Conceptions,
Understanding, and
Wisdom
John Bengson (ANU/Wisconsin)
&
Marc Moffett (Wyoming)
The Starting Point
One’s conception of something is how one conceives or thinks, or is
somehow inclined to think, of it.
 That’s not an analysis or theory, but a way of pointing to a rather
familiar phenomenon.
2
We have conceptions of
 ourselves,
 our environment (e.g., as something sacred),
 motion (Newton’s conception differed from Aristotle’s),
 how to reason according to modus ponens,
 a variety of traditional philosophical topics such as freedom,
justice, truth, reference, knowledge, and so forth.
What are conceptions? What is their philosophical significance?
3
A number of philosophers have claimed that conceptions and their kin
(e.g., schemas, stereotypes, perspectives, views, “frames”) are
indispensable in a wide variety of areas.
4
This talk will develop an account of the M&E of conceptions that
may provide the theoretical resources needed to assess such
claims.
The talk will also explore some of the further significance of
conceptions.
 We’ll argue that an adequate account of conceptions yields
insight into the nature of understanding.
 It also introduces a straightforward treatment of the notion of a
worldview.
 And it illuminates the classical centerpiece of philosophia: the
notion of wisdom.
5
The Plan
Part I: The M&E of Conceptions
 Clarify some central features of conceptions and critically
examine extant reductionist treatments
 Introduce an alternative, non-reductionist theory
Part II: The Significance of Conceptions
 A new analysis of understanding
 A new analysis of wisdom
 Extension to other notions: authenticity and intelligent action
6
Part I:
The M&E of Conceptions
§1. Reductionist Theories
An Ambiguity
 one’s having a conception = a mental attitude (state, event)
 the conception that one has = a content
Neither has received much attention, at least not as such. This may
be due to a widespread yet largely implicit acceptance of reductive
views of conceptions (in terms of concepts or propositions).
8
Conceptual Reductionism
[CRC] Conceptions (the contents) = concepts
 concept: non-mentalistic entity (e.g., Fregean sense)
[CRA] Conceptions (the attitudes) = mental relations to concepts,
or states of grasping concepts
9
Assessing [CRC]
In general, a conception of  (the content) is not identical to a
concept of .
 First, it’s plausible that some concepts—perhaps concepts for
colors, consciousness, existence—are simple and unanalysable.
Even so, it seems possible to have complex conceptions of these
things. (Cf. Frege on truth.)
10
Assessing [CRC]
In general, a conception of  (the content) is not identical to a
concept of .
 Second, consider Tyler Burge’s arthritis example.
Burge has argued convincingly that the patient and doctor share
the same concept of arthritis. Regardless, it seems clear that their
conceptions of arthritis are quite different (for the confused
patient: as possibly occurring in the thigh).
11
A possible “move” is to hold that a conception of  is a concept, but
not a concept of —it’s a concept of something else.
But this introduces a general reason against thinking that a
conception is identical to any concept (or set of concepts).
12
 Consider once again Burge’s doctor and patient.
They might possess all of the same concepts, including the
concept possibly occurring in the thigh. But they could still
have different conceptions of arthritis: only for the patient is
this concept “oriented towards” arthritis—it as it were
purports to say how arthritis is.
The difference lies, not in their conceptual repertoires, but in
something else—again, how those repertoires are “oriented
towards” the world (here, arthritis). [More on this notion later.]
13
Assessing [CRA]
For analogous reasons, conceptions (the
attitudes) are not identical to states of
grasping concepts.
 Consider the particular conception of Middle East politics you
currently harbor. While this conception plausibly requires grasping
various concepts, your current conception of Middle East politics is
not (or, not simply) a state of grasping those concepts.
You have to as it were put those concepts to use in characterizing
Middle East politics.
14
These points are compatible with the following ideas:
 conceptions (the contents) are structured entities constituted, at
least in part, by concepts;
 conceptions (the attitudes) require grasping those concepts.
Both ideas are plausible.
This, together with the observation that conceptions purport to say or
characterize how things are, would seem to make them prop- or propattitude-like.
Perhaps this is why a number of philosophers have been attracted to a
propositional reduction.
15
Propositional Reductionism
[PRC] Conceptions (the contents) = propositions
 prop: the semantic value of a full indicative sentence
[PRA] Conceptions (the attitudes) = mental relations to props, or
prop attitudes
16
 In Truly Understood, Christopher Peacocke says conceptions
are states of knowledge. [Problem: Arist vs. Newton on motion.]
