UNU - NPSIA WORKSHOP ON CONFLICT PREVENTION
Project Directors:
David Carment (NPSIA) and Albrecht Schnabel (UNU)
Hosted by:
INSTRAW, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
Supported with grants from:
IDRC (Ottawa), UNU (Tokyo) and NPSIA (Ottawa)
14-16 December 1999
by
Abdul-Rasheed Draman, David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel
Day One – 14 December 1999
Introduction
The three-day workshop was organized and co-chaired by David Carment of the Norman Paterson
School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada and Albrecht Schnabel of the
Peace and Governance Program of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan. The workshop opened on December 14 at 14:00 with an inaugural address by the Director of INSTRAW Eleni
Stamiris, who thanked the attendees for coming to Santo Domingo and representatives of INSTRAW for hosting the workshop.
Albrecht Schnabel gave a brief overview of the United Nations University and its activities. He noted that, even though the UNU has been in existence for over 25 years, its presence in international peace and security research and policy remains largely unnoticed. To this end, the UNU is engaging in constant efforts to become relevant to the activities of the UN, regional organizations and the global community. Conflict prevention, he emphasized, is an important area of research in this regard.
David Carment began his address by focusing on the central researc h question of the workshop: “Can rhetoric be translated to policy?” He argued that, if the answer to this question were yes, then a ground-up approach involving local actors would likely be the most effective and long lasting means of ensuring meaningful conflict prevention.
In an effort to translate rhetoric to policy, Carment and Schnabel initially targeted academics who assessed the conditions necessary to make conflict prevention a reality. The draft manuscript of this
- first project volume was distributed at the workshop. Carment briefly touched on the aims for the overall project, the output of which aims to:
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Translate theoretical insights into policy recommendations;
Integrate the perspectives of academics and practitioners;
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Develop guidelines for training and capacity building; and
Create a network of local partners (academic, policy and practitioner) in conflict prevention.
The current workshop, representing the second stage of the project, had as its main focus the training needs for effective conflict prevention. This second stage is followed by a third capacity-building stage which will focus on the local level transfer of knowledge; an emphasis on training tools for regional and international organizations; bridging the scholar-participant gap; and NGO capacity building.
David Carment delved into conceptual issues by assessing various ways in which conflict prevention has been defined. He likened early warning and risk assessment to weather forecasting and compared conflict prevention to preventive diplomacy. He argued that preventive diplomacy applies to emergent and acute conflict and crises in which risks are much more proximate. Conflict prevention however, remains more rhetoric than reality, with capacity building as a key to making it a reality.
Carment posed the question: ‘What are the key economic, political, social and diplomatic factors for effective conflict prevention’? From the work done so far in this area, he argued that there have been recommendations for action that enhance the political will of the international community. The purpose of such recommendations is to link regional organizations and the international community. To do this,
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- there is the need to:
Establish an Eminent Persons Group to foster better more coherent initiatives;
Establish indigenous mechanisms for and approaches to conflict prevention;
Identify triggers for action based on threats to human rights and democracy; and
Increase the coherence of information gathering and the independent analysis of emerging conflicts.
PANEL 1 - CONFLICT PREVENTION AND THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT: ACADEMIC
PERSPECTIVES
Panel Members:
David Carment (Chair)
Albrecht Schnabel
Barnett R. Rubin
The first presenter, Albrecht Schnabel, focused on whether conflict prevention is a “path to peace or a grand illusion,” drawing on the first project volume with this very title (UNU Press 2000). Specifically, in his paper on “Conflict Prevention and Human Security” he argued that human security and conflict prevention are broadly conceived and too vague for practical use. They therefore need to be refined and operationalized if they are to become relevant. Broadly defined, human security is likened to the welfare of people in a society and anything that reduces the satisfaction of basic needs is a threat to human security. Unfulfilled human needs will eventually cause conflicts. The majority of people around the world live under bad governance with their human needs rarely fulfilled. Good governance is thus a key to human security.
Similarly, Schnabel argued that the broad conception of conflict prevention applies mainly to peacetime diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, and peacemaking after war. As well, there is the concept of structural conflict prevention, which addresses the underlying causes of conflict – based in the absence of development, democracy and human rights. This conception of conflict prevention, he argued, needs to be narrower. As of now, conflict prevention is a catch-all word for any activity by any actor to reduce the possibility of conflict. Schnabel argued that the most effective approach to conflict prevention is the creation of a fair society where competition over land, resources and political access and control would be a non-issue.
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Echoing the views of the first presenter as to whether conflict prevention is a path to peace or a grand illusion, the second presenter, David Carment, began with probing examples of successful conflict prevention. To find these examples, there is the need for designing indicators for a joint evaluation on extreme cases of different types of conflict - genocide, state failure, complex emergencies and so on.
Follow-up impact assessments are also crucial to find out if preventive measures put in place have been successful or not. The War-Torn Societies project, for instance, is a model that could be emulated. Any effort at evaluating the success or failure of a preventive regime should focus on the use of such information as the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) – a project which provides structural indicators of country performance that work in tandem with events data analysis and incountry risk assessments.
In his paper “Sources of Conflict and Requirements for Early Warning and Prevention,” Barnett Rubin focused specifically on the sources of conflict at the global, regional and sub-regional levels. He emphasized the need for a thorough understanding by researchers and policymakers of the sources of conflict in order to develop early indicators and to define appropriate policy instruments and strategies. He argued that observed growth of a factor that causes conflict could constitute “warning”, and that policy in such a situation should be designed to reverse or deflect the effects of these causes.
Rubin argues that the complex, multi-level nature of human society, the question of what causes conflict should be decomposed into several different questions at different levels of analysis:
1. Why are there more, fewer, or different types of conflict in the world at one time than another?
2. Why are conflicts more likely to involve certain units, whether regions, countries, or minority groups, than others?
3. Why does conflict break out in a certain place at a certain time?
On the sources of conflict at the global level, Rubin pointed first of all to the changes in the international system since the late 1980s. However, he noted that, contrary to a common impression, there is no evidence that the end of superpower competition saw a gross increase in the volume or intensity of conflict. Rubin argued that the end of superpower competition had contradictory effects.
Regions where conflicts had been aggravated by superpower intervention to support opposing sides became more stable (Central America, Southeast Asia). In some cases, superpower competition was replaced with competition among regional states, now freer to act on local interest without fearing reactions by major powers (Afghanistan). Another phenomenon was that states that had depended on politically motivated flows of foreign aid became weakened as those flows decreased, making such states more vulnerable to insurgency and state collapse (Somalia, DRC).
Another important effect of the end of the Cold War was the glut in the arms market, especially small arms and light weapons. Among the factors that have contributed to this glut were: the reduction in size of major militaries; the termination or winding down of a number of Cold War conflicts; and the continued dependence for employment on arms production and arms sales of a high proportion of the population in countries such as Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with the result that these governments and companies were actively seeking out new markets, especially in Africa. Arms per se, Rubin argued, do not cause conflict, but their easy availability no doubt accelerates the escalation of disputes.
At the state level, the sources of conflict that Rubin identified are structural, cultural and institutional.
On the structural level, differences in access to key resources by economic entitlement, territory, and group membership can be a source of conflict. This is especially so when there is perceived unjustified relative deprivation, and particularly changes in the degree of deprivation or its legitimacy.
According to Rubin, poverty does not cause conflict by itself; it brings about conflict when it assumes a vertical form. Cultural sources of conflict include the meanings with which social facts are imbued.
These include values, constructions of history, and symbols. Like poverty, cultural differences in themselves do not cause conflict; rather, they provide political resources that can be used for different purposes, including conflict. On the institutional level, political institutions mediate between social and cultural factors and the strategies of actors. Societies that manage political conflict without violence or repression do so through effective institutions. If institutions and the processes of interaction within states are seen to be legitimate and fair, or seen to be so, those who lose on an issue are less likely to resort to violence. Effective institutions also prevent looting and provide security to the population.
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At the individual level, Rubin argued that systemic or society-wide changes can place actors in situations where conflict is almost inevitable. Unless these conditions are transformed, conflict is likely, albeit not certain, to recur. Also, the way conflict does break out and spreads depends on the actions of individual agents who mobilize the resources in their environment, leading to a process of escalation.
