Joining isn’t Everything: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Party Organizations
Emilie van Haute – Cevipol, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)
evhaute@ulb.ac.be – www.cevipol.be
Paper prepared for the Workshop ‘Parties as Organizations and Parties as Systems’
19-21 May 2011, Vancouver, Canada
Very first draft – Please do not cite without the permission of the author
Paper abstract
Literature on party organizations at the grass-root level mainly focuses on the question of who joins
parties, and why. Explanatory models have been developed, inspired by the literature on political
participation. Whereas scholars questioned the motivations for joining a party, few researches have
been performed on the reasons for remaining a member, or for leaving a party. Combining the idea
that parties are miniature political systems, and Hirschman’s trilogy on organization, the paper
suggest applying the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty to the study of party organizations. This
question is of particular interest in a context of declining membership and questioning of the parties’
capacity to perform their essential functions in democracies.
1
Introduction
European political parties have been recruiting members for over a century. However, ‘parties
without partisans’ are conceivable today (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2001). Clearly, parties are changing,
whether they are mutating, adapting or declining. This makes the study of party membership and its
mechanisms, processes and evolutions crucial. Besides, party membership is at the crossroads of two
prolific fields in political science (party organizations and political participation). One would therefore
expect to find an abundant literature on the topic. However, until recently, scholars have not
devoted much attention to the phenomenon (van Haute, 2009).
The first developments concerned the general decline in party memberships, framed in the thesis of
party decline. In return, this has made the question of who joins political organizations a question
commanding considerable attention. The work of Seyd and Whiteley is a turning point in this respect
(Seyd & Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley & Seyd, 1994). Since then, several scholars or teams have
performed the same type of micro-level analysis in their national contexts1. Most of this literature is
rather descriptive, with an emphasis on the socio-demographic and political profile of the
respondents. When turning analytical, the literature is rooted mainly in the literature on models of
political participation: the resource model (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978), the socio-psychological model
(Finkel, Muller & Opp, 1989), and the rational choice model (Whiteley & Seyd, 1996).
Today, we have a better picture of who joins parties, why they do it, what opinions they hold.
However, Heidar (2007) pointed out that our knowledge is still kaleidoscopic as the existing studies
are generally one-party or one-country studies. Very little comparative work has been done so far.
We share this plea for more comparative work. However, this comparative work would still be
anchored in the theories of political participation. We argue that this leads to three weaknesses for a
better understanding of party membership and party organizations.
Firstly, because it is rooted in the theories of political participation, the existing literature on party
membership does not contribute significantly to the understanding of parties as organizations. The
focus is on the individual act of joining, and not on the relationship between the member and his/her
party. Conversely, research on parties tends to focus on specific aspects of parties, generally along
the lines of a functionalist divide (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000): parties in government, in the
electorate or as organizations (Reiter 2006). If the latter has known a theoretical revival in the mid1990s with the cartel party thesis (Katz & Mair 1995), we still have little empirical evidence on what
is happening in the black box of party organizations.
1
See “Special Issue: Party Members and Activists”, Party Politics, 20/4, 2004.
2
Secondly, the contribution to the knowledge of political participation is in itself rather limited due to
the survey method used to collect data. At most can we say that we know more about ex post
reconstruction of the motives to join than about the process of joining itself. Indeed, the surveys are
aimed at members who joined on average a long time ago. For example, in Belgium, the surveys
show that members joined their party on average 24.8 years ago for the Flemish Christian Democrats
(CD&V), 19.7 years ago for the Flemish Liberals (OpenVLD), and even 29.5 years ago for the Frenchspeaking socialists (PS). Studies have shown that the longer the retention period, the higher the
expected bias due to respondent recall error (Biemer et al., 2004: 134). In our example, the
probability of recall errors among the respondents is very high.
Finally, the existing literature based on explanatory models for joining could be compared to fairy
tales. We meet the characters, get to know them, learn how they met, fell in love and got engaged.
But these studies end too often on a ‘happily ever after’ note. Like with fairy tale, some fundamental
questions are left open: what happens after the engagement? Do they remain faithful to each other?
Do they face crises? How do they cope with these tensions? Does the story end up in a divorce? The
explanatory models for joining do not shed light on what’s happening inside the parties once
members have joined.
The reference to romance and fairy tales is seemingly trivial. However, it emphasizes indirectly the
fact that party membership can (and, from our point of view, should) be studied with other
theoretical frameworks than the theories of political participation. We argue that to capture this idea
of relationship between the members and the party and to remedy to the other weaknesses of the
existing literature, two complementary frameworks can be mobilized: theories rooted in social
psychology, which investigate individual behaviours in relationships, groups and organizations, and
studies of organizations rooted in labour economics and management.
Therefore, this paper aims at proposing new theoretical tools for the study of party membership,
which allow tackling these questions of loyalty, dissatisfaction, doubts, or criticism. The main goal is
to better understand the mechanisms through which party members renew their membership,
decide to stay or to leave the party organization. These processes and concepts sound surprisingly
close to Hirschman’s model of exit, voice, and loyalty (1970). This paper discusses how Hirschman’s
model can be mobilized to analyze party members and their relation to their political party. In order
to do so, this paper first explores Hirschman’s contribution and its consecutive applications in various
fields in social sciences, including political science. We then offer arguments on why and how to
apply Hirschman’s framework to the study of party membership and party organizations.