 Frank Jackson equates “folk conceptions” with “folk
theories”—presumably these are often opinions or beliefs, not
necessarily knowledge.
 David Wiggins: “A conception of horse is a set of beliefs
concerning what horses are, or what it is to be a horse.”
 Anil Gupta: conceptions or “views” involve judgments.
17
Against a Propositional Reduction
While conceptions are certainly like props and prop-attitudes in many
ways, there are also several (subtle) differences.
For example, propositions are bearers of truth/falsity, the contents of
belief, and possible objects of judgment. By contrast,
 Conceptions aren’t true or false (rather, they’re correct/incorrect).
# ‘The conception of nature as something sacred is true.’
 Conceptions aren’t the contents of belief.
# ‘A believes the conception of nature as something sacred.’
 Conceptions aren’t possible objects of judgment.
# ‘What I judge to be true is the conception of nature as
something sacred.’
18
Interestingly, conceptions are possible objects, not of judgment, but
rather of broadly evaluative attitudes like respect, admiration, and
abhorrence.
‘I have a deep respect for the conception of nature as sacred.’
Contrast:
# ‘I have a deep respect for the proposition that nature is sacred.’
19
Further, propositions are introduced by certain expressions involving
that-clauses.
‘A believes the proposition that nature is sacred.’
By contrast, conceptions are canonically introduced by certain
expressions involving as- or by-clauses.
‘A’s conception of nature is as something sacred.’
‘A’s conception of how to reason according to modus ponens is by
inferring q from (p, pq).’
20
If the preceding is correct, conceptions (the contents) are not
identical to props, and conceptions (the attitudes) are not identical
to prop attitudes.
Of course, it doesn’t follow that conceptions (the contents) are not
somehow associated with propositions, and that conceptions (the
attitudes) are not grounded in prop attitudes.
Both ideas are quite plausible, and a non-reductive theory can
accept them.
Let’s now try to develop such a theory.
21
Part I:
The M&E of Conceptions
§2. A Non-reductive Theory
The Foundations
i. Pointer: One’s conception of δ is how one conceives of δ.
ii. Relational Constraint: Conceptions (the attitudes) relate thinkers
to conceptions (the contents).
iii. Constitution Thesis: Conceptions (the contents) are structured
entities constituted by concepts.
23
iv. Orientation Constraint: Unlike concepts, conceptions (the contents)
are “oriented towards” the world.
v. As/by constraint: Unlike props, they are canonically introduced with
certain expressions involving as- and by-clauses (e.g., as something
sacred).
vi. Grounding Thesis: They serve as contents of mental states
(conceptions, the attitudes) that are distinct from but nevertheless
grounded in prop attitudes.
24
We think these constraints identify features of conceptions that any
theory of conceptions must capture.
 In a moment we’ll float a proposal that looks to satisfy this
desideratum.
Of course, conceptions also have a variety of other features that
must be respected. Here are four.
25
Some Broadly Logico-semantical Properties of Conceptions
a. Non-factivity: A conception of  can be correct or incorrect, and to
a greater or lesser degree.
 Burge’s arthritis patient
b. Non-exhaustiveness: A conception of  can be complete or
incomplete, and to a greater or lesser degree.
 My current conception of black
holes
26
c. Diversity: There can be many distinct conceptions of a single .
 Aristotle vs. Newton on motion
d. Publicity: Two distinct individuals can share a single conception of .
 Augustine and Descartes on the soul (as immaterial and immortal)
27
In some ways conceptions are proposition-like or prop-attitude-like.
In other ways they are more concept-like or grasp-of-concept-like.
Conceptions are neither, though intimately related to both. Perhaps
they can be viewed as “lying in-between”.
At any rate, they belong to their own category.
 They have (types of) properties which neither concepts nor
props have; they lack (types of) properties which either concepts
or props have.
28
A Proposal
[NRc] What it is for a conception  of  (the content) to exist is for
there to be a (possibly ordered or singleton) set C of concepts C1,
..., Cn oriented towards  in such a way as to characterize ,
where what it is for C to be oriented towards  in such a way as
to characterize  is for there to be some corresponding set P of
propositions P1, …, Pn, where P1 = [ is C1], …, Pn = [ is Cn], such
that  is wholly correct iff every member of P is true.
[NRA] What is it for an individual x to have a conception of  (the
attitude) is for there to be a conception  of  (the content) and for
x to stand in the having relation to ,
where what it is for x to stand in the having relation to  is for x
to possess a set PA of acceptance-entailing prop attitudes such
that every member of PA is true iff  is wholly correct.