Rubin also touched on early warning and prevention. He argued that early warning can mean different things to different organizations. He also argued that risk analysis is good for long term prevention but not good for operational prevention. What is thus useful is a system of events data, risk assessments and engaged monitoring. Establishing such a system is however problematic since there is sometimes not enough information; no political will; and no knowledge of what to do.
Finally, Rubin called for a transnational epistemic movement consisting of academics, practitioners and policy-makers to build collective pressure if conflict prevention is to become a reality.
Discussion
The discussion that followed centered on democracy, utility of data and human security.
The first two interveners focused their discussion on democracy. While the first was concerned with how to operationalize democracy; the second was concerned with how democracy is often defined as a set of structural features. He argued that there is the need to unpackage the term to make it meaningful in a variety of situations. He noted that democracy is not a limit to conflict; rather it will be more useful to look at societal values as sources of conflict. Taking up a similar theme, another intervener argued that if democracy and good governance are the key conflict prevention tools, then there is no role for the UN.
Another intervener raised the issue of data objectivity. He believed that raw data used to forecast country performance is a projection of country values; primarily of those who design and supply the data, but also of those who use it. The consensus that emerged was that it would be useful to have correspondents in each country to complement risk assessments and early warnings that rely on structural indicators of country performance.
A fifth intervener was concerned about the issue of human security. She argued that the focus on nation states as the providers of human security leaves other actors – above and below the nation state - out of the picture. The UN is a global organization of states and has difficulty working with and acting as a mediator for non-state actors at the local and regional level. Therefore, it is important to identify the needs and interests of non-state actors working in concert with regional organizations.
Ultimately, any measure of success and in evaluating conflict prevention will be instances where the
UN played a secondary role.
Along these lines, a final intervener also cautioned exclusive focus on policy designed by the UN and big powers. He posed the question: ‘whose policy are we talking about in this project?’ He argued that conflict prevention would benefit immensely if policy looks at the interests of the people for whom the policy is being designed. Local ownership, he argued, is central to effective conflict prevention.
Day Two – 15 December 1999
PANEL 2 - CONFLICT PREVENTION AND THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT: UN PERSPECTIVES
Panel Members:
Albrecht Schnabel (Chair)
Colleen Duggan
Beatrice Labonne
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Colleen Duggan’s paper on “UN Strategic and Operational Coordination: Mechanisms for Preventing and Managing Conflict” focused on UN mechanisms at both headquarters and in the field. She argued against the traditional notion that the locus of action is at the headquarters. This view has been challenged in the literature and by basic realities on the ground. The UN needs to be effectively engaged at the local level. Today, more than ever before, more and more activities geared at preventing conflict are carried out in the field with UN organs such as UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF implementing effective development activities through a conflict prevention lens. To the extent that most of the activities of the main UN organs are in preventive peacemaking, preventive disarmament, preventive humanitarian action, preventive peacebuilding and preventive deployment, the organizational lens tends to be overarching and primarily focused on the high politics of international security. Duggan reiterated that, although these activities are in line with Secretary-General Kofi
Annan’s call for the UN to be a forum for preventive measures there is concern that there is often an operational division between headquarters and field mechanisms. She called for basic and fundamental changes within UN practice in order to create meaningful fora for member states as well as academics, practitioners and policymakers. These fora would serve in promoting wider consultation and would help coordinate UN activities, especially for the purposes of prevention at the local level where the results will likely be more tangible.
Duggan outlined several existing mechanisms for information-sharing and strategic planning which could be better used to link headquarters with the field. The ensuing discussion focused on field level mechanisms, focussing specifically at the activities of the UN Country team under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator. These activities range from dealing with environmental security threats to preventing human rights violations to providing solutions for uprooted populations. These activities are coordinated through the UN Country Team’s thematic groups, which provide working forums for mid-level UN officers in the various countries. These groups are highly operative and flexible working fora that can include the participation of actors from outside the UN System, including civil society. Duggan also described the strategic planning and programming instruments used in the field. These include the Common Country Assessment (CCA),
UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), and the
Strategic Framework. All these instruments are geared towards stabilizing societies and preventing conflict, although in practice their effectiveness remains open to scrutiny.
Duggan pointed to a number of obstacles that stand in the way of preventive efforts. She noted particularly that there does not exist within the UN a uniform consciousness concerning how conflict prevention could best be carried out by different actors within the System - there is no culture of prevention, so to say. If upper level mechanisms for conflict prevention do not factor in the potential for widening the concept of and tools for prevention, then it will not be possible to maintain structures that sustain conflict prevention at the local level. Limited understanding among UN personnel about
UN reform or the potential use of mechanisms in the field needs to be addressed in tandem with conflict prevention methodology. Another fundamental and well-known obstacle is the proliferation of similar mechanisms that encourage duplication of efforts and waste of resources at UNHQ.
On early warning, Duggan noted that the strategic planning and programming instruments such as the
Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) offer workable frameworks. But these need to be linked to existing upstream mechanisms such as the
Executive Committees in order to unleash their real potential. To create early warning capability, there is the need to deploy more resources, which means training people and strengthening local capacities. This can be done through existing frameworks, but UNHQ will need to support these initiatives at the highest levels. She also noted that the academic community does a lot work on early warning and conflict prevention and should continue in these endeavors. However, in so doing, academics would be well advised to simplify the panorama of mechanisms to make them easily understood and relevant to practitioners.
In her paper on “From Conflict Resolution to Post-Conflict Peace-Building: Policy Guidelines with a
Focus on Natural ResourcesRich Countries,” Beatrice Labonne began by echoing some of the views of the previous presenter. She argued that the mechanisms outlined by Colleen Duggan are very laudable. The Common Country Assessment (CCA), for example, is broader in scope than the UN’s
Funds and Programmes, and since it is mostly government-driven, it can be a very effective conflict prevention mechanism. However, if such frameworks are to be effective conflict prevention tools, there should be proper coordination within the UN organs.
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Labonne’s piece focused on the relationship between natural resources, conflict resolution and postconflict peace building. Before delving into the argument of her paper, she briefly outlined the challenge of conflict prevention. She made reference to the UN’s efforts and the current Secretary-
General’s appeal to the international community to develop a culture of prevention. She also referred to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts to support her argument about the challenge of prevention. Among other things, she argued that the efforts of donors and multilateral organizations are fragmented, lacking any proper coordination. Also, there seem to be a gap between international perception and demands and local realities in the approaches to conflict prevention.
Again, as Labonne argued, there seems to be a hiatus between research and operations leading to a misunderstanding of the causes of conflict - a very important component of conflict prevention.
Going back to the main argument of her paper, Labonne noted that the availability of natural resources in resource rich countries per se does not bring about conflict. What brings about conflict is inequalities between groups within these countries. These inequalities result from the control and use of these resources. Competition over resources leads to conflicts. This brings about what she termed
‘loot-based’ conflict. She argued that any conflict prevention effort should address grievances and aim at correcting the inequalities that exist in natural resource-rich countries. If natural resources are part of the problem, then they should be part of the solution. An important element in her discussion is the way resources are mismanaged in most of these countries. Governments take the proceeds from these resources and spend them in other places, without any direct benefits to the people who inhabit the resource-rich areas. Labonne argued that resource mismanagement does not only bring about conflict, it also leads to the destruction of the economic potential of these countries.
In recognition of the difficult task in preventing conflicts in resource-rich countries, Labonne argued that any effort at conflict prevention should be multi-faceted and integrated. The political economy of intrastate conflict needs to be better understood. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), among others, has to be seriously engaged in playing an important role in this regard as do the private sector and NGOs. She also argued that the Secretary-General should continue his efforts in the area of conflict prevention, making better use of the research findings available. The media should not be left out as well. More importantly, she called for the constructive engagement of multinational corporations, which are in the business of exploiting and extracting natural resources in resource-rich countries.
Discussion
The discussion that followed focused on a number of issues. The first intervener reminded participants that, rather than discussing the roots of conflict, the group should focus its work on strategies that aim to prevent conflicts. He noted that the structural differences within most societies and strategies - long term - should not focus on operational aspects but rather deal with preventive issues. This is where he finds an important role for NGOs working in partnership with regional organizations.
