Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Ministry of Finance
Development Cooperation Report
2010
Foreword
On behalf of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA),
it is my pleasure to present the first Development Cooperation Report (DCR) to the international community
and the people of our nation.
The Development Cooperation Dialogue (DCD) process was initiated to stimulate policy dialogue on
development and reconstruction between the GoIRA with its Development Partners (DPs) to help strengthen
the relationship and cooperation between the GoIRA and its partners. This report, the outcome of a successful
round of negotiations, will serve as a critical tool for GoIRA and our DPs to assess the development
achievements of the country since 2002, identify the challenges to development in Afghanistan encountered
both by the Government and the international community and will hopefully provide policy directions to
further strengthen and accelerate the development process in Afghanistan.
We greatly appreciate the sustained assistance to Afghanistan provided by the international community for
development and gratefully acknowledge how such support helped bring positive changes to the lives of
Afghans since 2002. We acknowledge the significant contributions made to our nation’s development, through
provision of support to the financing of Afghanistan’s medium and long term strategies (Afghanistan National
Development Strategy and the national priority programs- NPPs). This report makes a brief assessment of the
utilization of development assistance to date and further analyzes the effectiveness of the delivery of
development assistance as based on the principles of Aid Effectiveness, agreed upon by the international
community and announced in Paris in 2005.
DCR reviews the financial trends of Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows since 2002 multi-year
projections of financing provided by DPs and the differences and disparities in financial support and
development progress across sectors and geographic areas. Dissemination of information and overview
analyses contained in reports of this nature contribute to transparency and accountability of development
finance utilization for the benefit of all stakeholders - the GoIRA, DPs and most importantly, the Afghan public.
The development dialogue process and the record of information collected, analyzed and shared widely have
the best potential of strengthening mutual trust between GoIRA, the international community and the Afghan
population. If appropriately used, these reports can provide decision making tools for the Government and
the international community for better aid coordination promoting improved medium and long term planning
of development interventions that can produce development results generating sustainable economic growth
and development benefits for the people of Afghanistan.
I express GoIRA’s commitment to serve the needs of the Afghan nation and its public and to this effect make
best efforts to strengthen cooperation, based on mutual accountability, with its DPs. The current report, with
its basic data and policy analysis, serves these objectives. Thus, our commitment is to make the DCDs an
annual event and publish annual reports generated out of the process. Our DPs' continuous support to this
process through provision of optimal information about their development financing to Afghanistan will
ultimately maximize public information both in Afghanistan and in donor countries about the benefits of our
DPs’ development interventions in Afghanistan.
MOF, on behalf of GoIRA, takes this opportunity to extend its gratitude to the Afghan population and the
international community for their continued support to GoIRA. We also thank UNDP for the technical and
financial assistance in support of the DCDs.
Dr. Omar Zakhilwal
Minister of Finance
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Contents
Foreword................................................................................................................................................................ I
Contents...............................................................................................................................................................IV
Acronyms ..............................................................................................................................................................V
Executive Summary............................................................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 4
2. History of Foreign Assistance in Afghanistan ............................................................................................... 6
2.1.
Pre-Cold War era (1919-50s)................................................................................................................ 6
3.
2.2.
The Cold War era (1960s-1990s) .......................................................................................................... 6
2.3.
Post 9/11 (2001- present) .................................................................................................................... 7
Landmark Conferences ................................................................................................................................. 9
3.1.
Bonn Conference (2001) ...................................................................................................................... 9
3.2.
Tokyo Conference (2002) ..................................................................................................................... 9
3.3.
Berlin Conference (2004) ..................................................................................................................... 9
3.4.
The London Conference ..................................................................................................................... 10
3.5.
Rome Conference (2007) ................................................................................................................... 10
3.6.
Paris Conference on Afghanistan (2008)............................................................................................ 11
3.7.
Hague Conference (2009) .................................................................................................................. 11
3.8.
London Conference (2010)................................................................................................................. 12
3.9.
Kabul Conference (2010).................................................................................................................... 12
3.10. Lisbon Conference (2010) ...................................................................................................................... 12
Assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... 14
4.
5.
Aid Dependency (Reality of Aid in Afghanistan) ......................................................................................... 15
Overview of External Assistance ................................................................................................................ 18
5.1.
Synopsis.............................................................................................................................................. 18
5.2.
Geographic Distribution of External Assistance ................................................................................. 21
5.3.
Loans .................................................................................................................................................. 22
5.4.
Aid Predictability ................................................................................................................................ 22
5.5.
Main Delivery Channels of External Assistance ................................................................................. 23
5.5.1.
External Assistance for Security Sector...................................................................................... 23
Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................... 25
5.5.2.
6.
External Assistance for Development ............................................................................................ 27
5.5.2.1.
Trust Funds ............................................................................................................................ 28
5.5.2.2.
Assistance through Government Systems ............................................................................. 30
5.5.2.3.
Support for Government Operating Budget .......................................................................... 31
5.5.2.4.
Share of Aid as Percentage of Government Budget .............................................................. 31
Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan ................................................................................................................ 34
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6.1.
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 34
6.2.
The Achievements in Brief ................................................................................................................. 34
6.3.
The Lapses Preventing Optimization of Benefits of International Assistance in Afghanistan ........... 35
6.4.
Absence of Strong Donor-Afghan Government Partnership ............................................................. 35
6.5.
Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action Addressing the Lapses............................................. 36
6.6.
Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda Aid Effectiveness Principles in Action in Afghanistan .............. 37
6.6.1.
Ownership.................................................................................................................................. 37
6.6.2.
Alignment................................................................................................................................... 37
6.6.3.
Harmonization ........................................................................................................................... 38
6.6.4.
Mutual Accountability ............................................................................................................... 39
6.6.5.
Managing for Development Results .......................................................................................... 40
6.7.
Primary Challenges to Implementation of Aid Effectiveness Principles in Afghanistan .................... 41
6.7.1.
6.7.1.1.
6.7.2.
6.7.2.1.
Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 41
Inadequate Capacity of National Institutions ............................................................................ 42
Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 43
6.7.3.
Low National Budget Execution ................................................................................................. 44
6.7.4.
Corruption.................................................................................................................................. 44
6.7.4.1.
6.8.
Annex-I
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
31.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Continuing Insecurity ................................................................................................................. 41
Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 45
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 46
Introduction to Development Partners …………………………………………………………….………. …….48
ADB (ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK) ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN ......................................................... 49
THE AGA KHAN DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (AKDN) IN AFGHANISTAN ...................................................... 50
AUSTRALIA IN AFGHANISTAN ..................................................................................................................... 52
CHINA IN AFGHANISTAN - COMMITTED TO THE SPIRIT OF GIVING ........................................................... 54
Canada’s (CIDA) aid to Afghanistan ............................................................................................................ 55
Czech Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan ............................................................................. 57
Danish Development Assistance to Afghanistan ........................................................................................ 59
European Union IN AFGHANISTAN ............................................................................................................. 61
Finland’s Contribution to Afghanistan........................................................................................................ 63
France’s Assistance to Afghanistan ............................................................................................................ 64
Reconstruction and Development - German Cooperation with Afghanistan ............................................ 65
India’s Development Cooperation Program in Afghanistan ....................................................................... 68
Participation of Islamic Republic of Iran in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.......................................... 70
ITALY’S SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN .......................................................................................................... 72
Japan’s Assistance to Afghanistan .............................................................................................................. 73
LITHUANIAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN..................... 75
THE NETHERLANDS IN AFGHANISTAN – A SMALL COUNTRY WITH A BIG FOOTPRINT .............................. 76
NEW ZEALAND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ................................................................................................ 77
Norway’s Development Assistance to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan............... 78
Poland’s Assistance to Afghanistan ............................................................................................................ 80
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21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Spanish Cooperation concentrated in Badghis Province............................................................................ 81
The Swedish Development Assistance to Afghanistan 2002-2010 ............................................................ 83
Swiss Commitment to Afghanistan - a contribution to a better future ..................................................... 84
TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN ............................................................................................ 86
Afghanistan Development Co-operation Report - UK Input....................................................................... 88
USAID ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN ....................................................................................................... 90
WORLD BANK IN AFGHANISTAN ................................................................................................................ 92
Annex-II Tables and Graphs………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 95
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Acronyms
AAA
AACA
AC
ACBAR
AIA
ANA
ANCOP
ANSF
APPF
APRP
AREU
ASFF
ASNGP
CDP
CERP
CIM
CIMIC
CNTF
CPI
CSR
DAC
DAD
DCD
DCR
DFID
DFR
DMU
DOD
DODCN
DOD-CN
DP
EPHS
FY
GDP
GoIRA
HIPC
I-ANDS
IFC
IMF
M&E
Accra Agenda for Action
Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority
Afghanistan Compact
Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
Afghan Interim Authority
Afghan National Army
Afghan National Civil Order Police
Afghan National Security Forces
Afghan Public Protection Forces
Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund
Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Program
Capacity Development Program
Commander’s Emergency Response Program
Centrum für Internationale Migration und Fachkräfte
Civil Military Cooperation
Counter Narcotics Trust Fund
Corruption Perception Index
Civil Service Reform
Development Assistance Committee
Donor Assistance Database
Development Cooperation Dialogue
Development Cooperation Report
Department for International Development
Donor Financial Review
Debt Management Unit
Department of Defense
Department of Defense and Counternarcotics
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities
Development Partner
Essential Package of Hospital Services
Fiscal Year
Gross Domestic Product
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy
International Finance Corporation
International Monetary Fund
Monitoring and Evaluation
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT
IV
MCP
MOF
NIP
NPPs
NRAP
NRVA
OECD
OEF
OG
PAR
PD
PDP
PEFA
PFEM
PITF
PRR
PRSP
PRT
QIP
SAF
SDC
SIGAR
TA
TF
TIKA
TVET
UK
UN
UNHCR
UNMAS
UNOPS
USA
USAID
USDoD
USSR
WB
Management Capacity Program
Ministry of Finance
National Immunization Program
National Priority Programs
National Rural Access Program
National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Operation Enduring Freedom
Operational Guide
Public Administration Reform
Paris Declaration
Provincial Development Planning
Public Expenditure Financial Assessment
Public Finance and Expenditure Management
Political Instability Task Force
Priority Reform and Restructuring
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Provincial Reconstruction Team
Quick Impact Project
Securing Afghanistan’s Future
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Technical Assistance
Trust Fund
Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
Technical and Vocation Education Training
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Mine Action Service
United Nations Office for Project Services
United States of America
United States Agency for International Development
US Department of Defense
Union Soviet Socialist Republic
World Bank
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Executive Summary
The Development Cooperation Report (DCR) 2010, prepared by the Aid Management Directorate (AMD)
of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), is a living proof of the determination of Government of Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) officials to make inflow of foreign assistance effective for Afghanistan
and its people. The results of the Development Cooperation Dialogues (DCDs) between the MoF officials
and their DPs (DPs), along with other measures introduced by MoF (e.g. organizational restructuring for
aid management and an aid management policy; Donor Financial Review (DFR); reform of Development
Assistance Database (DAD)), are expected to pave the way for effective development.
Tracing the long history of foreign involvement in Afghanistan, the DCR advances the analysis to the 21st
century and the complex aid scenario in this country, which, devastated by decades of war, was
compelled to marginalize development of its people for decades. This DCR covers the years post-9/11, a
period in which GoIRA and its DPs have worked to reconstruct the country from the ashes. The
impediments on their way are all-embracing: threats to human security resulting from terrorist violence;
weak rule of law and governance; inappropriate protection of human rights; lack of resources to
educate and provide employment to millions of young people and to nurture a healthy population –men
and women - who could serve as the main contributors to increasing the country’s productivity. Low
capacity of human resources in a country where war has played havoc with the education system
exacerbates the difficulties the Afghan leaders encounter.
The DCR reflects the resolve of GoIRA to tackle these issues, both with its own limited revenue and
effective financial and technical assistance from its DPs, as per the aid effectiveness principles
announced in Paris (2005) and Accra (2008). The DCR is a call by GoIRA for the implementation of the
principles of aid effectiveness, elimination of ineffective aid and a pledge to make itself accountable to
its tax-paying public.
The DCR outlines the international community and GoIRA’s progress from 2001 to 2010, starting in
Bonn, followed by conferences in Tokyo, Berlin, London, Rome, Paris, Hague, London, Kabul and Lisbon,
where we re-pledged to legitimize a state born out of decades of conflict. The DCR sounds an alert that
many themes common to the previous conferences continue to dominate today’s agenda, as some basic
problems related to the revitalization of Afghanistan, and to also make aid delivery and utilization more
effective, have not been resolved. The DCR contends that while the inadequacies of the outcomes of the
previous conferences should not deter the GoIRA and the DPs to take new actions, acknowledgement of
the lack of progress and further resolve to take new and determined measures are essential for
sustainable resolution of the problems.
The Report contends that while the generous assistance of the international community produced some
significant outcome results, in the absence of appropriate adherence to the aid effectiveness principles,
full benefits of foreign aid have not been realized. On the DP side, deficiencies in aid delivery cover
several spectrums that restrict appropriate implementation of aid effectiveness principles. Discrepancies
in pledges, commitments and disbursements of aid finances, resulting in unpredictability in availability
of financial resources, continue to hamper long term planning. The DCR also expresses concerns about
the high aid dependency rate of Afghanistan, relying on external funding both for recurrent/operating
costs and also development expenditure. DCR identifies the risks of aid dependent economies and
proposes measures for GoIRA to take for mitigating the risks.
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The security scenario - a war on terror - pushes a large volume of external finances to address security
requirements. Itemization by DCR of a long list of funds, solely devoted to security-related
programming, vividly displays the dominance of security sector spending (representing 51% of total
external assistance), which outweighs investments in other sectors combined. While security is a precondition for operation of development projects, inequity in distribution of funds between security and
non-security development sectors often results in neglecting the country’s basic development needs
prioritized by GoIRA, and aid becomes politicized and militarized.
82% of external assistance disbursed from 2002-2010 by-passed GoIRA’s national budget process, was
invested in programs/projects parallel to those of GoIRA and managed directly by the implementing
agencies of the DPs, without any accountability to the GoIRA. Such practices of tied and prescriptive
donor-driven aid violates the Paris principle of ownership of development programs by the recipient
government and alignment of donor programs with national priorities. DCR concludes that external
ODA delivery by-passing Government budget channels results in a missed opportunity for GoIRA to learn
by doing and thereby develop the required capacity to design, implement, monitor and report on
development programs. In relation to parallel mechanisms for aid program delivery, the ill-conceived
contracting and sub-contracting processes of the DPs and their negative impact on the Afghan economy
has been raised in the DCR.
According to DCR’s assessment, donor coordination in Afghanistan is less than satisfactory and
harmonized actions are few. Program Based Approaches (PBAs) and Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs)
have hardly gained ground. The result is fragmentation of aid, duplication of programs in the absence of
well shared information amongst DPs and unbalanced and inequitable development resulting from
overcrowding of certain sectors or geographic areas by too much funds invested by too many DPs.
Meanwhile, other areas with greater needs are left with little investment.
These problems emanate from inadequate attention by the DPs to accountability needs. GoIRA has
limited knowledge about one third of the total external assistance investment in the country since 2001,
as many DPs do not disclose information on project activities and results, while others do not have
information readily available . Under such circumstances, when results to be attained by the donorfunded programs are not clearly recorded and communicated, managing for development results
becomes rather rhetorical.
Other than accountability for development results, mutual accountability needs demand further actions.
DPs demand accountability from GoIRA in areas such as faster project/program execution, increasing
absorptive capacity, improved public performance management and greater transparency to control
corruption. The DCR outlines the measures undertaken by GoIRA to address these accountability
requirements, as demanded by the DPs. The expectations are that transparent and regular DCDs would
help build up mutual accountability and trust. The DCR provides a lengthy list of actions to be taken to
address the lapses (as identified above), to which a lack of attention will lead to failure in effective aid
delivery and utilization, which, in turn, will have huge impact on Afghanistan’s reconstruction and
development.
Other than those actions directly related to promoting aid effectiveness, critical points integral to
balanced development and reduced aid dependency include increased revenue generation and
implementation of the related reforms in tax and customs administration, and engendering an enabling
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environment for private sector development through implementation of business investment and
banking laws and control of corrupt practices. Actions for promotion of equalitarian practices in
development investment will include emphasis on women’s development, which will help utilize the
productive capacity of 50% of the Afghan population. Urban-rural disparities should be countered with
transfer of more aid resources to, and better development programming for, the rural areas through
Provincial Development Planning that would facilitate balanced allocation of funds.
The DCR concludes with a summary of the GoIRA-DP commitments at the Kabul Conference (2010). The
highlights of these commitments included: greater proportion (at least 50%, within the next two years)
of aid delivery through the Afghan budget (or on-budget support), along with measures taken to
maximize aid effectiveness benefits from off-budget assistance (as per the guidance outlined in the
Operational Guide for Off–Budget Development Financing). Both are expected to help reduce
Afghanistan’s aid dependency and enable the Government to utilize aid resources identified in needsbased development, in priority sectors.
The DCR confirms that the international community’s commitments were matched at the Kabul
conference by GoIRA’s commitments for reforms to strengthen public finance management systems,
reduce corruption, improve budget execution and increase revenue collection. GoIRA is determined to
take further measures to make aid utilization more effective. GoIRA’s expectation is that timely delivery
on its own commitments, translated into concrete monitorable actions, shall elicit concomitant delivery
from the international community. Future DCRs will report on the progress in the planning and
implementation of the commitments made by both GoIRA and the DPs.
(Hard data on donor profiles and aid flow and distribution are available in the main text)
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1. Introduction
Overall, this report aims to provide an analysis of aid flows to Afghanistan and their effectiveness.
Following this first DCR, similar future reports will provide more comprehensive information on foreign
assistance and improve public awareness on its role in the stabilization and development of Afghanistan.
After the establishment of the Interim Administration in 2001, following the Bonn Conference, the
international community committed to support the new transitional Government in Afghanistan by
providing both development and military assistance. Since then, billions of dollars of development
assistance have been provided in different forms: financial grants, loans, and in-kind and technical
assistance.
The need for oversight of the high and intensive volume of international assistance to track the inflow of
aid and ensure aid coordination and management was acknowledged as a priority by GoIRA. The GoIRA
thus established the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) in April 2002 through a
presidential decree. In August 2003, the AACA was dissolved and the functions of aid coordination and
management were incorporated into the General Budget Directorate of MOF.
In 2006, MoF initiated the semi-annual Donor Financial Review (DFR) process, with the aim to: (a) obtain
and analyze data on donor assistance to Afghanistan and (b) support preparation of the National Budget.
Such a process helped build cooperative ties between GoIRA and its DPs and promoted mutual
accountability and transparent exchange of information. These outcomes assisted GoIRA in planning
spending priorities and appropriation of development finances through tracking the inflow of donor
finances. In 2008, MoF published the first DFR report on development assistance to Afghanistan. The
2008 and the subsequent reports have, to date, serve as useful digests providing information on foreign
assistance to Afghanistan.
Initially presented as priorities by H.E. President Hamid Karzai during his inaugural speech of his secondterm appointment as president, and later officially introduced in the Kabul Conference (July 20, 2010),
GoIRA and the international community endorsed the Kabul Process, an Afghan-led action plan to
improve governance, social and economic development, and security, prioritized from the Afghanistan
National Development Strategy (ANDS). GoIRA prioritized the needs in the form of National Priority
Programs (NPPs).
For promotion of effective cooperation between the GoIRA and its DPs, significant resolutions were
adopted at the Kabul Conference, which are highlighted below:

In line with the London Conference Communiqué, the international community restated its strong
support for channeling at least 50% of development aid through GoIRA’s core budget within two
years. Concomitantly, GoIRA resolved to undertake the necessary reforms to strengthen its public
financial management systems, reduce corruption, improve budget execution, and increase
revenue collection to finance key NPPs and progressively achieve fiscal sustainability.

The international community expressed its readiness to progressively align donor development
assistance with the NPPs, with the GoIRA achieving 80% of alignment within the next two years.
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
The international community committed to work with GoIRA to take concrete steps necessary to
address GoiRA’s current limited capacity for absorption of funds.

The international community expressed its intent to begin work with GoIRA to practically
implement the principles outlined in the 2030 “Operational Guide: Criteria for Effective OffBudget Development Finance”.

