on
of one
by
firm,
the
have been
the community
affecting
The
it.
Watts,
which
community but
advocated
Worker partici-
for management
which
in
2
above.
it s conference of C.D.C.'s
such
owned
Corporations
those- discussed
the commu nity, in
share
is
Development
in
firms
would
owned
retain some
Cambridge
Institute's
contains a description
already
exists:
run by workers
it
rather
than
managers.
The
results of
participation
action
and
can
that
th is
meet
this
study
the need
show at
for
least
greater
form of management
that worker
job satisf-
should be
inves tigated
113
issues which have not yet
There are some important
been
For
problem of the
the
example,
worker
questions which
and
studied
control
result
wh ich
higher th a n the average
already
in
the fi rm.
are
discussed by
but
little
the
hypothesis.
to
has
er
Ward
The
controlled
to hire
gests
that
but
is
not
effects
of worker
pants.
The
nat ives.
needs
A
capitalist
feel
to
done
t es t
cro cial
to be
economy.
corporations:
a
firm
capitalist
an
It
a ten
s ug
-
-
extreme w6rker
for community
effective
firm.
dealt with here,
its workers'
In the
prove
question which
people
Van ek,
value of setting u p work-
least
at
participatio
available.
change
than
capitalist
important
A very
know are
respect
t han a
development
cuss ion,
few er workers
controlle d firm
Joan Robinson and
development
fi rm would be less
controlled
the worker
the
for
of
problems
a worker-controlled
communi ty
in one
of worke rs
work has been
impli cati ons
obvious
product
problem might
the workabilit y of
dency
may
Domar,
emp irical
if any
in
of
un-
margin al
theoretical
labor
for
demand
and
their
unless
is
'perverse'
unanswered.
remain
mobility
lower
from
product
The
far
redistributive effects
to hi re n ew workers
willingness
so
underlies
is the
this d is-
longer te rm
n schemes on the partic idepend on what choices the y
firm wi t h
worker
perception of
participation
th e possible alter-
firm:
the lack of creative,' self-deve lopmental work
....
vities insures that workers will not demand such a
environment: their preference, (like everyone else
are molded by their-environment, and the absence o
alienating alternatives allows worke rs no basis on
to change their
preferences.(3)3.
O
act i wo rk
's)
f non-
wh i ch
in a worker controlled firm the opposite may be true: If
workers will demand more power and more participation.
so,
1 14
as
a
is
two
groups
believe
Both
for
consciousness
Others
capitalism.
15
Matt-ick
in
the operation
control
is
cooption by managemenit,
of
of worker
forms
the opposition to
part-
argue that all
.
icipation
,
raise
firm, short of full
the
of
firms will
cap italist
and str-ngt hen
( eg.
called worker self-
that demands by work-
argues
inside
power
increased
workers'
4.
Andre Gorz
management.
somet imes
is
This
workers.
trolled by
ers
a socialist
in
that
of 'workers- control."
w orld, work will be con-
advocates
of socialist
cont rove rsy between
the
underlying
one question
ers
of work-
' consciousness'
on
the effects
issue of
The
a little.
of having had
result
Mattickjrites
Paul
i n capitalist-owned
participation
f i rms
These measures do not point to an unfolding industrial
democracy but are designed to safeguard exis ting production relations and-reduce their immanent frictions
study
This
participation 5s
and
from
formis t
The
of
the appeal
results of
participation
in workers
ma ins.
st age of
in
control
Needs
social
the study have
reducing
research
Among
them
confirmed t he
for
My
ange
evident
a prime
role
i nteres t
socialch
became
,
'non-re-
a
change.
alienation.
a strategy
for more
the study.
for
least allevi-
as
control
of. the workers
as
at
alienat i ng work,
or
of unsatisfying
s trategy
reform'
in wo rke rs
i nterest
an
for sol ving or
a strategy
problems
the
ating
from
developed
need
re-
at every
was
for
15
the development
of workers
controlled
developments,
tested
of some
against
further
firms
theoretical
and economies.
testable hypotheses
reality.
models
From these
should emerge
to be
116
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Experiments with worker participation: summary of the evidence
Alex Bavelas,(''Some Problems of Organizational Change", Journal
of Social
Issues,
Summer 1948, p. 48+):
Using workers at a garment factory, Bavelas compared the
efficiency of two matched groups of sewing machine operators.
One group discussed and decided on its production goal;
the
other group discussed their work but did not set their production
goal.