29
A Proposal
[NRc] What it is for a conception  of  (the content) to exist is for
there to be a (possibly ordered or singleton) set C of concepts C1,
..., Cn oriented towards  in such a way as to characterize ,
where what it is for C to be oriented towards  in such a way as
to characterize  is for there to be some corresponding set P of
propositions P1, …, Pn, where P1 = [ is C1], …, Pn = [ is Cn], such
that  is wholly correct iff every member of P is true.
[NRA] What it is for an individual x to have a conception of  (the
attitude) is for there to be a conception  of  (the content) and for
x to stand in the having relation to ,
where what it is for x to stand in the having relation to  is for x
to possess a set PA of acceptance-entailing prop attitudes such
that every member of PA is true iff  is wholly correct.
30
These theses offer a substantive characterization of conceptions
which captures their core features and connects them to concepts
and props (non-reductive but not “brute”).
These are some of the specific virtues of the proposal.
31
Broader Virtues
The theory also has a variety of potential
theoretical implications and applications,
showing that conceptions are not explanatorily idle.
Some were mentioned earlier: a priority, anti-individualism,
conceptual analysis, imaginative resistance, meaning, and
perception.
Here, we’ll focus on the theory of understanding, then turn briefly
to wisdom.
32
Part II:
The Significance of Conceptions
§3. An Analysis of Understanding
Varieties of Understanding
We’ll focus on objectual understanding, not propositional or factual
understanding.
 understanding global warming
vs.
 understanding that global warming is thus and so.
(NB: We realize there may be a difference between understanding 
and an understanding of . Our primary concern is the former, if and
when they diverge.)
34
Arguably, understanding-that may serve as a useful means when the
comparatively more fundamental end of achieving a general
understanding-of.
 For example, to understand that
global warming is partly caused by
the accumulation of CFC’s in the
atmosphere may be of some help
in achieving an understanding of
global warming. But clearly more
is wanted.
 What else? What is understanding-of?
35
A Proposal
To understand  is to have a certain type of conception of : a noetic
conception.
36
Noetic Conceptions
Like all conceptions, noetic conceptions come in degrees, e.g.,
degrees of correctness and completeness.
This is desirable, for understanding comes in degrees.
 One can understand better or worse, or have a greater or lesser
degree of understanding.
 Correspondingly, one’s conception may contain greater or fewer
gaps and errors, which may be corrected and completed (or vv).
 Specifically, one can correct one’s conception by adding
suitable true props to P. One can complete one’s conception by
adding suitable concepts to C.
 So the proposal makes sense of how one’s understanding may
change: improve, strengthen, weaken, regress, etc.
Noetic conceptions also have several distinctive features.
37
To explain what is distinctive about noetic conceptions, two notions
are needed:
 the notion of the core of a conception
 the notion of a central attribute (property, relation, etc.)
38
The Core
In general, what a conception of  does is characterize : it specifies
attributes of  (corresponding to various members of C, e.g. C1).
Part of the conception characterizes what  is: it specifies what
attributes are part of what it is to be  (corresponding to different
members of C, e.g. C2). This is the ‘core’ of the conception.
For example, it might be part of my conception of the rainforest
that it has been inhabited for most of human history, and so it is
appealing to people as a natural habitat. But its being an appealing
natural habit isn’t part of the core of my conception of the
rainforest, of what the rainforest is.
As we shall see, much of what’s distinctive of noetic
conceptions concerns what’s happening in the core.
39
Central Attributes
Central attributes may be context sensitive in various ways. They are
sometimes essential attributes (what  is essentially), as perhaps in
the context of Descartes’ project in the Meditations. Other times
they are not essential, but central in some other relevant way.
For instance, accumulation of CFC’s may be a central attribute of
global warming given our current overuse of fossil fuels. However,
different technological developments might generate global
warming in different ways and in those circumstances other
(bio)chemical mechanisms may be central (given our interests and
concerns).
Very roughly, noetic conceptions “place” the central attributes in
the core.
40
Unlike other conceptions, noetic conceptions are:
1. Correct in the core
 their core does not include any of ’s non-central attributes
Suppose that the failure to plant lots of trees is not a central
attribute of global warming (e.g., because planting trees is not by
itself an effective means to reducing carbon). This should be
reflected in a noetic conception of global warming: to conceive of
global warming otherwise is to harbor a confusion.