The DPs expressed their intent to work with GoIRA to improve procurement procedures and
pursue due diligence in international contracting process over the course of a year; endeavor to
reduce sub-contracting unless a clear evidence of added value for adoption of such an approach
was provided; and take responsibility for ensuring transparency and accountability of all subcontracting networks.
The Kabul Process, the commitments made by all parties to improve partnership, and the interest
generated in addressing the issues that would help implement these commitments, created a
heightened sense of need for comprehensive and regular dialogues with DPs on aid and development
effectiveness. In view of this, AMD of MoF started the first series of direct bilateral dialogues in late
November 2010 with individual DPs, the process called the Development Cooperation Dialogues (DCDs).
It is believed that comprehensive discussions between the GoIRA and the DPs, promoted by DCDs,
would better attend to the need for compliance with development effectiveness principles and devise
measures to improve effective and efficient delivery and utilization of aid. Successful dialogues would
certainly help advance the implementation of the aid effectiveness principles of the Paris Declaration
(2005) and Accra Agenda (2008).
The DCD meetings provide the opportunity to the international community and GoIRA to discuss and
internalize the importance of the commitments made and the challenges ahead. There are clear signals
that a process of this nature helps both the GoIRA and its DPs to work in close collaboration to maximize
the impact of development assistance. The success of the first set of DCDs is best evidenced in DPs’
transparent release of information of their assistance provided to Afghanistan and joint Afghan
Government and DPs’ review of the obstacles and solutions to effective aid delivery and utilization.
This report, which presents quantitative and qualitative analysis of foreign assistance to Afghanistan, is
mainly developed based on DCDs and other complementary studies such as PD Evaluation 2010, PD
Monitoring Surveys and Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.
The expectation is that regular reports of this nature will further promote accountability and
transparency of ODA to both the Afghan and donor country publics. Notably, this DCR marks a
departure from the former DFR Reports as it includes inputs from all DPs engaged in Afghanistan and
contributing to its development.
The report begins by setting out the history of ODA since 2002 (including international conferences on
Afghanistan), followed by presentation of significant trends in the flow of development assistance,
Afghanistan’s aid dependency, an analysis of the relationship between the military and development aid
and aid distribution. The report subsequently analyzes ODA’s impact in Afghanistan and explores the
remaining critical challenges to be addressed. Finally, it focuses on the implementation of aid
effectiveness principles of the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA-2008) in
the Afghanistan-specific context, along with recommendations for the way forward.
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2.
History of Foreign Assistance in Afghanistan
Foreign assistance has played an important role in Afghanistan’s history, with Afghanistan receiving its
first monetary assistance from the East India Company during the British rule in South Asia. Although the
mentioned financial assistance did not necessarily put Afghanistan in the category of aid dependent
nations, the country has rarely achieved fiscal sustainability even after it gained de jure and de facto
status of state. The degree of its aid dependency changed from time to time, with changes in economic
and political situations in the country.
The history of the influx of foreign assistance to Afghanistan can be divided into the following three
periods, each of which was characterized by factors influencing the country’s aid dependency:
1. Pre-Cold War (1919-1950s)
2. The Cold War era (1960s-1991)
3. Post 9/11 (2001-present)
2.1.
Pre-Cold War era (1919-50s)
In order to modernize the centralized economy, several attempts were made to scale up economic
growth during King Amanullah’s regime. These included widening the revenue base such as tax
collection. The basics of domestic revenue mobilization came from the tax on agricultural products,
which accounted for 60% of domestic revenues. The amount of revenue from this category declined to
18% in 1953, and 7% in 1958, respectively. As a result, the domestic revenues were not enough to
finance the needs of the country, which, in turn, made the economy run a fiscal deficit. In order to fill
the deficit, the then Government sought foreign assistance from major donor countries of the time. The
major sectors receiving support in this period were infrastructure and education. Selected results of
such assistance can be cited in the construction of schools; the most ancient ones, Malalai and Estiqlal,
were built with the help of the French Government, Germany constructed Amani and the USA built
Habibia High School. Due to a lack of information, however, it is difficult to track the exact volumes of
foreign assistance, their type and the results achieved.
2.2.
The Cold War era (1960s-1990s)
Even before 1960s, the economy was heavily influenced by factors associated with the Cold War. In
order for the country to survive the pressures of the superpowers during the Cold War period, the then
Prime Minister, Mohammad Daud Khan, sought foreign assistance from both USA and the Soviet Union.
From the late 1950s to 1970s, Afghanistan received 50% of its foreign assistance from the former USSR,
and 30% from the USA, which included approximately USD 160 million commitments in the form of
loans (DMU, MoF). Assistance was also received from multilateral DPs such as the World Bank and ADB.
Foreign assistance mainly focused on infrastructure and agricultural sectors. The major outputs were the
Salang Tunnel and 1200 km of paved roads, which played an active role in economic growth.
The 1970s was marked by an economic downturn characterized by severe droughts, low agricultural
production, consequent famine and a centralized economy, which hampered private investment. In
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
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such a difficult period, western aid assistance also declined, which pushed the country into further
economic turmoil.
The deteriorating scenario made the country rely mostly on former USSR assistance. During the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, the inflow of former USSR assistance to the country got further momentum,
which helped develop infrastructure and boost trade opportunities. In the decade of 1970s, the amount
of loans Afghanistan received from the USSR stood at USD 11 billion (DMU, MoF). Notably, although the
enormous flow of financial assistance from the former USSR helped Afghanistan cover its fiscal deficits,
it had an adverse impact on potential influx of assistance from other countries and multilateral agencies.
During the Soviet occupation, illicit (informal) components were introduced into the licit (formal)
economic structure. The illicit economy was promoted with case and in-kind assistance from
neighboring countries, and from the USA to the Mujahidin and refugees. During this period, NGOs led
the humanitarian response and provision of assistance.
In the absence of proper records, it is not possible to report the exact amount of foreign assistance in
support of the Mujahidin. However, available data confirms that USSR’s aid to GoIRA contributing to the
licit pie of the economy in 1980 alone was USD 1 billion, which further grew in subsequent years (Steve
Coll, 2004).
The official inflow of assistance to Afghanistan stopped after the downfall of Dr. Najeebullah’s regime,
which also marked the end of the Cold War in 1992. However, small scale humanitarian assistance from
a few countries via NGOs and UN agencies continued between 1992 and 2000. Due to unavailability of
information, it is not possible to present the exact amount of assistance during this period.
2.3.
Post 9/11 (2001- present)
The post-Taliban era was a turning point in the economic history of Afghanistan as it was the first time
since the end of the Cold War that Afghanistan moved to the top of the ODA 1agenda. Acknowledging
the mistakes made, and the resulting negative impact of withdrawal from substantive engagement in
Afghanistan, the international community recognized the need to help Afghanistan become a stable
state for global security reasons. The international community therefore re-entered Afghanistan, a
country with war-torn infrastructure, a feeble economy and weak governance incapable of delivering
basic services to its people.
The re-intervention process began with the establishment of the Interim Government in late 2001. In
response to a large number of needs and challenges in the country, a remarkable volume of
development assistance has been provided. For further details on distribution of aid, refer to the
overview section below.
External assistance provided to date, has enormously contributed towards achieving some significant
results in various sectors of the economy. Building, reconstructing and rehabilitating physical
infrastructure, amongst other major achievements of foreign assistance, played a key role in economic
development in Afghanistan. For the first time in history, more than 4000 kilometers of paved highways,
secondary and tertiary roads have been built with aid money. The investment in the energy sector
1
Official Development Assistance in the form of grand or loan from a sovereign Government to a developing
country or multilateral agency for the promotion of economic development and welfare.
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
7
provided 30% of the people with access to electricity. The increasing GDP rate since 2001 is a highlight.
These are just a few examples of the impacts of external assistance, the detailed account of which can
be found in Chapter 3.
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8
3. Landmark Conferences
3.1. Bonn Conference (2001)
Representatives of Afghanistan, under the initiative of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of
the United Nations Secretary General for Afghanistan, met in December 2001, and agreed to bring an
end to the coalition war against the Taliban and build a new Government in cooperation with the
international community. From the Bonn conference emerged the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), made
up of 30 members, headed by a chairman. AIA was inaugurated December 22, 2001 with a six-month
mandate, followed by a two-year Transitional Authority (TA), after which democratic elections were to
be held for formation of a permanent Government.
The Bonn Agreement authorized the establishment of the NATO-led International Security Assistance
(ISAF) Force for oversight of security in Afghanistan. The Afghan Constitution Commission also
established in Bonn to draft a new constitution in consultation with the public. A judicial commission
was established to rebuild the justice system in accordance with Islamic principles and international
standards of the rule of law, Afghan legal traditions and inauguration of a Supreme Court.
In the Bonn Conference, the international community did not pledge any financial assistance, but they
expressed determined political commitments to support a prosperous and peaceful Afghanistan.
3.2. Tokyo Conference (2002)
The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan was held on January 21-22,
2002 in Tokyo, with ministerial level participation, co-chaired by H.E. Hamid Karzai of the Afghanistan
Interim Administration, Japan, the US, the EU and Saudi Arabia.
The conference provided the AIA an opportunity to reaffirm its determination to pursue the process of
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan according to the Bonn Agreement principles and
provided the international community the opportunity to express its political support for this process
with pledges of concrete assistance. The international community strongly emphasized the importance
of rapidly establishing a comprehensive macroeconomic and monetary framework. Thus the focus was
placed on sound economic reforms to achieve sustainable economic development. A cumulative total
pledge of more than USD 5.1 billion of assistance was announced to support the implementation of the
commitments of the conference.
3.3. Berlin Conference (2004)
The Berlin conference was held on March 31, 2004 in Berlin, Germany. The conference was co-chaired
by the UN and the Government of Afghanistan, Federal Government of Germany and Government of
Japan.
This Conference had three major aims: (1) Renewal of commitments for reconstruction funds; (2) longterm commitments from the International Community for continued support to Afghanistan; and (3)
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
9
concrete planning for the post-Bonn phase of reconstruction. The conference reaffirmed the need to
boost Afghanistan's fragile reconstruction efforts, improve security conditions to promote peaceful
presidential election in 2004 and the parliamentary and provincial elections of 2005, and furthermore to
clamp down on the burgeoning opium trade.
The following were the major outcomes of the conference: (a) GoIRA agreed on a development
framework entitled “Securing Afghanistan’s Future (SAF)”, (b) NATO committed to expand ISAF's mission
by establishing five additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams by the of Summer 2004 and further PRTs
thereafter; and c) ISAF agreed to assist in securing the conduct of elections.
At the end of the conference, multiyear pledges were made for the reconstruction and development of
Afghanistan totaling USD 8.2 billion for the three years from March 2004 to March 2007. But this
amount included earlier commitments and thus new confirmed commitments amounted only to USD
5.6 billion
3.4. The London Conference
The London Conference was held on January 31 and February 1, 2006, in the capital city of UK where 66
states and 15 international organizations participated. The conference was co-chaired by British Prime
Minister H.E. Tony Blair, The President of Afghanistan H.E. Hamid Karzai and UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan. In this conference GoIRA presented the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (IANDS), through which the future development framework was envisaged.
The delegates adopted the Afghanistan Compact, a political agreement between the international
community and the GoIRA, and agreed to establish a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)
for overall strategic coordination of the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact. This identified
three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity for the next five years: Security, Governance,
Rule of Law and Human Rights, and Economic and Social Development. An additional focus was on a
critical issue cross-cutting across all pillars: elimination of the narcotics industry, a formidable threat to
the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and globally.
The Afghanistan Compact marked the formal conclusion of the Bonn process The compact served as a
basis for the next phase of reconstruction, with commitments to rely more on the country's own
institutions and support the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) development process.
At the end of the conference the donor countries and development agencies pledged to provide a total
of USD 10.5 billion for a period of five years to support the implementation of ANDS. After the
confirmation of pledges and exclusion of the reiterated pledges, the actual new pledge was confirmed to
be USD 8.7 billion.
3.5. Rome Conference (2007)
The Rome conference was held on July 2, 2007 in Rome, Italy. The conference was co-chaired by
Government of Afghanistan, Government of Italy and the United Nations and focused on strengthening
the rule of law and justice sector in Afghanistan. The framework for the rule of law and justice reform
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
10
was provided by the Afghanistan Compact and its benchmarks, based on the vision of “Justice for All”
and within the overall conceptual framework of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).
In this conference, GoIRA committed itself to finalize a national justice sector strategy and to implement
comprehensive rule of law reform with the assistance of the International Community, through a
national justice program. The DPs promised to support Afghanistan on its path towards the rule of law
and justice, based on the GoIRA proposed national justice program and pledged a total of USD 360
million. However, after the confirmation and exclusion of reiterated pledges, the new pledge was
verified to be USD 40 million.
3.6. Paris Conference on Afghanistan (2008)
The International Conference in Support of Afghanistan was held on June 12, 2008 in Paris, the capital of
France, under the chairmanship of the three co-chairs: H.E Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, H.E
Hamid Karzai, President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and H.E Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General.
This conference marked a new commitment of the international community to work in closer
cooperation under the Afghan leadership to support Afghanistan’s first five year National Development
Strategy (ANDS). GoIRA and the international community agreed to retain the Afghanistan Compact as
the foundation of future activities. The agreed priority was to strengthen institutions and economic
growth, particularly in agriculture and energy sectors. The other key elements identified in the
Declaration of this conference were the importance of holding free, fair and secure elections in 2009
and 2010; ensuring protection of human rights and the provision of humanitarian assistance; and the
need to improve effective utilization of aid in order to ensure concrete and tangible development
benefits for all Afghans.
At the end of the conference the international community announced a generous financial pledge of
USD 20 billion, of which only USD 14 billion was confirmed to be new pledges.
3.7. Hague Conference (2009)
The Hague conference was held on March 3, 2009 based on the initiative of the Government of the
Netherlands. The conference was hosted by the Government of Netherlands and co-chaired by the
Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of
Netherlands and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan.
The conference agreed on the urgent need for a clear direction for provision of strengthened support to
the people of Afghanistan, for enhanced security, improved life conditions and protection of their
democratic and human rights. The U.S Government unveiled a new strategy, which committed
additional funds and troops for Afghanistan, and a renewed focus on targeting al Qaeda militants on the
Afghanistan/Pakistan border. In this conference the GoIRA presented a new policy to promote
reconciliation with the Taliban. Overall, the conference participants agreed to pursue the following
priority for promotion of good governance and stronger institutions in Afghanistan; generation of
economic growth; strengthening security and enhancing regional cooperation.
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11
3.8. London Conference (2010)
The second international conference on Afghanistan in London was held in January 2010 where the
prime focus was to set a timetable for advancing security operations tied to a political process in
Afghanistan. The conference was organized by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and co-chaired by
the President of Afghanistan H.E. Hamid Karzai and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. This
Conference represented a decisive step towards greater Afghan leadership to secure, stabilize and
develop Afghanistan.
The aim of the 2010 London Conference was to draft plans to hand over security responsibilities from
ISAF to Afghan forces and to encourage Taliban members to renounce violence. The conference laid out
a plan for what was hoped to be a new phase addressing the conflict of Afghanistan. One of the major
outcomes of the conference was the agreement on the transition of security to Afghan Security Forces
in a gradual fashion where Afghan security forces to take the responsibility of security province by
province until 2014. Together, the GoIRA and the international community committed to make intensive
efforts to ensure that GoIRA would be prepared to increasingly meet the needs of its people through
developing its own institutions and resources.
3.9. Kabul Conference (2010)
The landmark Kabul Conference was held on July 20, 2030 in Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. Hosted by
GoIRA and co-chaired by the United Nations, the conference agreements followed up on the London
communiqué of January 2010 and reaffirmed renewed commitment to the Afghan people. It was
historic as it was the first time that a conference of this kind was held in Afghanistan and by Afghans.
GoIRA presented an Afghan-led plan for improving development, governance and security, including the
NPPs and Public Financial Management Roadmap. An Operational Guide was introduced for promoting
alignment of off-budget development financing with GoIRA development priorities and, thereby,
improving the effectiveness of aid. In order to enable GoIRA to implement its prioritized agenda,
renewed emphasis was placed on the need for sustained and coherent capacity-building support at
national and sub-national levels.
The Kabul Conference was a critical stepping stone to the Kabul Process of transition to full Afghan
leadership and responsibility for the country’s security, development and reconstruction in all spheres,
building on previous international commitments including the London Conference of 2010 and the
GoIRA-led Consultative Peace Jirga of June 2-4, 2010.
3.10. Lisbon Conference (2010)
The NATO Conference was held in November 2010 in Lisbon and chaired by the NATO Secretary-General,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen. This was the third major international conference of 2010 for Afghanistan.
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan was the main topic of discussion.
At Lisbon, 28 heads of states of NATO elaborated the policy statement related to special training (to be
started in the beginning of 2011) for capacity building of Afghan security forces to make them able to
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
12
assume the security responsibilities for Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The assumption of responsibility
by Afghans will help pave the way for withdrawal of NATO and its allies from Afghanistan.
Other agreements included the allies’ agreement with Russia to jointly expand support for Afghanistan,
including by broadening transit arrangements, extending training of counter narcotics officials and
providing equipment to Afghan security forces.
Table 1: Summary of major outcomes of the international conferences on Afghanistan
Conference
Major Outcomes
1.
Bonn
Conference
(2001)
2.
3.
4.
1.
Tokyo
Conference
(2002)
2.
1.
Berlin
Conference
(2004)
London
Conference
(2006)
Rome
Conference
(2007)
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
1.
2.
Paris
Conference
(2008)
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
Hague
Conference
(2009)
3.
4.
The Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was inaugurated with a six-month mandate to
be followed by a two-year Transitional Authority (TA), after which elections were to
be held.
Establishment of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force mission for
Afghanistan.
Establishment of the Afghan Constitution Commission to draft a new constitution in
consultation with the public.
The establishment of a national justice sector strategy, and a judicial commission to
rebuild the justice system
GoIRA and International Community reaffirmed commitment to pursue the process
of reconciliation, reconstruction and development, according to the Bonn
Agreement.
GoIRA and International Community reaffirmed the commitment to establish a
comprehensive macroeconomic and monetary framework.
The final publication of Securing Afghanistan’s Future (SAF) document was
produced by the World Bank, the UN and GoIRA.
NATO committed to expand ISAF's mission by establishing five additional Provincial
Reconstruction Teams by summer 2004 and further PRTs thereafter, as well as the
readiness of ISAF and OEF to assist in securing the conduct of elections.
Adoption of Afghan Compact.
Establishment of a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) for overall
strategic coordination of the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact.
Commitment to Afghan National Development Strategy.
Eliminating the narcotics industry.
Finalization of a national justice sector strategy.
The implementation of a comprehensive rule of law reform through a national
justice program.
New commitment of International Community to work more closely together under
Afghan leadership to support Afghanistan’s first five-year National Development
Strategy (ANDS).
Commitment to strengthen institutions and economic growth, particularly in
agriculture and energy sectors.
Commitment to hold free, fair and secure elections in 2009 and 2010.
Commitment to ensure respect for human rights and the provision of humanitarian
assistance.
Commitment to improve aid effectiveness
Commitment to promote good governance and stronger institutions; to generate
economic growth; to strengthen security and to enhance regional cooperation
Pledged a stronger military offensive against the Taliban insurgency, to invest in civil
reconstruction, to tackle the drug trade and to stabilize neighboring Pakistan.
The U.S Government unveiled a new strategy, which combined extra funds and
troops for Afghanistan, and a renewed focus on targeting al-Qaeda militants on the
Afghan/Pakistan border.
GoIRA presented a new policy to reconcile with Taliban and give opportunities to
reintegrate into Afghan society.
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
Pledges
US$5.1
billion
US$5.6
billion
US$8.7
billion
US$0.04
billion
US$14
billion
13
1.
London
Conference
(2010)
2.
3.
1.
Kabul
Conference
(2010)
2.
3.
1.
Lisbon
Conference
(2010)
2.
3.
Drafted a plan to hand over security responsibilities from ISAF to Afghan forces and
to encourage Taliban members to renounce violence.
A Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund mooted to offer economic alternatives to
those who renounce violence.
Commitment to making intensive efforts to ensure that GoIRA is increasingly able to
meet the needs of its people through developing its own institutions and resources.
An Afghan-led plan for improving development, governance and security, including
National Priority Programs, was presented by GoIRA to enhance service delivery.
Commitment to sustained and coherent capacity-building support at national and at
sub-national levels.
Commitment to support Afghan ownership and leadership, strengthening
international partnership.
Special training of capacity building of Afghan forces would be resumed in 2011 to
make them able to assume the security responsibility of all Afghanistan by the end
of 2014.
Commitment to broaden transit arrangements, extending training of counter
narcotics officials and providing equipment to Afghan security forces.
Signed an agreement with the NATO Secretary General on a long-term partnership
between the Alliance and Afghanistan that will endure beyond the combat mission.
Assessment
The international community and GoIRA have marched from Bonn in 2001 to Tokyo, Berlin, London,
Rome, Paris, Hague, London, Kabul and Lisbon in 10 years, re-pledging delivery of development and
reconstruction, security, governance and rule of law, and helping to legitimize a Government and a state
born out of decades of conflict.
At the base of all conferences lay the intent to revitalize Afghanistan and bring new hope for the future.
While much optimism must boost our activities, it is unwise to avoid a realistic assessment of how much
of what was planned, agreed upon and promised in the past costly conferences have been delivered to
Afghans. It is important that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past. The issue of accountability, in
fact, has been raised repeatedly at national and international levels, regrettably with no real impact in
producing better results.
Indeed, with generous support from the international community, some results are seen on the ground.
But given that we started at ground zero in 2001, any improvement is bound to be seen as a sign of
progress. Many of the themes common to the previous conferences continue to dominate the joint
agenda of the international community and Afghans, as some basic problems have not been resolved.
Full resolution of these issues could not have been expected, but the lack of improvement on issues
significantly important for Afghanistan's survival, development and eventual exit from aid dependency
must be noted. Not that the inadequacies of the results of the past should deter us from taking new
actions and continue the previous resolve, but acknowledgement of the inadequacies and probing their
causes are essential for future success.
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4. Aid Dependency (Reality of Aid in Afghanistan)
A country is truly aid dependent when it relies on external funding to cover its day-to-day operating
(recurrent) costs and development expenditures. Afghanistan has been aid dependent for over 60 years,
with the roots of dependency going back to the middle of the 20th century, which has been explained
under the previous section “History of External Aid”.
As stated earlier, Afghanistan has become one of the largest recipients of external aid since 2002. After
the fall of the Taliban, external aid has accounted for a substantial portion of the country’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). The following graph shows the trend of the contribution of ODA as a
percentage of GDP over the past few years.
Figure 1:
Aid as Percentage of GDP
At the level of 71%, the aid dependency ratio in Afghanistan is one of the highest in the world. Similarly,
dependency in Afghanistan is high compared to its neighboring countries like Pakistan, where the aid to
GDP ratio is 1.1%, Iran, with a ratio of 0.1%, and Uzbekistan, with a ratio of 2.4% (Nation Master 2010).
Since 2002, the entire Development Budget, and on average up to approximately 45% (44% for 20102011) of the Operating Budget, has been financed by external aid. It is worth acknowledging that this
assistance has helped the country achieve a lot in terms of development over the past years. External
assistance has helped build infrastructure, increase primary school enrolment, increase access to basic
health for almost the entire population and has helped to generate revenues from nationally conducted
economic activities. The following graph shows the trends of national revenue versus operating
expenditures:
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Figure 2:
Domestic Revenue vs. Operating Budget
Despite an increasing trend in domestic revenue, it still accounts for less than 10% of total GDP (MoF
2011). The argument that Afghanistan is heavily dependent on external assistance continues to be valid
and is supported by the fact that the entire development budget and a significant portion of the
operating budget of Afghanistan are financed by external assistance.
Similarly, the above graph shows that there is also an increasing trend in operating expenditures of the
country which puts a heavy burden on the Government and increases the reliance of the country on
external financing. It is anticipated that this burden and the gap between the national revenue versus
operating expenditure will increase even further, given the new fiscal pressures such as the transition
process and strengthening of ANA and ANP.
It is anticipated that aid dependency will remain a reality for Afghanistan for a number of years.
Therefore, efficient aid delivery and effective coordination among DPs and between DPs and the
Government is important to ensure that the aid money is spent on revenue generating sectors that
guarantee maximum return on investment and sustainable development.
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
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Section I
Overview of External Assistance
5. Overview of External Assistance
5.1.
Synopsis
Figure 1:
Overview of External Assistance (2002-2010)
This section presents an overview of external assistance
to Afghanistan since late 2001. Since the establishment
of the interim Government, a total of USD 90 billion in
aid has been pledged for Afghanistan (for the period of
2002-2013) by the international community through a
series of pledging conferences and supplementary
means. From the total ODA pledged, USD 69 billion has
been formally committed to be disbursed from 2002 to
2010. Of the total ODA committed, USD 57 billion forms
the actual amount of ODA disbursed to finance a wide
range of programs and projects as part of the
reconstruction and development process. [See figure 1]
Since 2002, the volume of total annual development
assistance increased from a total of USD 3.2 billion in
commitment in 2002 to USD 16.8 billion in 2010. [See
figure 2] The reason for a two-fold rise in the amount of
assistance in 2007 was due to an increase from the
United States (2007 Supplementary Budget).
In 2008 and 2009, similar levels of development
assistance were retained. However, 2010 marked the peak of assistance committed to funding
development and security-related activities in Afghanistan. Despite this large increase in the volume of
ODA committed, the total volume of assistance disbursed has only been USD 10.9 billion, indicating a
65% execution rate by DPs.
Figure 2:
Classification of ODA by Year (2002-2010)
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Not all commitments made from 2002 to 2010, have been translated into 100% disbursements. The
reasons for slow disbursement are manifold. Amongst all, security deterioration is considered to be a
major obstacle hampering project implementation across the country. Security cannot be accepted as
the sole excuse, however, because other DPs such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the
Netherlands fully disbursed the amount of development assistance they committed from 2002 to 2010.
The European Union comes fifth with a 90% disbursement rate, followed by the United States with 84%,
and the World Bank with 81%. In terms of the volume of ODA disbursed, however, the USA is by far the
largest donor, followed by Japan, EU, UK, WB and Canada. [See figure 3]
Figure 3:
Classification of ODA by Donor (2002-2010 – in US$ billions)
For the bulk of external assistance disbursed from 2002 to 2010 for both security and development, two
main channels of delivery have been used: a) Off-budget, and b) On-budget. Off-budget support consists
of assistance that bypasses the Government’s Public Finances Management System with little or no
Government involvement in planning, implementation or monitoring of the programs/projects. Onbudget support consists of assistance that either has been given to the Government as bilateral support
or provided through the Trust Funds. Most such on-budget programs are Government designed,
implemented and monitored. Administered by multilateral agencies, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund (ARTF), Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) and Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Trust Fund (APRTF) provided the largest sources of on-budget support to the Government.
However, an analysis of ODA disbursement for financing security, reconstruction and development
related development activities reflect the ratio of on-budget to off-budget support as 18:82. In other
words, only 18% of external assistance disbursed in the period 2002 to 2010 has been provided through
the Government’s Core Budget. The remaining 82% of assistance has been managed by the DPs alone
through projects/programs implemented parallel to those of the Government. [See figure 4]
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
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Figure 4:
Ratio of On-budget versus Off-budget Support (2002-2010)
Notably, from year to year, the percentage of ODA channeled through the Government’s budget might
fluctuate, with the on-budget amount slightly higher in some years while lower in others. For the sake of
simplicity, the ratio of on-budget assistance has been calculated from the cumulative volume of external
assistance disbursed since 2002. Despite the fact that only a fraction of external assistance has passed
through Government’s treasury, the trend of DP’s on-budget contributions, in terms of volume, has
experienced an upward trend. [See figure 5] However, after the commitments made at London and
Kabul Conferences, in January and July 2010 respectively, GoIRA expects an increase in the volume of
on-budget assistance by its DPs.
Figure 5:
DPs’ Contribution through the Government’s Budget
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5.2.
Geographic Distribution of External Assistance
Since the start of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, data collection based on geographical
distribution of external assistance has always been a challenge for GoIRA. Despite a number of initiatives
taken by MoF since 2003, such as the establishment of the DAD and carrying out portfolio reviews with
the individual DPs and/or DFR processes, the Government has not been able to collect accurate and
reliable data on distribution of aid across different provinces. However, according to [Figure 6], which
only reflects data for the top 10 provinces and is the only data available at MoF, the highest amount of
external aid - USD 2.8 billion - which includes both security and development spending, has been
disbursed in the capital Kabul, followed by Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar provinces. On average,
the provinces of Herat, Kunar, Ghazni, Paktika, Paktya and Balkh have received USD 476 million each.
For further details of provincial distribution of external assistance, please refer to [Graph 2] in Annex-II
of this report.
In addition to the assistance provided for reconstruction and development purposes by our DPs, the
bulk of disbursements made in all these provinces include spending through military means such as the
PRTs and CERP.
The GoIRA underscores that sustainable development requires a more equitable distribution of
investment across sectors and geographical areas, and therefore the DPs are encouraged to make use of
the current systems in place to provide maximum information about aid distribution and to use the
information made available through these systems for better coordination and planning of aid flows in
the future.
Figure 6:
Top 10 Recipient of External Assistance (2002-2010)
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5.3.
Loans
Since the late 1960s, Afghanistan, in addition to receiving external assistance in grants, has received
foreign assistance in the form of loans from bilateral and multilateral creditors. Total loans committed
between 1966 and 2008 stand at USD 13 billion, of which USD 11 billion or the largest proportion has
been provided by the former Soviet Union during the Soviet era in Afghanistan. While a large portion of
ODA provided to Afghanistan since 2002 is in the form of grants, a fraction of it, which is around USD 1.5
billion, has been provided in the form of loans. [Table 5] in Annex-ii shows that Asian Development Bank
(ADB) is the second largest provider of loans to Afghanistan, followed by the World Bank (WB).
Afghanistan is obliged to repay the loans it has received from every bilateral and multilateral creditor.
Although the country has received a total amount of USD 10.5 billion as debt relief under the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 2Debt Initiative, its total debt stock or outstanding loans to be repaid
stand at USD 2.3 billion. It is envisaged that Afghanistan will receive a sum of USD 225 million as debt
relief under the HIPC over the next 20 years.
5.4.
Figure 7:
Aid Predictability
Predictability of Aid
As committed in the Accra Agenda for Action,
providing full and timely information on annual
commitments and actual disbursements will allow
recipient countries to record the actual amount of aid
flows in their budget estimates and their accounting
systems. It was agreed that, “DPs will provide
developing countries with regular and timely
information on their rolling three-to-five-year forward
expenditure and/or implementation plans, with at
least indicative resource allocations that developing
countries can integrate in their medium-term planning
and macroeconomic frameworks.” (AAA, 2008)
In the context of Afghanistan, aid predictability has
been a challenging problem where most DPs have not
been providing GoIRA with information on their rolling
three-to-five-year onward level of assistance and/or
indicative resource allocations for projects/programs that are implemented in the country. [Figure 7]
shows predictability of external assistance for 2011-2013. According to available information at MoF,
USD 4.4 billion is estimated to be spent during 2011. However, the trend is declining to USD 1.2 billion in
2012 and USD 0.7 billion in 2013, respectively. It is worth noting that these figures are best estimates
only, and may change overtime.
2
The HIPC program was initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB in 1996, following
extensive lobbying by NGOs and other bodies. It provides debt relief and low-interest loans to cancel or reduce
external debt repayments to sustainable levels. To be considered for the initiative, countries must face an
unsustainable debt burden which cannot be managed with traditional means. Assistance is conditional on the
national Governments of these countries meeting a range of economic management and performance target.
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
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5.5.
Main Delivery Channels of
External Assistance
Figure
7:
Main Delivery Channels
Assistance (2002-2010)
of External
With respect to sectoral distribution of external
assistance in Afghanistan, the security sector carries
a slightly heavier weight compared to the rest of
the sectors combined. As indicated in [Figure 7],
51% of external assistance disbursed to date has
been invested in security, whilst the remaining 49%
supported development activities across different
sectors. The overview is divided into two main
sections: a) Security, and b) Reconstruction and
Development, which are discussed below:
5.5.1. External Assistance for Security Sector
After the ousting of the Taliban regime and with the establishment of the Afghan Interim Government in
late 2001, building of the Afghanistan National Security Forces was one of the first priorities of the
Government and DPs. To serve this purpose, the international security forces started to actively support
the establishment of Afghanistan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA). As far as
involvement of international security forces in the reconstruction and development is concerned, in
2002 the U.S. Department of Defense (USDoD) began providing funds to small scale reconstruction and
development projects in support of their counter-insurgency activities in provinces. Until 2004, the U.S.
forces were the only international security forces, under the International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) mandate, to provide reconstruction and development funding to Afghanistan.
After the transfer of ISAF command to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 and expansion
of NATO peacekeeping to the provinces, more donor countries with military presence began providing
development funding through PRTs with civil-military mandates to respond to the immediate
reconstruction and development needs of the provinces. Although there was no initial plan to rely on
the PRTs for delivering assistance in the long term, these channels continue to deliver assistance in the
provinces.
5.5.1.1.
U.S. Department of Defense (USDoD)
The United States is by far the largest provider of security assistance for Afghanistan. According to the
SIGAR report of January 2011, from 2002 to 2011, the USDoD has appropriated a total amount of USD
31.98 billion in support of the Afghanistan National Security Forces, of which USD 28.85 has been
committed, and USD 26.05 billion has been disbursed. Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF),
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Drug Interdiction and Counter-Narcotics
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Activities (DOD-CN) are the three main military programs financed by the United States in support of the
Afghanistan National Security Forces, and reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan.
5.5.1.2.
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
U.S. Military Funding (2002-2010)
was created by the United States to
In
US$
billions
provide the Afghan National Security
Agency
Pledge
Commitment
Disbursement
Forces with equipment, supplies, services
and training in addition to building ASFF
27.83
25.43
23.08
infrastructure facilities. Since 2005, total CERP
2.64
1.99
1.54
funding appropriated for ASFF stands at DoD-CN
1.51
1.43
1.43
USD 27.83 billion, of which USD 25.43
Total
31.98
28.85
26.05
has been committed. The total amount
disbursed stands at USD 23.08 billion, of Source: SIGAR Report – Jan, 2011
which USD 14.80 is for ANA, and USD 8.16 is for the ANP (SIGAR, Jan 2011). [See Figures 8 and 9]
Figure 8:
ASFF Disbursements for the ANA (2005-2010)
5.5.1.3.
Figure 9:
ASFF Disbursements for the ANP (2005-2010)
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) is solely focused on the provision of
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance in an emergency response mode, providing urgent
assistance to the local population in the areas where U.S. security forces are positioned. This program is
providing funding for small projects that are estimated to cost less than USD 500,000 each. According to
the SIGAR report of Jan 2011, total cumulative funding appropriated for CERP stands at USD 2.64 billion.
The total amount committed is USD 1.99 billion, of which USD 1.54 billion has been disbursed. For
detailed geographical distribution of CERP funding please refer to Annex-II [Graph 1].
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5.5.1.4.
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD-CN)
The DoD-CN provides support to the counter-narcotics effort by supporting military operations against
drug traffickers, expanding Afghan interdiction operations and building the capacity of Afghan law
enforcement—including Afghan Border Police—with specialized training, equipment, and facilities.
According to the SIGAR report of Jan 2011, total cumulative funding appropriated for DOD-CN stands at
USD 1.5 billion. The total amount committed is USD 1.4 billion, which has been fully disbursed.
5.5.1.5.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
After the transfer of command from ISAF to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004,
expansion of the international security forces to the provinces was planned. The first PRT was
established in Kunduz Province. The initial objective behind the establishment of the PRTs was to
extend the authority of the central Government and improve security, thereby facilitating the
reconstruction process at the provincial level. In 2004, the PRTs were further expanded to the North
and West of the country. Currently, there are 27 operational PRTs, comprised of 14 different nations.
PRTs are not development agencies, as such, but are engaged in development projects through their
reconstruction groups such as Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Quick Impact Project (QIP). In
general, the total PRT contribution towards reconstruction and development in all provinces of
Afghanistan stands at around USD 900 million. For further details, refer to [Table 3] in the Annex-II.
5.5.1.6.
Law and Order Trust Fund
Administered by UNDP, LOTFA was established in 2002 to mobilize resources for the support of
Afghanistan National Police (ANP). It is a Multi-Donor Trust Fund which is jointly funded by several DPs.
LOTFA is delivered through a series of sequenced phases. The combined phases of the Trust Fund
provided a mechanism for coordinating contributions from DPs to cover police salaries, as well as to
pursue other police reform activities. In addition, LOTFA has contributed to strengthening the capacity
of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) through a range of projects. Approximately 23 DPs contributed to
LOTFA from 2002-2011. As at February 2011, USD 1.8 billion has been invested in LOTFA by the DPs. The
largest DPs of the trust fund are the U.S.A with USD 694.64 million contributions, and the European
Commission (EC) and Japan with USD 422,722,490 and USD 324.62, respectively. [Table 4 in Annex-II
includes further details].
Analysis
It is estimated that overall, to date, military spending exceeds 50% of the total assistance provided to
Afghanistan. In most cases, security spending, including the contribution of military agencies for
reconstruction and development, are not appropriately reported to GoIRA or even their relevant
countries’ diplomatic missions (embassies, development agencies) because the funding for the military
assistance comes from the donor country’s Ministry of Defense, while the development funds come
through the countries’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the development agency with ODA responsibility.
Despite the contribution that military aid has made to the reconstruction process, during the earlier
years when there was little or no Government infrastructure, their modality of delivery and spending
have been criticized for a variety of reasons. The aid provided by these agencies is essentially
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“militarized”, and is an often critiqued approach of aid provision, serving the military or political agenda
of the donor country. Humanitarian assistance provided through PRTs and other military means are
considered militarized for winning the hearts and minds of the people, mainly for the protection of the
foreign troops. Such aid provision not only undermines the neutrality and impartiality principles of aid
principles but they undermine development needs-based programming.
To resolve the problems associated with militarized aid, a gradual shift to successful Afghan national
programs like the NSP, EQUIP and other national programs are being pursued, under the clusters
approach. Moreover, a strategy is being considered for a gradual phase out of PRT-provided and other
militarized forms of aid; and for promoting military institutions’ sole focus on direct security related
activities and building capacity of security forces in the provinces. Translation into action of such plans
and strategies will help pave the way for the Government to acquire some control over planning of
external resources to serve GoIRA priorities.
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5.5.2. External Assistance for Development
Pure commitment for reconstruction and development purposes for the period (2002-2010) stands at
