Match-ups
Lola Mantero v Aneesh Susarla – Economy
Ryan Wellman v Nina Cubero – Biodiversity
Alex Baez v Alice Xue – Brazil Prolif
Michael Vera v Sasha Uchitel – China War
Arpan Sarkar v Duncan McCallum – Middle East war
Omar Abu-Omaileh v Sophia Zheng – Russia War
Sam Lemons v Manu Meel – Resource Wars
AJ Byrne v Frannie Tomasino – Terrorism
Varun Gupta v Rahul Soni – Saudia Arabia Prolif
Juliette Hernandez v Ryan Lee – Warming
Madison Wong v Charlotte Stott – Warming
Lucas Weiner v Rahul Shuklah – Russia War
Jonathan Dare v Gaby Delgado – China War
Sophia Nielsen v Ashvin Antony – Economy
Aidan O’Brien v Nikita Ramoji – Biodiversity
Biodiversity
Biodiversity in specific hotspots checks extinction. Key to ag, medicine, and
ecosystems
Mittermeier ‘11
(et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in
Biological Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He has conducted
fieldwork for over 30 years on three continents and in more than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations. He is the President of
Conservation International and he is considered an expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally discovered several
monkey species. From Chapter One of the book Biodiversity Hotspots – F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI 10.1007/978-3-64220992-5_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. This evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a very famous British
environmentalist specialising in biodiversity. available at:
http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global_biodiversity_conservation_the_critical_role_of_hotspots)
Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is¶ irreversible.
Human activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a¶ thousand or more
times the natural background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the¶ consequences of this loss? Most obvious
among them may be the lost opportunity¶ for future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earth’s species¶
(perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer¶ (Novotny et al. 2002). As
species vanish,
so too does the health security of every¶ human. Earth’s species are a vast genetic storehouse that
may harbor a cure for¶ cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen – cures waiting to be discovered.¶
Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all¶ commercial medicines – even more in developing
nations (Chivian and Bernstein¶ 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration ¶ for a growing
array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and¶ other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been
compared¶ to burning down the world’s libraries without knowing the content of 90% or¶ more of the books. With
loss of
species, we lose the ultimate source of our crops¶ and the genes we use to improve
agricultural resilience, the inspiration for¶ manufactured products, and the basis of the structure and function of the
ecosystems¶ that support humans and all life on Earth (McNeely et al. 2009). Above and
beyond¶ material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency,¶ and freedom of choices and actions
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).¶ Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs¶
inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake,¶ and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric
of all the world’s cultures¶ (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader
ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and
mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et
al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East
Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity
loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earth’s natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past
decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce
resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have
been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earth’s climate changes,
the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009).¶ In many respects,
conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these
ecosystems the most – and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that
all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve
Extinction is a global phenomenon,
with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the threats to it,
their living resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities?
and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget –
perhaps 90% – originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally
flexible funds available – in the hundreds of millions annually – be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately
toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss.¶ The establishment of priorities for biodiversity conservation is complex, but can
be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where
should action toward reducing the loss of biodiversity
be implemented first ? The field of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves
around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures
the risk to the species present in a region – if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will
not get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity.
The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species.
In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they
contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in
certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of
these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact.¶ Myers’ seminal paper (Myers1988) was
the first application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers
described ten tropical forest “hotspots” on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high
levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of “hotspot” status. A subsequent analysis added
eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an
institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a first systematic update of the hotspots. It
introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics
(¶ >¶ 0.5% of the world’s total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining.
These efforts culminated in an
extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientific publication (Myers et
al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the basis of both the better-defined criteria and new data.
A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data
on the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redefined
several hotspots, such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which
sufficient data either did not exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered
another region – the East Melanesian Islands – which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a
biodiverse region that failed to meet the “less than 30% of original vegetation remaining” criterion to a genuine hotspot.
Marine ecosystems are resilient
Kennedy ‘2
Victor Kennedy, PhD Environmental Science and Dir. Cooperative Oxford Lab., 2002, “Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global
Climate Change,” Pew, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm
There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems
are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991)
hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical
factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus
rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic variability
throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.
