China-Latin America relations: a
Comparative Typological approach
Steen Fryba Christensen, presentation at workshop, Nov.
19th 2015:
New Trends in China – Latin America Relations
George Washington University, Elliot School of
International Relations
Sigur Center for Asian Studies
Focus
• China-Latin America relations, interests and aims.
• Two moments: 2004 and 2015
(dynamic research object – issue of change)
• Point of exit is three typologies, all South American
(types of countries), based on three elements. Aim is
China-LA relations broadly. Research in progress.
• Typologies are not theories but a useful way to
organize my/one’s thoughts
Reflecting on approaches to
China-Latin America Relations
• Winners and losers (conjunctural and economic
focus) (mid-2000s).
• Dynamic properties of economic relations: The
danger of ”de-industrialization” for South
American ”winners”.
• Broader approaches: Political economy,
Geopolitics, economy.
A broad approach is suggested:
relations, interests and aims
• A) Economic relations.
B) Geopolitical issues
C) China’s aims, interests and strategies.
D) Latin American aims, interests and
strategies.
• Dynamic analysis comparing two moments –
2004/2015.
My aim
• To analyze: Do China-LA relations,
strategies and aims differ according to LA
country types?
• (The analysis is based on a systemic, historical structural
conception of development and international relations
(Wallerstein; Latin American historical structuralism).
Importance of own strategies for development. Concept
of ”internal-external situations” (Cardoso/Faletto).)
3 Typologies
• Brazil
• Venezuela
• Chile
(Ecuador, Bolivia)
(Colombia, Peru)
Though the typologies are all South American, it is
assumed that this typological approach can be
generally useful in analyzing China-Latin America
relations, interests and aims – through comparison
on the three elements/dimensions.
Typologies are based on 3 elements
• 1. Economic policy orientation.
2. Foreign policy orientation.
3. Development model – economic
(production) structures.
China-Brazil
• 1. Intermediate economic strategy:
Orthodox/Heterodox.
• 2. National autonomy through diversification. Seeks
multipolarity and influence. Based on a critical ”world
vision”. Seeks to change global power balances through
South-South cooperation and coalitions, e.g. with
China: a ”similar country”/Great Peripheral Countries.
• 3. The most diversified economy, but increasingly
natural ressource based. The biggest economy in Latin
America.
China-Venezuela (Ecuador and Bolivia)
• 1. The most heterodox – economic strategy.
Strongly interventionist state.
• 2. National autonomy and multipolarity.
Strongly anti-hegemonic. Anti-US and Antineoliberal.
• 3. ”Mono-cultural” economic model. Neoextractivism.
China-Chile (Peru and Colombia)
• 1. The most orthodox economic strategy.
Liberalism.
• 2. Liberalism. Diversification. Open regionalism +
post-hegemonic regionalism. Emphasis on
economic aspects. Bilateral FTA with US, China
etc – part of TPP.
• 3. An intermediate level of economic
diversification. Natural ressource emphasis.
Other countries (%)
• Can be analyzed with reference to the three elements in
the typologies.
• Mexico and Central America have development models
that differ from South American models in terms of
production structure/specialization.
• Uruguay is a small economy largely based on agricultural
specialization. Paraguay as well, but with a weaker
industrial base than Uruguay.
• Argentina is more diversified than Uruguay and Paraguay –
and is more heterodox in economics and foreign policy.
China-Brazil: Relations, strategies and
aims
• 2004: Brazil initially very enthusiastic about
China’s rise. Global politics – alliances with
”similar countries.” Growing trade and improved
export prices. Helps Brazil stabilize and grow
economically. However, skeptical and critical
attitudes from industrial interest organizations.
• China interested in Brazilian resources (oil, steel,
soy, food) and market. Initially not very interested
in the political dimension due to priority to
relations with the US.
China-Brazil:
Relations, strategies and aims
• 2015: Brazil’s view much like in 2004, although there is now a
greater worry about the North-South pattern of economic
interaction. Not so similar after all. Still a hope that Chinese
investments will be useful, still a hope for better access to Chinese
market for products with higher value added.
• Emphasis on BRICS and South-South, but Brazil may change foreign
policy orientation towards a greater emphasis on Latin America,
Europe and the US. Volatility in export prices to China have revealed
fragility of excessive dependence on ”ressources” and Chinese
market.
• Economic crisis – risks of a ”jump backwards” in terms of economic
model. ”Shared gains”?
China-Brazil:
Relations, strategies and aims
• China 2015: Interests largely revolve around access to
Brazilian natural resources (Soy, Iron) and markets. More
FDI in Brazil related to this. Enhanced focus on the ”winwin” discourse and rhetoric - which is increasingly difficult
to ”sell”.
• China-CELAC – seeking image as a ”friend” of Latin America
that really wants to assure ”win-win”. More focus on SouthSouth coalition – BRICS – as a tool to enhance influence.
This may not be a lasting emhasis. Hegemonic strategy of
influence in all regions and influence through structural
economic power (and diplomacy)/or just focus on
economic interests and aims?
China-Venezuela relations
• 2004: Great enthusiasm in Chávez government (Bolivia and
Ecuador later, though Bolivia less connected to China
economically).
• Autonomy enhancing. China as an opportunity – prices,
trade, investment and common projects. Anti-hegemonic
intention on the side of Venezuela.
• 2015: same situation as in 2004.
• However, development outcomes vary (V/E/B) despite
common experience of volatility of ”ressource/export
prices”. (Own strategies; Venezuela’s use of windfall profits
is less productive than e.g. Bolivia’s)
China-Venezuela relations
• 2004: China’s main interest is oil (mining in Ecuador, too). Rhetoric:
not a challenge to US influence.