USD 37.6 billion, out of which USD 28.1 billion has been disbursed so far. In terms of sectoral allocation
of finances, infrastructure has received the largest amount of assistance followed by agriculture & rural
development, governance, social protection, education, private sector and health. [Graph 2] shows both
commitment and disbursement figures for each sector. Infrastructure, which is the second largest sector
in terms of foreign assistance investment, has received a total of USD 9.20 billion in commitment, of
which USD 6.02 billion, or 65% of the commitment, has been disbursed. [See Figure 10]
For the volume of external assistance disbursed from 2002 to 2010 solely for reconstruction and
development, again two main delivery channels have been used: a) Off-budget, and b) On-budget.
MoF’s analysis shows that 10% of the disbursed assistance has been provided through the Government’s
core budget. The remaining 70% of assistance has been managed by the DPs (DPs) for financing
projects/programs implemented parallel to those of the Government. [See figures 11 and 12]
Figure 10:
External Assistance for Reconstruction and Development (2002-2010)
3
3
Unclassified sector consists of assistance provided for cross-cutting activities such as gender, anti corruption etc,
and/or outside of ANDS classification.
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Figure 11:
5.5.2.1.
Disbursement only to the Development Sector
Figure
12
Trust Funds
External Assistance only for
Development
As stated above, resources that are provided to the
Government through Trust Funds such as ARTF, LOTFA, CNTF
and PITF are all considered as on-budget support. After the
formation of the Interim Government in late 2001,
Afghanistan was rising from the ashes of three decades of
war and unrest, when the institutional capacities were very
low. The existing rules and procedures, especially the Public
Financial Management System, could hardly meet
international standards. In order to respond to the capacity
inadequacies, the international community, in consultation
with GoIRA, decided to establish the Trust Funds
mechanisms, managed by multilateral agencies such as the
World Bank and UNDP with an aim to mobilize more onbudget resources to finance Government’s priority programs
across Afghanistan.
5.5.2.1.1. Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which is a multi-donor pooled funding mechanism,
was established in 2002. It is composed of two windows, recurrent window for partially supporting the
Government’s operational costs and the investment window to support Government’s development
budgets. Administered by the World Bank, ARTF has been successful in meeting the Government’s
priorities in both areas, thanks to the generous contributions of ARTF DPs.
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To date, entire DPs’ contributions to ARTF, the largest trust fund, stand at USD 4.1 billion. Contributions
to ARTF have increased on an annual basis from a total of USD 185 million in 2002 to USD 657 million in
2009. DPs’ assistance in 2030 may exceed those of 2009, provided that all pledges, which stand at
around USD 1 billion, are translated into firm commitments. Contributions made to ARTF are of two
kinds: (i) Preferenced investment allowing DPs to invest up to 50% of their contribution to ARTF for a
specific program in the Trust Fund; and (ii) Non-Preferenced contribution, whereby the remaining 50%
of a donor’s contribution will remain at the discretion of the ARTF Management Committee to decide
where the funds should be allocated. The volume of Preferenced allocation has increased from USD 21
million in 2003 to USD 325 million in 2010, limiting the volume of funds for the Non-Preferenced
portion, reducing discretionary power of GoIRA in funds investments in priorities it identifies. [See figure
13]
Figure 13:
Summary of DPs’ Contribution to ARTF (2002-2010)
Source: ARTF Report, January 2011
5.5.2.1.2. Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund
Formed in 2005, the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) received a sum of USD 0.04 billion from
different DPs until late 2007. This program was aiming to counter narcotics cultivation and trafficking in
Afghanistan. Resources out of this basket of funds have been invested in the agriculture and rural
development sectors to find other crop alternatives for Afghan farmers to cultivate, rather than poppy.
This trust fund’s operation was unsuccessful and it was closed in 2007.
5.5.2.1.3. Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund
Finally, the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund (APRTF) came into existence after the
consultative Peace Jirga in June 2010 in Kabul with a mandate to support the Peace and Integration
Program. This trust fund consists of three windows, which are managed by MoF, UNDP and UK,
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respectively. Until date, a total of USD 85 million has been received in support this important initiative,
of which USD 6 million has been preferenced for community recovery through the National Solidarity
Program (NSP). [Figure 14] shows DPs’ contribution to all Trust Funds since 2002.
Figure 14:
Summary of DPs’ Contribution to Trust Funds (2002-2010)
Source: Trust Funds Reports, January 2011
5.5.2.2.
Assistance through Government Systems
From 2002 to 2010, out of USD 57 billion total aid disbursed, actual on-budget external assistance
provided through the Government systems stands at USD 10.15 billion, of which USD 8.5 billion has
been invested in the reconstruction and development sectors, and USD 1.65 billion has financed security
related activities. [Figure 15] shows DPs’ contribution to both development and operating budgets of
the Government. Further breakdown of the total on-budget assistance for operations is given below:
Figure 15:
ODA through Government Systems
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5.5.2.3.
Support for Government Operating Budget
As stated above a sizable proportion of the total ODA, disbursed through the Government systems, has
financed the operating costs. In addition to Government’s own revenues, support to the Government’s
operating budget is made out of funding from a wide range of other sources. As stated earlier, ARTF and
LOTFA have been two of the largest sources of support for the Government’s operating budget since
2002. The next largest sources are funding from the USDoD with a total contribution of USD 592 million
from 2007 and 2030. ADB’s commitment of USD 4.9 million in 2010 will fund the security cost of the
Qaisar-Balamurghab road in the North-West of the country through Afghan Public Protection Forces
(APPF). [See Figure 16]
Figure 16:
Support for Government Operating Budget
Note: though the total pledge for ARTF in the year 2010 is around USD 1 billion, the actual disbursement is USD 523
as of February 2011. Some DPs have withheld their contribution to ARTF because of the lack of an IMF program.
5.5.2.4.
Share of Aid as Percentage of Government Budget
Since 2002, Afghanistan’s national budget has been highly dependent on foreign aid, with 300% of its
development budget, and, on average, around 45% of its operating budget financed externally. [Figure
17] shows the share of aid as a percentage of the Government national budget, inclusive of
development and operating, since 2003. For further details on DPs and Government’s contribution
please refer to [Table 8] in Annex-II of this report.
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Figure 17:
Share of Aid as Percentage of Government National Budget
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Section II
Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan
6. Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan
6.1.
Introduction
The data presented in the overview section helps provide a basis for us to make an assessment of the
effectiveness of aid delivery and utilization, which is the focus of this concluding chapter of the DCR.
Since 2001, a total of USD 57 billion of foreign assistance funds has been infused into Afghanistan. Of
this total, USD 28.14 billion was allocated for development and poverty reduction and the remaining
expended on security-related programs. Foreign funding has resulted in some gains. Yet, a number of
challenges remain to be met to make Afghanistan stable, economically self sustainable and improve the
conditions of its people.
Currently, aid to GDP ratio is 71%. Close to 100% of the development budget and approximately 45% of
the operating (recurrent) budget is financed by donor assistance (MoF 2011). These indicators make
Afghanistan one of the most heavily aid dependent countries in the world. To move the country out of
such high aid dependency and optimize the economic impact of foreign assistance, efficient and
effective utilization of foreign assistance is a high priority.
This chapter analyzes the issues related to not only effective utilization but also effective delivery of
international assistance and discusses the associated challenges. Issues analyzed include the
achievements resulting from foreign assistance, the weaknesses in the delivery of international
assistance that prevent optimization of benefits, the means of redressing these through
operationalization of the aid effectiveness principles of Paris and Accra Declarations and the related
challenges in an Afghanistan-specific context. Initiatives already undertaken and further planned to
improve effectiveness of aid delivery and utilization will be briefly reviewed. Most of these issues have
been discussed during the DCD meetings. By presenting detailed discussions on the challenges of aid
effectiveness in Afghanistan we aim to provide comprehensive analysis of all factors to develop
directions for future course of actions.
6.2.
The Achievements in Brief
Some of the major achievements have been also mentioned in the following chapter under the
“introduction to our DPs”. In this section we aim to provide a summary of major achievements since
2002 with the assistance of international community.
In the education sector, today nearly 7 million children (one third of whom are girls) attend schools.
More than 3,500 schools have been built and new curriculum and textbooks developed for primary
education and the number of teachers increased seven-fold (Tanin 2008). National Programs such as
Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP) played a key role in these achievements.
The health sector achievements include access for 85% of the Afghan population to basic health
services. Access to diagnostic and curative services increased from zero in 2002 to more than 40% in
2008. Infant and maternal mortality reduced by 85,000 and 40,000 per annum, respectively (Tanin
2008). National Programs such as Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), Essential Package of Hospital
Services (EPHS) and National Immunization Program have mainly contributed to these achievements.
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Infrastructure has improved, with more than 4,000 km of roads paved, provision of access to
telecommunication services provided to more than 73% of the population and increased energy supply
from 430 MWs in 2001 to 1029 MWs in 2009 (SIGAR 2010). National Programs such as Resource
Corridor, Rural Access (NRAP), and Energy have made a major contribution to these achievements.
However, quality of infrastructure still remains a concern.
A process of rural community development, involving participation of the local community members in
determining and investing in local development priorities is a major development achievement gained
through the operation of the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which has gained international
recognition as a community development model.
Other achievements include two rounds of democratic presidential and parliamentary elections since
2002, albeit with indications that the elections require strengthened regulatory processes. Improved
protection of human rights and reduction of violence against women and children are cited as
achievements. The Government is cognizant that in these areas, significant challenges remain to be
overcome.
Improved scores in raising GDP and revenue mobilization as a result of multiple rounds of reforms of the
Public Finance and Expenditure Management (PFEM) systems and rollout of centralized Afghan Financial
Management Information System to all provinces are some of the other significant achievements.
The GoIRA is aware of the contribution and role of external assistance in relation to the abovementioned achievements. It is obvious that without the generous support of our DPs the GoIRA would
have not been able to produce these results.
6.3.
The Lapses Preventing Optimization of Benefits of International Assistance in
Afghanistan
GoIRA and its international partners have several times attempted to take stock of concrete progress
attained in development effectiveness since 2001 - in Tokyo, Berlin, London, Rome and Paris. In London
(2006), the international community agreed through the Afghanistan Compact to GoIRA’s leadership in
setting the country’s development priorities based on needs, mutual accountability, and transparency
and to coordinate their assistance with Afghans. In Accra (2008), the international community and the
developing country partners attempted to accelerate the pace of change required for better aid. The
principles agreed upon in various aid effectiveness declarations are, however, still not always practiced
by our DPs and aid, as well as development cooperation effectiveness, thus, has had faltering progress.
6.4.
Absence of Strong Donor-Afghan Government Partnership
It is evident that the process of providing development assistance requires close cooperation and
dialogue between two major parties: the DP and the recipient partner. While the DPs obviously have
their own areas of interest in which they want to focus their development investments, GoIRA must also
underscore the country’s key areas of development priorities, where development assistance can
provide maximum benefit for the well-being of the people of Afghanistan. This recognition of each
other’s needs, which would result in aid resources complementing and supplementing Government
budget resources, is not yet given a priority.
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6.5.
Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action Addressing the Lapses in
International Assistance
The OECD-DAC members have long recognized the core problems that reduce the effectiveness of aid in
most developing countries. The problems related to aid that Afghanistan encounters reflect these. The
Paris Declaration of 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 provide general directives to DPs and
recipient partners to address these core problems to make aid more effective. The Paris Declaration
(PD) endorsed (March 2005) an international agreement to which over one hundred Ministers, Heads of
Agencies and other senior officials committed their countries and organizations to increase efforts in
alignment and Government ownership, harmonization, mutual accountability and managing aid for
development results, with a set of monitorable actions and indicators . Afghanistan became a signatory
to the PD in 2006 and since then, GoIRA and the donor community have taken multiple initiatives to
comply with the monitoring requirements of PD implementation. Afghanistan participated in the
voluntary survey on monitoring the PD both in 2006 and 2008 rounds as well as the second phase of the
Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration - 2010. The purpose of the declaration and
the subsequent rounds of surveys were to ensure better compliance and measure progress towards
achieving the five PD principles.
To further strengthen the PD principles through international consultations, the 3rd High Level Forum on
Aid Effectiveness was held in Accra in 2008. The three main themes discussed in the AAA included
strengthening the use of country designed and devised systems, improving predictability of aid and
decreasing conditionality. The objective behind the agenda was to strengthen the recipient country’s
ownership, alignment of development programs to the recipient country’s national priorities and to
allow the recipient country to plan for medium and long term development programs.
The OECD-DAC efforts to address the basic needs for effective delivery through aid effectiveness
principles of PD and the AAA are depicted in the box below.
The subsequent section is devoted to a review of the primary challenges encountered in Afghanistan in
implementing the aid effectiveness principles.
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
Ownership - Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty
reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.
Alignment - Donor countries align behind national development objectives and
use local systems.
Harmonization - Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share
information to avoid duplication.
Managing for Results - Developing countries and DPs shift focus to
development results and results get measured.
Mutual Accountability - DPs and partners are accountable for development
results.
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Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) was drawn up in 2008 and builds on the commitments agreed in the Paris
Declaration.
An Agenda to Accelerate Progress
Predictability – DPs will provide 3-5 year forward information on their planned aid to partner countries.
Country systems – partner country systems will be used to deliver aid as the first option,
rather than DP systems
Conditionality– DPs will switch from reliance on prescriptive conditions about how and when aid money is
spent to conditions based on the developing country’s own development objectives.
Untying – DPs will relax restrictions that prevent developing countries from buying the goods and services
they need from whomever and wherever they can get the best quality at the lowest price.
6.6.
Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda Aid Effectiveness Principles in Action in
Afghanistan
The purpose of this section is to analyze the operation of the PD principles, in light of the findings of the
two rounds of PD Monitoring survey and the Evaluation of the PD implementation, in the Afghanistan
specific context.
6.6.1. Ownership
The PD 2005 defines ownership as the recipient country’s ability to exercise leadership over its
development objectives and needs. To this effect, Afghanistan developed the five year Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) entitled the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS),
endorsed in Paris conference of 2008 by the international community. At the Kabul International
Conference, GoIRA committed to translate the ANDS into 22 National Priority Programs (NPPs). The
work on the development of NPPs is underway and will hopefully be completed soon.
As mentioned in the previous section, around 80% percent of the total external assistance to
Afghanistan is not channeled through GoIRA’s system; it is channeled through parallel systems set up by
the donor countries. Parallel mechanisms operating outside of the Government’s system, undermine the
ownership principle, disabling GoIRA to finance its development priorities with limited resources of its
own while DPs invest on programs that are identified, designed and implemented directly by the donor
country through their contracted agencies, sometimes without appropriate consultation with GoIRA.
6.6.2. Alignment
According to the PD it is necessary to align aid with the national development strategies, priorities and
systems of the recipient country. The alignment principle of PD is also violated because such donordriven programs neglect to address the country’s priority development needs, thus failing to contribute
to the Government designed and implemented programs. GoIRA has no discretionary power or
accountability over development expenditure of such parallel programs.
Foreign aid, bypassing the GoIRA national systems and delivered through parallel mechanisms,
ultimately increases the operational costs of development projects through an increase in
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administration costs (ACBAR 2008). Some projects operate with five layers of contractors and subcontractors, with 10-20% profit margin cut at each level. This not only is increasing the total operational
cost, but also resulting in fewer dollars spent in achieving the project objectives and poverty reduction.
Most off-budget projects delivered through parallel mechanisms require mandatory procurement from
the donor countries, particularly the procurement of project consultants. According to Oxfam’s
calculations, close to 40% of aid to Afghanistan flows back to donor countries. Such operations not only
result in the loss of opportunities to generate income for the Afghan service providers and local
producers, but also make the results less cost-beneficial because costs of both services and labor, and of
goods, are lower in Afghanistan compared to the donor countries.
One of the key commitments of DPs under the Alignment Principle of PD is to “provide reliable
indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disburse aid in a timely and predictable
fashion”. In the DFR (3188) and the DCD meetings of 2010, DPs mostly failed to provide multi-year
projections of their ODA. In certain instances, DPs appear unwilling or unable to disclose project
information. Provision of reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and
disbursement of aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules help the
Government’s development planning process and forecasting of investments in priority programs. The
scorecard on timely sharing of information on finance availability and timely commitments in both on
and off budget has been less than satisfactory in Afghanistan, with bilateral financing, in particular. They
slow down the Government’s budget appropriation and planning, making multi-year planning close to
impossible. With investment plans unclear, results formulation remains unrealistic.
Lack of predictability from DPs is often the result of complexities of approval processes in donor capitals.
Parliamentary approvals are time consuming and are often given on an annual basis. Problems also arise
when the donor fiscal year is different from that of the Afghanistan Government which leads to
unmatched budget cycles and difficulties of projection or allocation for the Afghan Fiscal Year.
6.6.3. Harmonization
The harmonization principle asks DPs to coordinate their activities with country systems (PFM, Results
Based Management, and Procurement Systems) and take harmonized actions in undertaking aid
financed program related activities.
A large number of DPs active in Afghanistan follow their own aid strategies, program design methods,
implementation and monitoring and evaluation procedures, along with their own procurement policies.
Such uncoordinated actions result in high transaction costs for both DPs and GoIRA. And not working
together on priority issues results in missed opportunities to produce the best results through learning
from each other and sharing of information. Un-harmonized and uncoordinated actions result in
fragmentation of aid preventing concentrated impact on a single sector or a priority issue, within a
sector and, often lead to duplication of efforts. Working together and sharing costs reduces the cost
burden to a single donor and thus has the potential of freeing up aid dollars for use in other areas that
are under-funded and require more support.
Lack of sharing of information also results in duplication of efforts and overcrowding of certain sectors
and geographic regions with donor financing, reflecting an unbalanced use of aid funds. Better
coordination and sharing of information among DPs have better potential of avoiding duplication and
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spreading aid dollars more equitably. This has also resulted in inequality in the distribution of aid, both
at the geographic and sectoral levels. Though much information is unavailable on the geographical
distribution of aid, it has been noticed that the bilateral DPs are mainly diverting their development
assistance to areas where their troops are based. Preferencing funding for the support of troops
undermines equality in the distribution of aid and undermines development activities in the more
peaceful and secured areas.
An indicator of harmonization is also the degree of the use of common program planning,
implementation and monitoring and reporting arrangements, following program-based (or sector wide)
approaches among the DPs. Unfortunately, however, in Afghanistan, multiple donor agendas
(development, commercial, military and political) make it difficult for DPs to coordinate among
themselves in a way to maximize the efficiency of programming and delivery through adoption of
common approaches. Common arrangements such as ARTF area useful mechanism to improve
harmonization and alignment with Afghan priorities. Despite some increases in the DPs contribution to
ARTF a majority of DPs still use a large portion of their assistance outside such common arrangements.
6.6.4. Mutual Accountability
In a country where 100% of development expenditures are financed from external assistance,
transparency and mutual accountability are critical for medium term budget planning, coordinated
implementation, balanced development and performance measurement to ensure effective
development cooperation.
GoIRA has limited knowledge about one-third of the total external assistance investments in the country
since 2001 (ACBAR 2008), as some DPs do not disclose project information while others do not have
accurate and full information readily available in their disbursement records. These problems continue
to persist and, as a result, the Development Assistance Database (DAD), created in 2003, remains
incomplete and inaccurate. GoIRA has not been able to verify the development expenditure of its DPs
over the past 9 years due to lack of accurate and complete information. DPs’ reporting is not
satisfactory. This issue is more serious in the security sector. The GoIRA does not have a complete
picture of security spending of our DPs for the Afghan Security Forces. As stated in the previous section,
more than 50% of external assistance is provided for the security sector while the flow of information
and consultation on the uses of these large funds with GoIRA is a major issue. Despite several attempts
MoF has not been able to get information on security sector assistance and therefore we have used the
SIGAR report as a reference for such information.
Transparency and accountability are at the base of the Paris Aid Effectiveness Principles of mutual
accountability and managing for results. Accountancy and financial audits are not equivalent to
accountability for results of development interventions. GoIRA, hardly ever provided with reports on the
results of the DPs’ development investments in off-budget projects, is unable to verify the effectiveness
and productivity of the 80% off-budget spending.
Overall, problems resulting from lack of Afghan Government’s control of development resources for
investment in priority needs and programs, DPs failing to align their programs to sector specific needs
identified by the Government and uncoordinated actions and procedures of DPs all combine to
undermine accountability of external assistance to GoIRA. Government programs financed by DPs
cannot escape accountability although such accountability might often boil down to activities completed
and the related expenditure, without reference to development results.
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Government, DPs, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, the PRTs, civil society, and the general
public are the numerous development actors who need to participate in the multi-dimensional
accountability processes, ensuring mutual accountability.
6.6.5. Managing for Development Results
Managing for Development Results is one of the key principles of PD which calls on both DPs and
recipient country to focus resources on the achievement of desired results. The ANDS has laid out the
desired development results of the GoIRA and has introduced the principles of results based
management but attention to managing for results by line ministries has made less than desirable
progress. Implementation and completion of activities, without monitoring the outcome results
achieved, fail to measure development effectiveness. Effective utilization of aid must be rooted in
development results that impact on people’s lives.
DPs are not in the practice of sharing their results or monitoring and evaluation reports with GoIRA, as
reflected in past DFR reports and the PD evaluation of 2010. For the latter, the evaluation team received
no results reports despite several requests to the DPs. Given the fact that around 80% of aid is managed
directly by DPs in Afghanistan, where each of them has different mechanisms for managing for results,
establishment of common arrangements for managing for results is very important. GoIRA has
introduced in the Paris Conference on Afghanistan the idea of “Joint Audits of Programs” which was
meant to assess the value for money and results of aid investment in Afghanistan. Despite the
agreement of all DPs at the Paris Conference, GoIRA has undertaken detailed work on the
implementation of this commitment, but unfortunately the DPs have not agreed to the plan and thus far
there is no common arrangement for managing for results.
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6.7.
Primary Challenges to Implementation of Aid Effectiveness Principles in
Afghanistan
As mentioned earlier, despite remarkable achievements, there are several challenges that have
undermined the effective utilization of external assistance in Afghanistan. During the recent
Development Cooperation Dialogue (DCD), bilateral meetings held between the MoF and DPs, major
challenges that impede development progress and implementation of PD principles of aid effectiveness
in Afghanistan were identified and discussed. In this section we discuss some of these challenges.
6.7.1. Continuing Insecurity
Both GoIRA and its DPs are highly concerned with the ongoing insecurity in the country that reduces
confidence in the potential for peace, limits access to volatile areas, and delays implementation of
program/project activities, along with increasing implementation costs. It generates fear and mistrust in
the public, including anti-Government attitudes and dislike of foreign presence in Afghanistan.
To create a stable and peaceful Afghanistan, large scale military and development assistance has been
provided by the International Community over the past 9 years, a major amount of which has been
utilized in pursuing military objective of counter-insurgency. Despite supporting the establishment and
expansion of Afghan National Security Forces (ANA and ANP) in the past 9 years, a lack of attention has
been given to the developing, equipping and improving the quality of ANA and ANP. It is envisaged that
with the transition of the responsibility of national security to Afghan Security Forces, GoIRA is
empowered and thus national security improves.
Because of insecurity, the foreign security forces present in Afghanistan have been also engaged in the
development activities. Therefore, the militarization of aid has proved to be detrimental to
implementation of PD principles and appropriate needs-based utilization of aid. As mentioned in the
previous section, billions of dollars worth of assistance have been provided through military agencies in
Afghanistan, where most of these agencies have little or no information on the principles of aid
effectiveness.
6.7.1.1.
Analysis
If we refer to the statistics mentioned in the previous section, it is clear that most foreign aid provided
to Afghanistan in the past 9 years is heavily influenced by military objectives, as clearly reflected in the
prescriptive and self serving nature of aid of the troop contributing countries. This directs a
disproportionate amount of aid, without consultation with GoIRA, to the province where their PRTs are
housed, and where their own troops have been fighting the insurgency. Development investment
concentration in the PRT provinces for winning hearts and minds for the troops have had little impact on
poverty reduction as they have subordinated humanitarian and development programming interests to
military interests (Foreign Policy 2011).
In general, PRTs’ impacts on both security and reconstruction have been rather disappointing.
Researchers have found little evidence that military reconstruction projects have been effective for
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reducing conflict and violence or having other significant counterinsurgency benefits. In fact, it has had
adverse security effects on safer areas because it generates the perception that increased insecurity
would attract increased attention and thus more funding (AREU 2009). As well, since the hearts and
minds aspects of reconstruction programs undertaken by the military in PRT provinces blur the line
between military and human development agendas, civilian aid workers’ safety is often endangered.
This results in missed opportunities to utilize civil society organizations that are more successful in
connecting with the grass roots and rural population.
The quality of development interventions is known to be compromised, especially in the insecure areas
of the south. Insecurity does not allow the respective GoIRA counterparts or the foreign funding
agencies to visit the intervention sites and monitor progress. Thus, local contractors are hired to serve
the purpose and the Government and the funding agencies have no alternative but to accept with trust
any information provided about the progress and quality of the ongoing projects. Thus insecurity
undermines monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and affects the implementation of the principle of
Managing for Results of aid effectiveness.
One doubts if the DPs set any clear objectives for their investments in the provinces based on
development needs. Without clear short term, not to speak of long term, objectives planned, quick and
visible fixes have become the order of the day for the troops of most troop contributing countries
(Oxfam 2011). Quick and visible fixes, especially when they are not planned and delivered by GoIRA but
by foreign troops, might win the hearts and minds of the people temporarily for foreign forces’
protection. But sustainability and long term benefits of such quick and visible projects are questionable.
Sustainability would require the participation of Afghans in determining the priorities and needs in
which development investments are made.
The GoIRA believes that hearts and minds of Afghan people can be won only if assistance is diverted to
the priority needs of the Afghans through support of projects that can bring job opportunities and
facilitate economic growth. It is widely believed by economists that investment in infrastructure creates
more job opportunities and facilitates economic growth. Therefore, GoIRA recommends investment in
infrastructure in the provinces that will not only win the hearts and minds of this generation, but given
the life span of such projects, even the next generation will remember the contribution and will feel its
effectiveness.
6.7.2. Inadequate Capacity of National Institutions
One of the major concerns of the international community related to the development process in
Afghanistan is the inadequate capacity of state institutions. This has been one of the common
challenges raised by DPs during the DCD meetings. The Government is mindful of this issue and is
struggling to improve the capacity of state institutions. This is a common problem in all countries that
are in conflict or a post conflict state. Over three decades of war, deaths, brain drain, and inadequate
development of education and lack of public service administration have resulted in inadequate capacity
in state institutions.
Comparatively speaking, the capacity of state institutions has improved significantly compared to the
immediate years of the Interim Government of Afghanistan. Several programs of civil service reform
such as, PRR, Civil Service Reform, Public Administration Reform, Management Capacity Program,
Capacity Development Program, Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Program and many more have
been implemented either through Government systems or directly by our DPs to improve the capacity
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of state institutions. Beside these programs, hundreds of foreign Technical Assistants have been
provided by our DPs to support state institutions in the capacity development.
6.7.2.1.
Analysis
Parallel mechanisms and delivery through contracted agencies are also detrimental to capacity building
of GoIRA. Bypassing GoIRA, using the excuse that the Government’s capacity is low, will never allow
building of the required skills and capacities and spirit of accountability on the Afghan side. Commitment
to partner Government’s capacity building permeates all principles of development effectiveness of the
PD and the Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situation. But in reality,
ODA delivery, by passing the Government channels, is resulting in missed opportunity of the
Government to learn by doing and developing the required capacity.
Faced with inadequate local capacity, the DPs have heavily relied on foreign technical assistance (TA) to
develop the capacity of Afghan National Institutions. Most TAs have been used as substitutes for civil
servants and have been engaged in daily operations rather than on institution building. On the other
hand, there is a criticism that foreign TAs are too expensive. Though GoIRA does not have sufficient
information on the total number of TAs and their cost, according to World Bank, a total of US$ 1.6 billion
was spent on TAs between 2002 and 2006. As per the Principles for Good International Engagement in
Fragile States and Situations, DPs should focus on state building as the central objective, but state
building has not been the central objective in the past 9 years and the focus has been on substituting for
state building through such parallel mechanisms.
TAs provided for strengthening capacity of civil servants and institutions are under much criticism.
Service delivery institutions have hardly been strengthened as a result of TAs, with clear signs of
inadequate service delivery ranging from basic needs services and income, to justice and human
security. The major criticism is that the TAs have not been able to transfer the required knowledge and
skills to Afghan institutions. Therefore with the exit of TAs, the vacuum will exist as it was before the
deployment of TA. The other criticism is that mostTAs have been supply driven rather than demand
driven. Considering all these challenges, GoIRA has recently developed the Civilian Technical Assistance
Program (CTAP) which is a national program and is in line with principles of Technical Cooperation of PD.
The program, which is managed by GoIRA, is designed to address the needs of state institutions by
providing needs-based TAs. Therefore, GoIRA prefers support through CTAP rather than fragmented TAs
through different mechanisms.
One of the major factors of low capacity at the national institutions is the lack of ability of GoIRA to
attract and retain qualified civil servants. The Government cannot compete with international
organizations and the private sector in the labor market because the Government cannot afford such
high salary and benefits. According to MoF survey, DP-funded contracted staff, working in the state
institutions, receive 3 to 8 times higher salary than the civil servants under the Government Pay and
Grading Scheme. This is even higher if we compare Afghans working in international organizations. The
favorable market outside of Government attracts high capacity while the Government has to rely on civil
servants who have less competencies and skills. Thus this ultimately affects the quality of service
delivery.
As mentioned earlier, the focus of international engagement in a post conflict or fragile state should be
on building the state’s capacity and peace building. This can be achieved only if we work in a real
partnership to learn from the experiences of each other. Avoiding state institutions and relying on
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parallel mechanisms is not the remedy for inadequate state instructions. The other benefit of working
with the state institutions of the recipient country, which is in conflict or post conflict, strengthens the
trust of citizens on the Government and not working in partnership with the Government will have the
reverse effect. If the Afghan citizens do not see state institutions acting to respond to their needs, they
do not see the presence of state institutions in the delivery of services (rather non-Governmental
organizations are fill this gap). This ultimately results in mistrust between citizens and the Government
and can lead to insecurity or collapse of Governments.
Based on these premises, the primary objective of Afghanistan’s international partners should be to
build and strengthen Afghan state machinery and institutions for service delivery and, thereby, lay the
foundations of state stability.
6.7.3. Low National Budget Execution
One of the commonly raised concerns by DPs is the low execution of the national development budget,
which is deeply interlinked with the issue of inadequate capacity at national institutions. The average
budget execution rate in the past few years stands at approximately 50%. There are several factors that
contribute to this problem, among them: insecurity, inadequate capacity in some state institutions,
unrealistic budget planning by budgetary units, inadequate capacity of contractors, high turnover rate in
technical staff, difference in fiscal year and of DPs calendar year, unpredictable changes in the
commitment of some DPs, different conditionalities and requirements of DPs and lack of on time
information from DPs for the preparation of national budget.
Recently this has been one of the top agendas of the Government, particularly for the council of
ministers. Recently the Minister of Finance initiated a regular review of spending of line ministries at a
senior level. To continue this process, the Minister has assigned a commission led by Deputy Minister for
Finance to review the spending of Line Ministries on regular basis. On the other hand, MoF has been
very mindful in the allocation of budget for the year 1390. Strict ceilings have been given by MoF
considering the past performance of budgetary entities. By doing so we aim to improve budget planning
which plays a key role in the implementation of the budget. The most serious impediment to
implementation of many of the aid effectiveness principles is the low budget execution rate in GoIRA
Line Ministries, which is also linked to low capacity of line ministries and to insecurity. Despite high
demand for development and reconstruction, the line ministries’ budgets are consistently under-spent.
DPs are unlikely to consider larger budget disbursement through the Government’s budget process or
focus on predictable and multi-year funding when the Government’s spending capacity is low.
6.7.4. Corruption
In the recent DCD meetings, DPs raised concerns over growing corruption and its effects on DPs’
assistance. There is a general perception that corruption has undermined the effective utilization of
foreign assistance in Afghanistan. This perception has been mainly reinforced by the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International. According to 2010 CPI, Afghanistan is ranked after
Somalia the second most corrupt country in the world. The President of Afghanistan has declared
corruption as national shame and GoIRA is fully committed to tackle this problem. However, we should
be mindful that corruption cannot be eradicated or reduced in a short period of time. This requires long
term remedy and huge investments, for which GoIRA is committed.
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6.7.4.1.
Analysis
The recent NRVA has identified four major causes of Afghanistan’s vulnerability to corruption:
a) the thirty years of conflict, which weakened state institutions and rule of law;
b) illicit drugs production and trafficking, destined for international markets for large financial gains that
enable trans-national criminals to and corrupt the structures of Governments, legitimate commercial
and financial business and society;
c) the vertical layers of contracting and sub-contracting, with loss of appropriate accountability and
control of corruption; and
d) the enormous inflow of foreign funds from various sources.
While GoIRA acknowledges the existence of corruption in Afghanistan, the Government questions the
CPI ranking of Afghanistan. The CPI survey is based on different surveys conducted by third party
organizations whose methodologies vary. There is no consistent methodology on different kind of
surveys used. All the surveys are based on subjective opinions of business people. Methodologies of
surveys can change over the time and therefore Afghanistan’s ranking can be influenced not exactly by
change in level of corruption but by a change in the survey methodology or subjective perception of
respondents. Meanwhile, there is no standard definition of corruption. The perception of corruption
could differ from culture to culture, e.g. in one culture a tip can be perceived as bribe in another.
Therefore, GoIRA criticizes the CPI ranking of Afghanistan and does not consider it as a reliable source of
information on measurement of the level of corruption in Afghanistan.
The concern of DPs on the existence of corruption in Afghanistan is valid, and most of the time existence
of corruption is used as an excuse for not using Government national systems in the delivery of their
assistance. It is important that we understand the correlation of perception to corruption and the flow
of funds through national systems. First of all, corruption is a common problem in Afghanistan and it
should not be only labeled as a government practice. There is no empirical evidence to show that there
is no corruption in the flow of aid outside of Government systems. This is an epidemic disease which is
mainly associated with the inflow of high influx of aid and can be spread everywhere if the aid is not
provided in an effective and transparent manner. If we refer to recent SIGAR reports, there are several
empirical evidences that corruption exists in the projects funded by aid money and managed outside of
Government system. Therefore, only GoIRA should not be blamed for corruption.
Secondly, there is no empirical evidence or any claim by the DPs in the past 9 years that the aid money
that has been channeled through Government system has been corrupted or wasted. Has there been
any major case of corruption in the Government that is concerned with the DPs’ money in the past 9
years? The answer would be no. It is mainly because of the checks and balances that are in place that
monitor the flow of money. If we look at the Government financial control systems which are verified by
International Financial Institutions, there are several under scrutiny such as: Parliamentary oversight,
Internal Audit of MoF, Control and Audit Office, monitoring from Attorney General’s office, monitoring
by National Directorate of Security, monitoring and oversight by High Office of Oversight and external
oversight and audit by DPs. While the control systems outside Government do exist, they are not as
rigorous. This has been also identified by SIGAR’s investigations of the off-budget funding. Given the
executive power of Government the system for prosecution and punishment is very high in the
Government systems than in non-Governmental systems. Therefore vulnerability to corruption of DPs’
funds through Government systems is less than the off-budget mechanisms.
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Finally, lack of proper systems and low capacity also increases vulnerability to corruption. If our DPs
work in a real partnership with GoIRA and use national systems then it is beneficial for both parties to
jointly identify vulnerabilities of national systems to corruption and to support the Government in the
development of capacity and systems to reduce vulnerability. If we work together we can double our
strength of monitoring and control and can prevent corruption. GoIRA will not be able to tackle
corruption alone and needs the support of DPs. If forces such as skills, knowledge and resources join
together the GoIRA and DPs will be able to tackle corruption and will make a difference. GoIRA sees the
solution of the problem in such partnership.
6.8.
Conclusion Based on Donor-Afghan Government Commitments at the Kabul
Conference (Kabul Communiqué 2010)
The PD on Aid Effectiveness provides a foundation for aid effectiveness and advocates worthy principles
but is insufficient for achieving aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, as it does not take into account the
interplay of political and military elements, the conundrums generated from the post conflict and inconflict context and Afghanistan-specific contextual challenges. Not paying adequate attention to these
issues undermines some of the main outcomes that are expected of effective aid delivery: stabilization,
institution and state legitimacy building and freedom from aid dependency.
At the Kabul Conference, participants acknowledged that aid delivered through the Afghan budget is
one of the most effective means of reducing aid dependency and strengthening GoiRA’s capacity to
promote needs-based development in the priority sectors of security, governance and rule of law, and
basic service delivery utilizing technical assistance from DPs. Along with the increase in on-budget
support, a plan to maximize aid effectiveness benefits from off-budget assistance was also agreed upon
to promote alignment of off-budget assistance with Afghanistan’s development needs reflected in the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy.
The three main commitments of the DPs comprise:
 Strong support for channeling at least 50% of development aid through GoIRA’s core budget
within two years;
 Readiness to progressively align development assistance behind the National Priority Programs
(NPPs), with the GoIRA achieving 80% alignment within the next two years;
 Intentions to cooperate with GoIRA in making a practical plan to implement the principles
outlined in the 2010 “Operational Guide -Criteria for Effective Off-Budget Development
Financing”.
The international community’s commitments were matched at the Kabul Conference by GoIRA’s
commitments to reforms to strengthen public finance management system, reduce corruption, improve
budget execution and increase revenue collection.
Admittedly, some weaknesses in Afghanistan’s management and development systems have deterred
DPs from addressing some of the aid effectiveness principles. Under GoIRA’s future plans, the
Government has made reform commitments. Performance improvements of GoIRA have already been
recorded in several areas that provide opportunities to modify donor assumptions and change their
methods of aid delivery.
A sample list of reforms undertaken by GoIRA should enable DPs to change their attitudes and adopt
principles of aid delivery that would improve their own and GoIRA’s development performance:
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


