COCOM
The „Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls“
Prof. Dr. Hanns-D. Jacobsen, Studienforum Berlin
Contribution to the conference
„The Economics of the Cold War“
Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 2-4 Sep 2009
Panel 6: Economic warfare vs. economic cooperation
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
CoCom – basic facts I
Purpose and duration:
• CoCom was the primary international institution through which the U.S. and other noncommunist countries controlled the export of
goods and technolo-gies for security reasons.
• CoCom was founded in 1949 and dissolved in
1994.
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
CoCom – basic facts II
Member countries:
•
•
•
•
•
NATO member countries in 1949 (United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, France, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Norway, Portugal, Belgium,
Netherlands, Luxemburg) and Japan
1952: Greece and Turkey
1955: Federal Republic of Germany
1985: Australia
1989: Spain
Target countries:
•
•
•
Warsaw Pact member countries (USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
German Democratic Repulic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania)
People‘s Republic of China
Cuba, Vietnam
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
CoCom – basic facts III
Control instruments: Three lists
• Munitions list
• Commodity list (this turned out to be the most important and controversial one because it contained „dual
use“ technology, products and services)
• Atomic energy list
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
CoCom controversies
• Definition of strategic goods
• Impact of„negative“ or „positive“
sanctions
• Exterritorial application of U.S.
legislation
• German division and divided Berlin
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
The „success“ of CoCom I
• The CoCom members were basically
successful in keeping a lead over the
Soviet bloc in critical technologies
• But the CoCom controls were ultimately
not able to reduce the military threat by
the communist countries
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
The „success“ of CoCom II
• CoCom controls proved to be a liability,
even an obstacle, when East-West relations improved (“détente”, “perestroika”)
• CoCom contributed to economic and
political isolation of the Soviet Union as
well as Central and Eastern Europe. This
isolation gave the Soviet Union much
room for tightening the grip on its allies
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
The „success“ of CoCom III
• CoCom induced the Soviet Union and its
allies to develop sophisticated military
technology of their own. Thus, CoCom
strengthened intra-bloc cooperation
• Some CoCom member countries and
third non-CoCom countries provided
ways and means for the Soviet Union and
its allies to get access to strategic technology illegally and by means of diversion
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
The „success“ of CoCom IV
• Export, including CoCom, controls vis-àvis the communist countries as well as the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law
were subject to several conflicts between
the United States and her allies
• This contributed to a weakening of
NATO and transatlantic cooperation
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
The „success“ of CoCom V
• The insistence of the U.S. on tightening
strategic controls and CoCom rules had
an economic impact that was perceived
by some West European and Japanese
actors as an activity that primarily intended to secure global U.S. lead in high
technology
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
The „success“ of CoCom VI
• CoCom controls induced Western European countries and Japan to initiate huge
technological programs of their own
• This contributed to the rise of non-U.S.
technology and finally a loss of U.S. international competitiveness
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom
Conclusion
• A final „cost-benefit analysis“ of CoCom‘s impact is almost impossible because one has to distinguish between
intended and unintended consequences
• Particularly since the end of the seventies
it was clear that CoCom became more of
a liability than an asset in East-West relations
Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom