Dinosaurs versus Mammals:
Insurgent and Counterinsurgent
Adaptation in Iraq, 2007
David J. Kilcullen
Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency
to the Secretary of State
RAND Insurgency Board
May 8, 2008
1
An unforgiving environment that
punishes error
Leading to Darwinian pressure on both sides…
2
1. Diagnosing the Problem – a Vicious Circle
2
Sunni extremists
attack neighboring
Shi’a communities
1
Extremists infiltrate
Sunni communities,
establish base areas
through intimidation
4 Sectarian attacks
intimidate Sunni
communities, which
close ranks
3
Shi’a militias and
“death squads” attack
Sunni communities
Accelerants:
AQI terrorism
Foreign fighters
Iranian infiltration
Crime & unemployment
2. Breaking the Cycle – Sustainable Stability
Gated communities
prevent Sunni
extremists infiltrating
Sunni areas
Joint Security
Stations & EPRT
civil programs
protect communities, 1
render them
Extremists infiltrate
resistant to
infiltration
Sunni communities,
establish base areas
through intimidation
Domination of “belts”
and control of access
to Baghdad prevents
“commuter insurgents”
and infiltration
2
Sunni extremists
attack neighboring
Shi’a communities
Market and district hardening
programs, and Joint Security
Stations protect public places
against terrorism
Joint Security
Stations protect
people in their
homes
4 Sectarian attacks
intimidate Sunni
communities, which
close ranks
Access controls
prevent Sunni
extremists entering
Shi’a areas
3
Shi’a militias and
vigilantes attack Sunni
communities
Gated communities
prevent Shi’a
extremists entering
Sunni areas
De-celerants:
Political reconciliation
Competent, non-sectarian
governance & institutions
Lines of Operation (generic)
Starting Conditions
Attitude of Populace
Insurgent
End State
Information Operations
Security Operations
Neutral
or
Passive
Neutral
or
Passive
Develop Security Forces
Essential Services
Support
Govern
ment
Insurgent
Better Governance
Economic Development
Support
Govern
ment
POLITICAL
LOO Goal – Political
accommodation agreement
leading to a sustainable security
situation, marked by a significant
reduction in aggregate political
violence
COMMUNICATION & ENGAGEMENT
LOO Goal - End large scale
violence; defeat irreconcilables;
develop leverage to bring
reconcilables to the table; reform
ISF; reduce destabilizing external
influences
Campaign Goal
Near Term - End to large scale
sectarian violence, improved
population security, and
substantial progress on political
accommodation
Lines of Operation (JSAT)
SECURITY
COMMUNICATION & ENGAGEMENT
Intermediate Term - The
establishment of a negotiated
political agreement that leads to
sustainable security
LOO Goal - Progress in key
Long Term - Iraq at peace with its
sectors of the Iraqi economy
supports and reflects movement neighbors and an ally in the War
ECONOMIC
towards sustainable stabilization on Terror, with a representative
government that respects the
and political accommodation
human rights of all Iraqis, and
COMMUNICATION & ENGAGEMENT
security forces sufficient to
maintain domestic order and to
LOO Goal - Negative influences
deny Iraq as a safe haven for
from neighbors reduced.
terrorists.
Increased Iraqi outreach to region,
DIPLOMATIC
more acceptance of Iraqi
government by region
6
Campaign Concept 2007-8 (JSAT, Mar 07)
window of
opportunity
Coalition
Force Level
Now
July 07
Feb 08
Dec 08
CRITICAL FACTORS: Time, Leverage, US political will, GOI performance
MNF-I applies increased force levels, intimate cooperation with ISF and a focus on
population security, to improve security situation between now and February 2008.
USM-I exploits improved security, to force key actors toward GOI reform, confidence
building measures (‘07) & political accommodation (‘08) resulting in sustainable stability.
MNF-I progressively reduces force levels through 2008, aiming for steady state early ‘09.
MAIN EFFORT: Political & diplomatic lines of operation translate security
progress into sustainable political stability.
