1AC – Plan
Regarding its monitoring of United States persons, the United States federal
government should:
 require use of a “specific selection term” to satisfy current “reasonable, articulable
suspicion standards”
 require that information collected through “pen register or trap and trace devices” via
emergency authorizations be subject to the same procedural safeguards as non-emergency
collections.
 require “super minimization" procedures that delete information obtained about a person
not connected to the investigation
1AC – Solvency
Contention One – Solvency
The new Freedom Act won’t reduce bulk surveillance – more safeguards
needed
New York Times ‘15
(editorial board of New York Times – The Opinion Pages of New York Times – “More Excuses on the Patriot Act “ - May 1st http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/opinion/more-excuses-on-the-patriot-act.html?smid=fb-share&_r=2)
designers have a term — “minimal viable product” — to describe early versions of things like
iPhone apps that they can rush to market. The idea is to get something out and refine it as they go
along. That’s the argument being made for a measure in Congress that would modify the Patriot Act to make
it somewhat harder for the government to conduct mass surveillance of Americans without
regard to whether they committed any misdeeds. Sure, there are compromises, Americans are told, but we should not let the perfect
Software
be the enemy of the good. The bill is a “critical first step toward reining in” surveillance by the National Security Agency and is a basis for more reform, said Human
Rights Watch.
Except the Constitution is not Candy Crush.
The same idea — let’s do what we can and improve it later — was
used to shove the original Patriot Act through Congress. It was used to justify the inadequate changes later made to the act, many of which made it more intrusive on
Americans’ rights. In 2008, we got a “reform” of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, that provided retroactive cover for the illegal surveillance of
The new bill, the USA Freedom Act,
was passed by the House Judiciary Committee on Thursday in a 25-to-2 vote and sent to the floor for what seems like near-certain approval. It does contain
useful changes to Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which was cynically misinterpreted by the Bush administration to cover the collection of
innocent Americans conducted under President George W. Bush behind the false flag of counterterrorism.
millions of telephone records in the United States and elsewhere. Section 215 will expire on June 1 if Congress does not act, but that is unlikely. The new bill would
narrow the kinds of records, including so-called metadata from phone calls, that the intelligence agencies can collect without bothering to obtain a warrant even from
the obliging FISA court, which virtually always grants one. It adds transparency measures related to government surveillance programs, and provides for more
But many of those provisions are weaker than in earlier versions of the bill , and
weaker than they need to be. The House committee rejected amendments designed to provide greater safeguards for civil liberties — including
one from a Republican that would have required the government to get a warrant before searching collected communications for information about Americans. The
bill does not end the bulk collection of surveillance data under Section 215. Rather, it limits
those operations, which, in addition to eroding the Bill of Rights, have been shown to be worthless in protecting America. The American Civil Liberties
Union believes the bill doesn’t sufficiently tighten the definition of the terms used to justify data
collection, or properly limit the retention of information about people who are not
suspected of wrongdoing, or require meaningful disclosure of so-called “backdoor” searches of databases by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
oversight of those programs.
It does not appoint an advocate to argue before the FISA court on behalf of civil liberties; instead, it simply appoints a panel of experts to advise the court, where only
the government is allowed to present a case, in secret.
The new Freedom Act fails. Pen register, super-minimization, and SST
standards from the original draft of the Freedom Act would solve.
Greene ‘15
(et al; David Greene, Senior Staff Attorney and Civil Liberties Director for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. David is also an
adjunct professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law, where he teaches classes in First Amendment and media law
and an instructor in the journalism department at San Francisco State University. David has significant experience litigating First
Amendment issues in state and federal trial and appellate courts and is one of the country's leading advocates for and
commentators on freedom of expression in the arts. “ACLU v. Clapper and the Congress: How The Second Circuit’s Decision
Affects the Legislative Landscape” - Electronic Frontier Foundation - May 11, 2015 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/aclu-v-clapper-and-congress-how-second-circuits-decision-affects-legislative)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper has determined that the NSA’s telephone records program went far beyond
what Congress authorized when it passed Section 215 of the Patriot Act in 2001. The court unequivocally rejected the government’s secret
reinterpretation of Section 215. Among many important findings, the court found that Section 215’s authorization of the collection of business
records that are “relevant to an authorized investigation” could not be read to include the dragnet collection of telephone records. The court also
took issue with the fact that this strained application of the law was accomplished in secret and approved by the secret and one-sided Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court). EFF filed amicus briefs in this case in both the district and circuit courts, and we congratulate our
colleagues at the ACLU on this significant victory. The Second Circuit’s opinion stands as a clear sign that the courts are ready to step in and rule
Second Circuit’s decision , however, also marks a significant
change in the context of the ongoing legislative debate in Congress. Above all, it is clear that Congress
must do more to rein in dragnet surveillance by the NSA. Clean Reauthorization First, the Second
Circuit’s opinion should stop the idea of a "clean reauthorization" (a reauthorization with no reforms) of
Section 215, which is set to expire June 1. Last month, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Intelligence
that mass surveillance is illegal. That’s great news. The
Chair Richard Burr introduced S. 1035, a bill that would extend the current language of Section 215 through 2020, thereby continuing the mass
spying rubber-stamped by the FISA Court. The morning of the Second Circuit decision, both Senators took to the Senate floor to vehemently
defend the bulk collection program and push for a clean reauthorization. But a clean reauthorization is much more complicated now. Congress
can’t pretend that the Second Circuit's narrow reading of “relevant to an authorized investigation” doesn’t exist. It’s likely that if Congress merely
does a “clean” reauthorization of Section 215, then the district court in ACLU v. Clapper will enjoin the government from using Section 215 as
authorization for the call records dragnet, because the district court is bound by the Second Circuit decision. However, if a reauthorization made it
clear that Congress intended to reject the Second Circuit’s narrow reading of the law, it could cause further confusion and the government could
argue that Congress has fully embraced the dragnet. We’re encouraging people to call Congress and tell their lawmakers to reject Senator
The USA
Freedom Act Must Be Strengthened In light of the Second Circuit’s decision, EFF asks Congress to
strengthen its proposed reform of Section 215, the USA Freedom Act. Pending those improvements, EFF is withdrawing our
support of the bill. We’re urging Congress to roll the draft back to the stronger and meaningful reforms
included in the 2013 version of USA Freedom and affirmatively embrace the Second Circuit’s opinion on the limits of
Section 215. Most importantly, the Second Circuit’s correct interpretation of the law should be expressly embraced by Congress in
order to avoid any confusion going forward about what the key terms in the statute mean, especially the terms
McConnell's clean reauthorization in order to avoid the risk that Congress might reject the Second Circuit’s decision
“relevant” and “investigation.” This recognition could be in the bill itself or, less preferably, in legislative history. The House Judiciary
Committee has already included such language in its report to the full House of Representatives, but now the Senate must include the language in
the bill or in its own legislative history. This easy task will make sure that the law is not read as rejecting the Second Circuit’s reading and
will help ensure that the USA Freedom Act actually accomplishes its goal of ending bulk
collection. The House Report on USA Freedom, issued today, takes a step forward by stating that: Congress’ decision to leave in place the
‘‘relevance’’ standard for Section 501 orders should not be construed as Congress’ intent to ratify the FISA Court’s interpretation of that term.
These changes restore meaningful limits to the ‘‘relevance’’ requirement of Section 501, consistent with the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper. Ensuring that the Senate doesn't move away from the legislative history should be a top priority as
the bill moves forward. But that’s the bare minimum Congress must do. The Second Circuit, and especially Judge Sack’s concurrence, noted a
lack of both transparency and a true adversary in the FISA Court. The 2014 and 2013 USA Freedom Act had stronger FISA Court reforms,
particularly around the creation of a special advocate who would argue against the government in the FISA Court. The Second Circuit’s opinion
also emphasizes that typical subpoenas seek only records of "suspects under investigation, or of people or businesses that have contact with such
subjects." Under the current USA Freedom Act, the government can collect records of a "second hop,"—the numbers, and associated metadata,
that have been in contact with the numbers collected initially—without any additional authorization. The bill should be changed so that the
government must file another application for any further records it wants to collect. Automatically obtaining a "second hop" is unacceptable
because it sweeps in too many people’s records. The
current USA Freedom Act is also out-of-sync with the court’s
narrow view of permissible collection of records because it lacks a rigorous definition of the
"specific selection term" the government can use to identify the records it wants to collect. This
can be addressed by two changes: (1) drawing upon last year's definition in the USA Freedom Act ;
and, (2) closing down potential loopholes like the definition of "address" or the use of a "person" to include a corporate person.