The next intervener’s concern was on how to stimulate political will. To do this, she argued, there is the need for an engagement between UN agencies in the field and bilateral donors. Another way to do that is for practitioners and transnational civil society to invest their energies in engaging Western embassies around the world. There is also the need for a wider public information campaign as well as conflict prevention advocacy.
Another intervener made reference to the executive committees of the UN, which were part of the first presenter’s schematic framework. He argued that, although some of these committees are useful, they have more often become bureaucratic obstacles with very rigid procedures - things are normally done in advance with little or no chance left for changes when they become necessary. The intervener also touched on the political economy of conflict. He said that if a way is found to make war very unprofitable for people who wage it, relying on the natural resources they loot, then conflict could in theory be prevented. Still on the issue of resources, the intervener argued that sometimes it is not so much the mal-distribution of resources and inequalities that bring about conflict, but, more importantly, lack of good leadership. He pointed out that, even if resources are poorly distributed, good leadership could make a lot of difference.
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The next intervener commented on the activities of the Common Country Assessment mechanism. He argued that most of the activities of the CCAs are not transparent, which leads them to be perceived as colonial processes. He said that the state, whether acceptable or not, is a main actor and should be brought back in - as one of their goals, CCAs should engage the state in a partnership to prevent conflicts. This does not, however, underrate the value of NGOs, IGOs, etc. and the very important role they can play in this regard.
Another intervener reiterated the relevance of the UN, especially in the post-Cold War world.
However, if the UN is to be effective in the area of conflict prevention, there has to be some form of division of labor with regional organizations. Regarding the role of multi-nationals, the intervener echoed an earlier view that there is the need to constructively engage MNCs. The Canadian government’s effort with Talisman in the Sudan was identified as an important example.
Overall, the consensus that emerged was that there is the need for more and better collaboration between the UN and regional organizations, especially about lessons learned in efforts to stem the tide of conflict around the globe.
The Chair noted that, overall, needs for more effective conflict prevention have been laid out from both the academic and UN perspectives. He expressed the hope that rhetoric could also be turned into a feasible package that would be manageable in our efforts to prevent conflict around the world.
PANEL 3 - CONFLICT PREVENTION: TRANSLATING RHETORIC AND GOOD WILL INTO
POLICY AND GOOD PRACTICE
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Panel Members:
Christopher Cushing (Chair)
Albrecht Schnabel
Tatjana Sikoska and Juliet Solomon
In opening this panel discussion, the Chair reminded the participants about the critical actors in the discussion to move from rhetoric to policy. The actors are the academics, the UN and the practitioners. He also mentioned that, today, bigger and powerful groups such as the G8 (drawing on the Kosovo experience) are becoming interested in the issue of conflict prevention. The Chair urged the participants to spend more time on the introductions as well as policy recommendations of their work and less time on theory, since many people, especially bureaucrats, do not have time for theory and rhetoric.
The first presentation was based on a paper prepared by Charles Dufresne and Albrecht Schnabel, entitled “UN Staff College Training Workshops: Building UN Capacity in Early Warning and Preventive
Measures.” Dufresne could not attend the workshop, and the paper was presented by Schnabel. The presentation discussed the activities of the UN Staff College in Turin, Italy and its UN staff training courses on early warning and preventive measures.
Schnabel noted that an important focus of the UN Staff College is to train UN Staff who are in the field and who, in turn, use their acquired knowledge to become a better informed partner for their colleagues at UN Headquarters. The Early Warning and Preventive Measures course is currently being “rolled-out” to target NGOs and local actors in addition to UN staff. These roll-out courses are facilitated and taught by UN Staff College core staff and a number of trainers from UN agencies and regional research institutions who have been prepared for this task during a Training of Trainers workshop in September 1999. Both Dufresne and Schnabel participated in this ToT course and now serve as UN Staff College trainers.
Before rolling out the courses, three pilot courses had been held in Turin, involving about 145 UN staff from 21 different UN agencies, departments, funds and programmes. They aimed at enhancing the skills of participants in the area of conflict management. In addition, a Senior Managers Workshop, the already mentioned ToT course and the first few field workshops were held. Funding for the workshops came from the British, Italian, Canadian, Swedish and Norwegian governments.
The first field workshop, organized in South Africa in November 1999, was aimed at UN staff working
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5. in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Zambia and South Africa. The field-based workshops have the same objectives as the initial pilot workshops. Specifically, their aim is to give participants skills and capacity:
To identify conflict causes and stages of conflict;
To structure systematically early warning analysis;
To identify and integrate a range of preventive measures;
To use existing mechanisms for interdepartmental/interagency co-ordination;
To improve quality and effectiveness of policy recommendations.
The main focus of these workshops includes knowledge and skill development in the area of analytical processes related to early warning. This includes the assessment of causes and stages of conflict and the identification of early warning signals of potential disintegration. The main emphasis is placed on the identification and integration of preventive measures, as well as the need for joint planning and decision making. Building on the outputs generated in the analytical sessions, the participants identify and discuss a range of preventive measures that can be employed to address the changing circumstances outlined in potential country-conflict scenarios.
Schnabel concluded by enumerating areas that have to be given further attention in this or any other training program on conflict prevention. Among them, he reiterated, a) the need to enhance the capacity of people in the field, particularly the ability for innovative thinking; b) the need to enhance the capacity to transform early warning information into policy;
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c) the need for conflict prevention activities to engage larger inter-agency coordination to enhance effectiveness; d) and the need to reach a broad spectrum of UN, state and nonstate representatives; spreading the message of conflict prevention and creating a “culture of prevention” among political decisionmakers and opinion shapers (such as educators and the media).
Tatjana Sikoska and Juliet Solomon presented their work on “Introducing Gender in Conflict and
Conflict Prevention: Conceptual and Policy Implications.” They drew attention to the need for application of a gender perspective in the analysis of conflict and conflict prevention and the need for a partnership between traditional conflict prevention actors - governments - and the new conflict prevention actors - civil society. Sikoska remarked that in order to do so, we need to understand first of all the meaning of gender. Gender is not only about women. It refers basically to the distinctive identities and roles of women and men, which are socially constructed and contested. As an analytical category, she argued, gender propels us to ask whether women and men as social and political agents are carriers of different and distinctive sets of values. And if so, how is this affecting their role within society, their interests and needs and their capacities to actively engage in diverse social, economic and political processes?
In order to gender-sensitize the general thinking on conflict prevention, Sikoska presented a gender analysis framework. The framework deals with general categories of women and men while allowing for individual differences influenced by factors such as culture, class or social status. Within this framework, gender, as much as culture, class or religion is seen as an important determinant of individual and/or group involvement in the dynamics of conflict.
The main components of the framework were:
- Profile of access and control of material and symbolic resources, including those factors influencing access and control in the early stages of conflict;
- The cycle of conflict and the effects of conflict escalation on gender roles and identities, and;
- Conflict prevention policy planning and risk and impact assessment. The former involves analysis of choices of objectives: strategies to be used for the achievement of these objectives, and instruments. The latter would involve analysis and assessment of risks involved (such as impact on strengthening of traditional gender roles, reinforcement of gender inequalities, etc.) and impact of conflict prevention strategies on the causes of conflict (through specific indicators such as access to resources, political and economic empowerment, etc.)
Based on the proposed gender analysis framework, Solomon drew a number of policy recommendations. First she argued that gender sensitivity training for peacekeeping forces should be compulsory. This means that the strategies used to prevent the eruption of violent conflicts should be gender-sensitive and gender-differentiated. Second, impact assessment of preventive actions should include gender indicators such as: the ratio of involvement of women and men in preventive activities; the extent to which a given conflict prevention action has facilitated access and control by women and young girls to basic social and economic assets; the extent to which conflict prevention has brought about greater autonomy and political empowerment for women. Third, while formulating policies aimed at reduction of tensions and confidence building among conflicting communities, different UN agencies and other international org anizations should aim at identifying women and women’s organizations across conflicting communities to be engaged in their activities. And lastly, mediation training needs to focus on how gender affects and permeates conflict dynamics at individual and group levels.
Discussion
The first intervener asked which elements from the pilot workshops at the UN Staff College in Turin have practical applicability. He thought that the element that has the greatest practical applicability was that of taking the composite understanding of the causes of conflict and linking them with the collaborative efforts of different groups at the local level.
The next intervener was concerned about the sustainability and impact of the UN Staff College’s training programs. In her opinion, there was an urgent need for follow-ups to some of these programs.