7
Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in Iraq,
RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008
A TENTATIVE THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
8
Research Limitations
•
Methodology: qualitative, subjective first-hand field research based on participant
observation, backed by quantitative data when available
•
Data corruption (especially SIGACTs) frustrated rigorous statistical analysis
•
Emphasis on professional judgment and “blink” knowledge
•
Selection bias (CF units in toughest areas, requiring most assistance, received
greatest attention)
•
Risk/stress/effort inherent in data collection clouds judgment & skews emphasis
•
Regional focus (Baghdad, belts, Anbar, Diyala) not necessarily transferable
•
Little direct interaction with UK forces in Basra
•
Poor Iraqi Arabic dialect language skills (some MSA) – views of male, urbanized,
educated Iraqis are therefore privileged in research
•
Emotional factors – sympathy for Iraqi nationalists, (over)concern for the civil
population, distaste for Shi’a clericalists, over time intense hatred for AQI & JAM
These research results provide a “conflict ethnography” of central Iraq in
2007, producing what anthropologists call a thick description of one time-andarea-specific case study – broader applicability is problematic
9
The logic of field observation in Iraq
• Everyone sees Iraq differently, depending on when they
served there, what they did, and where they worked.
– The environment is highly complex, ambiguous and fluid
– It is extremely hard to know what is happening – trying too hard to find
out can get you killed…and so can not knowing
– “Observer effect” and data corruption create uncertainty, and invite bias
– Knowledge of Iraq is very time-specific and location-specific
– Prediction in complex systems (like insurgencies) is mathematically
impossible…but we can’t help ourselves, we do it anyway
• Hence, observations from one time/place may or may not
be applicable elsewhere, even in the same campaign in the
same year: we must first understand the essentials of the
environment, then determine whether analogous
circumstances exist, before attempting to apply “lessons”.
My role (hence, my bias)
•
Senior counterinsurgency advisor to Commanding General MNF-I (Petraeus)
•
No specific direction on what to do or how, just broad guidance on what to
achieve (rapid shift of focus across MNF-I and ISF) and why (need to get
through learning curve ASAP to make the Surge work)
–
Very limited background in organizational change theory / organizational learning literature,
just “made it up as I went along” (could have done with insights from Dr Davidson / LTC Nagl)
•
Design of the 2007-2008 MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan (the “surge”), the MNCI Counterinsurgency Guidance, and training packages for MNF-I, ISF and
USM-I
•
Field counterinsurgency support (combat advising) with the:
–
–
–
–
Multi-National Force-Iraq and subordinate units
U.S. Mission-Iraq (Embassy, AID mission, Office of Regional Affairs)
Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Iraqi government (civil, military, police, intelligence)
•
Raising, vetting and employing tribal irregular forces (AFF, shurta isanad,
sahwa al Anbar, abna al ’Iraq)
•
Approx. 65% field-deployed, 35% headquarters/embassy – almost all
muhalla time was in Baghdad, the northern and southern belts and the socalled “triangle of death” south/SW of Baghdad City (the “fiyas”)
Tentative theoretical model for Insurgent &
Counterinsurgent Learning
2
Insurgent starts
ahead of acceptability gradient
Counterinsurgent’s
adaptation
prompts evolution in
insurgent
7
8
4
Performance
1
Counterinsurgent starts
behind acceptability gradient
The “Metz Threshold”
Insurgent
Performance
Counterinsurgent
Performance
Insurgent and
counterinsurgent
performance converge
through co-evolution
3
6
Rising expectations
invoke “red queen effect”
for counterinsurgent
5
Counterinsurgent
failure to meet
rising expectations
may prompt
insurgent “take-off”
Counterinsurgent
must achieve
acceptable
performance
before Metz
threshold reached
Counterinsurgent adapts to
environment and improves
Time
12
Observations and Hypotheses
•
Observations:
– The counterinsurgent always starts from behind in terms of objective
performance, as well as in terms of performance acceptability (Galula
1964,Thompson 1966)
– Counterinsurgency techniques decline in effectiveness as a function of time,
speed and scope of onset, and insurgent familiarity (Beitler 1995, Kilcullen
2004b)
– The counterinsurgent must achieve acceptable performance by the time
political patience runs out, requiring an organizational learning response
(Davidson 2005,Nagl 2002/2005)
– The historical U.S. threshold for political patience is 3 years (Metz, 2007)
•
Hypotheses:
– The acceptability gradient is defined by domestic political perceptions, and
governed by the tyranny of rising expectations
– In a “domestic counterinsurgency”, there is one acceptability gradient, hence
insurgent and counterinsurgent performance are systemically coupled
(through the mechanism of competition for support of one domestic population)
– In a “third-party counterinsurgency” (Simpson 2008), there are multiple
gradients – one for each constituency within the domestic polity, one for each
intervener – hence insurgent and counterinsurgent performance are decoupled
in terms of acceptability, though mutually influential through a process of
co-evolution
13
Scope & Permanence – key factors?