Improved Public Finance Management (PFM) Laws and systems; good scorecards on Public
Expenditure Financial Assessment system (PEFA); improved budget, aid and treasury capacity; a
comprehensive results-based Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), with
monitoring and evaluation plans and complimentary results-based program budgeting;
strengthened financing mechanisms, such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF),
national programs - all of which have had external scrutiny and endorsement by International
Financial Institutions (2009) and bilateral DPs, such as DFID and USAID.
GoIRA’s expectation is that timely delivery on its own commitments translated into concrete
monitorable actions shall elicit delivery from the international community.
Consultations between the international community and GoIRA have been launched and are
ongoing for development of detailed implementation plans to address both the DP and GoIRA
commitments. Future DCRs will report on the progress and results obtained from those already
at the implementation phase.
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Annex-I
Introduction to Development Partners
Disclaimer: the write up of this section has been done by our DPs in their own words and does not
necessarily reflect the position of GoIRA. The purpose of this section is to provide an opportunity for our DPs
to showcase their assistance for Afghanistan in the way they want.
1. ADB (ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK) ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN
Founded in 1966, ADB is a multilateral development bank owned by 67 members, 48 from the region and 19
from other parts of the world. ADB’s main instruments for helping its developing member countries are
policy dialogue, loans, equity investments, guarantees, grants, and TA (technical assistance)
Afghanistan was one of the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) founding member countries in 3966. However,
because of intensive ongoing civil conflict in Afghanistan, ADB operations in the country were suspended
from 1989 to 2002. Upon resumption of its assistance to Afghanistan in 2002, ADB provided Afghanistan
with $2.1 billion in loans, grants, guarantees, technical assistance, ADB-administered co-financing, and
private sector investments. In terms of overall donor pledges from 2002–2031, ADB ranks as Afghanistan’s
fourth largest donor in terms of overall pledges from all DPs. The country is ADB’s 38th largest borrower.
As required by ADB Strategy 2020 (Country Partnership Strategy- 2009-13) supports ANDS and its related
national priority programs, with sectoral focus on energy, road and rail transport, and irrigation and
agriculture sectors.
Transport Sector
ADB as one of the key DPs for the transport sector, focuses on the rehabilitation of several regional airports,
with a financial contribution of $31 million and rebuilding of 1100 km regional and national roads with
finances amounting to $1 billion (as of December 2010). Key interventions include the $400 million Multitranche Financing Facility (MFF) for the Road Network Development Investment Program, to improve about
400 km of national roads, as well as to maintain some 1,500 km of the country’s paved roads for 5 years.
About 665 km roads were newly built as a result of four completed projects within the MFF. In 2009, ADB
approved a $165 million grant for the construction of a new 75-km railway line between Hairatan at the
border with Uzbekistan and Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan. The project is part of the Transport Strategy and
Action Plan agreed under the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program.
Energy Sector
ADB, as Afghanistan’s largest development partner in the energy sector committed $700 million in loans,
grants and TA. The $35 million Regional Power Transmission Interconnection Project is an ADB funded
project. The project interconnected power grids in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, allowing Tajikistan to export
surplus electrical power to Afghanistan. $570 million for the Energy Sector Development Investment
Program focuses on transmission and distribution, rehabilitation and further extensions of the main North
East Power System (NEPS). The first $164 million tranche financed a number of subprojects, including a 60km Kunduz–Taloqan transmission line, NEPS distribution in Kunduz and Baghlan municipalities and
rehabilitation of Shibarghan Gas Fields. The second tranche of $81.5 million rehabilitated and expanded
power distribution network in Kabul.
Other Sectors
ADB invested a total of $513 million in Natural Resource Management sector; $55 million in Fiscal
Management and Public Administration Reform; $60 million in Private Sector and Financial markets
Development Program; a total of $206.1 million in Private Sector Development; and $67 million in TA to
support the national capacity development.
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2. THE AGA KHAN DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (AKDN) IN
AFGHANISTAN
The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) is engaged in nearly 40 countries around the world through
its nine agencies, which work to improve the quality of life and opportunities for people in some of the
poorest parts of the developing world. With its partners, AKDN has channeled more than US$850 million
for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development since 2002.
AKDN’s commitment to Afghanistan is long-term. It uses a multi-input area development (MIAD)
approach, which seeks to build a critical mass of interventions in poor and isolated areas, connecting
them to wider national and regional investments. This entails responding to a spectrum of livelihood
requirements. AKDN also seeks to support the creation of an enabling environment for civil society and
private initiative, essential for the development of dynamic, prosperous, stable and pluralistic nations.
Social Development