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Another concern she raised was the fallacy of targeting UN staff in these training programs. She was concerned about the ability of these people to act independently in the field since they work for the
UN. In response to this concern, Schnabel noted that very modest gains have been made on the issue of sustainability and impact. With regards to targeting UN staff, his view was that the college was specifically established to empower mid-level UN staff to become conflict prevention sensitive.
Again, the purpose of the college is to enable these people to acquire a set of skills to ensure coordination.
PANEL 4 - ASIA
Panel Members:
David Carment (Chair)
Gerald M. Steinberg
Chetan Kumar
Vanchai Vatanasapt
In opening the panel discussions, the Chair emphasized the need for the panel members to go straight to the point and make at least three policy recommendations on how to implement conflict prevention in the regions. This is in keeping with the theme of the workshop - moving from rhetoric to policy.
Gerald Steinberg presented on “The Centrality of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): Lessons from Conflict Prevention in the Middle East.” He began by reiterating the importance of moving from theory to practice in our efforts to design workable conflict prevention tools. Steinberg referred to a news headline of that day - 15 December 1999, which reported that the Syrian Foreign Minister refused to shake hands with the Israeli Prime Minister during peace talks. This, he argued, was a demonstration of the lack of understanding of the centrality of CBMs, a critical factor in any peace talks. According to Steinberg, the situation in the Middle East is one of protracted conflict in a very complex environment. Thus, conflict prevention in that region begins with the ongoing peace process that has witnessed a renewed commitment in recent times.
Steinberg argued that CBMs are a vital first stage in any transition process from conflict to cooperation without which other more complex steps, involving significant risks to the parties such as arms control, become virtually impossible. In the Middle East, as in other regions, CBMs are essential for creating the psychological basis for the development of mutual understanding. In a region with a history of hostility and violence groups cannot end their conflict without some form of mutual understanding and communication. Steinberg argued that there are a number of challenges that stand in the way of any effort to build confidence in the region. Most important among them is the fact that public views are often based on exaggerated myths, leading to misperceptions on the part of all parties and, sometimes, it takes a long time for the parties to understand each other. There is thus the need for an emphasis on changing misperceptions in the literature, especially in times following formal peace agreements and treaties. The challenge is to contain this impact of misperceptions so as to reach a stable plateau in the process of establishing peace.
In the context of the Middle East, Steinberg called for ‘soft security’ CBMs prior to attempting to focus on ‘hard security’ measures. Soft-security CBMs can take the form of dialogue between the parties and cooperative measures, particularly with respect to economic cooperation, the environment and the planning of joint responses to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods or prolonged drought.
According to Steinberg, the importance of CBMs has been recognized by the various parties to the crisis in the Middle East. President Sadat’s breakthrough visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 remains the ultimate example of a confidence building measure and illustrates the importance of
CBMs in the transition from war to peace. Sadat’s visit broke through the barrier of non-recognition and turned the situation around. Another important CBM was King Hussein’s visit to Israel in 1997 to pay condolence to families of Israelis killed in Jordanian bombings.
Steinberg noted that at the societal level the impact of CBMs is weak. He particularly noted the series of bombings that have been taking place in the Middle East and the fact that both Israel and Syria
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conduct large-scale military exercises on the opposite sides of their border. He argued that the development and implementation of CBMs does not automatically lead to successful and longstanding conflict resolution. In order to be successful, CBMs must spill over into other areas, and create a climate of mutuality in which a security community can be formed and maintained.
To move ahead, Steinberg called for a code of conduct that is necessary to prevent disagreements from escalating into full-fledged conflict again. Such codes can and should also have a human dimension, including the prohibition of terrorism and condemning threats and incitement that encourage or justify violence.
Chetan Kumar’s paper was on “Conflict Prevention in South Asia.” Kumar started off with what he called his philosophy of conflict management. He argued that it is very difficult to draw a correlation between the root causes of conflict and conflict itself. For example, he refuted the general belief that poverty causes conflict. A cursory glance at some hot spots around the world reveals that certain poor countries are sometimes stable whereas certain rich countries are in turmoil. He also dismissed religious differences as a root cause of conflict. For him, one element that is common in conflict situations is the fact that the political process fails to properly address disputes before they turn violent. To varying degrees, and depending on the situation, conflicts have been exacerbated by poverty; environmental degradation or catastrophe; transboundary population movements, etc. In the absence of political failure, however, these factors are not enough by themselves to cause conflict.
Kumar identified four kinds of political failure:
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4. Deliberate exclusion or marginalization of particular communities.
The above phenomena, Kumar argued, are variously responsible for violent conflict in South Asia. He identified six types of violence:
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Failure of political leadership to anticipate and resolve disputes before they turn violent;
Absence of skills, mechanisms and aptitude for resolving disputes peacefully;
Exploitation of existing religious, social, and other group differences for short-term political gain by local or national leaders;
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Localized sectarian violence – inter-religious or inter-communal violence, common to all
South Asian states;
Localized sectarian violence resulting from transboundary demographic shifts – violence in
Assam in India, violence along the Uttar Pradesh/Nepal border, tensions in Bhutan from demographic shifts;
Completely internal insurgencies – the Naxalites in the Andhra Pradesh and Bihar states of
4.
5.
6.
India and the MQM-related organized violence in Karachi;
Internal insurgencies with external networks of support – the LTTE in Sri Lanka, minor insurgent movements in India’s North-East states, the Chakma insurgency in Bangladesh, Shan insurgency in Myanmar;
Internal conflicts at the nexus of interstate disputes – the Pakistani civil war, which turned into the India-Pakistan war of 1971 and led to the formation of Bangladesh, the Afghan civil war, the
Kashmir insurgency in India;
Interstate conflicts – brief wars, none currently ongoing that have taken place four times between India and Pakistan, and once between India and China. In addition border skirmishes continuously occur intermittently between Indian and Pakistani troops along the international border, and the Line of Actual Control that divides Kashmir between the two countries.
Having identified the types of violent conflicts in South Asia, Kumar shifted his discussion to strategies for conflict prevention in the region. He differentiated early prevention – political initiatives that arrest disputes when they are still at the stage of general tension, from late or operational prevention and preventive diplomacy - political initiatives that prevent the occurrence or escalation of conflict after the parties have organized themselves to inflict violence.
The Indus River water-sharing agreement was cited as an example of early prevention. The agreement negotiated between India and Pakistan in the 1960s dealt with what was potentially a major source of violent conflict between the two countries. Another early conflict prevention example was structural prevention, focusing on development in Bangladesh. In the 1980s when Bangladesh stood on the brink of political ineptitude in the face of political turmoil and ecological crises, a network
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of international and domestic NGOs launched a series of activities focused on women’s education and empowerment, local government and sustainable development. Another case of early prevention was the economic and political liberalization in India in the early 1990s when the government launched a series of reforms aimed at decentralizing political decision-making, giving more power to the states, and handing the reins of the economy to the private sector.
On late prevention, Kumar cited the 1988 border crisis between India and Pakistan that could have led to a fullscale war if it would not have been for the personalized ‘cricket diplomacy’ between Prime
Minister Ghandi and President Zia-ul-Haq. Another incident was the 1990 crisis during which India and Pakistan reportedly came close to a nuclear clash. The crisis was reportedly averted because of informal diplomacy by the director of the US Central Intelligence Agency.
Next, Kumar focused his discussion on a number of policy recommendations for future conflict prevention in Asia. Among other things, he called for:
- Dispersal of conflict resolution and management skill among political leadership at state and community levels;
- Encouragement for regional philanthropy in the area of conflict management;
- Public education to raise awareness of key foreign policy and security issues;
- Learning from Indus Valley cooperation;
- Local peacebuilding in Afghanistan, a situation which parallels that of contemporary Somalia.
Kumar concluded by arguing that most wars in South Asia are small wars and processes can be initiated to deal with them if there is a properly focused international engagement.
The next presenter, Vanchai Vatanasapt, continued with the discussion on Asia with a paper entitled
“Conflict Prevention in Asia: The Greater Mekong Sub-region.” His discussion encompassed the
Greater Mekong sub-region made up of Cambodia, Laos PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and
Yunnan (southern part of China).
