What were the key factors behind the successful internal
resettlement of the Karelian refugees in Finland between
1944 and 1950?
Word Count: 2,000
Internal Assessment – History HL
May 2015
[name here]
Candidate Number: [here]
December 11, 2014
[school name / center number here]
1
Section A – Plan of the Investigation
This investigation answers the question, “What were the key factors behind the successful
internal resettlement of Karelian refugees in Finland between 1944 and 1950?” The scope of this
investigation is the on the second resettlement,1 and covers the period from the resettlement’s
beginning to its end in 1950, focusing on the policies adopted by Finland and how each contributed to
the successful resettlement.
The method has sought to identify the key challenges facing the Resettlement Office (ASO)
by consulting the book Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme (1988) by Veikko Vennamo, head of ASO. The
policies taken by the Finnish authorities are evaluated in terms of their contribution to the success of
the resettlement. This is done by synthesizing information gathered from a variety of sources (books,
journal articles, and lectures), as well as critically evaluating the existing historical research, most
notably The Solution of the Karelian Refugee Problem in Finland (1952) by Axel de Gadolin. Where
appropriate, the evaluation is supported by comparisons to resettlement efforts abroad.
(164 words)
1
The first one was following the Winter War (1939--‐1940), also fought between the Soviet Union and Finland.
2
Section B – Summary of Evidence
The Refugee Problem
During WWII Finland fought and lost twice against the Soviet Union (SU): the Winter War of
1939-‐‐1940 and the Continuation War of 1941-‐‐1944. Following the loss in the Continuation War,
Finland ceded 12% of its territory and resettled 430,000 persons -‐‐ 11% of her population -‐‐
primarily from the ceded South-‐‐Eastern territory of Karelia.2 The Karelians were also evacuated
after territorial losses of the Winter War, but two-‐‐thirds returned following the initial reconquering
of those areas during the Continuation War.3
The post Continuation War economic output was 30% lower than pre-‐‐war, electricity production
was down by 15%, key infrastructure was destroyed, and Finland had to pay 300 million USD in
indemnity to the SU.4 The Karelian economy primarily relied on agriculture and forestry, and
most refugees were farmers.5 Finland’s economy did not need more farmers.6 Vennamo and Gadolin
argue that the highest political leadership was gravely concerned of communism’s rise, and Gadolin
writes: “There was a real possibility that the great mass of workers and refugees, the latter robbed of
all means of existence, would create a revolutionary situation.”7
2
Pertti Ahonen, “Taming the Expellee Threat In Post--‐1945 Europe: Lessons from the Two Germanies and Finland,”
Contemporary European History 14, no. 1 (1999): 10.
3
Matti Sarvimäki, Roope Uusitalo, and Markus Jäntti, “Long--‐term Effects of Forced Migration”, (Discussion paper,
Institute for the Study of Labor, 2009): 6. Available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp4003.pdf
4
Ibid., 7
5
Kristiina Tolvanen, “A Nation in Transition: the Resettlement of Karelian Refugees” (Essay, University of Tampere, 2008).
Available at https://www15.uta.fi/FAST/FIN/HIST/kt--‐evac.html
6
Axel de Gadolin,The Solution of the Karelian Refugee Problem in Finland, (Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1952), 39.