Restoring
Important Parts of 2013’s USA Freedom Act This is also an opportunity and a new context for Congress
to address the shortcomings of the new ly introduced USA Freedom Act that we previously wrote about.
Congress should put back key provisions that were dropped along the way as well as remove those that were
introduced at the behest of the intelligence community. First, the "super minimization" procedures , which were
key privacy procedures that mandated the deletion of any information obtained about a person
not connected to the investigation, should be reintroduced. Key provisions establishing a higher
legal standard and compliance assessment for the use of pen register/trap-and-trace devices , legal standing to
sue the government over surveillance practices, and the original transparency provisions allowing government and corporate disclosure of
surveillance orders should
also be resuscitated.
1AC – Human Intelligence
Contention 2 - is Human Intelligence
The squo relies Big Data surveillance. That means info overload & less
HUMINT.
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, “Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted Boston Marathon Bombing: The former
NSA contractor says a focus on mass surveillance is impeding traditional intelligence-gathering efforts—and allowing terrorists
to succeed”, October 20, 2014, ak.)
Edward Snowden on Monday suggested
that if the National Security Agency focused more on traditional
intelligence gathering—and less on its mass-surveillance programs—it could have thwarted the
2013 Boston Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker, speaking via video to a Harvard class,
said that a preoccupation with collecting bulk communications data has led to resource
constraints at U.S. intelligence agencies, often leaving more traditional, targeted methods of
spying on the back burner. "We miss attacks, we miss leads, and investigations fail because when
the government is doing its 'collect it all,' where we're watching everybody, we're not seeing
anything with specificity because it is impossible to keep an eye on all of your targets," Snowden told
Harvard professor and Internet freedom activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good example of this is, actually, the Boston Marathon bombings."
Snowden said that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev were pointed
out by Russian intelligence to U.S. officials
prior to the bombings last year that killed three and left hundreds wounded, but that such actionable intelligence
was largely ignored. He argued that targeted surveillance on known extremists and diligent pursuit of
intelligence leads provides for better counterterrorism efforts than mass spying. "We didn't really
watch these guys and the question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is because we do have finite
resources and the question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on mass-surveillance
programs of the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means of traditional [targeting]?"
Anti-spying activists have frequently argued that bulk data collection has no record of successfully
thwarting a terrorist attack, a line of argument some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their legal
reviews of the activities. Snowden's suggestion—that such mass surveillance has not only failed to directly stop a
threat, but actually makes the U.S. less safe by distracting resource-strapped intelligence officials
from performing their jobs—takes his criticism of spy programs to a new level. "We're watching everybody that
we have no reason to be watching simply because it may have value, at the expense of being able to watch
specific people for which we have a specific cause for investigating, and that's something that we
need to look carefully at how to balance," Snowden said.
Big Data kills human-intel – key to overall US operations.
Margolis ‘13
Gabriel Margolis – the author presently holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Conflict Management & Resolution from UNC
Wilmington and in his final semester of the program when this article was published in the peer-reviewed journal Global Security
Studies . Global Security Studies (GSS) is a premier academic and professional journal for strategic issues involving international
security affairs. All articles submitted to and published in Global Security Studies (GSS) undergo a rigorous, peer-reviewed
process. From the article: “The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem” - Global Security Studies - Spring 2013,
Volume 4, Issue 2http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf
The United States has accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological advances of the 20th
century. Numerous methods of collection have been employed in clandestine operations around the world
including those that focus on human, signals, geospatial, and measurements and signals intelligence. An
infatuation with technological methods of intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence
organizations, often leaving the age old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on
technical methods, some of the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can be attributed to an
absence of human intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances in technology have allowed UAVs to
become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering platform; however human intelligence is still being
neglected. The increasing reliance on UAVs will make the United States susceptible to
intelligence failures unless human intelligence can be properly integrated. In the near future UAVs
may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before classical espionage is a thing of the past.
BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT is key to stay-ahead of these risks.
Johnson ‘9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of the journal
"Intelligence and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign policy. Dr. Johnson served as staff
director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in political
science from the University of California at Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security"
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST,
ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 – available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html
The world is a dangerous place , plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states; competition for scarce
resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling
arsenals of conventional armaments; and deep-seated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if
for no other reason, government officials leaders seek information about the capabilities and—an especially elusive topic—the intentions
of those overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation. That is the core purpose
of espionage: to gather information about threats, whether external or internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret
services hope to provide leaders with data that can help advance the national interest—the opportunity side of the
security equation. Through the practice of espionage—spying or clandestine human intelligence : whichever is one's
favorite term—the central task, stated baldly, is to steal secrets from adversaries as a means for achieving a more
thorough understanding of threats and opportunities in the world. National governments study information that is
available in the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for example), but knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite
metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw puzzle. Many of the pieces to the puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there will
continue to be several missing pieces— perhaps the most important ones. They may be hidden away in Kremlin vaults
or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired through careful research; but often discovery of the
missing secret pieces has to rely on spying, if they can be found at all. Some things— "mysteries" in the argot of intelligence professionals—are
unknowable in any definitive way, such as who is likely to replace the current leader of North Korea. Secrets, in contrast, may be uncovered with a combination of luck and skill—say, the
Espionage can be pursued by way of human agents
or with machines, respectively known inside America's secret agencies as human intelligence
("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists of spy rings that rely on foreign agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence
professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations officers). -_ Techint includes mechanical devises large
number of Chinese nuclear-armed submarines, which are vulnerable to satellite and sonar tracking.
and small, including satellites the size of Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft,
most famously the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predator—often armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill what its handlers have just spotted
through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at enemy territory: listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that
carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs" concealed within sparkling cut-glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces.
Techint attracts the most
funding in Washington, D.C. (machines are costly, especially heavy satellites that must be launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over humint in
America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to be recruited by the United States in most every region of the globe. Some critics contend that
only human agents can
provide insights into that most vital of all national security questions: the intentions of one's
rivals— especially those adversaries who are well armed and hostile. The purpose of this essay is to examine the value of
these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of international affairs; other authorities maintain, though, that
humint, based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is organized in the following
manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines some empirical data on its value; surveys more broadly the pros and cons of this approach to
spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's security.
Those impacts cause extinction.
Ochs ‘2
Richard - Chemical Weapons Working Group Member - “Biological Weapons must be Abolished Immediately,” June 9,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]
the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or
vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence
Of all the weapons of mass destruction,
pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear
weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control.
Biological weapons, on the
can get out of control very easily
other hand,
, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these
doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the
Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they
can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical
weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination
With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive
elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than
that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than
is over, it is over.
could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of
such plagues? HUMAN
EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.
Plan solves and is reversible. Less Big Data means conventional and targeted
human intel.
Walt, 14
(Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The Big
Counterterrorism Counterfactual Is the NSA actually making us worse at fighting terrorism?”,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/10/counterterrorism_spying_nsa_islamic_state_terrorist_cve, November 10,
2014, ak.)
