IMIHIGO EVALUATION FY 2013/2014 FINAL REPORT Institute of Policy Analysis and Research- Rwanda (IPAR) For The Prime Ministers’ Office Kigali, Rwanda 0|Page September 2014 Contents List of Tables ......................................................................................................................................................i List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................... ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. iii CHAP. I INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Country Context ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.2. The Concept of Imihigo ......................................................................................................... 2 1.3. The importance of the planning and Implementing Imihigo .................................................. 4 1.4. Monitoring and Evaluation of Imihigo ......................................................................................... 6 1.5. Evaluation of Imihigo as a Performance Management Tool ................................................... 6 1.6. Objectives of Imihigo Evaluation............................................................................................... 7 1.7 Rationale of the evaluation ......................................................................................................... 7 CHAP. II METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................................................. 9 2.1. Approach ..................................................................................................................................... 9 2.2. The Evaluation Process ............................................................................................................ 10 2.3. Data Collection Methods .......................................................................................................... 10 2.3.1 Audit of district Imihigo ....................................................................................................... 10 2.3.2. Key Informant Interviews.................................................................................................... 11 2.3.3. Focus Group Discussions ..................................................................................................... 11 2.3.4 Satisfaction Surveys ............................................................................................................. 12 2.4. Scoring of Imihigo Outputs ...................................................................................................... 12 2.5. Quality control measures ......................................................................................................... 15 2.6. Ethical considerations ......................................................................................................... 16 CHAP. III THE NEXUS BETWEEN IMIHIGO AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES ... 17 1|Page 3.1. Imihigo Pillars and EDPRS ....................................................................................................... 18 3.1.1. Economic Transformation and Rural Development............................................................ 18 3.3. Social Development .................................................................................................................. 21 3.4. Good Governance...................................................................................................................... 22 CHAP.IV IMIHIGO EVALUATION FINDINGS .......................................................................................... 25 4.1. Scoring Ministries..................................................................................................................... 25 4.2. The District Scorecards: Imihigo Achievements for 2013-2014................................................. 28 4.3. Imihigo Challenges ................................................................................................................... 35 4.3.1. Across pillars: Measurements, Recording, and Reporting .................................................. 35 4.3.2. Structural Issues .................................................................................................................. 38 CHAP. V. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY FORWARD .................... 45 Lessons Learned .............................................................................................................................. 46 Key Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 49 Way forward .................................................................................................................................... 49 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................... 51 List of Tables Table 1. Criteria for weighting Imihigo performance ..................................................................................... 14 Table 2. Imihigo Indicative achievements for the Economic Pillar (2013-14) .................................... 20 Table 3. Imihigo Indicative achievements for the Social Pillar (2013-14) ............................................ 21 Table 4. Imihigo Pillars and the National Deveopment Strategies............................................................ 23 Table 5. Economic, Social and Governance and Justice Clusters .............................................................. 26 Table 6. Results from the Scorecard for Economic, Social and Governance and Justice pillars.... 28 Table 7. Indicative Imihigo achievements (2013-14) .................................................................................... 31 i|Page List of Figures Figure 1. GDP Per Capita 2003-2012 US$............................................................................................................... 1 Figure 2. Relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes .................................................................... 7 Figure 3. Balanced Scorecard ................................................................................................................................... 15 Figure 4. Gross Domestic Product by Activity (%) 2006-2013 .................................................................. 17 Figure 5. Population below the National Poverty Line 1990-2010/11 (%) ......................................... 19 Figure 6. Average Score per cluster (Economic, Social and Governance and Justice) ...................... 26 Figure 7. Overall Performance of the Districts .................................................................................................. 31 List of Abbreviations CD DEC EDPRS EWSA FGD FY GDP ICT IPAR JADF M&E MDGs MIFOTRA MINALOC NGO PRSP RALGA RBM RGB RRA RTDA RTDA SMART TVET VUP ii | P a g e District Council District Executive Committee Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy Energy Water and Sanitation Authority Focus Group Discussion Financial Year Growth Domestic Product Information Communication Technology Institute Of Policy Analysis and Research Joint Action Development Forum Monitoring and Evaluation Millennium Development Goals Ministry of Public Service and Labour Ministry of Local Government Non Government Organiations Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities Result Based Management Rwanda Governance Board Rwanda Revenue Authority Rwanda Transport Development Authority Rwanda Transport Development Agency (RTDA) Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and time-bound Technical and Vocational Training Education Vision 2020 Umurenge programme EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Rwanda has provided a picture of promising change from the commitment to achieving its vision 2020 goal of becoming a middle-income country. To achieve this, a number of policies and strategies have been implemented. Currently, the country is implementing its second generation of Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 2) for the period between 2013 and 2018. One of vital tool to achieve EDPRS 2 targets is the “Imihigo”, re-initiated in 2006 as a tool to regularly monitor and evaluate the general government’s performance in order to enhance service delivery in Districts, Central Government, and Rwanda’s Diplomatic Missions abroad. Every year, since 2006, Imihigo performance contracts are evaluated to inform the Government on the relevance of the government’s interventions in changing people’s lives, whether the public spending makes difference or value for the money, what policy or programme works well, if policy makers are able to judge on the merit or worth of an intervention, among others. Since then, the assessment of Imihigo was done by a team comprised by members from the President’s Office, Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Local Government, and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. This year, the Prime Ministers’ Office commissioned the Institute of Policy Analysis and Research- Rwanda (IPAR) as an external evaluator of Imihigo (Performance Contracts) for the 2013/14 financial year to assess its processes from the planning to the evaluation stage. Based on the results, IPAR is expected to inform the Government of Rwanda in the following areas: (1) Relevance of Imihigo targets in respect to the evolving development priorities of the government and effectiveness of the collaboration between the Districts and the Central Government in planning and implementation of Imihigo. (2) The extent to which the outcomes have been achieved and whether the outputs of Imihigo contributed to achieving the intended outcomes and impacts. (3) How efficient is the resource allocation in achieving Imihigo and how this is converted into tangible outputs such as goods and services. (4) The degree of responses to the needs and complaints of the target population, and whether Imihigo products and services address citizen’s social and economic expectations. (5) Level of beneficiaries or local populations’ involvement in the planning process and implementation of Imihigo and assurance of sustaining the positive changes observed beyond Imihigo. The evaluation of 2013/14 Imihigo addressed the above questions based on the results from the assessment of all entities both at Central and Local Government Levels – 18 iii | P a g e Government ministries and 30 Districts plus Kigali City- that signed the performance contracts directly with His Excellence, The President of Rwanda Paul Kagame. Information needed to validate this study’s objectives were obtained using different data collection techniques including an audit of imihigo achievements against pledged outputs, interviews with a range of stakeholders (from the Government, the private sector, and the civil society), Focus Group Discussions with members of the community and an individual perception survey. The views obtained from the data collected were taken into account in the design of the scorecards used to measure the overall rate of performance. Results show that there are many positive changes brought by the Imihigo for the period 2013/14 at both planning and implementation stages. At the level of planning, the following are the merits or strengths, although these may bear some notions of experiences gained from the planning of Imihigo in the past years: (1) A structure of clear channels to ensure that priorities are identified. This channel exists from the lowest administrative levels (village, cell, sector, and district) to the highest where priorities of different communities are considered and consolidated. Most importantly, they serve a purpose of ensuring that targets identified respond to the needs of the citizens and that, for the most part, they are transformative in nature; (2) Enhanced coordination with the private sector, NGOs, faith based and civil society organisations under the umbrella of JADF to ensure that their action plans are considered in Imihigo. JADF members are eager to implement their items placed in Imihigo which implies an increased spirit of ownership of Imihigo on their part as key partners in local development; (3) A spirit of consultation and common purpose between the central and local government. The vast majority of the items in Imihigo reflect the intended social economic change intended in sector strategies and national priorities. This link between district targets and national priorities means that Imihigo are addressing their intended objectives; (4) An increased sense of self reliance where citizens are becoming more innovative with home-grown solutions for responding to challenges in their communities. Despite the above strengths in the planning process, there are still some challenges that need proper consideration from the policy for Imihigo to become more an effective tool of planning: (1) There is room to improve the effectiveness of the existing consultation channels through empowering all decentralized entities up to the household level in their setting of Imihigo; iv | P a g e (2) In some districts, there is a need to improve how performance indicators are measured as well as providing a clear definition of Umuhigo to avoid multiple interpretations including setting baselines that are used to establish targets. Indicators need to be clearly defined. For instance, despite its importance, ‘mobilisation’ is immeasurable. (3) District Councils still lack full control over the extent to which they can contextualize sectoral targets from the central government; while there is a positive spirit of consultation between central and local government, the ability of the latter to adapt targets that are driven by the central government is inadequate particularly in the context that every Umuhigo should be a response to a particular problem in the local environment; (4) Some items in the Imihigo do not provide a clear division of responsibility between the central government and the district. This means that when a project is successful it is likely to be claimed by both entities with failure placed on the other. That means that where possible, two entities should not claim responsibility over the same Umuhigo. Where they do, a clear division of responsibility should be outlined; (5) There doesn’t seem to be a clear process for monitoring targets to ensure continuity in the progress of Imihigo from one period to another which is necessary to ascertain the extent to which a particular outcome has been achieved. The closest opportunity for such a progress report is presented through the EDPRS midterm evaluation; (6) Planning based