• Scope (Operational vs Institutional learning)
– Operational (pertaining to that part of an institution
actually engaged in operations)
– Institutional (pertaining to the entirety of an institution,
including its supporting structures and processes outside
theater)
• Permanence (Adaptation vs Evolution)
– Adaptation (structural or behavioral modifications of a
temporary or ad hoc nature that occur within one
generation and improve fitness for the environment, but
may not be sustained over multiple generations)
– Evolution (changes of a permanent or semi-permanent
nature that occur over, and are sustained over multiple
generations – tours, life cycles or posting cycles)
14
Example adaptations
Supplemental
funding
Institutional
Adaptation
Scope
New
TTPs
Operational
Adaptation
New
Budget
permanent
changes Institutional
units
New
Evolution
individual
New
training
personnel
New
systems
collective
training
Operational
New
Evolution
In-theater
organizations
Permanence
15
Hypothesis: counterinsurgents adapt
slowly, insurgents evolve quickly?
• Observation seems to suggest that counterinsurgents typically undergo
relatively slow operational adaptation during a campaign, and only
engage in institutional evolution more slowly (possibly not until after
the campaign’s outcome has already been determined)
• Conversely, insurgents (especially those with loose organizational
structures or fluid network architecture) may be more likely to evolve
rapidly (through attrition and natural selection over “generations” of
insurgent life-cycle), as well as engaging in purposeful adaptation at
“street” level
• Is this pattern apparent in Iraq in 2007?
• Should we expect insurgents with tighter structures and hierarchies
(e.g. JAM) to adapt in a similar fashion to counterinsurgents, while
looser networks (Sunnis) evolve in a more fluid fashion?
Counterinsurgents are dinosaurs (powerful, dominant, slow to adapt);
insurgents are more like early mammals (small, furtive, will lose any encounter
with dinosaurs but potentially out-compete and out-evolve them over time)
16
Hypothesis: mechanisms for insurgent
evolution
• General evolutionary effect:
–
–
Attrition imposed by combat action culls less well-adapted members of the insurgent network,
improving overall quality
Weaker, smaller networks coalesce or collapse and are absorbed by stronger networks
• Leadership evolution (destruction-replenishment cycle):
– Targeting of insurgent HVTs creates greater attrition at the mid-upper leadership level than at
any other
– Hence networks have a relatively stable senior leadership core, but rapid turnover at mid-level
– Junior leaders are more familiar with the environment and CF TTPs, hence better adapted to
current conditions
– Older leaders are tired, combat-shocked, increasingly over-confident or careless, more likely to
be attrited
– This keeps leadership improving over time, unless attrition rate too high to be sustained or a
critical mass (say, 25% of insurgent middle leadership) killed/captured (cf Israeli data on PIJ)
• Bell Curve effect:
Too little attrition to
generate meaningful
evolution
Significant
evolutionary
effect
Too much attrition for
destruction-replenishment
cycle to operate
Rate of attrition x% per unit time
17
Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in Iraq,
RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008
INSURGENT EVOLUTION
18
UNCLASSIFIED
Derived from OSINT
Iraq – Sunni insurgent Networks
Abdullah Janabi friends with
Izzat al-Duri & Harith al-Dari
(all three Baathists, sufis, fedayeen, IIS –
Not Salafists, sufis [tarekat links]
Kamis al-Sirhan
Muhammad Yunis Ahmad al Hamdani (al
Duri’s deputy in Mil Bureau – Saddam’s
network for religious-based organization of
insurgency, kept eye on tribes, mosques &
security orgs – old boy network)
Horror Brigades
(Ba’athists /
Former Regime
Elements)
Jaish al Sunna
wa’l Jama’a
Islamic Jihad Brigades
1920s
Revolutionary
Brigades
Coordination
Department
of the
Jihad Brigades
Jaish al
Green
Ansar al Tawhid
Brigades
Victorious Army Group
Jeish al-Ta'eifa al-Mansoura
Jama’a al
Brigades
Islamic Iraqi
Resistance
Front
Ja’ami
Jaish
Muhammad
Larger in numbers
Murabitin
Mujahidin Shura Council
(ISI may have taken over)
Iraqi Turkmen Front
(Turkish govt links?)