The head of the British electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an article he wrote for the Financial Times. In effect,
Hannigan argued that more robust encryption procedures by private Internet companies were unwittingly aiding terrorists such as the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda, by
making it harder for organizations like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor online traffic. The implication was clear: The more that our personal privacy is respected and
protected, the greater the danger we will face from evildoers. It's a serious issue, and democracies that want to respect individual privacy while simultaneously keeping
citizens safe are going to have to do a much better job of reassuring us that vast and (mostly) secret surveillance capabilities overseen by unelected officials such as
I tend to favor the privacy side of the argument, both because personal freedoms are hard to get back
once lost, but also because there's not much evidence that these surveillance activities are making
us significantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist leaders, but there's a lively debate among scholars over whether tracking
Hannigan won't be abused.
and killing these guys is an effective strategy. The fear of being tracked also forces terrorist organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures, but it
So here's a wild counterfactual for you to ponder: What
would the United States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and powerful nations do if they didn't have these vast
surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't have armed drones, cruise missiles, or other implements of destruction that can make it
doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless.
remarkably easy (and in the short-term, relatively cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a terrorist? Assuming that there were still violent extremists plotting
would these powerful states do if the Internet was there but no one knew how to spy on it? For starters, they'd have to rely
more heavily on tried-and-true counterterrorism measures: infiltrating extremist organizations and
flipping existing members, etc., to find out what they were planning, head attacks off before they
occurred, and eventually roll up organization themselves. States waged plenty of
counterterrorism campaigns before the Internet was invented, and while it can be difficult to infiltrate such movements and
find their vulnerable points, it's not exactly an unknown art. If we couldn't spy on them from the safety of
Fort Meade, we'd probably be doing a lot more of this.
various heinous acts, what
(Note to students: Fort Meade – internally referenced – is a United States Army installation
that’s home to NSA and other intelligence agencies.)
More funding WON’T solve. Data overload overwhelms intel and guarantees
ongoing resource failures.
Tufekci ‘15
Zeynep Tufekci is a fellow at the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University, an assistant professor at the
School of Information and Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, and a faculty associate at the Harvard
Berkman Center for Internet and Society. “Terror and the limits of mass surveillance” – Financial Times’ The Exchange - Feb 3rd
http://blogs.ft.com/the-exchange/2015/02/03/zeynep-tufekci-terror-and-the-limits-of-mass-surveillance/
The most common justification given by governments for mass surveillance is that these tools are
indispensable for fighting terrorism. The NSA’s ex-director Keith Alexander says big data is “what it’s all about”.
Intelligence agencies routinely claim that they need massive amounts of data on all of us to catch the bad guys, like the French brothers who assassinated the
cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo, or the murderers of Lee Rigby, the British soldier killed by two men who claimed the act was revenge for the UK’s involvement in the
But the assertion that big data is “what it’s all about” when it comes to predicting rare events is
not supported by what we know about how these methods work, and more importantly, don’t work. Analytics on
massive datasets can be powerful in analysing and identifying broad patterns, or events that occur regularly and
frequently, but are singularly unsuited to finding unpredictable, erratic, and rare needles in huge haystacks. In
fact, the bigger the haystack — the more massive the scale and the wider the scope of the surveillance — the less suited
these methods are to finding such exceptional events , and the more they may serve to direct resources
and attention away from appropriate tools and methods. After Rigby was killed, GCHQ, Britain’s intelligence service, was
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
criticised by many for failing to stop his killers, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. A lengthy parliamentary inquiry was conducted, resulting in a 192-page
report that lists all the ways in which Adebolajo and Adebowale had brushes with data surveillance, but were not flagged as two men who were about to kill a soldier
on a London street. GCHQ defended itself by saying that some of the crucial online exchanges had taken place on a platform, believed to be Facebook, which had not
alerted the agency about these men, or the nature of their postings. The men apparently had numerous exchanges that were extremist in nature, and their accounts were
suspended repeatedly by the platform for violating its terms of service. “If only Facebook had turned over more data,” the thinking goes. But that is misleading, and
makes sense only with the benefit of hindsight. Seeking larger volumes of data, such as asking Facebook to alert intelligence agencies every time that it detects a post
containing violence, would deluge the agencies with multiple false leads that would lead to a data quagmire, rather than clues to impending crimes.
For big
data analytics to work, there needs to be a reliable connection between the signal (posting of violent content)
and the event (killing someone). Otherwise, the signal is worse than useless. Millions of Facebook’s billion-plus users
post violent content every day, ranging from routinised movie violence to atrocious violent rhetoric. Turning over the data from all such
occurrences would merely flood the agencies with “false positives” — erroneous indications for events that actually will not
happen. Such data overload is not without cost, as it takes time and effort to sift through these millions of strands of hay to confirm that they are,
indeed, not needles — especially when we don’t even know what needles look like. All that the investigators would have would be a lot of open leads with no
resolution, taking
away resources from any real investigation. Besides, account suspensions carried out by platforms like Facebook’s
are haphazard, semi-automated and unreliable indicators. The flagging system misses a lot more violent content than it flags, and it often flags content as inappropriate
even when it is not, and suffers from many biases. Relying on such a haphazard system is not a reasonable path at all. So is all the hype around big data analytics
unjustified? Yes and no. There are appropriate use cases for which massive datasets are intensely useful, and perform much better than any alternative we can imagine
using conventional methods. Successful examples include using Google searches to figure out drug interactions that would be too complex and too numerous to
analyse one clinical trial at a time, or using social media to detect national-level swings in our mood (we are indeed happier on Fridays than on Mondays). In contrast,
consider the “lone wolf” attacker who took hostages at, of all things, a “Lindt Chocolat Café” in Sydney. Chocolate shops are not regular targets of political violence,
and random, crazed men attacking them is not a pattern on which we can base further identification. Yes, the Sydney attacker claimed jihadi ideology and brought a
black flag with Islamic writing on it, but given the rarity of such events, it’s not always possible to separate the jihadi rhetoric from issues of mental health — every
era’s mentally ill are affected by the cultural patterns around them. This isn’t a job for big data analytics. (The fact that the gunman was on bail facing various charges
and was known for sending hate letters to the families of Australian soldiers killed overseas suggests it was a job for traditional policing). When confronted with their
the NSA, should have said instead of asking for increased
surveillance capabilities: stop asking us to collect more and more data to perform an impossible task. This glut of data is
making our job harder, not easier, and the expectation that there will never be such incidents, ever, is not realistic.
failures in predicting those rare acts of domestic terrorism, here’s what GCHQ, and indeed
1AC – India
Contention # 3 is India
Reversing US hypocricy key to alter India’s surveillance practices – pressures
global internet companies to demand privacy
Wong ‘13
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human
Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on
Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular
focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the
technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights
in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law – “ Surveillance and the Corrosion of
Internet Freedom” - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW website at this address:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internet-freedom
Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as problematic as “listening to the
content of people’s phone calls” or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially
if it is collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized data can be easily combined and analyzed. The revelations have also exposed glaring
contradictions about the US Internet freedom agenda. This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically
denounce US hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though there is hypocrisy on both sides, the
widening rift between US values and actions has real, unintended human rights consequences. For the human
rights movement, the Internet’s impact on rights crystalized in 2005 after we learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account
information over to the Chinese government, leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government
forcefully objected to the Chinese government’s actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In the end, that
incident catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed some companies to improve
safeguards for user privacy in the face of government demands for data. US support was
critical back then , but it is hard to imagine the government having the same influence or credibility now. The
mass surveillance scandal has damaged the US government’s ability to press for better corporate practices
as technology companies expand globally. It will also be more difficult for companies to resist
overbroad surveillance mandates if they are seen as complicit in mass US infringements on privacy.
Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for the same cooperation that the US receives. We can also
expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user data locally or maintain a local presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now
there is reason to worry about the broader precedent the US has set.
Just months before the NSA scandal broke, India began rolling out a centralized system to monitor all phone and Internet
communications in the country, without much clarity on safeguards to protect rights. This development is
chilling, considering the government’s problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over the last few weeks, Turkish officials have
condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has drawn particular ire. Now the government is preparing
new regulations that would make it easier to get data from Internet companies and identify individual users online. The
Obama administration and US companies could have been in a strong position to push back in India and Turkey.
debating. While comparisons to the Chinese government are overstated,
Instead, the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass surveillance
and conscripting the help of the private sector.
(Note to students: “conscripting” means compulsory enlistment of companies for state service.)
