• Do a SWOT Analysis for CSUB
• Combine 2 elements from your list above and devise 1 potential strategy
92 Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5

Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 93

5.1
SWOT Analysis
Internal Environment
• Strengths
• Weaknesses
External Environment
• Opportunities
• Threats
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 94

5.4
TOWS Matrix (Fig. 5.2)
EXTERNAL
FACTORS
(EFAS)
INTERNAL
FACTORS
(IFAS)
Strengths (S)
List 5 – 10 internal strengths here
Opportunities (O)
List 5 – 10 external opportunities here
Weaknesses (W)
List 5 – 10 internal weaknesses here
SO Strategies
Generate strategies here that use strengths to take advantage of opportunities
WO Strategies
Generate strategies here that take advantage of opportunities by overcoming weaknesses
Threats (T)
List 5 – 10 external threats here
ST Strategies
Generate strategies here that use strengths to avoid threats
WT Strategies
Generate strategies here that minimize weaknesses and avoid threats
Source: Adapted from Long-Range Planning, April 1982, H. Weihrich, “The TOWS Matrix—A Tool for Situational Analysis” p. 60. Copyright 1982, with kind permission from H. Weihrich and Elsevier Science Ltd. The Boulevard, Langford Lane,
Kidlington OX5 1GB, UK.
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 95

Domino’s
Pizza
Weaknesses
- Transient work force
Strengths
- Delivery system
Threats
- Energy blackouts
T & W
Supermarket pizza
T & S
- Mobile ovens
Opportunities
Cell phones
O & W
free employee cell service
(repay if leave before 1 year)
O & S
One-button rapid response “Dom-Fob”
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 96

5.6
Business Strategy Components
• Competitive
• Cooperative
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 97

5.7
Porter’s Generic Competitive Strategies (Fig. 5.4)
Porter’s Generic Competitive Strategies
Competitive Advantage
Lower Cost Differentiation
Cost Leadership Differentiation
Name a firm for each quadrant.
Why are they operating in that quadrant?
Cost Focus Focused
Differentiation
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 98

• Two Game Theorists Win the Nobel Prize for Economics Thomas
Schelling's and Robert Aumann's work sheds light on conflict and cooperation. By Michael Muskal and Ken Ellingwood, Times Staff Writers
• An American and an American Israeli were awarded the Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economic Sciences on Monday for fostering the understanding of conflict and cooperation — in matters such as nuclear arms races, trade battles or price wars.
Thomas C. Schelling, 84, an emeritus professor at the University of
Maryland and Harvard University, and Robert J. Aumann, 75, an emeritus professor at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, used "game theory" as a way to explain social, political and business interactions.
Working separately, the pair have "enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis," the Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences said in its prize citation.
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 99

-The act of endeavoring to gain, what another is endeavoring to gain at the same time
Rivalry, for a prize, or as where two or more persons are engaged in the same business and each seeking patronage
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 100

Bonnie
Remain Silent Confess
Al Remain Silent
Confess
1 Year (Al)
1 Year (Bon)
10 Years (Al)
0 Years (Bon)
0 Years (Al)
10 Years (Bon)
6 Years (Al)
6 Years (Bon)
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 101

Tosca Cooperate
Defect
Scarpia
Cooperate
Tosca & Scarpia make love
Tosca’s lover is spared
Defect
Tosca & Scarpia make love
Scarpia has Tosca’s lover killed
Tosca lies & murders Scarpia
Tosca’s lover is spared
Tosca lies & murders
Scarpia
Scarpia has Tosca’s lover killed
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 102

Shadow of the Future
Motor City Lexus
Remain Closed Open Sundays
Barber
Cadillac
Remain
Closed
$500k profit
- $500k profit
Open
Sundays
$600k profit
$300k profit
$300k profit
$600k profit
$400k profit
$400k profit
103 Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5

•Axelrod Experiments
–62 researchers submit for iterated PD game
–Cooperative Tit-for-tat wins
–Cooperate / Reinforce (+, -)
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 104

• Distributive bargaining  fixed-sum pie
• Integrative Bargaining  Multiple issues w/trade offs
105 Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5

Distributive Negotiation
Bargaining Zone
Party A’s aspiration range
Fixed Sum Pie
Party B’s aspiration range
Settlement range
Party A’s target point
Strategy - competition & cooperation
Party B’s resistance point
Party A’s resistance point
Chapter 5
Party B’s target point
106

• Prepare
• Different perceptions
• Don’t make first offer
• Take notes
• Use creativity
• Power of silence
• Be kind and fair
• Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement
(BATNA)
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5.15 Continuum of Strategic Alliances (Figure 5.5)
Mutual Service
Consortia
Joint Venture
Licensing Arrangement
Value-Chain
Partnership
Weak and Distant Strong and Close
Source: Suggested by R. M. Kanter, “Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances,” Harvard Business Review (July-August
1994), pp. 96–108.
Strategy - competition & cooperation Chapter 5 108