on a future ranking of districts has the tendency to focus on targets that are soft and therefore those that do not reflect the intended objectives of accelerating national development priorities; (7) The lag between the planning process of Imihigo and that of the budget means that some activities may get inserted in Imihigo that are not planned for in the budget. Looking at the implementation phase of Imihigo, the following are some of the positive changes observed during this evaluation: (1) Enhanced collaboration and a sense of shared responsibility between JADF members, District staff, and the District Council. For instance, apportioning Imihigo among the district staff and other stakeholders to monitor implementation is a positive practice. (2) Increased sense of ownership of local challenges by citizens and a spirit of innovation around these. Citizens are increasingly seeking solutions through unconventional methods, which are a form of local resource mobilization and saves money. v|Page (3) A culture of self-reliance among the vulnerable. They are taking the direct support from VUP programmes and investing them into sustainable income generating activities. Some of the issues requiring attention from the policy makers in terms of Imihigo implementation comprise the following: (1) Most Imihigo are implemented in the last quarter due to delays in either the transfer of financial resources to the districts or delays on the part of the district to request for disbursement. When finances are disbursed late and they meet with procurement processes, the intended implementation of a project may be affected, especially if it is taking place in the fourth quarter of the FY. (2) When priorities outside of Imihigo require urgent attention, resources (time, finances, and human) are shifted away from implementing planned Imihigo. (3) Audits by numerous agencies at different times of the year (MINALOC, Parliamentary Committee, Auditor General, etc,) delay the implementation of Imihigo. One period of planned consolidated audits would save time for implementing Imihigo. (4) Some targets are included in Imihigo without adequate control of the sources of funds for implementation. Some of these are from the central government while others are items added by some members of JADF. The efforts used to add an item in the district Imihigo are not always matched with the same enthusiasms when it comes to implementation to the extent that the concerned party may simply say, “remove them.” (5) In some situations, Imihigo without proper local contextualization were difficult to implement. (6) Some targets were not achieved due to a third party. Most of these were targets on water, electricity and road construction where the challenge was related to not having control over the operations of EWSA and RTDA. (7) There are challenges in establishing measurement standards of output indicators from one district to another. (8) There is tendency to inflate imihigo achievements due to eagerness for higher ranking. (9) There are challenges in common planning for trans-boundary items. An example is that one district may have road construction as a priority when its neighbor does not, a case which should be addressed by joint planning to allow continuity. vi | P a g e (10) Understaffing and high turnover at the local administration level calls for improved capacity building and need to improve the institution environment for delivering. In view of the above, Imihigo have set in motion development processes that are significantly contributing to accelerating the achievement of national development priorities. Imihigo are working as a tool for mobilising human and financial resources needed to facilitate this transition. They are also merging different interests that in other contexts would have competing objectives. The importance of Imihigo compels a future where they: (1) Fully integrated into the planning process from the central government to the lowest administrative levels; (2) Show continuity that links past and present achievements to the future that leads to outcomes intended from the national development priorities. Their evaluation should reflect intended progress in the achievement of sector strategies to inform progress towards achieving national development priorities; (3) Are evaluated based on annual measurements of outputs that track targets and achievements that are directly linked to a long-term outcome; (4) Have created a framework responsible for strategic intervention for empowering Imihigo, given its current importance as a tool for development planning; (5) Have appropriate features that lead to socioeconomic transformation. This implies that districts and ministries should be empowered in the designing of Imihigo that have the necessary features or characteristics of a “good Umuhigo,”: locally contextualized, identified through a participatory process, compliance with the national priorities, challenging in nature, it should be SMART, gives value for money, and innovative, among others. vii | P a g e CHAP. I INTRODUCTION 1.1. Country Context Rwanda has been widely praised for the social and economic progress it has made since 2000. Driven by Vision 2020, Rwanda aims to transform from a poor, post-conflict country to a thriving, socially inclusive middle income country by 2020. The Government has put in practice its development strategy through a series of implementation plans, the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP, 2002), the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS-1, 2008) and is currently implementing its second generation of EDPRS. Since 2000 Rwanda has achieved strong economic growth with per capita GDP increasing from $226 in 2000 to $605 in 2012 (Figure 1) and significant poverty reduction as well as improved food security (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2013). Achieving the objectives of EDPRS-2 is guided by five principles. The first is the need to be innovative and develop new initiatives and strategies. The second is, while focusing on emerging priorities captured in the thematic areas, to continue to invest in foundation areas such as health and education. The third is to be inclusive of all stakeholders at all levels inside and outside of government. The fourth is recognising that there will need for development plans at the district level and strong linkages between district plans and EDPRS-2 and Sector Strategic Plans. The fifth is to ensure that sustainability is built into all development programmes. Figure 1. GDP Per Capita 2003-2012 US$ GPD Per Capita (USD) 1400 1240 1200 1000 800 600 400 333 242 289 220 206 212 225 200 0 391 595 480 520 540 605 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Source: GDP National Account 20091; NISR 2012b; NIRS 2013 1 http://statistics.gov.rw Last accessed 04/04/2013. 1|Page 2020 Also inbuilt in the EDPRS are the mid-term and end of period evaluations through tracking indicators, targets, and processes at national and district levels. Accordingly, the end of period evaluation of EDPRS-1 revealed the following: 1. Limited expertise in result based management and development of monitoring indicators 2. Inadequate skills in conducting evaluations with greater focus placed on the monitoring function 3. Insufficient focus on policy research and preparation of policy briefs 4. Lack of a national monitoring and evaluation policy and consistent reporting 5. Insufficient capacities at decentralized level on Results Based Management (RBM) and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). Underway since 2013, the implementation of EDPRS-2 aims at overcoming some of these obstacles at both the Central and Local government levels. The impetus for continuous improvement informs Imihigo in their objective for fast-tracking, and domesticating, development priorities at the district level, as well as the spirit for an exercise as this aimed at examining the extent to which Imihigo are responding to citizen needs. As such, districts are expected to engage with the citizens in design, implementation, monitoring, and assessment of progress and impacts made. 1.2. The Concept of Imihigo Imihigo is a performance management tool whereby most government ministers on behalf of their ministries and all the district mayors, and the mayor of the City of Kigali, on behalf of citizens sign a performance contract with His Excellence The President of Rwanda every year. The initiation of Imihigo was intended to accelerate the achievements of government development programmes and priorities. The government decentralisation policy that was launched in 2000 required a greater level of accountability. The policy, therefore, had as its main objective to make public agencies and institutions more effective and accountable in their implementation of national programs and accelerate the socioeconomic development agenda. The districts are responsible for implementing programs under this broad agenda while Central Government assumes the task for planning and facilitating. Planning ensures that national objectives of growth and poverty reduction are attained. The decentralisation policy is also designed to deepen and sustain grassroots-based democratic governance and to promote equitable local development by enhancing citizen participation and strengthening the local 2|Page government system, while maintaining effective functional and mutually accountable linkages between Central and Local Governments entities (MINALOC 2012). This entails enhancing citizens’ participation, promoting the culture of accountability, fast-tracking and sustaining equitable local development as a mechanism to enhance local fiscal autonomy, employment and poverty reduction and enhancing effectiveness and efficiency in the planning, monitoring, and delivery of services. The principle of subsidiary underpins the decentralisation policy, which is designed to ensure transparency and accountability for local service delivery through citizen participation in planning as well as civil society and faith-based organisations, the private sector and development partners. Imihigo are used across government as performance contracts to ensure accountability. All levels of government from the local district level to ministries and embassies are required to develop their Imihigo and to have them evaluated. Further, members of the public service also sign Imihigo with their managers or heads of institutions. In this sense, Imihigo is a subset of a district’s action plan showing priority activities to be used as a performance measure. District Development Plans are designed to locally contextualize EDPRS-2 priorities in order to address the needs of the local population. Districts are held accountable by the government for meeting targets through the Imihigo performance contracts which the mayor signs with HE the President on behalf of all citizens living in the district. Partnership between the government and local communities is seen as essential to building confidence in government and enabling ordinary Rwandans to take responsibility for their own development. Residents are mobilised via sectors, cells and villages to contribute to the realisation of the targets but local government is also answerable to local residents for the quality of service that they deliver. At its inception, a limited evaluation process took place between 2006 and 2009 whereby the best ten performing Districts from across the nation were reviewed, two from each province and the City of Kigali. Ever since, the Imihigo evaluations have been expanded as noted above and have come to symbolise the tradition of accountability. The evaluation exercise is significant because the government of Rwanda assesses the degree to which ministry and district priorities and targets are realised against their Imihigo. Over time, Imihigo have become institutionalised as a means to keep local leaders accountable to their communities and the Government. It is a means of planning to accelerate the progress towards economic development and poverty reduction and is designed to: speed up the 3|Page implementation of government policies and programs; ensure stakeholder and citizen ownership of the development agenda; promote transparency and accountability; and encourage partnership between government, development partners, community based organisations and the private sector. It is a compact between all Rwandans, public sector institutions, public sector employees and citizens whereby they commit themselves to make the best contribution they can towards the development of the country by agreeing on what they will achieve. The performance targets are based on government priorities designed to drive forward the development process and achieve Vision 2020. Central government ministries’ and district councils’ performance targets are identified the outcomes for the districts are announced at the National Dialogue Council. This process is designed to ensure that government policies and priorities are implemented and there is a strong incentive in place for good performance. While Imihigo has undoubtedly played a significant role in the development progress that has been achieved since 2006 (Byamukama and Makonnen 2010; Gatari 2013; Scher 2010; Versailles 2012) a number of concerns have been expressed. Despite the importance of Imihigo implementing national priorities the EDPRS-1 evaluation (Ministry of Finance 2012; Ministry of Local Government 2012) concluded that to some extent there was a lack of synergy between national priorities and local development plans. It was clear that there were some weaknesses and perhaps break downs in the planning chains as is also noted in the 2012/13 evaluation of Districts Imihigo (Ministry of Local Government 2013). This has made the tracking of progress towards the desired outcomes somewhat challenging. There have been challenges in data quality management and insufficient technical skills in M&E in local government and central government (Byamukama and Makonnen 2010; Gatari 2013). Baseline, targets and indicators have been not clearly defined to inform on output indicators (Byamukama and Makonnen 2010; Gatari 2013; Versailles 2012). However, once continuously improve, Imihigo is a best tool to accelerate socio-economic development and will be able to play more significant role in the implementation of EDPRS 2 targets and realisation of vision 2020. 1.3. The importance of the planning and Implementing Imihigo Given a properly constructed contract and operational plan and a simple but adequate records system, evaluation is simply a matter of comparing outputs to targets – perhaps with some negotiation as to whether a given target may be excluded because failure to achieve it was out of 4|Page the control of the district or ministry in question. It is when the plan and contract are being drawn up that careful thought and scrutiny are needed: (1) Are the targets so organised that it is clear what measure should be used to assess success and what level of performance is to be expected? Is there a baseline to help establish what level of performance can be expected? (‘Open-ended’ commitments that depend on the ministry identifying classes of case whose numbers are not known in advance and then claiming success for dealing with them might be part of the assessable operational plan but should have no place in imihigo). (2) Are the actions to be taken clear, and is it clear what counts as a separate action? (3) For the Imihigo contract, are the outcomes which the ministry is committed to furthering clearly linked with an EDPRS2 priority or some other government policy or commitment? (4) Are the target outputs which they are committed to delivering clearly and logically linked to the outcome they represent – is there good reason to believe that taking action to deliver these outputs will make the achievement of the outcome more likely? (5) Are the commitments realistic, in the light of available human and financial resource and the extent to which their achievements depend on factors outside the District or Ministry’s control? Imihigo are the result of a participatory process of identifying priorities from the grass roots to the national level. Imihigo are developed through a number of stages: Step I: identification of National Priorities Identification of national priorities: Based on EDPRS-2 as well as 7YR Government priorities, each line ministry identifies national priorities to be implemented at the local level for which they have earmarked resources that they will transfer to local governments. Central Government consolidates the priorities paying special attention to quick wins, synergy and avoiding unnecessary duplication. Step2: Communication of National Priorities to Local Government List of central government priorities are communicated and discussed with local government leaders in the Forum of Central and Local Government. Step 3: Identification of Local Priorities Districts consult their district development partners (DDPs) and consultative meetings are held at the different local authority levels (district, sector, cell, village) to discuss and consolidate emerging priorities. 5|Page Step4: Preparation and Approval of District Imihigo District level consultations with DDPs to integrate local priorities and national priorities as communicated in the Forum of Central and Local Government. Consolidation of national and local priorities at district level and discussion of draft Imihigo. Discussion of draft district Imihigo with Quality Assurance Technical Team (Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Finance and Local Government. Presentation of priorities to stakeholders. Approval of Imihigo. 1.4. Monitoring and Evaluation of Imihigo The outcome of the evaluation has been an overall score for each district based on the extent to which targets across the three pillars, economic development, social development and governance have been achieved. Although information on process, innovation and challenges has been collected it is not used in calculating the scores. The overall planning instruments are Vision 2020 and EDPRS-2 so the targets for and outputs from Imihigo are expected to be in line with these documents and support the driving forward of the development process. During the development of Imihigo each output is linked to an indicator, a target and an output. These are expected to be consistent with national targets and district plans. 1.5. Evaluation of Imihigo as a Performance Management Tool The Imihigo should flow from EDPRS-2 priorities and the districts strategic plans. They should also meet the needs of residents and other stakeholders and be designed and implemented so that it encourages good performance by staff. Imihigo can also be thought of as a contract between local government and citizens where each pledges to play their role and they therefore have the potential to transform the relationship between citizens and the state. Previously, the evaluation of Imihigo was based on the extent to which targets have been met (effectiveness) based on information provided by the districts. Although there were spot checks carried out, other factors including the following were not given adequate consideration: 1. Citizen satisfaction including the extent to which central government consider that the targets are priorities derived from EDPRS-2 etc., that district residents agree that the targets are based on priorities that meet local needs or that the outcomes have improved the lives of residents; 2. Ensuring that targets are relevant to the district and that the district is focusing on the contribution that it is best placed to make to the overall achievement of the country’s social and economic development; 6|Page 3. Process including the consultations undertaken with different stakeholders (central government, JADF, district council members, residents, council employees) and communication of the agreed Imihigo; 4. The contextualisation of the targets in the district development and operationalization plans. Outputs were the end product of a process. However, in order to ensure the sustainability of Imihigo and continuous improvement, it is necessary to evaluate the process and the outcomes. It is only when we link inputs with process, outputs and outcomes that we can see how inputs led to outputs and outcomes and the steps that a district may need to take across a number of years to achieve the intended outcomes in a sustainable way. Further examining the process leads to understanding why outputs were not fully achieved or achieved in the most efficient and effective manner and put in place remediation strategies. The following Figure (2) depicts a true picture of the relationship between inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Figure 2. Relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes Imihigo Targets Processes Resources Inputs Outputs Outcomes 1.6. Objectives of Imihigo Evaluation The main objective of this exercise was to assess the processes from the planning to the implementation/execution stage for all entities that signed a performance contract with His Excellence The President and come up with a set of recommendations to address potential gaps in the Imihigo process. 1.7 Rationale of the evaluation As a performance management tool, Imihigo are designed to accelerate the achievement of national development priorities with special focus at the local government. Their use is primarily intended to facilitate district leadership to respond to local development needs while remaining aligned to broader national development goals. Further, Imihigo can also be thought of as a contract between local government and citizens where each pledges to play their role. It, 7|Page therefore, has the potential to transform the relationship between citizens and the state, where citizens become active partners in the development processes. In this regard, the evaluation is a means to ensuring that development achievement are on track. More specifically, findings from this evaluation of Imihigo are expected to inform the Government of Rwanda in regards to: Performance: Provide feedback on the delivery of outputs and the impact these have had on the lives of the intended beneficiaries. Accountability: Whether public spending is addressing the appropriate priorities and whether it is making a difference in the lives of citizens. Knowledge: Increasing knowledge about what policies and programmes work, enabling the government at central and local levels to build an evidence base for future policy development and enabling the identification of innovative ways of increasing effectiveness. Decision-making: Providing evidence to enable policy-makers, planners and finance departments to judge the merit or worth of an intervention. Co-ordination: Identifying key stakeholders expected to be involved in specific areas/programs/projects and the extent to which they actually participated and how they were coordinated. Beneficiaries’ satisfaction: The extent to which beneficiaries are happy with the different Government interventions and the extent to which they were consulted. 8|Page CHAP. II METHODOLOGY This chapter gives details of how the evaluation was conducted. In this regard, it defines the approach used and the processes and methods employed to gather information, the sampling process, and it provides quality assurance measures, among other methodological aspects. 2.1. Approach The nature of the evaluation dictated the use of both qualitative and quantitative evaluation approaches. For this reason, the evaluation combined a number of techniques for data collection namely the desk research, audit, a survey and interviews with key or expert informants (mainly government officials). It considered the synergy between district performance targets and national priorities, and the extent to which local communities are able to articulate their needs and to participate in the development of Imihigo targets. The appraisal also took into consideration how local communities contribute in the implementation of Imihigo targets and how they are benefiting from them. The evaluation linked the dissemination of priorities from central government to districts to local communities and then back through village councils, to cells and sectors and to districts where it informs the content and the process of Imihigo. The approach was participatory in nature. Key district stakeholders participated in this evaluation. Their views were taken into account in the construction of both the balanced scorecard. The evaluation was conducted at both the national and local levels. At the national level, attention was placed on 18 government ministries that sign Imihigo. At the local level, the country’s 30 districts and the City of Kigali both of which sign Imihigo directly with the H.E. Paul Kagame were evaluated. At each level, evaluators carried out an audit of Imihigo targets against outputs, interviewed a range of stakeholders, held Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and conducted perception surveys with a range of stakeholders and beneficiaries. At the central government level, evaluators assessed Imihigo of each ministry and used a qualitative approach to ascertain the views of senior ministry officials on the identification, prioritisation, planning and implementation of the district Imihigo. The interview guides were designed in ways that cover 2013-2014 priorities on key EDPRS 2 thematic areas, the 7YGovernment Program, MDGs, the resolutions of the December 2012 National Dialogue Council and the 2013 Government Leadership Retreat. At district level, members of the District Executive Committee (DEC), the District Council (CD) and the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) were interviewed. As part of the audit intended 9|Page to verify claimed achievements, evaluators paid spot-check visits using a probability sample of outputs to confirm or raise questions on such claims. In addition, evaluators conducted FGDs with a sample of village leaders and citizens. 2.2. The Evaluation Process The rigour of the evaluation of the 2013-2014 Imihigo can be discerned from the following key stages that it passed through: Exploration phase: examining existing literate for the philosophy that informs the concept of Imihigo, the development context in which it operates, as well as the existing challenges in their implementation Preparation of evaluation tools and methodology design: after literature review, the evaluation team developed evaluation instruments in accordance with the objectives of the assignment Field work: Gathering of primary data. This involved mainly perception survey with citizens, interviews of officials, office audits, and spot-checks, among others. Data analysis: Providing meaning for the data collected in line with the stated objectives. This involved the use of SPSS for quantitative data analysis and thematic grouping for qualitative data analysis. Drafting: The presentation of results in a coherent document with meaningful information in relation to the objectives for evaluating the Imihigo. Presentation: Sharing of the evaluation findings with the technical team with the purpose of receiving input aimed at improving the final report. 2.3. Data Collection Methods Evaluators used a range of methods to collect data, both qualitative and quantitative. Tools used included audit instruments and interview guides, FGD checklists and face-to-face administered questionnaires. Each of these tools corresponds to specific objectives of the evaluation and evaluators were able to triangulate data collection techniques to improve the quality of findings. 2.3.1 Audit of district Imihigo At each ministry, district and the City of Kigali, a full audit of their 2013-14 Imihigo was systematically carried out. The purpose of the audit was to capture the status of implementation of Imihigo. In each district, a probability sample of targets was selected for spot-checks to compare the progress in the field with the progress reported. Spot-checks included, for example, 10 | P a g e checking the sites of consolidated land, water pipelines laid, and so on. During the audit particular attention was paid to the extent to which: District targets are aligned with national development priorities as sustained by major development frameworks such as Vision 2020, EDPRS, MDGs, etc.; Planned outputs are achieved The outputs have the potential for transformation; The solutions are innovative to achieve meaningful outcomes; Supporting documents are available and the quality and accuracy of information provided, etc. 2.3.2. Key Informant Interviews At each district and sample ministries, evaluators conducted a number of key informant interviews where questions about the process of developing and implementing Imihigo, and the reasons for setting particular targets were asked. Interviews also covered the role of the various stakeholders in the entire Imihigo process. In addition, interviews sought to identify challenges related to the implementation of Imihigo performance contracts. In total, group interviews were conducted with 1,020 resource persons. Indicatively, the interviews covered the following areas: The process of developing Imihigo, their implementation, and the expected outcomes; The extent to which Imihigo fits into the district/ministry development plans and the sustainability of outputs; The implementation and monitoring mechanisms of Imihigo; What targets respondents think are potentially transformative; What areas they think are hard to tackle and are not being adequately addressed; Challenges that they faced in developing and implementing Imihigo in 2013/14 and those that they face more generally. Among key interviewees were the following: Mayors, Vice Mayors, Executive Secretaries, members of District Councils, members of JADF, and Village leaders. 2.3.3. Focus Group Discussions To augment the information gathered from the desk review, interviewees, and audits, the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) made it possible to engage and gain collective memories in open dialogue with Imihigo beneficiaries at the lowest administrative level. The objective of such discussions was to ascertain the involvement of households and authorities in the process of 11 | P a g e developing Imihigo at the lowest administrative levels. Accordingly, FGDs were held with ordinary citizens, village leaders, district executive committee and council members, and with JADF staff. In total, 370 focus group discussions were held countrywide. On average, five to six people participated in each FGD, making it a total ranging between 1850 and 2220 participants. The content of the discussions covered different thematic areas of Imihigo: General knowledge about Imihigo; Level of involvement of various stakeholders in the preparation of Imihigo; How the implementation is monitored; Whether targets respond to local development priorities; How the relevant category under consideration finds out what the priorities are and if they have any opportunity to say what they would like included in the district Imihigo; and What they consider as implementation challenges. 2.3.4 Satisfaction Surveys Perception and satisfaction surveys were conducted to gather information on developing and implementing Imihigo. Stakeholders participated in the surveys, responding to a number of questions in accordance with their respective areas of interventions. Also factored was the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) Citizen Report Card2 on satisfaction with service delivery as recommended by Resolution 14 of the 2014 Leadership Retreat. More precisely, the following categories were covered by the survey: Employees at the district level; District Council Members; District Executive Committee Members; And JADF members 2.4. Scoring of Imihigo Outputs Contrary to the purely output based scoring (used in past imihigo evaluations), which considers all items on the performance contract to require the same resources (skills, commitment, time, budget, mobilization efforts, etc) for implementation, this evaluation introduces a new approach: the “Balanced scorecard” in scoring. This approach assigns 2 Citizen report card focuses on the extent to which citizens in different districts are satisfied by service delivery on following nine indicators: Education, Agriculture and Livestock, Local Government, Justice, Infrastructure, Health, Economic welfare, Land and Governance issues. 12 | P a g e weights based on the disparity in resources required to achieve a set target. It considers the quality of documentation provided against which achievements are claimed, the accuracy of the information, the clarity (coherence) of the content (objective, output, baseline, targets, and achievements) of each item, as well as the extent to which the item is challenging in terms invested efforts and most importantly whether it contributes to local and national development goals. This led to a decision for attributing different weights as summarised in the table below: minimal, moderate, greater (based on the extent to which an output contributes to district and national development goals): Each item was measured against these criteria and assigned scores in relation to its achievement status. Furthermore, the balanced scored card also incorporates a number of factors (Figure 3): Citizen Satisfaction – as indicator of utility, effectiveness and impact. It is based on individual testimonies and success stories of beneficiaries and other stakeholders, JADF evaluation as a measure of relevance and utility; Employee measure (satisfaction, turnover,…) as one indicator of sustainability; Spot-check score as a physical verification of the status of reported achievements. Incorporating these elements has increased the percentage assigned to the governance and justice pillar from the 10 percent used in previous evaluations to 20 percent. The balanced scorecard finally considers the findings from the Citizen Report Card conducted by the RGB as recommended in the resolutions of the last Leadership Retreat. This is assigned 10 percent of the overall performance score. 13 | P a g e Table 1. Criteria for weighting Imihigo Criteria Range in % Explanatory notes Extent to which Imihigo Contribute towards achieving national Development Agenda ( 70%) Minimal 1-20 Minimal contribution to DDP and EDPRS priorities, requires negligible efforts, can be classified as routine activity, can be achieved in short period with minimal resources, does imply specific skills and capacities. Moderate 21-50 Moderate or reasonable contribution to DDP and EDPRS priorities. Its achievement requires reasonable efforts (time, financial resources, skills, mobilization…) Greater 51-70 Greater contribution to DDP and EDPRS priorities. Its achievement requires significant efforts (time, financial resources, skills, mobilization…) Availability of the documentation and quality of information provided (30%) Poor documentation and poor 1-5 information Provided documentation is insufficient or no supporting documents. Partial documentation but with 6-19 quality information, Relationship between measurements Fair part of the documentation is provided with quality information. Full required documentation 20-30 and quality information, Counter verification (M&E) Significant documentation is available and provide quality In the weighted score, the economic pillar contributes 50%, social pillar 30% and the governance and justice pillar with 20%. In the balanced scorecard, the three pillars account for 90% of the score, with the remaining 10% accounted by the RGB citizen report card (Figure 3). 14 | P a g e Figure 3. Balanced Scorecard Economic (50%) Social (30%) 90% Citizen Report Card by RGB Overall score (10%) Governance & Justice (20%) Source: Own construction 2.5. Quality control measures Conducting such an evaluation requires a set of measures to assure quality data and information. For this evaluation, the following activities and measures contributed to the quality and integrity assurance of the data collection process: Development of the evaluation tools and methodology in a participatory way: several meetings with the technical committee; Validation of the inception report by the steering committee; Triangulation: use of several techniques to gather maximum information and to supplement the inherent weaknesses in each approach; A training of enumerators on the evaluation instruments; A supervision team established to ensure daily follow-up of field evaluation and the cross-checking of the questionnaires on field; Daily transcriptions and reports in a bid not to overlook important information Anonymous questionnaire administered in order to encourage free and open expression by some of the respondents. 15 | P a g e 2.6. Ethical considerations This evaluation involved collecting information that some respondents may have a tendency to withhold due to fear of adverse effects in relation to their employment status. For similar reasons, evaluators were likely to be exposed to offers of favours from some of the respondents in an effort to influence aspects of the report. For this purpose, the researchers observed a set of measures to comply with ethical standards during the whole process of research such as: A formal consent from each informant was requested and obtained before interviewing him or her or engaging in detailed discussions; Confidentiality was guaranteed regarding any information given and that it was to be used exclusively for the purpose of this assignment; Anonymity was guaranteed where needed. 16 | P a g e CHAP. III THE NEXUS BETWEEN IMIHIGO AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES The Government of Rwanda (GoR) has identified two key priorities for EDPRS-2: (1) accelerating sustainable economic growth to an average of 11.5 percent per annum, essential to meet the target of becoming a middle income economy by 2020, and (2) accelerating poverty reduction so that the headline poverty figure is below the current 30% percent. To drive these there are four thematic areas to guide policy and investment decisions: economic transformation, rural development, productivity and youth employment, and accountable governance. Under EDPRS economic transformation targets accelerated economic growth, requiring that the contribution of agriculture to GDP declines as that of the service sector and industry increased, however, as Figure 3 shows there has been little change in the relative contribution of each sector since 2008. Furthermore the average growth in each sector between 2010 and 2013 was well below the average annual growth rate required to meet the Vision 2020 targets. It was 3.1 per cent in agriculture compared to a target of 8.5 per cent, 10.5 per cent in industry compared to a target of 14 per cent and seven per cent in the service sector compared to a target of 13.5 per cent. Figure 4. Gross Domestic Product by Activity (%) 2006-2013 Agriculture Industry 45 42 38 36 14 2006 14 2007 (Source: NISR 2014) 17 | P a g e 2008 Industry Services 47 47 48 47 46 45 33 34 33 32 33 33 14 13 13 14 14 15 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 3.1. Imihigo Pillars and EDPRS In this section, details are provided in relation to the links between national development strategies and the Imihigo in general and the objectives and outputs therein, with view to determining the extent to which targets are contributing to the desired socioeconomic progress. Particularly, it provides a discussion of the feedback loop between EDPRS and the three broad pillars of Imihigo: Economic development, social development, and governance (including justice). 3.1.1. Economic Transformation and Rural Development Imihigo, unlike the EDPRS, combine the goals of economic transformation with those of rural development. This overlap may not be insignificant for purposes of tracking progress made towards achieving EDPRS through Imihigo. However, their assignment of a weight of 60 percent means that the framers of Imihigo considered the two themes as the backbone for socioeconomic transformation and therefore justifying its provision of the lion share of all Imihigo outputs which average to about 18, 10, and 8 in the pillars of economic development, governance, and social development, respectively. Economic Development The economic development pillar focuses on the agricultural, infrastructure, and employment and business promotion. Within these, the outputs being implemented at the district level include key outputs being implemented focus on. Within these are outputs on land use consolidation, productivity, fish farming production, milk collection centres, rural settlements, improved infrastructure, the promotion of youth employment, access to finance, and loan recovery. These outputs and improving the collection of revenue serve as common development themes for all the 30 districts. One of the priorities of economic transformation is to increase the domestic interconnectivity of the economy through investments in hard and soft infrastructure by meeting energy demands in the country. This is expected to be met through an increase in electricity generated from 110 Mega Watts in 2012 to 349 Mega Watts between 2015 and 2016 and a target 563 Mega Watts by 2018 (EDPRS-2). Increases in the supply of electricity are also expected to spur rural development by increasing the 18 | P a g e number of rural settlements that are able to facilitate access to basic services as well as increased access to basic infrastructure for rural households. As the number of rural households living in planned settlements is expected to steadily increase from 37.5% in 2012 to 56% in 2015 and 70% in 2017 as well as an increase in rural households with access to electricity increasing from 5% in 2012, 50% in 2015 , and 70% in 2017 (EDPRS-2). Data reported during this evaluation shows a 368,855 increase in households with access to electricity this year alone, a remarkable improvement that should increase confidence in the likelihood of reaching the 70% target set for 2017.3 Rural Development The objectives under the theme of rural development are intended to ensure that poverty is reduced from 44.9 percent in 2010 to 30 percent by 2018 and 20 percent by 2020 (Figure 5 ). It is worth noting that the poverty rate varies significantly between districts, from 8.3 per cent in Kicukiro to 73 per cent in Nyamagabe while extreme poverty varies from 2.8 per cent and 45.2 per cent in the same two districts. Since 2000, Rwanda has achieved sustained poverty reduction, with a significant decline of twelve percentage points, between 2005/6 and 2010/11, with the sharpest decline being in rural areas. Figure 5. Population below the National Poverty Line 1990-2010/11 (%) Poverty Reduction (%) 70 58.9 60 50 56.7 47.5 44.9 40 30 23.3 20 10 0 1990 2000/1 2005/6 2010/11 2015 Sources: Republic of Rwanda and United Nations 2003; EICV 1, 2, 3. A key strategy for sustainable poverty reduction is rural development. It pays particular attention to increased productivity of agriculture, a sector that engages the vast 3 Particularly noting that four districts did not report statistics for access to electricity during this evaluation 19 | P a g e majority of the population (EDPRS-2). EDPRS objectives are reinforced by the agricultural sector strategies consisting of programs in: agriculture and animal resource intensification; research technology transfer and professionalization of farmers; value chain development and private sector investment; and institutional development, among others. Underpinning these objectives for economic transformation and rural development is the expectation that both can contribute to boosting productivity and youth employment through focus on developing skills for productive employment particularly among the youth by creating at least 200,000 new jobs per annum going forwards to 2020. Skills development is expected to be achieved through reforms in the national education curricula, strengthening the Technical and Vocational Centres (TVET), and promoting adult literacy. Similarly significant in the area of employment creation is the ability to stimulate entrepreneurship, access to finance, and business development (EDPRS-2). This evaluation showed that in 2013-14 achievements in the districts registered an impressive increase as evidenced by the following indicative figures: Table 2. Imihigo Indicative achievements for the Economic Pillar (2013-14) # Type of achievement 1. Total area of land consolidated 2. Total area terraced (progressive and radical terracing) 3. Number of cows distributed 4. Households with access and connection to electricity 5. Number of new people with access to water Estimate 1,369,778.13 (ha)4 47,638 (ha) 33,7155 368,8556 1,449,567 Notes: Estimates obtained from District reports. 