Independently, US bulk surveillance sets precedent that causes indiscriminate
surveillance in India.
Sinha ‘14
(et al; Authors Include: G. Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights
Program at the American Civil Liberties Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York University’s School of Law. This includes a
specialization as a Scholar from NYU’s Institute for International Law & Justice. The author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy
University of Toronto. Additional authors include - Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, US Program deputy director at Human
Rights Watch, who participated in some of the research interviews; and Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington Director at Human
Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research interviews and provided key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an
independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause
of human rights for all. From the Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming
Journalism, Law and American Democracy – This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists covering
intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times, the Associated Press, ABC, and
NPR. JULY 2014 – available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
The questions
raised by surveillance are complex. The government has an obligation to protect national security, and in
some cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end. At the same time, international human rights and
constitutional law
set limits on the state’s authority to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential
to undermine so many other rights. The current, large-scale , often indiscriminate US approach to surveillance
carries enormous costs. It erodes global digital privacy and sets a terrible example for other
countries like India , Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that are in the process of expanding their surveillance
capabilities. It also damages US credibility in advocating internationally for internet freedom,
which the US has listed as an important foreign policy objective since at least 2010. As this report documents,
US surveillance programs are also doing damage to some of the values the United States claims to hold most
dear. These include freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all protected by both
international human rights law and the US Constitution.
India’s surveillance is not narrowly-targeted. This indiscriminate, bulk
collection hurts India’s financial markets.
Trivedi ‘13
Anjani Trivedi. The author holds a Master Degree in Journalism from the University of Hong Kong and a Bachelor’s Degree in
Mathematics from MIT. The author has previously held internships at the New York Times and CNN International. This piece
internally quotes Meenakshi Ganguly, The South Asia director for Human Rights Watch; Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy
Project; and Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre for Internet and Society. “In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips
Under the Radar” – Time Magazine – 6-30-13 - http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillance-slips-underthe-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB
CMS is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social-media engagement and phone calls on
landlines and cell phones, among other communications. That means 900 million landline and cell-phone users and 125 million Internet users. The project, which is
being implemented by the government’s Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), is meant to help national law-enforcement agencies save time and avoid manual intervention, according to the Department of
Telecommunications’ annual report. This has been in the works since 2008, when C-DOT started working on a proof-of-concept, according to an older report. The government set aside approximately $150 million for the system as
part of its 12th five-year plan, although the Cabinet ultimately approved a higher amount. Within the internal-security ministry though, the surveillance system remains a relatively “hush-hush” topic, a project official unauthorized to
speak to the press tells TIME. In April 2011, the Police Modernisation Division of the Home Affairs Ministry put out a 90-page tender to solicit bidders for communication-interception systems in every state and union territory of
Civil-liberties groups concede that states
often need to undertake targeted-monitoring operations. However, the move toward extensive “surveillance capabilities enabled by
India. The system requirements included “live listening, recording, storage, playback, analysis, postprocessing” and voice recognition.
digital communications,” suggests that governments are now “casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives,” according to Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director for Human Rights Watch. This extensive
communications surveillance through the likes of Prism and CMS are “out of the realm of judicial authorization and allow unregulated, secret surveillance, eliminating any transparency or accountability on the part of the state,” a
recent U.N. report stated. India is no stranger to censorship and monitoring — tweets, blogs, books or songs are frequently blocked and banned. India ranked second only to the U.S. on Google’s list of user-data requests with 4,750
queries, up 52% from two years back, and removal requests from the government increased by 90% over the previous reporting period. While these were largely made through police or court orders, the new system will not require
such a legal process. In recent times, India’s democratically elected government has barred access to certain websites and Twitter handles, restricted the number of outgoing text messages to five per person per day and arrested
citizens for liking Facebook posts and tweeting. Historically too, censorship has been India’s preferred means of policing social unrest. “Freedom of expression, while broadly available in theory,” Ganguly tells TIME, “is endangered
by abuse of various India laws.” There is a growing discrepancy and power imbalance between citizens and the state, says Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project. And, in an environment like India where “no checks and
balances [are] in place,” that is troubling. The potential for misuse and misunderstanding, Kovacs believes, is increasing enormously. Currently, India’s laws relevant to interception “disempower citizens by relying heavily on the
executive to safeguard individuals’ constitutional rights,” a recent editorial noted. The power imbalance is often noticeable at public protests, as in the case of the New Delhi gang-rape incident in December, when the government shut
down public transport near protest grounds and unlawfully detained demonstrators. With an already sizeable and growing population of Internet users, the government’s worries too are on the rise. Netizens in India are set to triple to
330 million by 2016, according to a recent report. “As [governments] around the world grapple with the power of social media that can enable spontaneous street protests, there appears to be increasing surveillance,” Ganguly
explains. India’s junior minister for telecommunications attempted to explain the benefits of this system during a recent Google+ Hangout session. He acknowledged that CMS is something that “most people may not be aware of”
because it’s “slightly technical.” A participant noted that the idea of such an intrusive system was worrying and he did not feel safe. The minister, though, insisted that it would “safeguard your privacy” and national security. Given the
new
system comes under the jurisdiction of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which allows for monitoring communication in the “interest of public safety. The surveillance system is not only
an “abuse of privacy rights and security-agency overreach,” critics say, but also counterproductive in terms of security. In
the process of collecting data to monitor criminal activity, the data itself may become a target for
terrorists and criminals — a “honeypot,” according to Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre
for Internet and Society. Additionally, the wide-ranging tapping undermines financial
markets, Abraham says, by compromising confidentiality, trade secrets and intellectual property.
What’s more, vulnerabilities will have to be built into the existing cyberinfrastructure to make way for such a system. Whether the nation’s patchy infrastructure will
be able to handle a complex web of surveillance and networks, no one can say. That, Abraham contends, is what attackers will target.
high-tech nature of CMS, he noted that telecom companies would no longer be part of the government’s surveillance process. India currently does not have formal privacy legislation to prohibit arbitrary monitoring. The
Financial markets key to India’s Economy.
