I. Roberts: There are no laws of the social sciences
Social sciences = sciences involving human behaviour (Economics,
Psychology, Sociology, Political Science)
7.1 Significance of question: are there laws in S.S.?
(Why care?)
Possible answers:
a) The existence of laws in the social sciences is incompatible with human
freedom.
Why rejected?
Laws in S.S. are compatible with deterministic freedom.
Laws in S.S. are compatible even with indeterminism.
Non-existence of laws in S.S. is compatible with determinism.
b) The existence of laws in the social sciences is a necessary condition if
they are to count as genuine science. [cf. Hempel’s D-N model]
Why rejected?
Explanations and predictions need not invoke laws.
c) Physics (‘paradigm’ science) has laws; other fields count as science to the
extent that they resemble physics.
Why rejected?
Roberts substitutes a sociological characterization of science, to
which social sciences conform.
Qu: Is this circular?
Better: The existence of laws is not an a priori requirement.
Roberts’ thesis:
The question is significant because if we assume that the social
sciences are sciences, and we can establish the non-existence of laws
in the social sciences, then existence (or discovery) of laws cannot be
the hallmark of a science.
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7.2 What is a law?
If there are no laws, then there are no laws in social sciences and Roberts’
point is established. So Roberts assumes that laws exist in physics.
1. Laws are closely related to regularities [identical to or entail].
Three kinds of regularity:
A) Strict regularity
“All copper conducts electricity.”
B) Statistical regularity “Any atom of U238 has probability 0.5 of
decay within 4.5 billion years”
C) Hedged (ceteris
Paribus) regularity
Possible ex: Law of supply and demand.
“If quantity supplied increases while
demand function remains unchanged, the
price decreases”, etc.
Hedged regularities:
- “rules of thumb” for prediction and explanation
- false in too many special cases to be reformulated as either a
strict regularity or a statistical regularity.
- exceptions are not made explicit and cannot be spelled out
except by saying “if no interference”, or “ceteris paribus”
[Cartwright: all laws are hedged?]
Note: there is no statistical regularity if the reference class can clearly
be partitioned (footnote 3).
2. Laws have a ‘modal character’.
Laws vs. accidental regularities.
Modal character: for Dretske, Cartwright and others, it’s because
laws are not about objects in the world, but something different.
3. Laws are robust (= not ‘fragile’). [Necessary for lawhood; see note 6.]
Rejects: Law = general, true, contingent, plays a role in explanation
Fragile = too easily upset by change [Ex: “Sea water is salty”]
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7.3 Three distinct questions
“Are there laws in the social sciences?” could mean any of the following
three questions:
(A) Have social scientists discovered any laws?
Roberts: No.
(B) Are there really any laws within the subject matter of the social
sciences?
Roberts: No (focus of argument).
(C) Do successful theories in social sciences posit laws?
Roberts: Charitably, no (and ignore all talk of laws).
Question:
For the analogous questions about physics: Roberts answers
“Probably not” for (a), and “Maybe” for (b). Yet he takes physicists
at their word to answer “Yes” for (c). Why not same for soc. sci.?
Clarification: Laws “within” soc. sci. = laws formulated using concepts of
soc. sci. (i.e., properties and kinds drawn from soc. sci.).
“All politicians fall with acceleration = 9.8 m/s2 near the surface of
the earth” does not count.
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7.4 The main argument against laws in social sciences
1. Laws in social sciences could only be hedged laws; but
2. There are no hedged laws.
A “hedged law” is a law that is (or entails) only a hedged regularity.
Question: Why not the following easier argument?
1′. Laws in social sciences could only be hedged laws in the social
sciences; but
2′. There are no hedged laws in the social sciences?
In fact, Roberts may be arguing for 2′ instead of 2.
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7.5 Laws in social sciences could only be hedged laws
1. Example: the “law” of supply and demand.
- cannot be a strict law: clear exceptions [rent control, impending
meteor crash, etc.]
- cannot be a statistical law
Qu: What is the argument here?
So it must be a hedged law: we can’t specify all the exceptions.
2. Objection: it could be a strict law:
“If conditions C obtain, then ...”
Roberts’ dilemma:
either C ≡ “there is a violation” [and we then have a tautology]
or C is characterized disjunctively, and it’s inexhaustible.
Diagnosis: kinds in the social sciences are multiply realizable.
A social system supervenes on the underlying physical system.
[No change in social system w/o change in the physical
system.]
A large and heterogeneous class of physical systems could
‘realize’ any social kind.
And how the social system will evolve depends greatly on the
details of the physical system.
**Any “law” that would work across the range of physical
systems would be uselessly weak.
Question: What about similar objections to laws in physics? (E.g., laws of
thermodynamics/stat. mech., where there is a tiny probability of decreased
entropy. Or Lang’s example: Metal bars expand when heated.)
Alternatively: could these be statistical laws after all?
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7.6 Case against hedged laws (in general or in S.S.?)
Basic argument:
1. Any hedged law either is or would entail a hedged regularity.
[§7.2]
2. There is no coherent concept of hedged regularity that could be or
be entailed by a social science law.
Hedged regularity:
When A happens, B happens unless there is interference.
Roberts’ point:
We have to have some non-tautological way to identify what would
count as interference. There are only two serious options.
(1) An interference is any cause of B failing to happen.
Objection: leads to too many hedged regularities.
Ex: Every sphere is magnetic.
Question: Is there hope for this view if interference is
characterized more precisely?
(2) We can’t identify the class of interferences, but we understand ‘in
context’ what counts as interference.
