Blowout BP Gulf of Mexico
The Dutch Hurricane Proof Solution
Registered at Horizon Support and BP
#BPCC-29893
Well MC 252 #1
Teamleader: Dick Swart
16-02-2011
Presentation to the Petroleum Geologische Kring
Meeting at TNO facility Utrecht
Hurricane proof Dutch solution
team
• Dick Swart
– International drilling expert / teamleader
• Willem Heijnen
– International production/well technology expert
• Professor Ruud van der Hoorn
– Centre for Advanced Technical Solutions
• Wouter Schiferli
– TNO Oil & Gas division
– Flow & pressure calculations
• Arie Vliegenthart
– Swellable packer expert
Presentation
•
•
•
•
•
What happened and what went wrong
The Dutch Hurricane Proof Solution
The BP solution
Findings and lessons learned
Impact to the industry
What happened
• Drilling had been completed
– Well was to be closed and temporarily abandoned
– Production can restart once production platform arrives
• Riser mud displaced to sea water
– Normally only done after second cement plug is set
– Decrease in bottom hole pressure (ca. 250bar)
– Influx of reservoir fluid (oil+gas)
• Failure of BOP’s to close in well
• Ignition and following explosion
– 11 fatalities
– Drilling platform burned for 2 days and sank
• Oil spill > 60 – 80,000 barrels/day
What happened
Explosion
20 April
21.56 hrs
Rig sunk 22nd of April 10.21 CSTam
Contributing factors
• Effectiveness of well barriers not ensured
• Mud displaced to seawater
– Caused 250 bar pressure drop, mud barrier ineffective
– Normally not done without first placing additional barrier (plug)
– 300bbls Kick not detected on surface whiles drill pipe pressure was
reported rising.
• Well barriers failed, either:
– Bottom cement plug, and/or
– Wellhead seal
• BOP shear ram did not close
–
–
–
–
Coupling or high strength drillpipe between rams?
Raised 9 7/8”casing?
Hydraulic leak?
Hydrate forming in BOP stack
Some accusations…
Preliminary results from investigating committees
• Behind schedule 5 weeks
– Corners cut to improve speed & lower cost
• Not repairing BOP hydraulic leak (12-48 hrs)
• Cementation (BP/Halliburton)
– Insufficient centralizer placement
– No Cement Bond Log (CBL)
(10 hrs)
(12 hrs)
• Mud (BP/Transocean)
– Not circulating ‘bottoms up’
(12 hrs)
• Well design (BP)
– Single full production string
– Rejected option:
($10 million)
• Two stage production string with liner hanger and tieback
• No lock down Casing hanger (BP/Transocean)
– No lockdown sleeve installed
– Reduces effectiveness of wellhead seals
Who did (not do) what?
• BP
– Cutting corners in design, operations, supervision
and management
• Halliburton/BP
– Performed cement job in contrast to own guidelines
– Bad quality
• Transocean/BP
– Inability to detect 300bbl kick timely and react properly
– Not closing in well (wrong equipment between shear rams or other
causes)
• MMS
– Did (not dis)approve well design
• US Government
– Reduced the MMS budget and control options
Initial Cause of Blowout bad
cement job or ?
Hurricane Proof Dutch solution
(Short term 4-8 weeks)
• Stop drilling the relief wells immediately, because cratering
possibilities (BP will intersect above cap rock)
• Oil& Gas tight connection to Horizon BOP stack
– LMRP cap riser stump or flange connection
– Swellable seals or flange connection or combination
• Tie in to nearby infrastructure
– Connection to eg Na Kika pipe line (@ ca. 5miles)
– Flow MC 252 well to Na Kika pipe line with 80,000bbl/day minimum
capacity
– System Hurricane proof i.s.o. disconnect and tie back systems with 14
days unrestricted maximum oilflow again
Hurricane Proof Dutch solution
(Long term6-12 month)
• Drill reservoir production wells
– 4 highly inclined wells in circle around flowing well
– Reduce pressure on the reservoir
• Production from reservoir through 4 wells via newly to be
installed subsea infrastructure
– Stop flow in uncontrollable well after a certain
production period by
• Killing well with relief well(s)
– Plug and abandon well MC 252 and recover Horizon
BOP stack
Advantages of the Dutch solution
• Oil could be produced and sold.