Goyal ‘14
Dr. Sakshi Goyal, former Faculty member at the Kaling Institute of Management Studies, Faridabad, Haryana (India). “Indian
Financial Markets: A Global Perspective” - Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research (JBM&SSR) - Volume
3, No.6, June 2014 - ISSN No: 2319-5614. Available at:
http://www.borjournals.com/a/index.php/jbmssr/article/viewFile/1729/1078
Financial markets are a vital part of an economy making it possible for industry, trade and
commerce to flourish without any obstacle in terms of resources. Today most economies around the world are judged by the
performance of their financial markets. The financial markets have indicators in place that reflect the performance of companies whose securities are traded in those markets. The
financial markets also serve a vital purpose in the growth and development of a company, which wants to expand. Such companies with expansion plans and new projects are in need of funding and the financial market serves as the
best platform from which a company can determine the feasibility of such possibilities
Krishnan (2011) mentioned that, the economic literature acknowledged that efficient and developed
financial markets could lead to increased economic growth by improving the efficiency of allocation and utilization of savings in the economy. Better functioning financial systems ease the external financing constraints that impede
There is a growing body of empirical analyses, including firm-level studies, industry-level studies,
individual country studies, and cross-country comparisons, which prove this strong, positive
link between the functioning of the financial system and long-run economic growth. In addition, they better
allocate resources, monitor managers and exert corporate control, mobilize savings, and facilitate the exchange of goods and services”. A
firm and industrial expansion. “
capital market is a market for securities (debt or equity), where business enterprises (companies) and governments can raise long-term funds. It is defined as a market in which money is provided for periods longer than a year as the
raising of short-term funds takes place on other markets (e.g., the money market). The capital market includes the stock market (equity securities) and the bond market (debt) The capital market of a country can be considered as one of
the leading indicators in determining the growth of its economy. As mentioned by C.Rangarajan, Ex Governor, RBI (1998), “The growth process of any economy depends on the functioning of financial markets which also helps to
augment its Capital formation. According to Professor Hicks, the industrial Revolution in England was ignited more by the presence of liquid financial market than the technological investment”. He writes interestingly- “What
happened in the Industrial Revolution is that the Range of fixed capital goods that were used in production Began noticeably to increase. But fixed capital is sunk; it is embodied in a particular form, from which it can only gradually
be released. In order that people should be willing to sink large amounts of capital it is the availability of liquid funds which is crucial. This condition was satisfied in England ...by the first half of the eighteenth century The liquid
asset was there, as it would not have been even a few years earlier “ Thus, liquidity is a very important component of Financial Market and plays a very vital role in the long run economic development of any country as it helps not
only in promoting the savings of the economy but also to adopt an effective channel to transmit various financial policies by creating liquidity in the market. Therefore Financial System of any country should be well developed,
competitive, efficient and integrated to face all shocks. The financial system and infrastructure of any country at any time can be considered as the result of its own peculiar historical evolution. This evolution is resulted by continuous
interaction between all the participants existing in the system and public policy interventions. The evolution of Indian financial markets and the regulatory system has also followed a similar path. India began with the central bank,
Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as the banking sector regulator, and the Ministry of Finance as the regulator for all other financial sectors. Today, most financial service providers and their regulatory agencies exist. The role of
regulators has evolved over time from that of an instrument for planned development in the initial stage to that of a referee of a relatively more modern and complex financial sector at present. Over this period, a variety of financial
sector reform measures have been undertaken in India, with many important successes. An important feature of these reforms has been the attempt of the authorities to align the regulatory view the needs of the country and domestic
factors. These reforms can be broadly classified as steps taken towards: a) Liberalizing the overall macroeconomic and regulatory environment within which financial sector institutions function. b) Strengthening the institutions and
improving their efficiency and competitiveness. c) Establishing and strengthening the regulatory framework and institutions for overseeing the financial system.The history of Indian capital markets spans back 200 years, around the
end of the 18th century. It was at this time that India was under the rule of the East India Company. The capital market of India initially developed around Mumbai; with around 200 to 250 securities brokers participating in active
trade during the second half of the 19th century. There are a number of factors that have paved path for India market growth. After the economic liberalization, policies were undertaken in the 1990s, the economy of the country has
been steadily rising which has led to more demands and supply circles. This has introduced diverse market sectors and industries in the country, which has led to a competitive consumer market. Through this research paper, an attempt
is made to understand the evolution of Global financial system with more emphasis on Indian markets. It also aims to study the global perspective of financial markets of any country and to understand that how a country’s financial
markets is integrated with the other world markets. Also the concept of efficiency is highlighted which says that a country whose financial markets are well integrated with the world markets are more efficient as compared to one
whose financial markets are not very well integrated. Lastly the paper concludes by leaving scope and opportunities to understand these global concepts in an easier way to the reader and further can be used for extensive research. A
the areas of surplus to the areas of deficit. A Financial System is a composition of various institutions, markets, regulations
and laws, practices, money manager, analysts, transactions and claims and liabilities. Indian Financial market can be considered as one of the oldest across the globe and is
experiencing favorable time during the recent years, which have prospered the economy of the
country to a great extent. Presently, India is rated by six international credit rating agencies, namely Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investor Services, FITCH, Dominion Bond Rating
financial system or financial sector functions as an intermediary and facilitates the flow of funds from
Service (DBRS), the Japanese Credit Rating agency (JCRA), and the Rating and Investment Information Inc., Tokyo( R&I).
Indian economic upheaval sparks nuclear war with Pakistan – risks of
accident, miscalc, and unauthorized theft all increase.
Busch ‘4
Please note that an updated edition of this book was re-released in Feb of 2015, but the original date was placed in the citation.
Dr. Nathan Busch, Professor of Government and co-director of the Center for American Studies at Christopher Newport
University. The author holds a Ph.D. in International relations from the University of Toronto and an MA in Political Science
from Michigan State University. The author previously held the position of Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also held the position of Visiting Faculty,
National Security Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory. This piece of evidence internally quotes George Perkovich, a South
Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It also internally quotes François Heisbourg. He chairs the
Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. His career has included
positions in government (member of the French mission to the UN, international security adviser to the Minister of Defence), in
the defense industry (vice-president of Thomson-CSF; senior vice president for strategy at Matra Défense Espace) and in
academia (professor of world politics at Sciences-Po Paris, director of the IISS). He is also a member of the International
Commission on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and has sat on a number of national and international blue-ribbon
bodies. From the book: No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation - p. 202-209
because the Indian military currently has little experience handling nuclear weapons, the risks of
accidental use could be very high during a crisis situation, at least for some time to come. If the order were given to prepare
In addition,
India's nuclear weapons for possible use, the military (perhaps in conjunction with India's nuclear scientists) would need to assemble the warheads rapidly; mate them
to the deliver)' vehicles (gravity bombs or missiles); and prepare them for use, either by loading them into bombers or by aiming the missiles and preparing them for
launch. All these procedures require training and precision, and, given the early stages of India's new command-and-control arrangements, it is not at all clear that the
Indian military would be able to carry them out safely under extreme time constraints.194 If India decided to develop a rapid-response capability, some of these
dangers would be lessened, but more serious dangers would be introduced. In particular, there would be a significantly increased risk of an accidental launch of
India would need to engage in a great deal of additional research into safety
mechanisms to prevent such an accidental launch, and it is simply not known how much effort
India is devoting, or will devote, to this area.195 Because the Prithvi and the two-stage Agni-I missiles contain a nonstorable liquid
nuclear-armed missiles.
fuel, it would be impossible to deploy the current configuration of either missile to allow for a rapid response. This significantly reduces the likelihood of these
missiles being launched accidentally during normal circumstances, though
the risks of accidental launches would probably increase
significantly if they were fueled during a crisis situation. As noted, however, India has conducted several successful flight tests of the Agni and
Agni-II missiles. Because these missiles use a solid fuel, they could be deployed in a rapid-response state. If India were to choose such a deployment option, the risks
of an accidental launch could increase significantly. These risks would depend on the extent to which India integrates use-control devices into its weapons to prevent
accidental launches, but there is little evidence that India is currently devoting significant efforts to develop such use-control devices.196 Furthermore, even if India
intends to develop such use-control devices, if a nuclear crisis were to arise before India had developed them, it still might be tempted to mate warheads on its
missiles. If India does decide to weaponize its arsenal, it still remains to be seen what type of deployment option it would choose. According to a statement in
November 1999 by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, India would not keep its weapons on a "hair-trigger alert," though he did suggest that these weapons would
be dispersed and made mobile to improve their chances of surviving a first strike.197 If this statement is true, then the risks of accidental launch would be relatively
small during normal circumstances.198 But these risks would increase significantly during crisis situations, when India would presumably mate the warheads to the
missiles.199 If the military still has not been given physical control over the warheads, this would further reduce risks of accidental use during peacetime, though the
transfer of nuclear weapons to the military during a crisis could significantly increase the risks of an accident due to the military's inexperience in handling the nuclear
weapons.200 What deployment option Pakistan might adopt depends in part on India's weapon deployment. It appears that if India were to adopt a rapid-response
option, Pakistan would probably adopt a similar missile deployment, thereby increasing the risks of an accidental launch of its nuclear weapons as well. But even if
India were to deploy its weapons (in field positions) withour the warheads mated, concerns about survivability might nevertheless cause Pakistan to adopt a rapidresponse capability. If such an event were to occur, the risks of Pakistani accidental missile launches could be quite high, especially because it is unlikely that Pakistan
currently has the technical capacity to integrate sophisticated launch controls into its missile designs.