3
Hirschman’s trilogy and consecutive applications
The main thesis developed in Exit, voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations,
and States (1970) suggests that exit and voice are the two reactions from consumers to a reduction
in quality of the product provided by an organization. The choice between exit and voice is partly a
rationalistic decision where individuals evaluate the costs and benefits of their actions according to
their own interests. But it is also influenced by a third concept, ‘loyalty’. Loyalty would prevent
consumers from leaving the organization and favor protest.
Hirschman’s contribution was qualified by Barry (1974) as the only book to fit to rank with Downs’
Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) and Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965). According to
him, it stretched the economic approach outside its conventional topics, reached an ‘oecumenical
spirit’, and opened new horizons for research. Each concept of the trilogy appealed to a specific
domain. Economic analyzes concentrated on exit (customers stopping to buy a product, or employee
turnover in firms). The study of voice opened the political dimension to the analysis (Kolarska &
Aldrich, 1980: 42). Loyalty brought in the socio-psychological dimension of the model. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the model has been used in various fields of research.
The social-psychological literature used Hirschman’s work to study interpersonal and intergroup
relations (Dowding et al., 2000). Research looked at dissatisfaction in social relations at work, in
groups, or in couple relationships. The main contribution of these studies is the addition of a fourth
category to the EVL model: Neglect, as well as the idea that responses to dissatisfaction can be
constructive or destructive, or passive/active. In terms of methods, these studies have conducted
empirical tests of the model and combined various methods (surveys, role-play methodologies, etc.).
Their main weakness is the lack of theoretical discussion. Loyalty is seen as a form of behaviour, and
the categories of exit and voice are conceived as mutually exclusive, which has been questioned in
other works. Finally, these studies rely mainly on cross-sectional analyses that do not solve the
problem of temporality, and they investigate reported behaviour rather than actual behaviours.
In labour economics and management literature, the application of Hirschman’s model is very basic.
The focus is on the trade-off between exit and voice, and little room is dedicated to theoretical
debates. Overall, the accent is put on exit (turnover in firms) and voice is mainly seen as collectively
expressed through unions. The main interest of these studies lies in their “considerable statistical
sophistication” (Dowding et al., 2000: 486). In the same vein, marketing and psychologists have
focused on the relation between consumers and producers. Again, the main focus is exit and the
impact of the market competition on the choice to exit or not. Urban studies have also focused on
exit (defined as the decision to move - Dowding et al., 2000). Their contribution is to have introduced
4
longitudinal approaches (data collected on both the intention and the realization). They are also the
first to emphasize the richness of voice (differentiate between private and collective voice).
Hirschman’s trilogy has been startlingly ignored by political scientists. It is even more surprising
knowing that Hirschman himself applied his model to political phenomena in two of his chapters
(however qualified by Barry as his weakest). One is an attempt to explain the failure of the dissident
members of the Johnson administration to resign and denounce the Vietnam War due to ‘excessive
loyalty’. The other is an application of his ideas to party competition in the USA, where he paved the
way for May’s law of curvilinear disparity (1973). In a downsian model, activists discontented by their
party’s moderate policies, having nowhere to go, would have two options. They can mobilize to push
their party away from the centre, or become apathetic. Leaders have to find the optimal mix
between electoral efficiency (centripetal tendencies) and keeping support from their activists
(centrifugal tendencies).
Political scientists haven’t completely forgotten Hirschman. Some work in comparative politics used
his framework. According to Dowding et al. (2000), the use is rather fluid and loose, and concepts are
used merely to give a name to processes. There is no rigorous test of models as it is the case in other
fields. Some comparative studies focus on the role of state repression in the choice between voice
and exit (Lee 1972; O’Donnell, 1986; Scott, 1986; Hirschman, 1993; Colomer, 2000; Pfaff & Kim,
2003; Gehlbach, 2006). Others are interested in the role of socio-economic (Ross, 1988), or
institutional variables such as the type of regime (Clark, Golder & Golder, 2006) to explain the choice
between modes of participation. Finally, others analyze the role of foreign aid, inequality, economic
development, natural resources and authoritarianism on democratic transition (O’Donnell, 1986).
There are extremely few applications of the model to party organizations, and they all focus on party
elites and not on the party members. It is the case for Eubank et al. (1996), who look at the decline of
the Italian Communism and the role of loyalty in the reform proposals. In the same vein, Salucci
explores the breakup of the Democratic Left party (DS) in Italy in 2007 through direct interviews of
the party leaders. Others have used the trilogy to study behaviours of parliamentarians (Kato, 1998)
or party leaders in one-party hegemonic regimes (Langston, 2002). Only Weber (2009) uses the
model to explain voting behaviour in cycles (‘second-order’ elections effects at the EP).
The above review underlines that the model has proved fruitful in various domains but has never
been thoroughly applied in political science. Startlingly, its more obvious application to party
organizations has been neglected. However, we think it is a fertile ground to study (dis)satisfaction
among party members, and their reactions to dissatisfaction, or the nature of intra-party
participation.