The first group was the more productive.
Lawrence and Smith
("Group Decision and Employee Participation",
Journal of Applied Psychology 1955, vol.
39, p. 334):
This was a study of workers in a (different) garment
factory using two groups, one of office workers paid a set wage;
the other of factory workers on piece rates.
Half of each group
discussed work related problems but did not discuss or set
production goals, in addition to discussing the other topics.
Morale rose in all groups.
Production rose in all the groups
but the increase in efficiency in the participative group which
set production goals was much greater; each of the participant
groups increased its efficiency over its original starting point
to a degree significant at the O',05 level and at the 0.01
compared with changes in the control groups.
level
117
Coch and French
1948, vol.
("Overcoming Resistance to Change",
Human Relations,
1, PP. 512+):
A comparison of three groups of garment workers who "participated"
in the introduction of changes in their job, with one group which
did not "participate".
The group which did not participate was
informed of changes in the job.
One group "participated" through
representatives who were chosen by the group who were to introduce
the new method.
The two other groups were "total-participation"
groups in which all members shared in introducing the new method,
as the representatives shared in the second group.
Management
had already decided on the changes to be made and set rates for
them.
The participant groups were informed in a more "dramatic"
way of the changes.
Both morale and productivity fell in the
first group, the non-participants, after the change.
The customary
output restriction, low productivity, hostility to management,
and labor turnover occurred; within 40 days of the change 17% of
the workers had quit their jobs.
In the groups with participation, no quits occurred during
the first 40 days.
Productivity rose after the change.
In the
representation group relearning occurred faster than usual and
attitudes to work were reported good.
In the groups with total
participation, efficiency rose almost immediately to a level
14% above what it had been before the change.
Morse and Reimer
("The Experimental Manipulation of a Major
Organizational Variable",
1956, vol. 52, pp. 120+):
Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology,
118
The effects of increasing and decreasing the level of decisionmaking on workers in a clerical office of an insurance firm were
examined in this study.
In two groups the level of decision-
making was systematically increased;
correspondingly decreased.
in the other two it was
In the "participation" groups the
workers had control of "work methods and processes, and personnel
matters, such as recess periods, the handling of tardiness, etc."
(Morse and Reimer, p. 122).
The workers had the power formally
vested in the supervisor and also "control over some of the deci+
sions regarding personnel matters and work processes previously
made fairly high in the supervisory line
(Daniel Katz, a colleague
of Morse and Reimer's, quoted in Blumberg, p. 88).
The group
did not, however, have complete autonomy and was subject to some
of the same rules and regulations as other employees"
experiment lasted a year and a half.
The
(ibid).
Morse and Reimer administered
questionaires to the workers,. interviewed supervisory personnel
and employees, and studied company records of turnover, absenteeism,
productivity, etc.
of four dimensions.
The described satisfaction in work as composed
They were self-actualization, attitudes toward
supervisors, satisfaction with the company, and "intrinsic job
satisfaction".
With every measure of satisfaction, the workers
in the participative sections were more satisfied, and the workers
in the hierarchical sections were less satisfied than before the
changes in control.
Productivity rose in both sections, but by more (14%) in
the hierarchical sections than in the participative sections were
it rose by only 10% on average.
119
The 'Haw thorne Experiments :
Rozethlisberger and Dickson (Manage-
ment and the Worker, .Harvard University Press,193 8 ):
In their study of the Relay Assembly Test Room, Roethlisberger
and Dickson studied the effects of changes in the work environment
on a small sample of workers whose job was assembling electrical
equipment parts.
The researchers planned to alter systematically
conditions of work such as the number and duration of rest periods,
improved diet, shorter work days and work weeks, and the effect
of wage incentives.
Each of these variables was expected to
have an effect on the productivity of the workers.
During the
first part of the experiment, up till 1929, productivity rose
fairly steadily no matter what changes were introduced, or
whether work conditions as they were defined by the experimenters
were improved or worsened.
Morale similarly rose.
During this
period of the experiment, the girls were allowed to discuss
changes to be introduced, to suggest changes to be tried, and
even to veto changes.
The foreman from the main workshop was
excluded and replaced by supervision by the experimenters.
The
workers had a much higher amount of participation in deciding
their work conditions than they had had previously.
The experiment continued after 1929' although Roethlisberger
and Dickson did not report on it in any detail.
During this
period, the experimenters lost interest in the Relay Assembly Test
Room part of their study.
