WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION AND CONFLICTS:
The case of the Euphrates and the Tigris
Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu
Gebze Institute of Technology
Turkey
Jean Michel Guldmann
The Ohio State University
U.S.A.
INTRODUCTION
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

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History: Conflicts over the control of fertile and irrigable
agricultural lands.
Today: Conflicts over the control of scarce water
resources.
The Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP).
Ethnicity & Religion: Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, and
Shiites.
High population growth rates: Doubling over 20 years.
Inelastic water supply.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Applications of Cooperative Games

Dinar & Wolf (1994)
– Introduction of an international WM (Water Market)
– Utilization of game theory and optimization
– Incorporation of political feasibility analyses

Rogers (1969)
– The Ganges
– Game theory (non-zero sum games)

Rogers (1993)
– ‘Reasonable and Equitable’ sharing
– Pareto-Admissibility
– Game theory
Application of Spatial Equilibrium Models
to Water Allocation Problems

Flinn & Guise (1970)



Vaux & Howitt (1984)




First application of spatial price equilibrium model
Hypothetical river basin and water allocation
Average cost pricing v.s. marginal cost pricing
Water Market in California
Results 1) Reduces the need for large supply-augmenting
conveyance facilities 2) Provides welfare gains
Booker & Young (1994)


Colorado River Institutional Model (CRIM)
Water market for efficiency
The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin
Model (ETRBM)
Goal:
Development of a methodology and its
application
Content:
 Benchmark Model
 Application of cooperative game theory
concepts to define sustainable benefits and
water resources allocations
Model Assumptions

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







Same agricultural productivity throughout the region;
Environmental problems are ignored (e.g., salinization, low BOD);
Same energy prices throughout the region;
Water unit values in urban and agricultural areas do not vary
throughout the region;
In Iraq and Syria, only cities exceeding 100,000 are incorporated;
Groundwater resources are ignored due to lack of spatial information;
Constant water transportation unit costs throughout the region;
The optimization model maximizes the total net benefits, rather than
the benefits of any country or of any sub-portion(s) of the basin;
Supply-to-supply internodal link unit costs are assumed to be the same
as agricultural transport unit costs between supply and demand nodes;
Water withdrawals per acre and per person are constrained by upper
limits, to prevent excessive withdrawals.
Spatial Structure of the ETRBM
45 Supply Nodes (j)
• Turkey has 15 supply nodes
• Syria has 7 supply nodes
• Iraq has 23 supply nodes
63 Demand Nodes (i)
• Turkey has total of 24
demand nodes
• Syria has 16 demand nodes
• Iraq has 23 demand nodes
Three Interbasin Links
All links from the Tigris to the Euphrates
• from j=21 to j=12: Turkey to Syria
• from j=28 to j=14: In Iraq
• from j=31 to j=16: In Iraq
Mathematical Structure of the ETRBM
Optimization Technique: Linear Programming

Objective function (Maximize)
–
–
–
–
–

Agricultural benefits
Urban benefits
Energy benefits
Delivery costs to urban and agricultural uses
Transshipment costs over the links
Constraints (Subject to)
–
–
–
–
Node balance constraints
Feasibility constraints (Supply to Supply & Supply to Demand)
Minimum & maximum withdrawal constraints
Equalities
Objective Function
NEB  agr VALAG  WTi   j ,agr W j ,i  DSD j ,i  AGRTC
 urbVALUR  WTi   j ,urbW j ,i  DSD j ,i URBTC
  j ,l EPR  EG j  PQ j ,l

 ( PQ28,14  CTSS  DSS 28,14 )  ( PQ31,16  CTSS  DSS 31,16 )  ( PQ21,12  CTSS  DSS 21,12 )
Sets:
i:
demand nodes (1 to 63)
j & l:
supply nodes (1 to 45)
agr:
set of agricultural demand nodes
urb:
set of urban demand nodes

Constraints: Node Balance
 W  Q  REL 
 RFR WT  TF   PQ
i
i
i, j
j
i, j
j
i
j
l
l, j
TRFN j  i RFRi , j  WTi
Constraints
WTi   j W j ,i
 PQ
l
j ,l
 Qj
SIZEi  MINAGR  WTi  SIZEi  MAXAGR
SIZEi  MINURB  WTi  SIZEi  MAXURB
W j ,i  M  FTRNSD j ,i
PQ j ,l  M  FTRNSS j ,l
Data and Parameter Estimates