5
Decline in quality: Dissatisfaction among party members
Parties are not homogeneous entities and it seems inevitable that some events or leadership
decisions will create dissatisfaction among membership. However, the literature on party
membership often takes for granted that members are happy, and love and support their party (van
Haute, 2009). Dissatisfaction is rarely investigated, if not completely ignored. In that sense,
Hirschman’s premise is an interesting starting point. Exit, voice and loyalty are conceived as various
reactions to a decline in quality of performance of an organization.
The notion of decline in quality is rather vague. Few applications of Hirschman’s model discuss the
concept; they tend to focus on the reactions to decline (EVLN) and to take the decline for granted
without defining or measuring it. Most of them assume tangible and objective decline in quality.
However, consumers will not react to decline in quality per se. Their reactions will rather be triggered
by their own perception of decline in quality. Hirschman himself (1970: 48) suggests that there are
differential evaluations of the decline in quality among consumers, depending on their criteria of
evaluation (he distinguishes the gourmets and the gourmands). The perception of decline would be
expressed by (dis)satisfaction with specific criteria of evaluation. It is what studies in labour
economics do when they equate measure of quality to measure of job satisfaction. They
operationalize the concept in multiple dimensions and indicators, such as the satisfaction towards
leadership, nature of specific tasks, relation with co-workers, role of supervisors, personenvironment fit, promotion opportunities, compensations and benefits, etc. (Bateman & Organ,
1983; Mayes & Ganster, 1988).
As regard party organizations, we are not interested in decline in quality of the performances of the
party per se. We are interested in the perception of this decline in quality by party members,
because this is what might trigger their reaction. Evidence shows that such perception of decline or
dissatisfaction is present among party members. For example, among the French-speaking socialists
(PS), 46% of the respondents think that the party has abandoned its principles, 20.5% think that party
members do not have a say in the decision-making process, 8.7% think that the party does a bad job
in power, and 5.5% are not satisfied with the leadership of the party. In the same vein, van Haute and
Carty (2011) have shown that political parties host a lot of ‘misfit’ members, i.e. members who
position themselves at odds with their party on a left-right scale. It is a clear case of personenvironment misfit, one of the dimensions of dissatisfaction.
6
Table 1. Party Members: Perceptions of Self & Party (%)
Congruent / perfect fit Misfits N
Canada
CA
PC
Lib
NDP
BQ
44.3
29.7
32.3
24.2
41.7
7.5
20.7
17.4
25.0
15.7
961
Belgium
VLD
CD&V
PS
Ecolo
45.8
52.2
42.8
46.7
19.3
12.5
22.9
12.5
404
Total
39.8
16.5
6195
784
815
575
362
510
783
1001
So far, surveys provide only impressionist accounts for dissatisfaction. We suggest that surveys
should include a systematic and coherent measure of membership satisfaction. One way to do this is
to rely on indexes developed in labour economics to measure job satisfaction, such as the Job
Descriptive Index (JDI), the Job in General Index or the Job Diagnostic Survey (JDS). Such an index
could tap various facets of satisfaction:
-
Satisfaction with collective goals (overall project, ideological orientation of the party)
Satisfaction with material benefits (promotions and pay)
Satisfaction with interactions with co-workers (social interactions)
Satisfaction towards the leadership
Satisfaction with the functioning of the organization (role granted to members, rights &
obligations)
Analyzing the decline in quality of party membership via dissatisfaction would bring new light on
intra-party life and dynamics. One interesting question raised in this respect is the origin of
dissatisfaction. Barry (1974) argues that a decline in the quality of performance is not enough, and
that the central point is the possibility of improvement, i.e. the belief that the organization can do
better. However, Birch (1975) argues that the possibility of improvement is always present, and that
the real question is rather why the quality becomes suddenly problematic. Applied to party
organizations, the question would be why would certain party members become at some point
dissatisfied with their membership? The literature provides hypotheses for the reasons to growing
dissatisfaction (Birch, 1975; Bajoit, 1988).
7
Dissatisfaction can plant its roots in a relative decline in quality: a new contender appears on the
market with a higher-quality product (or a better job offer), or an old rival improves its offer, which
makes the organization’s own offer look less appealing. Here, it’s the comparison with the existing
market that generates dissatisfaction. Party members would compare their current situation to their
potential situation in other parties. Dowding et al. (2000) warns that this very much depends on the
nature of the firm, and that competition would be less fierce between purposive organizations.
However, it forces researches to take into account the context in which parties and party members
play, and not study parties as isolated islands.
Dissatisfaction can be related to an absolute decline in quality, i.e. diminishing performances of the
organization. The organization would not be able to provide the same equilibrium between costs and
benefits to its employees. Growing costs and diminishing benefits would trigger dissatisfaction. Clark,
Golder & Golder (2006) provide examples for this kind of situation: a state introduces new taxes,
devaluates its currency, or pass new rules about public schools. It can affect the equilibrium between
costs and benefits for citizens, and generate dissatisfaction. The same reasoning can be applied to
political parties. The party can face problems in maintaining the equilibrium between retributions to
members and costs of membership. It can raise the fees, or not be able to provide the same upward
mobility anymore (Bajoit, 1988: 337). It can reduce the fit between the member and its environment
and increase the difference between the wants of the members and the perception of what’s
available (Mayes & Ganster, 1988), and generate dissatisfaction.
