1
Conflict and Water Scarcity
Christian Perkins
2015 Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference
April 12th-15th
2
Policy makers and analysts have acknowledged that water scarcity is becoming an
international security concern.1The UN defines water scarcity as the point at which the aggregate
impact of all users impinges upon the quality or supply of water under prevailing institutional
arrangements to the extent that the demand of all sectors, including the environment, cannot be
satisfied fully.2Water scarcity has already engendered significant instability in the Middle-East,
North Africa, and Central Asia.3 The U.S. State Department has recognized water scarcity as a
threat multiplier, meaning that it interacts with other underlying tensions to exacerbate and
complicate conflict.4Water scarcity has the potential to exacerbate both inter- and intra-state
conflict, although most scholars consider the latter more likely.5 The National Intelligence
Council predicts that this scarcity will only worsen in the next 15 years and must be addressed
now to prevent further instability in the future.6The countries experiencing water scarcity
typically do not have the resources, infrastructure, or proper governance to deal with the problem
effectively.7 It is in the U.S.’s best interest to aid in addressing water scarcity. The National
Intelligence Council also argues that the U.S. can increase the likelihood of a future favorable
global environment if it remains engaged in the international community and attempts to
encourage stability.8This paper will first analyze the scope and causes of water scarcity and how
it can exacerbate problems within a region. It will next demonstrate the role water scarcity plays
in increasing instability by focusing on Yemen as a case study. The paper will conclude with a
prescription foractions the U.S. and multilateral institutions should take to address the global
problem of water scarcity.
3
SCOPE AND CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM
The consensus among analysts is that there is no one cause of water scarcity.9 Instead,
they cite many different trends and problems thatinteract with each other to cause scarcity.
Diverse factors can have differing levels of significance in various regions or countries.10
Analysts identify the major trends contributing to water scarcity as unprecedented population
growth, poorly designed policies, ineffectual government regulation, and increasing climate
change.11Chronic water mismanagement and pollution interact with these trends as well.12 Poor
governance aggravates these problemsso that water scarcity is now pervasive in many MiddleEastern countries like Yemen and Pakistan.13Although most of the Middle-East suffers from
water scarcity to some degree, it is a global phenomenon. (See Appendix A, Figure 1.) For
example, countries as diverse as Somalia, Nigeria, and Uzbekistan,also currently experience
water scarcity. Many of these problems are solvable, but have persisted for so long that
overcoming them seems impossible.14 States lacking strong government and resources are the
most susceptible to developing serious water scarcity.15
Scholars have identified inter-state conflict, internal political strife, and ethnic clashes
due to migration as categories of conflict worsened by water scarcity.16Inter-state conflict occurs
most often over water disputes between riparian states.17 In the past, these inter-state conflicts
have rarely resulted in extended conflict.18 Many analysts agree that inter-state conflicts are
unlikely since they require a particularistic set of circumstances. The downstream country must
be highly dependent on the river’s flow for its national wellbeing, and the upstream nation must
threaten to affect the river’s flow substantially. A history of antagonism must exist between the
two states and, most importantly, the downstream state must believe it has sufficient military
power to rectify the situation.19However unlikely, it is important not to discount inter-state
4
conflict completely when discussing water scarcity. Michael T. Klare makes a compelling
argument in his book Resource Wars for the potential of future inter-state conflict over water. He
posits that if trends of worsening scarcity continue, the likelihood of inter-state water conflict
will increase commensurately.20 Countries have already come close tostarting armed conflicts
over water disputes.21 As the resource becomes increasingly scarce, nations could become more
aggressive towards the neighbors with whom they share water.
In contrast, analysts predict that intra-state conflicts involving water scarcity are much
more likely.22 Already, many states experience widespread internal instability due in part to
water scarcity.23 Water scarcity is most likely to exacerbate instability in poor or underdeveloped
countries that lack the resources to address the issue properly. Parts of California currently suffer
extreme water shortages, but the U.S. government possesses the infrastructure and resources to
mitigate thedrought’s effects.24Many countries plagued with water scarcity, however, do not
have sufficiently strong governments to address the problem effectively.25 Countries that do
possess the financial resources to address water scarcities are usually dealing with more pressing
problems like widespread insurgency or poverty.26Water shortages indirectly worsen these
seemingly more pressing issues,intensifying instability.27.