Al Qa’ida
in Mesopotamia
Tanzim Qa’idat
DJ Kilcullen / JSAT / March 07
Islamic
Army in Iraq
Mujahidin
Strangers’
Brigades
Muslim Ulema Council
(former Ba’athist Society of
Islamic Scholars)
Mujahideen
Central
Command
fil Balad ar Rafidayn
Ansar al Sunna
Blended org, FREs + jihadists, formerly
Ansar al Islam Kurdish Shia & Sunni
Leaders, long-standing personal links to AMZ,
home ground advantage in KRG area
Insurgent Organizational
Evolution – Jaish al Mahdi
JAM 2005-6
JAM 2007
Political Leadership
Political Leadership
Propaganda wing
Propaganda wing
Social Services / Charity
Social Services / Charity
Militia / Local insurgents
Militia / Local insurgents
Special Groups
Special Groups
Criminal elements
Political leadership divided
Propaganda efforts weak
Social services growing
Crafting a “Hizb’allah model”
Propaganda and social services
strengthened, Criminal elements
starting to be eliminated
20
EVOLUTION OF IMPROVISED
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
IED tactical counter-mobility –
overpass attacks during surge
Route Grizzlies, 10 June 2007, 0500 am
22
Strategic counter-mobility ops or
copy-cat attacks?
Sarafiyya Bridge attack, April 2007
23
28 MAY 07 - DOWNED OH-58 - TIMELINE
WHO: MND-N
WHAT: DOWNED OH-58
WHEN: 281816D MAY 07
WHERE: 38S MC 7696 5353
28 MAY
1816D- 0H-58 (SB 56) DOWNED 38S MC 7696 5353, 16KM W.
OF MUQDADIYAH. SWT RECEIVED SAFIRE FROM SINGLE
POO. SB 56 CONDUCTED ATTACK RUN RESULTING IN
CATASTROPHIC DAM TO SB 56. B26 EVADED ENEMY FIRE.
1820D- 3-1 CAV RECEIVED MAYDAY CALL FROM DOWNED
OH-58. QRF ALERTED. ANOTHER AWT RESPONDED TO
CRASH SITE AND ASSISTS SB26 IN SECURING SITE.
1842D- CAS (2X F-16) OVERHEAD.
1848D- A UH-60 TEAM (LIGHTNING 06) IVO CRASH SITE
LANDED AND PICKED UP OH-58 CREW. AWT PROVIDED
SUPPRESSIVE FIRE – 2X CF (US) KIA. UH-60 CASEVACED
CAS TO FOB WARHORSE.
1940D- AWT (REDWOLF 06) ENGAGED 3X AIF AT CRASH
SITE – 2X AIF KIA.
2006D- GROUND QRF IN ROUTE (3-1 CAV QRF – 4X M1114,
2X M2, 24X PAX)
2024D- 5W’s SENT TO COMMAND GROUP FROM MNFI
CHOPS (OIC).
1816D - OH-58 CRASH SITE
2034D- DART INBOUND TO DO PHO.
2048D - QRF HIT IED
2035D- QRF HIT IED ENROUTE TO CRASH SITE, 5X CF (US)
KIA, 3X CF (US) WIA AND 1X M2 BFV DAMAGED.
2048D- A10 HAD EYES ON DOWNED A/C CRASH SITE.
2051D- AASLT QRF LANDED AND SECURED THE CRASH
SITE. TEAM INCLUDED EOD AND MAINT TECH.
2200D- A/C TI CONDUCTED – A/C TOTAL LOSS.
2309D- EOD DESTROYED A/C.