Finally, agenda setters or ‘agitators’ can initiate or facilitate the perception of decline among
individuals. They provoke an aspiration for improvement.
Responses to dissatisfaction
As we have pointed, the existing surveys on party membership rely mainly on the theories of political
participation. They provide data on reasons for joining or on the level of intra-party participation. It
gives an idea of the intensity of participation (Whiteley & Seyd, 2002): the amount of time that
members dedicate to party activities, their attendance to party meetings and congresses, etc.
However, surveys do not provide information on the nature of intra-party participation. What do
members actually do when they participate to a meeting? Do they attend silently? Are they
intervening in debates? So far, surveys are missing this essential aspect of intra-party dynamics.
Hirschman provides another new avenue for research with his model of the consequences of
dissatisfaction in organizations. When facing a decline in quality, consumers can react in various
ways. According to Hirschman, they can either decide to leave the organization (exit), or to stay and
8
try to improve the situation (voice). The choice between the two would be affected by the level of
loyalty of individuals towards the organization.
One cannot study responses to dissatisfaction without discussing first the status of loyalty in the
model. The concept is highly ambiguous in Hirschman’s own work. Sometimes loyalty is depicted as
an attitude (influencing the choice between voice and exit); at other times it is described as a form of
behaviour (a distinctive response to dissatisfaction). This has been the source of continuous debates
in the literature. Besides, it is a value-laden term, related to ideas such as constancy, fidelity,
devotion, considerable attachment, sense of belonging, or strong affection (Graham & Keeley, 1992).
We agree with Dowding et al. and suggest seeing loyalty as an independent psychological variable, an
attitude linked to identification (Campbell et al., 1960) built on past investment (personal history and
social capital, reinforced by social groups). This strong attachment or identification can be directed
towards the product (brand loyalty) or the organization – or part of it (group or sub-group loyalty).
Group membership becomes part of individual identities; party identification becomes part of selfidentity. Therefore, we do not treat it as a possible reaction to dissatisfaction, but as a factor
influencing the choice between the possible reactions (see below).
The range of possible reactions to dissatisfaction has also been debated heavily. Hirschman’s model
presents a binary choice between voice and exit (or fight vs. flight). According to Barry, there is a first
choice between exit and stay, and a second choice between voice and silence in both situations,
broadening the model to 4 possibilities (exit & voice, exit & silence, stay & voice, stay & silence).
Rusbult et al. (1988) propose to differentiate constructive and destructive reactions, which we think
cannot apply to exit because exit already destroys the relationship with the organization. Dowding et
al. (2000) add another nuance when they distinguish individual and collective reactions, which is
crucial for purposive and collective organizations such as parties.
To apply typologies of reactions to dissatisfaction to party organizations allows grasping dynamics in
party life. It shifts the research away from the analysis of the intensity of intra-party participation,
and brings it closer to the study of the nature of participation and the variety of intra-party
behaviours.
A first type of response to dissatisfaction would be to exit the organization, according to Barry’s
revision of Hirschman’s model. Applied to political parties, the choice to exit is binary:
1. Exit & voice: the individual (or a sub-group) breaks the relationship and retreat from the
authority in a vociferous manner. It is combined with attempts to convince others, with
confrontation with the leaders, etc. Examples of individual type of vociferous exit are party
9
officials resigning in protest, or an ordinary member exiting a local meeting with angry
comments, slamming the door. Vociferous collective exit can be associated to party scission,
when a sub-group decide to leave the party.
2. Exit & silence: the individual (or a sub-group) breaks the relationship quietly. Kolarska &
Aldrich (1980) emphasized that this reaction might have contradictory consequences, since
the reason for exit may remain undetected for some time, the discontent will not spread and
it will delay mass exit. Examples of individual quiet exit are party members who do not renew
their membership, party officials who retire from politics. Collective exits are by definition
more noticeable, and we find it difficult for it to be quiet.
The choice to stay in the organization paves the way to a variety to reactions or forms of intra-party
behaviours. We argue that stay can be associated with 4 different types of behaviour, along a
voice/silence and constructive/destructive classification:
Table 2. Typology of intra-party responses to dissatisfaction
Voice
Silence
Constructive Stewardship Resignation
Destructive
Sabotage
Neglect
1. Stewardship: the individual (or a sub-group) decides to voice dissatisfaction to improve the
relationship and suppress discontent. Bajoit associates this behaviour to a mix of conviction
and vigilance. In a party organization, stewards would for example make suggestions,
develop argumentation, participate to the decision-making process, use principled dissent,
etc. (Gorden 1988: 285).
2. Sabotage: the individual (or a sub-group) decides to use voice to destruct. To distinguish it
clearly from stewardship, we have to look at the content of the behaviour, and not at the
intention of the actor. Sabotage would therefore include complaining to other members,
duplicitous behaviour, verbal aggression, bad-mouthing, etc.