Resource capturing is a common response to water scarcity.28Thomas Homer-Dixon
defines resource capturing as aggressively acquiring and stockpiling a scarce resource to ensure
one’s security.29Scarcity encourages empowered groups to obtain as much water as possible to
secure their own interests.30 This leads to the ecological marginalization of less
socioeconomically privileged groups. Israel is a prime example of this. In the early 1990s, a
water shortage on the West Bank of the Jordan River encouraged financially sound farmers to
drill aggressively for more water.31 These wealthier farmers secured their own economic
5
interests at the expense of other farmers who could not afford to drill for more water. This
encouraged many to abandon agriculture and move into cities, hoping to find a better livelihood.
Mass migrations have become common in countries plagued with water scarcity and cause a
myriad of problems that further contribute to instability.32
As seen in the case of Israel, migrations induced by water scarcity are most likely to
involve displaced farmers migrating either to an area where water is not scarce or to a city in
search of other employment.33 Sometimes these migrations are transnational. All such scenarios
have the potential to cause widespread instability in a country or region. The migration of
farmers to regions without scarcity strains populations already settled there. A higher
concentration of farmers means more competition for water, land, and business. This can cause
strife between migrants and settled populations as well as economic and environmental
degradation.34 A similar effect resultswhen environmental refugees migrate to cities in search of
economic and social stability. The overcrowding in cities of nations with widespread water
scarcity has raised crime and poverty ratesand increased political unrest.35Trans-national
environmental refugees can strainneighboring countries, potentially heightening regional
instability. These migrations have resulted in violent conflict between refugees and native
populations of a country and have also damagedrelations between states.36
If a population perceives the government as eitherexacerbating, or not addressing,water
scarcity, political frustration likely willincrease.37A government unable to mitigate water scarcity
is likely unable to address other national problems effectively. Unaddressed water scarcity adds
to peoples’ perception that their government cannotmaintain security or provide effectively for
them.38Itfurther complicates problems already causing political frustration in a society. This
makes insurgency or revolutionary action more likely.39While it will not likely cause an
6
insurgency directly, water scarcity’s indirect effects highlight the shortcomings and mistakes of
an ineffective regime and increase a populations’ perceived deprivation.40This can promote
widespread instability in states struggling with water scarcity. Many of these regimes are
vulnerable to,and even existentially threatened by, insurgency. Through its indirect
socioeconomic effects, water scarcity increases both the likelihood and the intensity of an
uprising.41
YEMEN: A CASE STUDY.
Yemenstands as an example of how water scarcity can increase both internal and regional
instability.42Yemen has the highest rate of water scarcity in the Middle-East, and analysts project
that it will exhaust its water within the next decade.43 Yemen’s population growth, misguided
agricultural policies, significant qat industry, lack of regulation, and high vulnerability to climate
change are the key causes of its water crisis.44 Scarcity hashistorically been a source of conflict
within Yemen. Sana’a University recently conducted a study that found that much of the
country’s rising militancy is over resources, including water.45 Armed insurgencies in North and
South Yemen contest for precious water reserves. Militant groups will often use captured water
supplies as leverage over both the government and rival groups.46 Water scarcity intensifies this
pervasive security threat and hinders the Yemeni government from addressing the root problem.
The water crisis in Yemen has the potential to contribute significantly to its current trajectory
toward collapse.