• Ample time to investigate/repair and recover
• No need for further quick fixes such as top kill’s, junk
kill’s, intersection above the cap rock
Disadvantages of the Dutch solution
• Cost money, had to pay NaKika for production loss
• Not invented by Us
• Would not show that one worked on the spill
The BP Solution
• Start the PR, allowing the media to observe the seafloor, open up
a response centre allowing people to contribute, hiring local
people to clean-up the beaches etc…
• Cap the well asap to stop the spill
• Use detergent to prevent the spill to come on shore
• Kill the well asap to enable removal of the BOP demonstrating the
well is dead and no longer dangerous.
Is the situation now OK ?
• The well is killed using a top kill and not a bottom kill
• There is no data available regarding the well bore condition in
the cap rock, hence erosion
• There is no data available showing that the cap rock is sealed
INTERNAL BLOWOUT SCENARIO ?
BOP
BP Top Kill Scenario
• BOP was closed
• The well was killed
• Well was intercepted above the cap
rock
• Cement was pumped from the top
and has sealed the well
Relief
Well
Frack’s ?
Cap Rock
Reservoir
150 bar
No evidence that:
• The cement did enter the cap rock
annulus
• There is sufficient cement to withstand
the 150 bar pressure differential.
• The overburdon is not fracked.
BP 8 Findings
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the
hydrocarbons.
The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
The negative-pressure test was accepted although well
integrity had not been established.
Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the
riser.
Well control response actions failed to regain control of the
well.
Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting
onto the rig.
The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon
ignition.
The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.
Government Findings
Lessons learned
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
MMS was lacking control due to industry pressure
Safety culture is lacking
Equipment might not be suitable for deep water
No emergency response plans and adequate equipment
Risk assessments are lacking and/or inadequate
Recommendations in the USA
divided in caragory A-G
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Improving the safety of offshore operations
Safeguarding the Environment
Strengthening Oil Spill Response, Planning and Capacity
Advancing Well-Containment Capabilities
Overcoming the Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Spill and
Restoring the Gulf
Ensuring Financial Responsibility
Promoting Congressional Engagement to Ensure Responsible
Offshore Drilling
The total recommendation section of the report to Obama is 40
pages……
BP Blowout Consequences
for the Dutch industry
This results in more inspections, more documentation, more evidence for
performance which includes even the drilling of geothermal wells.
QUESTIONS
• Why was the Dutch help not accepted and implemented ?
• Why was a bullhead cementation performed instead of
circulating cement as usual ?
• Why was the relief well not drilled into the reservoir ?
• Why was the second relief well not used ?
• etc………..
Backup viewgraphs
New LMR Cap
with 18” pipeline
tieback and 3ea
10” bypass valves
Clamping tool or
Flange connection
STEP 1
Hang new LMR
cap with 18”
diverless
connector and
3ea 10”
bypass valves
close to MC 252
well
Remove old LMR
Cap
STEP 2
Install LMR Cap
with all valves
open on the
riser stump
or flange
STEP 3
Tie in MC252
into PLET to
Na Kika pipeline
STEP 4
Presently installed subsea
methanol system to be used
Pipe heating to be investigated
If necessary
3 ea 10” bypass valves
can be used for floating
Production systems
as backup
Open valves
to Na Kika
pipeline
close 3 ea 10”
valves 1 by 1
remove Drilstring
RESULT :
A HURRICANE
PROOF
SYSTEM
Picture taken of removed riser bottom by ROV
2 pieces of 5 ½” drill pipe sticking up inside riserstump
If the inside of the 9 7/8”casing would have been clean than the Drill Pipe should have fallen to bottom or blown out of the well
9 7/8”casing hydrauliced out of casing hanger by 250 bar pressure difference when displacing mud with seawater and/or
temperature expansion with slip &seal assembly not locked
2 pieces, because of chainsaw cut and one because of final shear, is our assessment, on what is pipe resting????
We assume on crushed casing by the shearrams
All rams do not function with hotline on seabed, technical failure or other obstructions inside the Horizon BOP stack?
Ongoing containment activities
Picture
Slide 16
Partly failed, had to cut with shears