To include non-central attributes in the
core is to conceive of  incorrectly.
Having such a conception indicates a
certain kind of error in understanding.
41
Unlike other conceptions, noetic conceptions are:
1. Correct in the core
2. Complete in the core
 their core does not omit any of ’s central
attributes
Suppose that A1, …, AM are central attributes of global warming.
This should be reflected in a noetic conception. A conception of
global warming that omits any of these central attributes from the
core is lacking or deficient in a crucial respect.
To omit central attributes from the core is to conceive of 
incompletely. It indicates a certain kind of gap in understanding.
42
Unlike other conceptions, noetic conceptions are:
1. Correct in the core
2. Complete in the core
3. Internally connected
 their core identifies substantive connections between ’s central
attributes
Suppose that planting trees doesn’t offset increased carbon caused
by widespread deforestation, unless the planted trees manage to be
carbon-neutral (e.g., they enter the geology or become part of a
self-sustaining forest). Identifying such connections (here, centered
on carbon) may be important to understanding global warming.
43
Unlike other conceptions, noetic conceptions are:
1. Correct in the core
2. Complete in the core
3. Internally connected
4. Externally coherent
 their core coheres with their non-core, as well as with related
conceptions (in particular, with conceptions of ’s central
attributes themselves)
Suppose one conceives of global warming as the result of
excessive carbon; at the same time, one conceives of carbon as a
chemical element that is very rare and precious. This tension may
impede one’s understanding of global warming.
44
To summarize, noetic conceptions are:
1. Correct in the core
2. Complete in the core
3. Internally connected
4. Externally coherent
 Other conditions (e.g., anti-luck) might be proposed. We demur,
and in any case regard (1) - (4) as “centerpieces”.
45
The Proposal, Restated
To understand  is to have an internally connected and externally
coherent conception of  that is correct and complete in the core.
 This is perfect understanding (this assumes an upper bound is
coherent).
 There is also imperfect understanding, or degrees thereof—
which are approximations of perfect understanding (this assumes
some scale is coherent).
46
A Comparison: Kvanvig’s proposal
“Understanding requires the grasping of explanatory
and other coherence-making relationships in a large and
comprehensive body of information. One can know many unrelated
pieces of information, but understanding is achieved only when
informational items are pieced together by the subject in question.”
—Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge . . . (2003, 192)
 Whether this is plausible, presumably it’s not meant as an analysis.
The shift from understanding to grasping is hardly an advance.
 In any case, it would just move the question: what is ‘grasping’?
 One can interpret our analysis as doing away with the need to
appeal to ‘grasping’. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as explicating
such ‘grasping’ in terms of noetic conceptions.
47
This is of course just the beginning of a full theory of understanding.
If it is correct (at least in outline, even if not in detail), then
explicating understanding is one important job that conceptions
might do.
Analyzing wisdom and related notions is perhaps another.
48
Part II:
The Significance of Conceptions
§3. Wisdom, Worldview, and Related Notions
Wisdom
It’s sometimes suggested that the aim of philosophy is wisdom.
If understanding is constituted by a noetic conception, then wisdom
is plausibly constituted by an appropriate noetic conception—for
instance, a noetic conception of the world and one’s place in it.
 Call this a noetic self-world conception.
One could just be wise about this or that (domain-specific wisdom).
In such a case, we can regard one as having a noetic conception of 
and ’s place in the world: a noetic -world conception.
 We’ll focus on wisdom (full stop).
50
It seems to be a platitude that the wise “see things aright”, or
without illusion—things broadly construed.
This is what we intend to capture with the notion of a noetic selfworld conception.
What is the precise content of such a conception?
 Perhaps, recalling the Tao Te Ching:
Those who say, don’t know;
those who know, don’t say.
51
A Comparison: Zagzebski’s Proposal
In Virtues of the Mind, Linda Zagzebski suggests that
Wisdom “is a matter of grasping the whole of reality”.
Here, again, the appeal to ’grasping’ makes it difficult to regard this
as an analysis (or, at least, an informative one).
As before, our approach can be interpreted as discarding ‘grasping’,
or as explicating it in terms of noetic conceptions.
Our approach might also be seen as replacing ‘whole of reality’ with
something slightly more focused (which takes into account the
standpoint of the individual), yet equally abstract.
52
Remaining at an abstract level, then:
To be wise is to have an internally connected and externally coherent
conception of the world and one’s place in it that is correct and
complete in the core.