Yemen experienced significant agricultural development beginning in the 1970s.47 This
led to its rapid adoption of advanced farming technologies, steering Yemeni farmers away from
traditional water management and agricultural systems. Although these new technologies
7
stimulated the agricultural sector, they also encouraged unsustainable water consumption. The
Yemeni government refrained from heavily regulating water usage,fearing it would slow this
new growth. It also implemented poorly conceived policies to stimulate agricultural
development. Low-interest loans and public investment in surface irrigation kept water
extremely cheap, consequently encouragingwaste. The failure to regulate water acquisition
techniques, such as ground drilling and well sinking, allowed farmers to deplete ground water
reserves quickly. This lack of regulation also engendered poorly built wells and pipelines, further
increasing waste.48
Once it realized the country’s water supplies were dwindling, the Yemeni government
sought to regulate agriculture and water usage. It promulgated laws prohibiting unauthorized
drilling or well digging andlimitingwater usage for farmers. It also mandated restrictions on the
growth of qat, a narcotic plant consumed by most Yemeni people. Qat requires heavy irrigation
and accounts for nearly 30 percent of Yemen’s annual water usage.49However, most farmershave
ignored these new regulations.50Agriculture, especially qat cultivation, serves as their sole source
of income, and these regulations disrupt their ability to sustain themselves. The central Yemeni
government is so weak that it cannot enforce its regulations, and Yemeni farmers have no
incentive to follow them, since many of them must cultivate qat to survive.51
Yemen’s dire security situation prevents it from effectively addressing its water scarcity
problem. A Shia group led by Hussein al-Houthi has been waging a war against the national
government since 2004.52 The Yemeni government has not neutralized these rebels, and in
January 2015, the group overran the capital city of Sanaa.53 The Houthi insurgents have taken
over regions of Yemen crucial to the country’s water security. Aquifers in the south have become
inaccessible because they are completely under insurgent control. Rebel activity has made the
8
region unsafe for government surveyors and hydrologists, further threatening the water security
of local populations. These populations think the government cannot solve their water issues,
impelling them tosupportthe insurgency.54
The growing presence and strength of the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has
worsened Yemen’s impending implosion. Security analysts consider AQAP to be one of the
most powerful and dangerous factions of Al Qaeda.55 AQAP is currently taking aggressive action
against both the Houthi insurgents and the collapsing central government.56These actions further
disrupt the government and prevent the insurgents and the current regime from reaching a peace
agreement.57 The water crisis exacerbates all internal conflicts in Yemen. Before the rise of the
Houthi insurgency and AQAP, the Yemeni government enjoyed little popular support partially
because of its inability to solve the water crisis.58Thus, insurgent movements gained support
among the population. The Houthi insurgency has explicitly promised fair and regular utilities to
the Yemeni people if it attains power.59Unsurprisingly, the region in which the Houthi insurgents
are strongest is the northeast, where water scarcity is pervasive.(See Appendix A, Figure
2.)Clearly, water scarcity has worsened instability.The inability of the Yemeni government to
provide basic necessities for its people demonstratesits weaknessand increasesboth the likelihood
and intensity of insurgency.60
Yemen is currently the most extreme example of how water scarcity can increase
instability in a country and exacerbate other internal issues. It effectively displays how water
scarcity can heighten existing political discontent and empower insurgent groups by giving them
leverage over the government. The government’s reluctance to regulate water usage due to its
fears of hindering economic development may have been a reasonable calculus in the short, but
not long, term. In addition, Yemen’s instability has both regional and global ramifications.
9
AQAP’s significant presence in Yemen has allowed it to execute terrorist attacks against other
countries in the region andagainst the United States.61It would be hyperbolic to claim that water
scarcity caused AQAP’s rise to power in Yemen, butit has provided favorable conditions for an
insurgent movement to accrue significant influence.62
PRESCRIPTION
Yemen is a worst-case scenario of how water scarcity can exacerbate, extend, and
complicate existing problems within a country. Analysts agree that Yemen is essentially a failed
state and beyond saving.63 If the Yemeni government had addressed its water problems when
first identified, its current situation might not be as dire. Despite the belief that Yemen is a lost
cause, the U.S. and UN send significant amounts of money and resources to the state
annually.64Other water-scarce countries experience many of the same problems to a lesser
degree. With timely corrective actions and external aid, these countries can potentially avoid
Yemen’s fate.Water scarcity is a multifaceted problem exacerbating diverse sets of problems in
different countries. Despiteunique factors in each country, most water scarcity cases share a set
of common variables.