SAF/HMG POO
29 MAY
290265D DURING RECOVERY OF THE M2 BFV FROM IED
STRIKE, A SECOND IED EXPLODED UNDER THE M2 BFV,
1X CF (US) KIA
BDA: 8X CF (US) KIA, 3X CF (US) WIA, 2X AIF KILLED, 1X OH58 DESTROYED, 1X BFV DAMAGED
LEGEND
LOCATION
AS OF
29 0630D MAY 07
Attacks Matrix SEP 06 - MAY 07
AS OF 30 MAY 07
Dates
IDF
SAF
IEDDIS
IEDDET
IED TOTAL
VBIED
Total
SEP 06
55 (25)
29 (4)
27 (1)
33 (4)
60 (5)
1 (0)
152 (34)
OCT 06
46 (22)
33 (6)
23 (3)
28 (4)
51 (7)
2 (1)
132 (36)
NOV 06
34 (13)
18 (2)
15 (2)
23 (2)
38 (2)
3 (3)
93 (22)
DEC 06
16 (5)
28 (1)
11 (0)
31 (7)
42 (7)
8 (6)
94 (19)
JAN07
39 (9)
34 (3)
41 (4)
23 (2)
64 (6)
2 (1)
139 (19)
FEB 07
38 (5)
39 (3)
23 (1)
22 (1)
45 (2)
4 (3)
126 (13)
MAR 07
34 (4)
32 (7)
47 (4)
24 (3)
71 (7)
3 (2)
140 (20)
APR 07
43(13)
25 (2)
18 (1)
20 (3)
38 (4)
1 (1)
107 (20)
MAY 07
35(6)
41(3)
15 (2)
17 (3)
32 (5)
2 (2)
110 (16)
12*
16
28
1
42
DET vs DIS
Change
DET vs DIS
SEP 06- MAY07
20
12
MAY 07
SEP 06
IEDDIS
45%
IEDDIS
IEDDET
55%
IEDDIS
45%
IEDDET
53%
IEDDIS
IEDDET
IEDDET
IEDDIS
47%
IEDDIS
IEDDET
23 MAR 07, 4/6 IA ICW 2-15 FA, OPERATION EAGLE DIVE
MISSION: NLT 23 0330 MAR 07
4/6 IA ICW TF 2-15 attacks to
disrupt AIF in the KILO 12 and
KILO 18 areas IOT deny AIF FOI
and FOM within 1/4/6 AO and
establish IA BP on key terrain
along ASR TEMPLE
D104A
OBJ RONALDINHO
ZONE
CENTRAL
OBJ RONALDO
OBJ CRESPO
OBJ ZICO
OBJ KAHN
OBJ CANIGGIA
NEW BP
OBJ VAVA
ZONE
WEST
ZONE EAST
OBJ HENRY
OBJ KLINSMANN
OBJ
BIERHOFF
TM BP
OBJ
BURRUCHAGA
OBJ VOELLER
OBJ PAPIN
OBJ BULLS
OBJ CANTONA
OBJ PLATINI
OBJ SCHUMACHER
OBJ MUELLER
OBJ FONTAINE
ZONE
SOUTH
OBJ KOPA
D103A
RFL
ATK PSN CENTRAL
TAC / QRF
SUMMARY:
Successful brigade size
operation along ASR TEMPLE.
The Brigade was able to disrupt
AIF activity while emplacing a
new battle position (BP158).
ATK PSN EAST
• Discovered 9 weapons caches
• Eliminated 7 IDF systems
• Captured 13 Black list
personnel
• Discovered and eliminated 4
IEDs
29 MAY 07, TF 2-15 ICW 4/6 IA OPSUM, EAGLE RAZOR SOUTH II
DETAINEES:
13 X LN DETAINED
INJURIES:
1 X US WIA BR# SM0998; MEDEVAC, GS
WOUND TO LEG, TREATED AND RTD STATUS
Cache Found:
1. MB 241 444
2. MB 242 442
3. MB 241 442
4. MB 238 441
5. MB 257 421
6 X BAGS UBE
4 X CANS 30MM
1 X SPARE BARREL AA
2000 X PROPAGANDA CD’S
1800 X BLANK CD’S
1 X CD WRITER
2 X GRNADE FUSES
1 X AK-47 WITH MAGAZINE
300 X CASSETTES
1 X WASHINE MACHINE TIMER
COPPER WIRE
Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in Iraq,
RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008
COUNTERINSURGENT
ADAPTATION
28
Senior COIN Advisor
•
Commanding Generals have a long history of employing specialist
advisers (e.g. Allenby/Lawrence, Rommel/Laszlo Almaszy,
Templer/Richard Noone, Woodward/Ewen Southby-Tailyour)
•
Not the first senior COIN adviser (built on experience of others, stood
on shoulders of giants like Kalev Sepp and, more distantly, drew on
methodology of Bernard Fall, Gregory Bateson and Gerald Hickey )
•
Cycled between personal interaction with CG MNF-I (daily),
Ambassador and AID Mission Director (weekly), Station Chief
(occasionally) and field interaction at BCT, PRT, Bn and Coy level
•
Extremely high degree of autonomy, “liminal” status (“pet expert”,
diplomat operating under military authority and ROE, SES rank)
•
Fall, 1967
Sepp, 2005
Acted as an “accelerant” to:
–
Interpret CG’s guidance for execution-level officers,
– Provide ground truth and a feedback loop to CG on issues and
conditions for those executing the mission,
– Conduct ops research on COIN best practices and feed latest TTPs
to training and planning staffs,
– Create informal communities of practice across units and districts,
and
– Provide technical (anthro/soc sci/COIN) advice to CG
Kilcullen, 2007 29
Field Methodology
• Participation in BUA, JECB, CIG activities, GOI engagement,
campaign/strategic planning activities
• Select units for advisory support based on unit background and
performance + nature of task (big-picture criticality) – methodology
based on participant observation and RRA techniques
•
Stages of an advisory deployment (3-5 days with frequent re-visit):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
In-brief with higher HQ (turf/rice-bowl issues)
Field entry phase (rapport-building, establish trust)
Historical discussions (reconcile reported SIGACTs with unit recollections,
observe TOC and intel fusion center)
Observation phase (patrols, KLEs, PRT activities, raids, cordon & knock,
combat engagements) – some immediate advising as needed
Advice phase (briefs, skills training, deliver key CG messages, identify
equipment, personnel, support and training needs, rectify where feasible,
establish ongoing plans with supporting agencies)
Out-brief with higher HQ (no written outbrief product, to encourage honesty)
Community-building phase (email, networking, link-up of similar groups)
Follow-up (2-4 weeks in most cases, sometimes longer)
30
ADVISING U.S. FORCES
31
ADVISING IRAQI FORCES
32
ADVISING IRAQI & U.S.
CIVILIAN AGENCIES
33
DESIGN AND DELIVERY
OF FORMAL TRAINING
34
Rapid Adaption 1 – MNC-I COIN Guidance
• Need to orient incoming
BCTs to new approach, reorient in-theater BCTs, and
align ISF and CF effort
• Conducted intense field ops
research activity to identify
best practices
• Produced “Field Service
Regulations”
• Close consultation with
MNC-I commander’s advisor
(Sky), DIV and BCT HQs
• Posted in all JSS/PBs
• Standardized approach for
all assets, civil/military
Developed approach late March, field work throughout April, briefing (MNF-I,
USM-I, IMOD, CENTCOM, MNC-I) late April to early May, drafting (to draft 18)
May, field testing late May, guidance issued early June 2007.
35
Rapid Adaption 2 – Local Security Forces
• Need to exploit rapid unsolicited emergence of
anti-AQI Sunni groups in
Baghdad and belts
• Anbar model (saHwa) not
directly applicable, local
alliances burgeoning out
of control, GOI panicking
• Conducted field work with
former insurgents, SOF,
AWG and partnering US
units to develop best
practices and safeguards
Began tracking phenomenon closely Apr/May 07, participation in Battle of
Ameriya (2-7 June 07) gave urgent impetus, close coord with MNC-I, USM-I
and FSEC, fielded final draft late Jun 07, FRAGO early Jul 07.
36
Rapid Adaption 3 – BCT & PRT Orientation
•
•
•
Need to re-orient incoming surge
BCTs, ePRTs and USM-I
personnel to new approach and
new environment
Focus on the 20 weeks leading up
to Sep 07 congressional testimony
Training at Taji COIN academy,
BCT and Bn headquarters, and
Embassy/AID Mission compound
Developed initial brief March 07, continuous refinement and development MarJuly 07, briefed weekly or more often
37
Rapid Adaption 4 – Deciding to Dismount
•
•
•
•
Progressive co-evolution of
IEDs and countermeasures
had alienated CF from pop
New devices (EFPs,
DBIEDs, RPG-29) made uparmd vehicles vulnerable
anyway
Ops Research for MNC-I
guidance suggested
dismounting would build
bond with pop, reduce IED
cas, increase sniper cas
Made risk judgment to
proceed with dismount in late
May, in time for Arrowhead
series (June 07)
Counterintuitive result: sniper risk up, IED risk up. (82d Abn and 10th Mtn casualties)
Emergency field intervention – discovered foot patrol skills had atrophied,
instituted crash re-training (AWG). IED and sniper cas immediately dropped and
kept dropping, patrol situational awareness and rapport improved.
38
New Tactics 1 -- Urban Oilspot
2
1
Security & Influence Zone
BCT main effort. Mission is to protect RZ
from enemy infil. Pop in this area are
denied benefits of RZ, kept under
intrusive control. Joint Influence Teams
work here, using progress in RZ as
”object lesson” to convince community
leaders to “sign on”. Pop must meet
criteria (control youth, report en acty, no
anti-CF activity etc.) to be eligible for PRT
benefits. Once criteria met, RZ expands
into this zone.
Reconstruction Zone
Initial focus of ops. Selected
where pop most supports CF.