4 This figure includes consolidated land in both seasons A and B for all crops under 2013-114 Imihigo. It also includes intercropped areas that in this case are likely to be double-counted 5 Out of a total of 184,614 cows distributed since program inception in 2006. 6 This figure include both households with access and those newly connected to electricity but does not distinguish between the two 20 | P a g e 3.3. Social Development One of the priority areas of vision 2020 translated in EDPRS is enhanced social protection programs that will be achieved through focus on productive and efficient workforce, essential for Rwanda to become knowledge based economy. For this to happen, efforts are intended to focus on two main areas: education and health. Further, it is important that poor and vulnerable people are guaranteed an income and to access core essential services, as well as ensuring that those who can work are offered support in their efforts to escape poverty (MINALOC, 2005). Observation of the national priorities of social development and those in the Imihigo reveals an alignment that in theory should be mutually supportive. In the social development pillar of Imihigo the key priorities include improving education and health infrastructure as well as increasing access in both areas. The key outputs in education comprise enhancing the quality of education and the multiplication of vocational and technical training centres (TVET) with the aim of improving access to employment among the youth through skills development. As for health, key outputs are targeted towards increased coverage of community health insurance, health hygiene, sanitation and social facilities and sustaining the fight against malnutrition against children under five years of age. Table 3. Imihigo Indicative achievements for the Social Pillar (2013-14) # Area of achievement Estimate 1. Classrooms built 2,010 2. School toilets built 2,159 3. % of people under health insurance scheme 82.4% 4. % of population covered by MUSA 80.1% 5. % of women using family planning methods 6. Number of off-farm jobs created 61% 118,4897 Note: The estimates were obtained from the District reports Most of these are casual and short term jobs (such as masonry) and due to high mobility of people involved in this types of jobs, there is a possibility that some people might have been counted more than once 7 21 | P a g e 3.4. Good Governance Good governance has been at the heart of the country’s development strategy. Central to this has been accountability and citizen participation. Further, increasing citizen participation ensures ownership and feedback for efficiency and sustainability. It is also expected to improve through use of “home-grown initiatives.”As revealed by the Rwanda Governance Scorecard (2012), the average satisfaction expressed by the citizens in the public service at the national level is 74.9% while it was 77.2% at the local government level. These findings show that service delivery at local government has drastically improved from the 64.5% score in 2010. Indeed, if this momentum is maintained, 2018 EDPRS II target of 80% satisfaction on service delivery will likely be achieved ahead of time. The innovation of the Imihigo performance contracts partly explains this accelerated progress in service delivery. In the governance and justice pillar of Imihigo, the districts commit themselves to promote access to equitable justice, to enhance accountability and citizen participation, to promote access to information and social media, to increase skills in public finance management, to strengthen security, and to promote the quality of service delivery, in line with the good governance priorities outlined in the 2000 National Decentralisation Policy, the 7YGovernment Program, EDPRS-2, and Vision 2020. 22 | P a g e Table 4. Imihigo Pillars and the National Development Strategies Development Pillar Economic EDPRS relevant priority areas Economic Transformation; Rural Development Productivity and Youth Employment PSTAIII Strategic Programmes Agriculture and animal intensification; Research and technology transfer; Professionalization of farmers; Agricultural crosscutting issues Imihigo 2013-2014objectives resource Increase agriculture and livestock production, productivity and value addition; Enhance urbanisation, rural settlement & sustainable infrastructure development; Promote entrepreneurship and business development Improve natural resources management for sustainable development Social Vision 2020/MDGs relevant Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP 2013-2018) Imihigo 2013-2014objectives priority areas /Education Sector Policy (2003)/National Social Protection Strategy Universal Education for To ensure that education is available and Ensure access to quality education & all accessible to all Rwandese people skills development To improve the quality and relevance of Focus on vocational and Improve access & use of quality health education technical training To promote the teaching of science and technology with a special focus on ICT Ensure effectiveness of social safety To promote trilingualism in the country Reduction of infant To promote an integral, comprehensive nets for poverty alleviation mortality rate (from education orientated towards the respect of 107 to 50 per 1000) human rights and adapted to the present situation of the country 23 | P a g e Development Pillar Economic EDPRS relevant priority areas Reduction of maternal mortality rate (from 1,070 to 200 per 100,000) Increase life expectancy (from 49 to 55 years) PSTAIII Strategic Programmes Good Governance (& justice) EDPRS relevant areas 24 | P a g e Strengthen participation demand accountability Improve delivery To inculcate in children and sensitise them to the importance of environment, hygiene and health and protection against HIV/AIDS To improve the capacity for planning, management and administration of education To promote research as a mobilising factor for national development and harmonise the research agenda Ensure universal accessibility (in geographical and financial terms) of quality of health services for Rwandans. priority National Decentralization Policy citizen and for service Imihigo 2013-2014objectives Ensure full participation of citizens Equip citizens with necessary knowledge and skills to plan for and manage themselves the local development processes Develop ownership of development process by local populations Imihigo 2013-2014 objectives Promote responsible and accountable governance CHAP.IV IMIHIGO EVALUATION FINDINGS This chapter presents findings from the evaluation of Imihigi articulated in the following order: in the first section are the major achievements of the Imihigo over the FY 2013-2014. In the second section, is the presentation of Imihigo scorecards using three different approaches. The third section presents the general challenges faced in the entire Imihigo process. 4.1. Scoring Ministries Districts’ Imihigo has been evaluated annually by a team of central government officials together with representatives of the private sector and civil society. Although central government ministries also sign Imihigo directly with HE the President, as well as the City of Kigali, only districts have been evaluated by the national evaluation team. The outcome of the evaluation has been an overall score for each district based on the extent to which targets across the three pillars, economic development, social development and governance have been achieved. This year it has been decided that ministries would be scored as part of a wider project on the imihigo process and how it can be improved. At each ministry a full audit was carried out of progress towards achieving 2013-14 Imihigo targets, using a template which organises the activities of the ministry under The scoring system used scores the individual ministry against the targets in its Imihigo. The 18 ministries are then placed in clusters8 (economic, social, and governance) after which an average is provided in percentage terms reflecting how the ministries in a particular cluster performed in Imihigo. 8 These were determined by the evaluation team and may defer from the traditional clusters used by the government. 25 | P a g e Table 5. Economic, Social and Governance and Justice Clusters Economic Cluster Social Cluster Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) Ministry (MINEDUC) Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) Ministry of Health (MoH) Ministry of (MININTER) Ministry of (MINIRENA) Resources Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF) Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST) Infrastructure Ministry for Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINAFET) Ministry of Youth and ICT (MYICT) Ministry of Sports and Culture (MINISPOC) Ministry of Defense (MINADEF) Ministry of (MINICOM) Ministry of Public Service and Labor (MIFOTRA) Ministry (MININFRA) Natural of Trade and Industry of Governance Cluster Education and Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) Internal Ministry of East African Community (MINIEAC) Figure 6. Average Score per cluster (Economic, Social and Governance and Justice) Cluster average perfomance (%) 69 68.4 68 67 66.5 66 64.9 65 64.6 64 63 62 Economic 26 | P a g e Social Governance and Justice Justice Overall average performance Security Source: Own construction based on the evaluation Overall, the 18 ministries evaluated performed at a 66.5 percent average level. When considered along the clusters to which they belong, the ministries in the governance and justice cluster performed better (68.4%) than those in the social (64.6%) and Economic (64.9%) clusters. What may appear as underperformance by the economic cluster is likely explained by the nature of the outputs that the concerned ministries focus on. Some of these such as road construction, agricultural mechanisation, irrigation, etc., require a significant amount of resources. While they have the highest multiplier effects for socioeconomic transformation, they require the coordination with a number of stakeholders in efforts geared at resource mobilisation. Further, some of the major projects in that cluster require joint planning and implementation with external partners, sometimes countries. Under such conditions, it means that the ministries in these clusters do not have full control over implementation. This may be contrasted with ministries in the best performing cluster (governance and justice) where implementation is for the most part fully under the control of the concerned ministries. Consequently, the extent of resource mobilisation and coordination required is within the cluster. Two related challenges were noticed in the Imihigo of the Ministries: coordination and duplication. There is a tendency for more than one ministry to target the same output. In such a case, it is not clear which ministry plays which role in its realisation. An example is an output on Television penetration in the public which may be found in the Imihigo of the Ministries of ICT and MINALOC, or when the Ministry of Justice and that of Sports and Culture share the output of conducting a research on a particular topic of mutual interest. Also problematic is that more than 75% of targets in the Ministry Imihigo are not met on time. Structured along quarters, most of the targets are not delivered in the quarter in which it was intended. Delays suggest issues in their planning, monitoring and evaluation systems. Similarly, some ministries have reporting challenges. This challenge is most prevalent in outputs that are implemented in partnership with externals partners, such as the World Bank or UNDP. In such arrangements, the ministry may keep records for only the portion of the task it implemented and tracking the remaining part becomes difficult. Also problematic is the tendency for ministries to have soft targets in their Imihigo, with tasks such as organising a conference, sending invitations, procuring a venue broken down under 27 | P a g e separate items of Imihigo when at best they should be combined into one. The same is true in an output of conducting a research that is then subdivided into validating an inception report, organising a seminar, etc. Finally the Imihigo of the Ministries suffer from a practice of shifting priorities. What is considered a priority changes and is replaced by another, thus making it difficult to monitor progress in regards to such targets. 