Brazil Prolif
Brazil prolif causes Latin American instability and regional prolif
Poblete ‘8
Jason Poblete, Vice-Chair to the National Security Committee of the American Bar Association, 9-16-2008, "Brazil Wants to Build
50 Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Submarines, More?" http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/09/16/brazil-wants-to-build-50-nuclearpower-plants-nuclear-submarines-more/
Despite repeated assurances to the contrary, Brazil’s
spotty record on transparency in this area should
be cause for concern. Unlike Iran or North Korea, a Latin American nation with a nuclear weapon
would have an immediate destabilizing effect in the Hemisphere . It will
surely set off an mini-arms race with Argentina or, more likely, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez.
Either Brazil is committed to a nuclear-weapons zone or it is not. Recent statements by high-ranking Brazilian military and civilian
officials are not helpful.¶ The regional
mechanisms in place to deal with non-proliferation in the
Americas are inadequate. For example, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico, is wholly unprepared to
deal with these matters. For one thing, the U.S. is not a member, but an observer. The regional mechanism are in need of
reform and are politically anemic. Neither OPANAL, or the Organization of American States, has ever voiced concerns when
Brazilian military officials state that they should be “technologically prepared” to build an atomic weapon. If OPANAL is not willing
to say anything, who will?
Brazil won’t proliferate - Regional integration and lack of motivation
Lavoy & Walker ‘6
Dr. Peter Lavoy, Director and Senior Lecturer in National Security Affairs at the Center for Contemporary Conflict, and Robin
Walker, Research Associate in National Security Affairs at the CCC, 7-29-2006,
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/NuclearWeaponsProliferation2016Jul06_rpt.asp
Both Argentina and Brazil have taken nuclear weapons production options off the table ,
and while both maintain civilian nuclear programs, they are about technology and modernity, not military power. Historically, Brazil
sees itself as a potential power, and it uses this quest for greatness as a rationale for many of its actions. Despite that, Latin
America is an isolated security environment and historically militaries in the region
have been more of a threat to their own countries than to foreign powers. The regional
integration of South America, both economically and in security cooperation, further decreased
the likelihood of international conflict. However, Argentina and Brazil maintain their nuclear expertise and
capabilities. The governing left-center coalitions have nationalistic tendencies and view nuclear power as a way to demonstrate
power, modernity and technology. Through its nuclear program, Brazil has achieved energy autonomy. The possibility also remains
for either Argentina or Brazil to export technology in order to earn reciprocity in other matters.
Economy
Global economic decline causes nuclear war
Auslin ‘9
(Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise
Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)
What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed
hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make
responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least
disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of
trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest
growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China
faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate
threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or
diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy
sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow . Vladimir Putin's rule has been
predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale
repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even
apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have
plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of
thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is
expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of
violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets.
Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from
poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants
since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor
strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would
dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation
in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence
that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce
into a big bang .
( ) Decline doesn’t cause war
Barnett ‘ 9
(Thomas P.M Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9
– “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/thenew-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts
of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great
Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery - surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year
and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact
whatsoever on the international security landscape.¶ None of the more than three-dozen ongoing
conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the
last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic
crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts
listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict
last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing
Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that
sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.¶ Looking
over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts,
insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up,
the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side
acquiring a nuclear
weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.¶ And
with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-intoPakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and
following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military
exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious
instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to
do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.