7
Ibid., 37. Veikko Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme (Helsinki: Gummerus, 1988), 53. (Translated title: The Miracle of
Resettlement)
3
Despite minor tensions between the Finns and Karelian refugees, the Karelians shared the
same language, and were “culturally and ethnically affiliated to the hosts [Finns]”, 8 which Kacowicz
and Lutomski identify as a key reason for the success of the resettlement.9
By 1950 essentially all of the refugees had been settled,10 and the resettlement is widely
considered as a clear success.11
Legislative Measures
In January 1945, the Finnish Parliament passed the Land Acquisition Act.12 The act entitled
refugees to receive land in compensation for their losses,13 and the earlier Compensation Act (1940)
provided compensation for lost property via cash and state-‐‐bonds.14 The Land Acquisition Act was
largely based on the earlier Emergency Resettlement Act (1940) for post Winter War resettlement ‐‐ de Gadolin called the 1940 Act a “dress rehearsal of the 1945 Act.”15
The Resettlement Office, ASO, established in 1940, was responsible for the planning and
execution of the resettlement.16 Working together with the Karelian League and landowners’
organizations, it drafted the Resettlement Act of 1945.17 Historian Pertti Ahonen argues, drawing
upon international comparisons from East and West Germany: “the permissive and inclusive
approach […] brought a variety of gains” and was “instrumental in avoiding social problems faced by
8
Arie Kacowicz and Pavel Lutomski, Population Resettlement in International Conflicts: A Comparative Study, (Lanham MD,
USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 71.
9
Ibid.
10
Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.”
11
Kacowicz and Lutomski, Resettlement in International Conflicts, 60.
12
Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 6.
13
de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 18.
14
Ibid., 20.
15
Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 50. de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 31.
16
de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 46.
17
Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.”
4
East Germany practicing repressive governance.”18 ASO had been working on the 1945 resettlement
plan since 1943.19 The Act relocated each village community as a whole to a new area, and the new
areas were chosen to match the community’s previous agricultural conditions.20
By 1950 1,214,000 hectares of arable land had been redistributed under the Land Acquisition
Act.21 This created around 80,000 new farms with an average of only 15 hectares of arable land.22
Other Resettlement Policies
KYMRO23 was an agency that coordinated the building of housing for refugees. In 1945 the parliament
banned all housing construction other than that for resettlement, and KYMRO oversaw and regulated
the supply of building materials.24 KYMRO also controlled the features of buildings: there were strict
limits for the size based on family size, windows could not be “excessively large”, ceiling heights were
capped at 2.2 meters, and so on.25
KYMRO and ASO worked together with the Finnish Architects’ Association to produce
blueprints for standardized houses for refugees.26 Many of these were designed in collaboration with
woodwork factories, and the factories provided some of the components readymade to ease
18
Ahonen, “Taming the Expellee Threat,” 15ff.
Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 114.
20
Silvo Hietanen, ”Oma Tupa, Oma Lupa,” (lecture, Karelian League, Helsinki 10 Nov 2007). (Translated title: Your Home,
Your Decision) Available at http://www.karjalanliitto.fi/index.phtml?s=224
21
Ibid.
22
Pertti and Maarit Alasuutari, ”The Narrative Construction of Karelian Identity,” (lecture, University of Tampere
Department of Sociology, 2009). Available at
http://wwwedu.oulu.fi/tohtorikoulutus/jarjestettava_opetus/Alasuutari/The%20Narrative%20Construction%20of%20Kare
lian%20identity.pdf
23
Abbreviation for “Kulkulaitosten ja Yleisten Töiden Ministeriön Rakennusosasto”, roughly translating to “The
Department of Construction under the Ministry of Transportation and General Affairs”
24
Petteri Kummala, Jälleenrakennuskauden pientalosuunnittelu, (Helsinki: Finnish Architectural Museum, 2004), 8.
(Translated title: Architecture during the Rebuilding Period)
25
Kummala, Jälleenrakennuksen pientalosuunnittelu, 10.
26
Ibid., 14.
19
5
construction – the refugees themselves almost invariably built their houses.27 KYMRO also developed
the RT-‐‐card system, which was designed as a “complete, comprehensive, and authoritative
encyclopedia of all construction techniques, materials, and tools.”28
Finland also established a scheme, named Arava, to financially support housing construction in
the countryside, and rent subsidies for urban areas.29 Kacowicz and Lutomski argue “the core of a
resettlement plan is a development scheme based on land-‐‐ and employment strategies”, as they are
“most effective” and “relatively cost effective.”30
(647 words)
27
Kummala, Jälleenrakennuksen pientalosuunnittelu, 13.