PRT main effort. Permanently
garrisoned. Must protect
population 24/7. No kinetic ops
in here without PRT clearance.
No expansion until fully secure.
3
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE
Disruption Zone
Remainder of AOR. Focus of intel and
SOF activity. Aim to disrupt enemy, keep
off balance, select next oilspot location.
39
Assembly
Point
cache
Local
cache
District
cache
Sponsor
Firing Point
OP
OP
IED site
Early warning
zone
A
Chokepoint –
likely IED site somewhere in here
Early warning
zone
Of all key locations, the actual IED site is least important.
Look for early warning OPs, firing and assembly points, infil/exfil routes.
Use friendly convoy movement as bait to trigger en action.
Pre-position sigint and recon assets to identify teams moving into
position, listen for the calls between OP and firing team.
Use tank, atk helo or snipers for point engagement of firing team, with
ground patrol follow up. Capture OP teams and exploit cellphone data.
Spring elements to capture and exploit observation teams, kill or capture
firing team, trace back to assembly point, local and district caches. This
will require detainee exploitation and THT ops as well as physical
exploitation of the firing point. Occupy the assembly point until done.
B
New Tactics 2 – IED counter-ambush
40
New Tactics 3 -- Demographic Targeting
Invented by McMaster in Tal Afar (2005), refined by Kilcullen (2007),
applied in NW Baghdad and southern belts.
Works on the fact that urbanization in Iraq is a relatively recent
phenomenon, hence people in urban districts have rural relatives
Exploits the dynamic whereby insurgents, when pressured in an urban
area, run “home” along kinship lines to relatives in rural areas
Powerpoint
“Rogues
Gallery”
D+7
Exploitation
D+7 onward
Census / Human
Cordon
terrain analysis
& Knock
reveals
D to
inhabitants’
D+1
village of origin
Sadr City (Illustrative only)
Medcap
+ THT, D+5
41
Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in Iraq,
RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008
INSURGENT & COUNTERINSURGENT
CO-EVOLUTION
42
Examples of Co-evolution
• IED and counter-IED
• Sniper and counter-Sniper
• Iraqi tribal uprising against AQI
43
IDF ATTACKS ON THE GREEN ZONE MAR 07
•1
10 MAR 07 – 1X 122MM RKT IN
FOB HONOR
•2
10 MAR 07 – 3X 122MM RKT IVO CP
BLACK
•3
10 MAR 07 – 1X 122MM IVO US
EMBASSY (FRONT FOUNTAIN)
•4
22 MAR 07 – 2X RND IVO LITTLE
VENICE/PM’S OFFICE
•
5
24 MAR 07 – 2x 107MM RKT IVO
EMB(5a), KBR TRAILERS(5b)
•6
25 MAR 07 – 1X 122MM RKT IOV
KBR TRAILERS
•7
26 1405C MAR 07 – 3X 107MM RKT
IVO KBR TRAILERS(7a), EMB(7b),
EMB(7C)
•8
26 1609C MAR 07 – 3X 107MM RKT
IVO EMB(8a), EMB(8b), KARADA
(8c)
•9
27 0120C MAR 07 – 1X 60MM
MORTAR IN IZ
•10
27 1927 MAR 07 – 1X 107 MM RKT
IVO KBR BILLETING OFFICE
1
4
2
5c
8c
5a5a
8a
3
107b8b
4b 5b
4c
7c
9
63 4a
7a
5b
IDF POI FEB
PREPARED BY STRATOPS
28 MAR 07
SNIPER AND COUNTER-SNIPER
45
THE TRIBAL UPRISING
46
Building a “ladder of tribes”
“There remained the technique and
direction of the new revolts: but the
direction a blind man could see...The
process should be to set up another
ladder of tribes, comparable to that
from Wejh to Akaba: only this time
our ladder would be made of steps
of Howeitat, Beni Sakhr, Sherarat,
Rualla, and Serahin, to raise us
three hundred miles to Azrak, the
oasis nearest Hauran and Jebel
Druse.”