4.2. The District Scorecards: Imihigo Achievements for 2013-2014 This section presents the findings from the audit of the FY 2013-2014 Imihigo. It provides scores from the three pillars of Imihigo as how these inform the balanced scorecard, itself based on a weighting technique that takes into account a number of criteria: the availability of supporting documentations, the quality of information provided, and whether the item listed in the Imihigo responds to national development objectives outlined EDPRS and Vision 2020. The balanced approach further considers the satisfaction of key stakeholders (JADF, District Council, district employees, and the beneficiaries) in the entire process: design, implementation, and evaluation. Table 6. Results from the Scorecard for Economic, Social and Governance and Justice Pillars District Bugesera Burera Gakenke Gasabo Gatsibo Gicumbi Gisagara Huye Kamonyi Karongi Kayonza 28 | P a g e Performance Performance Scores for Scores for Economic pillar Social pillar Performance Scores for Governance and Justice Pillar Rate (%) Rate (%) Rate (%) 76 72.3 76.2 71 74.2 76.1 75 78.4 76.3 77.1 77.3 71.7 73.5 69.6 71.9 68.4 74.8 77.7 75.7 71.7 68.9 70.7 73.8 72.9 75.8 73 72.2 69.3 69.5 71 76.8 76.4 76.2 Overall district performance Rate (%) Rank 74.38 73.38 74.15 71.64 70.74 74.29 75.12 75.68 73.86 74.59 75.17 13 20 15 28 30 14 7 4 16 11 6 District Kicukiro Kirehe Muhanga Musanze Ngoma Ngororero Nyabihu Nyagatare Nyamagabe Nyamasheke Nyanza Nyarugenge Nyaruguru Rubavu Ruhango Rulindo Rusizi Rutsiro Rwamagana Performance Performance Scores for Scores for Economic pillar Social pillar 77.4 75 75 70.1 78 77.8 76.5 77 75.7 76.7 77 75.4 76.1 76.2 74.9 76.7 77.5 76.9 71.4 74.7 74.7 69.7 74.5 70.7 77 67.9 76.2 74.7 74.7 74.7 73.7 74.7 66.6 67.7 62.8 73.7 67.3 70.7 Performance Scores for Governance and Justice Pillar 77.3 76.3 72.5 72.2 74.2 72 72.1 72.7 74.1 75.5 74.9 75 76.2 71.7 75.4 73.6 75.5 74.8 70 Overall district performance 76.12 75.59 72.21 71.73 75.85 75.7 72.91 74.7 73.31 73.68 75.11 73.48 74.68 71.81 72.09 71.82 74.54 73.64 71.6 1 5 23 27 2 3 22 9 21 17 8 19 10 26 24 25 12 18 29 The tradition of Imihigo has brought about tremendous achievements in Rwanda. These achievements are noticeable in all the three development pillars of Imihigo namely economic, social, and governance (including justice). While challenges persist, suggesting room for improvement, the achievements thus far lead to the conclusion that Imihigo are an effective tool for local development and socioeconomic transformation. The table below illustrates some key positive developments brought about by Imihigo for the period 2013-2014. From the Table (6) above, it is clear that the general rankings reflect the performance of a district against some of the key priorities in both the District Development Plans and EDPRS-2. Differential positions reflect district performance against each output in the economic pillar and how that output contributes to national priorities. Within each 29 | P a g e output, all districts may have the same targets. However, some district may perform better than another. For instance, performance against the target of road construction depends on the level of completion as well as the size (length) of the road completed, such as two districts both targeting road construction with one completing only 50%. The best performing districts in the economic pillar are those that performed well in infrastructure development as well as in agriculture development. Those districts were able to provide water and electricity to a large number of people as well as building feeder roads connecting a sizeable population. In agriculture, the districts that performed better than others invested in irrigation, mechanisation, and agro processing intended for value addition in agricultural production. Similarly, excellent performance in crop production and post harvest facilities raised the scores of some districts. The Girinka programme and its multiplier effects in terms of reduction in malnutrition and its use for manure also raised points for some districts. Also significant in distinguishing districts was the extent to which districts were able to provide jobs to a sizeable number of people. Again, while most districts may have these as targets, the extent to which these targets were reached counted most in the scoring. In the social pillar, some districts performed better than others in the construction of schools and health facilities. Scores also reflected the extent to which districts provided support for vulnerable groups, and whether beneficiaries turned into income generating activities also helped raise scores for some districts. Similarly, some districts had more effective programs for fighting malnutrition than others as did those for sensitising or promoting maternal health. In governance, mobilisation and sensitisation of citizens towards development programmes as outlined in the social sector contributed to scores earned by districts. Higher scores were earned by districts’ efforts in service delivery, activities related to security, and how accountable they are to the beneficiaries. Overall, most districts had these indicators in their Imihigo but were separated in scores by the extent to which targets were delivered. The following Figure 5 depicts the overall performance score at district level while Table (6) gives a summary of indicative achievements in Imihigo for the period 2013-2014. 30 | P a g e Figure 7. Overall Performance of the Districts Overall Score (%) 77.0 76.1 76.0 75.8 75.7 75.7 75.6 75.2 75.1 75.1 75.0 74.0 73.0 72.0 71.0 70.0 69.0 68.0 31 | P a g e 74.7 74.7 74.6 74.5 74.4 74.3 74.2 73.9 73.7 73.6 73.5 73.4 73.3 72.9 72.2 72.1 71.8 71.8 71.7 71.6 71.6 70.7 Table 7. Indicative Imihigo achievements (2013-14) Economic Development Pillar 1. Created employment opportunities 2. Increased access to infrastructure facilities Increased sense of accountability among leaders 3. 4. 5. 9 Indicator Achievement Since the decentralization policy in 2000 and more particularly since the inception of the Imihigo tradition in 2006, district and other local government entities have initiated development programs. The implementation of these programs has created opportunities for employment creation for citizens mostly in infrastructure projects such as in construction of roads, schools, and health facilities.. In FY 201314, a total of 118489 Rwandans benefited from employment opportunities, according to district reports.9 One of the outstanding achievements of Imihigo is expanding access of households to water and electricity. Figures from the evaluation indicate that In FY 2013-14 368,855 and 1,449,567 households got access to electricity and water, respectively. Imihigo is a contract between the President and district leaders. As such, it sets grounds against which development and accountability are measured. It is an aspect of positive competition where leaders are focused on delivering a set of targets since they understand that they are accountable for what they promise to deliver. It is worth noting that in the past such practices of accountability were nonexistent and are an innovation of post-genocide leadership that places a premium on accountability and the obligation to deliver. Strengthened The Imihigo tradition has strengthened the culture of planning at both the local culture of administration entities and at the household level. Households are also planning progressively building that culture of planning that is important for self sustenance, kwigira. Overall, there is noticeable progress in planning of Imihigo at district level, more efforts are to be made at lower levels of local administrative entities and the household. Public Private Rwanda’s good governance strategy identifies public private partnerships as a key Four districts did not include job creation in their Imihigo of FY 2013-14. 32 | P a g e Partnership (PPP) pillar for sustainable development. Through Imihigo, public private partnerships are becoming an important vehicle for socioeconomic transformation. They facilitate coordination and synergy and enhance engagement, important elements for achieving a common purpose. For instance, according to respondents, when an entrepreneur understands that his targets are part of the district Imihigo, significant energies are spent ensuring that the targets are implemented, with the understanding that failure impacts the image of the entire district. It thus, facilitates enhanced drive/commitment. 6. 7. 8. 33 | P a g e Increased participation citizens development Previously considered as passive beneficiaries of government goodwill, citizens of were often left out of planning processes and therefore little regard for their real in needs and priorities. This led to minimal ownership of local development projects. With Imihigo, considerable efforts to involve citizens in the planning and implementation of development projects/programs were noticed. Yet, some areas need to be sustained for more benefits in the future (e.g. in setting development priorities and putting in place mechanisms). Home-grown The involvement of citizens in the Imihigo process has to some extent motivated solutions and them in regards to the value of innovation. Itself a home-grown solution, the innovation success of Imihigo enables citizens to appreciate the innovative potential in regards to responding to problems in their communities. The 2013-14 evaluation noticed encouraging innovations linked to Imihigo practices. For instance, the E-kaye is becoming an effective tool for cataloguing citizen dissatisfaction/complaints. It is an electronic tool whereby citizens directly register their complaints in order to facilitate their resolution by local authorities. A similar initiative is “Maman Lumiere”. This is a practice aimed at fighting malnutrition. Women gather in the communities where a knowledgeable resource person (usually an elder mother) provides them with insights on how to prepare a balanced diet, for instance. Maman Lumiere has particularly targeted fighting childhood nutrition in the local communities. Thinking Big The culture of Imihigo has raised citizen expectations in terms of development targets. As such, Imihigo are quickly becoming drivers for great ambitions. Field 9. 10. 10 visits and discussions with citizens revealed that the demands from the population have graduated from minor items10 such as school uniforms and materials (pens, pencils, and excise books) to bigger items such as demanding for things such as feeder roads, access to markets, electricity and water, among other things. Contributed to EICV 3 indicated a tremendous decrease of 12 percent points in poverty and that poverty sharp decreases were mainly in the rural areas. The decrease in poverty is related reduction & to an increase in food security and the rise in outputs in rural development, improved living particularly in the agricultural sector. Those achievements are somewhat linked to conditions increases in areas of land consolidated (1,488,581 hectares) and terraced (47,638 hectares) in FY 2013-14. Improved Service Delivery Imihigo targets have set service delivery as one of the priority areas of good governance. In regards to citizen satisfaction in service delivery, the EDPRS target is at 80% by 2018. In 2012, the level of citizen satisfaction in service delivery at the local government level was at 77.2%, according to RGB. If the momentum is maintained, it is likely that EDPRS targets will be achieved ahead of time. A respondent in Ruhango referred to such minute things as “Ubwajaba.” 34 | P a g e 4.3. Imihigo Challenges Despite the achievements, the evaluation observed a number of challenges in the way targets are set against a given output and therefore how to interpret the achievements. 4.3.1. Across pillars: Measurements, Recording, and Reporting One of the objectives under the economic development pillar is to increase agriculture and livestock production, productivity and value addition. The main issue involved in items under this objective has to do with inconsistent measurements. Consideration of two outputs can illustrate this problem: land consolidation and productivity. The evaluation noticed that under land consolidation some cultivated areas were double counted due to intercropping. On its own this is not a problem; however, double counting distorts the actual area under consolidation. Measurements for productivity also proved problematic. In some districts, for instance, information provided on this measure was gathered from “model farmers.” This practice distorts the true picture of productivity levels on the average since the model farmer cannot be considered to be representative of the average farmer in the district. Related challenges make it difficult for cross district comparison, which would require standardising measurement criteria. A related challenge was uncovered in livestock production. The output of insemination of cows has a significant number of districts basing their count on the number of cows inseminated. However, data cows inseminated versus those successfully fertilised should be disaggregated for a true picture of the achievements under the output of cow insemination. For the evaluation, this posed a difficulty in efforts to measure progress in line with the objective of increasing livestock production. It is worth noting, however, that logistical challenges to access beneficiaries were faced by many sector veterinarians. Remarkable progress was registered aspects of the broader objective of enhancing urbanization, rural settlement and sustainable infrastructure development. Particularly impressive is the progress that districts are making in the provision of water and, especially, electricity. On these two outputs, some districts were unable to hit their targets due mainly to delays in service delivery on the part of the parastatal responsible for water and electricity provision (former EWSA). Exogenous challenges were also observed in assessing the output of road construction where a significant part of the 35 | P a g e responsibility was on the side of the Rwanda Transport Development Agency (RTDA). Rounding out outputs under this broad objective is the item of affordable housing, a problem mainly found in the districts in the urban areas. Affordable housing as defined in district Imihigo, costing in the range of 65m to 85m francs, is clearly outside affordability and financial capacity of many city dwellers and therefore making it difficult to align the concept with the costs and to track progress on that particular output. Reporting challenges were noticed in efforts to track progress under the objective of promoting entrepreneurship and business development. The evaluation noted the absence of an appropriate mechanism for recording or counter verification in regards to the output of increasing access to employment. The practice was such that most offfarm jobs were casual jobs in nature. That is, an individual is likely to shift from job to job, moving from on one project to another in a very short period of time, while potentially being counted numerous times among employment beneficiaries. The indicator of access to finance also proved problematic in a number of ways. First, records showed the number of people who opened bank accounts without indicating whether those who opened accounts did in fact access banking services such as credit. Second, banks provide officials with the number of people who opened an account over a given period of time without consideration that some of these may be residents of other districts working there. In