According to Vatanasapt, at the sub-regional level there has been ongoing low-intensity conflict among and within neighboring Mekong Delta countries over the past several hundred years. One latent conflict has been the result of uneven usage of the water and natural resources from the
Mekong and Salween Rivers, which are the international rivers that flow through six and three countries, respectively. As a result, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was established over forty years ago to try to set the agreement and support the development of the sub-region. Only four countries of the riparian states agreed to sign the Memorandum of Understanding of the agreement, especially with regards to water usage. The difference and diversification in political regimes and economic development of each country in the past have been the weakness and constraint of cooperation.
Vatanasapt argued that Asian values play a crucial role in any effort at conflict management. It is generally considered that open conflict is destructive. At the same time, when there is conflict, conflict management and mediation become problematic as face-to-face discussion is not part of the Asian culture. Avoidance leads to unresolved and underlying tensions between and within groups. In the context of Thailand, conflict has arisen due to the enforcement of public policy that failed to include local participation in the decision making process. The way to prevent conflict is thus to get people involved at the outset. The crucial issue for conflict prevention , he argued, is ‘public participation.’
Another important factor is the development process. He noted that, while most development projects are not only ‘donor driven’ or ‘top down,’ they are also not transparent. Development projects are normally pre-packaged and handed down to the people. Theirs is to follow instructions. Consequently, most of these projects have failed and created even more conflict between local people and the government.
Vatanasapt noted that the Mekong Training Institute was established three years ago to be a conflict prevention training and research institute for the Greater Mekong countries. The institute normally runs courses lasting three to ten weeks and participants have to live in the same building. The process of training facilitates close relationships through learning and living in a group, leading to friendship and understanding, and thus trust and cooperation. The effect of such an initiative is that it has strengthened the spirit that is needed to prevent conflict and misunderstanding among the people
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of the region. Vatansapt concluded his remarks with a call for good governance, transparency in government activities, and transparency in business and community empowerment if conflict is to be prevented and if the people of the region are to live in peace.
Discussion
The Chair noted that, in Asia, there are weak or non-existent multilateral mechanisms for conflict management. This is cause for concern, given the plethora of unresolved ethnic tensions, resource disputes and emerging problems of weak states. He also argued that most of the time the focus on conflict management is at the inter-state level with emphasis on conventional security matters. He furthermore noted that, while the presence of nuclear weapons in the region (India and Pakistan) has played a strong deterrent role in preventing outright war between those two countries, it permitted lowintensity conflict in South Asia to proliferate.
The first intervener talked about the influence of the United States in mediating conflicts in the Middle
East and Asia. He also touched on the nuclear factor in the region, arguing that it is an important factor that decides if the UN gets involved in the region or not.
The next intervener commended the activities of the Mekong Institute in giving technical training to the people of the region, but expressed concern about the role of the Chinese and their threat to disrupt water usage along the Mekong basin.
A panelist asked for clarification on what Steinberg meant by international actors to stay engaged.
Steinberg responded by arguing that, for him, engagement means monitoring, facilitation, and mediation, essentially multilateral attention to ensure stability. In his opinion there is not much international engagement in the region at this time. The only relevant actor in the Middle East is the
United States. He said that the United States is engaged in trying to stabilize the nuclear equation. On the same issue, another intervener argued that while it is true that the United States is crucial, it is not the only relevant state in the region with the ability to influence outcomes.
The next intervener, a practitioner, made a number of general observations not only relating to this particular panel, but also to most of the previous panel discussions. First, he observed that his concept of prevention is a situation in which there is an avoidance of crisis and an attempt to keep tensions away from slowing down the development process. Peace and stability, he argued, can be likened to a complex chemical process that requires a lot of interaction.
He further argued that while the promotion of democracy, peace and security is very useful, it should not be looked upon as the duty of any one set of actors – it is everyone’s duty and all stake holders have to get involved. For him, the golden rule is that successful conflict prevention is one in which all stakeholders get involved. Echoing the views of some earlier presenters, he emphasized the fact that no prevention system can ignore the role of women. He also raised a concern regarding civil society.
He further noted that, although civil society plays a very important role in conflict prevention, he has heard little about the importance of its enhancement in conflict prevention efforts.
Touching on regional organizations, he argued that they have to be encouraged to do a lot more in the area of conflict prevention. Every effort of theirs should be put into a conflict prevention mode. On the issue of training, he noted that there is a need for the dissemination of knowledge and the creation of expertise in conflict prevention everywhere. Training institutes such as the Mekong Institute represent the future of conflict prevention in South East Asia and elsewhere. This way, society can always be in a permanent conflict prevention mode.
PANEL 5 - EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA
Panel Members:
Albrecht Schnabel (Chair)
Anara Tabyshalieva
Fraser Cameron
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Monika Wohlfeld
Anara Tabyshalieva presented her work on “Conflict Prevention in Post-Soviet Central Asia”. She began by offering an account of the recent history of conflicts in the region and the Fergana valley
(formed by the intersecting territories of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), where in 1989 and
1990, shortly before the USSR’s collapse, two violent eruptions occurred. The riots, which left hundreds dead and thousands injured, were surprising in the hitherto quiescent southern rim of the
Soviet Union.
Under the Soviets, a military and centrally controlled administrative machinery enforced ethnic stability in this region. However, such force vanished overnight with the disintegration of the USSR. The
Central Asian republics have developed into independent, polyethnic states with no effective policies to deal with the new situation.
After this brief introduction, Tabyshalieva moved to the ‘lessons learned’ in conflict prevention in the
Central Asia. First, she emphasized the importance of ethnic peace and religious tolerance in the
Central Asian region. Second, she stressed the significance of regional cooperation and dialogue.
Third, there is the need of heavier international involvement in the region. She also noted that, in recent times, reliance on international organizations is increasing in the small countries of the region.
In her opinion, coherent coordination and a problem-centered approach by the UN and other international organizations are obvious and urgent.
Forth, the lack of information is a very important obstacle in conflict prevention. Tabyshalieva noted that all news comes mainly from Moscow and there is no regional newspaper to present the ‘other view.’ There is a need for serious social assessment of factors that contribute to conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the Central Asian region. Fifth, the gender aspect in conflict prevention and conflict resolution is still neglected. There are no women’s organizations working on conflict prevention in the region. More active participation of women in decision-making and security issues of
Central Asia is essential. Experts argue that the region is sitting on a time bomb and could explode at any moment. This leads to the final lesson, which is the need for effective monitoring by the international community if peace and stability is to be achieved in this region.
The next paper, by Fraser Cameron, addressed “The European Union and Conflict Prevention.” Since
Cameron could not attend the workshop, his findings were presented by Monika Wohlfeld. The paper was divided in two sections. The first section provided an o verview of the EU’s existing conflict prevention approaches and instruments. The second section explored ways in which the EU could enhance its capacities for conflict prevention.
In recent years, largely because of the events in the Balkans, the EU has paid increasing attention to conflict prevention. However, the development of effective early warning systems and their utility are still problematic. Cameron argued that early warning is of little or no value unless it is linked to policy formulation and results in timely and effective action. Early warning is a complex issue, requiring analysis of the interaction of a wide range of political, economic, military, environmental and social factors. Thus there is a need to assess a range of conflict indicators and to analyze their interaction and overall impact. Another problem with early warning and conflict prevention is the decision of when to take action. Too often, as Cameron argued, preventive diplomacy tends to focus on situations where violent conflict is already likely or imminent and on strategies designed to address the immediate threat of violence.
There has been a growing recognition in the EU in recent times that effective conflict prevention requires a more comprehensive approach addressing the underlying causes of instability and conflict and not only the more immediate causes or symptoms of violence. The EU’s biggest contribution to conflict prevention is that its existence provides a powerful model for other countries to co-operate.
On policies and instruments, a wide range abounds within the EU. It actively promotes regional political and economic cooperation by using several instruments including trade agreements, partnership and cooperation agreements, association and Europe agreements, the Stability Pact and the Royaumont process for South Eastern Europe, etc. The EU also runs the largest humanitarian, development and technical assistance programs in the world. It imposes conditionality on these programs to ensure respect for human rights, minority rights or good governance. It also supports
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regional cooperation in Africa – the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the East African Community
(EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). There are also increasing efforts to integrate conflict prevention into EU development instruments and policies. According to Cameron, promoting peace and stability is a central objective in the Commission’s mandate for the renegotiation of the Lome Convention in 1999-2000.