Ibid., 9.
29
Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.”
30
Kacowicz and Lutomski, Resettlement in International Conflicts, 61.
28
6
Section C – Evaluation of Sources
Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme (1988, “The Miracle of Resettlement”) is a book written by Veikko
Vennamo, the head of the Resettlement Office. Vennamo published the book shortly after resigning
from his career in the parliament. Its purpose is to explain how he led ASO to solve the “Karelian
problem”, but also to be his personal account of the events of the resettlement and quarrels with his
political rivals.
The value of this source is that it offers an inside-‐‐view into the organization and politics of the
resettlement: its author was the most important person in the resettlement process. It highlights the
challenges ASO faced, the policies it undertook, and the policies that were considered most important
by those in power.
The limitation of this source is that seeks to explain the successes of the resettlement as the
result of ASO’s actions, thus downplaying other important factors. For example, Vennamo places the
greatest credit on the Resettlement Act of 1945 that ASO drafted, calling it “the law that solved the
refugee problem”31, without recognizing that it was mostly based on the earlier Emergency
Resettlement Act of 1940. Similarly, he gives little consideration for the work of other organizations,
such as the Architects’ Association and KYMRO that were crucial in the construction of refugees’
homes.
The Solution of the Karelian Refugee Problem in Finland (1952) is an academic publication by
Åbo Akademi Professor of Political Economy Axel de Gadolin, who was part of the Research Group for
31
Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 163.
7
European Migration Problems. Its purpose is to investigate the reasons behind the successful
resettlement; he argues that the foremost reasons were the legislative ones and economic ones.
The source’s value lies in that it provides a detailed account of the resettlement policies, how
they worked in practice, and how Finland was able to finance them. Importantly, it also investigates
how the 1940 resettlement shaped the 1945 resettlement. While perhaps not as exciting as
Vennamo’s “miracles”,32 these are crucial in providing a more nuanced and balanced understanding
of the resettlement effort.
One limitation of this source is that due to the proximity to the events, de Gadolin often had
to rely on estimates instead of accurate statistics for his analysis on resettlement policies’
effectiveness. For example, when assessing refugees’ integration into the workforce, he wrote: “It
seems most probable that the employment rate is comparable to that of the general population.” 33
(394 words)
32
33
The title of Vennamo’s book translates into “The Miracle of Resettlement.”
de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 78.
8
Section D – Analysis
How is it that a small nation of 3.9 million that had just suffered a devastating defeat in a war,
lost 11% of its land area,34 and had its industries and economy in shambles could successfully resettle
430,000 refugees in the span of less than five years?35
Despite the difficult circumstance Finland was in, several factors were in its favor. The
Karelians were internal refugees, and the close cultural and national connection eased their
integration into their new homes.36 Kacowicz and Lutomski identify “cultural and ethnic compatibility”
as a key factor contributing to the success of refugee resettlement.37
Furthermore, Finland was in a relatively good position to deal with the refugee resettlement of
1945: most of the essential political structures, organizations, and legislation for handling such
situations had already been established through the Emergency Resettlement Act following the 1940
resettlement.38 Gadolin argues: “The Emergency Resettlement Act of 1940 was a dress rehearsal of
the 1945 Act.”39 Similarly, ASO had already been established for the first resettlement in 1940.40
Indeed, ASO remained at work in between the resettlement efforts, and started preparing for the
1945 resettlement in 1943.41 As mentioned in Section C, Vennamo downplayed the significance of
these existing frameworks, but as the evidence suggests they were instrumental in shaping the 1945
resettlement, it is reasonable to challenge Vennamo’s analysis. The Finnish resettlement organization
34
Ahonen, “Taming the Expellee Threat”, 15ff.
Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees”.
36
Kacowicz and Lutomski, Resettlement in International Conflicts, 71.
37
Ibid.
38
Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 50.
39
de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 31.
40
Ibid., 46.