similar vein, a district may not record their resident who has opened an account in another district due to the fact that they either work there or that they reside along the border to another district. Third, a situation where a person opens two accounts is likely to be interpreted as if it were two individuals opening bank accounts. Overall, therefore, the evaluation noticed challenges in the governance pillar that demand the standardisation of measurements, disaggregation of data, and improvements in record keeping, key elements for tracking progress. In social development, one of the key objectives is to ensure access to quality education and skills development. On the output of quality education, the findings from this evaluation point to significant shortcomings. Most problematic was that while the target is to improve the quality of education, the targets identified to achieve this objective 36 | P a g e focus primarily on infrastructure (constructing classrooms and toilettes). Important as infrastructure is for effective education, they should not be the primary indicators for measuring the quality of education. The second concern is in the area of inspection. As an output, its targets are not clear in terms of what is expected to be inspected. Related to the first concern, the evaluation found that targets of inspection disproportionately focus on the quality of infrastructure and sanitation, except for the inspection that aims to ensure that the teacher is present. The pillar of good governance and justice aims at promoting responsible and accountable governance. Indicators under this objective show that the districts are performing well, except for a number of outstanding issues. The first has to do with the output on increasing the value and participation in Umuganda. The evaluation revealed an absence of a clear standard on how to measure the value of Umuganda. For instance, some districts measure its value based on the number of people participating on the day multiplied by the daily labour (mostly farming) rate applicable in that district, whereas other districts attempt to estimate the financial cost of achievements on the day of Umuganda. However, in both cases it is known that Umuganda lasts only three hours. A key defect from the first approach is that when calculations are based on a full day’s work rate when Umuganda lasts an average of three hours means that the value assigned could potentially mislead by overestimating the achievement. Citizen participation and satisfaction rates have been steadily increasing. However, the evaluation noticed a tendency for local authorities to exaggerate the extent to which households inform Imihigo. The citizen notebook will illustrate this point. Citizens are asked to purchase a note book in which they note their Imihigo targets for the upcoming year. Instead, they often scribe in their notebooks the assets they already possess instead of the targets they intend to achieve in the coming year. Most problematic was where testimonies from ordinary people that some local authorities are the ones to complete their family Imihigo notebooks, practice that undermines the whole idea of family Imihigo. The evaluation team also found situations where some families do not possess these notebooks. Taken together, therefore, these accounts seem to contradict the claims by local leadership about the extent of citizen participation in the Imihigo processes. 37 | P a g e 4.3.2. Structural Issues In 2000, in an effort to improve local service delivery, the government of Rwanda began a program of decentralization. Under this program, mayors are responsible for implementing local development programs. On the side of the central government is the responsibility to ensure that mayors are accountable. Accordingly, in 2006 the government launched an innovative system known as the Imihigo process. In the long run, it is believed that Imihigo will build a culture of accountability while promoting participation of the population in determining the direction that their country takes. The Imihigo retain great potential for socioeconomic transformation. Byamukama and Makonnen (2010) point out that Imihigo have undoubtedly played a significant role in Rwanda’s progress since 2006.11 However, a number of concerns have been expressed about Imihigo, despite its recognition as important in development processes. In their assessment of the Imihigo, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Ministry of Local government (2012) raised concerns about a lack of synergy between national priorities and local development plans. In similar vein, this evaluation has observed a number of challenges (exogenous and endogenous) that are likely to negatively affect the expected outcomes of Imihigo. 1. Budget versus needs There is a clear discrepancy between allocated budget and the magnitude of citizen needs at the local administrative level. This challenge was raised by a number of leaders at the district level from the Executive Committee, Councils, and the Joint Action Development Forum (JADFs). In all focus group discussions with district authorities, harmonising citizen needs with the available budget was pointed out as a key challenge. While there are always several competing needs for a limited budget, appropriate apportionment implies that the limited resources should respond to the most pressing demands. 11 See also Gatari 2013; Scher 2010; Versailles 2012 38 | P a g e In this evaluation, the most pressing needs were infrastructure development (water, electricity, and feeder roads), access to vocational training (TVET), and access to employment, especially for the youth. It is worth noting that unique circumstances dictated different pressing needs; for instance demands for radical terraces in highlandscape zones, irrigation in dry regions like Bugesera, and access to affordable housing in urban areas. The budget issue is worsened by weak capacity for local tax collection. A recent evaluation (2011) of the decentralization process that implies fiscal and financial decentralization indicated that low tax collection capacity is part of the challenges hampering optimal functioning of districts (MINALOC). The decentralization plan intended to promote an efficient and sustainable resource mobilization at the local government level. One of the strategies that are to be used is the enhancement of local revenue collection capacity using partnership between districts and Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA). In its pilot phase, once the strategy is rolled out it is expected to facilitate the mobilization of resources for districts to be able to implement their Imihigo. In the current circumstances, this evaluation found that districts are still weakly equipped to mobilize internal resources. 2. Competing Agendas The evaluation team noticed the existence of competing agendas between central and local government. In all districts, respondents reported that urgent assignments from line ministries and other central government agencies interfere with local planning. Despite efforts for joint planning meetings between the central and local levels, unplanned for requests emerging from channels outside of joint planning often come from the central government consume local resources (finances and time) particularly when the demands are not accompanied with implementing funds. In some instances, money to implement an inserted item will be promised but the promise is not delivered when it comes to the implementation phase or local authorities are told to insert items and are then told to expect the resources to come from private sources. In general, local implementers would be less concerned if all the requests from central government were accompanied with implementing resources. 39 | P a g e Despite strong political will and commitment towards decentralization, line ministries have remained with substantial power over local policy making. Further, although the process of development supposes wide consultation of all sectors of the population, it is evident that the central agenda is given priority. What this reveals is that at a certain point local and national development priorities are likely to conflicting, which might affect local prioritization as well as resource allocation. The time that could be used to implement local priorities is also shifted away from those of the district to those priorities that have come from the top. 3. Low Ownership of Imihigo Ideally, district Imihigo should be informed by the needs of citizens at the local level while being aligned to national development priorities that themselves stem from those needs. However, findings from this evaluation suggest that Imihigo ownership is relatively low among the intended beneficiaries. In some respects, districts officials pointed to a “dependency syndrome” where citizens would rather depend on government to provide them with free or subsidised goods. In some instances, the officials pointed out, citizens will compete for lower categories of Ubudehe in order to become eligible for free healthcare and VUP programmes. Overall, officials point to these programs as responsible for diminished ownership of Imihigo. On the other hand citizens point to a distance between what they consider their needs and those that officials place in the district Imihigo. This raises questions about the interpretation of officials on the failure of ownership and that suggested by the beneficiaries, implying a need for common ground on the issue of ownership of development priorities at the local level. 40 | P a g e 4. Understaffing and Low Capacity Understaffing and capacity gaps at the local government level are widely documented. Studies have provided evidence on the subject (MIFOTRA 2008; RALGA 2010). According to RALGA, lack of staff, insufficient financial means, lack of data base to facilitate planning, monitoring, and evaluation and heavy workload constitute “the most pressings factors influencing service delivery in local government” (RALGA 2010:8). In 2008 the District Capacity Building Needs Assessment conducted by the Ministry of Public Service and Labour showed that in many districts posts are occupied by staff without the requisite skills. The same study pointed to challenges in staff recruitment and low staff retention rate at the levels of the sector and the cell (MIFOTRA 2008). While these are factors that affect service delivery at the local level, these shortages have particular effects on the implementation of Imihigo. On one hand, district staff is overloaded to the extent that they may not have the requisite time to implement Imihigo targets. On the other hand, as evidenced by the above studies, local government staff are not skilled enough in Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), a key element if the Imihigo are to achieve optimum impact. 5. Delays in Funds Disbursement Some of the key detriments to Imihigo are delays in funds disbursement, be it from the central government or from other development partners. The same RALGA study pointed to delays in funds disbursement as the most important issue affecting service delivery at local government level, equally important as insufficient staff. This evaluation process has pointed to two related issues that make it difficult to implement Imihigo targets in a timely manner. First, there is a discrepancy between the fiscal year and the period of Imihigo signing. This challenge comes from the relationship with stakeholders most of whom use the calendar which starts in January against the district’s fiscal year which starts in July. Overall, time discrepancies mean that there is a period of time that is lost before Imihigo can be effectively implemented. More specifically, Imihigo are usually signed 2-3 months after the fiscal year has started. This means that almost a quarter is lost. 41 | P a g e Further, it is difficult to rely on sources of funds for which the district does not have total control. This concern is particularly pertinent with partners in the private sector. In some instances they commit to funding the implementation of certain targets, only to withdraw at the period of implementation. A possible explanation may be due to challenges in capital mobilisation. Furthermore, delayed disbursement has an impact on both procurement and implementation at the district. In a situation where the disbursement is released towards the end of the fiscal year, little time is left for procurement processes to run their course, which lives little time for implementation and therefore negatively affecting achievement of Imihigo targets. 6. Reporting The evaluation exercise revealed that there was no single reporting format in relation to Imihigo. One of the main consequences is that tracking progress is difficult. There are no standard measurements from district to district, and sometimes from the district to the line ministries. The use of fertiliser can be considered an illustration. In one district, progress on the use of fertilisers may be measured in the number of hectares on which fertiliser has been used whereas in other districts progress on the same output may be measured by the number of households that apply fertiliser on their crops. In such circumstances cross district comparison on fertiliser use is not possible. Further, there are not mechanisms for capturing the use of organic fertilizers. Since this is the case, it is difficult to give credit for information that is not recorded. This complicates the work of monitoring in general and for evaluation such as this, in particular. 7. Division of Responsibilities and Follow up Imihigo bring together various stakeholders in a bid to supplement each other’s efforts. Among these are the ministries and central government agencies, private sector, civil society organizations, faith-based organizations, and local government. The multiplicity of stakeholders implies shared responsibilities in the design and implementation of Imihigo. 42 | P a g e The evaluation revealed a number of challenges related to the division of responsibilities among the above mentioned stakeholders. One of these was poor follow-up in the implementation of Imihigo targets by concerned entities after their inclusion in the district Imihigo. Here, the evaluation noted that the chief concern is for each entity to ensure that their outputs are included in the Imihigo, after which little follow up is done. A key consequence is that concerned entities are not updated on the status of progress. What is likely to happen under such conditions is that an entity may succeed in placing an item of interest in the Imihigo but fail to provide the promised resources for its implementation, thus negatively impacting the extent to which Imihigo are achieved. An illustration provided in a different context fits in yet another challenge faced by districts when it comes to the division of responsibilities between the district and those of other government agencies. Again we have a scenario of constructing a hospital in one of the districts. The Ministry of Health hires a construction and supervising company for the hospital, signs a contract with both. In terms of evaluation, the district would produce progress reports using documents from the supervising company which in fact is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health. In such circumstances, the district in which the hospital is built is likely to place such a project in its Imihigo when its role is clearly doubtful, except for “mobilisation,” itself immeasurable. 8. Local Context in Imihigo This evaluation has pointed to serious shortcomings in Imihigo in relation to consideration of local specificities (particularities). Close analysis of the Imihigo format suggests that districts are using a one-size-fits-all approach. While setting Imihigo, little is done to consider the local viability of each district. For example, earmarked funds for large infrastructure projects such as road construction may be the same for a district with flat terrain like Nyagatare and that of mountainous terrains such as Ngororero, Burera, Kalongi, and Rutsiro, for example. Similar context specific situations that are not captured in Imihigo may involve a situation where internal migration, say, from the Northern Province that may affect Nyagatare and Gatsibo districts, are not taken into 43 | P a g e consideration during local planning. This provides an additional burden to the district budget that is not considered in the Imihigo of the affected districts. 9. Ranking Driven Planning A closer analysis of Imihigo documents as well as extensive interactions with concerned officials suggests that some district authorities are largely interested in scores. This significantly impacts the design of Imihigo by including soft targets that in reality should be routine activities. In this spirit, a one-time activity such as purchasing a television set for a cell office, trainings and seminars, as well as beatifying public spaces ought to be considered routine activities rather than items to be placed in Imihigo. One potential consequence from this situation is diverting the spirit of Imihigo from being a tool for socioeconomic transformation to a mere competition between various entities. Crucially, citizens would likely withhold support, and to assume ownership, for Imihigo if they fail to see how they are contributing to changing their lives. 44 | P a g e CHAP. V. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY FORWARD The 2013/2-14 Imihigo evaluation has revealed that tremendous socioeconomic progress has been registered over that period. All districts were able to achieve the majority of their targets at an impressive rate. The evaluation also noted the continued planning of Imihigo along key national development priorities as outlined in EDPRS2 and Vision 2020. The results show, for instance, that in the economic pillar the agricultural outputs in Imihigo have increased land terracing by 47,638 hectares in 2013/2014. Over the same time, 368,855 households have accessed electricity and an estimate of 1,449,567 people with access to water, a remarkable achievement in terms of socioeconomic progress. Imihigo targets have also seen achievements of 118,489 off-farm jobs created during the FY. In the social pillar 2,010 classrooms and 2,159 toilets have been built. The percentage of people under health insurance scheme is estimated at an average of 82.4% while the average percentage of people covered by the community health insurance is estimated at 80.1. Imihigo evaluation has also revealed that the number of women using family planning method is estimated at an average of 61%. Also significant in achieving some of the results in the social pillar has been the role of local government in citizen mobilisation. In governance, Imihigo have raised citizen expectations on service delivery and ownership of their development processes. Their demands have shifted to projects with multipliers effects like roads, electricity and water and are increasingly searching for solutions to problems in their communities and are doing this in the most innovative ways using unconventional methods. Umuganda is continuing to be an important element in mobilising efforts for socioeconomic change. Challenges remain in Imihigo, however. Inconsistency of measurements, baseline setting, and reporting were observed which point to the need to strengthen systems of recording, monitoring, and evaluation. Structural challenges were more debilitating. These included understaffing and low capacity in implementing Imihigo, delays in funds 45 | P a g e disbursement, unclear division of responsibility between central government and districts, discrepancy between the magnitude of citizen needs and available resources, and to a lesser extent, competing agendas between central government and districts. The presence of clear structures for the Imihigo process (design, implementation, and monitoring) was also not used to its optimum, which, if well utilise, could potentially lead to significantly increased levels of ownership of Imihigo. Empowering these structures would also address shortcomings where achievements continue to be reported orally (and therefore not recorded) at the lower administrative levels. Most problematic is that Imihigo as a ranking-driven process has tended to focus on soft targets that are of minimal value in relation to accelerating national development goals. Overall, it is evident that Imihigo are positively impacting the people by improving their lives and livelihoods. Indeed, progressive improvement suggests that the districts are performing their intended role of accelerating socioeconomic progress towards the targets set out as national development priorities in EDPRS-2 and Vision 2020. Lessons Learned The tradition of Imihigo has improved development planning in the broad sense. More particularly, the evaluation has noted a number of observations in the areas of planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation as well as providing a glance into the future utility of Imihigo. The evaluation exercise specifically provided the following key lessons. In the areas of planning there are overall improvements in priority setting and coordination with the relevant administrative levels and entities, as follows: Strengths in planning: Channels exist to identify local priorities at the village, cell, sector and district levels. These channels serve an important purpose of ensuring that targets identified respond to the needs of the citizens and that they are transformative; There is sufficient coordination with the private sector, NGOs, faith based and civil society organisations under the umbrella of JADF that ensures that the Imihigo are inclusive which increases the level of ownership among key stakeholders; The central and local government have enhanced extent of consultation which ensures a sense of common purpose. 46 | P a g e The vast majority of the items in Imihigo reflect the intended social economic change intended in sector strategies and national priorities. Citizens are increasingly aware of their responsibility to respond to challenges in their community. This is increasingly done through innovative home-grown solutions. Challenges in planning Despite the existence of channels for consultation, there is room to improve their effectiveness. Empowering all decentralized entities up to the household level in their setting of imihigo would improve effectiveness; Consistent measurements of performing indicators is needed in order to avoid multiple interpretations including setting baselines. District Councils still lack full control over the extent to which they adapt targets that are driven by the central government; There is a need to provide a clear division of responsibility between the central government and the district. There is a tendency for two entities to claim responsibility over the same output. There doesn’t seem to be a clear process for monitoring targets to ensure continuity in the progress of Imihigo from one period to another. There is a tendency to focus on soft targets; Strengths in implementation: There is a sense of shared responsibility between JADF and the District Council. There is an enhanced sense of ownership of local challenges by citizens. A culture of self-reliance among the vulnerable is developing. Most are investing the direct support money they receive from government into sustainable income generating activities. Issues in implementation The lag between the passing of the budget and the Imihigo translates to a loss of the first quarter in implementation. Most Imihigo are implemented in the last quarter due to delays in either the transfer of financial resources to the districts or delays on the part of the district to request for disbursement. Shifting priorities take away resources (time, finances) from implementing Imihigo. 47 | P a g e Some targets are included in Imihigo without adequate control of the sources of funds for implementation. In some situations, Imihigo without proper local contextualization were difficult to implement. A good example was when the evaluators found farmers in some hilly parts of the country using land tillers on terraces in efforts that were clearly designed to reach the target of agricultural mechanization. The tool was not appropriate for the terrain. Some targets were not achieved due to a third party such as those on water, electricity and road construction where delays in implementation were related to not having control over the operations of EWSA and RTDA. There are challenges in establishing measurement standards from one district to another. An output that requires building households for the vulnerable may have a house value ranging between 2m and 15 million. There is an assumption that an implemented item meets requisite standards which themselves are not outlined anywhere. Guidance from the central government for standard setting should be strengthened as well as a team for quality assurance to ensure implemented items meet the quality standards. Some achievements were inflated. A good example is an output for building a house claimed to be 60% complete when a site visit would place it at a far less percentage. There are challenges in common planning for district trans-boundary items such as feeder road construction. Understaffing and high turnover at the local administration level calls for improved capacity building and need to improve the institution environment for delivering. Advances in Monitoring and Evaluation There is a growing attention to the role of JADF and District Council in monitoring through their ad hoc commissions. Challenges in M &E Counter verification mechanisms to reported achievements need improving; Recording was problematic; lower administrative entities that are said to generate data may not have records, with reporting between village and cell largely oral in nature. As such, many achievements are undocumented; Overall record keeping (reporting and filing) system need strengthening; 48 | P a g e Monitoring and evaluation is largely not based on standard tools for measuring progress; Key Recommendations In relation to the above observations, the evaluation team recommends that: 1. There should be improved consultations to increase effectiveness of existing channels for enhanced penetration of Imihigo 2. Strengthen monitoring and evaluation frameworks (tools, baselines, indicators, time bounded reviews, reporting, etc) at the central and local government levels for Imihigo 3. Umuhigo should not be claimed by more than one entity unless clear division of responsibility is clearly defined; 4. Core features (challenging and transformative) of Imihigo should be retained to avoid tendency for soft targets that do not impact peoples lives. 5. Ensure timely facilitation, guidance, budgetary transfer from the central government to the districts. 6. Data on service delivery should be disaggregated by gender 7. Imihigo should be limited in number (not to exceed 10). Way forward Imihigo have set in motion development processes that are significantly contributing to accelerating the achievement of national development priorities. Imihigo are working as a tool for mobilising human and financial resources needed to facilitate this transition. They are also merging different interests that in other contexts would have competing objectives. The importance of Imihigo compels a future where they: 1. Fully integrated into the planning process from the central government to the lowest administrative levels; 2. Show continuity that links past and present achievements to the future that leads to outcomes intended from the national development priorities. Their evaluation should reflect intended progress in the achievement of sector strategies to inform progress towards achieving national development priorities; 3. Are evaluated based on annual measurements of outputs that track targets and achievements that are directly linked to a long-term outcome; 4. Have created a framework responsible for strategic intervention for empowering Imihigo, given its current importance as a tool for development planning; 49 | P a g e 5. Have appropriate features that lead to socioeconomic transformation. This implies that districts and ministries should be empowered in the designing of Imihigo that have the features or characteristics of a “good Umuhigo,” as below: It should be locally contextualised to respond to specific needs of the citizens; It should identified through participatory approach (to enhance ownership and effective implementation); It should comply with national priorities, leading to socioeconomic transformation; It should be challenging in nature; It should be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Time bound); It should consider value for money; It should be innovative (to allow for unconventional approaches for resource mobilisation). 50 | P a g e REFERENCES Byamukama, B. and Makonnen, N. (2010). Performance Contracts and Social Service Delivery – Lessons from Rwanda. Kigali: African Development Bank. Gatari, E. (2013). 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