Supply Data
– Tributary Flows
– Return Flows
– Evaporation

Demand Data
– Agriculture & Urban Use
VALAG & VALUR
 MINAGR & MAXAGR
 MINURB & MAXURB
– Water Conveyance Cost and Energy Price Data
 Transportation Costs
 Energy

General Summary of the Benchmark Solution

Energy benefits
constitute nearly 50%
of overall returns;
 Return flows make up
almost 50% of the
water input from
tributaries, and are
available for reuse;
 Total water withdrawal
is very close to the total
tributary flow input,
whereas water released
to the Gulf makes up to
35% of the total
tributary inflow.
Solution
Net system benefit (NEB),
$
2,407,731,200
Water use benefits (TECBW)
$
2,091,003,000
Energy generation benefits (TECBE),
$
1,175,087,800
Transportation costs for urban uses (TTCURB)
$
32,145,138
Transportation costs for agricultural uses (TTCAGR )
$
826,214,547
Interbasin transfer cost (TTRSS )
$
0
Water release to the Gulf (GULF)
28,225
Total water withdrawal (TWT)
78,528
Total return flow (FRET)
42,582
Total in-out balance (TOTBAL)
Total agricultural water withdrawal (TWAGR)
Total urban water withdrawal (TWURB)
0
77,505
1,022
System Parameters
Total tributary flows (TFT)
81,920
Total reserve evaporation (RELT)
17,750
Minimum required total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMIN)
Maximum total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMAX)
Minimum required total water withdrawal for urban use (TWURBMIN)
Maximum total water withdrawal for urban use (TWURBMAX).
0
122,519.12
0
1,880.95
Benefit Allocation by Country and Use
Summary
Economic Benefits
Transport Costs
Net Economic Benefits
Economic Benefits /
Transport Costs
Percent Distribution
Withdrawal
Energy
Urban Withdrawal
Agricultural Withdrawal
Transport Costs
Urban Withdrawal
Agricultural Withdrawal
Link Transshipment

$
$
$
Total
3,266,090,800
858,359,685
2,407,731,200
$
$
$
Turkey
1,161,095,600
144,065,122
1,017,030,400
$
$
$
Syria
294,048,029
60,237,792
233,810,237
$
$
$
Iraq
1,810,947,300
654,056,771
1,156,890,500
3.81
8.06
4.88
2.77
64.0%
36.0%
4.7%
59.3%
24.6%
75.4%
3.0%
21.6%
56.3%
43.7%
2.9%
53.3%
90.5%
9.5%
6.1%
84.5%
3.7%
96.3%
0.0%
7.6%
92.4%
0.0%
4.7%
95.3%
0.0%
2.8%
97.2%
0.0%
Net benefits of Turkey and Iraq are almost the same
–
–
–
Turkey obtains most of her benefits from energy generation (75%)
Iraq obtains hers from agriculture (90%)
Syria obtains 56% from water withdrawals and 44% from energy generation

Energy generation potential at the upstream nodes
 Agricultural uses potential at the downstream nodes
–
–

Turkey has the lowest transport cost
Iraq the highest transport cost
Total urban transportation costs constitute an insignificant share of the
total transportation costs in the whole system and in each county
Water Resources Allocation by Country, Basin, and Use
Summary
Euphrates Urban
Tigris Urban
Euphrates Agriculture
Tigris Agriculture
Basin
Euphrates Total
Tigris Total
Use
Urban Total
Agriculture Total
Overall
Total Withdrwals
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

Turkey
45
0.1%
190
0.2%
3,402
4.3%
6,626
8.4%
Syria
58
0.1%
6,273
8.0%
-
Iraq
78
0.1%
652
0.8%
25,800
32.9%
35,405
45.1%
35,655
42,873
45.4%
54.6%
3,447
6,816
4.4%
8.7%
6,331
-
8.1%
-
25,878
36,057
33.0%
45.9%
1,022
77,505
1.3%
98.7%
235
10,028
0.3%
12.8%
58
6,273
0.1%
8.0%
730
61,205
0.9%
77.9%
78,528
100.0%
10,263
13.1%
6,331
8.1%
61,934
78.9%
The highest withdrawal (61,934 Mm3) in Iraq