T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of
Wisdom, 1935, Ch. LIX
Concept: build a “ladder” of tribal alliances, each bringing you closer to the
objective, until the revolt reaches a take-off point and spontaneously ignites
47
The Iraqi revolt
-- tribal ladder
Revolt takes off
Ameriya Freedom Fighters
Ghazaliya Guardians
Concerned Local Citizens
etc etc
Abna al-Anbar / al ‘Iraq
(sons of Anbar/Iraq)
Sahawa al-Anbar
(“The Awakening”)
Zobai
Anbar, Zaytun, Baghdad
Abu Abed (tribal military leader)
(links to 1920s Bde and
Moderate imams in Baghdad)
Anbar People’s Council
Anbar/Tigris Valley
Smashed brutally by AQI
Jan-Feb 2006
Albu Isa
Battle of
Ameriya
2-7 June
07
Abu Abed
Kuehl
L’Etoile, Burton
Albu Risha
Minor tribe of Dulaim qabila
Sitar Abu Risha Killed with 2 sons
Sheikh Abd el Sittar ar Rishawi
(youngest) survives
Anbar, Ramadi
Split btw AQI & tribal allegiance
Allen, MacFarland
Albu Mahal
NW Anbar, Nineveh
First to turn against AQI
Vines, McMaster
48
Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in Iraq,
RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008
INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS
49
General Insights
• By mid-April 07, AQI began to slip behind the destruction-replenishment
cycle, and could no longer replace mid-level and HVTs as they were
eliminated – a critical mass (approx 25%) of AQI leaders began to be
eliminated and the organization began a cascading collapse
• MNF-I reacted with surprising agility to a series of major events (principally
the sahawa and associated uprising) -- cf. 5+ months to react to Samarra
bombing 2006
• Orientation of new arrivals proved easier than re-orientation of units used
to old TTPs
• Accelerant tools (Senior COIN Adviser, Archer Teams, Taji Academy,
COIN Guidance, civil-military training) assisted greatly in speed of change
• Pairing and embedding of CF with Iraqi units improved performance of both
• Basic COIN approaches proved a useful guide, but had to be applied in a
severely time-limited, resource-constrained, tribal environment
• GPF in 2007 possess capabilities that only existed in SMUs in 2001, while
SMUs (and SOF generally) possess capabilities that only existed in
Hollywood – U.S. Forces are now unequivocally the best in the world at
COIN, by a significant margin
50
The logic of local partnerships
Option 1 – insert 50 000 U.S. troops into theater
FOB security, logistics, HQ, rear area or other non-combat tasking:
Force available for combat tasking on a 1:1 or 2:1 rotation model:
Force actually out on the ground at any time (ie net effect):
Effect on enemy forces and recruiting base:
30 000
20,000
7-10,000
NIL
NET EFFECT: 7-10,000 pax improvement in force ratio
Option 2 – win over 50 000 Iraqis into LSFs
FOB security, logistics, HQ, rear area or other non-combat tasking:
NIL
Force available for combat tasking on a 1:1 or 2:1 rotation model:
50,000
Force actually out on the ground at any time (ie net effect): 40,000
Coalition forces required for partnering, mentoring and supervision: 5,000
Effect on enemy forces and recruiting base:
-50,000+
NET EFFECT: 80-95,000 pax improvement in force ratio
(ie 8 to 12 times the value of inserting CF)
Conclusions
• In a counterinsurgency, insurgent groups and security forces appear to
engage in time- and resource-competitive processes of adaptation,
driven by the Darwinian pressure imposed by a complex, hostile
“conflict ecosystem” that operates on the edge of chaos
• Counterinsurgents appear mainly to adapt, insurgents to evolve – but
insurgent groups whose network and organizational structure is tighter
may behave in a more purposeful adaptive manner (e.g. JAM)
• In Iraq in 2007, the following key factors led to relatively rapid coalition
adaptation:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
High degree of political will in coalition capitals (do or die)
Quality of senior leadership (Petraeus, Crocker, Odierno)
Units that were relatively familiar with the environment through previous tours
Close integration/understanding between senior military and civilian leadership
Focus on, and understanding of, political and influence elements of the campaign
Presence of “accelerant” organizational learning tools
Dense internal communications, information and social networks within the force
Good pre-existing general understanding of COIN techniques across the force
Coherent civil-military planning and execution (relatively speaking) via the JSAT and
Joint Campaign Plan process
52
Research Implications
• This “conflict ethnography” will only be applicable to
situations that are broadly analogous – these may be
rare
• But resource-constrained COIN in tribal environments
will be the norm for the foreseeable future
• Further research could focus on:
– Methods to assess evolutionary pressure on insurgent
groups
– Options to extend the time available before the “Metz
threshold”
– Development of best-practice learning accelerant tools
– Comparison of year-by-year organizational learning in Iraq
– Understanding the dynamics and force-ratio implications of
local alliances
53
Questions/Comments
54