Example: Metal rods expand when heated.
Hitting with a sledgehammer counts as interference.
Objection: No help in social sciences.
Multiple realizability in complex physical system ⇒
nobody could have an ‘implicit grasp’ of interference.
Questions: 1) Is Roberts now working with 2′ instead of 2?
2) Is the ‘no implicit grasp’ claim obviously correct?
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7.7 Social Sciences don’t need laws
Example: studies of agrarian political systems and their link to revolution
Kincaid:
These are “laws” (albeit hedged laws).
Roberts:
These are not laws, but “projectible statistical results” suitable for
prediction and explanation.
They may be strict or statistical regularities. But they are too ‘fragile’
to be laws: they could be too easily upset by changes in
circumstances.
Question: Does Roberts’ objection rest on intuitions about fragility that are
ultimately circular?
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II. Kincaid: There are laws in the social sciences
Paradigm: the law of supply and demand
8.1, 8.2: What is a Law?
First answer: an exceptionless generalization (about human society, for the
social sciences)
Familiar objections (generalizations that aren’t laws):
- wrong level of description (“Humans are attracted by gravity.”)
- logical truths (“Human societies are populated by humans.”)
- accidental regularities (“No state has lasted > 1000 years.”)
Strategy:
Look at paradigm cases and extract the essential features.
Main claim:
Any statement that picks out causal factors is a law.
Comment: Kincaid seems to be setting the bar for lawhood very low. That
leads to a battery of objections.
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In defence of main claim:
1. “Not universal regularities.” Cartwright shows that laws identify
explanatory factors without generating accurate universal regularities.
Kincaid embraces this view of laws.
2. “Laws need not be causal.” No problem – he is looking at one category
of law. “Laws as causal factors” conception seems legitimate, even if it is
just one kind of law.
3. “Singular causal claims can’t be laws.” One can avoid reference to
particulars by reformulating the claim. [A better response is Hempel’s idea:
every singular causal claim implies some general relationship holds over a
range of nearby cases.]
4. “Laws are non-accidental, they support counterfactuals, and they
lead to prediction; causal factors may do none of these.” Response: no
fundamental division between laws and other types of causal claims. It’s
just a matter of degree (scope).
In particular: any causal claim supports some counterfactuals and some
predictions.
[Compare: Woodward’s invariants are like “little laws”.]
5. “Laws describe fundamental causal forces that aren’t the result of
deeper forces.” This is too demanding, even within the physical sciences.
“Derivative” laws should count as laws: they can explain and predict.
But: at the very end, he backs off from his main claim to suggest that laws
identify causal factors with “significant” or “wide” potential for explanation
and prediction.
Question: Is there a purely metaphysical conception of law (causal factors)
or a partly pragmatic one (significant potential = “widely used” in
explanation and prediction)?
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8.3 Problems and Prospects for General Causal Knowledge
Pattern for establishing causal knowledge (causal inference):
• Start with background knowledge about possible causes, known
causes
• Observe how changes in some (variables) lead to changes in others
Ideal: all possible causal factors known; all but one held fixed.
Possible obstacles to employing this type of reasoning in social sciences:
Nonexperimental. Response: Experiment is not always required.
Nature provides cases where some factors are held constant and others
are varied. (Examples: astronomy, evolutionary biology)
Heavy reliance on idealizations and abstractions. Best response:
controllability (Sklar). An idealization or assumption is controllable
if its literal falsehood can be shown not to matter:
i) Because the difference from true value is negligible (sin θ = θ
in pendulum case); or
ii) Because the causal factor combines linearly with other
factors to produce the behaviour (gravity and EM force).
iii) Because we have independent theoretical grounds for
ignoring the omitted causal factors (thermodynamics / statistical
mechanics).
Idealizations in social sciences are (or can be) controllable.
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Example: law of supply and demand
• Picks out causal factors (supply, demand, price mechanism)
• Evidence from
- passive observation that takes other possible causal factors
into account
- theoretical models
[Note: this part is sketchy – the objective is just to convince us that
it’s possible. But are the idealizations so obviously controllable?]
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8.4 Objections
1. Hedged laws. The laws have exceptions that can’t be identified in
advance.
Main Response: We need not think of laws in social sciences as ceteris
paribus.
Analogy: law of gravity does not claim to identify an exceptionless
regularity, but identifies “gravitational force”. We need not think of
this as a ceteris paribus law.
Similarly: law of supply and demand identifies real causal factors, in
isolation from other possible causal factors.
Question: In the case of gravity, the force combines additively with any
others that might be present. Is it harder to think of the causal factors in
economics as “really there” when they would interact non-additively with
other forces?
[Acid/base and aspirin/alcohol examples]
2. Human freedom. Humans make free choices, so they are not subject to
“laws”.
In more detail: causal laws should allow for prediction; but human
freedom makes prediction impossible.
Objections:
1. Compatibilist free will is compatible with prediction.
2. Not all of social science is about behaviour of individuals – some
constraints are fixed.
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Some final questions:
1. What of Roberts’ objection about knowing in advance what counts as
interference? Is that a sine qua non for a law?
2. Does he push the analogy between “supply and demand” and “gravity”
too far?
If Cartwright is wrong: the law of gravitation does truly describe a
real force (a component of the total force).
Can we understand supply and demand as “real” forces that are
“components” of some net force?
Example: Relatively stable price of a personal computer.
Innovation ⇒ shifts supply curve upwards
Increased demand ⇒ shifts demand curve upwards
Result: new price is same as old.
Can we think of these as “real” forces that have produced no
change in price?