Laver (1976) associates collective voice to consumer associations; Spencer (1986), to unions. They
both consider collective voice as channels of expressions, voice amplifiers, which would reduce (or
delay) exit but could also lead to heating up if the organization does not correct the decline. In a
political party, collective voice can be related to factions and factionalism (Close, 2011).
10
Voice can be expressed horizontally (among equals at the local level) or vertically (talking to
superiors or party leaders), and expressed inside party channels or outside the party.
3. Resignation: the individual (or a sub-group) decides to endure and accept the situation
passively until things improve. It entails tolerance, patience and faith (Graham & Keeley 194).
In an organization, it translates into behaviours such as attentive listening, quiet support,
unobtrusive compliance (self-censorship) and cooperation (Gorden 1988: 285) Gorden
underlines that too much esprit de corps/teamness might have negative consequences for
organizations. ‘Groupthink’ can favour cover-ups or loss of individual critical thinking.
Hirschman stresses out the necessary balance between voice and silence in an organization.
Resignation would moderate the effects of voice (stewardship or sabotage), but it should not
be too strong for it would lead to degradation (Farrell, 1983).
4. Neglect: the individual (or a sub-group) decides to wait until things fall apart (Rusbult et al,
1983). In an organization, it translates into behaviours such as absenteeism, virtual
withdrawal, calculated silence, or apathy. It can be summarized by considerations like “I just
work here” (Gorden 1988: 285).
These various reactions can succeed or precede each other in time (sequential), or be combined and
co-occur (Laver, 1976: 469; Withey & Cooper, 1989). They are certainly not mutually exclusive
(Dowding et al., 2000: 491).
We do not claim that these types of behaviours are the only options in a party. For example, there
are behaviours associated with satisfaction that could be investigated further: compliance,
dependability, cooperation, etc. (Bateman & Organ, 1983). We argue that these are possible
responses to a perception of decline in quality. The notion of perception is crucial because decline
can go unnoticed, due to inattention, selective perception or total blindness (cult and diminished
sense of individuality - Graham & Keeley: 194). If unnoticed, there is no dissatisfaction, and therefore
no reaction to it. The stay is not associated to a conscious decision.
Factors explaining the choice between alternative reactions
In some cases, when dissatisfied, individuals have no choice between various options. Bajoit takes
the example of some regimes with a high level of control. In these contexts, stay & voice is not an
option and the only possible reactions are exile or stay & silence (Bajoit, 1988: 334). Apart from these
extreme cases, individuals make a choice between various behaviours. The factors affecting the
choice of individuals are a fascinating ground for new research. It would help to better understand
the intra-party dynamics and the choices that party members make. It would shed light on the
11
dynamics that lead to membership renewal or exits, and add empirical flesh to hypotheses about
membership decline.
The literature emphasizes different factors that could affect the choice of individuals. These factors
are related to the context (macro level), the type of organization (meso level), and the characteristics
of the individual (micro level). Indeed, the choice of behaviour is the result of two forces: push and
pull (Withey & Cooper, 1989).
Macro level factors
One major factor is emphasized in the literature as a factor diminishing the probability to stay when
dissatisfied: the existence of attractive alternatives (Whitey & Cooper: 523-524). Bajoit stresses that
if exit is easy, stay will less be considered. In other words, monopoly favours stay, and competition
tends to favour defection.
In the case of party organizations, multiparty systems would favour exit whereas dominant party
systems tend to favour stay, because exit is difficult and protest inefficient or repressed. This
hypothesis has been suggested to explain why we find more misfit members in the Canadian parties
than in Belgian parties: the alternative options are more numerous in the Belgian case, and
dissatisfied members would therefore find it easier to exit the party. Members who feel at odds with
their party have more alternative options than in the Canadian context, where dissatisfied members
do not have alternative options. It could explain why they decide to stay (van Haute & Carty, 2011).
There would be less dissatisfied members in multiparty systems.
Meso level factors
The choice of individuals’ reactions to dissatisfaction is also influenced by the type of organization
they belong to. Some characteristics of the organization can affect the decision to exit or stay:
1. The goal of the organization: Political or ideological organizations would favour stay, whereas
firms or businesses would face more exits in case of dissatisfaction.
2. The accessibility: The openness of the organization to dialectic, and the existence of channels
of communication (Gorden, 1988: 293) enhance the probability to stay. If dissatisfaction can
be heard through formal, legitimate mechanisms (grievance procedures, etc. – Mayes &
Ganster, 1988; Spencer, 1988), the probability of exit would be lower. However, the
existence of channels of communication is not enough. Individuals must perceive the
effectiveness of the existing voice mechanisms (Spencer, 1988) – see micro level factor
below.
12
3. The fear of retaliation: The fear that intervention would make things worse (reprisals,
repression, retaliation) favours exit over stay (Birch, 1975: 75).
Some features of the organization affect the decision to voice dissatisfaction or remain silent:
1. The expected reaction of the leaders / responsiveness of the organization: An authoritarian
leader or obedience-oriented organization will provoke stay & silence or exit & silence; a
more understanding boss or participationist organization will provoke stay & voice.