Just as in India, it is also unlikely that
Pakistan's nuclear devices are designed to minimize risks of accidents.201 Because Pakistan's
warheads are based on an early Chinese warhead design, they probably do not contain one-point
safety designs, IHE, or fire-resistant pits. If Pakistan were to assemble its nuclear warheads, there
could be an unacceptable risk of an accidental detonation of its nuclear weapons. Moreover; if Pakistan were
to mate nuclear warheads to its missiles, either because it chose to establish a rapid-response capability or because of an ongoing nuclear crisis, then similar concerns
current risks of unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons in India and Pakistan are probably relatively small because they have a very small number of nuclear weapons and those weapons
are tightly controlled by their nuclear establishments. But there are a number of factors that could increase risks of unauthorized
use in the future. Although both India and Pakistan currently possess nuclear weapons that could be delivered by aircraft, and are both actively developing
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, none of their weapons appear to contain sophisticated use-control devices to prevent unauthorized use. Instead, the nuclear
controls in both countries appear to be based on guards, gates, and guns . As we have seen in the Russian and Chinese cases,
while the "3 G's" might be sufficient during normal circumstances, they are particularly
vulnerable during political, economic, and social upheaval s. The Russian case has demonstrated that severe domestic
upheavals can undermine central controls and weaken the infrastructures that previously maintained the security for nuclear
weapons. In particular, such upheavals can undermine the loyalty of guards and workers at nuclear facilities, especially
if the state collapses economically and can no longer afford to pay those employees. Neither
India nor Pakistan appears to have taken the necessary steps to prevent such weaknesses from
arising in their nuclear controls. Because Indian and Pakistani nuclear controls rely on the "3 G's" while
reportedly lacking personnel reliability programs, there could be a significant risk of thefts of nuclear weapons
during severe upheavals. The Russian analogy is particularly relevant in the Pakistani case. The Pakistani state is far from stable. After the
would exist about accidental launches of Pakistani nuclear weapons. The
nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999, the Pakistani economy came close to collapsing and remained quite unstable for the next several years.202 In the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States removed economic sanctions and approved nearly $1 billion in international foreign aid to
Pakistan. But with a debt burden of nearly $39 billion, massive economic disparities, and continuing low levels of foreign investment, there still is significant cause
for concern about the prospects for Pakistan's long-term political and economic stability.203 If the Pakistani state were to fail, there could be significant risks of a
collapse in its nuclear controls. Were such an event to occur, there could be an extreme risk of thefts of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands
of Islamic militants.204 In the events following the September 11 attacks and President Musharraf's decision to support U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan, there
were serious concerns about a potential collapse of Pakistani nuclear controls. These concerns were spurred by reports of public riots, a close affiliation among some
elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence community with the Taliban regime and al Qaeda, and the tenuous hold that Pakistani president Musharraf appears
to have in Pakistan.205 In October 2001, President Musharraf took significant steps to centralize his control by removing high-level military and intelligence officers
with ties to the Taliban, but analysts have nevertheless continued to raise concerns about Musharraf's ability to maintain control.206 Due to the seriousness of these
risks, President Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the United States has offered to advise Pakistan on methods for
securing its nuclear stockpile. ' If the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan had extended for a longer period, Musharraf might have found it increasingly difficult to
One also cannot rule out the possibility that terrorists might
choose to target nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan, especially if domestic instability were to
increase. Both India and Pakistan have serious problems with domestic terrorism.208 These terrorists are increasingly well-armed and have targeted critical
remain in power and reign in the more extreme elements in his country.
infrastructures and military bases in the past.209 Although current defenses at both Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facilities are probably sufficient to
if the defenses at
the most sensitive facilities were weakened by domestic upheavals, then the risks of successful terrorist
attacks—either for purposes of theft or sabotage—could increase significantly. But even if such extreme events did not occur,
defend against most terrorist attacks,210 the physical protection systems at other nuclear facilities might be less effective.211 Moreover,
the tightly controlled decision-making and underdeveloped command-and-control structures in both India and Pakistan could potentially allow unauthorized use,
particularly during crises. In India, some of these risks have been minimized by the formalization of its command structure, though the military units are still fairly
because India probably still lacks clearly defined, detailed operational procedures and
established, resilient communication channels, there would still be a fairly high risk of unauthorized use
arising from confusion or miscommunication during a crisis. These concerns will probably remain for some time to
inexperienced with handling these weapons.212 Moreover,
come, though the specific risks could eventually be improved, depending on the training the military receives and the degree of professionalism among the troops.
Because Pakistan is currently under military rule, and its nuclear weapons are controlled by the military, one would expect a better coordination of nuclear decisionmaking and command-and-control systems. Nevertheless, there are potential problems with Pakistani command and control as well. The lack of a clear operational use
doctrine, combined with inadequate C3I could increase the risks of unauthorized use during crises: "there is no enunciated nuclear doctrine, nor are there decisionmaking and communications systems adequate for either strategic or tactical command and control in the nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information could
not be passed in time to be of use in a rapidly changing situation, which would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical [nuclear] missiles."213 The
risks or unauthorized use would increase if India and Pakistan were to deploy their weapons on ballistic missiles. Risks of decapitation and questions about the
survivability of the nuclear forces would probably cause both India and Pakistan to deploy mobile systems if they were to operationalize their nuclear forces. These
systems would significantly increase difficulties in command and control, especially because their weapons lack use-control devices.214 In addition, because of the
risks of decapitation, Pakistan is likely to adopt a "delegative" system, where the authority to launch nuclear weapons is given to a number of military officials.215 As
the number of people authorized to launch nuclear weapons increases, so does the risk of a use of nuclear weapons that has not been commanded by the central
The greatest concerns have been raised about a possible inadvertent use of nuclear
weapons in South Asia. The combined effects of mutual mistrust, very short flight times for missiles, continual armed conflicts along their borders,
and few reliable CBMs make the risks of inadvertent use quite severe, especially during crisis situations. According to George Perkovich, a
South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Kargil proved that having
nuclear weapons would not deter new conflicts. It also showed that unless such conflicts themselves were prevented, the
authorities.216
possibility of an accidental or deliberate nuclear exchange would also increase given both states' relatively poor systems of intelligence surveillance and nuclear
Due to continual mistrust between the two countries, each would be likely to
misinterpret military movements, missile tests, or accidental detonations as an impending attack by the other side.
command and control."217
The risks of misinterpreting each other's motives are compounded by the vulnerability of their nuclear forces and the short flight times of the forces to key targets. For
example, because the runways at Pakistani Air Force bases could be destroyed by a conventional air strike or nuclear attack,218 India could effectively eliminate
During an acute crisis, Pakistan might be faced with a "use them or lose them"
dilemma, in that it would need to attack rapidly or lose its ability to retaliate altogether. For this reason,
Pakistani officials would be extremely suspicious of any Indian actions that could be
interpreted as preparations for an attack. Because the flight time of Indian bombers is approximately ten minutes, Pakistani leaders
Pakistan's nuclear bomber capability.