Although there is no one solution, countries can pursue a set of common solutions that
will significantly mitigate water scarcity. Though technical,some of these potential fixes are
critical for many countries’ water problems. Addressing water pollution through increased
industrial and agricultural regulation is a crucial step many water-scarce countries can take.
Rampant industrial pollution has significantly compromised the groundwater reserves of China,
Brazil, and Yemen, among others.65 This is common among developing countries whose
industrial sectors are growing rapidly and do not have strong governmental regulations.66Another
10
critical step many water-scarce countries can take is to update their irrigation systems.
Developing nations with large agricultural sectors, notably those in the Middle-East, waste
significant amounts of water through inefficient or dilapidated irrigation systems.67For example,
analysts estimate that irrigation systems in Yemen waste up to 60 percent of the water they
transport due to leakage.68Updating irrigation systems would improve water efficiency and raise
the government’s legitimacy among its people.
These steps are general; most water-scarce countries can take them to good effect.
However, a broader focus on good governance and better regulation should be pursued as well.
At present, the aforementioned steps cannot be effectively taken given the current state of many
water-scarce governments. The majority of them have a history of poor policy design and
implementation, corruption, and non-existent or ineffectual regulation.69 These factors promote
both instability and water scarcity. As with Yemen, weak regimes cannot meet their peoples’
needs, leading to political discontent and social disorder.70 The U.S. needs to support weak
governments through the financing of water scarcity relief projects and the promotion of good
governance. Analysts and policymakers have determined the stabilization of the Middle-East to
be crucial to U.S. interests,which is why addressing water scarcity in the region should be a
priority.71
USAID has placed increased attention and funding toward initiatives in the Middle-East
aiming to improve governance in the past 15 years.72 These initiatives aim to produce long-term
improvement in countries with imbedded governance problems such as Egypt, Morocco, and
Yemen.73 USAID has worked on increasing the freedom and efficacy of the press in these
countries to increase government responsiveness to their populations.74 It has also worked with
the International Monetary Fund to enhance the skills of government officials in countries with
11
widespread corruption and financial mismanagement.75 Although these projects have already
produced positive results in several countries in the Middle-East, one must remember that the
U.S. cannot right every wrong. Policymakers mustdecide in which countries aid will do the most
good and concentrate U.S. resources there.
Water scarcity is such a pervasive global problem that multilateral action mustaccompany
bilateral action by the U.S. Over the past 15 years, various international organizations such as the
World Bank and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have made fighting water
scarcity a priority.76Although awareness of global water scarcity has risen in the past decade, the
U.S. must keep pressing for more international attention devoted to this matter.77 As noted, the
U.S. cannot single handedly ameliorate this pervasive problem. More prominent discussion of
water scarcity within the UN would help other leading nations realize that relieving global water
scarcity is in their best interest. A 2013 Global Water Institute report predicts that despite
increased investment in developing countries’ water security, 2.8 billion people will be dealing
with water scarcity in 2025.78 While financial commitments towards water relief projects from
the World Bank haveincreased steadily over the last 15 years, to make a meaningful impact on
this worsening problem, more international effort and money needs to be allocated toward
alleviating global water scarcity.79 The international community must recognize that access to
water is a basic human right. As people are increasingly deprived of this right, instability and
conflict will continue to abound. If world leaders want to ensure a stable future global
environment, they must make ameliorating this pervasive problem an international priority.
12
Appendix A: Maps
Figure 1: Global Water Scarcity
Source: World Resources Institute
13
Figure 2: Insurgency in Yemen
Source: Stratfor Global Intelligence
14
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ENDNOTES
1
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Global Security (New York: Foreign Policy Association
Inc.,1993), 3-12.
2
“UN on Water Scarcity,” last modified March 2012, http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml.
3
Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001), 138-190.