41
Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 114.
35
9
was prepared in 1945, and this was primarily due to frameworks established for the 1940
resettlement.
So what exactly did Finland do right beyond being prepared? ? Kacowicz and Lutomski argue:
“The core of a resettlement plan is a development scheme based on land-‐‐strategies or around
employment-‐‐based strategies” as land-‐‐strategies are “most effective” and “relatively less
costly.”42
Finland did exactly that: it adopted a moderate land-‐‐reform law that redistributed land to the Karelian
refugees.43 The distribution of the refugees across Finland was particularly important. Each Karelian
village community was resettled as a whole into one area,44 thus preserving community structures
and inter-‐‐personal relations.
Although absorbing the Karelians primarily into the agricultural sector was economically
questionable (added capacity was not needed, larger and more efficient farms were sliced into
smaller ones),45 it was important from the perspective of social stability. Most of the Karelians were
farmers,46 and agriculture was the only sector that could absorb them relatively swiftly. Employment
and economic livelihood are crucial in integration, and both Gadolin and Vennamo agree that the
Finnish political leadership was prompted to act, as they were genuinely afraid of the possibility of a
communist uprising, a “revolutionary station” as Gadolin puts it,47 if the refugees’ problems were not
42
Kacowicz and Lutomski, Resettlement in International Conflicts, 61.
de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 18.
44
Hietanen, ”Oma Tupa, Oma Lupa.”
45
de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 31.
46
Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.”
47
de Gadolin, Solution of the Refugee Problem, 37.
43
10
effectively addressed.48 The Land Acquisition Act provided the refugees with a home and a livelihood
and ensured social stability, arguably making it the most important factor in the resettlement.
Another important aspect was the inclusive governance. Vennamo understood that people
from all sides of the matter needed to be heard. The 1945 Act ASO prepared was drafted together
with representatives from both the landowners associations, as well as refugees’ Karelian League.49
Ahonen argues for the importance of this inclusive governance, highlighting that it helped Finland and
West Germany avoid significant social instability faced by East Germany.50
Finally, Finland made substantial efforts to facilitate the building of homes for Karelians. The
Architect’s Association made available standardized designs, KYMRO used construction bans and
regulations to ensure that all available resources were used for refugees’ housing construction, and
KYMRO developed and distributed the RT-‐‐cards, “a building encyclopedia”, to guide the refugees
in the building process.51 This was critical as the majority of the houses were built by the refugees
themselves,52 and hence most did not have professional skills in construction. KYMRO also worked
together with factories to have some of the components of the standardized houses pre-‐‐made.
Together with the Arava scheme providing financial support,53 these policies made it possible for the
refugees to build their new homes.
(644 words)
48
Vennamo, Jälleenrakennuksen Ihme, 53.
Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.”
50
Ahonen, “Taming the Expellee Threat”, 15ff.
51
Kummala, Jälleenrakennuksen Pientalosuunnittelu, 8ff.
52
Ibid.
53
Tolvanen, “Resettlement of Karelian Refugees.”
49
11
Section E – Conclusion
The key factors behind the successful resettlement of the Karelian refugees were four-‐‐fold.
First, although economically hit, Finland was in relatively favorable circumstances: the Karelians were
Finns themselves, and a shared language and cultural background decreased frictions with the
“hosts”. Critically, Finland also already had the necessary frameworks to effectively address the
refugee issue, mainly because of the resettlement effort following the earlier Winter War. Second,
the Land Acquisition Act of 1945 was instrumental as it provided the refugees with land and a
possibility to continue their professions thus ensuring their economic livelihoods, and it maintained
the social fabric and communities of the refugees. Third, Finland’s inclusive decision-‐‐making made
sure the problem was properly understood from all perspectives, and thus legitimized and gave
increased support for the resettlement policies. Fourth, Finland took important steps to ensure that
the refugees had the materials, know-‐‐how, and financial resources to build their new homes.
(151 words)
12
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