China War
US-Sino war goes nuclear. Crisis management won’t check
Lowther ‘13
Note: when this card has a line that reads “it says”, it is referencing a 42-page report by the Washington
DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS and
the PONI (Project on Nuclear Issues) – several of them have worked for that organization and will have
unique insights. The study at hand was prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues. The Tapiei Time
article was written by William Lowther, who is the Washington DC staff writer for that organization and
he is citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3-16-2013, “Taiwan could spark
nuclear war: report,” Taipei Times,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management
mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the
Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw
on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether
either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear
response by the other party. To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared
policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could
be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says. Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it
cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” The report says: “ With both sides possessing
and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously
dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”
“
( ) US-China war won’t escalate
Dobbins ‘12
James Dobbins, directs the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, previously served as
American Ambassador to the European Community and Assistant Secretary of State, August/September 2012, “War with China,”
Survival, Vol. 54, No. 4, p. 7-24
China is seeking neither territorial aggrandisement nor
ideological sway over its neighbours. It shows no interest in matching US military
expenditures, achieving a comparable global reach, or assuming defence commitments
beyond its immediate periphery. Such intentions might change, but if so, the United States
would probably receive considerable warning, given the lead times needed to develop such
capabilities. Despite cautious and pragmatic Chinese policies, the risk of conflict with the United States remains, and this risk will grow in consequence and perhaps
in probability as China’s strength increases. Among the sources of conflict most likely to occasion a China–US
military clash over the next 30 years, listed in descending order of probability, are changes in the status of North Korea and Taiwan,
Sino-American confrontation in cyberspace, and disputes arising from China’s uneasy relationships with Japan and India. All these sources are on
China’s immediate periphery, where Chinese security interests and capabilities seem likely to remain focused. It is important to stress that
It is important to begin any such analysis by recognising that
a China–US military conflict is not probable in any of these cases , but that judgement is
based on the view that the United States will retain the capacity to deter behaviour that could lead to such a clash throughout this period.
Middle East War
Most probable impact.
Russell ‘9
James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability
Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26,
http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining
framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that
introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible
assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework
strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for
military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to preemptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the
lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework
participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties
could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is
disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the
regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would
be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from
being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in
fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a
variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own
and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility
seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented
disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
Mid-East war especially unlikely
Fettweis ‘7
(Christopher Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, “On the
Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)
Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country
where the religious divide exists. A
Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in
proxy wars across the region. In
addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan
Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight
might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might
follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a
destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its
neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a
nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is
particularly likely.¶ Wider war¶ No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into
chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very
stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East
regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state,
have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has
ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more
likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather
unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of
stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially
destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again.¶ The region actually
experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided
an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel
fought four wars with neighbouring states in
the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed
Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique.¶ The
biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will
likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury
propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As
much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to
intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counterinsurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources,
could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17¶ Common interest,
not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in
the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every
actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in
Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is
far more likely than outright warfare.
Resource Wars
This specific type of resource war escalates – causing huge death tolls.
Lendman ‘7
(Stephen Lendman is a renowned author and Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization (CRG). The Centre for
Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal. The CRG is involved in
book publishing, support to humanitarian projects as well as educational outreach activities including the organization of public
conferences and lectures. The Centre also acts as a think tank on crucial economic and geopolitical issues. Stephen has written
extensively on war and peace, social justice in America and many other national and international issues. Stephen Lendman is a
recipient of a 2008 Project Censored Award, University of California at Sonoma – “Resource Wars – Can We Survive Them?” –
Global Research, June 06, 2007 – http://www.globalresearch.ca/resource-wars-can-we-survive-them/5892)
With the world’s energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and “peak
oil” near or approaching, “security” for America means assuring a sustainable supply of
what we can’t do without.
It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it
travels. That means energy’s partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, wars, ecological recklessness, and now an extremist
US administration willing to risk Armageddon for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost,
starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New “Great Game” and Perils From It The new “Great Game’s”
the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British
This time, it’s the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states
like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today’s weapons and technology on both sides
making earlier ones look like toys. At stake is more than oil. It’s planet earth with survival of all life on
it issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet’s ability to
sustain life front and center, if anyone’s paying attention. They’d better be because beyond the point of no return, there’s no
second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : “I know not with
begun, but this time
empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn’t oil.
what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.” Under a worst case scenario, it’s more dire than
There may be nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria in the wake of a nuclear
holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. The threat is real and once nearly happened
during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th
anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba . For the first time,
we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only
because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire
nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near
Kennedy’s “quarantine” line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet
that.
earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.
