Chapter 8
Comparative Politics: Structures and Choices 2e
By Lowell Barrington
Political Participation and Approaches
to Linking Elites and Masses
Learning Objectives
 Discuss the difference between elites and masses
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and describe different ways that the idea of an elite
is conceptualized in comparative politics.
Describe different forms of political participation and
give examples from the TIC cases.
Discuss the differences between programmatic and
clientelist linkage and between an interest group and
a social movement.
Characterize alternative arrangements for
incorporating interest groups into the policy-making
process.
Analyze various approaches to linking elites and
masses in the TIC cases.
The Elites and the Masses
 The Political Elite
 Those who are much more involved in politics
than ordinary citizens
 The political elite has significant influence over
political outcomes
 Power elite
 C. Wright Mills: A single elite with shared goals
 Is the Elite Open or Closed?
 Open: E.g., a merit system for bureaucracy
 Closed: E.g., nepotism (favoring relatives)
Think and Discuss
Is it good or bad for a democratic
political system to have a strong
political elite?
The Masses and Their
Political Participation
 Conventional vs. Unconventional
Participation
 Conventional: Participation through channels
elites support being used (e.g., voting)
 Unconventional: Activities not approved by the
elite (e.g., strikes and violent protests)
 Nonparticipation
 Common in nondemocracies and democracies
 Nonparticipants often young, poor, &
minorities
Connecting Elites to Masses
 Programmatic or Clientelistic Linkage?
 Programmatic representation: Linking elites and
masses through things like political parties that
stress policy positions
 Clientelism: Linking elites and masses through
individual, patron-client relationships
Connecting Elites to Masses
 Elite-Mass Linkage, Information, and
Representation
 Both programmatic and clientelist systems allow
masses to provide information to elites
 This information includes demands for government
programs or services
 In programmatic systems, such information comes
mostly from the attentive public, those not in the
elite but who pay more attention to – and participate
more in – politics than other citizens
Social Movements
 Social Movements
 Informal networks
 Connect those with a common viewpoint, who
take actions to promote or resist political,
economic, or social changes
 New Social Movements
 In the past, social movements centered on
workers’ issues
 After WWII, social movements developed
around quality of life issues (women’s issues,
environmentalism, peace movement)
Interest Groups
 Types of Interest Groups
 Economic groups
 Advocacy groups
 Local issue groups
 NIMBY groups
 The Organization of Interest Groups:
Pluralism, Corporatism, and State Control
 Pluralism
 Corporatism
 State corporatism
Societal
corporatism
Neo-corporatism
State control system
Interest Groups
 Advantages and Disadvantages of Pluralism
 Advantages
 A marketplace of ideas
 Even minor groups can be heard
 Disadvantages
 Inefficiency through competition between similar groups
 Money talks
Social Movements, Interest
Groups, and Civil Society
 Civil Society
 Term usually used to refer to the set of groups that
are autonomous from the state and that people
voluntarily
 Large civil societies most common in democracies
 Sometimes hard for comparativists to agree on
what groups are part of civil society
 How autonomous does the group have to be?
Think and Discuss
In what ways can civil society
organizations be a force for instability
and intolerance?
Topic in Countries
 The United Kingdom
 Shaped by principles of noblesse oblige and
working class deference (ch. 4); less unconventional
political participation than most countries to region
 In the past, clientelism was common; today,
programmatic approaches dominate
 More corporatist in the past; weakened under
Thatcher; strong civil society
Topic in Countries
 Germany
 High voter turnout; unconventional political
participation at times and visible fringe groups
 Programmatic parties began developing by the late
19th century; today, main political parties are “catch
all” parties
 Societal corporatism; interest groups negotiate
policies with the state and play a central role in
implementing them
Topic in Countries
 India
 Relatively low voter turnout; other forms of political
participation–including unconventional–are
common, with variation from region to region
 Clientelism less central than in many developing
countries; regional programmatic appeals growing in
number and effectiveness
 Many interest groups; often affiliated with political
parties
Topic in Countries
 Mexico
 Voting rates vary from election to election;
unconventional political participation becoming
more visible
 Retreating from the clientelism that existing during
period of dominance under the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI)
 “Party corporatism” under the PRI being
transformed into a more pluralist system; social
movements also increasing
In Theory and Practice
Disturbance Theory and Mexico
 Disturbance Theory
 Associated with David Truman
 Interest groups and social movements form in
response to social or economic disturbances
 Mexico, NAFTA, and Chiapas
 Theory helps explain emergence of the Chiapas
rebellion and the EZLN group in response to
NAFTA
 EZLN also an example of importance of leadership
 The group’s leader, Subcomandante Marcos, play
a key role in articulating the “disturbance” and
organizing the unconventional actions in Chiapas
Topic in Countries
 Brazil
 Unconventional political participation is
prevalent, often from organized labor
 Parties often lack clear ideological differences; most
linkages highly personalistic
 Labor represented through state corporatist
system; vibrant civil society but not well linked to
elites
Topic in Countries
 Nigeria
 Varying levels of voter turnout; violent
unconventional participation remains a problem
(i.e., Niger Delta violence)
 Clientelism provided structural support for military
leaders in the past; continuing clientelism feeds
corruption in the present
 Legacy of military rule when interest groups and
social movements were repressed
Topic in Countries
 Russia
 High rates of political nonparticipation;
occasional violent instances of unconventional
participation
 USSR’s collapse discredited ideology; politics
highly personalized; clientelism fits focus on
personal connections (Russian: blat )
 Previously state-controlled interest group system;
looks more state corporatist today
Topic in Countries
 China
 Unconventional political participation is frequent,
but (since Tiananmen Square) they are typically
confined to small, localized uprisings;
conventional participation less important because
of CCP dominance
 Focus on ideology in decline since Mao’s death;
importance of personal networks (Chinese: guanxi )
 CCP had repressed many civil society groups and
controlled formation of interest groups; less state
control today than in past
In Theory and Practice
The Military-Industrial Complex in
China
 Subgovernment Theory
 Highlights how groups concerned with a particular
issue work with government institutions that also
deal with that issue
 This can result in “iron triangles,” including the
military industrial complex (MIC)
 China and MIC
 In the past, China’s military controlled all three
corners of the MIC’s iron triangle
 Today, system is more like other countries’ MICs
Think and Discuss
To what extent does the logic behind the
concept of a military-industrial complex
make sense? What might prevent the
three groups from working together to
increase defense spending?
Topic in Countries
 Iran
 Moderate voter turnout levels; many citizens
withdrawn from politics due to the power of
unelected institutions
 Programmatic and clientelist appeals are both
important; more clientelism since Khomeini’s death in
1989
 Some groups tolerated by the state if non-threatening
and providing benefits; other groups and social
movements (women’s movement) more likely to be
repressed
In Theory and Practice
The Collective Action Problem and
Iran
 The Collective Action Problem
 Mancur Olson’s idea about collective behavior
 Says that individuals have incentives not to
participate if they will receive benefits resulting from
the participation anyway
 Iran and Collective Actions
 Olson’s theory predicts difficulties in organizing
interest groups and social movements
 In Iran, the difficulties are even greater
 Rather than only the normal costs of participating,
collective actions can lead to arrests or worse