As the experimenters' interest in the
study declined, the amount of participation which the operators
were allowed in setting the experiment was reduced.
conditions were changed without notice.
trol over their jobs.
Their working
The workers had less con-
The workers' control over their jobs was
120
further reduced by the depression which dictated changes in the
work conditions of the test room such as shorter hours and lay-offs
which even the experimenters could not control.
During the
period, the workers' productivity no longer improved, as it had
continuously during the first two years of the experiment.
the lay-offs began, productivity fell
had ever been before.
After
to a lower level than it
The morale of the workers fell simultaneously:
workers in the test room became bored, disillusioned, and restive.
"The degree of direct workers' participation in decision-making,
however, did undergo a marked change after 1929, and its decline
was roughly coincidental with the rise of disaffection among the
workers"
Strauss
(Blumberg,
p. 40).
(in William F. White, Money and Motivation, Harper and
Row, New York, 1955, p.90'):
Strauss has described an instance of participation at shopfloor level which involved direct control by workers of the speed
and environment in which they worked.
In a toy factory, the
female workers whose job was to paint toys showed very low
productivity after their job had been re-engineered.
They com-
plained of the speed of the line and of the heat of the room.
Management eventually allowed the workers to have fans installed
to cool the room, at the workers' suggestion, and also installed
a control
for the speed of the production line in the room.
The
girls discussed the speeds at which the line was to be set and
made the decision themselves.
the day.
On average,
however,
They varied the speed throughout
the speed was higher than it
had
121
been when set at a constant speed by management.
Productivity
increased between 30-50% over expected levels, and morale rose
(partly reflecting increases in pay, since the girls were paid
piecework rates).
The girls' control both over the machinery
with which they worked, and over supervision (since they were
making for themselves decisions which had been management prerogatives) both had increased, and these were presumably the cause of
their increased production and work satisfaction.
Trist, Higgin, Murray and Pollack
(Organizational Choice):
The Tavistock Institute in London has studied a number of
cases in which worker participation has occurred in the context
of changing technology.
E.L. Trist and others have described
alternative forms of social ordanization and of mining technique
in Northern England coal mines.
The oldest technique is the
traditional method, in which each miner works one work place, doing
each stage of the work himself, using hand picks;
is removed from the face in tubs.
conventional
longwall,
and the coal
The two newer methods are:
in which the work is highly specialized,
subdivided and each miner has one job only;
and composite longwall,
in which there is no rigid division of labor and miners work as
a team by dividing the jobs between them --
hence not observing
rigid job divisions.
Composite longwall working represents an alternative social
organization within longwall technology.
With composite longwall
operation, a team of 50ror so miners ahd responsibility for
operating a longwall face and is consequently paid as a group
122
(basic pay, with a bonus if a cycle is completed within 3 shifts).
The team of miners is self-selected from among comparable skill
levels.
The team is responsible for allocating to its members
all the roles needed to do the prescribed task and is in control
of the workplace organization to a large extent.
Consequently,
foremen are free to provide miners with services which enable
the cycle to proceed with greater ease, whereas with convential
longwall he must do "progress chasing".
The Tavistock researchers
found that composite work gave miners' mosre variety, and meant that
difficulties when they occurred were shared, not restricted to
a few men on the shoft.
Absence rates among composite longwall
workers were lower, as were sickness and accident rates.
tivity was higher for these teams.
Produc-
The investigators therefore
concluded that:
within the same longwall technology, composite organization
was found to possess characteristics more conducive than
(conventional longwall) to productive effectiveness, low
cost, work satisfaction, good relations and social health.
(Trist, p. 291)
r
123
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Examples of firms with worker participation:
What follows is a brief description of those examples of
worker participation which may be unfamiliar to readers:
Yugoslavia:
Worker Self-management
The Yugoslav economy
is based on a system of worker self
management in enterprises, with some central planning and some
elements of community control.
In Yugoslavia all capital
is owned by the state, which
receives for it a fixed return (so that the state is in the position
of a lender, with no say in decisions about the operation of
the firm).
The enterprise is run by all the members of the enter-
prise who meet as the workers' collective.
The workers' collective
makes decisions by democratic vote;
it delegates much of its
authority for day to day decisions
(except in small enterprises
with fewer than 30 members) to a workers council with up to 30
members.
The workers council meets monthly and is responsible
for major decisions on basic issues:
the enterprise's economic
plan, the allocation of the net profit, prices of the firm's product,
production plans, budgets, what to produce, etc. and for decisions
on labor relations.