would have a very limited amount of time to decide whether to launch their own attack.219 These conditions thus create an ongoing environment in which inadvertent
use is quite possible. In addition, both countries have unreliable intelligence systems, which have repeatedly misinterpreted the other's intentions. For example, during
the Brasstacks incident, Pakistani intelligence reported that India's exercise was merely a cover for an attack. Meanwhile, Indian intelligence overlooked the defensive
nature of the Pakistani troops' position. These intelligence failures caused each side to escalate the tensions unnecessarily. In addition, their intelligence systems have
sometimes failed to detect major troop movements altogether. As we have seen, during the Brasstacks crisis, Indian surveillance planes did not detect Pakistani troops
positioned at their border for two weeks. And in the 1999 Kargil war, Indian intelligence failed to detect the Pakistani invasion until several months after they had
positioned themselves at strategic locations in the Kargil heights. These intelligence failures could have two consequences. First, if either side were surprised by
comparatively benign actions (such as Pakistan's defensive positioning during the Brasstacks crisis), it would be more likely to overreact and mistakenly conclude that
an attack is imminent. And second, if one side (especially Pakistan) is confident that an invasion would not be detected at first, it might be more likely to launch
attacks across the border: Each of these scenarios would greatly increase the risks of nuclear escalation.220 Presumably owing to the massive intelligence failure prior
to the 1999 Kargil war, however, India has recently made significant investments in its intelligence-gathering capabilities, which could reduce risks of such failures by
The dangers of miscalculations and intelligence failures are increased by the crude
early-warning systems employed by both countries, particularly Pakistan. Several incidents serve to illustrate this
India in the future.221
point. First, prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan reported that it had detected an air force attack on its radars and warned that it had mated a number of
warheads to its Ghauri missiles.222 While this report might have been circulated in order to justify their nuclear tests, circulating such a report could have caused
India to mate weapons to its missiles, greatly increasing the risks of inadvertent use (as well as accidental and unauthorized use). Another, perhaps more troubling,
incident occurred prior to the U.S. missile strike on Afghanistan in August 1998. The United States sent a high-level U.S. official to Pakistan because it feared
Pakistan would detect the missile and interpret it as an Indian strike. Pakistan never even detected the missile, however. Scholars have pointed out that this incident
emphasizes not only the U.S. concern about inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan, but also that Pakistan's early-warning system "has serious flaws, and
such shortcomings are more likely to foster nervousness than calm. To the extent that they lack reliable early-warning systems, India or Pakistan could base launch
decisions on unreliable sources, increasing the chance of mistakes."223 But even if India and Pakistan had reliable early-warning systems, the risks of inadvertent war
would still be extremely high. If Indian or Pakistani radars detected aircraft headed toward them, they would have very little time to decide what to do before the
aircraft reached their targets. In addition, because there would be a great deal of uncertainty about whether attacking bombers carried conventional or nuclear
Pakistan) could face a "use them or lose them" scenario and be tempted to
launch a nuclear attack to ensure that its nuclear capability was not destroyed.224 Thus, even if India and
weapons, the attacked side (especially
Pakistan do not deploy nuclear weapons on missiles, the risks of an inadvertent use in these circumstances could be extremely high. If India and Pakistan were to
deploy their nuclear weapons on missiles (a scenario that is quite likely, given the vulnerability of Pakistani airfields and India's stated need for deterrence against the
People's Republic of China), the risks of inadvertent use would become even worse. Because the flight time for ballistic missiles between the two countries is less than
five minutes,225 Indian and Pakistani leaders would have virtually no time to decide what action to take (or perhaps even to launch a retaliatory strike) before the
According to Francois Heisbourg, once
strategic situation will resemble the Cuban missile crisis, except that it
"would be permanent rather than tempo-rary, would occur without adequate C3I in place, and with political leadership located
less than five minutes from mutual Armageddon." 227
missiles hit their targets.226 The psychological effect on the two countries would be tremendous.
theater missiles are deployed in South Asia, the
(Note to students: “3 G’s” – internally referenced – stands for “guards, gates, and guns” as a
security measure to protect an installation. “C3I” – also internally referenced – stands for
“Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence”).
Even a limited nuclear war between India & Pakistan causes extinction –
smoke and yields prove
Toon ’07
(et al, O. B. Toon -- Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics,
University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, -- “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and
acts of individual nuclear terrorism” – Atmospheric Chemistry & Physics – April 19th -- http://www.atmos-chemphys.net/7/1973/2007/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)
We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the detonation of small
nuclear weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986,
the number of nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear
weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized)
explosives. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be targeted in a nuclear conflict.
We
find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce
100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as previously
estimated in analyses for full scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons , if the small weapons are targeted
at city centers. A single “small” nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the
a regional nuclear exchange involving 100 15-kt explosions (less
than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal). We find that such an exchange could produce direct fatalities
comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war
between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with
severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war would
rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection. Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the
stratosphere due to atmospheric heating, and then might induce significant climatic anomalies on global scales .
We also anticipate substantial perturbations of global ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we
make here, the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The scope and severity of the hazards
identified pose a significant threat to the global community. They deserve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised
major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of
by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread public debate. In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between the
superpowers provoked international scientific and political debate, and deep public concern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Pittock et al., 1985). The resulting recognition that
such conflicts could produce global scale damage at unacceptable levels contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and improvements in relationships between the major nuclear
powers. Here we discuss the effects of the use of a single nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist. We then provide the first comprehensive quantitative study of the consequences of a nuclear
conflict involving multiple weapons between the emerging smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) explore the climate changes that might occur due to the smoke emissions from such a
conflict. The results of this study show that the potential effects of nuclear explosions having yields similar to those of the weapons used over Japan during the Second World War (WW-II) are,
in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At least eight countries are capable of transport and detonation of such nuclear devices. Moreover, North Korea appears to have a growing stockpile of
warheads, and Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment – a necessary precursor to weapons construction. Thirty-two other countries that do not now have nuclear weapons possess
sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons, some in a relatively short period of time. For these nations, a regional conflict involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the
TNT explosive yield equivalent) weapons to attack cities could cause casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders of magnitude, their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed, in some case, the
casualties can rival previous estimates for a limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands of weapons carrying several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield. Early radioactive
fallout from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas contaminated and effectively uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked by airbursts, which will
not deposit large amounts of local radiation unless it is raining. They were continuously inhabited.) Because of the smoke released in fires ignited by detonations, there is a possibility that 100
15-kt weapons used against city centers would produce global climate disturbances unprecedented in recorded human history (Robock et al., 2007). An individual in possession of one of the
thousands of existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist attack. Below we first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers. We
then describe the casualties due to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation from an attack on a single megacity with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we discuss the casualties if current
and projected arsenals of such weapons were ever used in a regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of radioactive contamination. Finally, we describe the amounts of smoke that may be
generated in a regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections we outline the associated uncertainties.
We have attempted to employ
realistic scenarios in this analysis. However, we do not have access to the war plans of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing
nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear weapons. There are obviously many possible pathways for regional conflicts to
develop. Opinions concerning the likelihood of a regional nuclear war range from highly improbable to apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters requires that a
range of plausible scenarios be considered, given the availability of weapons hardware and the history of regional conflict.
In the present analysis,
we adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single small nuclear device detonated in a city center by terrorists; and ii) a regional nuclear exchange between two newly
most
citizens and politicians today are aware of the potential disaster of an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian nuclear confrontation, or a IndianPakistani territorial confrontation. Moreover, as nuclear weapons knowledge and implementation proliferates, the possible number and
minted nuclear weapons states involving a total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations. We do not justify these scenarios any further except to note that
combinations of flash points multiplies. The fact that nuclear weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past hostilities substantiates the idea that such
scenarios as we propose are executable.
The new Freedom Act won’t solve US image. Protections from the original
version do solve, even without protections for persons outside the US.
Ries ‘14
(Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights Program. Also internally quoting
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human
Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on
Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular
focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the
technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights
in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Also internally quoting Center for
Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger – Brian Ries is Mashable’s Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working
at Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for using Twitter, Facebook, and
Tumblr to cover revolutions, disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team
that won two Webby Awards for “Best News Site”. “Critics Slam 'Watered-Down' Surveillance Bill That Congress Just Passed” Mashable - May 22, 2014 – http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsa-surveillance-bill/)
many of its initial supporters pulled their support. “We supported the original USA
Freedom act, even though it didn’t do much for non-US persons,” Zeke Johnson, director of
Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote.
He described the original version as “a good step to end bulk collection. ” However, in its
current version, it's not even clear that this bill does that at all, Johnson said. He added that Congress left a lot
of "wiggle room" in the bill — something he said is a real problem. "Where there is vagueness in a law, you can
count on the administration to exploit it," Johnson said. However, Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington
As a result,
Legislative Office, took a more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the out-ofcontrol NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the concerns of many — including members of both parties who rightly believe the bill does not go far enough
— without it we would be left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence Committee bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans’
The ban on bulk collection
was deliberately watered down to be ambiguous and exploitable,” said Center for Democracy and Technology
Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. “We withdrew support for USA FREEDOM when the bill morphed into a
codification of large-scale, untargeted collection of data about Americans with no connection to
a crime or terrorism.” And Cynthia Wong , senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch, said, “This
so-called reform bill won’t restore the trust of Internet users in the US and around the world. Until
Congress passes real reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will
continue to fade.”
communications into law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply called it "a weak attempt at NSA reform." “
1AC – Bigotry
Contention # 4 is Bigotry
Warrantless surveillance boosts a distinct form of racial, religious, and ethnic
discrimination. The Neg’s security interests only drive this racialized violence.
Unegbu ‘13
Cindy C. Unegbu - J.D. Candidate, Howard University School of Law - NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional Misstep - Howard Law Journal - 57 How. L.J. 433 Fall, 2013 – lexis; lawrev
Picture this: you live in a society in which the government is allowed to partake in intrusive surveillance
measures without the institutionalized checks and balances upon which the government was founded. In this society, the
government pursues citizens who belong to a particular race or ethnicity, practice a certain religion, or have
affiliations with specific interest groups. Individuals who have these characteristics are subject to surreptitious
monitoring, which includes undercover government officials disguising themselves as community members in order to attend various community events and programs. The
government may also place these individuals on watch lists, even where there is no evidence of
wrongdoing. These watch lists classify domestic individuals as potential or suspected terrorists and facilitate the monitoring of their personal activity through various law
enforcement agencies for an extended period of time. This "hypothetical" society is not hypothetical at all; in fact, it is the current
state of American surveillance. The government's domestic spying activities have progressed
to intrusive levels, primarily due to an increased fear of terrorism. n1 This fear has resulted in
governmental intelligence efforts that are focused on political activists, racial and religious minorities, and
immigrants. n2 [*435] The government's domestic surveillance efforts are not only geared toward suspected terrorists and those partaking in
criminal activity, but reach any innocent, non-criminal, non-terrorist national, all in the name of national security. The
government's power to engage in suspicionless surveillance and track innocent citizens' sensitive information has been granted through
the creation and revision of the National Counterterrorism Center n3 and the FBI's (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide. n4 The grant of surveillance
power has resulted in many opponents, including those within the current presidential administration, who challenge the order for numerous reasons. n5 These reasons include the inefficiency of
storing citizens' random personal information for extended periods of time, n6 the broad unprecedented authority granted to this body of government without proper approval from Congress, n7
and the constitutional violations due to the deprivation of citizens' rights. n8 [*436] This Comment argues that the wide-sweeping surveillance authority granted to the government
results
in a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause due to far-reaching domestic monitoring practices. Surveillance practices, such as posing as members of the community
and placing individuals on watch lists without suspicion of terrorist activity, result in the impermissible monitoring of individuals on the
basis of their race or ethnicity . These practices, although done in the name of national security, an established compelling government interest, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they are not narrowly tailored to the stated interest. The procedures are not narrowly tailored
to the interest of national security because of the over-inclusiveness of the measures.
Mass surveillance results in selective enforcement that disproportionately
impacts those lacking privilege.
Stanfill ‘13
Mel - The author now holds a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in Communications and Media. The
Author was working on that PhD at this time of this writing. When this piece was written, the author held an M.A. from
California State University, East Bay in Media and Cultural Studies and had Graduate minors in Gender and Women’s Studies
and Queer Studies. The author also held a B.A. from University of California, Berkeley - English with Distinction in General
Scholarship. At the time of this writing, the author had published several Peer-Reviewed Publications. The author is internally
quoting Daniel J. Solove is the John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law
School. “NSA Prism Part III: Due Process and Presumed Guilty” - July 1, 2013 – http://www.melstanfill.com/nsa-prism-part-iiidue-process-and-presumed-guilty/
Posing this as a due process question could be the way to get some traction in light of the nonchalance about privacy discussed last week: The problem with NSA
PRISM is that we are all being treated as guilty until proven innocent. This has been going on since 9/11, of course, with airport security being one highly visible
iteration, but there’s a chance that this new level of awareness of just how much everyone is being treated as criminal without due process of law could be the straw.
Even if a person is doing nothing wrong, in a free society, that person shouldn’t
have to justify every action that government officials might view as suspicious. A key component
of freedom is not having to worry about how to explain oneself all the time.” Crossing this line into blanket
Solove describes the stakes well: “
assumption of guilt is what animates the Stop Watching US petition, which says “the contents of communications of people both abroad and in the U.S. can be swept
in without any suspicion of crime or association with a terrorist organization,” though they tie their concern to the 1st and 4th amendment and “citizens’ right to speak
and associate anonymously, guard against unreasonable searches and seizures, and protect their right to privacy” without mentioning due process. (That people feel
due process has gone out the window is clear from the fact that RootsAction sent me a petition to President Obama “not to engage in any abduction or other foul play
against Snowden,” ironic when the administration’s line on why they’re disappointed that Hong Kong let him leave is that they want there to be rule of law.) Wired
Police already abuse the immense power they have, but if
everyone’s every action were being monitored, and everyone technically violates some obscure
law at some time, then punishment becomes purely selective. Those in power will essentially have
what they need to punish anyone they’d like, whenever they choose, as if there were no rules at all.” Of course,
black and Latino citizens have been living under presumed-guilty, surveilled-within-an inch-of-their-lives, selectivelypunished conditions for decades: they’re more likely to get caught at things white folks also
do and be punished more harshly for them, even as early as middle school (see Ann Ferguson’s Bad Boys). Muslim and
Arab citizens have been living under it since 9/11.
perhaps elaborates the worst-case-scenario best: “
Reject this discrimination as an unacceptable wrong that must be rejected as an
end onto itself
Shamsi ‘14
(et al; Hina Shamsi is a lecturer-in-law at Columbia Law School, where she teaches a course in international human rights. She is
also the Director of the ACLU’s National Security Project, which is dedicated to ensuring that U.S. national security policies and
practices are consistent with the Constitution, civil liberties, and human rights. She has litigated cases upholding the freedoms of
speech and association, and challenging targeted killing, torture, unlawful detention, and post-9/11 discrimination against racial
and religious minorities. Her work includes a focus on the intersection of national security and counterterrorism policies with
international human rights and humanitarian law. She also served as Senior Advisor to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial Executions. Hina is a graduate of Mount Holyoke College and Northwestern University School of Law. “The
Perversity of Profiling” – April 14th – available at the ACLU website - https://www.aclu.org/blog/perversity-profiling)
Using expanded authorities that permit investigations without actual evidence of wrongdoing , the FBI
has also targeted minority communities for interviews based on race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion. It
has used informants to conduct surveillance in community centers, mosques, and other public gathering places and against people exercising their First Amendment
among America’s minority communities, “flying while brown”
soon joined “driving while black” as a truism of government-sanctioned discrimination and stigma.
right to worship or to engage in political advocacy. And
It’s hard to overstate the damage done to the FBI’s relationship with minorities, particularly American
Muslims. The damage, however, has spread further. When federal law enforcement leads in
discriminatory profiling, state and local law enforcement will follow. Nowhere is that clearer than
in New York City, where the NYPD – which is twice the size of the FBI – launched a massive program of
discriminatory surveillance and investigation of American Muslims, mapping the places where they carry out daily activities
and sending informants to spy on mosques and Muslim community organizations, student groups, and businesses. After the Associated Press broke a series of stories
the NYPD defended itself, arguing that it was only doing what
the FBI was permitted to do. Again, it’s hard to overstate the harm. From the ACLU’s work with New York’s
Muslim communities, we know that a generation of youth is growing up fearful of its local police
force, scared to exercise the rights to freedom of worship, speech, and association. Fortunately, the issuance of the
describing this program in stark and shocking detail,
revised Guidance on Race has been delayed and both the Justice Department and the civil rights community have a crucial opportunity to put a spotlight on the FBI,
the FBI’s argument seems to be that it needs
to identify where Somalis live to investigate potential Somali terrorism suspects. But that argument must be
rejected for the same reason that we reject it in other contexts. Many mass shooters are young
white males, yet we rightly don’t map where whites live or send informants to majority white communities to ferret out
potential mass shooters. Put another way, the FBI’s argument presumes what the Ashcroft Guidance “emphatically rejects”: that
crime can be prevented by the mass stereotyping of entire communities. Not only is that wrong , it is a hamhanded approach that squanders resources that should properly be devoted to investigating actual
wrongdoing.
which vigorously opposes those fighting for equality. According to the New York Times,