AKDN implements social development programs in 53 districts across 7 provinces, reaching
nearly 3 million people in Afghanistan.

The Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) undertakes rural development programs in agriculture, natural
resource management, governance, civil society development, infrastructure creation, market
development, and health and education.

AKF introduced 1500 community-based savings groups (69% women), which have provide
flexible loans and increased financial management education. The aggregate savings of the
21,331 members (70% women) spread across 21 districts rose significantly during 2010,
reaching a cumulative total of Afghani 20.12m.

AKF continues to improve food security in villages in 18 districts including implementing
participatory management of irrigation systems and supporting integrated crop management
research. In 2010, in Takhar, a research laboratory was successfully handed over to the Ministry
of Agriculture and Livestock.

Education programs provide support to more than 216 Government schools and community
primary classes in more than 220 remote villages, increasing access to quality education for
more than 332,000 pupils. Special attention is paid to improving girls’ access to education. Nonformal education programs provide classes in Early Childhood Development and adult literacy in
remote rural communities.

The Aga Khan Health Services help provide the Ministry of Public Health’s (MOPH) Basic Package
of Health Services (BPHS) in Badakhshan, Baghlan and Bamyan provinces and operates
provincial hospitals in Faizabad and Bamyan. The Aga Khan University (AKU) manages the French
Medical Institute for Children (FMIC), an ISO-certified tertiary pediatric hospital in Kabul. AKU
supports national nursing and midwifery training and plays a lead role in developing the national
nursing and community nursing curricula. It s a mental health program that conducts research
and provides technical support to the Ministry of Public Health.

The First Microfinance Bank (FMFB), Afghanistan’s largest provider of microfinance services to
small businesses and households, disbursed 160,000 loans worth USD 270 million.
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
FOCUS Humanitarian Assistance, an AKDN affiliate, implements disaster risk reduction
programs.
(a) Culture:
The Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC) helps preserve and develop Afghanistan’s cultural heritage,
particularly in the historic quarters of Kabul and Herat. In Kabul, AKTC has rehabilitated Bagh-e-Babur, a
Mughal-era garden, the Timur Shah mausoleum, and restored war-damaged quarters of the old city. In
Herat, AKTC has helped to preserve surviving sections of the old city and an important Timurid shrine
complex. The Aga Khan Music Initiative in Central Asia (AKMICA) supports masters of classical Afghan
music in two schools in Kabul and Herat. Cultural development and achievements contribute to
heightening of Afghans’ self esteem and pride in its history, an important as aspect of building
nationhood.
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3. AUSTRALIA IN AFGHANISTAN
Donor Profile
Australia’s assistance to Afghanistan is helping to build a stable, accountable and functional Afghan state
that can provide health, education and employment opportunities to its people. Australia provides
assistance to stabilise conflict-affected communities and strengthen the capacity of GoIRA to deliver
basic services, infrastructure and economic growth. Australia works along with the Government of
Afghanistan to identify priorities and aligns its support with the Afghanistan National Development
Strategy.
The overarching GoIRAl of Australia’s two year public strategy, released in December 2030, guiding the
delivery of the Australian development assistance in Afghanistan, is to build GoIRA’s capacity to deliver
basic services and provide economic opportunities to its people. Australia’s support is based on four
pillars:




Enhancing basic service delivery in health and education
Supporting rural development and livelihoods
Improving governance and the effectiveness of GoIRA
Supporting vulnerable populations.
In 2011 Australia will develop a formal Development Partnership Agreement with the Government of
Afghanistan to set out jointly agreed priorities, key commitments and deliverables for both countries.
Proposed annual, high-level consultations will add to transparency and mutual exchange between the
Governments.
Australia is committed to the principles of aid effectiveness as articulated in the Paris Declaration, Accra
Agenda for Action and the Deli Declaration on Peace Building and State Building. In delivering assistance
to Afghanistan, Australia seeks to work through Afghan Government systems, with intents to support
the National Priority Programs, consistent with the international community’s commitments at the 2030
London and Kabul Conferences. In 2009-10 Australia provided 46 per cent of AusAid assistance through
Afghan systems and will meet the commitment to deliver 50 per cent of assistance through Afghan
Government systems within two years. Australia delivers its aid program to Afghanistan through trusted
partners such as the World Bank’s ARTF, the United Nations and international non-Government
organizations. The majority of Australia’s assistance is provided at the national level, primarily through
the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). Australia has been in the list of top 10 contributors to
the ARTF.
To date, Australia committed AUD 743.5 million (USD 735.3 million) of development assistance. In
2010/11 AUD 106 million (USD 104.8 million) will be delivered.
 Promotion of security, stability and transition to Afghan leadership in Uruzgan Province, one of
the poorest and least developed areas of Afghanistan. Australia has recently taken on increased
responsibilities in Uruzgan, including civilian leadership of the Multinational Provincial
Reconstruction Team.
 Supporting the priorities of the Provincial Government and building its capacity to deliver basic
services to its people.
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Australia delivers innovative bilateral programs in niche areas. The Malaysia-Australia Education Project
for Afghanistan Development is a unique trilateral capacity building activity for the Teachers Education
Directorate of the Ministry of Education. To date, it has trained 60 master teacher trainers and a further
120 are planned through 2011-12.
The Development Assistance Facility for Afghanistan provides a program of capacity building assistance,
including scholarships, to four key national Ministries - Health, Education, Agriculture, Irrigation and
Livestock, and Rural Rehabilitation and Development. From 2012, 25 scholarships per year will be
provided to these ministries and the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Mines.
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4. CHINA IN AFGHANISTAN - COMMITTED TO THE SPIRIT OF GIVING
China as a large developing nation remains firm in providing aid to other financially-constrained
developing countries and undertaking within its capacity its share of international obligations. The core
principles of China aid are equality and mutual benefit without conditions.
Through building projects, providing debt relief, conducting technical cooperation, providing equipment
supplies, capacity building programs and other forms of aid, China tries her best to help aid recipient to
establish and develop their own national economy, improve people's livelihood status and promote
social progress.
China began its small scale aid program for the developing countries in 1950. Since 60s, China provided
assistance to 168 countries and made contributions to 30 international and regional organizations. Up to
2009: China sent 600,000 people to assist with programs associated with local production and
livelihood; provided concessional loans to 77 countries in support of 325 projects; held 4,000 sessions of
various types of training on human resources development for 120,000 people from 173 countries;
provided scholarship programs to 70,627 students from 119 developing countries; supplied over 2,000
teachers and trained 10,000 instructors and headmasters; signed debt relief protocols with 50 least
developed countries and heavily indebted poor countries; cancelled 380 mature debts amounting to
25.6 billion RMB Yuan; sent 21,000 medical professionals to 69 developing countries and treated 260
million patients; dispatched about 200 missions in emergency disaster relief; deployed over 8,000
volunteer teachers to 70 countries and 405 volunteers in 19 developing countries. More than 700 aid
workers lost their lives in serving foreign aid missions.
China’s first aid to Afghanistan dates back to 3965. From 3965 to 3979, China provided 374.29 million
RMB Yuan of aid, built 19 projects, including Parwan Irrigation project, Baghlan textile mill and Kandahar
Hospital project. From 1980 to 2001, China provided 350.75 million RMB Yuan of aid through
international channels such as UNHCR.
Since 2002, China provided 1,030 million RMB Yuan of grant to Afghanistan; undertaken 7 complete
plant projects (including the Jamhuriat Hospital and Parwan Irrigation Project); 15 batches of materials
and equipment; 4 bunches of emergency humanitarian donations; trained over 600 Afghan officials &
professionals; wrote off the debt of £9.6 million; and provided zero tariff treatment of about 60%, 4762
categories of products originated in Afghanistan for exporting to China since July 1, 2010.
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5. Canada’s (CIDA) aid to Afghanistan
Thematic Focus
CIDA’s programming in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2033 is aligned with Canada’s whole-ofGovernment approach, focusing on six priorities and three signature projects to help rebuild the country
through reconstruction and development.
CIDA support in Afghanistan focuses on:
Children and Youth:

Improving access to education, especially for women and girls, through repairing, and
constructing schools in Kandahar province (signature project);

Training teachers in line with the Afghan Ministry of Education’s National Education
Strategic Plan;
Providing literacy, vocational, and life-skills training, especially for women;
Supporting UNICEF with nine national polio vaccination campaigns to vaccinate
approximately seven million Afghan children (signature project);
Improving access to pre-natal, post-natal and obstetric care, and improving the skills of
health care workers.



Sustainable Economic Growth:
Supporting microfinance and alternative livelihoods programs to improve access to employment and
income opportunities for women and men, particularly in Kandahar province; Rehabilitate Dahla Dam’s
irrigation system (signature project) in the Arghandab Valley.
Protection of Vulnerable Populations:


Providing food supplies to vulnerable populations;
Providing non-food aid and winterization packages to people in Kandahar province.
Safety and Security:


Releasing more than 500 square kilometers of previously hazardous land as a result of demining
activities;
Increasing public awareness through mine risk education.
Supporting Democratic Governance and National Institutions:

Helping develop local governance through development of Community Development Councils
that plan and implement projects at the village level to improve access to water, sanitation, and
roads;
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
Help Afghan adults, particularly women, participate in the electoral process in 2009 and in the
2010 elections.
KEY PROJECTS:






Dahla Dam Signature Project (Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Project)
Education Signature Project
Polio Signature Project
Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP)
National Solidarity Program
Technical Assistance
HIGHLIGHTS of Afghan Development Achievements to which CIDA support
contributed:






Increased school enrolment to 6.2 million, with one third of the total students enrolled being
girls- an increase from 700,000 students in 2001, all of whom were boys;
Completed more than 770 infrastructure projects through the National Solidarity Program;
Improved access to primary health care services within two hours’ walking distance, an increase
to 65% of the population from 9% in 2000;
Helped reduce the number of mine victims in 2009 to its lowest level since 2001, by offering
mine-risk education programs to girls, boys, and adults;
Improved economic opportunities through skills development and micro finance loansnationally 430,000 Afghans have received micro loans, two-thirds of whom are women;
Provided expert technical support to Afghan ministries in key areas through 13 technical
advisors who work as part of the Canadian Governance Support Office
MOVING FORWARD: ANTICIPATED RESULTS:
CIDA will continue to focus its development support in Afghanistan on improving education,
providing humanitarian assistance, increasing food security, and supporting democratic governance.
CIDA is on track to achieving its benchmarks in 2011.
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6. Czech Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan
Czech Republic’s launched the official development assistance to Afghanistan in 2002. In 2006 the Czech
Republic started to contribute on annual basis to different Afghan trust funds that significantly increased
the overall amount of the Czech ODA.
Since 2008 the flagship contribution of Czech ODA has been the Provincial Reconstruction Team in the
province of Logar. By the end of 2010 the PRT completed 77 development projects and 67 quick impact
projects (in total 144). It currently operates 20 projects and more than 10 are at different stages of
development.
The Czech contribution to the development/reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is not limited
exclusively to the PRT or contributions to trust funds. Czech Republic’s development assistance is also
delivered by its non-Governmental organisations, active mainly in Kabul and Northern Afghanistan. Their
budgets are co-funded by the Czech Republic’s development cooperation budgets or humanitarian aid
budgets.
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM IN LOGAR:
Strategy and achievements
In 2010 Czech PRT completed 42 development and 31 quick impact projects (in total 73) for
approximately 1.5 million USD. Total sum spent on PRT’s development projects and humanitarian
activities since 2008 amounts to more than 10 million USD.
All projects of Czech PRT are prepared and implemented in close cooperation with provincial authorities,
local communities and other active partners in the province. Czech PRT projects are focused on priorities
and sectors that correspond with Afghan National Development Strategy, Logar Provincial Development
Plan and other relevant documents. All projects funded by the PRT are implemented by Afghan
contractors through open tendering.
Strategy of the Czech PRT is based on three priorities:
1. Support of Provincial Government
-
Security (construction of police checkpoints, infrastructure and equipment of ANSF, their
training, mentoring etc.)
Good Governance (mainly infrastructural projects: construction of provincial prison, court,
capacity building – mentoring, trainings and internships - for provincial officials)
2. Support of activities leading to economic development
-
Agriculture (milk collection centres, support of silkworm industry, Secondary Agricultural and
Mechanical School in Pol-e Alam, trainings, information campaigns, capacity building)
-
Water Management (construction and reconstruction of irrigation systems, weirs, retention
walls, capacity building, information activities)
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3. Media
- Support of local radio stations
- Enlightenment, educational and information campaigns.
Other activities of Czech PRT
The Czech PRT is also involved in other sectors which are not its niche sectors but which are critical for
successful and sustainable development of the province.
It supports development of infrastructure and capacity building in sectors of
Education: Construction or reconstruction of 13 schools for 12 thousands children (both boys and girls).
29 projects have been implemented at an expenditure of $3,085,000.
Public Health: Equipment and material supplies, vaccination, trainings, reconstructions and construction
of new facilities- 17 projects implemented with a total cost of $404,000.
Small Infrastructural Projects (bridges, roads etc): 12 projects implemented at a value of $328,000.
Other activities
Czech Republic also financially supports activities of major Czech non-Governmental organisations
(mainly People in Need) as well as private actors. Between 2006 and 2010 the Czech Republic supported
development projects of such organizations with $3.6 million (in 2010 alone, more than S300, 000 was
provided). The major portion of this support was directed to development of secondary agricultural
education and income stabilisation of local population in the provinces of Baghlan, Badakhshan, and
others in northern Afghanistan.
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7. Danish Development Assistance to Afghanistan
With a comprehensive strategy integrating all Danish support to Afghanistan – development, military
and humanitarian assistance – Denmark is one of the largest bilateral contributors. For the strategy
period (2008-2032), Denmark’s development assistance is to reach approximately USD 80 million per
year. The Danish assistance focuses mainly on education, state building and improvement of living
conditions of people.
Education: Denmark is one of the key partners to the Ministry of Education, supporting the
implementation of the National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) and more specifically the
implementation of the more operational education Interim Plan (IP) 2011-2013.
Denmark has been supporting the education sector in Afghanistan since 2003 focusing mainly on
primary education. The support targeted service delivery and capacity development in curriculum
development, teacher education, printing and distribution of textbooks, construction of educational
infrastructure as well as institutional restructuring and administrative reform. The Danish support is
aligned with the National Education Strategic Plan and is mainly provided as sector budget support to
the core budget of the Ministry of Education (MoE). Specific Danish Support to education in the
Helmand Province was initiated in 2008. This support is now fully integrated in the Danish program
support to education. Funds are coordinated and administered by the Ministry in Kabul in support to the
Provincial Education Directorate (PED) in Helmand.
Denmark, through ESPA, supports MoE to achieve the objectives of NESP/IP through provision of
financial and technical assistance in a two-tier approach; (i) direct support to MoE budgets and plans
and (ii) technical assistance and capacity building.
State Building: In support of state building, assistance is geared towards democratic processes, the
protection of human rights and the promotion of good governance. Anti-corruption and gender equality
are priorities to be pursued in order to render Afghanistan’s sustainable development. In supporting the
UNDP ELECT program, Denmark has been a consistent supporter of reform of Afghan institutions to plan
and operate national elections.
Other key areas of interest for financial support include strengthening the rule of law in Afghanistan
through its contribution to Law & Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), TAs, and training facilities for Afghan
policemen and improving the judicial infrastructure.
Denmark is among the core group of DPs to support of governance at the sub-national level and
provided funds to the District Delivery Program, focusing on Helmand, to empower local communities to
prioritize projects for development and to enhance district development capacity.
Denmark was one of first DPs to support the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program and this support
continues.
A special priority is also the reform of the Afghan National Police for which Denmark supports the efforts
of the EU’s police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), being one of the mission’s largest personnel
contributors.
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Living Conditions: The Danish development assistance to Afghanistan concerning improvement of
people’s living conditions includes National Solidarity Program (NSP), National Area Based Development
Program (NABDP) and Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program (AREDP). Microfinance
Investment Support Facilities for Afghanistan (MISFA) has also been financed by Denmark from the start.
Danish contributions in the past few years included support to specific counter-narcotics programs to
promote alternative livelihoods. Provincial counter-narcotics plans in Helmand and Herat operated by
UNODC have been supported by Denmark. Denmark also cooperates with the Ministry of Agriculture
Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) with setting up of a natural recourse management program for
protection and rehabilitation of forests in eastern provinces and continued implementation of the
program over a five-year period.
In addition to that, Denmark is supporting renovation of a hydro-power plant in Gereshk - Helmand.
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8. European Union IN AFGHANISTAN
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is one of the major DPs to Afghanistan. All EU assistance is aligned with the
Government of Afghanistan's priorities as set out in the ANDS. The EU strongly supports the Kabul
Process and is committed to further aligning its programs with evolving Government priorities as
identified in the National Priority Programs.
Assistance from the EU Budget is managed by the European Commission (EC), through the EU
Delegation to Afghanistan in Kabul. Bilateral cooperation is implemented on the basis of multiannual
programming documents and annual action programs. The current Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013)
and Multiannual Indicative Program (2011-2013) outline support strategies for three focal areas and one
non-focal area. The focal areas are Rural Development (including mine action), Governance & Rule of
Law, and Health & Social Protection; the non-focal area is Regional Cooperation.
The EU's budget for bilateral development cooperation for 2007-2030 was €645 million, including an
additional allocation of €15 million in 2009 for election support. For 2033-2013, the indicative budget is
€600, an increase of 10% compared to the previous period. A significant part of these funds is channeled
through national programs and through multi-donor trust funds that contribute to the Government's
Core Budget.
Afghanistan also receives support through regional EU programs for Asia, in particular for refugees, as
well as through thematic EU programs on food security, civil society development, and democracy and
human rights, and the EU's Instrument for Stability (IfS). EU humanitarian assistance is provided by the
European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) which has an autonomous
office in Kabul.
Assistance Summary
For the period 2002-2031, the EU has pledged more than €2.6 billion to Afghanistan (including
humanitarian aid). Up to the end of 2030, €2,055 million had been contracted, of which €3,828 million
had been disbursed. More than 38% of aid from the EU Budget provided between 2002 and the end of
2010 was channeled through multi-donor trust funds such as the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
(ARTF - €293.95 million) and the Law and Order Trust fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA - €273.75 million).
Overall, the EU has contributed €578.7 million to trust funds to date.
Key Objectives
The EU provides development aid across the world. More than half the finances invested in underprivileged countries come from the EU and its Member States, making it the world's major aid donor. Its
development cooperation objectives are poverty reduction, sustainable economic and social
development, integration into the world economy, consolidation of democracy and of the rule of law,
and respect for human rights.
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Division of Labour and Coordination
The quality of aid is important for the EU. National ownership and alignment, donor coordination and
harmonization with recipient-country systems, and a focus on results are core principles. In order to ensure
coordination and coherence in the implementation of external assistance programs worldwide, the European
Commission works in close collaboration with EU Member States, civil society, international organizations
and Governments to make aid more effective.
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9. Finland’s Contribution to Afghanistan
Close to 50% of Finnish ODA is channeled through trust funds and 25% of Finland’s aid is channeled to
northern Afghanistan.
Finnish support is directed to two main sectors: 1) promoting good governance, rule of law and human
rights, including security sector reform, and 2) promoting rural development and alternative livelihoods
to drug cultivation. Special attention is given to promoting gender equality.
Finland supports, inter alia, the multilateral Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF); the Law and
Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA); the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC); UNODC’s (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) provincial drug control program;
reproductive health program of Marie Stopes International; and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
projects within the security sector in the region of Mazar-e-Sharif. Finland also supports a UNICEF-led
program to improve water and sanitation conditions at schools in the region.
Finland supports the development of the Afghan national police and criminal justice system through the
EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). Finland supports EUPOL with approximately 35 experts.
Finland's humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan is channeled through the UN system and the Red Cross
movement. The aid is allocated on the basis of needs assessments, the estimated level of aid being EUR
1-2 million per year. For 2010 the amount was EUR 2.1 million.
Finland supported humanitarian mine clearance in Afghanistan since the beginning of 1990's through
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). With a significant increase in funding since 2008- a
total of EUR 1.6 million was earmarked for 2010 and channeled through UNMAS and the HALO Trust.
The support to Afghan civil society is important to Finland. The support for Afghan organizations directly
and through Finnish NGO's working in Afghanistan is approximately EUR 1.5 million annually.
Finland’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Afghanistan in 2011 totaled EUR 17, 2 million. This
includes Civilian Crisis Management, which is EUR 3.8 million.
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10. France’s Assistance to Afghanistan
France has been a very close cultural partner for Afghanistan for almost a century. As early as
1922, The French Archaeological Delegation (DAFA) was created, even before an Embassy was installed.
The relationship between our two countries had hence been initiated as a strong cultural and
educational partnership, undertaking actions primarily in educational and cultural fields, before it was
expanded to in depth cooperation in the field of rule of Law.
The DAFA has a long history in rehabilitating the richness of the Afghan culture since the
Antiquity. The exceptional searches underway in Mes Aynak are yet another proof of the wealth of the
Afghan history. The DAFA is involved in very important partnerships with the Ministry of Culture.
Education is also one of France’s main fields of involvement. The Esteqlal and Malalay high
schools of Kabul are the two emblems of excellence, of teaching “à la française”. More recently, France
has developed active partnerships in the field of Higher Education. These have been developed for
instance within the French Department of Kabul University, the Law Faculties (Kabul and Herat), or the
Polytechnic University. Strengthening ties between universities are now allowing a greater number of
Afghan students to obtain high-level diplomas as part of capacity building within Afghanistan. France
also offers the best students 70 scholarships to study one degree (Licence, Master, and Doctorate) in
one of the best French universities.
After one year of refurbishment, the very unique venue that is the French Institute, offers
multiple cultural events- exhibitions, movies, concerts, theatre plays- and educational programs such as
language classes. It is now the sole institution for such activities in Afghanistan, coupling a classic
cultural diffusion with a unique place of meetings and exchange between people. With an auditorium of
450 seats, equipped with a very advanced sound and video system, the French Institute is the largest
conference centre in Afghanistan.
France has moreover developed a program designed to participate in security systems reform.
Throughout its project at the Parliament and the faculty of Law, France also shows its strong
commitment to reinforcing the rule of Law in Afghanistan and more broadly the Afghan state. Training
of Afghan key actors is core in France’s cooperation strategy.
The French Medical Institute for Children (FMIC), partly funded by the French Development
Agency (FDA), with great equipments and highly qualified and trained staff, offers a unique medical
assistance to indigent children.
France’s agricultural collaboration through the FCO-MAIL contributes to the rural development
of Afghanistan. French NGOs, supported by the FDA, are also key actors of Afghanistan development,
their activities covering a widespread array of interventions from emergency food assistance to longterm rural development, from rehabilitation of shelters and water infrastructures to the setting up of
innovative passive solar houses.
For 2033, France’s will is to pursue its unconditional support to Afghanistan, in education,
governance, cultural activities and development sectors, with the constant eagerness to reinforce
afghan local capacities in order to help building the future of its old friend, Afghanistan.
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11. Reconstruction and Development - German Cooperation with
Afghanistan
In light of the strategic decisions taken at the London and Kabul Conferences and NATO’s Lisbon
Summit, the importance of civilian reconstruction and development assistance will grow more in the
future. The German Government has nearly doubled its funding for reconstruction and development to
up to 430 million Euro annually 2010-2013, making Germany the third largest donor to Afghanistan,
complemented by humanitarian aid (approx. 10 million Euro annually) and development oriented
emergency and transitional aid (approx. 10 million Euro annually). In the period 2002-2010 Germany
provided a total of 3.6 billion Euros for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development.
German sector-wise achievements in Afghanistan since 2002 are as follows:
Education:
Through the national education program (EQUIP) Germany has funded school infrastructure for about
279,000 pupils as well as trainings for 32,000 teachers. Beyond this multilateral contribution, the
German Federal Government started a bilateral basic education program in 2005 for the provinces of
Badakhshan, Kunduz, Takhar and Paktya, adding Balkh province in 2007 and Sar-e-Pul province in 2009.
The GoIRAl is to provide schools and to train teachers for 500,000 pupils in northern Afghanistan by the
2013-end.
Furthermore, the Kabul Mechanical Institute is designed to train up to 2,300 young people. With respect
to higher education, more than 600 Afghan university teachers have participated in trainings in
Germany, while more than 300 courses have been offered by German scientists at universities in Kabul,
Herat and Mazar-e Sharif.
Peace and Security:
Between 2002 and 2009, the German Government contributed more than 150 million Euros to police
reform in Afghanistan for training, equipment, infrastructure and police salaries (including through
LOTFA). In 2010 alone, the German Police Project Team GPPT trained around 3,900 Afghan trainees.
4,200 trainees are currently enrolled in training programs at Police Training Centers in Mazar-i Sharif,
Kunduz and Faizabad and at the National Police Academy in Kabul mentored by GPPT.
Major infrastructure projects completed in 2010 include: ANCOP Headquarters, the Police Training
Center Kunduz, the Border Police Faculty Kabul, the Traffic Police Headquarter Kabul and the Police
Headquarters in Faizabad.
In addition to the engagement in the area of police reform, Germany is also one of the main
contributors to the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (10 million Euros annually).
Sustainable Economic Development:
Since 2002 Germany has provided more than 300 million Euro to improve the business environment and
income generation. Financial institutions such as the First Micro Finance Banks were established for
credit provision. Since 2002, over 600 kilometers of roads and numerous bridges have been built in
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North. The recently established Regional Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) provides flexible
funding for critical infrastructure projects in Northern Afghanistan.
In cooperation with Australia, Germany supports the Afghan civil aviation sector through establishment
of a country-wide air surveillance system.
At the national level, German experts advise the Ministry of Commerce and Industry support the Export
Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA) and assist the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(ACCI). In north, Germany provides small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The New Baghlan Sugar
Company has been rehabilitated with German assistance.
Infrastructure - Water:
Germany is supporting the improvement of water supply and sanitation in Afghanistan. Almost 300.000
people in the cities of Herat and Kunduz have gained access to clean drinking water. In Kabul, 500,000
people have been reached so far. As planned, a total of 1.4 million inhabitants of Kabul will benefit from
access to clean drinking water in the next few years. In Faizabad, Imam Sahib and Balkh City, about
135,000 inhabitants will gain reliable access to drinking water and basic sanitation by the end of 2012.
Infrastructure – Energy:
Since 2002, Germany provided more than 120 million Euros for improving energy supply in Afghanistan.
In addition to investments in the North Eastern Power System, German assistance focuses on renewable
energies such as hydropower. The hydropower plants Mahipar and Sarubi were rehabilitated. These
power plants are now supplying about 800,000 people in the Kabul region with electricity. The
commissioning of two substations in Mazar-e Sharif and in Pol-e Khumri improved power supply for
further 300,000 people.
Health:
Since 2005, over 1,000,000 patients have been treated in basic healthcare projects in northeastern
Afghanistan funded by Germany. Jointly with Japan, Norway and Sweden, Germany finances the
rehabilitation of the regional hospital in Kunduz, the provincial as well as selected district hospitals of
Balkh, Takhar and Badakhshan. Germany also supports the training of hospital staff.
Governance:
Germany supports key Afghan investment programs and the recurrent costs of the Afghan state through
its regular contributions to the ARTF-203 million Euros since 2002. Germany also actively participates in
the ARTF’s Incentive Program.
Whilst the newly established Regional Capacity Development Fund (RCDF) aims at strengthening
political and administrative structures at the province and district level in north, the Open Policy
Advisory Fund’s (OPAF) objective is to strengthen the Afghan administrations’ capacity at the national
level in designing and realizing structural reforms. Capacity in Afghan ministries is also enhanced by
providing German-Afghan experts through CIM (Centrum für Internationale Migration und Fachkräfte)
and through German contribution to the CTAP.
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Since 2004, Germany supported trainings to bolster the Afghan judicial and public administration
systems. Support to improving the political, social and economic conditions of women is part of the
ongoing gender mainstreaming project. Germany provided funding for elections in Afghanistan.
Culture:
German funds have so far facilitated the promotion of 57 individual projects, including restoration
works, small donations in kind but also complex projects such as the restoration of the Babur Garden
(Bagh-e Babur) in Kabul, excavations in the city area of Herat or safeguarding works at the Buddha’s of
Bamyan.
Media:
Germany has supported a number of projects for training journalists.
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12. India’s Development Cooperation Program in Afghanistan
While it is not a traditional donor country, India is making a significant contribution to the
reconstruction of Afghanistan by sharing its own development experience with the Government and
people of Afghanistan. This south-south cooperation is based on centuries-old ties of history and
civilization between the two countries. It also reflects India's belief that democracy and development
are keys to stabilize Afghanistan and thereby contribute to regional stability and dynamic economic
development in the south Asian region.
Current Indian development assistance commitment to Afghanistan amounts to about US $ 1.3 billion.
Indian development projects in Afghanistan are marked by lower overhead costs, and faster
disbursements, than those of other traditional donor partners. As a matter of policy, India offers
assistance only in the areas where it is requested, by GoIRA.
Infrastructure: India helped construct the 218 km highway from Zaranj to Delaram, facilitating
movement between Afghanistan and Iran. It built a 220kV DC transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to
Kabul and a 220/110/20 kV sub-station at Chimtala to bring power from the northern border countries
to Kabul. Ongoing projects include the reconstruction of Salma Dam in Herat province; the construction
of the new Afghan Parliament building; and setting-up of two electric sub-stations in Doshi and Charikar.
Humanitarian and medical assistance: Apart from its reconstruction of Indira Gandhi Institute of Child
Health, India has been providing free medical services through 5 Indian Medical Missions in Kabul,
Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Herat and Kandahar. It provided 1 million tons of wheat to Afghanistan as
food aid; and with the assistance of WFP distributed high-protein biscuits to 1.5 million Afghan
schoolchildren daily. An additional 250,000 tons of wheat as food assistance was provided recently, to
address the current food shortage.
Education and capacity development: India provides scholarships to about 675 Afghan students every
year to pursue university studies in India, and also an equal number of scholarships for short-term
vocational training. Because of the excellent quality of university instruction in India, and the cultural
proximity, the Indian scholarships have proven to be extremely popular among Afghan students.
Recently, India started a new program of scholarships for Afghan scholars to pursue Master’s and
Doctoral level degrees in Agricultural Sciences.
India had been the major contributor to UNDP's Capacity for Afghan Public Administration (CAP)
Program, through secondment of 30 Indian civil servants in various Afghan Ministries to build the
Government of Afghanistan’s capacity, Towards this end, India continues to be the major contributor to
UNDP's 'National Institution Building Programme'.
Further, India established a vocational training centre for training 3,000 Afghans in carpentry, plumbing,
welding, masonry and tailoring; with a project in Bagh-e-Zanana for providing training to women in
garment-making, nursery plantation, food processing and marketing.
The newest facet of India's development portfolio comprises a special program for sponsoring
community-based, small development projects in vulnerable border areas. This extremely successful
program supported more than a hundred projects in the fields of agriculture, rural development,
education, health, vocational training, etc.
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In terms of the way forward, a major focus of Indian assistance is to help Afghanistan’s progressive
transition from the present aid-centric economic model to one based on trade and investment. In this
context, India, as a fast growing neighboring economy offers one of the best potentials to serve
Afghanistan’s needs. Indian efforts would increasingly focus on leveraging these latent
complementarities, to ensure that Afghanistan becomes an integral part of a wider South Asian successstory of economic dynamism and democratic social cohesion.
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13. Participation of Islamic Republic of Iran in the reconstruction of
Afghanistan
Islamic Republic of Iran, as a neighboring country, from the start of new situation and beginning the work of
Interim Administration of Afghanistan in 2001 has been playing an active role, by undertaking a good policy,
in building long lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan. Effective participation of our country in the
international conferences such as Tokyo, Berlin, and Paris and exchange of delegations and also extensive
dialogue of political and non-political authorities are the vivid signs of our policy to support Interim
Administration, Transitional Government, and elected government of President Karzai. Mutual summits of
heads of both countries and also mutual trips of officials of both countries at different levels shows the high
will of official of both countries to expand and deepen the relations between the two countries.
Assistance of Islamic Republic of Iran to the people of Afghanistan and reconstruction of economic and social
infrastructure is defined in the following three parts:
Assistance through its operating budget:
In the first part, Islamic Republic of Iran by allocating the biggest part of its recurrent budget has embarked to
expand roads ending to the borders with Afghanistan, expand water, power, and telecommunication
networks up to the border, increase Chabahar sea port capacity, which is one of the nearest sea port to
Afghanistan, construct customs facilities, and improve border based in the joint border with Afghanistan,
provide facilities in custom tariffs and taxes and to establish air network between the two countries and so
on….
Cost of presence of Afghan refugees living in Iran:
In the past three decades, Islamic Republic of Iran has been the host of more than three million Afghan
refugees out of which only one million have been registered legally in Iran, while the remaining two million
have been living in Iran illegally and without any official permission. During this period, Iran has paid a big
cost for the presence of Afghan refugees including government subsidies for their education, health and
other services. The costs include the following:
 Study of thousands of Afghan students in different universities of Iran in the past 30 years;
 More than five thousand Afghans are studying in different faculties of Iran;
 Currently, more than 300,000 Afghans are studying in the Iranian schools;
 In the past three decades, more than one million Afghans have studied in the Iranian schools at the
different levels;
 Around 600,000 Afghan adults have studies in literacy classes in the past three decades; and
 Providing 600 scholarships for Afghan students in the Islamic Republic of Iran from the development
budget.
Granting banking credits and facilities:
In the recent years, the policy or Islamic Republic of Iran has been to encourage private sector to invest in
Afghanistan. Providing necessary facilities for Iranian companies and their presence in Afghan markets and,
providing insurance coverage for Afghan importers, on the other hand, has been in the focus and working
agenda of the Iranian government. Also, in Paris Conference in 2008, Islamic Republic of Iran announced
granting new banking facilities to private sector with the total amount of USD 300 million for three years; the
mechanism of implementation of this credit is also to be negotiated with Afghan side.
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Grants:
In part three which belongs to grants, Islamic Republic of Iran, so far, has invested more than USD 370million
to take part in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Iranian aid to Afghanistan reconstruction has been focusing
on three parts, namely, infrastructure facilities, educational and vocational services( taking part in the
training and capacity building of ministries, granting scholarships, construction of vocational and technical
education centers, teacher training center in Kabul, Communication Training Center in Kabul, and …), and
cash assistance to government and in-kind assistance to needy Afghans.
The biggest chunk of Iranian aid is aimed at construction of infrastructure facilities such as roads, bridges,
and also power network which are effective and key for the expansion of infrastructure facilities of
Afghanistan. In the area of power transmission, the project of power transmission to two provinces of Herat
and Nimroz bordering with Iran has been completed and now is under use. In the area of roads, construction
of transit highway of Dugharoon-Hirat which has already been opened, and construction of part of ring road
between Herat and Maimana in the North of Afghanistan which connects Afghanistan with central Asian
countries is of major importance for Afghanistan.
Also, connecting South to Center and North of Afghanistan through Chabahar sea port and border bridge of
Milak( Abrisham bridge which has already been opened) will have important and key role in connecting
Afghanistan to sea and ports in Oman sea and Persian Gulf.
The big project of construction of railway of Khawaf- Herat which is underway at present will bring a big
change in transit and connecting Afghanistan with regional countries and Europe. Connecting to central Asian
railway network, Turkey and Europe through Iran and also connecting to national railway network of Iran will
provide more facilities for transportation of goods and passengers for Afghanistan.
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14. ITALY’S SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN
Italian Cooperation aims to contribute to the sustainable improvement of the living conditions of Afghan
people as well as to the stabilization of the country and its social, economic and institutional
development.
From the end of 2001 to date, more than 500 million Euros have been committed for multilateral and
bilateral initiatives (managed and implemented by various agencies- executed by the Government of
Afghanistan, managed by Italian Cooperation or implemented by Afghan NGOs, Italian universities and
other institutions). Currently, 56 ongoing cooperation projects for a total amount of more than 200
million Euros are funded. 71% of funding is channeled through GoIRA core budget.
The Aid Strategy of the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation of the Italian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (DGCS) emphasizes a partnership approach at national and sub-national levels,
institutional and capacity development, alignment to ANDS and the National Priority Programs and
Provincial Development Plans, with the spirit of promoting Afghan ownership of the development
process, all with the motive of making programs sustainable.
Italy’s geographical focus is increasingly on Herat and the Western Region where most of ongoing
projects are located. The objective is to work side-by-side with the Afghan sub-national administrations
in the process of institutional growth and development of the Province. In this area Italian NGOs are
active in carrying out emergency and development interventions directed to most vulnerable population
through Italian Cooperation funds. The Italian-led PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) is also based in
Herat. From 2002, more than 80 million Euros have been committed to the Province.
The Italian Cooperation focus is mainly on sub-national governance, justice, public health, infrastructure,
agriculture and rural development all with a cross-cutting attention to the protection of the most
vulnerable and the promotion of gender equity.
Italy is also fully committed to support the reintegration strategy as well as regional co-operation
efforts.
The main achievements of the Italian Cooperation include: the establishment of the INLTC; the
construction of the Juvenile Rehabilitation and Female Detention Centers in Kabul; support to the
justice sector and criminal law reform; the ongoing construction of the 136 KM Maidanshar-Bamyan
road; the rehabilitation of ERTV, the rehabilitation and support to Baghlan and Estiqlal Hospital
(including the construction of the Burnt Department); construction of Herat Pediatric Hospital and TB
Regional Laboratory (the latter through the WHO); support to Herat Regional Hospital (including the
Emergency Department and Operation Theatre); support of Afghan women through professional
training and female entrepreneurship projects that led to the birth of four small independent companies
which represent an authentic example of economic emancipation and social development of women.
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15. Japan’s Assistance to Afghanistan
◆Political Support
5 conferences in Tokyo
・Tokyo Conference (2002.1)
（Start of reconstruction process)
・DDR conference (2003.2)
・DIAG conference Ⅰ (2006.7)
・DIAG conference Ⅱ (2007.6)
・JCMB meeting (2008.2)
◆Support for CounterTerrorism Maritime
Interdiction activities
・Replenishment support to vessels
engaged in the counter-terrorism
Maritime Interdiction activities in the
Indian Ocean (till January 2010)
◆ About 30 members of the
Japanese Embassy and
about 55 members of the
JICA based in Afghanistan
(as of November 2010)
・124 Japanese experts dispatched
each year and 291 Afghan
trainees received yearly
1. Political process
(1) Bonn Process (2001-2005)
・Election support, election observation teams
(2) Presidential election in 2009
・Assistance to Independent Election Committee
(US$ 36 million), election observation team
(3) Parliamentary election in 2010
Assistance to Independent Election Committee
(US$ 35.6 million)
2. Security
(1) DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration)
・G8 lead country. DDR of 60,000 ex-combatants completed
in June 2006.
・50,000 weapons and 100,000 heavy weapons collected
(2) DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups),
Reintegration
・G8 lead country. 737 illegal armed groups out of 2,000
groups disbanded
・126,000 weapons brought under GOA control
・105development projects in DIAG support area
・Cooperation with NATO to empower ANA on ammunition
stockpile (NATO Trust Fund)
・Assistance for reintegration through ＵＮＤＰ(US $50
million)
(3) Police Reform, Counter-Narcotics and Demining
・Construction of Border Police Center in Nimruz
(Afghan-Pakistan-Iran border) (ongoing)
・Construction of Border Custom Facilities in Tahar
(Afghan-Tajikistan Border) (ongoing)
・Assistance equivalent to salary of all 96,000 policemen
for 6 month
・Police training in Japan
・Custom and border control assistance in Afghanistan and
Central Asia through OSCE
・Mine-clearing of 90 ㎢, Anti-landmine education for
0.87 million people
◆Implemented $ 2.49billion
of Assistance
・Covers democratic process, security
improvement, human resources
development, economic infrastructure
and humanitarian assistance.
3. Infrastructure
(1) Trunk Roads
・661 km roads (Ring Road and others）(implemented
or decided)
(2) Development of Kabul city
・Construction of Kabul International Airport Terminal
・Rehabilitation of Airfield Pavements of Kabul
International Airport
・Provision of 115 public buses
・Master Plan of Kabul Metropolitan City Development
4. Basic Human Needs
(1) Education, Vocational Training
・650 schools constructed or repaired
・10,000 teachers trained by JICA
・Literacy education for 10,000 adults by JICA
・Literacy education for 600,000 adults in cooperation with
UNESCO (ongoing)
・14 vocational training centers
(2) Health, Medical Care and Water
・Vaccination to 47 million people (polio, BCG etc)
・70 clinics constructed
・Tuberculosis Control Project, Reproductive health
・Equipment to 100 clinics constructed by US
・20 water supply vehicles, 1,000 wells constructed
(3) Humanitarian Assistance
・9,114 tons of wheat and pulses in 2009
・Provision of 2,500 shelters and lump sum cash assistance
to 45,000 people in 2008
・Large scale reintegration project to receive 2 million
returnees in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad :
housings, education, health and vocational training
(since 2002)
5. Agriculture and
Rural Development
(1) Agriculture
・Technical assistance to rice-farmers in
Nangarhar
・3 Agricultural Experiment Stations
・Improvement of Agricultural Production and
Productivity, Improvement of Irrigation
Systems and Construction of Micro-hydro
Power facilities in Kabul and Bamiyan
Provinces through FAO
(2) Rural Development
・2,000 community-based projects across the
country : schools, clinics, vocational training
centers, bridges, canals etc.
・Of which 97 projects in cooperation with PRTs.
1 Japanese liaison officer to the NATO SCR
・4 MOFA staffs to Chaghcharan PRT
・One-Village-One-Product (carpets, potatoes,
dairy products, garlic etc)
6. Culture
(1)Bamiyan ruins
・Preservation of Bamiyan ruins in cooperation
with UNESCO
(2) Istalif Pottery
・Support to maintain traditional Istalif pottery
skills
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Japan will provide assistance of approximately 80 billion yen urgently needed in Afghanistan. Shifting up
from the existing pledge of a total of approximately two billion US dollars, Japan will provide assistance
up to an amount in the region of five billion US dollars in about five years from 2009, based on the
future situation of Afghanistan (Japan has implemented approximately 1 billion US dollars of assistance,
based on the assistance package (as of November 2010)).
Three main areas of Japan’s assistance
(1) Support in enhancing Afghanistan’s capability to maintain security.
Japan will pave the way for the Afghans to take their own security responsibilities by such assistance as
supporting the National Police.
(2) Assistance for reintegration of grass root level soldiers
For reintegration and long-term reconciliation with insurgents, it is important to begin by working on
assistance for reintegration of grass root level soldiers. Japan will provide financial assistance to
programs such as vocational training and small scale rural development programs for job creation.
(3) Assistance for Afghanistan’s sustainable and self-reliant development
For Afghanistan’s sustainable and self-reliant development, Japan will provide assistance in areas such
as agriculture and rural development, infrastructure development (including energy), education, health
and other basic human needs based on the Afghanistan’s needs
Total of approximately $2.49billioTotal 2.49billion
(2001.10 – 2010.11)
●Humanitarian Assistance
Total of $401 million
●Reconstruction
●Political Process, Governance
$299 million
・Budget Support to
Afghan Government
$164 million
・Media Support
・Election Support
・National Census
$26 million
$103 million
$6 million
●Security Improvement
$679 million
・ DDR , DIAG & Reintegration
・ De-mining
・ Counter- Narcotics /
Border Management
$ 267 million
$ 57 million
$32 million
・ Police Reform
・ Ammunition Management
$ 319 million
$ 4 million
1109 million
・ Infrastructure
$309 million
・ Health, Medical Care
$90 million
・ Education
$84 million
・ Refugees and IDPs
$129 million
・ Agriculture, Rural Development $181 million
・Assistance through NGOs
$99 million
・ JICA Technical Assistance $
$183 million
・ Others
$34 million
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16. LITHUANIAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
Afghan-Lithuanian relations have a long and positive history, reaching back to the start of the 20th
century. Lithuania established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in December 1930 by signing an
Agreement on Foundation of Friendly Relations.
After a gap during the decades of war, diplomatic relations with Afghanistan were reestablished in
March 2005. In June 2005, Lithuania undertook obligation to lead ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) in the Province of Ghor. Special Mission in Kabul coordinates implementation of PRT civilian tasks
and performs other functions related to diplomatic representation.
Afghanistan is one of the priority countries for Lithuanian development activities. Lithuania’s total
contribution to development cooperation projects in Afghanistan, mainly focused in the Province of
Ghor, is $5.4 million. In 2006-2010, Lithuania implemented a total of 132 development and
reconstruction projects with 62 projects in the sectors of health, social protection and sustainable
development; 22 projects in good governance and rule of law; 22 projects in education; 14 projects in
cultural development and 12 other miscellaneous projects. Main long-term projects include the
reconstruction of Chagcharan city roads; construction of Chagcharan Children Care Center; and
reconstruction of Ghor provincial hospital.
A number of small scale and quick-response activities have been carried out in Ghor province by the
Lithuanian Special Mission to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Main needs of local institutions and
population in areas such as infrastructure development, support for education, good governance and
rule of law have been addressed. Majority of the activities are fully owned by local communities.
Lithuania, as a leading country of PRT in Ghor province, is actively involved in attracting international
DPs and partners to the Province. Continuous collaboration with the United States of America and
fruitful partnership with Japan and Greece are the results of Lithuania’s diplomatic efforts and successful
development cooperation activities.
In 2010, Lithuania reassessed development cooperation activities in Ghor province in the light of
upcoming transition process. As a result, the following priority sectors for Lithuanian development
assistance were identified for 2011:


capacity building of local governance and local NGO’s;
Rural development in Ghor province and improvement of agricultural productivity..
Lithuania’s experience shows that seemingly secure and calm situation of provinces such as Ghor is
presented as a reason to provide less funding for their development. Yet these areas require
development assistance. Lithuania, therefore, seeks to highlight a clear need for more even distribution
of financial aid across the country. Balanced and equal development of all provinces is a key to efficient
and sustainable development action in Afghanistan.
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17. THE NETHERLANDS IN AFGHANISTAN – A SMALL COUNTRY WITH A
BIG FOOTPRINT
The Netherlands has been a partner of Afghanistan for many years. We have been with Afghanistan
during the difficult times of the 1990s when we provided crucial humanitarian assistance. Since then,
the Netherlands’ engagement in Afghanistan has intensified enormously. Our GoIRAl has always been to
assist the Afghans in building a stable, more prosperous and democratic state. To this end, the
Netherlands has contributed over $ 1 billion dollars. This level of support stems from our strong belief
that all people deserve a decent life.
The 3D approach – a best practice that yields tangible results
We managed to bring positive change to Uruzgan through our comprehensive ‘1D’ approach (development,
diplomacy and defense), emphasizing development where possible, using forceful interventions where
necessary. We built the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces; engaged key community leaders; and
supported a broad spectrum of development projects. The basic philosophy of the 3Ds has been the guiding
principle in the period between 2006 and 2010, when the Netherlands was the lead nation in Uruzgan. Over
time, this approach became a best practice within ISAF and inspired the current COIN strategy.
The results of this approach: Today, life in Uruzgan is markedly different from four years ago. Security around
the three major towns improved; over one million trees have been planted; micro-dams and water wells
constructed; bazaars increased in number and are increasingly offering locally grown fruits and vegetables.
Employment has gone up. Access to health care and education has tremendously improved. Cell phone
coverage has been established.
This has all been made possible through a handful of strategic interventions. The construction of the Tarin
Koot – Chora road has opened up the province. The three times a week air service between Kabul and Tarin
Kowt has connected the province to Kabul. Finally, the number of NGOs active in Uruzgan has grown from a
handful to over fifty.
Belief in Afghan ownership
The Netherlands works hard to make sure that our efforts are in line with Afghan priorities and enjoy the
support of local leaders and population. That is why the Netherlands works closely with the Government in
Kabul. Through our support to the ‘Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund’ (ARTF) and the ‘Law and Order
Trust Fund’ (LOTFA), we assist the Government in taking responsibility for delivering the most essential
services, such as health care, education and security.
The Netherlands not only provides financial support to the Government, but also assists in building its
capacity. The best example is our ongoing support to the modernization of the Ministry of Agriculture,
Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL). Through our support, and thanks to the capable Afghan leadership team, the
Ministry has transformed from a dysfunctional institution into one of the best-run ministries.
Bringing about a more democratic Afghanistan, in which all men and women enjoy their human rights, is as
much a matter of the Government as of civil society. We therefore support the emergence of a vibrant civil
society by assisting the media, human rights organizations and research groups.
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18. NEW ZEALAND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
New Zealand’s involvement in Bamyan began in 2001 when it took over the lead of the Bamyan
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The initial deployment consisted of New Zealand Defense Force
personnel, with some limited funding provided to the NZDF for development projects.
The New Zealand Aid Program formally commenced in 2005 with a three year, NZ$15 million program
(approx US$11 million). Prior to this, funds were dispersed through UN organizations, NGOs and
Consolidated Appeals.
In 2010 the New Zealand Government increased its civilian and development assistance contributions to
Afghanistan. An Ambassador resident position was established in Kabul and in Bamyan two civilian
posts were established: PRT Director and a Development Adviser. Recognizing further investments were
needed to support the development of Afghanistan; New Zealand’s Aid Program was increased to
NZ$10-12 million/year (US$7.5-9m).
The NZ Aid Program is primarily focused in Bamyan Province and in three sectors: Rural Economic
Development (agriculture, energy, and tourism); Social Sector Delivery (education and health); and
Community Safety and Access to Justice (ANP development and human rights).
Significant programs to date include:
- Support to UNFAO to implement initiatives focused on women in the agriculture sector;
- Infrastructure projects in health, education and agriculture sectors;
- In-service winter teacher training programs for teachers without Y12 qualifications;
- Support to Bamyan University;
- Support to implementation of Basic and Essential Packages of Health in Bamyan;
- Development of tourism infrastructure in Bamyan;
- Support to AIHRC and capacity building training for GoIRA officials and local civil society;
- Support to ANP mentors (as part of EUPOL mission).
Major new initiatives under development include: an agriculture program aimed to increase productivity
of farmers and access to markets; a renewable energy program to bring power to Bamyan province; a
health package focusing on the development of health care personnel and managers; and an expanded
teacher training program.
New Zealand works closely with other partners in the Bamyan PRT, such as the US, Malaysia and Japan,
ensuring programs are complementary and coordinated with GoIRA.
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19. Norway’s Development Assistance to the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Norway has been a development cooperation partner to Afghanistan for the past thirty years. Until 2001
support was channeled through the UN, Afghanistan Support Group, and non-Governmental
organizations.
The Norwegian Embassy was established in Kabul in 2001. Since then the Norwegian engagement in
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation has grown substantially. The framework for the
Norwegian cooperation is Afghanistan’s plans and strategies, and the current focus is to follow up on the
Kabul Conference.
The overall objective for Norwegian development co-operation with Afghanistan is to support stability
and sustainable development. In order to ensure such development it is necessary to support the
strengthening of state institutions and a strong and legitimate Government. In line with ANDS, Norway is
primarily concentrating on three sectors; i) good governance, ii) education and iii) rural development. In
addition, priority is given to cross cutting issues such as anti-corruption, gender and health.
Underlining the importance of national ownership and leadership in building the Afghan state, Norway
was among the first DPs to contribute with budget support to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund (ARTF). In order to follow up on the Kabul commitments of giving GoIRA more ownership, 100% of
Norway’s current funding to ARTF (about USD 50 mill. annually) is not tied to any specific program.
Norway is leading the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab province. PRT is part of the ISAFmandate to Afghanistan and consists of military and civilian engagement. The PRT does not implement
development projects of its own. Instead the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul channels funds to projects
and programs in Faryab which are implemented by local Government, the United Nations and NGOs.
Approximately 20% of Norway’s assistance is
channeled to Faryab.
Good governance: Over the past years Norway has
financed Afghan stakeholders, the international
community and the United Nations (UNAMA) who
are engaged in various efforts to improve the justice
system and strengthen rule of law in Afghanistan.
Under UNDP, Afghanistan Sub National Governance
Project (ASGP) aims at moving the Public
Administrative Reform process out to the subnational level. Norway is supportive of this venture.
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Education: Norway is one of the lead DPs in the area of education and was the first bilateral donor to
ARTF’s special program supporting basic education (EQUIP) through the Ministry of Education (MOE).
UNESCO/IIEP, with funding from Norway, supported MOE’s development of two National Education
Strategic Plans. Over many years, the NGOs have received funding for their good contributions in
education. Through the ARTF/NIMA program, significant and strategic support has been provided to
establish a modern TVET sector in Afghanistan.
Rural Development is supported via ARTF’s National Solidarity Program; UNDP’s NABDP-program
under MRRD; the NGO’s integrated Rural Development Programs (with a particular focus on Faryab);
and through FAO’s program to promote sustainable and environmentally safe agricultural production,
with introduction of integrated pest management practices.
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20. Poland’s Assistance to Afghanistan
Poland has been involved in the field of development co-operation in Afghanistan since 2002. Polish aid,
administrated by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is mainly channeled bilaterally. During the period 20022009 over 100 projects were implemented with a total estimated support of 14 million USD through
Polish Component in PRT Ghazni; NGOs; and the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kabul.
In 2010 Poland implemented approx 40 projects worth 6.8 million USD mainly through Polish
Component in PRT Ghazni.
Poland also provides assistance to Afghanistan through contributions to international institutions and
organizations such as World Bank (ARTF), UNODC and WFP.
In 2011 Polish assistance to Afghanistan will reach 12 million USD (PRT Ghazni 8 million USD; study visits
and other Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects 700,000 USD; and multilateral aid 2.25 million USD).
In Afghanistan, Poland supports processes aimed at building stability and national reconciliation and a
sustainable improvement of the quality of life of Afghan citizens. We undertake actions aimed at
addressing the objectives of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Development co-operation
is of critical significance for the peaceful future of Afghanistan.
The main sectors of Polish aid to Afghanistan include:




Good governance, specifically, strengthening the national administration, including the
judiciary system, the development of independent media, and education;
Development of the city and province of Ghazni, specifically, developing public
infrastructure
(roads, schools, access to water and electricity), job creation and aid for refugees;
Rural and agricultural development, specifically, promoting alternatives to poppy
cultivation; health protection (including the creation and development of health care centers)
Small and medium enterprises, specifically, developing the private sector, professional
activation of women.
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21. Spanish Cooperation concentrated in Badghis Province
A synopsis
The Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (or AECID, in its Spanish abbreviation)
has been working in Afghanistan since 2006 using bilateral and multilateral instruments. Through
bilateral channels, AECID has developed its activities as part of the civil component of the Badghis PRT,
within the civilian-military model implemented in Afghanistan by NATO. Under the name
¨Reconstruction and Development Program in Badghis Province´´, AECID has developed seven sectoral
programs in the following areas: 1) Infrastructure, 2) Health, 3) Education, 4) Water & Sanitation, 5)
Agriculture & Rural Development, 6) Gender and 7) Good Governance. Through multilateral channels, it
has supported different funds managed jointly between international organizations (Word Bank, UNDP)
and Departments of GoIRA (e.g. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Public
Works). In these cases, AECID has sought with the different stakeholders to link formally the bulk of the
multilateral contribution to specific interventions in Badghis province.
The financial commitment of the Spanish Government for reconstruction and development activities in
Afghanistan was formally established in the International Donor Conferences for Afghanistan in London
(2006) and The Hague (2009), for a yearly 30m Euro appropriation for development activities during the
2006-2012 periods. For the first half of this period, 2006-2009, overall Spanish development assistance
to Afghanistan effectively amounted to over 132 million Euros. This overall amount comprised both
bilateral and multilateral funds, following approximately a 1:2 ratio.
Since the very beginning AECID has always followed a strategy of comprehensive “Afghanization” based
on the following principles: 1) alignment, 2) ownership, 3) legitimacy and 4) capacity building. The
common element which coordinates these principles is the political, institutional and social leadership of
the Afghan institutions. Furthermore, with respect to the definition of the different programs, AECID has
always included in its interventions the principles and objectives of the Afghan National Development
Strategy (ANDS). On the other hand, the Provincial Development Plan (PDP) has remained, through
permanent dialogue with the Governor of Badghis province and the directors of the Provincial
Departments, the essential element for the planning of the development activities during the period
2006-2010.
During the first two years of AECID intervention in Badghis, activities related to infrastructure programs
took up a substantial part of the budget executed through the bilateral channel, specifically those
related to the rehabilitation of the road network. Since then, however, the focus has been to participate
in areas prioritized by the local and provincial authorities, i.e. agriculture, water & sanitation, gender
and good governance.
SECTOR
Infrastructures
Health
Water and Sanitation
Agriculture
Education
Gender
BUDGET 2006-2009
20.044.084 €
7.294.852 €
4.009.236 €
3.251.198 €
3.711.456 €
1.139.341 €
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Good Governance
458.304 €
With respect to the interventions funded
through multilateral channels, the main national programs benefited are the National Area-Based
Development Program (NABDP), the National Solidarity Program (NSP) and the National Rural Access
Program (NRAP) implemented by the MRRD, MPW and the respective Provincial Departments.
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22. The Swedish Development Assistance to Afghanistan 2002-2010
The Swedish commitment to the Afghan people is long term. Its aid dates back to 1982. From the mid90s to 2000 Sweden was one of the largest DPs of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. From 2002,
there has been a shift from providing predominantly humanitarian assistance to focussing on
development assistance. From 2002 to 2010, approximately 445 million EURO (4 billion SEK) was
channelled to long term development projects/programmes and of these funds approximately 71
million EURO (640 million SEK) was for humanitarian support. Over the years, Sweden supported sectors
such as road and transport, democracy and human rights, education, health, agriculture and
rehabilitation.
In the on-going Swedish Strategy for Development Cooperation with Afghanistan (July 2009 –December
2013) Sweden focuses on three main sectors; Democracy and Human Rights (including women’s rights,
and strengthening of sexual reproductive health and rights;, Education; and Private Sector Development,
including infrastructure development. The objective is for people living in poverty, particularly women
and girls, to enjoy better living conditions in a peaceful and democratic society. Increased gender
equality in all sectors and focus on anti-corruption are the main issues of dialogue for Sweden.
Sweden supports GoIRA with an eye to ensure Afghan ownership, sustainability and transparency but
also recognizes the need for improving the access to basic services. Sweden does not implement its own
programs but works through partners.
In 2010, Sweden contributed 526 million SEK (approximately 58 million EURO) of which 27% was
allocated to the provinces where the Swedish/Finnish-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams are housedSar-e Pul, Samangan and Balkh. The 27% is partly earmarked to finance national programs, partly
reserved for direct funding of NGOs in the area, and partly used to finance smaller interventions.
42% of the total Swedish funding goes to support of national systems, through the ARTF, NSP, AREDP
and EQUIP; 22 % through the UN system- UNIFEM, UNICEF, UNDP and UNOPS; and 30% for support to a
number of non-Governmental organizations, for instance, SCA.
An example of the Swedish Contribution is provided below:
Basic Education, supported since 1984 with a total of approximately 820 million SEK (91 million EURO).
The support has gone through different stages starting from pure service delivery through supply of
salary, equipment and materials support aiming at provision of access to education for boys and girls in
remote and underserved areas, to recently well defined development approaches including service
delivery, quality improvement and capacity development interventions.
Selected interventions of Sweden in the education sector include: 400 Government schools supporting
in average 270 000 students. Sweden has supported more than 5, 200 Community based schools
covering 180, 000 students (more than 50% girls). More than 106 000 teachers (21% female) have been
trained. Girls’ annexes have been established in south-eastern provinces where no girls’ schools
functioned over the past decades. Currently 71 girls’ annexes serving a total of 35,000 students from
grade one to nine are supported.
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23. Swiss Commitment to Afghanistan - a contribution to a better
future
Switzerland’s engagement in Afghanistan is purely civilian and focuses on long-term development
activities. The program managed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) relies on
a need- and result-based approach. Therefore, SDC has built close links between its partner
organisations and its own field missions to ensure its areas of intervention are effectively coordinated.
This enables SDC to understand and encompass Afghanistan’s reality at various levels, which is a
prerequisite for promoting sustainable development. Furthermore, because SDC works both locally and
nationwide, it can use is broad range of field experiences to contribute to the overall policy dialogue in
the country.
Encouraging results in a challenging environment
SDC’s program focuses on promoting good governance and respect for human rights throughout the
country, as well as improving livelihoods in Bamyan, Baghlan, Samangan, Takhar and Badakhshan
provinces. In view of the difficult context, the results are remarkable.
The following list of achievements is not exhaustive:
 Switzerland was one of the driving forces behind the establishment of a humans right support
unit in the Ministry of Justice inaugurated in 2010.
 As the lead donor for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), last year
Switzerland witnessed considerable achievements, such as the impact of an enhanced dialogue
between AIHRC and religious leaders. As a consequence, ulema councils have issued decrees to
prevent practices that violate human rights, such as pre-age marriages and restrictions on
women’s freedom of movement.
 As for institutional capacity building, the main focus is on local governance and its support to
relevant UNDP-implemented programs. So far, 5,000 civil servants have been trained, leading to
improved administrative practices, which in turn have brought economic and social benefits.
 In the area of livelihood, SDC plays a pioneer role by supporting the establishment of a
sustainable land management institute in Bamyan. The institute is meeting the pressing need for
training and knowledge sharing in natural resource management and, in its initial stage, has
already drawn the interest of various stakeholders and builds on field experience of a wide
range of Governmental and NGO stakeholders. By 2014, about 1'600 farmers, professionals and
students would be trained.
 Food gap reduction has been reported for an estimated 5,000 families, namely through the
consolidation of honey production and improved crop management.
 In education, support to the Government school program led to a 0 drop-out rate for 42,000
girls in 9 SDC-supported districts. The importance of this result is highlighted by the fact that in
50% of the schools countrywide no girls at all are enrolled in grades 10 to 12.
 In the humanitarian portfolio, Switzerland supports the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) by protecting detainees, preventing violations of International Humanitarian Law,
assisting the wounded and disabled, and providing humanitarian aid. ICRC’s principles of
independence and neutrality give it a unique standing, along with ensuring broad acceptance by
all parties and beneficiaries.
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SDC is committed to stay engaged
In 2002, SDC re-opened its cooperation office in Kabul and focused its activities on meeting the
enormous needs of the most vulnerable, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees to
Afghanistan and refugees in Iran and Pakistan. Since 2004, the Swiss program has gradually shifted from
humanitarian aid to a longer-term engagement for development.
In 2012, SDC will be celebrating its 10th anniversary in Afghanistan and Switzerland will continue its
engagement to supporting the Afghan people’s striving for dignified and enhanced living conditions.
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24. TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN
The Republic of Turkey is committed to contributing to realization of a secure, stable and prosperous
Afghanistan. To this end, Turkey has been providing the most substantial foreign development
assistance program in its recent history to Afghanistan. While allocating considerable personnel
resources to its program in Afghanistan, Turkey delivers its major contributions to Afghanistan through
projects funded by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA).
A breakdown of Turkish assistance to Afghanistan through TIKA in the period 2004-2010 is listed below:
Social Infrastructure and Services
Economic Infrastructure and Services
Production Sectors
Multi and Convergent Sectors
Emergency Aid
Subtotal:
79.992.588 USD
37.250.718 USD
1.508.056 USD
1.791.795 USD
1.317.811 USD
121.860.968 USD
Additionally, Turkey donated 5.000.000 USD to UNDP/ELECT project for the presidential elections in
2009 and parliamentary elections of 2010.
Turkey aims to realize two primary goals through its assistance in Afghanistan. The first is to bring peace
and stability to the country. The second goal is to ultimately entrust the Afghans for its own socioeconomic development and security. In pursuit of these objectives, Turkey focuses on capacity building
projects that support Afghan ownership. Turkey’s sectoral priorities are: education, healthcare,
reconstruction and security. Turkey also provides emergency and humanitarian assistance programs for
Afghanistan.
Turkey reaches out to almost 100,000 students through its projects in education sector. To date, 65
schools and training sites have either been constructed or rehabilitated; and 62 schools were furnished.
Improvement of healthcare services in Afghanistan is the focus of Turkish efforts in Afghanistan. To
date, Turkey constructed 1 hospital and 17 clinics and rehabilitated 2 hospitals in various
provinces/districts. Three hospitals, three clinics and one midwife training center are being operated by
Turkish medical doctors in partnership with their Afghan colleagues. Turkish mobile medical teams also
provide medical screenings in remote regions of the country, where healthcare services are barely
delivered.
Turkish contributions in other sectors include:









83 deep and shallow water wells have been drilled.
1 water refinery system has been provided.
1 water tank with a capacity of storing 400 tons of water along with its transmission lines.
273 tons of food has been provided to 6.300 families in 7 provinces.
Construction of Pol-e Sokhta Bridge in Kabul Province.
Construction of 2 cold storages in Wardak Province.
Construction of one stadium and children park in Wardak Province.
Asphalting of De-Afghanan – Baraki- Nadiry High school Road
Construction of Water Supply Department’s Building in Wardak Province.
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


Rehabilitation of a number of mosques.
Putting together the central street lightening system in Wardak Province.
Capacity Building Programs in a variety of fields.
Ongoing Projects and Programs in 2011














Construction of 18 new school buildings,
Construction of Continuous Training Center for Teachers,
Construction of Kabul University, Turcology Department’s service building,
Operation and administration of Turcology Department in Kabul University,
Furnishing of 28 schools,
Operation and administration Jawzjan Province, Habibi Qaderi Girls High school.
Construction of two clinics and one polyclinic,
Construction of one midwifery training center,
Construction of 3 lodging buildings for clinics,
Operation and administration of 2 hospitals, 3 clinics and one midwifery training center.
Asphalting the roads and construction of an overpass in Kabul city,
Asphalting of Taimani Road in Kabul Province,
Construction of Kokcha Bridge in Takhar Province,
Construction of Afghan-Turk Friendship Recreation Park in Mazar-e Sharif Province,
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25. Afghanistan Development Co-operation Report - UK Input
Afghanistan is the UK’s top foreign policy priority country. To help accelerate progress towards a more
stable and prosperous Afghanistan, in June 2010 the UK announced a 40% increase in the Department
for International Development’s (DFID) country program.
DFID’s program is fully in line with GoIRA’s National Development Strategy, and the UK is committed to
spend at least half of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) through Government systems. Since
2001 the UK has invested over £1.2 billion of ODA in Afghanistan which has helped maintain
macroeconomic stability, stimulate economic growth, encourage private sector development, create
jobs, and achieve progress in Helmand. The UK has been the largest contributor to the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), committing over £500m since 2001/2002.
The UK’s global Conflict Pool provides additional funds to Afghanistan focused on improving governance
and the rule of law, security, counter narcotics, reconciliation and reintegration, and stabilization in
Helmand. In 2010/11 the Conflict Pool expects to spend around £70m in Afghanistan.
Through its close partnership with GoIRA and others, UK Aid has helped:

 Finance the salaries of 320,000 public servants, such as teachers and health workers;
 15 public bodies to develop anti-corruption plans to simplify procedures and reduce
opportunities for corruption;
 Increase tax revenue from $200m in 2004 to almost $1.3bn in 2009/10;
 Provide 800,000 Afghan entrepreneurs with small loans;
 Build or repair over 80km of road in Helmand, improving access to markets and transport for
70,000 people;
 Improve over 4,000 water sources, benefitting over 500,000 people;
 Support over 50,000 locally-generated projects to improve water, roads, schools and clinics.
 Support the Consultative Peace Jirga, which led to the creation of a new High Peace Council and
a comprehensive peace plan;
 Support the development of the Afghan National Police by posting officers to the NATO Training
Mission / Combined Security Transition Command, and EU Police Mission.
 Establish an anti-corruption unit within the Office of the Inspector General of Police, and
provided UK police support to help develop a long term National Police Strategy and Plan.
DFID has committed to invest over £700m in Afghanistan over the next four years to support the
Government to achieve sustained progress towards poverty reduction, with a rigorous focus on impact
and results. In getting behind Afghan priorities and national priority programs, future UK Aid will focus
on the following areas:
Peace, security and political stability




Help stabilize key districts and offer improved basic services to the local population.
Support the Ministry of Interior’s efforts to improve the performance of the police.
Ensure elections are better planned, with reduced fraud and greater voter participation.
Improve mechanisms for citizens to hold the Government to account by strengthening civil society.
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Economic stability growth and jobs





Support sustained economic growth and help the Government to meet its targets on revenue
generation.
Continue to support infrastructure development and stimulate the economy in Helmand.
Accelerate job creation through further growth in small and medium enterprises.
Support the Government’s National Solidarity Program, to reach more communities in insecure
areas.
Contribute to getting 200,000 people into technical and vocational training.
Getting the state to deliver improved services