It appoints and can discharge the director.
It elects a managing board of about 10 persons which acts as
agent of the council, meets frequently, and is responsible for
carrying out the council's decisions on a day to day basis.
124
The profits of the enterprise, net of the fee paid to the
state for use of capital, are available to the workers for distribution or reinvestment, either in the same plant or in expansion
in the same commune or a different one.
for the workers
The director of the enterprise, who runs it
collective, is appointed by aselect'on committee,
tion, in conjunction with the workers council.
by open competi-
The selection
committee is composed of representatives of the workers council,
and of the local people's committee.
The manager can be removed
by the workers council.
Workers are elected to the workers council for a two year
term, with half replaced each year;
two consecutive terms.
at large;
no council member may serve
In small enterprises, members are elected
in larger ones they represent units of the enterprise.
Candidates are nominated at meetings of the workers' collective;
the vote is by secret ballot.
The union has some, but probably
2
not predominant influence in the selection process.
Attempts have been made and are being made to bring participation in the Yugoslav firm to the shopfloor level:
enterprises
are divided into economic units of 20 - 100 workers, which are
responsible for production and innovation, and increasing productivity.
They make some investment decisions, and the profits of the enterprise which are to be distributed are shared between economic
units on the basis of their productivity.
The commune in which the firm is located shares in decisions
to a limited extent through its role in the appointment of the
manager;
but most decisions about the operation of the firm are
125
made by workers, as members of economic units and of the workers'
collective;
by elected representatives of the workers, on the
workers council and the management committee;
and by the director
who is chosen by representatives of the workers.
Studies of Yugoslav firms have shown that on the whole,
elections are contested;
they are not dominated by the union or
the party, though both have branches in each enterprise.
Limits
on the terms and number of terms served by elected representatives
operate to hinder or prevent the development of a class of "workers"
separate from the rest who run the firm.
And studies show that
workers management has produced developments whichwere not foreseen or wanted by the government and the party, which suggests
again that they do not control firms:
wage and price increases,
the development of increasing concentration in Yugoslav industry
and of monopolistic practices in Yugoslav firms, which led to the
need for anti-trust legislation.
Studies of Yugoslav worker self
management produce results which show that workers in worker
managed enterprises believe that they do have significant amounts
of control of the operation of their enterprises.3
West Germany:
Mitbestimmung
In Western Europe, West Germanyl has the most extensive
form of workers participation:
(codetermination) was introduced
in the coal,
its scheme of Mitbestimmung
(as a result of labor pressure
iron and steel industries after World War 11),
early '50s, when it was considered vital
in the
to West Germany's
recovery to raise productivity in those sectors.
In each firm
126
covered by the legislation, labor representatives, chosen by the
workers council
(all workers in the firm) and by the unions,
sit on the supervisory board together with an equal number of
representatives of the owners and management and with one independent member approved by both sides.
The executive board of each
firm includes a labor member.
The system of Mitbestimmung was first established
law in the largest firms;
in federal
in 1956 it was extended to holding
companies controlling mainly firms subject to the 1951 law.
smaller firms in the coal and steel
The
industries and all firms in
other industries have a system of participation and representation which falls well short of Mitbestimmung in the control
gives to worker:
it
workers are consulted by management, but have
no final say in decisions.
The presence of both a type of worker control and of participation in German firms is a potential source of some evidence on
the differences in impact on individual workers of the two
systems.
In the firms with codetermination industrial relations
appear to be better;
the enterprises with codetermination lead
the way in the German economy with social services and provision
of fringe benefits.
They use more of their receipts for wages and
other benefits to workers than do the correspondingly sized
firms in industries without Mitbestimmung.
The differences between
control and participation do appear to be represented in differences
in behavior between the two types of system.
In firms with Mitbestimmung, the firm is controlled both by
workers and by private owners.
The profits go to the owners;
but
127
as a result of pressures from worker directors a share of profits
goes to workers as expenditures on wages, fringe benefits, social
services, etc.
power:
Firms withparti~cAatfon have workers who have less
they can comment and make suggestions but are not able
to impose any decisions on the firm.
United States:
The Scanlon Plan
The Scanlon Plani is probably the most important workers
participation scheme to be put into practice in the U.S.:
has been applied in a number of firms;
it
and results of its appli-
cation have been documented and evaluated.
The differences
which exist between the versions used in different firms are
relatively small.