As to improvements t o the EU’s conflict prevention capacity, Cameron stressed four key points:
1)
2)
It is important to revisit the concept and goal of conflict prevention as practiced by the EU;
There is the need to develop ways in which conflict prevention is integrated into existing
3) programs and policies;
The EU needs to integrate gender sensitivity and awareness into its existing policies and programs and develop new frameworks through which women’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities are supported;
4) There is the need to examine the way in which conflict prevention is actually realized and implemented in different contexts.
Cameron concluded by arguing that the EU’s strength is that of a soft power – by shaping a peaceful environment through the use of political and economic instruments and setting standards on human rights, democracy, and market economy. Its weakness is its lack of military muscle, visibility and, on occasion, diverging interests. However, he argued that the EU is making significant progress and, paraphrasing Commissioner Patten, he said it is better to be small and early than large and late.
Monika Wohlfeld’s contribution focussed on the ”OSCE and Conflict Prevention: Achievements and
Limitations.” Starting with a few comments on the nature of the organization, she argued that the
OSCE is active in all phases of conflict cycles and operates in countries in transition to democracy. Its engagement with these countries is based on a comprehensive framework encompassing security, political, economic and environmental issues.
The OSCE’s concept of security is geared towards assisting in the first instance participating states, based on politically binding agreements that possess few ‘carrots and sticks.’ It is also based on consensus rule. The OSCE also cooperates with NGOs and civil society in the area of security. This relationship, according to Wohlfeld, is developing in leaps and bounds.
Wohlfeld argued that, while the issue of sovereignty is normally an obstacle when dealing with states that do no t respect the human rights of their citizens, states’ actions are not purely domestic if their actions threaten human security and the security of their neighbors.
In its quest to prevent conflict in Europe, the OSCE has a number of instruments and institutions that it employs. These include:
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Arms control;
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs);
The Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security;
Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM);
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR);
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Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFM); and its various Missions.
Any activity undertaken with the help of these institutions involves action on the part of the Chairmanin-Office (CIO), the decision of the Permanent Council (PC), and the agreement of the country in question. This kind of arrangement is fraught with problems.
For instance, since the decision-making is based on the receptivity of the host state, it occasionally does not lead to early action. The fact that the host state has to be in agreement can mean that in certain situations it can take long for a decision to be reached.
Wohlfeld pointed out that the relatively recent development of OSCE field operations (since 1992) caused a major transformation of the Organization, enabling it to play a prominent role in promoting peace, security and compliance with OSCE commitments. Based on the experience acquired, the
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OSCE will develop and strengthen this instrument further in order to carry out tasks according to their respective mandates, which may, among other things, include the following:
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Providing assistance and advice or formulating recommendations in areas agreed by the
OSCE and the host country;
Observing compliance with OSCE commitments and providing advice or recommendations
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- for improved compliance;
Assisting in the organization and monitoring of elections;
Providing support for the primacy of law and democratic institutions and for the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
Helping to create conditions for negotiation or other measures that could facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
Verifying and/or assisting in fulfilling agreements on the peaceful settlement of conflicts; and
Providing support in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society.
According to Wohlfeld, the largest effort of the OSCE has been in post-conflict rehabilitation in South
Eastern Europe. In general, however, the OSCE has valuable experience in conflict prevention on a number of specific issues and has a variety of tools available for this purpose. Like the EU, the OSCE operates in a low-key manner, without much publicity. This is in part because of its limited resources, and in part it is a conscious decision destined to allow for development of trust and dialogue.
Wohlfeld noted that one of the biggest challenges facing the OSCE is the move from early warning to conflict prevention, and from an emphasis on Southeastern Europe to Central Asia and the Caucasus, where the OSCE’s involvement had a bigger added value. Another challenge is the fact that the High
Commissioner on National Minorities has often been criticized for picking only on small states – for obvious reasons the OSCE approaches smaller states differently than more powerful ones (such as
Russia).
Discussion
The Chair of the session opened the discussion by noting that conflict prevention in Europe is exciting but at the same time frustrating because of the politics of the region. The region, unlike other less fortunate regions, is endowed with ample capacity and wealthy and sophisticated regional organizations. At the same time, however, it has not been very successful in actually preventing conflicts.
The first three interveners raised concerns about the work of the OSCE, for which they needed clarification from the presenter. The first intervener asked how the OSCE could achieve coherence if it has to put a large mission together. The second intervener asked how one could identify a successful case of conflict prevention; and the third person asked why the OSCE was not involved in Cyprus.
Wohlfeld responded to these concerns by arguing that it is true that the OSCE is not involved in certain places and this is because these places, politically speaking, are ‘off limits’ areas. On the issue of coherence of large missions, the OSCE relies mainly on seconded staff with a high turnover, which creates some difficulties. However, the OSCE has coherent mandates and consequently also job descriptions to guide members of its missions. It uses experienced mission members to plan and staff new missions. On the issue of measurable factors in conflict prevention, Wohlfeld noted that in conflict prevention lack of success is measurable, whereas success is not. Adding to this last issue, an intervener argued that it is possible to measure the success of conflict prevention initiatives. One way of doing it is to use what he called the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). Another useful tool is the Strategic Country Assessment.
The next intervener asked how the presenters perceive the effectiveness of the OSCE in Central Asia.
The people on the ground in Central Asia still seem to have little information of what the OSCE is all about. Wohlfeld argued that is therefore important to st rengthen the OSCE’s presence in the Central
Asian region.
The next intervener also raised a similar concern. She questioned if the OSCE can use its leverage to develop conflict prevention ideas and institutions elsewhere around the world. Wohlfeld responded
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that the OSCE is already involved in the coordination of economic and environmental activities in the region - especially on the issue of water management. She noted, however, that the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), for example, does not want a lot of publicity and keeps a low profile. It remains unclear how much can be taken from the OSCE and applied in different regional contexts (e.g. NE Asia).
DAY 3 – 16 December 1999
PANEL 6 – THE AMERICAS
Panel Members:
Colleen Duggan (Chair)
Osvaldo Nestor Kreimer
Yadira Soto
Osvaldo Kreimer’s discussion focussed on “The Perspective from Regional Organizations: Conflict
Prevention in the Americas”. He began by recalling an event of the previous week when there was a problem between Honduras and Nicaragua. He noted that the OAS immediately intervened, an indication that the organization is up and running. According to Kreimer, while as much as the OAS
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- has different mechanisms working to prevent conflicts, it will be more effective if the UN and other regional organizations support and coordinate their actions with the OAS.
Kreimer identified a number of sources of conflict in the Americas. Among these are:
Left-over conflicts from the Cold War;
Conflicts involving boundary issues;
Transnational illicit trade;
- Clashes resulting from demographic movements.
He identified a number of instruments that the OAS has at its disposal to deal with conflicts in the region. The first is overall security, dealing with both diplomatic and military issues. He said that under this framework, there are a series of treaties on arms control etc., as well as mechanisms geared towards reducing inter-state threats, increase transparency, curtail arms trade and to prevent and mediate conflict.
The second framework is General Assembly Resolution 1080. Adopted in 1991, the resolution postulates that in the event of any breach or disruption of a government in any member state, the
Secretary General of the OAS can convene a meeting to take early action. Under this framework, a member state can also be suspended. The framework gives the Secretary General the power to act swiftly in times of emergencies. It works through good offices and mediation. For instance, when
President Aristide was ousted from power, this framework was invoked. It was also used in the cases of Peru and Guatemala. Last year the “Washington Declaration” came in force in support of this mechanism, allowing the OAS to expel regimes that are founded on breaches of constitutional processes.
Another mechanism working in the area of conflict prevention at the OAS is the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the main theme of the subsequent presentation.
Finally, Kreimer stressed the importance of the Inter-American system on human rights for conflict prevention. He argued that this important element has not been given enough attention as a conflict prevention mechanism. It does very significant work in moderating conflict and influencing leaders into more responsible action. He outlined the different ways in which activities through a human rights system are in effect conflict prevention mechanisms.
Kreimer concluded by calling attention to the issue of rights of indigenous people in the Americas, an issue which, as he believes, should be addressed properly. Besides the intrinsic fairness and justice
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that lies at the roots of this appeal, such action will reduce tensions in some areas of the region. He cited the example of the Chiapas in Mexico to support his argument.