• 2015: In practice China’s influence grows due to its growing
economic presence and due to cold bilateral relations between US
and Venezuela. China’s interest remains focused on ”natural
ressources” for import. Much more FDI and financing (V + E
especially). (local conflicts in mining – Ecuador). Win-Win discourse.
Continued financing of V?
• China’s ”support” for and financing of Venezuela (and Ecuador)
more based on economic interests than on ideology. However,
ideology faciliates growing Chinese influence (V, Ec, B).
Particularly Venezuela (but also Ecuador) is increasingly dependent
on China.
China-Venezuela: characteristics of
their mutual relations and aims.
• North-South pattern of economic relations.
• 2015: Issue of growing dependency and risks to
autonomy – Chinese rhetoric: ”Win-Win”.
Different from US (solidarity).
• In reality we can observe a potentially risky
development for Venezuela. It remains to be
seen if Bolivia and Ecuador will be able not to
grow as dependent on China as Venezuela.
China-Chile (Peru and Colombia):
Relations, interests and aims.
• 2004: Chile (Peru and Colombia) very welcoming of China
as a way to diversify and grow the economy + strengthen
autonomy. Emphasis is on economic relations.
• 2015: China has become Chile’s greatest trading partner
and export destination. Chile has not been successful in
attracting Chinese FDI (contrary to Peru and Colombia –
mines in Peru; local conflicts around mining investments Peru).
• Positive developmental outcomes, though volatility in
export prices is also relevant for these countries.
China-Chile (Peru, Colombia):
Relations, interests and aims.
• 2004 and 2015: China interested in copper
imports and in Chilean export market (mining and
oil Peru/Colombia).
• FDI not strategically important for China in Chile
(no oil, copper not particularly open sector).
China interested in mining investment in Peru,
infrastructure in Colombia and Peru.
• Win-win discourse (largely accepted in these
countries).
General for the three typologies
• China’s aims seem to be general in nature: Access to
needed natural resources (main aim) and export
markets. FDI associated with these same aims.
Financing with same aim and potentially also as a way
to assure acceptance of ”win-win” discourse.
• Interest in influence and a good image largely
associated with the economic aims described.
Potentially also connected to geopolitical ambition of
growing influence in all world regions (hegemony?)
Other countries (%)
• Mexico: China mainly seen as a threat (from
competition in Mexican and Third Markets (US).
• Central America: Same as Mexico – though some
individual differences appear. Costa Rica –
particularly close relationship. Nicaragua – canal
project. Relevance of Taiwan/One China policy?
• Argentina: Hit by volatility; FDI interest.
• Uruguay and Paraguay same type of relations, but
more successful in development terms than other
Atlantic South American countries.
Conclusions and Synthesis:
China-Latin America Relations
• Relations between China and Latin America have
gone from being rather insignificant some 15
years ago to being very significant now for almost
all of Latin America.
• Economic relations follow a North-South pattern
today. Trade composition/capital exports (FDI
and lending). Shared gains? Or are we rather
seeing growing dependency and cementation of
ressource-based models of development?
Degree of Chinese interest/relations
with Latin American countries
• Especially strong relations with a few countries – 5-6:
Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela (Mexico).
• General interest in natural ressource imports, export
markets (investment opportunities, FDI and financing –
typically connected to same interest).
• Interest in a good image across the board.
• 1.Main interest is economic.
• 2. Influence: One China (Taiwan) and geopolitical
competition with the US?
Conclusions and Synthesis:
China-Latin America Relations
• China’s rhetoric regarding its relationship with
Latin America is upbeat. It seeks to create an
image of a country that is different from the
United States and represents an alternative
model for Latin America and the South as a
whole (than the US/North) and neoliberalism:
the ”Win-Win” rhetoric sums up this ”story”.
Conclusions and Synthesis:
China-Latin America Relations
• The rhetoric is however increasingly out of sync with
developments in the Brazil and the Venezuela typologies.
They experience a regression in economic model and
growing financial vulnerability and economic crisis. This
leads to reconsideration (Brazil) and confusion (Venezuela)
and growing China dependency. The Chile typology does
better but experiences the same North-South economic
relationship.
• The rhetoric has not been very convincing in Mexico and
Central America, perhaps with Costa Rica as an exception.
Hopes: Mexico, Nicaragua, others?
Conclusions and Synthesis:
China-Latin America Relations
• China’s real aims are to pursue their core interests in
promoting their economic model dominated by urban
areas and manufacturing production and exports,
moving up the value-chain and going global + at the
same time secure access to needed natural resources,
largely in Africa and in South America.
• The good and friendly image China promotes is meant
for international ”consumption” and the legitimacy of
China’s external relations that would allow the
continued ”economic rise” and, perhaps, the ”political
rise” of China as a superpower and a potential
hegemon/or key economy of the global system:
Return of the ”Middle Kingdom”?/hegemonic power?
Conclusions and Synthesis:
China-Latin America Relations
• Of the three elements in the typologies, the issue
of economic model/production system and
associated social system is the most important
predictor of the national characteristics of ChinaLatin America relations.
• China does not seem particularly concerned with
the economic policy element nor the foreign
policy element of Latin American countries.
Conclusions and synthesis
• Brazil and the Venezuela typology don’t only
focus on the economic dimension, but also
the geopolitical dimension in their way of
relating to China.
• Economic developments and changing
domestic political constellations and
ideas/interpretations may alter the approach
to China.