The plan was originally devised in the early 1950's by
Joseph Scanlon of the MIT department of Industrial
Relations.
It
is designed to be introduced by workers and management in collaboration.
Its advocates attribute some failures of the plan to
failure at this point:
the imposition of "participation" by
managers on workers with inadequate prior consultation and agreement with them.
This arouses (possibly justified) suspicions
among employees that the management is trying to put something over
on them.
In many cases, however, the Scanlon
Plan is introduced
because a firm is in financial difficulties and in danger of
closing down.
In this case, the similarity of interests of
workers and management is obvious.
The plan calls for a sharing of profits, or of the increases
in profits attributable to increased productivity, between owners
braries
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129
and workers
in.the firm.
It includes opening of managerial
decisions and the running of the firm to workers:
they are given
access to information about the firm to a greater extent than is
usual.
A major component is the opening of routes to the acceptance
of workers'
ideas to increase the efficiency of the firm or plant,
the ideas being evaluated by joint worker-management committees.
Unlike most suggestion plans, the Scanlon Plan does not reward
individual workers for their ideas, but shares the increases
in profits derived from worker ideas between all workers.
Scanlon
Plan firms usually distribute to workers a fixed percentage of
any increases
in productivity over a base period (before the plan).
The percentage ranges from 50% to 100%.
The Plan implies "opening
the accounts" of the firm so workers can judge for themselves
that the calculation of bonuses is done fairly.
In addition to increased profits and incomes for owners and
workers, the plan's advocates claim that it increases productivity
and improves the quality of work-life for workers.
Scanlon
writes:
If you visited one of the participating plants, you would
say to yourself, 'here are people at work, not resentful
or suspicious, not just here because they have to earn
their living they are enjoying their work. They are participating'.
While initial successes of the plan may be attributable to
a "honeymoon
effect", the plan has been shown by evaluations to
continue to raise efficiency and labor productivity even 2 or
more years after the initial phase.
On average, as table 3.1
shows, one evaluation showed a 23% increase in efficiency over
2 years of operation.
130
Problems with the Scanlon plan frequently arise at
management levels:
lower level
supervisors feel stripped of
authority, union leaders perceive loss of power, and higher
managers see the role of listening to initiatives from below as
an abdication of authority.
TABLE 3.1
Percentage Increases in Productivity in Scan Ion Plan Firms
Company
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Average
(unweighted )>
First-Year
Relative
Efficiency
Sedond-Year
Relative
Efficiency
Two-year Average
Relative Efficiency
(Unweighted)
10.9
12.7
13.2
12.9
36.7
28.9
32.9
38.7
29.3
49.4
42.9'
25.1
14.1
12.9
16.5
23.2
33.0
39.2
37.9
31 '19t
15.3
6.8
13.7
.8.1
10.3
23.7
23.1
14.9
21.9
16.7
22.5
17.3
15.0
Source: Frederick G. Lesieur, ed. The Scanlon Plan
MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 113.
131
Footnotes:
Chapter I
1.
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations, Random House, 1932, p. 99.
2.
See
G.
Press,
3.
Becker, Human
Capital,
Columbia University
1964.
S. Rottenberg, "On Choice in
See also on this:
Labor Markets," Industrial Labor Relations Review,
No. 9, 1956, pp. 183-197, reprinted in B.J. McCormick
and E.O. Smith (ed.) The Labour Market, Penguin,
London,
1968, and
R.C. Edwards and Arthur McEwan, A Radical Approach
to Economics, URPE, 1970, pp. 10-17, and
in
Les Boden, "The Economy of New Communities"
New Community Report, Urban Systems Laboratory,
MIT, Summer, 1968, Appendix 1.
July 2,
1970,
p.
20.
4.
New York Times,
5.
"The School Teacher" in R. Fraser (ed.), Work,
1969, vol. II, p. 226.
vols.) Penguin, London,
6.
"The
7.
Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy:' The Sociology
of Participation, Constable, London, 1969, p. 47.
8.
See Vroom, Work and Motivation, John Wiley and Sons,
New York,,1967, p. 99.
9.
Alvin Gouldner, "The Unemployed Self" in Work, op.cit.,
See also Gouldner's analysis of
vol.
II, p. 3 4 6.
alienating factors associated with rules and bureaucracy in his Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, The
Free Press, New York, 1954, especially ch. 9 and
pp.
Steelman"
in
Fraser,
op.cit.,
vol.
p.
66 .
216-217.
10.
Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom,
1964, p. 2.
of Chicago Press, Chicage,
11.
Victor Vroom, op.cit.,
12.
I I,
(two
:.Blauner,
op.cit.,
p.
15.
p. 5.
University
132
13.
Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
of 1844, trans . M. Milligan, Edited by D.J. Struick,
International Publishers, New York, 1965, p. 110.
14.
Ibid.,
15.
See also Danie l Bell, Work and
Beacon Press, Boston, 1965.
16.
See Blumberg, op.cit., Ch. 4, who discus ses each
of these alternatives and its proponents in some
detail.
17.
Blumberg, op.cit.,
18.
Georges Friedma n, The Anatomy of Work, The
Press, Glencoe, lilinois, 196 1, p. 4T.
19.
Blumberg,
20.
Blauner, op.cit.,
21.
Blumberg, op.cit., pp.61-2.
22.
de Grazia, Of T ime, Work and Leisure, Twentieth
Century Fund, N ew York, 1962 (reference to how
little the time people spend at work has decreased
in a century).
23.
Blumberg, op.cit.,
24.
F.J. Stendenback, Participation and Manpower
Polic y: A Challenge to Modern Industrial Society,
OEDC, Manpower and Social Affai rs Directorate,
Paris, 1969, entire paper.
25.
Blumberg, op.cit., p. 123.
26.
Stendenbach, op.cit., pp.
27.
Blumberg, op.cit., Stendenbach, op.cit., Vroom,
op.cit., Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political
Behavior, Princeton University Press, Pr inceton, 1961.
p. 111
op.cit.,
its Discontents,
p. 66.
Free
p. 53.
p. 182.
especially
chapters 1-6.
31-2, p. 36.
;33
Chapter 2
1.
See Victor Vroom,
of the Eff ects of
New York, 1960.
2.
See Appendix
best immung.
3.
King and Van de Vall, Dimensions of Workers Participation in Management Decision-Making, Industrial Relations Research Association Proceedings,
p.
1969,
4.
to
Some Personality Determinants
Participation, Prentice Hall,
Chapter
description
3:
of Mit-
172.
Abraham Schuchman, Codete rmination: Labor's Middle
Way in Germany, Public Af fairs Press, Washington,
1957,
D.C.,
p. 6.
71.
5.
Paul
6.
Michael Barnett Brown, "Opening the Books, " Institute
for Workers Control Bulletin, Nottingham, England.
n.d.
7.
Coch and
in Human
See also
iment is
Blumberg,
Industrial
Democracy,
French, "Overcoming
Relations, vol. I,
appendix to chapter
summarized.
p.
Resi stance to Change,"
512-32.
2 in which the exper-
1948 , pp.
8.
Problems of Organizational Change,"
Bavelas, A "Some
.
Summer 1948,
Journal of Social Issues, Volume 4,
See a Iso the appendix to chapter 2.
pp. 48-52.
9.
"Group Decision and
L.C. Lawrence and P C. Smith,
Employee Part ici pat on ," Journal of Applied Psychology,
Volume 39, 1955, pp
See also the appendix to
334-7.
chapter 2.
10.
F.J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1939;
Blumberg, op.cit.,
chapters 2 and 3;
Charles Hampden-Turner, Radical Man,Schenkman, CamSee also the appendix to
bridge, 1970, Chapter 8.
chapter 2.
11.
Roethlisberger and Dickson,
12.
Ibid.,
p. 39.
op.cit.,
p.
183.
134
p. 56.
13.
Ibid.,
14.
Mor se,
Nancy C. and E. Reimer, "The Experimental
Man ipulation of a Major Organi zational Variable,"
Jou rnal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Volume
See also the appendix to
1956, pp. 120-9.
cha pter 2.
15.
King and Van de Val],
16.
Ibid.,
17.
Victor Vroom,
18.
See Workers Management in Yugoslavia,
1962.
Labor Organization, Geneva,
19.
Kavcic, Dagdan,
"Control, Partic
Yugoslav Industr
to be published
20.
Obradovic, "Participation and Work Attitudes in
Industrial Relations, Volume 9, no.
Yugoslavia ,"
February, 1970.
op.cit.
p. 172.
op.cit.
International
Veljky Rus and Arnold S. Tannenbaum,
ipation and Effectiveness in Four
ial Organizations", mimo, no date,
in Administrative Science Quarterly.
21.
Kavcic,
22.
A.K. Rice, Productivity and Social Organization,
Tavistock Publications, London, 1958.