2. The hierarchical structure of the organization: centralized organizations will favour silence,
whereas decentralized organizations will favour voice.
3. The localization of expertise: if expertise is in the hand of the leadership as regard the cause
of dissatisfaction, it favours silence over voice.
4. The possibility of social or geographical mobility: low mobility favours protest.
In the case of party organizations, it would be very interesting to test the impact of the type of
organization on the members’ behaviours, especially when they face dissatisfaction. It would give
evidence to support the cartel thesis by empirically linking a specific type of party organization to
specific reactions to dissatisfaction, among which exit. We could test if certain types of organizations,
such as cartellized parties, favour exit over stay. We could thereby explain declining party
membership figures.
Micro level factors
In Hirschman’s model, the individual’s choice between various types of behaviours is above all an
economic decision, or a costs-benefits calculation (Whitey & Cooper, 1989: 523-524). Individuals
would weights de benefits and costs of the alternatives (stay or exit):
1. The benefits from stay: individuals weight the potential value of improvement
2. The benefits from exit: individuals calculate the value of the best alternative (the direct gains
from exit, but also the expected gains over time
3. The costs of stay: individuals take into account the costs of stay, such as the efforts required,
the likelihood of punishment, or the possibility of improvement
4. The costs of exit: individuals weight the potential costs of exit, such as the direct switching
costs (sanctions and costs of confrontation, loss of income or benefits, blocked
opportunities), but also the indirect costs of exit such as sunk costs (loss of skill specificity,
13
loss of investment, emotional strain, loss of position and privileges/reputation, loss of social
network and connections, loss of ease, sense of failure). The costs of exit are related to the
cost of entry in the group: the higher the costs of entry in the group (ex.: closed groups such
as cults), the higher the costs of exit. One can therefore expect that more discontent is
needed before exit, but that the reaction will be more violent and quick. The costs of exit are
also related to the embeddedness of the individual in the organization: the more embedded
in the group (ex.: spouse in the party), the higher the costs of exit.
In other words, people would stay only if the value of a given probability of a given improvement is
higher than the value of the best alternative minus the costs of exit plus the cost of exercising voice.
According to Barry (1974: 92), stay is “rarely an option that a rational person would choose”,
especially staying to claim a general increase in quality (stewardship). The logic behind is the same as
in the collective action problem: individual voice is not free, whereas the expected benefits are public
and collective. The paradox is that people do stay & voice (Laver, 1976: 464). Therefore, voice will
only be rational if people are seeking for individual benefits (selective improvement), such as
selective material improvement, process improvement, or ideological improvement. However, Barry
also recognizes that sometimes people want to exercise voice irrespective of the calculations. It’s a
“consumer crusade”, where voice can be regarded as a form of life in some collectivity (collective
improvement).
The rational approach can be complemented with social psychological literature, which can explain
the relationship between attitudes and behaviours. A first social psychological factor that can help to
overcome the paradox is loyalty (expressive factor in Whiteley & Seyd’s model). Barry argues that
loyalty is an ‘ad hoc equation filler’ and a post hoc explanation of why people decide to exit or not,
logically redundant. Birch’s attack regards the nature of the concept. Hirschman argues that the
higher the level of loyalty, the higher the probability to voice rather than exit. Birch contests that
loyalty favours voice. He links loyalty to allegiance, fidelity or attachment, and therefore to someone
who accepts the leaders’ decisions rather than someone who would criticize them constantly.
According to Birch, “a critic is necessarily disloyal” (1975: 75). We agree with Birch as well as Laver
(1976: 479) when he states that “what is clear is that Loyalty is associated with Stay”. Loyalty would
explain why some people make the irrational decision to stay in an organization, even when this
organization offers declining quality and unsatisfactory performances. According to Birch, strong
loyalty diminishes the probability to exit, but also the probability to voice when staying in the
organization. More specifically, a strong identification with the project (brand loyalty) makes
individuals psychologically resistant to change, and blind to alternatives. They do not see attractive
alternatives and think they have nowhere to exit. A strong identification with the organization (group
14
loyalty) increases the costs of exit. Both types of loyalty make it difficult to exit and explain
individuals sometimes fail to act as utility maximizers, and why dissatisfied individuals can make to
choice to stay in the organization.
A second class of social psychological factors is linked to the expectations-values-norms model
(Finkel, Muller & Opp, 1979), where behaviours are understood as the result of expected benefits and
social norms. Expected benefits (likely success of the action) lie outside the rational choice model
since it emphasizes the cognitive calculations guiding action. The expected benefits are relates to
prior satisfaction (indicator that recovery is possible, probability of improvement) and the locus of
control or sense of efficacy (Whitey & Cooper: 523-524; Dowding et al., 2000: 476).
A third class of social psychological factors are personality traits and individual competences. The
literature distinguishes optimistic and pessimistic traits. Optimists would have confidence in the
organization, and therefore stay, whereas pessimists would exit (Laver, 1976). In the same way,
individuals with critical analysis and innovative thinking would choose voice over silence, whereas
individuals characterized by high levels of trust and patience would choose silence over voice.