 This is full-blown wisdom: perfect wisdom, as it were.
 There are also lesser degrees of wisdom—which are, in effect,
approximations of a noetic self-world conception.
53
The Connection between Wisdom, Understanding, and Conceptions
Here is the Dalai Lama on the path to wisdom:
[D]efilements of the mind such as lust, hatred, jealousy, and
belligerence are based on a fundamental misconception of the
nature of persons and objects… In order to overcome this
misconception of the nature of persons and things, you have to
understand their true nature. (2002, 57)
A consciousness that conceives of [reality as having] inherent
existence does not have a solid foundation. A wise consciousness,
grounded in reality, understands that living beings and other
phenomena—minds, bodies, buildings, and so forth—do not
inherently exist. This is the wisdom of emptiness. Understanding
reality exactly opposite to the misconception of inherent existence,
wisdom gradually overcomes ignorance. (140)
54
The Socrates Example
This approach to wisdom in terms of understanding,
rather than knowledge-that, renders intelligible
(without endorsing) the Oracle’s claim: Socrates
was wisest because he knew he was ignorant.
In this respect, our view is like other understanding-based views. But
one specific advantage of our version is that it provides a general
analysis which reveals the basic “shape” of wisdom; as a result, it
allows an underlying diagnosis of what’s happened in the example.
 Despite his lack of knowledge-that, Socrates is being claimed to
have a noetic self-world conception: viz., a conception of the world
as something of which he is ignorant.
Of course, other traditions will dispute whether this specific
“Socratic” conception is in fact a noetic self-world conception (recall
the Dalai Lama). Our analysis makes sense of this dispute (a further
55
advantage).
Theoretical Wisdom vs. Practical Wisdom
It might be said that while a noetic self-world conception may
illuminate theoretical wisdom, it does not capture practical wisdom
(this assumes a theoretical/practical distinction is coherent or
compulsory).
This isn’t a problem for our approach. Practical wisdom can be
analyzed as a different noetic conception.
 For instance, a noetic action-oriented conception—that is, a
noetic conception of how to live well.
(NB: There is a natural connection to know-how here. Elsewhere
we have analyzed knowledge-how in terms of conceptions of ways
of acting, which would vindicate the connection.)
56
An Extension to Action
Suppose the foregoing analysis of wisdom is correct. Then we could
say:
To act wisely is to act in a way that exercises a noetic actionoriented conception.
This can be seen as an instance of a more general view of intelligent
action:
To act intelligently is to act in a way that exercises an appropriate
noetic conception.
In this way, conceptions enable a plausible “intellectualist” view of
wisdom and wise action, and of intelligence and intelligent action
more generally (which we develop in other work).
57
The Notion of a Worldview
By contrast with wisdom, when one has a non-noetic conception of
the world, one merely has a worldview. More generally:
A worldview is a conception of the world.
Correlatively, we can say:
A selfview is a conception of oneself.
This might enable an analysis of the ordinary notion of authenticity:
To act authentically is to act in a way that exercises one’s selfview.
58
Summary

A non-reductive (but not “brute”) theory of conceptions.

An analysis of understanding in terms of noetic conceptions.
Analyses of wisdom, worldview, and related notions also in terms of
conceptions.

The core idea: conceptions are a distinctive type of entity that may
illuminate understanding, and such a link between conceptions and
understanding may help to illuminate wisdom and related
phenomena.
59
Thanks to Chad Carmichael, Dan Korman, Anat Schechtman, Zoltan Szabo, David Sosa,
Daniel Stoljar, and audience members at the SEP.
References
Burge, T. 1979. Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 73–122.
Burge, T. 1986. Intellectual norms and foundations of mind. Journal of Philosophy, 83: 697–720.
Burge, T. 2003. Concepts, conceptions, reflective understanding: Reply to Peacocke. In M. Hahn
and B.T. Ramberg, eds., Reflections and replies: Essays on the philosophy of Tyler Burge.
Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books.
Gendler, T.S. 2000. The puzzle of imaginative resistance. The Journal of Philosophy, 97: 55–81.
Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama. 2002. How to Practice.
Jackson, F. 1998. From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Kvanvig, J. 2003. The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Peacocke, C. 1998. Implicit conceptions, understanding and rationality. Philosophical Issues, 9:
43–88.
Peacocke, C. 2008. Truly understood. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wiggins, D. 2001. Sameness and substance renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zagzebski, L.T. 1996. Virtues of the mind. An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical
foundations of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
60