23.:
lbid.,
p. 69.
24.
Ibid.,
p. 159.
25.
Lesieur, Frederick G., ed., The Scanlon Plan A Frontier in Labor Man agement Cooperation, MIT
Press, Cambridge, 1968.
173 pp.
26.
International
27.
Stendenbach, op.cit.,
28.
A.K. Rice,
29.
Wi illiam F. Whyte, ed.,
and
Rus
1960,
Bros.,
and Tannenbaum, op.cit.,
p.
3,
9.
Labor Organization, op.cit.
op.cit.,
New Yorkm
p.
p.
6
9.
9.
Money
1955.
and Motivation, Harper
135
30.
Trist, E.L., G.W. Higgin, H. Murray and A.B. Pollack,
Organizational Choice, London, Tavistock Publications,
1963.
31.
Babchuck, N. and W.J. Goode,
Self-Determined Group," Amer
Volume 16, October 1951, pp.
10,
"Work Incentives
can Sociological
in a
Review,
679-87.
p.
90,
in Money and
32.
George Strauss, Chapter
Motivation, op.cit.-
33.
Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1964.
See also
A. Kornhauser, Mental Health of the Industrial
Worker, New York, John Wiley, 1965.
34.
Whyte,
op.cit.
35.
Work,
Factoryioney
36.
Gorz, Andre,
in Europe,"
lecture "The Workers Control
Harvard University, October,
Movement
1970.
136
Chapter 3
1.
Benjamin Ward, "The Socialist
Organizational Al ternat ives
1967,
2.
Economy", A Study of
Random House, New York,
p. 6.
"The Firm in Illyria:
Benjamin Ward
ism", America n Economic Review, vol.
pp.
Market
Syndical-
48, 1958,
566-89;
Evsey Domar, "The Soviet Collective Farm as a Prod uce r
Cooperative",
American Economic Review, vol. 56,
1966, pp. 734 -57;
Joan Robinson
"The Soviet Cooperative Farm as a
Comment", American Economic
Producer Coop erative:
Review, vol. 57,
1967, pp . 222-23;
Jaroslav Van ek, "Decentra l ization Un der Workers'
American
A Theoretica l Appraisal ",
Management:
Economic Review, vol. 59, 1969, pp. 1006-14;
Benjamin Ward, "The Socialist Econom y"', op. cit.;
IlIlyria for
Charles S. Rockwell, "The Relevance of
Less Developed Countries", mimeo, Ec onomic Growth
Center, Yale University, Discussion paper #56, 1968;
Evsey Domar, Market and Price Mechan isms in Socialist
Discussion, American Eco nomic Association
Countries:
Annual Meeting, New York, December, 1969;
General
Vanek,J.The
Theory of
Labor:
University Press
Managed Market
Ithaca, N.Y.
Economies,
Cornell
1970;
Vanek, J., The Participative Economy ,% (continuation
of hi.s previous book, more speculati ve and philosoph ical), manuscript to be published by Co rnell Universi ty
Press;
op. cit.
1967,
3.
B. Ward,
4.
Evsey Domar,
1966, op.
5.
Vanek, 1970,
op. cit.
6.
Rockwell,
7.
Ward,
8.
Vanek, 1969,
9.
Ibid.,
p. 1007
10.
Except
fa rms.
for
11.
Bavelas,
12.
Lawrence and Smith,
ticipation".
op.
cit.
op.
1958,
cit.
p. 566
cit.,
op.-cit.,
Domar who
"Some
p. 1006-7
bases
Problems
his work
on Soviet
of Organizational
"Group
Decision and
Collective
Change".
Employee Par-
137
French,
Resistance
"Overcoming
to
13.
Coch and
14.
Kurt Lewin, "Studies in Group Decisions",
wright and Zandett, ed., Group Dynamics,
Change".
in CartNew York
1959.
15.
Morse and Reimer, "The Experimental Manipulation of
a Major Organizational Variable", Journal of Abnormal
vol. 52, 1956.
Social Psychology,
16.
Sidney Verba,
p.
Groups
Small
Behavior,
and Political
238.
in William F. Whyte,
Money and Moti-vation.
17.
Strauss,
18.
Trist, Higgin and Pollack, Organizational
Tavistock publications, London, 1963.
19.
A.K. Rice, Productivity and Social Organization:
Tav'istock publications,
The Ahmedabad Experiments,
London, 1958.
20.