Finally, the nature of dissatisfaction affects the reaction. The higher the importance and the breadth
of the problem, the higher the probability of voice over silence (Withey & Cooper, 1989: 523-525).
The time horizon has also an impact on the reaction. If individuals face a long-term problem, they
would tend to favour voice over silence. Conversely, a short-term problem has a higher probability to
generate silence (Graham & Keeley 1988).
Conclusion
Literature on party membership focuses on the question of who joins parties and why. This paper has
shown that it leads to major weaknesses in our capacity to understand the relationship between
individuals and their organization. Consequently, it recommends to combine theories rooted in social
psychology and studies of organizations rooted in labour economics and management. The paper
uses Hirschman’s model on exit, voice, and loyalty to suggest new avenues for research on party
organizations and party membership.
A first avenue for research lies in the measuring and understanding of dissatisfaction among party
membership. Parties are not homogeneous entities and one can assume the choices and decisions
made do not always please the grassroots. However, we know very little about this phenomenon, its
origins, its facets and its consequences for party organizations. The paper suggests ideas to measure
(dis)satisfaction, as well as explanatory hypotheses to test.
15
A second avenue for research consists of investigating the nature of intra-party dynamics rather than
the intensity of participation. We know that party members are not all active and participating.
Whiteley & Seyd (1998) have shown that between 1990 and 1994, in the average month, “the mean
number of hours worked in the case of Labour fell from 1.96 to 1.89, and the mean number of hours
for the Conservatives from 1.44 to 1.40”. What we do not know is what kind of behaviour party
members adopt when engaging in party activities. However, we argue that this is crucial if we want
to understand intra-party dynamics and their consequences for party organizations.
Thirdly, the paper suggests developing explanatory models of behavioural choices. Individuals face
various options when dissatisfied with the party organization. We argue that research has to be
performed so as to better grasp what triggers the individuals’ decision in favour of one form of
behaviour above the others. This is crucial in order to understand why some members stay whereas
others leave the party. It can provide empirical contributions to the theories of membership decline.
Finally, the paper has shown that the existing literature does not allow tackling the question of intraparty processes and dynamics. This is mainly due to the method used so far to study party
membership. Data has been predominantly collected via cross-sectional surveys. Previous research in
other fields has shown that longitudinal (panel) surveys and experimental studies contribute in a
more significant way to our knowledge of dynamics and processes.
If we want to go beyond the traditional questions of who joins and why, we have to investigate the
relation between members and their party. Relations are dynamic and necessitate monitoring how
the relation evolves over time in order to understand the processes through which members decide
to renew their membership or leave the party.
16
References
Bajoit G. (1988) ‘Exit, Voice, Loyalty… and Apathy: Les réactions individuelles au mécontentement,
Revue française de sociologie, 29/2: 325-345.
Barry B. (1974) ‘Review Article: ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’, British Journal of Political Science, 4/1 : 79107.
Bateman T.S. & Organ D.W. (1983) ‘Job Satisfaction and the Good Soldier: The Relationship between
Affect and Employee ‘Citizenship’, The Academy of Management Journal, 26/4: 587-595.
Biemer P.P. et al. (2004) Measurement Errors in Surveys, Hoboken, Wiley.
Birch A.H. (1975) ‘Economic Models in Political Science: The Case of ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’’, British
Journal of Political Science, 5/1: 69-82.
Boroff K.E. & Lewin D. (1997) ‘Loylaty, Voice, and Intent to Exit a Union Firm: A Conceptual and
Empirical Analysis’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 51/1: 50-63.
Clark W.R. et al. (2006) ‘Power and Politics: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Revisited’, paper presented at the
2006 Annual Meeting of the APSA, Philadelphia.
Close C. (2011) ‘Le factionnalisme partisan: imbrication ou concurrence des loyautés?’, paper
presented at the 4ème Congrès international des associations francophones de science politique,
Brussels.
Colomer J.M. (2000) ‘Exit, Voice, and Hostility in Cuba’, International Migration Review, 34/2: 423442.
Dalton R.J. & Wattenberg M.P. (eds) (2000) Parties Without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced
Industrial Democracies, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Dowding K. et al. (2000) ‘Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirical developments’, European
Journal of Political Research, 37: 469-495.
Downs A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper.
Eubank W.L., Gangopadahay A. & Weinberg L.B. (1996) ‘Italian communism in crisis: A study in exit,
voice and loyalty’, Party Politics 2: 55–75.
Farrell D. (1983) ‘Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect as Responses to Job Dissatisfaction: A
Multidimensional Scaling Study’, Academy of Management Journal, 26/4: 596-607.
17
Finkel S.E., Muller E.N. & Opp K.D. (1989) ‘Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass
Political Action’, American Political Science Review, 83/3: 885-902.
Gehlbach S. (2006) ‘A Formal Model of Exit and Voice’, Rationality and Society, 18/4: 395-418.
Gorden W.I. (1988) ‘Range of Employee Voice’, Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, ¼: 283299.
Graham J.W. & Keeley M. (1992) ‘Hirschman’s Loyalty Construct’, Employee Responsibilities and
Rights Journal, 5/3: 191-200.