( ) No resource wars – too expensive and market checks
Victor ‘8
David G,- Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, Program on Energy and
Sustainable Development @ Stanford “Smoke and Mirror” http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=16530
MY ARGUMENT is that classic resource wars—hot conflicts driven by a struggle to grab resources—are increasingly
rare. Even where resources play a role, they are rarely the root cause of bloodshed. Rather, the
root cause usually lies in various failures of governance. That argument—in both its classic form and in its more nuanced
incarnation—is hardly a straw man, as Thomas Homer-Dixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to
resources as a cause of war. And so do social scientists and policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. I’ve triggered this
debate because conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis on resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big
implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often even larger implications for public policy. Michael
Klare is right to underscore Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource conflict in recent memory. That episode
highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars are becoming rare—they’re expensive and rarely work. (And
even in Kuwait’s case, many other forces also spurred the invasion. Notably, Iraq felt insecure with its only access to the sea a narrow
strip of land sandwiched between Kuwait on one side and its archenemy Iran on the other.) In the end, Saddam lost
resources on the order
of $100 billion (plus his country and then his head) in his quest for Kuwait’s
1.5 million barrels per day of combined oil and gas output. By contrast, Exxon paid $80 billion to get Mobil’s 1.7 million
barrels per day of oil and gas production—a merger that has held and flourished.
As the bulging sovereign wealth
funds are discovering, it is easier to get resources through the stock exchange than the gun
barrel.
Russia War
Small US-Russia conflicts can escalate or cause nuclear miscalc.
Gottemoeller ‘8
(Rose Gottemoeller was sworn in as the United States Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and
Compliance on April 6, 2009. She was the chief negotiator of the follow on for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty otherwise
known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation. Since 2000, she had been with the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – “U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia,”
Carnegie Moscow Center, August- July 2008. PLESE NOTE – THIS CARD APPEARS IN A HOST OF CURRENT OPEN-SOURCE
DEBATE DOCS AND THE URL THAT APPEARS ON THOSE CARDS MISDIRECTS TO A DIFFERENT Gottemoeller ARTICLE. The
website below redirects to her October article: http://www.scribd.com/doc/13031239/RussianAmerican-Security-Relations-AfterGeorgia)
No holds barred, no rules—the
United States and Russia may be heading to a confrontation more
unpredictable and dangerous than any we have seen since the Cuban missile
crisis . A confrontation today would be different—the two countries are in constant and intense communication, unlike the
situation in 1962—but if those exchanges provoke mutual anger and recrimination, they have the potential
to spark a dangerous crisis . This effect is especially dangerous because both countries are in presidential
transitions. Russia, whose government is riven by corruption, internal competition, and disorder, is attempting an unprecedented
tandem leadership arrangement. The United States is in the midst of its quadrennial election season, with both political parties
competing to show that their man is more skilled and tough on national security issues than his opponent. The unpredictability of
these two transitions
stokes the potential for misunderstanding and descent into crisis. We
must avoid such a crisis, because we have never succeeded in escaping the nuclear
existential threat that we each pose to the other. We never even came close to transforming the U.S.–
Russian relationship into one that is closer to that which the United States has with the United Kingdom or France. What if
Russia had refused to confirm or deny that no nuclear weapons were on the bombers it flew
to Venezuela? Our nuclear weapons are still faced off to launch on warning of an attack,
and in a no-holds-barred confrontation between us, we could come close to nuclear catastrophe before
we knew it.
Russia impact is wrong – not a threat and miscalc risk’s exaggerated.
Graham ‘7
(Thomas, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control ambassador, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and
weakness", http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)
An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia
has at different times been
demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and
frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To
be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western
interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically,
this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia
United States in particular,
is arguably less threatening to the West, and the
than it has been at any time since the end of the Second
World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its
military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations
with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is
under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen yea rs and the
threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries,
however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with
Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.
Saudi Arabia Proliferation
Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.
Edelman ‘11
(Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evanbraden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could
accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face
tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to
preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing
a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons
development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During
the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi
Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered
the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver
conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions
involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of
several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia,
or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear
weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such
support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical
reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it
needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent
guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United
States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons.
And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim
forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops.
Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as
strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most
worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its
own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in
either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out
nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of
other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their
ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that
acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of
acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear
weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is
unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet
rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among
three or more nuclear-armed
powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are
generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting
the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in
the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear
exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike
capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a
devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable
capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely
vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic
missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or
even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level
commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated
into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And
without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly . That
is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation
was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a
significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear
war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely
screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before
the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to
implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the
weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items . Some states might seek
to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence
compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a
source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that
other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with
advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring
technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head
miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance
if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for
example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share
with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming
first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military
states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with
unpredictable consequences.
Saudi Arabia will never prolif.
Lippman ‘8
[Thomas W. Lippman is a former Middle East correspondent and a diplomatic and national security reporter for The Washington
Post (1966-1999, 2003). He covered the war in Iraq for The Washington Post’s online edition in 2003. He appears frequently on
radio and television as a commentator on Middle Eastern affairs. He is the author of several books about the Middle East and
American foreign policy, including Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia (2004), Madeleine Albright
and the New American Diplomacy (2000), Egypt After Nasser (1989) and Understanding Islam (1995). He has also written on these
subjects for several magazines, including The Middle East Journal, SAIS Review and US News and World Report. His latest book on
the history of US engagement in Saudi Arabia and US-Saudi relations will be published in January 2008. Lippman is also a member
of the Council on Foreign Relations, “Nuclear Weapons and Saudi Strategy” The Middle East Institute,
http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/nuclear-weapons-saudi-strategy.pdf]
It is widely believed among policymakers and strategic analysts in Washington and in many Middle Eastern capitals that if Iran
acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will feel compelled to do the same. In some ways this belief makes sense because Saudi
Arabia is as vulnerable as it is rich, and it has long felt threatened by the revolutionary ascendancy of its Shi‘ite rival across the Gulf.
Moreover, some senior Saudi officials have said privately that their country’s hand would be forced if it became known beyond doubt
that Iran had become nuclear weapons capable. The publication in late 2007 of portions of a US National Intelligence Estimate
reporting that Iran had abandoned a program to weaponize nuclear devices in 2003 did not put an end to the speculation about a
Saudi Arabian response; the NIE made clear that Iran was continuing its effort to master the uranium enrichment process, and
could resume a weapons program on short notice. It is far from certain, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to
acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it is capable of doing so. There are compelling reasons why
Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event
that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten the Kingdom. Money is not an issue — if destitute
North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. In the fall of 2007, the
Saudis reported a budget surplus of $77 billion, and with oil prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the
acquisition or development of nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial
and extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would likely weaken the kingdom rather
than strengthen it. Such a course would be directly contrary to the Kingdom’s longstanding stated
goal of making the entire Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone . According to Sultan bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the
Defense Minister and Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, nuclear weapons by their nature contravene the tenets of
Islam. Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabia’s commitments
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United
States. Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its
own. An attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch
Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatory trajectory that could destabilize the entire region,
which Saudi Arabia’s leaders know would not be in their country’s best interests. The Saudis always
prefer stability to turmoil.
Terrorism
Nuclear terrorism escalates to major nuclear war. Global coop on material
transfers is key.
Ayson’10
Robert – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of
Wellington – “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7,
July, obtained via InformaWorld
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not
necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism
should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global
catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these
weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance
alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as
long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always
the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two
nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear
exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an
act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive
exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context,
today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of
small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties.
These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1
problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear
terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United
States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they
seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too
responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some
possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how
might the United States react if it was
thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come
from Russian stocks, FN 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The
correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by
Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its
radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the
efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist
group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally
countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a
very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would
Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular,
if the act of nuclear
terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia
and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and
political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only
seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they
were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The
reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even
limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the
United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response
to a terrorist
nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided)
confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate
aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces,
including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning
runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read
this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation,
the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would
probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed
earlier) Washington
might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming
attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity
and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action
as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of
influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in
Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in
connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American
pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced
consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.There is also the question of how other
nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected
that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support
to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one,
where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the
United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found
the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly
were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group
had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if
Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then
draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of
Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example,
that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain
below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely
different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently
strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from
such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has
been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it
may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads
and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear
terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering
the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a
possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of
influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China
had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to
sit back and let this occur? In
the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would
the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in
kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this
concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear
restraint. FN 40 . One way of reducing, but probably not eliminating, such a prospect, is
further international cooperation on the control of existing fissile material holdings .