Efficiency Under Managerial
Seymour Melman, "Industrial
vs. Cooperative Decision Making" in URPE Review of
Radical Political Economics, vol. II, no. 1, 1970.
21.
"Factory
22.
Money"
in
Frazer, Work,
Unemployed.Self"
Gouldner, "The
Alvin
II,
p.
289.
in Work,
vol.
cit.
op.
Reimer,
vol.
Choice,
23.
Morse and
24.
Oscar Lange,
McGraw Hill,
25.
International Labor Organization (ILO), Workers
Management in Yugoslavia, Geneva, 1962, p. 253 and
especially cahpter XI.
26.
ILO,
27.
Ekeberg and Lantz,
tion in Management
28.
William Kapp,
1963,
29.
op.
cit.
On the~Economic Theory
New York, 1964.
p.
of Socialism,
253.
Participa-
Blue Collar Workers
in Sweden, Stockholm
Social
Costs
of Business
Enterprise
ch. 9.
See Paul
Yorker,
Brodeur, "The
Jan.
16,
p.
1971.
261.
30.
ILO,
op.
cit.
31.
ILO,
op.
cit. p. 267.
Enigmatic
Enzyme"
in The
New
II.
138
32.
Roethlisberger and Dickson, Management
Worker, p. 234, see also table XXI.
33.
See also on this:
34.
Robert
35.
Robert Dahl, "After the Revolution?"
Review of Books, Jan. 9,
1971.
and
the
Tony Topham, Industrial Safety:
for Workers
Institute
Workers Cont rol is the Answer,
Control (IWC
PubI ication, Nottingham; and
Jack Jones,
I ndus trial Safety Joint Control is the
Answer," in Coates and Williams (ed.), How and Why
1969
Nottingham,
IWC,
Industry Mus t Be Democratized,
in
Coates
Health"
and
"Fatigue
Geoffrey Ric hman,
and Williams
(ed. ), How and Why Industry Must Be
Democratized
IWC,
Nottingham, 1969.
Blauner, Alienation
and Freedom.
in
the
New York
139
Conclusion:
1.
Footnotes
Ernest
Mandel,
International
2.
Rhea Wilson,
Laboratory
Paper
3.
Debate
Socialist
on Workers
Control
Review, May-June
Guerilla War
1969
on
Poverty,
M.I.T.
for Environmental
Studies,
Discussion
1969
Richard C.
Approach
4.
The
Edwards and Artbur MacEwan,
to
Andre Gorz,
Economics
Strategy
URPE
1970,
for Labor,
A
Radical
p.17
Beacon Press
Boston
1967
5.
Paul
Ed.
6.
Mattick, Workers'
Priscilla
Mattick, op.
Long,
Control,
Porter
Cit.
C-1
in
Sargent
TherNew Left,
1969
140
Footnotes:
Appendix to Chapter 3
Yugoslav'ia:
1.
See:
International Labor Organization, Workers Management
in Yugoslavia, Geneva, 1962 (Parts 1I and III describe
the structure and working of worker self management);
Benjamin Ward, The Socialist Economy, Random. House,.
New York, 1970
Yugoslav Worke rs' Self Management, ed. by M.J.Broekmeyer, Dororec ht, Holland, 1970 (proceedings of a
symposium).
2.
Jiri
Kolaja, Workers
Councils
in
Yugoslavia,
Lexington,
1960.
3.
West
1.
Veljko Rus,"Influence
Industrial Relations,
Germany:
Structure
vol.
9,
in Yugoslav
Feb.
Enterprise",
1970.
Mitbestimmung
a lso:
Sturmthal, Workers Co unc i s, Harvard University
Cambridge, 1964,
Press
esp ecial ly chapter IV;
Schau er, Helmut, Critique o f Codete rmi nationmimeo,
Berl n, no date; to be publ ished in reader on workers
coun t rol , ed. by Cambridge Ins t i tut e;
Micha el P. Fogarty, Corpora tion--On e Law? Geoffrey
Chapman, London, 1965.
See
Adolf
Scanlon Plan
1.
See:
Frederick G. Lesieur, ed., The Scanlon Plan...a frontier
in Labor-Management cooperation, MIT Press, Cambridge,
1958;
D. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, McGraw
Hill, New York, 1960, pp. 110-124;
Charles Hamden-Turner, Radical Man,
Chapter Vill,
Corporate Radicalism, esp. pp. 192-207, Schenkman,
1970.
2.
Lesieur, op.
cit. p. 63.
141
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