4
“Global Water Security: The Intelligence Community Assesment,” last modified May 2012,
http://www.state.gov/j/189598.htm.
5
Thomas homer Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 133166.
6
National Intelligence Council.Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, Washington D.C. 2012, 30-36.
7
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity and Violence, 47-52.
8
National Intelligence Council, Alternative Worlds, 98-106.
9
Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1 (1998)
10
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 12-25.
11
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 12-25.
12
Michael Renner, Introduction to the Concepts of Environmental Security and Environmental Conflict, Institute for
Environmental Security, (2006): 1-5.
13
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 12-25.
14
Aaron T. Wolf, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, “Navigating Peace,” Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, 1 (2006): 1-3.
15
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 12-25.
16
Niloy R. Biswas, “Is Environment a Security Threat? Environmental Security Beyond Securitization,” International
Affairs Review 20 (2011): 5-10.
17
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 133-166.
18
Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation”
19
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 133-166.
20
Klare, Resource Wars, 138-190.
21
Klare, Resource Wars, 138-190.
22
For a detailed explanation see the following sources: Daanish Mustafa, “Social Construction of Hydropolitics: The
Geographical Scales of Water and Security in the Indus Basin,” Geographical Review 97 (2007): 484-501, Thomas
Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Global Security (New York: Foreign Policy Association Inc.,1993), Michael
T. Klare, Resource Wars (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001.
23
Michael Renner, “Environmental and Social Stress Factors, Governance and Small Arms Availability: The Potential
Conflict in Urban Areas,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1998): 2-5.
24
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 47-72.
25
Nicole Glass, “The Water Crisis in Yemen: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions,” Global Majority Journal, 1
(2010): 17-20.
26
Glass, “Water Crisis in Yemen,” 17-20.
27
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 73-106.
28
Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Global Security, 33-44.
29
Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Global Security, 33-44.
30
Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Global Security, 33-44.
31
Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Global Security, 33-44.
32
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 136-166.
33
Richard Black, “Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?,” University of Sussex, (2001): 1-3.
34
Renner, “Environmental and Social Stress Factors,” 8-15.
35
Renner, “Environmental and Social Stress Factors,” 8-15.
36
Renner, “Environmental and Social Stress Factors,” 8-15.
37
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 133-166.
38
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 133-166.
18
39
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 133-166.
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 133-166.
41
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 133-166.
42
Glass, “Water Crisis in Yemen,” 17-20.
43
Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Yemen’s Looming Water Crisis,” December 1st 2014, 1-2.
44
Glass, “Water Crisis in Yemen,” 17-20.
45
Giesecke, Craig, USAID Knowledge Services Center, “Yemen’s Water Crisis: Review of Background and Potential
Solutions,” June 15, 2012.
46
Stratfor, “Yemen’s Looming Water Crisis,” 1-4.
47
Glass, “Water Crisis in Yemen,” 20.
48
Glass, Water Crisis in Yemen,” 20-22.
49
Stratfor, “Yemen’s Looming Water Crisis,” 3-6.
50
Glass, “Water Crisis in Yemen,” 22.
51
Glass, “Water Crisis in Yemen,” 20-22.
52
“Yemen Profile,” last updated February 27th, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704951.
53
“Yemen Profile,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704951.
54
Stratfor, “Yemen’s Looming Water Crisis,” 3-6.
55
“Threats to Yemen,” Accessed 3/10/2015, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen
56
“Threats to Yemen,” http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen.
57
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58
“Crisis in Yemen: Food, Water and the Slow Motion Coup,” accessed 3/18/2015,
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59
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60
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61
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62
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 142-147.
63
Stratfor, “Yemen’s Looming Water Crisis,” 4-5.
64
“Democracy and Governance Initiatives in the Middle-East,” last updated March 24th, 2014,
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65
Emilio Custodio, “Trends in Groundwater Pollution: Loss of Groundwater Quality and Related Services,”
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66
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 49-51.
67
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68
Glass, “Water Crisis in Yemen,” 27.
69
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70
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71
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73
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74
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