( ) No nuclear terrorism – tech barriers.
Chapman ‘12
(Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22,
http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)
A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book
“Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001,
we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved
unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot
up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a
chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor
John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up
with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen
comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile
material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have
already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are
not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a
Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards
designed to prevent unauthorized use. As
for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally —
for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue
individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building
a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage.
It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with
specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over
those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring
in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like
every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know
what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has
heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the
formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by
securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think
that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.
Warming
The impact is billions of deaths.
Cummins ‘10
(Ronnie, International Director – Organic Consumers Association and Will Allen, Advisor – Organic Consumers Association,
“Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century”, 2-14, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6)
The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world
needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid
climate
chaos , crop failures , endless wars , melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in
ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2)
pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and
nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at
Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying
billions will die of
thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation. If the U.S. significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions, other
countries will follow. One hopeful sign is the recent EPA announcement that it intends to regulate greenhouse gases as
capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario,
pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately we are going to have to put tremendous pressure on elected public officials to force
the EPA to crack down on GHG polluters (including industrial farms and food processors). Public pressure is especially critical since
"just say no" Congressmen-both Democrats and Republicans-along with agribusiness, real estate developers, the construction
industry, and the fossil fuel lobby appear determined to maintain "business as usual."
( ) Species can adapt – especially in tropical hotspots
Wiley Sciences ‘12
(Citing research carried out at the University of Zurich led by Dr Richard Walters, David Berger now at Uppsala University and Wolf
Blanckenhorn, Professor of Evolutionary Ecology at Zurich, “Newsflash: tropical species adapt to temperature changes,”
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/08/16/newsflash-tropical-species-adapt-to-temperature-changes/#more-69341)
Ecologists studying evolutionary
responses to climate change forecast that cold-blooded tropical species are not as
vulnerable to extinction as previously thought. The study, published in the British Ecological Society’s
Functional Ecology, considers how fast species can evolve and adapt to compensate for a rise in
temperature. The research, carried out at the University of Zurich, was led by Dr Richard Walters, now at Reading University,
In the face of a changing climate many species must adapt or perish.
alongside David Berger now at Uppsala University and Wolf Blanckenhorn, Professor of Evolutionary Ecology at Zurich.
“Forecasting the fate of any species is difficult, but it is essential for conserving biodiversity and managing natural resources,” said
lead author Dr Walters. “It
is believed that climate change poses a greater risk to tropical coldblooded organisms (ectotherms), than temperate or polar species. However, as potential
adaptation to climate change has not been considered in previous extinction models we
tested this theory with a model forecasting evolutionary responses.” Ectotherms, such as lizards
and insects, have evolved a specialist physiology to flourish in a stable tropical environment. Unlike species which live
in varied habitats tropical species operate within a narrow range of temperatures,
leading to increased dangers if those temperatures change. “When its environment
changes an organism can respond by moving away, adapting its physiology over time or,
over generations, evolving,” said Walters. “The first two responses are easy to identify, but a species’ ability to
adapt quick enough to respond to climate change is an important and unresolved
question for ecologists.” The team explored the idea that there are also evolutionary advantages for species adapted to
warmer environments. The ‘hotter is better’ theory suggests that species which live in high temperatures will
have higher fitness, resulting from a shorter generation time. This may allow them to
evolve relatively quicker than species in temperate environments. The team sought to directly compare the increased
risk of extinction associated with lower genetic variance, owing to temperature specialisation, with the lowered risk of extinction
associated with a shorter generation time. “Our
model shows that the evolutionary advantage of a
shorter generation time should compensate species which are adapted to narrow
temperature ranges,” said Walters. “We forecast that the relative risk of extinction is likely to
be lower for tropical species than temperate ones.” “The tropics are home to the greatest
biodiversity on earth, so it imperative that the risk of extinction caused by climate
change is understood,” concluded Walters. “While many questions remain, our theoretical
predictions suggest tropical species may not be as vulnerable to climate warming as
previously thought.”