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Total
180
0.2%
843
1.1%
35,475
45.2%
42,030
53.5%
Iraq obtains its major benefits from agriculture water withdrawal
Turkey (with nearly 2/3 of Iraqi land) withdraws only 1/6 of Iraqi
withdrawal (10,263 Mm3)
Urban withdrawals (1,022 Mm3)
Agricultural withdrawal (77,505 Mm3).
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN WATER
RESOURCES ALLOCATION:
Game – Theoretic Analyses
a. Independent Action by Individual Countries
Step 1
T
T
T
Step 2
Energy Prices (EPR)
EPR = $0
EPR = $25
EPR = $100
Water Resources Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights
(TTF=Bm3)
Turkey: 1.1
Syria: 1.0
Iraq: 0.9
A11
A12
A13
59.8 Minimum
A21
A22
A23
81.9 Average
A31
A32
A33
92.6 Maximum
Water Resources Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights
(TTF=Bm3)
Turkey: 1.0
Syria: 1.0
Iraq: 1.0
B11
B12
B13
59.8 Minimum
B21
B22
B23
81.9 Average
B31
B32
B33
92.6 Maximum
Water Resources Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights
(TTF=Bm3)
Turkey: 0.9
Syria: 1.0
Iraq: 1.1
C11
C12
C13
59.8 Minimum
C21
C22
C23
81.9 Average
C31
C32
C33
92.6 Maximum
A
S
S
Diagram 1
Diagram 2
Diagram 3
b. Two-Country Coalitions
Step 1
Step 1
Step V=T+1
TS
T
T
B
C
I
Step 3
Step T=V+1
S
Step 2
Step 2
I
SI
Diagram 1
Diagram 2
Diagram 3
c. Grand Coalition
T
Step 1
LEGEND
S
I
T
Turkey
S
Syria
I
Iraq
Return Flows
Water Releases
Diagram 1
I
NEBt  ta VALAG  WTi   j ,ta W j ,i  DSD j ,i  AGRTC
Objective Functions
 tu VALUR  WTi   j ,tu W j ,i  DSD j ,i  URBTC
Individual Country Objectives
 st ,l EPR  EGst  PQst ,l
NEBs  sa VALAG  WTi   j , sa W j ,i  DSD j ,i  AGRTC
 su VALUR  WTi   j , su W j ,i  DSD j ,i  URBTC
 ss,l EPR  EGss  PQss,l

 ( PQ21,12  CTSS  DSS 21,12 )
NEBi  ia VALAG  WTi   j ,ia W j ,i  DSD j ,i  AGRTC

 iu VALUR  WTi   j ,iu W j ,i  DSD j ,i  URBTC
 si,l EPR  EGsi  PQsi,l

 ( PQ28,14  CTSS  DSS 28,14 )  ( PQ31,16  CTSS  DSS 31,16 )
Coalition Objectives
NEBts  NEBt  NEBs
&
NEBi  NEBiTS
NEBti  NEBt  NEBs
&
NEBs  NEBsTI
NEBsi  NEBs  NEBi
Grand Coalition Objective (Equivalent of Objective in the Benchmark Model)
NEBtsi  NEBt  NEBs  NEBi

Core Conditions
X t  min( NEBt , NEBtSI )  NEBt min
X s  min NEBs, NEBsTI   NEBs min
X i  min NEBi, NEBiTS   NEBi min
X t  X s  NEBts
X t  X i  NEBti
X s  X i  NEBsi
X t  X s  X i  NEBtsi
Models for Core and Subsidy Determination

Maximize
FZ

Subject to
X t  min( NEBt , NEBtSI )  NEBt min
X s  min NEBs, NEBsTI   NEBs min
X i  min NEBi, NEBiTS   NEBi min
X t  X s  NEBts
X t  X i  NEBti
X s  X i  NEBsi
X t  X s  X i  Z  NEBtsi
Shapley Allocation (e.g., Iraq)

Iraq joining the “empty” coalition
IBi   NEBi min

Iraq joining either the Turkey or Syria coalition
IBi t  NEBti  NEBt min
IBi s  NEBsi  NEBs min

Iraq joining the Turkey-Syria coalition
IBi ts  NEBtsi  NEBts min
Core Analysis Summary
Differences Between Shapley, Core, and Minimum Benefits
FURTHER RESEARCH

Environmental issues
– Gulf area preservation (intrusion), salinization, drainage

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Utilization of nonlinear objective functions
Incorporation of groundwater resources
Multi-period river basin analyses
– Utilization of large reservoirs

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
More details for the demand nodes (smaller size)
Projections for the future demands
Water transfers to the other countries
– From where to where?
– Impacts to the system

Evaluation of impacts of important projects and
government subsidies
– e.g., Urfa Tunnel