Yadira Soto’s presentation on “The Role of the Organization of American States in Conflict
Prevention” focussed particularly on the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy – one of the OAS mechanisms for conflict prevention. But before elaborating further, Soto talked briefly about regional organizations and their role in conflict prevention. She emphasized the important roles played by these organizations, which are lately increasingly recognized by the international community.
However, she noted that most of these organizations are hindered by a lack of funds and political support and, usually, a rivalry exists between them and the UN. Instead of rivalry, she called for cooperation between these organizations and the UN so that resources can be harnessed and maximized. She cited the example of Guatemala where, because of such problems, there is much duplication of efforts between the UN and the OAS.
She noted that the OAS, with a membership of 34 states, is the oldest regional organization in the world and has witnessed much transformation. In recent times, the OAS has taken an active role in conflict prevention in the Americas and has achieved a great deal in the area of human rights, capacity building in conflict resolution, and more. After the Cold War, the OAS began focusing inward and paying much more attention towards increased dialogue within states and between civil society and government. Soto noted that, although many Member States of the OAS have established formal peace structures to address potential conflict, such structures do not guarantee peaceful resolution of conflicts because of the numerous post-conflict challenges that they face. Aside from this, such structures do not focus on building relationships between people, and as a result people lack the necessary skills to enter into existing or potential dialogue. Moreover, if governments and civil society are to develop peaceful mechanisms for addressing key national problems and their sources, they will need to develop strategies to modify existing cultural patterns based on confrontation and exclusion and adopt the necessary reforms to bring outdated laws and judicial or political practices in line with democratic principles.
Soto noted that the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) pursues long-term, comprehensive strategies for supporting the democratization efforts of its member states. It is aimed at building indigenous capacity and exploring how training can be institutionalized within society and government.
An integral part of the OAS dialogue and peacebuilding efforts have been to strengthen the capacity of state and nongovernmental institutions to resolve disputes peacefully and prevent recurrence of violent conflict. A key component of several of the UPD programs has been to bring together governmental actors with their civil society counterparts through formal and informal dialogue mechanisms in order forge consensus on key issues of common interest. Some of the UPD’s main areas of focus in training programs are: conflict analysis, resolution, mediation and political negotiation, decentralization and local governance, democratic values and practices, and developing young political leaders. The UPD has a number of working areas: Democratic institution building, technical electoral assistance, information and dialogue, and special programs, where most of the work in conflict resolution training is coordinated. Soto reiterated the UPD training programs in conflict resolution are designed with the participation of the beneficiaries and emphasize the use of participatory training. These methods are geared towards developing a contextualized approach to training design. She used the case of the “Culture of Dialogue: Development of Resources for
Peacebuilding in Guatemala” (PROPAZ) to illustrate the work of the UDP.
The principal strategy of PROPAZ is to develop national capacity to manage conflict by creating formal and informal forums for dialogue and providing training in conflict analysis, communication, negotiation, conciliation, and mediation. In addition, PROPAZ seeks to develop and strengthen collaborative attitudes, abilities, and processes among Guatemalan economic, social and political actors.
She noted that, in the case of PROPAZ, the OAS was invited by the government of Guatemala to design a program that would help Guatemalans address and resolve peacefully the key problems afflicting the country. This provided a good entry point - an important component of conflict prevention.
The OAS worked within the Peace Accord Framework and therefore the priorities, needs and actors were known right from the start. Soto noted that the aim of the OAS is to institutionalize and enhance capacity: thus, if the organization leaves, there will be continuity. The presenter noted that the OAS has had other interesting projects geared towards conflict prevention, training and peacebuilding: in
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Haiti, Nicaragua, and Colombia. She concluded by noting that, in the case of Colombia, there were important lessons learned because of cooperation with academics, the OAS and various key sectors of Colombian society such as indigenous peoples, government and environmental NGOs.
The Chair opened the discussion by commenting that there does not seem to be much coordination between the work of the OAS and other regional organizations, such as the EU. She commended the
OAS on its role in the area of human rights and conflict resolution training.
The first intervener echoed the view of the Chair and argued that interchange among regional organizations is very important. He noted that the experience in Columbia, for example, could be useful for a country such as Nigeria, if there was cooperation between the OAS and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Another intervener was concerned about the level of participation of local communit ies in OAS’s programs. Soto noted that the OAS enlists the active support and participation of local populations in the actual design of its programs.
Another intervener thought that, although the OAS should be commended for its work in the area of human rights, there was much uproar in response to the organization’s report on the Dominican
Republic’s treatment of Haitian people and their descendants born in the Dominican Republic. She noted that the timing of the launching of the report (during the election season) was inappropriate. On this issue, Kreimer noted that human rights have to be defended and violations have to be denounced irrespective of electoral timings.
A further concern was raised in regard to the OAS’s approach of training local people and then leaving the country. It was suggested that the OAS should consider the establishment of permanent or semi-permanent institutions. In addition to training, those institutions could undertake locally conducted research, so that culture, in particular, could be better understood.
PANEL 7 - AFRICA
Panel Members:
Louis Guay (Chair)
Njeri Karuru
Teferra Shiawl
Rasheed Draman
The last panel began with a presentation by Njeri Karuru on “Conflict Prevention in Africa: Responses from Regional Organizati ons.” Her discussion focussed in particular on the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), and the East African Community (EAC).
Karuru noted that, while IGAD was originally established to deal with drought and desertification in the region, it has in recent times taken up security issues as well. The organization is made up of Sudan,
Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Kenya. In 1997, at its Council of Ministers meeting in
Nairobi, the members agreed to implement the organizatio n’s existing projects on conflict prevention, resolution and management. As a result, it was felt that there was a need for capacity building to enable it to do research, training, workshops and seminars. The IGAD commitment to conflict prevention was also demonstrated at the same meeting when it was announced that an IGAD Peace
Fund for Emergency Action had been set up, and that Canada had already granted Cdn$25,000 to the fund. Karuru noted that one of the areas in which IGAD has been forthcoming is mediating in conflicts within its member states.
The East African Community (EAC) is another regional organization that is involved in conflict prevention in the region. Originally established to regulate commercial and industrial relations, the
EAC, because of the numerous threats to peace and security in the region, has recently taken up the issue of security. In 1993, a provision was made for the establishment of a permanent tripartite commission for co-operation, to co-ordinate economic, social, cultural, security and political issues.
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The organization’s Charter contains provisions that specifically empower it to deal with ‘Regional
Peace and Security.” Accordingly, members are urged to commit themselves to conflict prevention as well as better management and resolution of disputes and conflicts.
Karuru offered some recommendations to strengthen sub-regional organizations conflict prevention capacity. The first recommendation calls for the need to strengthen the organizations’ conflict prevention system by focusing on the needs of the people instead of the current practice of focusing on the politics of individual heads of state. The second recommendation relates to the issue of redress. Karuru stressed that one of the biggest problems facing Africa as far as conflict management is concerned is the tendency for conflicts to re-occur. She recommended the involvement of civil society, such as religious groups, in engaging the communities embroiled in conflict in a truth and recovery process that could lead to psychological healing.
A further recommendation concerned human rights. Since human rights abuse has been a major cause of conflict in Africa, Karuru called on sub-regional organizations in Africa to make this a central issue in their work. Other recommendations included the need for a multi-track approach in dealing with conflict, and the need for strong collaboration between the UN, OAU and sub-regional organizations.
Karuru argued in conclusion that, in order to prevent conflict properly, one needs to build relationships, organizations, institutions, and governments that are rooted in peace and non-violence.
For her, that is the ideal peace building strategy.
While Karuru’s paper focused on sub-regional organizations, Teferra Shiawl focussed on the
Organization of African Unity (OAU). He briefly touched on the root causes of conflicts in Africa.
Among other things, he argued that some of the root causes could be found in governments’ lack of respect for the rights of the individual citizen and the wholesale abuse by some of the regimes of such rights in the name of collective rights. Corruption, lack of efficient administration, poor infrastructure and weak national coherence make governance both difficult and costly. The combination of weak states and the scramble for rich natural resources, the culture of looting that is particularly obvious in the case of the diamond mines in Angola, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, has resulted in a dangerous structural environment fueling conflicts.