Help to reduce corruption in key spending ministries and improve public financial management.
Support the development of a more professional and effective civil service.
Accelerate progress towards getting 6 million children in school, with an increasing proportion being
girls.
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26. USAID ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has been supporting the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) as part of U.S. Government’s efforts to secure and rebuild
Afghanistan. USAID has assisted GoIRA to provide services and security and to take the lead in the
development and reconstruction of their country. USAID’s strategy focuses on developing the capacity
of Afghan institutions to withstand and diminish the threat posed by extremism and to lay the
foundation for a working civil society and high impact economic development.
USAID supports the development of effective governance through Afghan-led programs that boost
confidence in the law; expand Government capacity and responsiveness; extend municipal services;
target corruption; support credible elections and representative institutions; and strengthen civil society
and independent media.
The key Afghan democracy and governance developments included the Kabul Conference, National
Peace Jirga, and the first Afghan-led parliamentary election.
In accordance with the Kabul Process, the U.S. Government intends to shift more responsibility to GoIRA
and to channel at least 50 percent of its assistance funds through GoIRA’s budget within two years,
depending on GoIRA’s adopting necessary reforms to: 3) strengthen its public financial management
systems; 2) reduce corruption; 3) improve budget execution; 4) and increase revenue collection to
finance key national priority programs.
USAID initiatives helped Afghans meet key governance objectives in 2010. These include training over
16,000 civil servants in core skills; strengthening independent electoral institutions to support the
historic parliamentary elections in September 2010 and enhancing assistance to a more independent
Parliament. Important civil society results included development of a national network of 10 Civil Society
Support Centers for 247 Afghan civil society organizations, creation of three regional media training
centers, and nationwide network of 43 community radio stations.
In the rule of law and anti-corruption arena, USAID piloted a new program that strengthens linkages
between the formal justice sector and community dispute resolution mechanisms. The program
established elder networks and helped communities resolve disputes in four kinetic districts. In concert,
USAID also launched major new initiatives to strengthen the formal justice system and oversight
institutions.
Two million of seven million school going children are supported by USAID and 37 percent of them are
girls. USAID has trained 52,000 educators and printed 97 million textbooks. In areas with no
Government schools, USAID established 3,695 classes serving 52,504 students, 65 percent of them girls.
To strengthen higher education institutions, USAID sponsored Afghan professors for master’s degree
and short-term study-abroad programs and raised the quality of university-level instruction by training
professors in modern teaching.
USAID support for midwife training increased midwives’ numbers from 468 to more than 2,700 in eight
years. With USAID’s support, Afghanistan achieved a 90 percent vaccination rate, including polio, for
children less than age five since 2002. USAID assistance resulted in a 22 percent reduction in infant
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90
mortality rate while approximately 60 percent of the population now has access to some form of
healthcare.
Afghanistan’s economy has been steadily growing at approximately 32 percent per year during the past
six years. USAID’s rehabilitation of more than 2,000 kilometers of roads – including regional and national
highways - is increasing mobility and strengthening trade. The U.S. Government and other DPs increased
power to two billion kilowatt hours through 2009; and aim to double power further by 2014. USAID
built the Kabul Power Plant that provides backup power for 600,000 Afghans in Kabul, and is expanding
energy infrastructure to provide reliable power to populations in the south and east.
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27. WORLD BANK IN AFGHANISTAN
Since April 2002, the World Bank committed over $2 billion for development and emergency
reconstruction projects and four budget support operations in Afghanistan. All World Bank operations
work through the Afghan budgetary systems. Currently, the Bank has 25 active IDA projects in
Afghanistan with commitments of over $1 billion. IDA also administers the Afghanistan Reconstruction
Trust Fund (ARTF) which raised $4.1 billion to date from 30 international DPs. The ARTF has developed
into the largest source of on-budget financing for the Government and has also developed a policy
platform to drive momentum in key economic governance reforms across Government. ARTF has 19
active grants with a total of $1 billion in active commitments. In addition, the ARTF recurrent cost
window has committed $2.2 billion for the Government’s operational/recurrent costs over the last eight
years.
The main areas of IDA and ARTF intervention in Afghanistan include:
 Building the capacity of the state and its accountability to citizens
 Promoting the growth of the rural economy
 Supporting growth of the formal private sector
The Bank also administers the Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) which has a special window for
Afghanistan. The JSDF has committed $81 million in total since early 2002, of which around half has
been in support of NSP. Most recently JSDF committed $10 million to support the piloting of clustering
for Community Development Councils (CDCs). JSDF is also supporting access to a basic package of health
services in three provinces.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank Group’s private sector development arm,
continues to work with its investment partners in Afghanistan. IFC now has an investment portfolio
totaling more than $90 million in six companies. This includes commitments in the financial (First
Microfinance Bank of Afghanistan, BRAC Afghanistan Bank, Afghanistan International Bank), telecom
(MTN Afghanistan), hospitality (Serena Kabul Hotel) and healthcare (Acomet Family Hospital) sectors.
Highlights of Achievements of World Bank & ARTF Financing
Education:
Since 2002, more than 6.3 million students and teachers have returned to school. The World Bank is
helping to rehabilitate primary schools and train teachers, while giving technical assistance to
strengthen the Ministries of Education and Higher Education. The Bank’s Education Quality
Improvement Program (EQUIP) fund communities to rehabilitate or construct school buildings and
access teaching and learning materials. Funds are directed through School Shuras, now functioning in
over 30,372 of the country’s 32,000 schools. It is envisaged that by the close of the project in 2012,
some 3,592 schools would be built, with a priority on girls’ schools; 8622 School Shuras would be
operational, with 1999 more Shuras to be formed; over 110,000 teachers and around 9000 school
administrators would be trained; 2750 girls in 25 provinces would receive scholarships to complete their
two-year studies at TTC; and 750 qualified lecturers recruited in 38 provinces. Under the World Bank’s
Strengthening Higher Education Program (SHEP), eleven overseas universities partnerships have been
formed with participating Afghan universities to restore basic operations at these universities.
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Health:
With the World Bank support in 18 provinces from 2003 to 2008, the number of health
facilities nearly tripled from 148 to 432. The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/08
indicate progress in reducing infant and under-five mortality. Infant and under five mortality in
2008 declined to 111 (13 percent reduction) and 161 per thousand live births (15 percent
reduction) from 129 and 191 per 1000 live births respectively in 2006. Health service utilization
increased among project area populations from a rate of 0.3 consultations per capita annually at the
outset to 1.44 per capita by the mid 2009. Health care for expectant mothers expanded, with the
number of deliveries assisted in facility by trained health workers jumping from 6 percent to 24
percent. The number of pregnant women who received at least one prenatal care visit rose from 11
percent in 2004 to 36 percent in 2008. Child immunization full rates in rural areas are still low but
have improved from 12 percent in 2005 to 33 percent in 2008. Around 20,000 community health
workers—half of them women—have been trained and deployed throughout the country,
increasing access to family planning and boosting childhood vaccinations. The number of facilities
with trained female health workers rose from 25 percent before the project to 74 percent today.
Rural and Community Development:
National Solidarity Program (NSP): The World Bank is the largest international source of funds for the
NSP. The program has financed over 50,000 community projects in more than 22,000 villages in all 34
provinces.
The National Emergency Rural Access Project (NERAP) is working to provide year-round access to the
rural areas of Afghanistan. Since launching of this project in 2007, over 1037 km of secondary and
tertiary roads and around 8,200 meters of cross drainage structures have been completed.
Customs and Revenue:
Since the implementation of an Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), the collection of
transit fees in major transit corridors in Afghanistan has improved and customs revenues increased by
more than 700 percent in Solar Year 1387 (2008/09). This was largely attributable to computerized
control over transit shipments, tighter control over the clearance of goods, and the enhanced capacity
of the Afghan Customs Department (ACD) staff. To date customs processes have been automated at
major Inland Customs Depots (ICD), including at the Kabul Airport which receives approximately 55
percent of all the country's customs declarations. Similarly, ASYCUDA is now functional at four major
transit axes which receive some 65 percent of Afghanistan’s transit trade by value.
Electrification and Power Generation:
The Power Rehabilitation Project has helped to provide improved and more reliable supply of electricity
to the residents of Kabul. This has been facilitated by the rehabilitation of several facilities: 110 kV link
between Kabul and the North East Power Transmission System (NEPS) with rehabilitation of Kabul North
and Kabul North-West sub-station; the 110 kV line that brings power from the Naghlu and Mahipar
Hydropower Plants into the city grid; completion of high capacity optical fiber ground wire system
(Chimtala and Pul-e-Khumri) to control and operate the NEPS facilities; and rehabilitation of the part of
Medium Voltage system of Kabul.
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Irrigation and Energy:
The Irrigation Rehabilitation Project helped rehabilitate 632 medium and large size traditional irrigation
schemes serving more than 660,000 ha of land in various parts of the country. As a result of the
rehabilitation, an additional 132,000 ha of land area are now receiving irrigation supplies. Installation of
105 of the 174 hydrology stations in different parts of the country has been completed. Work on
installation of 40 Cableways has commenced.
Annual IDA Commitments ($m)
$450.0
$400.0
Private sector development
$350.0
$300.0
$250.0
Infrastructure & natural resource
development
$200.0
Human Development
$150.0
Agriculture, Rural Development &
Irrigation
$100.0
$50.0
PFM/PAR (including budget support)
$0.0
Fy02 Fy03 Fy04 Fy05 Fy06 Fy07 Fy08 Fy09 Fy10 Fy11
est
Annual
$500.0 ARTF Investment Window Commitments ($m)
$450.0
$400.0
Private sector development
$350.0
$300.0
$250.0
Infrastructure & natural resource
development
$200.0
Human Development
$150.0
$100.0
$50.0
$0.0
Agriculture, Rural Development &
Irrigation
PFM/PAR
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
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Annex-II
Tables & Graphs
Table 1: External Assistance to Afghanistan
Figures in US$ Millions
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
Donor
United States of America
Japan
European Union/European Commission
Asian Development Bank
United Kingdom
World Bank
Germany
India
Canada
Netherlands
Norway
Australia
Italy
Sweden
United Nations
Denmark
Iran
France
Spain
Turkey
Finland
Russian Fed.
Agha Khan Development Network
Saudi Arabia
China
United Arab Emirates
Switzerland
South Korea
Czech Republic
Islamic Development Bank
Belgium
New Zealand
Ireland
Poland
Kuwait
Luxembourg
Lithuania
Hungary
Austria
Pakistan
Brunei
Greece
Singapore
Estonia
Portugal
Brazil
Croatia
Egypt
Malta
Oman
Qatar
Slovakia
Taiwan
Vietnam
Total
2002-2013
Pledge
2002-2011
Com
2002-2010
Disb
56,100
7,200
3,068
2,200
2,897
2,800
5,029
1,200
1,769
864
938
369
753
515
305
533
673
134
308
143
152
239
190
268
252
97
197
85
0
87
60
28
29
7
70
12
1
14
289
15
2
3
2
1
1
11
30
5
33
3.46
44,356
3,152
2,883
2,269
2,222
2,137
2,130
1,516
1,256
1,015
775
744
645
635
446
438
399
323
220
213
160
151
140
140
139
134
118
116
108
70
61
34
22
22
19
12
6
6
5
5
4
2
2
1
1
-
37,118
3,152
2,594
1,005
2,222
1,700
762
759
1,256
1,015
636
656
540
635
182
438
377
174
194
180
160
147
140
103
58
117
102
83
102
17
57
34
21
20
19
11
5
5
5
0
1
2
1
0
-
89,982
69,248
56,803
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96
Table 2: Commitments and Disbursements to Afghanistan (2002-2011)
Figures in US$ Million
Rank
Development Partner
2002
Comit.
2003
Disb.
Comit.
2004
Disb.
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total Comit.
Total Disb.
-
44,356
37,118
-
3,152
3,152
264
2,883
2,594
313
290
2,269
1,005
310
383
383
130
2,222
2,222
222
174
216
192
-
2,137
1,700
99
355
140
594
205
-
-
2,130
762
143
80
231
93
313
77
45
-
1,516
759
261
216
216
201
201
78
78
-
-
1,256
1,256
98
98
134
134
184
184
91
91
80
90
125
125
125
125
125
77
140
140
156
156
130
130
123
36
44
40
50
74
126
96
79
65
87
37
51
52
52
60
60
71
71
94
94
100
100
13
14
146
10
26
3
55
44
67
34
35
0
34
34
34
40
40
49
49
55
55
70
70
70
70
-
64
54
51
53
45
52
45
49
26
23
31
30
1
1
56
20
9
12
31
12
26
25
36
19
91
33
40
38
-
45
17
45
51
45
76
45
50
20
Comit.
Disb.
Comit.
Disb.
Comit.
Disb.
Comit.
Disb.
Comit.
Disb.
Comit.
Disb.
Comit.
Disb.
Comit.
1
United States
866
866
953
953
2,255
2,255
4,518
4,518
3,277
3,104
9,623
9,458
5,292
4,458
4,505
3,382
13,069
8,126
2
Japan
366
366
229
229
249
249
198
198
147
147
91
91
505
505
615
615
752
752
3
European Union
318
190
324
360
365
258
287
303
354
283
357
350
188
264
429
322
259
4
Asian Development Bank
205
100
203
71
241
65
236
45
306
89
193
151
278
87
295
108
5
UK
85
85
178
178
237
237
146
146
247
247
246
246
260
260
310
6
WB
100
23
215
108
293
265
285
250
240
171
316
328
250
189
7
Germany
196
66
125
71
169
73
137
44
124
21
165
41
265
8
India
55
18
80
46
122
84
177
128
171
116
180
118
9
Canada
109
109
71
71
79
79
83
83
158
158
261
10
Netherlands
181
181
81
81
77
77
64
64
105
105
11
Norway
60
69
60
48
60
52
60
57
80
105
12
Australia
50
50
24
24
23
23
21
21
77
13
Italy
88
82
63
59
63
49
44
39
14
Sweden
74
74
53
53
63
63
51
15
United Nations
31
20
44
37
28
20
16
Denmark
43
43
43
43
34
17
Iran
69
37
69
68
18
France
8
8
7
6
19
Spain
-
20
Turkey
5
21
Finland
22
-
-
-
-
-
5
21
22
18
18
8
8
18
18
17
17
77
60
10
10
38
21
21
21
11
11
11
11
11
11
13
13
18
18
23
23
25
25
27
27
Russian Fed.
30
30
109
-
-
74
-
35
-
-
-
-
5
5
5
3
23
AKDN
11
11
22
22
41
41
12
12
9
9
5
5
13
13
16
16
12
12
24
Saudi Arabia
82
82
6
6
5
5
6
5
25
5
17
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
25
China
34
26
20
0
10
1
0.40
33
1
28
15
19
2
1
-
26
UAE
10
4
35
1
13
4
11
6
7
4
8
1
47
8
2
4
0
56
27
Switzerland
3
3
10
7
16
13
26
13
15
13
18
14
7
12
13
13
9
14
28
South Korea
24
1
15
18
17
3
10
4
5
-
1
-
-
63
35
2
1
29
Czech Republic
6
6
6
6
2
2
4
4
11
11
42
42
26
26
10
4
30
IDB
50
31
Belgium
20
12
3
4
1
1
10
12
3
1
15
17
4
4
3
3
3
32
Newzeland
10
10
4
4
4
4
5
5
3
3
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
33
Ireland
7
6
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
3
3
34
Poland
-
1
1
1
5
3
8
7
8
7
35
Kuwait
9
9
5
5
5
5
-
-
-
36
Luxembourg
3
1
2
3
0.19
0.08
37
Lithuania
38
Hungary
39
Austria
40
Pakistan
41
Brunei
0.44
42
Greece
1
43
Singapore
2
44
45
-
1
1
20
-
-
2
-
1
5
-
-
-
0.37
-
0.06
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
1
1
-
4
1
2
0
-
-
5
-
-
1,015
1,015
-
775
672
-
-
744
656
645
540
635
635
446
182
-
438
438
-
10
399
377
17
2
323
174
20
-
220
194
-
-
213
180
-
160
160
151
147
140
140
140
103
17
17
2
-
139
58
29
134
117
-
118
102
116
83
108
102
5
70
17
3
61
57
34
34
22
21
22
20
-
19
19
12
11
6
5
5
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
0.40
0.40
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
0.18
0.37
-
0.18
0.18
0.14
1.74
0.03
3
3
-
1
-
-
6
1
1
1
0
0.05
2
2
-
5
5
0.44
-
-
1
-
-
2
-
-
-
Portugal
-
-
1
Estonia
-
-
-
3,102
2,615
2,614
-
-
-
-
-
3,229
-
2
130
-
-
Total
-
-
Disb.
1
5
-
-
-
-
-
0.05
4,628
-
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4
0
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
2
0.20
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
0
-
-
-
-
-
0.04
-
0.40
0.42
0.25
0.05
-
-
1
0
4,170
6,513
6,182
8,471
7,133
8,259
6,319
69,248
56,839
5,827
4,931
12,196
11,789
16,792
10,899
231
188
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
97
Table 3: Breakdown of External Assistance to Afghanistan by ANDS Sectors (2002-2011)
Rank
Figures in US$ Million
Development
Partner
Infrastructure
COMT
1 United States
2 Japan
3 European Union
4 Asian Dev. Bank
Governance
DISB
3,615
371
149
COMT
2,558
371
141
Education
DISB
COMT
2,345
303
1,172
303
518
493
Health
DISB
COMT
Agri/Rural Dev.
DISB
734
522
675
134
13
134
12
201
225
COMT
538
225
169
DISB
4,452
202
513
Private Sector
Dev/Econ Dev
Social Protect.
COMT
3,377
418
202
417
DISB
559
826
COMT
390
666
353
339
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5 United Kingdom
6 World Bank
479
479
476
476
186
186
183
183
275
275
228
742
584
382
355
160
114
207
151
489
423
8
7 Germany
8 India
494
224
378
38
224
55
45
21
205
85
734
503
4
4
173
91
39
29
7
136
420
136
420
92
92
96
96
30
30
9
9
10 Netherlands
11 Norway
5
5
37
37
Unclassified
DISB
820
512
28,850
66
55
486
954
COMT
26,050
954
482
Total
Disbursement
Total Commitment
DISB
2,447
404
111
2,000
44,357
37,118
404
3,152
3,152
2,882
2,594
104
-
-
-
-
-
-
2,269
1,005
228
35
35
358
358
-
-
2,221
2,221
2
149
71
-
-
-
-
2,137
1,700
40
16
426
63
318
247
14
2,130
762
3
551
124
3
3
4
3
1,516
759
185
185
162
162
217
217
72
72
204
204
13
13
117
205
117
205
246
246
1,256
1,256
26
26
1,015
1,015
34
4
18
93
51
24
1
20
36
10
13
10
119
15
59
14
86
416
22
411
1
1
18
334
92
521
84
636
1
18
18
776
4
96
162
2
12 Australia
13 Italy
743
656
146
86
225
223
7
7
29
14
63
43
132
133
9
9
29
21
5
3
645
540
14 Sweden
27
27
256
256
137
137
34
34
2
2
149
149
9
9
21
21
-
-
635
635
15 United Nations
16 Denmark
37
9
36
23
106
51
171
58
29
6
43
15
3
0.25
16
16
4
1
446
179
61
61
92
74
10
10
70
70
20
20
9
5
15
13
161
185
438
438
111
111
399
377
17 Iran
-
COMT
559
721
1,916
9 Canada
Security
DISB
202
180
10
10
33
33
6
6
11
10
16
16
3
3
8
8
18 France
19 Spain
17
11
36
29
55
42
50
34
94
44
41
13
10
1
20
16
-
-
323
174
36
36
26
26
8
8
11
11
54
54
9
9
-
-
1
1
76
50
220
194
20 Turkey
21 Finland
39
30
1
1
54
43
54
52
2
2
4
4
1
1
53
43
5
5
213
181
-
-
49
49
-
-
8
8
5
5
31
31
-
-
18
18
49
49
160
160
147
-
-
-
-
2
1
-
-
-
-
40
37
-
-
109
109
-
-
151
30
-
45
45
17
0.29
2
2
-
-
51
51
-
-
0.01
0.01
-
-
145
98
25
25
-
-
16
16
20
20
33
33
17
17
30
30
-
-
-
-
140
140
25 United Arab Em.
26 China
7
5
2
-
0.40
0.05
1
1
104
104
10
10
-
-
134
126
-
-
23
2
-
-
6
1
39
14
-
-
21
2
42
40
130
59
27 Switzerland
1
1
27
23
15
11
12
12
33
24
25
25
4
4
3
2
118
102
28 South Korea
29 Czech Republic
4
4
14
11
18
17
54
29
5
5
2
-
5
5
14
14
116
85
4
4
1
1
4
4
1
1
2
2
8
8
5
5
78
78
102
102
66
12
0.12
22 Russia
23 Saudi Arabia
24 AKDN
30 Islamic Dev. Bank
2
3
3
6
-
-
0.12
5
5
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
72
17
31 Belgium
32 Newzeland
1
15
12
1
1
6
6
13
8
21
20
5
4
1
6
63
58
7
7
6
6
5
5
2
2
3
3
-
-
-
-
3
3
7
7
34
34
33 Ireland
34 Poland
-
-
18
16
0.35
0.09
0.25
0.25
1
1
6
5
-
-
2
2
-
-
28
25
12
11
1
0.07
4
4
1
0.22
1
0.42
2
2
0.03
-
-
-
2
2
22
19
35 Kuwait
0.20
0.20
15
15
-
-
4
4
-
-
0.45
0.45
-
-
-
-
-
-
19
19
-
-
9
8
1
1
-
-
-
-
2
2
-
-
0
0
-
-
13
11
1
1
0.06
0.06
2
2
2
2
2
2
6
6
36 Luxembourg
37 Austria
39 Hungary
40 Lithuania
41 Pakistan
-
-
1
0.20
2
2
1
0.43
1
1
0.07
0.07
-
-
1
1
-
-
6
5
0.37
0.37
1
1
1
1
3
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5
5
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5
0
0.44
0.44
4
0
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
1
3
42 Brunei
43 Portugal
1
0.10
1.00
1
0
0.10
44 Greece
-
-
-
-
0.05
-
-
-
-
-
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
2
1
45 Singapore
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
2
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
1
0.38
0
0.26
6,452
4,669
2,415
1,724
2,220
1,750
31,670
28,735
46 Estonia
Total
9,241
6,020
-
-
-
6,998
5,442
4,122
3,399
1,911
1,133
1
4,221
3,955
69,250
1
56,812
1) Social protection includes humanitarian assistance.
2) Reason for discrepancy between total commitment and disbursement by year, and total committeemen and disbursement by sector is mainly due to:
a) Lack of data by sectors
b) By year commitment includes data of FY 2011, but by sector includes only upto end of 2010
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
98
Graph 1: The figures only represent the projects costs, not the actual disbursements made
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
99
Table 4: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan
Figures in US$ Millions
No Province
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total
1
Badakhshan
3
3
0
1
8
2
Badghis
9
13
18
2
42
3
Baghlan
0
5
1
0
6
4
Balkh
6
79
0
0
85
5
Bamyan
1
1
0
0
2
6
Day Kundi
0
0
0
0
0
7
Farah
1
2
4
0
7
8
Faryab
0
6
0
0
6
9
Ghazni
0
1
2
0
3
10 Ghowr
0
4
1
0
5
11 Helmand
1
5
5
1
12
12 Hirat
4
10
4
96
114
13 Jowzjan
1
0
0
0
1
14 Kabul
84
181
4
2
271
15 Kandahar
19
6
2
0
28
16 Kapisa
1
1
23
0
25
17 Khost
2
3
3
0
8
18 Kunar
1
2
46
0
48
19 Kunduz
1
0
0
0
2
20 Laghman
0
0
0
0
1
21 Lowgar
1
0
0
0
1
22 Nanagrahar
0
3
0
0
3
23 Nimroz
0
0
0
0
0
24 Nuristan
0
0
0
0
1
25 Paktika
0
3
2
0
5
26 Paktya
1
66
0
0
67
27 Panjsher
11
11
20
0
42
28 Parwan
3
39
14
2
58
29 Samangan
1
0
0
0
1
30 Sar-e-Pul
0
0
0
0
0
31 Takhar
0
0
0
0
0
32 Uruzgan
2
4
2
1
9
33 Wardag
1
0
0
0
1
34 Zabul
3
2
1
0
5
35 Central
Total
3
0
0
0
3
159
450
152
106
867
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
100
Table 5: DPs' Contribution to LOTFA (2002 - 2011)
Figures in US$ Millions
Rank
Donor
Contributions
1 United States
2 EC
3 Japan
4 Canada
5 Germany
6 Netherlands
7 United Kingdom
8 Norway
9 ARTF
10 Finland
11 Denmark
12 Italy
Grand Total of all Contributions
Rank
694.64
422.72
324.62
90.77
88.96
68.54
33.69
28.53
21.64
10.29
6.38
5.06
Donor
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Contributions
Australia
Switzerland
UNDP
DFID
CIDA
Belgium
Ireland
Czech
Hungary
Iceland
Latvia
3.47
3.37
1.73
1.58
0.82
0.71
0.54
0.15
0.13
0.10
0.02
1,808
Source: LOTFA report, February 2011
Table 6: Afghanistan Debt Historical (1966-2008)
Figures in US$ Millions
Creditors
Russia (RU)
Asian Development Bank (ADB)
International Development Association (IDA) - WORLD BANK
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Government of United States (GOUS)
Government of Deutch Republic (GODE)- Germany
Saudi Fund for Development (SFD)
Islamic Development Bank (ISDB)
Bulgaria (BG)
Kuwait Fund for Economic Development (KFED)
Slovak Republic (SK)
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)
Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
Iran (IR)
Iraq
OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)
Kingdom of Denmark (KDEN)
Government of Croatia (GOC)
TOTAL
Committed
11,034.39
820.28
542.14
122.68
107.34
89.83
81.07
56.97
56.58
29.86
29.34
19.75
14.81
10.75
9.50
1.76
0.87
0.44
Debt Stock
(Outstanding)
987.00
595.85
434.52
114.13
18.16
46.61
11.02
51.42
21.72
10.03
1.76
-
13,028
2,292
Source: Debt Management Unit - MoF
Zero Debt Stock means that debt has either been fully repaid or forgiven
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
101
Graph 2: Provincial Distribution of External Assistance (2002-2010) Figures in US$ Millions
Note: Multiple Provinces include information on projects/programs that have nation-wide impact, such as the National Solidarity Program, National Rural
Access Program, and other big infrastructure projects in the area of irrigation, energy, and transport.
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
102
Table 7: Modalities of External Assistance Disbursed (2002-2010)
Figures in US$ Millions
Modality
Amount
Percentage
1. Assistance Managed Directly by DPs
46,544
82%
2. Assistance Provided through Government:
a Bilateral Support for Development
b Support through Trust Funds for Development
c Support for Operating Budget
Total
10,286
4,865
1,268
4,152
56,830
18%
9%
2%
7%
100%
Table 8: DP’s Support through Government Budget (2002-2010)
Figures in US$ Millions
2003
1. Total Development Budget
723
2004
2005
228
2006
570
762
1.1. Donors' Contribution
723 100% 228 100%
570 100%
1.2. Government's Contribution
-
-
2. Total Operating Budget
-
0%
2007
743
0%
774
18
2008
1153
2009
1342
940
98% 1053 91% 1342 100%
2%
884
100
9%
1096
-
2010
0%
897
636
2.1. Donors' Contribution
515
57% 331
52%
348
45%
366
41%
481 44%
1477
558
38%
2.2. Government's Contribution
382
43% 305
48%
426
55%
518
59%
615 56%
919
797
940 100%
-
726 91%
0%
72
1791
2469
723
40% 1074 44%
62% 1069
60% 1395 56%
Table 9: Support to Government's Operating Budget (2002-2010)
Figures in US$ Millions
Funding Source
ARTF
LOTFA
USDOD
ADB
Grand Total
9%
2002
111
6
2003
213
66
2004
235
65
2005
253
81
2006
300
107
2007
290
136
64
2008
310
229
91
2009
250
230
115
2010
225
447
322.5
4.9
117
279
300
334
407
490
630
595
999
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
Total
2,187
1,367
593
5
4152
103
Table 10: Delivery Channels of External Assistance (2002-2010)
Rank
Figures in US$ Millions
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
Total
Breakdown of Disbursment
Development Partner
United Sates
Japan
European Union/Comission
United Kingdom
World Bank
Canada
Netherlands
Asian Development Bank
Germany
India
Australia
Norway
Sweden
Italy
Denmark
Iran
Spain
United Nations
Turkey
France
Finland
Russian Fed.
Agha Khan Development Network
United Arab Emirates
Switzerland
Czech Republic
Saudi Arabia
Korea
China
Belgium
Newzeland
Ireland
Poland
Kuwait
Islamic Development Bank
Luxembourg
Austria
Lithuania
Hungary
Kazakhistan
Singapore
Portugal
Estonia
Greece
Brunei
Brazil
Pakistan
On-budget
Support
2,455
900
774
861
1,700
491
425.7
955
287
112
232
171
212
252
84
2
62
48
4
0.40
7
3
25
6
9
16
4
15
17
8
2
1
1
10,142
Off-budget
Support
34,664
2,252
1,820
1,360
Total
Disbursement
1
1
0
-
37,118
3,152
2,594
2,222
1,700
1,256
1,015
1,005
761
759
656
636
635
540
438
376
194
182
180
174
160
147
140
126
102
102
98
83
58
52
34
21
20
19
17
10
6
5
5
2
2
1
1
1
0
-
46,664
56,805
764
590
50
474
759
544
404
464
327
186
376
110
180
180
113
112
143
140
126
95
100
73
77
58
43
34
5
16
4
2
4
4
5
2
2
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
104
Table 11: Summary of DPs’ Contribution to Trust Funds (2002-2010)
Figures in US$ Millions
Trust Funds
ARTF
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
185
286
380
404
454
635
627
657
523
4,151
6
45
65
81
107
136
203
448
555
1,647
16
24
4
0
-
-
LOTFA
CNTF
-
-
-
APRTF
Total by Year
191
332
446
501
585
775
830
1,105
Total
44
86
86
1,078
5,843
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT |
105