Heidar K. (2007) ‘What would be nice to know about party members in European democracies?’,
Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki.
Hirschman A. (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
States, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Hirschman A. (1993) ‘Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in
Conceptual History’, World Politics, 45: 173–202.
Katz R.S. & Mair P. (1995) ‘Changing Models of Party Organizations and Party Democracy: The
Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, 1/ 1: 5-28.
Kato J. (1998) ‘When the party breaks up: Exit and voice among Japanese legislators’, American
Political Science Review, 92: 857–870.
Kolarska L. & Aldrich H. (1980) ‘Exit, Voice, and Silence: Consumers’ and Managers’ Responses to
Organizational Decline’, Organization Studies, 1/1: 41-58.
Langston J. (2002) ‘Breaking Out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico’s One-Party
Hegemonic Regime’, Latin American Politics and Society, 44/3: 61-88.
Laver M. (1976) ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’ Revisited: The Strategic Production and Consumption of
Public and Private Goods, British Journal of Political Science, 6: 463-482.
Lee W.-C. (1972) ‘Read my lips or watch my feet: The state and Chinese dissident intellectuals’,
Daedalus, 101: 35–70.
May J. (1973) ‘Opinion Structure of Political Parties: The Special Law of curvilinear Disparity’, Political
Studies, 21: 135-151.
18
Mayes B.T. & Ganster D.C. (1988) ‘Exit and Voice: A Test of Hypotheses Based on Fight/Flight
Responses to Job Stress’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 9/3: 199-216.
O’Donnell G. (1986) ‘On the fruitful convergence of Hirschman’s exit, voice and loyalty and shifting
involvements: Reflections from the recent Argentine experience’. In: A. Foxley, M. McPherson & G.
O’Donnell (eds), Development, Democracy and the Art of Trespassing: Essays in Honor of Albert
Hirschman, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Press.
Olson M. (1965) The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups, Cambridge, MA,
Harvard University Press.
Pfaff S. & Kim H. (2003) ‘Exit-Voice Dynamics in Collective Action: An Analysis of Emigration and
Protest in the East German Revolution’, American Journal of Sociology, 109/2: 401-444.
Reiter H.L. (2006) ‘The Study of Political Parties, 1906-2005: The View from the journals’, American
Political Science Review, 100/4: 613-618.
Ross M.H. (1988) ‘Political organization and political participation: Exit, voice and loyalty in
preindustrial societies’, Comparative Politics, 21: 73–89.
Rusbult C.E. & Zembrodt I.M. (1983) ‘Responses to Dissatisfaction in Romantic Involvements: A
Multidimensional Scaling Analysis’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19: 274-293.
Rusbult C.E. et al. (1988) ‘Impact of Exchange Variables on Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect: An
Integrative Model of Responses to Declining Job Satisfaction’, The Academy of Management Journal,
31/3: 599-627.
Salucci L. (2008) ‘Left No More: Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Dissolution of a Party’, paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, Boston.
Scott R.J. (1986) ‘Dismantling repressive systems: The abolition of slavery in Cuba as a case Study’. In:
A. Foxley, M. McPherson & G. O’Donnell (eds), Development, democracy and the art of trespassing:
Essays in honor of Albert Hirschman, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Press.
Seyd P. & Whiteley P. (1992) Labour’s Grassroots. The Politics of Party Membership, Palgrave,
Macmillan.
Singh J. (1990) ‘Voice, Exit, and Negative Word-of-Mouth Behaviors: An Investigation Across Three
Service Categories, Journal of Academy of Marketing Science, 18/1: 1-15.
19
Spencer D.G. (1986) ‘Employee Voice and Employee Retention’, The Academy of Management
Journal,29/3: 488-502.
Van Haute E. (2009) Adhérer à un parti. Aux sources de la participation politique, Brussels, Editions de
l’Université de Bruxelles.
Van Haute E. (2009) ‘Party Membership and Discontent’, paper presented at the 81st Canadian
Political Science Annual Conference, Ottawa.
Van Haute E. & Carty R.K. (2011) ‘ideological misfits: A distinctive class of party members’, Party
Politics, forthcoming.
Verba S., Nie N.H. & Kim J. (1978) Participation and political Equality: a seven-nation comparison,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Weber T. (2009) ‘Exit, Voice, and Cyclicality: A Micro-Logic of Voting Behaviour in European
Parliament Elections’, paper presented at the 2009 EUSA Conference, Los Angeles.
Whiteley P., Seyd P. & Richardson J. (1994) True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party
Membership, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Whiteley P. & Seyd P. (1996) ‘Rationality and Party Activism: Encompassing tests of Alternative
Models of Political Participation’, European Journal of Political Research, 29/2: 215-234.
Whiteley P. & Seyd P. (1998) ‘The dynamics of party activism in Britain: a spiral of demobilization?’
British Journal of Political Science, 28: 113-137.
Whiteley P. & Seyd P. (2002) High Intensity Participation. The Dynamics of Party Activism in Britain,
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
Whitey M.J. & Cooper W.H. (1989) ‘Predicting Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect’, Administrative
Science Quarterly, 34/4: 521-539.
20