Shiawl argued that , during the early stages of its establishment, the OAU’s attention was geared towards the attainment of independence for countries that were still under colonial rule. After independence, the focus shifted to economic development. Because of the turbulence on the continent, the attention of the OAU has in recent times been devoted to security issues. At the assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Cairo in July 1993, the organization set up its Mechanism for Conflict Resolution and Management. Its purpose is to be actively engaged in the search for solutions to the numerous conflicts that beset the continent. The OAU has thus been at the forefront of some hot spots in Africa. For instance, a panel of Eminent Personalities was established to investigate the causes of the Rwanda genocide. Supported by the UN, the OAU is involved in the peace efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) through the deployment of a peacekeeping mission and the establishment of the OAU’s Joint Military Commission. Shiawl noted, however, that the efforts of the OAU in the DRC have faced numerous obstacles because of conflicting interests of the allies on all fronts of the conflict.
Shiawl echoed the views of Karuru by arguing that regional organizations have to collaborate if they want to be effective. The effectiveness of any concerted effort rests on three core elements: early action in response to signs of trouble; an extended effort to resolve underlying causes of violence; and a comprehensive, balanced approach to alleviating pressures that can trigger conflicts.
He concluded by arguing that the key to conflict prevention in Africa rests within the agreed international approach to peace building and peacekeeping, the traditional mechanisms of conflict management and prevention and local capacity building in partnership with NGOs.
Rasheed Draman, the last presenter on this panel and the workshop in general, focused his discussion on the conditions and institutions that are needed to secure durable peace in Africa. His presentation on “Conflict Prevention in Africa: Establishing Conditions and Institutions for Durable
Peace” was divided into three parts. A first section looked at the contours/patterns of conflict in Africa.
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A second section briefly discussed some of the contributing factors to conflict. The final section proposed a set of policy recommendations.
Draman pointed out that the patterns of conflict in Africa are characterized by military hostilities between rebel groups, mostly organized, and the incumbent government. Another pattern, aside from the use of force to settle disputes in Africa, is the fact that most conflicts in Africa take the form of
‘irregular warfare’ in which, for strategic reasons, civilians instead of professional soldiers are subjected to the most heinous atrocities. A third pattern is the extent to which almost all conflicts in
Africa have been commercialized.
Discussing the causes of conflict in Africa, Draman looked at the role of small arms and regional causal factors. He argued that the role of arms in fueling conflict in Africa is manifest in the mountain of arms that has been used to destabilize the continent. Arms do not cause conflict by themselves, but their proliferation and wide availability pose a major threat to peace, security and development on the continent. Regarding regional causal factors, the presenter noted the important role that some African leaders play in fueling some of the deadly conflicts on the continent. The cases of Liberia and the
DRC are instructive.
Draman offered a number of policy recommendations that would need to be followed, if the pursuit of durable peace in Africa is not to remain elusive:
First, there is the need for strengthening the OAU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional organizations to strengthen their capacity for preventive deployment, as political will is not as much a problem as economic means. They also need training in handling complex emergencies and skills in conflict resolution. The experience of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone provide very good lessons.
Another recommendation concerns the need to improve the structure of society – by addressing issues of poverty, unemployment or economic inequalities. There is also a need for training to improve governance. UN agencies such as the UNDP are engaged in such activities, but more needs to be done in this area. Moreover, conflict skills need to be disseminated as widely as possible.
People need to be well-informed and equipped conflict management skills. Other recommendations include the need to promote the development of a culture of peace; and the need to cultivate and support moderate local leaders as a central component of conflict prevention. Also important is the need for strengthened regional cooperation in Africa and responsible political behavior from leaders; the education and reintegration of child soldiers and combatants; the need to invest in preventive action in countries which appear stable at the moment; and, lastly, the need for a coordinated, concerted and sustained efforts to control the vast illicit trade in small arms.
The Chair noted that conflict resolution and conflict prevention are conceptually and technically quite different. The general opinion of the workshop seems to have been that there is no need to engage in an effort of trying to operationalize and contextualize conflict prevention at the local level. This is especially so in Africa where it is sometimes difficult to make such distinctions, as most of the conflicts seem to have no clear onset and termination points.
In terms of the role of natural resources and the political economies that fuel some of the conflicts in
Africa, one intervener noted that it would be important to turn the economies of war into economies of peace. This calls for the development of strategies by regional organizations in Africa to engage more constructively multinationals that do business in Africa.
A number of interveners talked about regional conflict prevention efforts in Africa. They noted the dilemma here – most of the conflicts are regional in nature and yet these regional organizations are supposed to resolve these conflicts.
Another issue raised concerned the need for cooperation between regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa with other regional organizations. This is an issue that kept recurring in almost all the regional panel discussions.
Since the aim of the workshop is long term conflict prevention, one intervener noted that there is the need to use training as a long-term systematic tool in conflict prevention. He called on regional organizations to work with educational institutions at all levels to achieve this objective.
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The last intervener noted that, while the aim of conflict prevention is to ensure the resolution of conflicts without violence, the larger objective of this project is not only to prevent genocide such as in
Rwanda, but, rather, it is long term, structural prevention.
OVERALL SUMMARY
In summary, the workshop produced the following findings and recommendations:
A. Conflict prevention research and training need to focus on:
1. Thorough analysis;
2. Multilateral and multi-track application;
3. Strategy convergence and harmonization;
4. Lessons learned between the UN and regional organizations;
5. Stimulation of donor activity;
6. Impa ct assessment and “sales strategy” of conflict prevention as investment in a safe future;
7. Ownership and self management.
B. More specifically, the following issues and concerns need to be addressed:
1. Analysis needs to be complex, multilevel, strategic and individual;
2. Actors need to be involved multilaterally, through multi-track initiatives, these processes and interactions must be sustainable;
3. Capacity building is crucial;
4. Convergence requires joint initiatives and information exchange;
5. The political economy of conflict and conflict prevention need to be (better) understood
Harmonization and mainstreaming could take place through policy coordination that is both formal and informal; including expert groups or standing contact groups. Sustainability could be best achieved through self-ownership and the development of indigenous capability. Donors could act as catalysts for these processes. Harmonization requires identification of key stakeholders and an inventory of needs and security providers. An engaged civil society may be the best route to achieve grassroots multi-track conflict prevention at the local level.
C. A number of challenges need to be met:
1. Entry and exit strategies for ROs into a conflict situation;
2. Problems of capacity building;
3. The development of proper impact assessment and evaluation;
4. Measuring effectiveness;
5. Development of a critical mass of interest in local issues (among local and external actors);
6. Recognition of, and work in the context of, a power politics framework;
7. Mainstreaming of CP training;
8. Identification of key tools for the end user;
9. Finding proper entry points and partners for CP action;
10. Securing appropriate timing and agents of change
D. Short-term and long-term issues of immediate concern:
1.
-
Working relationships between: regional organizations and the UN
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- regional organizations and other regional organizations
- organs, departments and institutions of the UN
…need to be improved dramatically.
2. Conflict prevention has to move closer to the local level; or, at the very least, national and international efforts have to be well tuned into local needs and invest in local capacity building.
3. Conflict prevention, at all levels, has to be sustainable (and has to be sustained) to assure meaningful results.
4. Regional organizations and the UN should have at their disposal stand-by expert groups (with theoretical, practical and regional expertise on conflict prevention) for urgent advice on early warning and preventive measures.
5. Academics and policymakers alike need to develop successful approaches to sell conflict prevention to decision-makers and opinion-makers.
6. “Lessons-learned” exercises undertaken by various regional organizations and UN institutions need to be thoroughly evaluated by all actors involved in conflict prevention activities.
7. Although difficult to measure, efforts need to be undertaken to determine, evaluate and explain success of preventive action.
8. Beyond the rhetoric of cooperation between the UN, regional organizations and civil society actors, the relationship(s) between them needs to be understood and pragmatically assessed.
9. Too much rhetoric and too many good ideas that have not been followed up have made conflict prevention a meaningless concept and exercise in the eyes of many stakeholders.
Smaller steps, based on pragmatic assessments of what can and cannot be done, along with honest efforts to engage in long-term human development, conflict avoidance and peace management, can go a long way in re-instilling confidence in the ability of intergovernmental, state and non-state actors to prevent or minimize violent conflict and human suffering.
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